status generalization in context: the moderating role of groups

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 273–279

www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

Status generalization in context: The moderating role of groups �

Julian Oldmeadow

The University of Exeter, UK

Received 1 February 2005; revised 23 January 2006Available online 23 March 2006

Abstract

Status generalization has been described as a process directly linking social status at the societal level to inXuence in interpersonalinteractions, providing one mechanism through which status inequalities in society are maintained. It is argued in this paper that groupscan moderate status generalization when a status characteristic is non-prototypical of the group. Two experiments are reported that mea-sured the relative inXuence of an older and younger target within diVerent group contexts: an undergraduate student group and a broaderuniversity group. In both experiments, the older target was more inXuential than the younger target in the context of the university group,but the younger target was more inXuential in the context of the undergraduate student group. Findings are discussed in relation to statusgeneralization and referent informational inXuence as separate inXuence processes.© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Status generalization; Social status; Prototypicality; Social inXuence

This paper is concerned with social status within groups,and in particular with a phenomenon that has been studiedextensively by researchers working from the perspective ofstatus characteristics theory (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch,1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Berger,Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Webster & Driskell, 1978).This phenomenon, called status generalization, is the obser-vation that individuals with high social status in society areoften aVorded advantages and inXuence in a wide range ofcontexts, even when there is no obvious reason to assumethat such advantages and inXuence are deserved. Statusgeneralization represents one important process throughwhich the values of society aVect the behaviour of individu-als, reproducing social inequalities in everyday interactions.However, status characteristics theory has largely ignoredthe potential role of the group in moderating the relationship

� The author acknowledges the contribution of the following studentswho assisted in the design and data collection for these studies: DianeGreenwood, Andrew Healy, Alice JeVerson, Katie Lamerton, CatherineLawrence, Kevin Leck, Mark Old, and Verity Thomas. The author wouldalso like to thank Tom Postmes, Thomas Morton, and several anonymousreviewers for valuable comments on earlier drafts.

E-mail address: [email protected]

0022-1031/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.01.008

between society and the individual. Drawing primarily onself-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg,Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), it is argued in thispaper that groups can moderate status generalization,either attenuating or reversing the eVect of status character-istics on inXuence patterns, when a status characteristic isinconsistent with the prototype of a salient ingroup.

Status characteristics theory (Berger et al., 1972, 1977,1980) describes a process, called status generalization,through which individuals with high social status in societyacquire advantages and inXuence in a wide range of taskcontexts, even when there is no previous associationbetween the status characteristic and task performance. Astatus characteristic is any characteristic that is diVeren-tially evaluated in society and associated with speciWc and/or general expectations of competence. The theory pro-poses that characteristics that carry status meanings in soci-ety, such as gender, race, and age, are associated with beliefsabout competence (see also Glick & Fiske, 2001), such thathigh status actors are expected to be more competent thanlow status actors at a wide range of tasks. Importantly,characteristics like gender, race, and age (called diVusestatus characteristics) are argued to produce general as wellas speciWc expectations of competence, and so can aVect

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274 J. Oldmeadow / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 273–279

evaluations and inXuence even when there is no previousassociation between the characteristic and task perfor-mance. Through these beliefs about competence, it isargued, high status in one domain often generalizes toadvantages and inXuence in other, unrelated domains.

Status generalization is an important process, because ithighlights one fundamental aspect of social status: that sta-tus aVords individuals advantages and inXuence that extendbeyond their speciWc competencies (for a similar view seeWashington & Zajac, 2005). However, status characteristicstheory tends to ignore the group level of analysis and thepotential role of the group in moderating the relationshipbetween society and the individual. The theory implies thatany status characteristic that diVerentiates actors in a taskcontext should provide an inXuence advantage to the actorthat has the characteristic most valued by society. However,it is argued in this paper that status generalization may bemoderated by groups, such that in some groups status char-acteristics will not give high status actors an inXuenceadvantage over low status actors, and may even confer adisadvantage.

There are a number of reasons for suggesting thatgroups may moderate status generalization. First, groupsoften hold values that are independent of or counter tothose held by society as a whole. For example, while malesmay hold higher status overall in society, amongst a groupof feminists males may lose their status advantage, even ontasks that are gender-neutral. A more theoretical argumentcomes from self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985;Turner et al., 1987). According to Turner’s (1991; see alsoTurner et al., 1987) theory of referent informational inXu-ence, evaluations of self and others are made against thebackdrop of the least inclusive group to which self and oth-ers belong, and which prescribes the dimensions uponwhich relative value is judged. The group member with themost inXuence and who is the most liked tends to be thegroup member who is most prototypical of the group, whobest represents what the group is about and what is distinc-tive about it (Hogg, 1992; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998;Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Since groups tend tovalue their distinctive traits (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead,1999), those who are most prototypical and most inXuentialin groups are often not those who have the highest status insociety. When interactions take place within a salientingroup, evaluations and inXuence may be more related toactors’ relative prototypicality in the group than to theirrelative status in society.

This self-categorization theory view of inXuence asrelated to group prototypicality sets up a conXict betweenstatus generalization and referent informational inXuencein groups where a status characteristic is non-prototypical(for a similar argument see KalkhoV & Barnum, 2000; Old-meadow, Platow, Foddy, & Anderson, 2003). In suchgroups a given person may possess a characteristic that issimultaneously high status in society and non-prototypicalof the group. Under such conditions status characteristicstheory and self-categorization theory make diVerent

predictions about inXuence. The former predicts the higherstatus actor will be most inXuential, while the latter predictsthe more prototypical actor will be most inXuential. ThisconXict does not arise in group contexts where a salient sta-tus characteristic is positively related to or independent ofgroup prototypicality, or where actors of diVerent statusare equally prototypical of the group.

The current research examined the eVects of a diVuse sta-tus characteristic in two diVerent group contexts: one wherethe high state of the status characteristic was non-prototyp-ical of the salient ingroup, and another where there wasexpected to be no conXict between the status characteristicand group prototypicality. To do this, the current researchexamined age as a source of inXuence within two diVerentgroup contexts: undergraduate students and the universityas a whole. Previous research shows that age functions as astatus characteristic in society (Boyd & Dowd, 1988; Freese& Cohen, 1973), such that older people (up to a point) aretypically viewed as more competent than younger people.However, the undergraduate student group is deWned, inpart, by a speciWc age range, such that those who are signiW-cantly older than the normative age are likely to be seen asatypical group members. In this group context, it was rea-soned that the status meaning of age would conXict withprototypicality as a source of inXuence. In contrast, in thecontext of the university group as a whole, which is notcharacterised by a speciWc age range, it was reasoned therewould be no conXict between age and prototypicality.

Participants were presented with two ingroup targets ofdiVerent ages, under conditions designed to make salienteither the university group or the undergraduate studentgroup. In the Wrst experiment, the degree to which partici-pants were inXuenced by each target in a task to name apub or a lecture theatre was measured. The second experi-ment replicated the design of the Wrst, but group contextwas manipulated independently of the task. In both experi-ments it was hypothesized that the older target would bemore inXuential than the younger target in the context ofthe university group. Here, age as a status characteristicshould not conXict with group prototypicality as a sourceof inXuence, so the predictions of status characteristics the-ory should hold. In the context of the undergraduate stu-dent group, however, age should function to identify theolder target as a peripheral group member, thus attenuatingthe eVect of age as a status characteristic. Hence, followingself-categorization theory it was hypothesized that theyounger target would be more inXuential than the older tar-get in the undergraduate student group context.

Experiment 1

Method

Participants and designForty-Wve male and 75 female students from the Univer-

sity of Exeter participated in the study. The mean age of thesample was 20.5 years (SDD2.9). Participants were

J. Oldmeadow / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 273–279 275

approached in public places around campus by a numberof diVerent experimenters and invited to complete a ques-tionnaire. Eight participants were excluded from data anal-yses because they were sceptical of the cover story, leaving atotal of 112 valid cases.

Participants were asked to evaluate a younger and anolder target in the context of either a university group oran undergraduate student group. Therefore, Experiment 1comprised a 2 (target: young vs. old)£ 2 (group context:university vs. undergraduate students) mixed design, withrepeated measures on the Wrst factor. The primary depen-dent variable was participants’ preference for names sug-gested by each target for either a new student pub or anew university lecture theatre (depending on the groupcondition).

Materials and procedureParticipants were given a questionnaire titled either

‘Name The Pub Competition’ or ‘Name The Lecture The-atre Competition,’ depending on the group condition. TheWrst page explained that the University was running a com-petition to name a new pub [lecture theatre], and that twoWnalists had been chosen. The purpose of the questionnaire,it was stated, was to canvas student opinion [the opinion ofthe university population] to ensure the best name was cho-sen. These two contexts were chosen to manipulate thesalience of the undergraduate student group and the uni-versity group. It was reasoned that the ‘name the pub’ com-petition would be seen to be relevant to undergraduatestudents, while the ‘name the lecture theatre’ competitionwould be seen to be relevant to the university as a whole,thus making these respective groups salient in the diVerentconditions (see Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam,1991).

Below this information were proWles of the two Wnalists,including a black and white photograph of each, theirname, age, and occupation (students). The Wrst Wnalist wasdepicted as a 19-year-old female student, while the secondwas depicted as a 41-year-old female student. Several stu-dent photos, obtained from a US website, were pilot testedamongst 31 undergraduates for their perceived prototypi-cality of the undergraduate student population, and the tworated the most and least prototypical were chosen for use inthe questionnaire. Also included in the proWle was the nameeach Wnalist had ostensibly submitted for the competition.To reduce error variance, several names for pubs and lec-ture theatres were pilot tested amongst a sample of 30undergraduate students, and the two most similarly likednames for each condition were chosen for use in the ques-tionnaire. The pairing of the proposed names with eachcandidate was counterbalanced.

On the next two pages participants answered questionsabout which name they would prefer and how happy theywould be for each name to be chosen. Preference for eithername was assessed by asking participants to tick one of twoboxes. All other ratings were made using 7-point Likert-type scales. Several additional items measured how creative

participants thought each target was1; how relevant theissue was to undergraduates and the university as a whole;and how typical each candidate was of the undergraduatestudent population.

Results

Manipulation checksThere was a signiWcant diVerence in the ratings of the

two targets’ prototypicality, F (1, 110)D 54.10, p < .001,�2D .33, no main eVect of condition, F (1, 110)D2.07,pD .15, �2D .02, and no interaction between target and con-dition, F (1, 110)D .98, pD .32, �2D .01. Participants in bothconditions rated the younger target as more prototypical(MD 5.73, SDD 1.02) than the older target (MD3.31,SDD 3.14). The manipulation of prototypicality appearedto be successful.

To check the manipulation of group context, the per-ceived relevance of the tasks to undergraduates and to theuniversity was assessed using a 2 (group: undergraduatesvs. university)£ 2 (task type: pub vs. lecture theatre compe-tition) ANOVA with repeated measures on the Wrst factor.There was a signiWcant diVerence in the perceived relevanceof the tasks to the groups in the two conditions, as indi-cated by a main eVect of group, F (1, 110)D8.89, pD .004,�2D .07, a main eVect of task type, F (1, 110)D 8.43, pD .004,�2D .07, and a signiWcant interaction between group andtask type, F (1,110)D52.14, p < .001, �2D .32. Simple maineVects analyses revealed that the pub competition was con-sidered more relevant to undergraduate students (MD4.83,SDD 1.30) than to the university as a whole (MD4.33,SDD 1.53), F (1, 110)D9.31, pD .003, �2D .08, and that thelecture theatre competition was considered more relevantto the university as a whole (MD4.41, SDD 1.74) than toundergraduates (MD 3.20, SDD 1.57), F (1, 110)D 50.25,p < .001, �2D .31. Assuming that relevant groups are moresalient than less relevant groups, the manipulation of groupcontext appeared to be successful.

Main analysesTwo measures were included to assess participants’ pref-

erence for the names oVered by the targets. First, partici-pants were asked to choose which name they preferred byticking one of two boxes. Second, participants were askedto indicate how happy they would be for each of the namesto be chosen using 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at allhappy) to 7 (very happy). In the questionnaire, the pairingof the suggested names with each target had been counter-balanced. Therefore, before analysing responses, the itemswere recoded so that responses related to who suggested thename, rather than the name itself.

1 Beliefs about creativity, like belief about competence, are anothermechanism through which status can aVect evaluations and inXuence (seeKasof, 1995). We chose to measure creativity rather than competence be-cause it seemed a more relevant trait in the context of the task.


Participants’ choice of name was analyzed using a �2

test. In the undergraduate group condition, more partici-pants chose the name suggested by the younger target thanthe older target, and in the university group condition,more participants chose the name oVered by the older tar-get than the younger target, �2 (1, ND112)D 5.96, pD .02,dD .47 (see Fig. 1). Separate �2 tests within each conditionshowed that the preference for the younger target in theundergraduate group was signiWcant, �2 (1, ND 58)D4.41,pD .04, whereas the preference for the older target in theuniversity group was not, �2 (1, ND54)D1.85, pD .17.

A repeated measures ANOVA on responses to howhappy participants would be with each name revealed a sig-niWcant main eVect of group context, F (1,110)D4.22,pD .04, �2D .04, and a signiWcant interaction between targetand group context, F (1, 110)D4.84, pD .03, �2D .04 (seeFig. 2). Overall, participants were happier with the namesoVered for the pub (MD4.29) than those oVered for the lec-ture theatre (MD 3.91). More importantly though, partici-pants in the undergraduate group condition indicated thatthey would be happier with the name oVered by the younger

Fig. 1. Number of participants choosing the name oVered by the youngerand older candidates in the undergraduate and university group condi-tions (Experiment 1).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Undergraduate group University group

Fre

qu

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Fig. 2. Ratings of how happy participants would be for each candidates’suggested name to be chosen in the undergraduate and university groupconditions.

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target, while participants in the university group conditionindicated that they would be happier with the name oVeredby the older candidate. Simple main eVects analysesrevealed that the interaction was driven primarily by partic-ipants being happier with the younger target’s suggestion inthe undergraduate group condition (MD 4.53, SDD1.43)than in the university group condition (MD 3.63,SDD1.74), F (1,110)D 9.09, pD .003, while being equallyhappy with the older target’s suggestion in the undergradu-ate group (MD 4.05, SDD 1.65) and university group(MD4.19, SDD1.55) conditions, F < 1. The diVerencesbetween targets within each group context were not signiW-cant (university group: F (1, 110)D2.67, pD .11; undergrad-uate group: F (1, 110)D2.17, pD .14).

Creativity ratingsTo explore the mechanism underlying participants’ pref-

erences, ratings of the creativity of the targets were exam-ined, again using repeated measures ANOVA. There was amain eVect of target, F (1, 110)D19.90, p < .001, �2D .15, nomain eVect of group context, F (1, 110)D1.80, pD .18,�2D .02, and no interaction between target and group con-text, F (1, 110)D .02, pD .89, �2 < .001. The younger targetwas rated as more creative (MD4.35, SDD 1.58) than theolder target (MD3.64, SDD 1.24) in both group contexts.

Discussion

Experiment 1 provides good support for the hypotheses.On both the binary choice measure and ratings of happinesswith each name, participants’ preferences for the names sug-gested by the targets diVered across the two group contexts.Since the names suggested by each target were counterbal-anced, these results reXect inXuence from the targets ratherthan preferences for the names themselves, and so must beinterpreted in terms of the characteristics of the targets andtheir meaning within the group contexts.

It was reasoned that the inXuence of the targets mightbe related to perceptions of their creativity, and that theseperceptions may be moderated by group context. How-ever, the younger target was rated as more creative thanthe older target in both conditions. This Wnding is in linewith earlier work showing that older people are stereotyp-ically less innovative, Xexible, and open-minded thanyounger people (see Kasof, 1995), and suggests that suchstereotypes may be robust, at least within this (young)university population. Whatever meaning age took withinthe diVerent group contexts, it was apparently not relatedto creativity.

Despite clear support for the hypotheses, there weresome limitations of Experiment 1 that compromise inter-pretation. First, there was a relatively high suspicion rate,indicating that the cover story may not have been believ-able to a number of participants. This may have made thehypotheses more transparent, and invited more strategicresponses. Second, although the younger target was clearlymore prototypical of the undergraduate student group, the


relative prototypicality of the targets in the context of theuniversity group was not assessed. A measure of this wouldbe informative. Third, while perceptions of the targets’ cre-ativity were measured as a potential explanation for partic-ipants’ preferences, beliefs about competence may haveplayed a role. It would be useful to assess whether age hasdiVerent eVects on perceptions of both creativity and com-petence in the diVerent group contexts. Finally, the manipu-lation of group context was confounded with diVerenttasks. Although the tasks were very similar, participantsmay have felt that the younger target was better positionedto name a new pub, while the older participant was betterpositioned to name a new lecture theatre, because of theirassumed interests and experiences. In other words, theresults could be due to the ‘Wt’ between age and the tasks,rather than diVerences in the status-meaning of age acrossgroup conditions.

To address the above limitations, a second experimentwas conducted using a similar design, but manipulatinggroup context independently of the task. The cover storywas also changed to allow for the manipulation of groupcontext and reduce suspicion rates.

Experiment 2

Method

Participants and designExperiment 2 comprised the same 2 (target: young vs.

old)£ 2 (group context: university group vs. undergraduategroup) mixed design as Experiment 1, with repeated mea-sures on the Wrst factor. However, group context wasmanipulated independently of the task.

One hundred eighty-six Wrst-year undergraduate stu-dents participated (83 male, 95 female, 8 not stated). Ageranged from 18 to 24 with a mean of 18.6 years. All wereliving in Halls of Residence and were asked to complete thequestionnaire by their hall tutor. All data were collected inthe Wrst two weeks of the Wrst term and participantsreceived no compensation for participating.

Materials and procedureParticipants were given a questionnaire titled “Per-

sonal Opinions Survey.” The Wrst page explained that thesurvey was collecting data on the personal preferences ofmembers of the University for use in a statistics class. Inthe undergraduate group condition, it was stated that thedata would be used to make statistical comparisonsbetween undergraduate students, postgraduate students,and staV at the university. In the university group condi-tion, it was stated that the data would be used to makecomparisons between members of the participants’ uni-versity and members of other universities. Manipulatingthe comparative context in this way should make salientthe participants’ undergraduate student group and uni-versity group respectively (Oakes, 1987). Participantswere asked to read a hypothetical scenario and then

answer questions about their preferences. In order toavoid suspicion over the cover story, it was made clearthat the scenario was hypothetical.

The second page of the questionnaire presented the‘Name the Lecture Theatre’ scenario used in Experiment 1.The wording of the competition, the proWles of the targets,and the names oVered by the targets were identical to thoseused in Experiment 1. The names oVered by each targetwere counterbalanced.

The questionnaire began by asking for the partici-pants’ age and gender. In the undergraduate group con-dition participants were asked to indicate whether theywere an undergraduate student, a postgraduate student,or staV. In the university group condition participantswere asked to indicate whether they were from the Uni-versity of Exeter, Plymouth University, or another uni-versity. These items were included to increase the salienceof participants’ undergraduate or university group mem-bership, respectively. As for Experiment 1, participantswere asked to indicate which name they would prefer byticking one of two boxes, and then to respond to a seriesof questions using 7-point Likert-type scales. These itemsmeasured how happy participants would be for eachname to be chosen, how creative and competent each tar-get was, and the targets’ perceived prototypicality ofboth the undergraduate student group and the universityas a whole.

Results

Manipulation checksThere was a signiWcant diVerence in ratings of the two

targets’ prototypicality of both the undergraduate studentgroup, F (1, 181)D 415.88, p < .001, �2D .70, and the uni-versity group, F (1, 181)D 447.55, p < .001, �2 D .71. Therewere no main eVects of condition and no interactionsbetween target and condition, Fs < 1. Participants in bothconditions rated the younger target as more typical thanthe older target of both the undergraduate group(Myounger D 5.72, SD D 1.23; Molder D 2.61, SDD 1.44) andthe university group (MyoungerD 5.69, SDD 1.10;MolderD 2.75, SDD 1.26).

Main analysesAs in Experiment 1, participants’ preferences for the

names oVered by the targets were assessed using a binarychoice measure and a measure of how happy they would befor each of the names to be chosen. These items wererecoded so that responses related to who suggested thename, rather than the name itself.

Participants’ choice of name was analyzed using a �2

test. In the undergraduate group condition, more partici-pants chose the name suggested by the younger target thanthe older target, and in the university group condition,more participants chose the name oVered by the older tar-get than the younger target, �2 (1, ND 184)D4.91, pD .03,dD .33 (see Fig. 3). Separate �2 tests within each condition


showed that the preference for the younger target in theundergraduate group was not signiWcant, �2

(1,ND93)D1.82, pD .18, and that the preference for theolder target in the university group was only marginally sig-niWcant, �2 (1, ND 91)D 3.18, pD .075.

Analysis of ratings of how happy participants would befor each name to be chosen revealed no signiWcant maineVects or interactions. Participants were no happier foreither targets’ suggested name to be chosen, F(1,182)D 1.35, pD .25, �2D .007, and there was no interac-tion between target and group context, F (1, 182)D .02,pD .88, �2 < .001.

Creativity and competence ratingsReplicating the results of Experiment 1, there was a

main eVect of target only on ratings of creativity, F(1,180)D 23.20, p < .001, �2D .11. There was no main eVectof group context and no interaction between target andgroup context, Fs < 1. The younger target was rated as morecreative (MD 4.28, SDD1.28) than the older target(MD 3.73, SDD1.29) in both conditions.

In addition to creativity, participants also rated the tar-gets on perceived competence. There was a marginally sig-niWcant main eVect of group context, F (1,183)D3.51,pD .06, �2D .02, no main eVect of target and no interactionbetween target and group context, Fs < 1. Both targets wererated slightly higher in competence in the university groupcondition (MD4.56, SDD 1.15) than in the undergraduategroup condition (MD4.30, SDD1.12).

Discussion

Experiment 2 partially replicated the results of Experi-ment 1, using a diVerent manipulation of group salience. Asin Experiment 1, whether the older or younger target’s sug-gestion was more frequently chosen depended on whichgroup context was made salient. Given that the manipula-tion of group context was independent of the task, theseresults suggest that group salience, rather than Wt betweenage and the task, moderated the eVects of age.

Fig. 3. Number of participants choosing the name oVered by the youngerand older candidates in the undergraduate and university group condi-tions (Experiment 2).

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Although the binary choice data replicated those inExperiment 1, there were no signiWcant eVects on the happi-ness measure. This is likely due to the relative strength ofthe diVerent manipulations of group context used in thetwo experiments. As shown in the chi-square analyses, theeVect size in Experiment 2 was small (dD .33) whereas itwas medium in Experiment 1 (dD .47, see Cohen, 1988).The weaker manipulation in Experiment 2 may haveincreased error variance on happiness ratings, leading to nosigniWcant eVects.

In Experiment 2, the younger target was again rated asmore creative than the older target in both group contexts,and there were no eVects of target or group context on per-ceived competence. Hence, although the relative inXuenceof the targets diVered across group contexts, this cannot beexplained by any eVects of group context on their perceivedcompetence or creativity. Nor does it seem that the eVectswere driven by the targets’ relative prototypicality in thediVerent group conditions, since the younger target wasseen as more prototypical of both groups. The data suggestthat groups can moderate the eVect of age on inXuence, butthey do not provide clear evidence of the process involved.

General discussion

There was clear support in both experiments for theargument that groups can moderate the eVects of statuscharacteristics. In both experiments, whether the older oryounger target was more inXuential depended on whichgroup context was salient. Age seemed to function as a sta-tus characteristic in the context of the university group, butnot in the context of the undergraduate student group. Inthe undergraduate student group context, the relative inXu-ence of the older and younger targets seemed more in linewith the predictions of self-categorization theory.

Experiment 1 revealed clear and consistent eVects onboth the binary choice measure and the ratings of happinesswith each name. Experiment 2 produced similar results, butonly on the binary choice measure. Overall, the eVects of themanipulations in both experiments were relatively small,with simple main eVects analyses showing that some pair-wise comparisons were not signiWcant. Nevertheless, thepattern of results was consistent across both experimentsusing diVerent manipulations of group context, suggestingthat the eVect of group context on the relative inXuence ofthe targets was robust.

Although the inXuence data seem to support a statuscharacteristics theory interpretation in the university groupcondition and a self-categorization theory interpretation inthe undergraduate student group condition, neither the com-petence and creativity data nor the prototypicality ratings Wtcleanly with either account. Hence, the process underlyingthese eVects is unclear. One explanation could be to do withinXuence norms. Within the context of the university as awhole, undergraduate students may be used to acceptinginXuence from older colleagues, such as professors. Amongsttheir peers, however, it may be more normative to accept


inXuence from others of a similar age. These inXuence normsmay have become activated in the diVerent group contextsand aVected the choice of names oVered by the targets.Clearly, further research is required to understand preciselyhow groups moderate the eVects of status characteristics.

In addition to clarifying the processes involved, furtherresearch could consider how these processes contribute tothe construction and meaning of status within groups.According to Ridgeway and colleagues (Ridgeway, 2001;Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998), the accep-tance or rejection of inXuence from others can lead to thedevelopment of status beliefs, such as competence, aboutinXuential others. Through referent informational inXu-ence, groups may come to construct notions of competenceabout prototypical group members that are diVerent fromand even counter to how society deWnes competence. Such aprocess may play a wider role in social change, and is con-sistent with Tajfel’s (1982) view that groups, rather thanindividuals, are the primary agents of social change.

The two experiments presented here provide initial sup-port for the argument that groups can moderate the eVectsof status characteristics on inXuence. Status generalization,as deference to those who are valued most in society, evenwhen such inXuence does not objectively seem deserved, is aprocess that may operate within groups that do not con-strain or redeWne the characteristics normally associatedwith status in society. However, the current studies suggestthat groups do have the power to constrain and change thestatus meaning of age, and so may have the power to atten-uate inequalities experienced by members of other low sta-tus groups, at least within their own boundaries.

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