stephen wood and john kelly introduction · pdf filetowards a critical management science...

Source: Journal of Management Studies, 15(1) (1978): 1–24.

5Towards a Critical Management Science

Stephen Wood and John Kelly

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to discuss the work of several authors whohave recently critically evaluated management science (includingwhat is broadly termed organizational theory) and attempted to direct

research and thinking about management and production systems away fromthe existing acceptance of the dominant values of society.1

In this paper we are not then concerned to systematically describe, out-line and categorize the nature of those activities, such as operations research(O.R.), organizational analysis, industrial and occupational psychology, whichare sometimes placed under the umbrella term of management sciences. But,rather, what we are concerned to do is outline and evaluate the emergingradical critique of (and possible alternatives to) the traditional managerially-orientated ‘management science’. We will take as given that the commonstrand running between the various existing approaches to management isprimarily an historical one, that is that they have grown out of or against (ifnot in total opposition to) what is generally described as ‘scientific manage-ment’ or Taylorism.2 We are sensitive to the fact that attempts to distinguishdifferent approaches to management have, by and large, been based on adhoc criteria rather than been guided by any coherent ordering principles.3

However, our attention will be focused on the literature that has been criti-cal of traditional management sciences and, thus, only the way in which thisliterature has treated and defined the tasks and methods of managementresearch is of relevance to the present task.

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It is interesting, as well as relevant to our present concern, to note thatcriticisms of Taylorism have rarely, if at all, questioned Taylor’s quest for a‘scientific management’.4 Fundamental criticisms lumped Taylor with Mayoismand Human Relations and other movements, and criticized it for its mana-gerial bias, and not so much for its method or application or scientific prin-ciples. A standard criticism made by many sociologists, as we have mentioned,is that an industrial sociology which takes as its starting point Taylorism andHuman Relations will tend to be biased and thus perhaps should be neglectedand even dismissed. It was not until the sixties that anybody fundamentallyquestioned the adequacy of the famous Hawthorne studies,5 but here againthe emphasis was on the researcher’s particular application of scientific pro-cedures rather than the procedures themselves. Of course, it is important torecognize that at the time that these criticisms of ‘managerialism’ were beingmade there was a widespread belief in, and quest for, a value-free social science,and hence that any criticism of a mode of operation as being biased towardsa particular interest thus amounted to a criticism of its scientific status.6

But, on the other hand, it may also be recognized that the idea of a value-free sociology is predicated on the basis of the fact-value distinction and theidea that there are statements about the ‘world’ which can be evaluatedwithout reference to values. And thus it may be argued that in any specialfield of social sciences the information that arises from its practice has noth-ing to do with the character of the people who use the information.7 It isperhaps because of this that Albrow8 was able to put forward one of themost serious and thorough attacks on the scientific, as opposed to manage-rial, status of management sciences, or to be more particular, organizationtheory. It was based on assuming that what distinguished organizationalanalysis from the sociological study of organizations was that the latter wasconcerned with knowledge and, hence, was scientific, and the former wasconcerned to use this and other knowledge in the furtherance of certainends, usually taken to be those of the dominant élite(s) or top managementor some allegedly neutral notion such as ‘survival’. Organizational theory isthus, if anything, a technology, not concerned, as the sociologist is, with‘understanding’. Given this, the ‘scientific’ social scientist could largely dis-miss managerially-orientated studies and pursue his pure and assumingly –at least academically – more legitimate pursuits.

But if, as the critical or radical theories argue, we should not divorce our-selves from the world of practical intentions in the name of objectivity andvalue freedom, as for example Albrow implies, it becomes important toquestion and possibly reject the assumption that practical industrial studiesmean a concern for managerial problems and outcomes. Does the study oforganization necessarily involve supporting the particular forms that theytake currently? Cannot the problem of organization be defined to admit ofa radical approach?

66 Critical Management Studies

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There have been several currents of thinking in diverse, but interrelatedareas of study, which have served to question the basis of the criticisms ofmanagement thinking and theory made by those who tend to dismiss it.Firstly, there has been the somewhat eclectic, but nevertheless potentially‘revolutionary’ debate concerning the nature and development of science suchthat, for example, greater emphasis is now placed on the ‘reality’ as opposedto the ‘logic’ of scientific study, the impingement of ‘ideology’ in science, andthe somewhat blurred and ill-defined nature of the commonsense distinctionbetween technology and science.9 Secondly, there has been the resurrectionor resurgence of Marxist theory, which has both fostered and been aided bythe publication of important (for gaining an understanding of Marx’s method),but previously neglected texts, such as Grundrisse. Not only does Marxistthinking seriously question the fact-value distinction, but it also serves toshed some light on the nature of the relation between science and the cap-italist mode of production and hence technology. It is, at least partly, in thelight of the first development that writers working very much within the tra-ditional concerns of management sciences have begun to criticize andattempt to change the basis of its activity. Thus, for example, the work ofChurchman and others is leading to greater awareness of the nature andproblems of scientific research which one author has argued could ‘revolu-tionize traditional, quantitative operations research’.10 On the other hand,writers who have been less integrated into the existing management sci-ences, such as Hales and Whitley, have been more influenced by the Marxist‘revival’ than Churchman, and have attempted to develop a radical manage-ment research which, if not based on Marxism, does at least owe a greatdeal to this tradition.

The principal concern of this paper is to critically evaluate several writers,who may not have answered the sort of questions noted above, but whosewritings about the possibility of a new management research serve at least toraise such questions. In particular we are principally concerned with the workof Churchman, Hales and Whitley. They all ‘want to demonstrate (principallyby example – our addition) that it is worth directing some very fundamentalcriticism at the activities which put themselves forward hopefully as the sci-ence of managerial practice’11, without at the same time implying that thequest for a specialist management studies is either redundant, inherentlyconservative, positively dangerous, or that it necessarily simply involves the‘problem of management’ (i.e. the problem of motivation).12

These three authors are also related to the debates around Marxism, andover the question of science and values. Churchman belongs very clearlywithin the latter category, his principal focus being on the values underlyingoperations research, and he concludes that we need to debate values and notsimply take them as given. Hales and Whitley have both written explicitlywithin a Marxist tradition, and although Hales in fact agrees with Churchman

Wood and Kelly Towards a Critical Management Science 67

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on the importance of values, he ends up pleading for a management sciencewhich is orientated to a particular set of values, namely self-management. Headds an important historical dimension to the discussion of existing manage-ment theory, arguing that changes in economic and industrial structures overthe past fifty years or so have not only led to the growth of management sci-ence, but also have affected the type and content of the theories developed.Whitley goes beyond this and implicitly argues for a more detailed considera-tion of both values and the different types of organizational forms within cap-italism than Hales provides, which is somewhat ad hoc and even post hoc.

The Broadening of Management Science: the Need toDebate Values

C. W. Churchman has been highly influential in the development of O.R.13

His early work displayed many of the characteristics of O.R., but alwaysrevealed a concern for fundamental issues of methodology and not simply a‘technical’ orientation.14 To some extent his criticisms of O.R. in his latestwork apply to his own earlier work. But here we are not concerned to eval-uate the extent to which Churchman has fundamentally changed his posi-tion. Rather, we shall concentrate on his paper (published in 1970)15 inwhich he presents a general overview of O.R. and its problems. Many of thearguments are, we feel, of a general nature, and not simply applicable to thequantitatively orientated management science.

The starting point for his analysis is the observation that O.R. is not,apparently, concerned with ‘social’ problems such as ‘poverty, pollution andprivacy’16 and this he takes as indicative of a deeper malaise within the dis-cipline. On the assumption that the education and training of the practition-ers of O.R. is either responsible for this demise, or is capable, in principle,of bringing about its amelioration, he proceeds to analyse what he calls the‘educational’ base of O.R. This task is begun by presenting a contradictorypicture of O.R. today – on the one hand it professes the highest standards ofscience and objectivity and seeks to clarify issues, provide rigorous assess-ments and unambiguous evaluations of solutions to problems. On the otherhand, it admits that human behaviour is exceedingly complex and difficultto quantify, and that uncertainty and ambiguity will inevitably characterizethe work of the practitioner. This contradiction between theory and practiceis taken as a critical analytic tool in Churchman’s investigation of O.R. It isfirst necessary to define O.R., the object of the enquiry, and this Churchmandoes as follows: ‘O.R. . . . is the securing of improvement in social systems bymeans of scientific method’.17 He then proceeds to examine each of the var-ious aspects of this definition to assess the significance in each case of thegeneral contradiction between theory and practice.


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With regard to scientific method the problem, for Churchman, is that thismethod comprises both rationalist and empiricist aspects, whereas in factthe prevailing orthodoxy in O.R. education is heavily empiricist and, hence,obscures the question of the theoretical structures which underpin observa-tions of the world. The result is that assumptions about social systems areleft unexamined and tend, therefore, to be drawn from the articulated andoften conservative views of those actually involved in the management ofthe system under consideration. In connection with social systems threedefects in the current education of practitioners are noted: the failure toanalyse what, in fact, is meant by ‘a system’, and the associated problem ofdefining systemic boundaries given that one system is almost invariablyembedded in another; the assumption that decisions are made only by thoseat the top of organizations; and the supposition that social systems neces-sarily serve the clients they claim to be serving.

The third element of Churchman’s definition – that of improvement –rests on preliminary analysis of ethical assumptions. According to Churchman’searlier analysis (see above) various kinds of assumptions are already implicitin much O.R. and, indeed, on the basis of rationalist–empiricist scientificmethod this is necessarily the case whenever empirical work is being done.He therefore proposes that objectivity should be arrived at through the con-frontation of theoretical perspectives, that is, on the basis of Hegelian objec-tivity. The ethic of O.R., he argues, should be an enabling theory of value,according to which, although different people want different things, every-body wants to have what he wants. In addition he adds the basic moral prin-ciple, drawn from Kant, that O.R. should treat people as ends only and neveras means to ends.

The final item – securing – is dealt with briefly, and consists essentiallyin an exhortation to O.R. practitioners to remain above politics and continueto work for their overall objective of system improvement. The practical pro-posals resulting from this analysis are then outlined in the form of conclusionsto the paper and follow fairly closely the issues outlined there, viz. the artic-ulation of assumptions, challenging orthodox power structures within theprofession and refurbishing the O.R. community.

In assessing this paper as a general critique of management science, it hasto be said that several of the arguments advanced by Churchman are clearlysound. It is the case that assumptions need to be examined in any scientificactivity, and it is, arguably, the case that the confrontation of theoretical per-spectives is the only substantial way in which this can be done. That is, onecan never simply oppose ‘pure facts’ to ‘theories’, since ‘facts’ are themselvesthe products of theory. However, in so far as he locates the problems of O.R.in a contradiction between theory and practice, and sets out to create a con-vergency of the two along more ethically acceptable lines, Churchman him-self falls into a number of seemingly intractable contradictions. To begin with


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he completely fails to take seriously his own principle of the embeddednessof social systems, in so far as he treats the educational system of O.R. in iso-lation from the wider society, of which, according to this principle, it mustinevitably form a part. By thus failing to recognize the constraints on O.R.and the material bases on which O.R. is constructed, he lapses into volun-taristic remedies for the profession’s sickness, and advocates such measuresas unstructured meetings, the publication of failed experiments, etc.

A further consequence of his treatment of education in isolation fromwider social forces is that he regards the (often conservative) assumptionsin O.R. as a product of the methods of education. To put the matter simply,students are not taught to examine their assumptions and thus acquire, orhave reinforced, those assumptions (about society, organizations, etc.) thatare most readily accessible, i.e. those which happen to be the most conser-vative. Alternatively, according to Churchman, students may over-react tosuch orthodoxy and develop ultra-radical views. But ‘the problem’ howeveris not that specific assumptions are made about society, etc., for there wouldseem to be no a priori reason why discussion of assumptions per se shouldresult in the rejection of conservatism, but that assumptions in general arelet pass without comment in the education and daily practice of O.R.Certainly the latter problem is capable of rectification through educationalreforms, but there is no mention of those sources of assumptions and ideaswhich are located outside the educational sphere and, hence, no theory tounderstand them and no strategy to counter them.

Churchman, in fact, has failed to distinguish necessary and sufficientconditions for change, since, although it may be necessary to examineassumptions and engage in theoretical controversy in order to radically alterthe discipline, it by no means follows that these are sufficient conditions.Indeed one suspects they are far from sufficient as there would appear to benothing inherently radical in the various organizational recommendationsof Churchman that could not be implemented by the existing profession.Here, as with the issue of assumptions in O.R., Churchman has confused thegeneral and the particular – because existing organizations appear bureau-cratic and inert, it is inferred that organization per se is the culprit andshould therefore be abandoned, at least temporarily.

The question of values also is raised by the debate between Ackoff andhis critics.18 Ackoff claims it is possible to reconcile the interests of differentsections of organizations, and of organizations and society, an assertion based,in part, on a number of case studies of organizational change. Although hiscritics make a number of valid points about the cases, and about Ackoff’sarguments, e.g. pointing out that it is more useful to discuss social incompat-ibility of objectives, rather than logical incompatibility, a number of the crit-icisms are very weak.19 They include, for instance, the complaint that thereconciliation achieved in one case was only ‘apparent’ and could not be


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‘guaranteed’ and, in another, that whilst women inspectors had securedpotentially higher earnings as well as a job-and-finish clause, their domesticroles remained unchanged.20 These criticisms are accompanied by formalassertions of the inevitability of worker-employer conflict, unrelated to anytheoretical underpinnings. It is thus difficult to see how one could connectthese formal assertions to ‘reality’, or to use them in the construction of acritical management science.

The Promise of Management Science – the Promise of Self-management

But if Churchman largely ignores the social context and, hence, the materialbases of O.R., the same cannot be said of the work of Hales.21 His articlemarks a significant advance over the work just reviewed in so far as itattempts an historical and materialist analysis of the forms and inter-relationsof management science, from Taylor’s scientific management up to the pres-ent day. The point of departure for Hales is the view that management science,if scientific, ought to generate techniques and insights that are of relevanceoutside the immediate context of the discipline and that, if it is non-ideologi-cal, it ought to permit our perception of some of the deeper developmentaltendencies within capitalism. However, precisely because society is capitalistthere exists the necessity to legitimate class rule, in this case, through the pro-duction of ideological science. Thus, Hales, as Churchman does, begins hisanalysis on the basis of a contradiction – again between theory and practice,but the substance of the contradiction is rather different.

The first section of his work seeks to illustrate the outcomes of this con-tradiction in two systems of management science – O.R., and socio-technicalsystems (S.T.S.) theory – and he starts by examining an early Coal Boardstudy of labour turnover, in which it was found that turnover correlated withfactors such as seniority, distance from home to work and availability ofhousing. The policy decisions that followed involved the provision of busservices and cheap housing for employees, but did not however have any-thing to say about the conditions of work and people’s responses to them.The point Hales makes here is that the study, although morally bad in so faras it treated people as objects, was nevertheless scientifically good in somuch as people-as-objects, and not people per se, were the focus of theenquiry. But since people are not in fact objects, but social subjects, thestudy, from this perspective, Hales argues, is scientifically bad, because itdistorts, and is hence unable to capture its proper object.

This reification of the social subject does not at first sight appear to char-acterize socio-technical systems (S.T.S.) theory, one of the more sophisticatedof recent developments in management science. Theorists of this school


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have themselves argued that S.T.S. is a necessary response to social andtechnological change, since technologies are becoming increasingly auto-mated, thus necessitating a shift from crude manual skills to cognitive andperceptual skills. At the same time workers are themselves becoming moreeducated and beginning to demand more fulfilling work and greater partic-ipation in decisions that affect their lives. It so happens, however, that the‘new technologies’ will provide precisely those tasks and roles for which‘workers are clamouring’ and, hence, these two developments, the socialand the technological, will converge, thus reinforcing the view of S.T.S. the-ory that social and technical systems in an organization must be examinedas a whole and not separately. But, as Hales remarks, this view of societalchange not only accepts ‘technology’ as a given and immutable force, but isalso predicated on a value consensus, such that management and employeesare seen as being able to work together and, furthermore, are having to doso in order to resolve the problems arising from increased environmental‘turbulence’, or uncertainty. The fact that management still defines the prob-lems and the objectives of production leads Hales to conclude that theautonomy, freedom and responsibility of workers in the new technologiesconstitute a ‘false praxis’,22 and that in so far as people are still regarded asfunctional parts of a total production system, S.T.S. differs from O.R. only inthe greater sophistication of its manipulation of social subjects for manage-rial, i.e. capitalist, purposes.

Having thus demonstrated the inadequacies of both O.R. and S.T.S. the-ory, Hales proceeds to lay the foundation for the remainder of his analysis:

. . . I shall try to show that the inability of management science to recog-nize and develop the full social character of the system it studies is not(fundamentally) a theoretical or technical shortcoming but rather a con-sequence of the social, political, and economic interest with which man-agement science identifies, and which is reflected in the methodologicaland conceptual structures of the science.23

The major developments in twentieth-century capitalism that are seen ascentral determinants of management science are the centralization andinternationalization of capital. These interconnected processes necessitatethe development of planning to control and regulate increasingly complex andfluctuating markets – for labour, raw materials, capital, and commodities –a development that is reflected in the evolution of management sciencefrom its inception. Three categories of scientific work in industry are distin-guished, each of which constitutes a response to particular developmentswithin capitalism, and these function as the conceptual framework into whichHales installs the history of management science. Further, each of these cate-gories constitutes an appropriation of some aspect of reality: Taylorism, orscientific management, continued the appropriation of technical skills from


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the workforce and their relocation in technology and in experts, a processthat had long been a feature of capitalism. The appropriation of a secondaspect of reality, of ‘objective social relations’ was, however, unique to scien-tific management, for it was Taylor’s achievement to have systematicallybegun the ‘structural socialization of labour’ (of ‘objective social relations’)that is, to have provided a method, ‘. . . by which the productive activitiesof individuals could be orchestrated as moments in the movement of a sin-gle whole’.24

Technical O.R. has set itself the same project as scientific management,but differs from it in that it seeks control through the creation of integratedand self-regulatory systems, rather than through an intensified division oflabour coupled with external supervision and financial incentives. It also dif-fers from scientific management in terms of its implications for organiza-tional structure, since where the latter implied an increased centralizationof decision-making, O.R. can result in either centralization or decentralization.These differences reflect changes in capitalism itself, namely the growingcentralization of capital. To what developments in capitalism, then, do S.T.S.theory and O.R. correspond? To the extent that it seeks (at least in theory)to clarify alternative solutions to problems, as well as to discuss objectivesof organizations, O.R. is regarded as a response to the ‘. . . progressive“rationalization” of this complex division of labour’, since ‘Rationalizationrequires that objectives be clarified . . .’. Management science thus ‘. . .enters the domain of praxis . . .’25 through seeking the ‘appropriation of sub-jective social relations’, the third aspect of reality referred to earlier. However,autonomy and other aspects of new work roles in the new technologies con-stitute, as we have already observed, a false praxis, a managed praxis, sincethese new roles are both initiated from outside the subjects and developwithin an instrumental logic (of capital accumulation) that is external to thesubjects involved.

Thus management science (comprising O.R. and S.T.S. theory) and sci-entific management stand in a dialectical relationship to one another –whilst the latter appropriates, primarily, objective social relations, the for-mer appropriates both objective and subjective social relations. Yet simulta-neously, this difference in appearance masks a unity in essence: both seek toappropriate the praxis of subordinates and harness it to the achievement ofcapitalist objectives.

The significance of this work is perhaps revealed more clearly now andfull credit is due to Hales for his theoretical advance in the comprehensionof management science in the capitalist epoch. For what may appear on thesurface to be isolated intellectual developments are, in fact, revealed asreflections of, and responses to, developments in the infrastructure of capi-talism itself. This permeation of super-structural phenomena is epitomizedin the denial of praxis and the transformation of social subjects into economic


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objects. And even the most apparently advanced management science –S.T.S. theory – has been unmasked as an attempt to facilitate not true, butfalse, or manipulated, praxis, and this ‘. . . under the specific imperatives ofmodern capitalism’.26 The question before us then is the famous ‘What is tobe done?’: how can management science avoid this subjugation of itself toexternal forces? The answer given by Hales is as follows:

the science which services this development – the objective socializationof labour – carries in it the tacit promise of other modes of rationalorganization of society.27

So there is hope at least, but then we are told:

In a class-divided, hierarchically-structured, capitalist society this prom-ise must remain suppressed.28

Indeed, the promise can only be realized by: ‘Organized, self-consciousagents. . . .’29

In other words the basic problem of management science – the denial ofpraxis, requires for its solution – praxis! Since this proposal clearly will nottake us very far, we must return to Hales’ analysis of management science inorder to discover the causes of this programmatic poverty.

Although for Hales, false praxis ‘. . . can only develop actively by refer-ence to images of its opposite, self-management . . .’.30 True praxis, involv-ing the ‘full dimensions’ of people, people as ‘social subjects’, remainsthroughout his work as an abstraction that is never concretized. At no pointin the article does Hales develop his concept of praxis in relation to the mys-tifications which he properly criticizes. Particular case studies, such as thatof the Norwegian pulp mill, in which employees were ‘given’ more autonomyand responsibility in order that the company might better achieve its objec-tives are criticized on the grounds that they constitute a false, or manipulated,praxis. Indeed, the essence of praxis lies precisely in the fact that it cannotbe ‘given’. Whilst such criticism is undoubtedly justified, it is neverthelessone-sided, and ultimately just as undialectical as the management science towhich it is being opposed. For as Hales comments in relation to scientificmanagement, capitalism itself creates the conditions under which produc-tion becomes progressively planned and socialized.

Equally, in relation to advanced technologies, capitalism does not simplyde-skill the workforce and confront it with its skills embodied in technologyand in ‘experts’, as Hales claims. Rather, it de-skills only a part of it, whilsta smaller section – of technicians and other specialists – is trained in thegeneral management and supervision of the whole productive process.Hence, at the same time as the work force may be divided and isolated, higherand middle management may itself become even more isolated and be seento play little or no role in the process of production per se. The point is that


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the treatment of people as objects through the theoretical constitution offalse praxis as the object of enquiry, does in fact capture a significant aspectof capitalist social reality. People are treated as objects and, if they were not,there would be no rationale for the Marxist theory of capitalism and nonecessity to transcend current society.

In relation to Hale’s underdeveloped concept of praxis, defined as ‘. . .self-conscious, self-developing social activity’,31 there runs throughout thework the concept of necessity, used in connection with the development ofmanagement science under capitalism. For it seems that not only does man-agement science appropriate or deny authentic praxis amongst subordi-nates, but that the science itself is the result of a false praxis, or a responseto the imperatives of laissez-faire and monopoly capitalism. Although againthis is undoubtedly true in part, it seems, for example, somewhat oversim-plified to account for the growth of O.R. and S.T.S. theory in terms of theprogressive rationalization of the division of labour, especially if this itself isleft unexplained. It is one thing to argue that O.R. appears to be functionalfor a particular stage of capitalist development, but quite another to trans-form this functionalism into a causal explanation. We do not doubt that O.R.is functional for capitalism, but was this the only possible mode of develop-ment of management science and, if not, why was it that O.R., and not someother perspective, emerged?

However, if management science is at present an ideological reflection(to a large degree) of the requirements of capitalism, then on what basis arewe to reconstruct the discipline? It cannot be done solely by reference to cur-rent management science, since by this means we would incorporate thelimitations of that science, and yet simultaneously have no means of tran-scending them. Nor can it be done, as Hales suggests, by reference to the‘full dimensions’ of people as ‘social subjects’ since if we knew through experi-ence what these dimensions were there would be no necessity to surpasscapitalism. Indeed such a notion is ultimately idealistic in so far as anyattempt to render it meaningful can succeed only in imposing extra-rationalconstraints on the concept of human nature, or else in adding a furtherseries of empty categories to those already extant. Hence, although the workof Hales is both valuable and significant, it has reached and exposed its ownlimitations. Without a fuller analysis of the social relations of capitalist pro-duction we will be left awaiting the spontaneous praxis of self-consciousagents to deliver us from the mystifications of ideological science.

The Importance of History

It is in this context that the work of Whitley assumes significance, for he hasset himself the task of producing, not only a critique of management science,but an alternative to it. The two papers, written in 1974, take up these tasks


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although one is more oriented to the former, and the other to the latter. Thecritique of management science begins by noting both the univtrsalism andthe empiricism which are to be found in many works on organizational the-ory and organizational control – topics which Whitley sees as the centralconcerns of most writers on management. The characteristic of universalismis indicated by the fact that ‘existing organizations are taken as given . . .32

and are treated as eternal, ahistorical entities, whilst empiricism manifestsitself in the rather arbitrary way management studies are categorized. Suchcategorizations seem to have ‘no coherent ordering principles . . ,’33 and soWhitley therefore produces his own:

Current approaches to management research may, then, be classifiedaccording to how relations between society, formal organizations and theindividual are understood.34

On this basis three major approaches are distinguished according towhether society, the organization or the individual are taken as the startingpoint for analysis, with other levels being reducible, or secondary, to the onechosen. Cybernetic and other systems theorists are placed in the first cate-gory, ‘radical psychological individualists’ in the third, and the bulk of organi-zational theory in the second. Whitley then proceeds to an exposition andcritique of the most prominent theories of management and organization.Many of the criticisms of these theories are perfectly valid, although in gen-eral they are not original. For instance radical psychological individualists,such as Herzberg and Argyris, are rightly criticized for ignoring the realityof structure and, hence, the structural basis of conflict. Systems theorists areaccused of being overly abstract, sometimes to the point of vacuity, and oftreating the biological notion of ‘a system’ as though it were a theoreticalconcept when, in fact, it is merely an analogy, or model. And ‘organizationtheorists’ are taken to task for failing to display any historical understand-ing of organizations and of the ways in which they change over time accord-ing to changes in the ‘wider society’. Indeed Whitley’s first paper is marredby a rather excessive predilection for throwing any and every criticism at‘management science’. This plethora of criticism necessarily entails a varietyof critical standpoints and it is therefore not altogether surprising that nocoherent alternative management science emerges from the paper. This isreflected in the fact that although the title of the paper refers to the studyof ‘forms of cooperation in changing socio-economic structures’, no furtherreference is made to these ‘socio-economic structures’ except by way of gen-eral remarks to the effect that they have been ignored.

However, overriding all these criticisms is the view that existing approachesto management research both take existing organizations as given and treatobjectives as specifiable, consensual and historically indeterminate. Whitleywrites:


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In almost all discussions of management research existing structures areassumed as basic data and their imputed or stated objectives are accepted.In other words not only do current forms of organization serve as thestarting point for analysis, they also serve as the reference point for con-cluding analysis. The emphasis is very much on improving existing struc-tures in the light of changing conditions.35

A broadening of approach to the study of ‘forms of organization’ thusinvolves, Whitley tells us, ‘a historical understanding of how forms of organi-zations have emerged, flourished and decayed in different socio-economicstructures’ and ‘some discussion of values and objectives which is not rootedin time and culture-specific circumstances’.36

Currently, then, management research – at least in western capitalism –must analyse ‘how particular types of coordinated work activities have arisenwithin the capitalist system, what are the inherent dynamics of these typesand how do these dynamics relate to the developments of capitalism’.37 It willbegin with the current forms of organization, but, unlike existing approaches,not end with them: ‘It is essential to understand how existing forms devel-oped if we are to see how future forms will occur and how they may be mod-ified’.38 Conventional management researchers either totally ignore society,or they regard it as a product of large scale organization and extrapolate cur-rent trends without attempting to model underlying processes. The virtue ofMarxism, according to Whitley, is that it does not do this; Marx practised a‘form of science which was predicated on the belief that real structuresunderlay common sense reality and these structures could be comprehendedby man and so controlled by him’.39 Thus Whitley concludes that even if onedoes not view Marx’s work as ‘definitive and exemplary’ it must be takenseriously, at least as a starting point, for it provides ‘one model of develop-ment for a substantive management science predicated on the belief thatman can understand his situation and improve it’.40 Whitley argues that itis this belief which distinguishes management research, although he doesrecognize that it could be argued that all social science is orientated towardsthe aim of developing a better society in terms of rationally discussed values.

Whitley’s management research implies that ‘not only are existing con-cepts of organization to be taken as problematic, but that existing dominantvalues are to be seen not only as social facts, hence scientifically problematic,but also as questionable in their own terms’.41 This implies at least a rejec-tion of the irrationalist view of values which dominates social science andespecially the attempt to achieve a value-free study, if not a rejection of thefact-value distinction. Indeed, Whitley goes so far as to assert, unfortunatelywith no detailed discussion as to its precise meaning and significance, that ‘ascience of management without discussing the problem of ultimate valuesand their role in understanding and practice’ is impossible.42 Unless we knowwhat precisely is entailed in such a discussion it is difficult to evaluate this


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assertion and its consequences; furthermore, it is not easy to see how Whitleyavoids retreating into idealism. A management science which, either by deci-sion or default, does not accept the values and goals of the dominant cultureneed not deny that values are historically determinate and, hence, the impos-sibility of ultimate goals and values. There cannot be a discussion of valuesand objectives which is not rooted in time and culture – as Whitley impliesthere could be, at least if his words are taken literally – for the terms of anyrational discussion will inevitably be historically and culturally determinedregardless of whether they reflect the dominant culture.

Given the lack of clarification in Whitley’s articulation of his proposedstrategy for research in management in his first paper, his second paper isthus of special interest. Unfortunately, he does not follow up all the pointshe raises in his first paper and, in particular, he does not enlarge on the‘problem of ultimate values’. It certainly cannot be taken to represent astraight follow-up of his previous paper. In the second paper theories are nowclassified according to the way in which they treat ‘the problem of order’ inorganizations and, specifically, to their explanation of the source of ‘disorder’.The first group see disorder as the result of human irrationality which isitself inexplicable; the second treats disorder as a function of ‘opposed per-sonal goals’, to be resolved by the exercise of power; whilst the third groupconsists of those theorists who, although they acknowledge the existence ofconflicting goals, nevertheless argue that organizations are bound togetherby a consensus of fundamental values. Within general sociology each ofthese views of ‘order and disorder’ has been subjected to considerable criti-cism and much of it is used by Whitley against management theorists. Thesame features which were found to characterize management theories in thefirst paper apply with equal strength to the theories reviewed in the secondpaper. Many contain universalist views of ‘human nature’, ahistorical treat-ments of organizations, and/or ‘managerialist’ views of organizational prob-lems. But the crux of their failings is that certain phenomena, whether theybe interpersonal conflict, environmental disorder, or human irrationality, aretaken as given, as unamenable to rational explanation. Whitley howeverargues that this tendency is inimical to the development of a science of man-agement and, in the second half of this paper, he lays down the basis for analternative management science. This alternative draws heavily on the workof Althusser and Poulantzas43 and has three basic components. Firstly, itstresses the relationship between organizations and the wider society; sec-ondly, it treats organizations, principally capitalist industrial organizations,in terms of their fundamental purpose, the accumulation of capital via theextraction of surplus value; and thirdly, it suggests that organizationalbehaviour can only be understood in terms of the interaction of dominantand subordinate collectivities, where the former seeks to legitimate its rulethrough the institutionalization of ideology. The perspective is summarizedby Whitley as follows:


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The comparative study of organizational control or organizational devel-opment, then, is the study of how macro-structural processes and powerrelations are manifested and how such modes of manifestation them-selves condition further developments.44

He later writes that,

organizations (may) be viewed as modes of institutionalizing patterns ofsubordination in a system of power relations derived from a context ofmacro-structural processes . . . .45

This perspective serves to draw our attention to the fact that organiza-tions do not operate in a vacuum and, also, to the fact that they are systemsbased on domination and not ‘free consent’. It also points to the purpose ofcapitalist industrial organizations. But unfortunately Whitley’s work con-tains many shortcomings. To begin with it is marked by a degree of abstrac-tion peculiar to much Althusserian writing and, although this in itself is notobjectionable, the point about Althusserian abstractions is that they do nottake us very far. Further, and more seriously, they appear incapable, even inprinciple, of yielding fresh insights into the questions under consideration.There is little interest in being told that organizations must be seen in thecontext of macrostructural processes unless these processes are at leastidentified, if not discussed. Whitley’s references to these processes are notaccompanied by such identification, and this lacuna lends weight to theaccusation of ‘reification’ that one could reasonably level at his work.

The second shortcoming concerns the relationship between the economicand the political functions of organizations. Although Whitley acknowledgesthe centrality of surplus value production in capitalist organizations, thisacknowledgement is in fact largely formal, as it is not explored. For he thenproceeds to treat organizations in terms of their political characteristics only,that is in terms of power and authority. Instead of seeing the political activ-ities of organizations as subservient to their economic ends, and discussingthe relations between them, Whitley appears to treat political activities asan object of study in their own right. Indeed to the extent that he pays nosignificant attention to the capitalist production process (except when treat-ing it as a premise from which to derive further arguments) we can say thatWhitley has failed to break from a purely sociological perspective.

Since Whitley does not follow up many of his ideas (for example, theimportance of profit in capitalism is mentioned but then dropped) and oftenuses ill-defined, obscure and vague terminology, it is difficult to know whatit would mean to follow his example. An overall evaluation of Whitley’s workmust await further contributions, and thus it is to be hoped that further expli-cations and development of his ideas will be forthcoming. It is also to behoped that his two papers are not dismissed – as Mills said of Parsons – as‘confused verbiage’.46 For Whitley does point to the importance of values,


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history, and non-reductionism, amongst other things, for a critical manage-ment theory. He goes beyond Hales – whose work he recognizes, but does notcriticize – in that he argues for the treatment of developments within capital-ist organizations as problematic. Unlike Hales, who simply counter-posescaitalpist and non-capitalist organizations according to the criterion of praxis,and thus by implication treats capitalist organizations as static and forminga homogeneous category, Whitley recognizes the dynamic nature of organi-zations, albeit in a somewhat formal manner. As it stands, though, it is diffi-cult not to conclude that his work contains a number of paradoxes. Compare,for example, his plea for historical analysis with his formalism; or his recog-nition of the economic character of organizations and his anti-reductionismwith his emphasis on the political level. These and other problems of Whitley’swork may have been overcome had he considered the location of the man-agement scientist in society and not simply focused on what he terms the‘intellectual structures’ of management research.47

As it is, it is difficult then not to conclude that Whitley has divested man-agement research of its practical dimension, despite his obvious concern forimprovements. For he ends up giving primacy to the development of ‘a setof categories for describing organizations and their modes of development’.Alternatively, it is difficult not to feel that the reader may be left with theimpression that the management scientist, according to Whitley, is somehow‘above society’ and/or should be involved in, or be stimulating, a rationaldebate about values. There is nothing in what Whitley says to imply that,because of the irreconcilable conflict between capital and labour in capital-ism, such a rational debate about the values (according to which we wish tojudge and improve organizations) cannot involve all simultaneously.

Concluding Remarks

The overall purpose of this paper has not been simply one of destructive crit-icism. We have attempted to describe and critically evaluate several recent‘radical’ writers on management. From this we may argue, amongst otherthings, that their work lacks any clear method, that is any notion of the pre-cise links between theory, concrete reality and practical intentions. There hasbeen little self-conscious reflection on what precisely the more critical man-agement studies are aiming to achieve, and how it might be achieved and forwhom it is ‘working’. Our discussion thus serves to raise several importantquestions. Can you have a radical management science? Is it not a contradic-tion in terms? If not, what would it look like? Part of the problems inherentin answering these questions arise from the obvious fact that ‘radical’ is aterm which applies to relative positions and can easily be used in a vague andmisleading way and, certainly, is a highly problematic concept. Thus, for exam-ple, Taylorism is radical in so far as it is a manifestation of the progressive


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nature of capitalism, whilst Taylor was certainly radical in his times. At pres-ent the term radical can be applied to many different things ranging fromsimply approaches which locate organizations within the wider society to afully fledged Marxist approach. Perhaps the common thrust in the radicalmovement is a concern not to treat the existing patterns of inequality ofwealth, status, power and authority as given, coupled with an attack on cur-rent management thinking for being a form of legitimation and support ofthe status quo. An important aspect of the work which we have discussed isits implicit acceptance of the study of forms of organization and managementas a legitimate and significant activity. It thus serves, amongst other things,to defend such enquiry against those who argue that to concentrate on man-agement systems is to support their very existence. There are, however, dif-ferences between the various writers we have discussed.

Churchman’s emphasis is more on the role of the management scientistand less on the cognitive structure of what they produce. It is interesting tonote that as discussion becomes more focused on the latter, as is exempli-fied by Whitley’s work, less attention is paid to how one might achieve adebate about values, and how theory relates to practical movements. This isnot to say that Churchman satisfactorily deals with such issues. He appearsto end up with a form of idealism and fails to locate the management scien-tist in society. Also, as we have seen, despite a recognition of the importanceof history and the material base of society, both Hales and Whitley appearreluctant to face up to the fact that the management scientist’s behaviourand values must inevitably be culturally and historically grounded. He can-not be above society, but rather his attempt to improve organizations ismediated through his membership of particular groups and communities, aswell as through his concepts and language. The question of a radical man-agement science, as Churchman to some extent recognizes, thus involvesthe problem of its organization, and how it relates to the activities whichconstitute its field of study. Unless this is confronted there is the danger thatwe simply replace moral condemnation with an amoral, highly scholastic,body of thought consisting of little more than a set of abstract concepts or,alternatively, with more sophisticated understandings of existing manage-ment thought which do no more than reinforce the tendency to dismiss it.

The various attempts to ‘radicalize’ management and organizationalstudies are distinguishable above all else by their approaches. In a sensethey all attempt to go beyond simple moral condemnation; that is, they havenot simply assumed management systems are manipulative and, hence, thatsocial scientists involved in activity directed towards changing or improvingthem are inherently the ‘servants of power’. The recent discussions of man-agement science have thus focused on it as a body of knowledge (of oneform or another) and not specifically on its creator and diffuser, the man-agement scientist or bureaucratic social engineer. Churchman and Halesthus agree that it is not so much that management science is aimed at


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(knowingly or otherwise) the manipulation of workers, but that it is con-cerned to adapt them to the ‘needs’ of a particular form of society. Howeverwhilst Hales goes on to state clearly that the basic form of this society, i.e.,capitalism, is one in which labour power is treated as a commodity, Churchmandoes not go beyond stating that the management scientist is failing to act asa change-agent and, hence, simply reflecting dominant views, whatever theymay be. He thus fails, as we have argued, to take seriously the ‘wider soci-ety’ in which management science is located and the management scientist’srelation to it. Churchman’s critique amounts then to little more than an eth-ical one: the management scientist should attempt to influence society, notdirectly through attempting to change values, but from a distance throughworking on broader issues than he has done so far.

This amounts to looking at social problems (e.g. poverty), which tend tobe accepted as problems but, nevertheless, to be neglected or ignored asindividual problems. The management scientist should thus according toChurchman join the rediscovery of, and regeneration of debate about, issuesthat were thought to have died with the ‘affluent’ or post-industrial society.Churchman fails to analyse or even discuss why it is that these particularproblems are neglected and remain, or if dealt with, are treated in an inad-equate way. Furthermore, he does not discuss whether they are defined in amanner e.g. in individualistic terms, which lends itself to their eliminationas social problems.

There has been a recent discussion of some of the problems of societywhich has not made this mistake. Thus, for example, work along somewhatsimilar lines to the modern deviancy theory in sociology has been carriedout in the industrial area; for example, disclosing that what one groupdefines as a problem may not be a problem for all,48 or that a problem is notdefined to reflect its true nature.49 Perhaps the best example of this type ofwork is that carried out by Nichols50 in the area of safety. He argues thatsafety is neglected at work, and that this arises because of the primacy ofproduction and because of the definition of the problem in individualisticterms. Hence its causes and solution are seen in terms of individual charac-teristics, e.g. morale and age. This kind of work is certainly important andrealistic but it stops at the point where it tells us that the safety problem arisesout of a situation in which the ‘people who do the producing’ do not havecontrol over production and that the ‘problem of safety is a question of put-ting people before production’. It can thus only conclude with little morethan an appeal to the effect that ‘the people who do the producing musthave power to ensure that their safety is put first’.51 It is open to debatewhether this kind of ‘disclosure’ research goes a great deal beyond the kindof moral condemnation that Nichols considers somewhat crude. Certainlywithout consideration of workers’ actions (or lack of them) about such mat-ters as safety, any analysis must be deemed deficient.


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If one does not consider the practices of workers struggling against capi-tal and their representatives then one can neither go beyond seeing particu-lar problems and systems as almost ‘naturally’ following from the laws ofcapitalism, or suggest ways in which those most affected by them can mean-ingfully confront them at a particular historical time. This weakness is revealedin the work of Hales who fails to go beyond seeing management science as areflection of the particular society in which it arises, namely capitalism. Tosay that it treats the worker as an object to be manipulated is in fact hardlysurprising since it is the historical task of capital and its agents to expropri-ate labour power and create surplus value. An understanding of this, as Halesand Whitley say, is a vital beginning for a radical management science whichdoes not simply reflect dominant values. However, it must go beyond this tosee the way in which workers’ struggles have affected the introduction, work-ings and rejections of particular forms of organization. In this way praxis isincluded in our analysis not simply because of the need to transcend man-agement systems, as Hales implies, but in order to grasp their essence. Nothingis the result of the laws of capitalism per se, for these laws are not generaland unconditional, but rather modified by specific factors. And perhaps themost important of these factors is the form which the class struggle takes. Amanagement science which analyses forms of organization in the light of thiscan hardly fail to relate to particular practical intentions. Perhaps this is thecrux of the matter: management systems are not simple reflections of eco-nomic laws to direct passive workers but rather part of a totality which livesbecause of the praxis which has produced it. A full recognition of thisinvolves realizing that workers are actively involved in struggle against beingtreated as objects and, in many cases, for example, have gone ‘beyond con-tracts’ not through higher-trust or interesting jobs, but through collectiveorganizations.52 Analysing this struggle historically will mean that we willnot make the mistake of assuming that all such struggle is revolutionary;such an assumption can only lead back to, or rest on, a moral critique of man-agement systems. That is, one which assumes the working class is inherentlyrevolutionary and, hence, in which all management systems are inherentlyideological weapons to contain the effects of this.53

That management science must incorporate an understanding of theclass struggle and of the various forms it takes is not to say that analysisbegins and ends there. The class struggle must itself be located in the actualdevelopment of the economy. In this way the danger of focusing on thepolitical, as Whitley does, will be avoided. To stress the political significanceof modern management thinking and techniques, such as job enrichment, isjustified in relation to the growing power of trade unionism, the problems ofmanagerial legitimacy, etc. But we must not neglect the fact that such ideasand techniques affect directly the mode of production, and reflect problemsof the production process and the need for efficiency and profit. It is in thisrespect that Rose in his recent history of the industrial social sciences is right


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to emphasize the need for a social science approach and not simply a soci-ological approach to industrial studies. It is a pity that neither he nor Whitleytake us very much beyond the sociological perspective as they continue toneglect the political economy of the factory.54

To stress the importance of the economic effects of management theoryand techniques is to point to its contradictory nature. For whilst, on the onehand, it may increase the rate of exploitation of labour power it may, on theother hand, represent a progression of, or reform in, the labour process.Recognition of this should lead to the elimination of the crude notions (suchas the idea that management theory is manipulative) which have led to thedismissive attitude on the part of so many towards management science.Perhaps then there is some need to distinguish organizational studies frommanagement studies, in that the former is broader and concerned with thescience of production and that the latter reflects a particular historical periodin which the problem of production is principally a problem of management.

Stressing the economic effects of management thought also serves toemphasize the need to treat its influence and effect as problematic and asan important part of management science. This involves fundamental ques-tions concerning the best way in which theory can develop, how theoristsshould organize themselves and who they should work with and influence.The fact that there is a task for the radical management scientist as a specialistis well illustrated by the quality and quantity of debate, for example, con-cerning the organization of workers’ cooperatives (such as the Scottish DailyExpress) and surrounding the Bullock Commission on Industrial Democracy.But perhaps more fundamentally there is a need for him because very fewpeople are in the privileged position (if it really is?) of being able to choosewhether they dismiss management systems and whether they ignore theresults of inventors such as Taylor. To neglect the systematic study of organi-zations is to encourage passivity on the part of those who have to react dailyto management initiatives or alternatively have to face problems (such asaccidents) arising from a lack of management initiative. It is precisely becausethe bulk of workers are not totally inert and passive, as much conventionalmanagement researchers assume and/or would prefer, that we should bestimulated to seek alternatives to existing organizational theories. It is alsoprecisely because they are not inherently revolutionary or automaticallydriven to socialism through experiences in the workplace (e.g. redundancyor job enrichment), that we should reject the crude so-called Marxist theo-ries of Bosquet and others.55 But rather we should take our lead along someof the lines suggested in this paper. What exactly the tasks of a radical indus-trial studies entail is another story and will be attempted in another paper.What is certain though, is that waiting for the perfect manifesto for radicalaction is like waiting for Godot, and that any specification of the tasks ofmanagement science cannot be done in isolation from practical activities.


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Notes

1. Churchman, C. W., ‘Operations Research as a Profession’, Management Science, Vol.17, Series B, No. 2, October 1970, pp. 37–53; Hales, M., ‘Management Science andthe “Second Industrial Revolution” ’, Radical Science Journal, No. 1, January 1974, pp.5–28; Whitley, R. D., ‘Management Research: The Study and Improvement of Formsof Co-operation in Changing Socio-Economic Structures’, in Roberts, N. (Ed.),Information Sources in the Social Sciences, London: Butterworth, in press (hereafter1974a); Whitley, R. D., ‘Approaches to Organizational Control and the “Problem ofOrder”: A Critique and a Possible Alternative’, forthcoming (1974b).

2. This is not to accept that a critical reconstruction of the history of management sci-ences and organization theory should present the development of the area as asmooth progression, say for example, from the work of Taylor, Mayo and others tothe complexities of ‘open systems’ theory.

3. See Whitley, R. D., 1974a, op. cit., p.4.4. It was the systematic scientific aspect of Taylor’s work which, of course, attracted the

attention of Lenin. See Lenin, V. I., The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, p. 14.

5. Carey, A., ‘The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical Criticism’, American Sociological Review,Vol. 32, No. 3, June 1967, pp. 403–16; Sykes, A. J., ‘Economic Interest and theHawthorne Researches: A Comment’, Human Relations, Vol. 18, No. 3, August 1965,pp. 253–63.

6. As Freeman has recently argued the idea of a value-free science is itself a value basedstatement. See, Freeman, M., ‘Sociology and Utopia: Some Reflections on the SocialPhilosophy of Karl Popper’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, March 1975,pp. 20–34.

7. Berger, P., Imitation to Sociology, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966, thus claims thatthe people who use the information provided by sociologists ‘has nothing to do withthe character of the information itself.’

8. Albrow, M., “The Study of Organizations – Objectivity or Bias’, in Penguin SocialSciences Survey, 1968, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.

9. The philosophy of science can no longer be taken to be logical positivism à laBraithwaite and others. See Martins, H., ‘Time and Theory in Sociology’, in Rex, J.(ed.), Approaches to Sociology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 285. Itmust not only include alternative philosophies, but also an historical and sociologicaldimension.

10. Whitley, R. D., 1974a, op. cit., p. 28.11. Hales, M., op. cit., p. 5.12. See Nichols, T., ‘The “Socialism” of Management: Some Comments on the new

“Human Relations” ’, Sociological Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1975a, p. 249.13. Churchman, C. W., Ackoff, R. L. and Arnoff, E. L., Introduction to Operations Research,

New York: Wiley, 1957.14. Churchman, C. W., Prediction and Optional Decision: Philosophical Issues of a Science

of Values, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961.15. Churchman, C. W., 1970, op. cit.16. Ibid., p. 37.17. Ibid., p. 39.18. Ackoff, R., ‘The Social Responsibility of Operational Research’, Operational Research

Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1974, pp. 361–71; Chesterton, K. et al., ‘A Comment on Ackoff’s“The Social Responsibility of Operational Research” ’, Operational Research Quarterly,Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 91–5, 1975; Ackoff, R. L., ‘Reply to the comments of KeithChesterton, Robert Goodsman, Jonathan Rosenhead and Colin Thunhurst’, Operational


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Research Quarterly, Vol. 26, 1975; Rosenhead, J., ‘Some Further Comments on theSocial Responsibility of Operational Research’, Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 27,1976, pp. 266–72.

19. Chesterton, K. et al., ibid.20. Rosenhead, J., ibid., pp. 270–1.21. Hales, M., op. cit.22. Ibid., p. 25.23. Ibid., p. 19.24. Ibid., p. 22.25. Ibid., p. 24.26. Ibid., p. 27.27. Ibid., p. 27.28. Ibid., p. 27.29. Ibid., p. 28.30. Ibid., p. 28.31. Ibid., p. 12.32. Whitley, R. D., 1974a, op. cit., p. 2.33. Ibid., p. 4.34. Ibid.35. Ibid., p. 2.36. Ibid., p. 3.37. Ibid., p. 25.38. Ibid., p. 25.39. Ibid., p. 26.40. Ibid., p. 26.41. Ibid., p. 26.42. Ibid., p. 27.43. See, for example, Althusser, L., and Balibar, E., Reading Capital, New York: Pantheon

Books, 1970; Poulantzas, N., Political Power and Social Classes, London: New LeftBooks, 1973.

44. Whitley, R. D., 1974b, op. cit., p. 19.45. Ibid., p. 25.46. Mills, C. W., The Sociological Imagination, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, p. 35.47. Whitley, R. D., ‘Review of J. E. T. Eldridge and A. D. Crombie, “A Sociology of

Organizations” ’, Personnel Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, Autumn 1975, pp. 61–2.48. For example, Hyman and Goldthorpe have criticized the presentation of strikes as a

problem. See Hyman, R., Strikes, London: Fontana, 1972; Goldthorpe, J. H., ‘IndustrialRelations in Great Britain; A Critique of Reformism’, Politics and Society, 1974, pp.419–52.

49. Martin and Fryer and Wood have, for example, argued that the standard definitionof the redundancy problem has ignored the issue of control and, hence, it is viewedsimply as a problem of labour mobility and not as a case of forced labour movement.See Martin, R. M. and Fryer, R. H., Redundancy and Paternalist Capitalism, London:George Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp. 216–60; Wood, S. J., ‘Redundancy and Stress’, inGowler, D. and Legge, K. (Eds.), Managerial Stress, Epping: Gower Press, 1975, pp.190–209; Wood, S. J., ‘Consideration of the Study of Redundancy’ The ScottishJournal of Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 1, November 1977, pp. 51–70.

50 Nichols, T., ‘The Sociology of Accidents and the Social Induction of Industrial Injury’,in Esland, G. et al. (Eds.), People and Work, Edinburgh: McDougals Holmes, 1975.Nichols, T. and Armstrong, P., Safety or Profit, Bristol: The Falling Wall Press, 1973.

51. Nichols, T. and Armstrong, P., ibid., p. 30.


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52. As Marx argues, ‘For protection against the worm growing at their vitals, the work-ers must put their heads together, and must as a class compel the passing of a law,the erection of an all powerful solid barrier, which will forbid even the workers them-selves from entering into a free contract with capital when by the terms of that con-tract they . . . are condemned to death or sold into slavery’. See Marx, K., Capital,New York: Everyman’s Library, 1972, p. 311.

53. Bogomolova, N., ‘Human Relations’ Doctrine: Ideological Weapon of the Monopolies,Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974.

54. Whitley’s last page of his second paper (1974b) thus could almost equally well havebeen written by a Parsonian. See also Rose, M., Industrial Behaviour: TheoreticalDevelopments Since Taylor, London: Allen Lane, 1975.

55. Bosquet’s argument is based on assuming that the experience of some control willlead to a socialist consciousness. It is at this point that Nichols gets closest to criticiz-ing the terms of Bosquet’s thesis (see Bosquet, M., ‘The Prison Factory’, New LeftReview, Vol. 73, 1972). He writes, ‘It has to be borne in mind that experience ofevents does not lead automatically to particular interpretations of these events andthis means that it cannot be assumed consciousness and organization will develop oftheir own accord, job enrichment or not’ (see Nichols, T., 1975a, op. cit., p. 263).Similar crude theories of the development of socialist consciousness appear in thesocial sciences. For example, Westergaard implies that the lack of radical ideologydiscovered by Goldthorpe et al., is conditional on an ‘affluent, stable’ economy; thusin contrast to Bosquet he argues that it is not so much rudimentary workers’ controloffered like a ‘Christmas box’, but rather extreme management domination and initi-ation (e.g. over manning levels) which will herald the beginnings of radicalism inindustry. (See Westergaard, J., ‘The Rediscovery of the Cash Nexus’, in Miliband, R.and Saville, J. (Eds.), Socialist Register, London: Merlin, 1970, pp. 111–38.)


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