I. BASIC CONCEPTS:

A. DEFINITION OF TERMS:

a.) Law- is a rule of conduct, just and obligatory, enacted for by an authorized legislative body for common observance and benefit.

b.) Bill- is a proposed draft of a law introduced by any member of the Congress.c.) Act- a passed bill according to the procedure it has to undergo according to the constition.d.) Statute- is a written will of the legislature solemnly expressed in a form required for it to become a

law of the statee.) Constitution- is the fundamental and supreme law of the land with accordance to the will of the

people to set up a form of government and its delimitation of power for the protection of their rights and security as well as for the promotion of their interests, welfare and happiness expected not to take binding effect only to present time but indefinitely.

B. SOURCES OF LAW (LPCC)

a.) Legislation- those that have been enacted by a legitimate authorityb.) Precedent- decisions or principles by a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of law (whether of

equal or inferior jurisdiction)c.) Custom- Requisites:

c.1- Must be proven as a fact according to the rules of evidence (Art. 12 New Civil Code)c.2- It must not be contrary to law (Art. 11 NCC)c.3- Repeated no. Of acts uniformly performedc.4- Judicial intention to make it a rule of conductc.5- Acknowledged and approved by society and has lasted long enough to prove its existence

d.) Court Decisions- application and interpretations of such are sources of law although they are not laws BUT evidence of their meanings.

C. SOURCES OF STATUTORY LAW

1.) 1987 constitution2.) Treaties and international agreements3.) Statutes enacted by legislature4.) Ordinances enacted by Autonomous Regions5.) Ordinances enacted by LGUs6.) Administrative rules and regulations

D. CLASSIFICATIONS OF LAWS (NP)

NATURAL LAW- derives its force/authority from God and binding everywhere.

Physical Law- universal rule of action on movement of things

Moral Law- establishes what is right and wrong dictated by human

conscience

Divine Law

Divine PostiveLaw(Ten

Commandments)

Divine Human Postive Law

(Commands of the Church)

POSITIVE LAW- man-made lawsPublic Law Private Law- rules which create duties, rights and

obligations and methods of setting courts to action for the enforcement of right or redress ofwrong.

Constitutional Law-

fundamental law of the land

Administrative Law- fixes

organizations, determines

competence of authorities and

regulates methods and

functions of the government

International Law- regulates community of

nations

Substantive Private- rules which declare legal relations of litigants

Procedural or adjective private law- means and

methods of setting courts in motion (judgment)

E. STEPS ON PASSAGE OF A LAW/ CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IN PASSAGE OF A BILL:

1.) A proposed draft of a law is to be submitted by any member of Congress to the Speaker/Senate president who would then calendar it for the 1st reading. Upon submission, signature of the proponent as well as his intention or purpose if the bill is to be given.

2.) 1st reading- Number and title of the Bill will be read.3.) The bill is to be directed to the special committee for its further study which would be followed by a

public hearing. (If no unfavourable comments, it shall be sent back to the speaker/president of the house; if there are unfavourable comments, the bill is dead)

4.) 2 reading- entirety of the bill would be read. In this period, the bill is set open for debates, amendments and propositions. The final bill as sprouted from the deliberations should be set for the 3rd reading.

5.) 3 days before final passage, the bill is to be produced in printed form and to be distributed to all members of that house.

6.) 3rd reading- No amendment rule is to be observed. Only the Title of the bill is to be read. Members (if is on a proper quorum 50% or 50% plus 1) shall proceed with division of the house by yeas and nays. If the bill is approved it would be directed to the other house to undergo the preceding process. (If No votes win, then the bill is dead)

7.) After passage from both houses, the bill is to be transmitted to the President for approval. If he approves, he shall sign it, if otherwise, he shall veto it back to the original house it came from together with his objections.

8.) Upon receipt of the vetoed bill, the original house shall take into reconsideration the objections of the President. After deliberations, the bill has to be voted again by yeas and nay of 2/3 members of that house. If yes votes win, then it would be transmitted to other house for the same reconsideration. If again yeas prevail, then the bill becomes a LAW. (If no votes win, the bill is dead)

F. ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

- Bills passed by Congress authenticated by the Speaker and the Senate President and approved by the President; if there has been MISTAKE in the printing of the bill after certification of the officers of Congress and the Chief executive, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curative legislation not by judicial decree.

- A bill arising from the compromise and reconciliation of versions of both houses (Bicameral Conference Committee) transmitted to the President for approval.

G. EFFECTIVITY AND OPERATION OF A LAW

The Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 2.  Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.  This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR

THEIR EFFECTIVITY

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

TANADA V. TUVERA

FACTS: With the Supreme Court’s decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.

HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise provided” pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.

H. PARTS OF A STATUE (TPEBRSSE)1.) Title- includes the NAME/ subject matter of the law2.) Preamble- explains the purpose/intent of the legislation 3.) Enacting Clause- declares the law’s enactment and to identify it to be of authorized legislation.4.) Body- where the provisions are seen.5.) Repealing clause- announces the abrogation of a prior statute or law 6.) Saving Clause- restriction in a repealing act to save the old law from unauthorized annihilation. 7.) Separability Clause- provides that if provisions are sought to be invalid, the remainder shall still have

force.8.) Effectivity Clause- announces the effectivity date.

I. KINDS OF STATUTE: (GSLPPRCPPRA/GSLP4R2CA)1.) General Law- one that affects community at large; all citizens of the state. 2.) Special Law- designed for a particular purpose, limited in range, confined to a prescribed field of action

on operation3.) Local law- operates in a local territory (vs. Whole territory)4.) Public Law- may be general, local or public law (criminal law, political law, constitutional law etc.)5.) Private Law- regulates and administers relationships among individuals, association and corporations6.) Remedial Statue- provides means/methods where causes of actions may be effectuated; wrongs

redressed and relief obtained. 7.) Curative Statute- a retrospective legislation which operates upon past events, acts or transactions in

order to correct errors and irregularities. 8.) Penal Statute- defines crimes and their corresponding punishments. 9.) Prospective law- applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment.

10.) Retrospective law- one made to affect acts/facts occurring or rights occurring before it came into force. 11.) Affirmative Statue- Mandatory in nature (what ought to be done)

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

A. DEFINITION OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- Art or process of discovering and expounding on the meaning or intention of the authors of the law with

respect to its application to certain cases where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

- Art of seeking the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts.

B. INTERPRETATION V. CONSTRUCTIONInterpretation- discovering the true meaning based on the language/text of the law itself;exploring the written text.

Construction- drawing of conclusions;respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text; conclusions which are in spirit but not within the letters.

C. SITUS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

ARTICLE VIIIJUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

D. REQUISITES FOR THE COURT TO CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET THE LAW

Article 9 of the Civil Code of the Philippines- No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

1.) There must be an actual controversy brought to the court by party litigants to hear or settle their disputes.

2.) There is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy. ( 2 reasonable minds interpret the law differently)

E. KINDS OF INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS (CEFLEP)

1.) Close/Literal Interpretation- to take words in their narrowest meanings. 2.) Extensive/Liberal Interpretation- comprehensive signification of words3.) Free/Unrestricted Interpretation- proceeds on the general principles of interpretation in good faith4.) Limited/Restricted Interpretation- influenced by other principles other than the hermeneutic ones. 5.) Predestined Interpretation- artful interpretation by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the

text other than the one he knows to have been intended. 6.) Extravagant Interpretation- substitutes meaning evidently different from the true one.

F. SUBJECTS OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION (COSRED)

1.) Constitution2.) Ordinance3.) Statutes4.) Resolutions5.) Executive Orders6.) Department Circulars

G. CONCEPT OF VAGUE STATUTESA statute may be said vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

Repugnancy of vague statutes in the constitution: 1.) violated due process to accord persons 2.) leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying

out its provisions.

H. TERRITORIAL AND PERSONAL EFFECTS OF STATUTES

- Supposes that the extent of Philippine Jurisdiction is both personal and territorial- Territorial in the sense that being independent and sovereign, its authority, decrees and commands are

supreme within its entire dominion. - Personal in the sense that the laws govern therein and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its

terms.

I. MOOT AND ACADEMIC

A case becomes Moot and Academic when the purpose has become stale or when no practical relief can be granted or which can have no practical effect.

In this case, the courts must refrain from construction BUT it may do so in cases when it is capable of repetition, yet evading review esp. Where public interest requires its resolution.

J. LEGISLATURE CANNOT OVERRULE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION

The legislature has no power to overrule jucdicial construction even if the former indicates construction of a law in the same or by a resolution. The Judiciary is lodged with the power to do so.

K. WHEN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION MAY BE SET ASIDE

The Supreme Court is not sancrosanct as to be beyond modification/nullification. It may, in appropriate cases change/overrule its own rulings.

It could also be done by amending the constitution in which the framers may modify/nullify judicial interpretations or repeal.

III. BASIC GUIDELINES IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION:

A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT

B. VERBA LEGIS (LETTER OF THE LAW)

- When the law is in clear and categorical manner, no need for interpretation- Intent based on the letters of the law- Literal meaning of the word/plain meaning rule

RAMIREZ V. CA

FACTS: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia’s office. Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording.

Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).

The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.

ISSUE: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent of all those involved?

HELD:

Sec. 1: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.

“The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party

other than or different from those involved in the private communication.”The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation. “This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties,” Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations.

Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.

C. SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW /RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA- The reason of the law is the spirit of the law- What is within the spirit is w/in the law although not within the letter and that which is within the letter

and not within the spirit is NOT within the statute.

*NO. AND GENDER OF WORDS

- Plural words are applicable to singular words as well (children-child)

- “He” is applicable to both sexes/any gender except in cases when the law itself provides that the pronounce is to be used only to a male.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. V. ORBECIDO

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City.  They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively.  In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer.  A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley.  He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.  The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

D. STATUTE AS A WHOLE

REGINO SY CATIIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1689 (SYNDICATED ESTAFA) and other related offenses.

On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the CHARGE BE NON-BAILABLE. However subsequently, the same judge issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order by DECLARING THAT THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS BAILABLE.

ISSUE: W/N THE ORDER IS CORRECT

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa, provides:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate CONSISTING OF FIVE OR MORE PERSONS formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys...

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.

Clearly, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as "consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." Under the second paragraph, it is provided that if the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than P100,000.00.

Petitioner’s interpretation that the term "any person" in the first paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. IT BEARS STRESSING THAT THE LAW MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE, JUST AS IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER A SENTENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY IN ORDER TO GRASP ITS TRUE MEANING. In fact, there is no need for any construction or interpretation of P. D. No. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity.

E. IMPLICATIONS

RAMON M. ATIENZA vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA

FACTS: Petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor received the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 issued by the respondent Governor concerning the “AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.”

For proper coordination ...all Purchase Orders issued ... shall be approved by the undersigned in his capacity AS THE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE of the province.

The provision of DILG Opinion No. 148-1993 which states that the authority to sign Purchase Orders of supplies, materials and equipment[s] of the Sanggunian belongs to the local chief executive, serves as basis of this memorandum.

Petitioner- We are of the opinion that … purchase orders for supplies, materials and equipment are included under those as authorized for signature by the Vice-chief executive of the Sanggunian on the basis of the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995

ISSUE: W/N THE POWER TO SIGN WARRANTS FOR DISBURSEMENTS IS LODGED TO THE GOVERNOR.

HELD: Rep. Act No. 7160.[15] The same statute vests upon the Vice-Governor the power to: (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and SIGN ALL WARRANTS drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

While Rep. Act No. 7160 is SILENT AS TO THE MATTER, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to SIGN ALL WARRANTS drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. This doctrine is explained, thus:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. ONE OF THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION USED TO FILL IN THE GAP IS THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

Warrants are “order[s] directing the treasurer of the municipality to pay money out of funds in city treasury which are or may become available for purpose specified to designated person[s].”

The ordinary meaning of “voucher” is a document which shows that services have been performed or expenses incurred.

Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.

F. CASUS OMISSUS

Chavez V. JBC

FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition. The respondents also question petitioner’s belated filing of the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

G. STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIERA MOVERE

AQUINO V. PPA

FACTS: The Congress of the Philippines passed on 21 August 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758 otherwise known as The Salary Standardization Law.

On the basis thereof, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued Memorandum Circular No. 57-87 which granted to its officials holding managerial and supervisory positions REPRESENTATION AND TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCE (RATA) in an amount equivalent to 40% of their basic salary.

Thereafter, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, which extended the RATA entitlement to its Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel at the rate of 20% of their basic pay.

The Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Auditor, however, in a letter dated 14 November 1990, addressed to PPA, disallowed in post-audit the payment of the RATA differentials. It likewise disallowed in audit the grant of RATA to PPA Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel occupying positions with salary grades of and above who were appointed AFTER the effectivity of R.A. no. 6758.

In a decision dated 16 October 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COA and declared that an official to be entitled to the continued RATA benefit under LOI No. 97 must be an INCUMBENT AS OF 1 JULY 1989 and more importantly, was receiving the RATA provided by LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989.

ISSUE: W/N THE ISSUED RAISED IN THIS CASE HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED

HELD: XXX Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.XXX

The issues raised by petitioners are no longer novel.

In those cases, the Court reiterated that the intention of the framers of the law was to phase out certain allowances and privileges gradually, without upsetting the principle of non-diminution of pay. The intention of Section 12 to PROTECT INCUMBENTS WHO WERE ALREADY RECEIVING THOSE ALLOWANCES ON 1 JULY 1989, when RA 6758 took effect.

IV. AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

a. WHAT ARE INTRINSIC AIDS?

INTRINSIC AIDS (WTP2HL)a.)Words, phrases and sentences context Language of the law itselfb.) Title Subject of the lawc.)Preamble Reasons and objective why it was enactedd.)Punctuations Low degree aide.)Headings and Marginal Notes Low degree aidf.) Legislative Definition and Interpretation The source of true intent or purpose of a law

EXTRINSIC AIDS (C3L2EPJ)1.)Contemporaneous Circumstances2.)Policy3.)Legislative History of the Statute Antecedents, explanatory note,deliberations,

sponsorship speech, amendments etc. 4.)Contemporaneous and Practical Construction Constructions given upon the statutes at the time or

after their enactment5.)Executive Construction 1. Construction by exec./admin officers called

to implement the law2. Construction by Sec. Of Justice (DOJ

Opinion)

3. Construction of quasi-judicial officers.

EXCEPTIONS: No ambiguity, where strong reason to the contrary exists, there is already jurisprudence, ultra vires

6.)Legislative Construction7.)Judicial Construction8.)Construction by the bar/ legal commentators

FPA V. MAPECON

Upon the request of Pablo Turtal, Jr., Manager of Supreme Pest Control (SUPESCON), Vicente Lañohan, the FPA Dumaguete Office Provincial Coordinator, issued an undated certificate that MAPECON-Dumaguete City branch HAD NO LICENSE TO OPERATE, and that its pesticide products were NOT REGISTERED with the FPA. Thus, it COULD NOT ENGAGE in pest control operation “until such time that this above-mentioned business entity can secure a license from the [FPA].

RULING OF COURT: We hold that the FPA has jurisdiction only over agricultural pesticides, not over urban pest control products.

“PESTICIDES” in P.D. No. 1144 refer ONLY to those USED IN FARMING AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES, as distinguished from pesticides used in households, business establishments, and offices in urban areas.

The preamble of P.D. No. 1144 provides:

WHEREAS, it is Government policy to provide adequate assistance to the AGRICULTURAL SECTOR in line with the national objective of increasing food production;

WHEREAS, fertilizer and pesticides are vital inputs in food production and must be supplied in adequate quantities at reasonable costs;

WHEREAS, the fertilizer and pesticide industries have much in common in terms of clientele, distribution channels, system of application in FARMERS' FIELDS, and technical supervision by the same FARM management technicians under the government's food production program;

Further, P.D. No. 1144 uses the term “pesticides” always in conjunction WITH “fertilizers” or with the phrase “fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals/chemical inputs” or the phrase “other agricultural chemicals,

Further, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1144 reads:

Section 1. Creation of the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority. The Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, hereinafter referred to as the FPA, is hereby created and attached to the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of assuring the AGRICULTURAL SECTOR of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and educating the AGRICULTURAL SECTOR in the use of these inputs.

Significantly, the above-quoted provision of P.D. No. 1144 sets the parameters of the powers and duties of the FPA.

First, the FPA is designated as an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture. Urban pest control or pesticide use in households, offices, hotels and other commercial establishments has NOTHING TO DO with agriculture.

Second, it spells out the purposes for which the FPA was created, viz: “for the purpose of assuring the agricultural sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer, protecting the public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides, and educating the agricultural sector in the use of these inputs.”

We go back to the basics of statutory construction... “pesticides” only to agricultural use. Thus, URBAN PEST CONTROL OPERATORS AND THEIR URBAN PESTICIDES ARE EXCLUDED FROM ITS COVERAGE.

B. WHAT ARE EXTRINSIC AIDS?

De Villa V. Court of Appeals Petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22.

Xxx That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of MAKATI, METRO MANILA, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court...make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ...payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00... said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds XXX

After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, PETITIONER MOVED to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION over the offense charged; and

(b) That no offense was committed since the CHECK INVOLVED WAS PAYABLE IN DOLLARS, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).

ISSUE: whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.

RULING OF COURT: The petition is without merit.

It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.

However, petitioner argues that the check in question was DRAWN AGAINST THE DOLLAR ACCOUNT of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22):

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish.

The RECORDS OF THE BATASAN, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.

V. APPLICATION OF THE LAW

New Civil Code Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Constitution Art. 3, Sec. 22 No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Revised Penal Code - Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.chanrobles

Art. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. — Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission.

A. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

FACTS: Initially charged for the felony were Proculo Mejeca y Montallana, Baldomero Quintina and Romeo Solarte. The corresponding information for ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE was filed on August 15, 1996.[1]

Subsequently, additional suspects were identified. Thus, indicted for the crime in an Amended Information for Robbery in BAND with Homicide

The case then proceeded to trial after which, the COURT A QUO rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

XXX WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the accused ARNOLD NARCISO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code with the AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM and IN BAND and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. XXX

ISSUE: W/N the use of unlicensed firearms in a band was properly applied as an aggravating circumstance in the case.

HELD: All told, we find no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quo insofar as accused-appellant’s culpability is concerned. This brings us to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty against him.

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides that: ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson; xxx.

In meting out the supreme penalty of death, the trial court appreciated the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm under Section 1, paragraph 3, of R.A. No. 8294. The imposition of the death penalty is infirm for several reasons:

First, R.A. No. 8294 took effect on JULY 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crime imputed to accused-appellant was COMMITTED ON JULY 11, 1996. It is fundamental that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.[24] More importantly, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[25] Thus, insofar as R.A. NO. 8294 IS NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE ACCUSED because it unduly aggravates the crime, such new law will not be given retroactive application, lest it acquire the character of an ex post facto law.[26] Stated differently, R.A. No. 8294, which considers the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing of a victim as an aggravating circumstance, cannot be given retroactive effect because to do so would be unfavorable to the accused.[27] xxx

b. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

VI. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

A. WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURTS MUST NOT DISTINGUISH

Pilar vs Comelec Case Digest

Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC. 

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures notwithstanding his having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after his filing. 

Held: The petitioner is liable. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTEFACTS: [P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin

and Currency). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

HELD: It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it(Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.

C. GENERAL V. SPECIAL TERMS

Colgate-Palmolive Phil. Inc. V. Hon. Jimenez

Facts: On several occasions, PETITIONER IMPORTED FROM ABROAD VARIOUS MATERIALS such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.

On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . STABILIZER AND FLAVORS . . . SHALL BE REFUNDED TO ANY IMPORTER MAKING APPLICATION THEREFOR, UPON SATISFACTORY PROOF OF ACTUAL IMPORTATION UNDER THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED PURSUANT TO SECTION SEVEN THEREOF."

The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that TOOTHPASTE STABILIZERS AND FLAVORS ARE NOT EXEMPT under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

ISSUE: whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law

HELD:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca,

STABILIZER AND FLAVORS, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; XXX to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines SHALL BE REFUNDED TO ANY IMPORTER MAKING APPLICATION THEREFOR, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)

The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "GENERAL TERMS MAY BE RESTRICTED BY SPECIFIC WORDS, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE GENERAL LANGUAGE WILL BE LIMITED BY THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WHICH INDICATES THE STATUTE'S OBJECT AND PURPOSE."

In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense.

D. GENERAL TERMS FOLLOWING SPECIAL TERMS

PARAYNO V. JOVELLANOS

FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao PETITIONED THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN (SB) OF SAID MUNICIPALITY FOR THE CLOSURE OR TRANSFER OF THE STATION TO ANOTHER LOCATION.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied. Hence, she filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City XXX

Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was NOT COVERED BY SECTION 44 of the OFFICIAL ZONING CODE since it WAS NOT A “GASOLINE SERVICE STATION” BUT A “GASOLINE FILLING STATION” GOVERNED BY SECTION 21 thereof.

She added that the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),[3] in a previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno), barred the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50.

ISSUE: W/N THE GAS FILLING STATION FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF A GAS SERVICE STATION

HELD: Before us, petitioner insists that:

(1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis (of the same kind) did not apply to her case;

We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between “gasoline service station” and “gasoline filling station.” The pertinent provisions read:

XXX

Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.[7] xxx xxx xxx Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales and no other.XXX

It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and distinct from each other.

E. EXPRESS MENTION IMPLIED EXCLUSION

PAGCOR V. BIR

FACTS: PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-A[2] on January 1, 1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-B[3](supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was issued exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the gross revenue.[4] Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption.

On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424,[8] otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 provides that government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall pay corporate income tax, EXCEPT PETITIONER PAGCOR, the Government Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social Security System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337[10] on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The particular amendment that is at issue in this case is Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that are exempt from payment of corporate income tax.

HELD:

(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or Instrumentalities. - The provisions of existing special general laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies, or instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business, industry, or activity.

In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. The legislative intent, as shown by the discussions in the

Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax; hence, the omission or removal of PAGCOR from exemption from the payment of corporate income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[27] Thus, the express mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax excludes all others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, expressed in the maxim: exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.

F. USE OF NEGATIVE WORDS

LOKIN V. COMELECFACTS: The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,[2] CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes.

(1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,[6] whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054[13] thuswise: WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC.

HELD: Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases WHERE THE NOMINEE DIES, OR WITHDRAWS IN WRITING HIS NOMINATION, BECOMES INCAPACITATED IN WHICH CASE THE NAME OF THE SUBSTITUTE NOMINEE SHALL BE PLACED LAST IN THE LIST. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The usage of “No” in Section 8 – “No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list” –

...renders Section 8 a NEGATIVE LAW, AND IS INDICATIVE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO MAKE THE STATUTE MANDATORY. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act,[38] subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.

G. “May” and “Shall” and “And” and “Or”

The use of the word "MAY" CLEARLY SHOWS THAT IT IS DIRECTORY IN NATURE and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the WORD "SHALL" IS IMPERATIVE, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced

H. Function of the ProvisoThe general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. Thus, it has been held that a PROVISO IS TO BE CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING PART OF THE PROVISION TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED, AND NOT TO THE STATUTE ITSELF OR TO OTHER SECTIONS THEREOF. The only exception to this rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

VII. PRESUMPTIONS

a. PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

FACTS: The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which AMENDED ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BY INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA COMMITTED BY MEANS OF BOUNCING CHECKS, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, the RIGHT TO BAIL and the provision against CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

ISSUES: VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, the RIGHT TO BAIL and the provision against CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

RULING OF COURT: Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is TOO SEVERE AND DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIME.

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to SHOCK THE MORAL SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY.

The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the following:

WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing checks; WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the people’s confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country; WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing penalties provided therefor.

Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary PRECAUTION TO DETER PEOPLE FROM ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential.

b. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESFACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any

administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

c. PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained FAVORABLE DECISION SUSPENDING THE LATTER.

Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67 (b) of the Local Government Code (LGC).

Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following: xxx xxx xxx

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.

 The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution ”.

Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD: We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision AS GIVING DISCRETION TO THE REVIEWING OFFICIALS TO STAY THE EXECUTION OF THE APPEALED DECISION. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it COULD HAVE USED MORE DIRECT LANGUAGE EXPRESSIVE OF SUCH INTENTION.

d. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

DANILO E. PARAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: Petitioner DANILO E. PARAS is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his RECALL as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.

Petitioner’s argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that “NO RECALL SHALL TAKE PLACE WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE OFFICIAL’S ASSUMPTION TO OFFICE OR ONE (1) YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING A REGULAR LOCAL ELECTION”, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election.

RULING OF COURT: We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: “SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.”

The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO ENACT AN EFFECTIVE LAW , and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.

e. PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

CESARIO URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS.

FACTS: On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to

worry as HE COULD JUST SIGN HIS (PEREZ) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.[3]

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors’ logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name “Oscar Perez.”

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as “Oscar Perez” was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.

The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085.

HELD: All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.

Clearly therefore AN ALIAS is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him PUBLICLY AND HABITUALLY usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,” which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not an alias name of petitioner. There is NO EVIDENCE showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. THE CONFUSION AND FRAUD IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE ANTI-ALIAS LAW AND ITS RELATED STATUTES SEEK TO PREVENT ARE NOT PRESENT HERE AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PECULIAR AND DISTINCT FROM THOSE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING C.A. NO. 142 AS AMENDED. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[12

F. PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERALJOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO

The resulting government [from the EDSA Revolution] was a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (the “PCGG”), through the AFP Anti-Graft Board (the “Board”), investigated reports of unexplained wealth involving Major General Josephus Ramas (“Ramas”), the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the time of Former President Ferdinand Marcos.Pursuant to said investigation, the Constabulary raiding team served a search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas’ alleged mistress – Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included in the warrant, particularly, communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several thousands of cash in pesos and US dollars, were also seized.

In its Resolution, the AFP Board reported that (1) Dimaano could not have used the said equipment without Ramas’ consent; and (2) Dimaano could not be the owner of the money because she has no visible source of income. The Board then concluded with a recommendation that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.

Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the “Republic” or “Petitioner”) filed a Complaint against Ramas and Dimaano. On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents and (2) the search and seizureconducted was illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties confiscated in Dimaano’s house were illegally seized andtherefore inadmissible in evidence.

HELD: The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. It was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.” Thus, the resulting government was a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

Thus, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remainedin effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.

With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally

binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the right of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance withits treaty obligations under international law.

VIII. STRICT AND LIBERAL INTERPRETATION

a. Penal Statutes- strict against the State, liberal in favor of the accusedb. Tax Law- strict to the government/lgu, liberal in favor of the tax payerc. Tax Exemption- strict against the applicant, liberal to the gov’t.d. Insurance Law- strict against the insurer, liberal in favor of the insurede. Labor Law- strict against the government, liberal in favor of laborf. Election Law- liberal in favor of speedy and just disposition of cases or will of the peopleg. Remedial/Civil Procedure- liberal in favor of speedy disposition of cases and justiceh. Social Security- liberal in favor of the beneficiaries, strict against the gov’t.i. Naturalization Law- strict against the applicantj. Retirement- liberal in favor of the retiree (for security and comfort)

IX. CONFLICTING STATUTESReconciling conflicting statutes:

- Must be construed in harmony with each other.- The courts must reconcile conflicting statutes/provisions as both are crafted by the same

legislature (which is presumed to be aware of the laws they create)

a. Pari Materia - when statutes relate to the same person/thing, or have the same purpose/object, or cover a particular subject matter.

- They are to be construed in form that is complete, coherent and leads to an intelligible system- They should be construed to complement each other. - In case of conflicts, the Courts must harmonize them; in when it is impossible to harmonized them, the

earlier must yield to the former.b. General V. Special Statues - courts must harmonize the two if they relate to same subject matter, person,

thing or purpose.- if harmonization is impossible, the special statute must yield to the former.c. Statute V. Ordinance - ordinances must yield to statutes since the former are only enacted by delegation

of legislative powers by the national legislature. LGUs cannot supersede the power of legislation by the Congress by enacting an ordinance that defies a statute.