strategic & problems for the study of the marne campaign 1914, volume i. studies on the command...

7/29/2019 Strategic & Problems for the Study of the Marne Campaign 1914, Volume I. Studies on the Command of t - Const…

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/strategic-problems-for-the-study-of-the-marne-campaign-1914-volume-i-studies 1/48

THE COMMAND AN D GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY

(SMm//A X # K ^

J)

Call Number

Accession Number- 47859

CGSC For m 154 (Rev ) 22 Oct 52Army—CGSC—P5-1707—28 Feb 55—M—2M



B-3084.

Six Copies Made.

Copy No.

STRATEGICAND

TACTICAL PROBLEMS

FOE THE STUDY OF TEE

MARKS CAMPAIGN - 1914.

VOLUME 1.

Studies on the Command of the

German 3rd Array,

August 27-29, 1914.

By

Colonel Constautin Hierl, retired.

S. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1927, publisher,

OPERATIVE UND TAKTISCHS AUFOABM ZUM

STHDIT3I DES MAHNE JELDZUGES 1914

Heft 1

Studien fcber die lUhrung

der Beutschen 3. Arraee

in dsn Tagen von 27-29 August 1914

von

Constantin Hierl

O"berst a.D.

Berlin 1927. Verlegt bei B. S. Mittler & Sohn.



In much of our contemporary military literature we find that

the importance of the command of large units in warfare is •under

estimated,

fhis underestimate is chiefly to 'be attributed to the biased

impressions gained and the one-Bided conclusions drawn froifi the many

years of position warfare fought on the western front during the World

War. Position warfare placed -upon the coxmaanders of larger units

fetters restricting their action* But perhaps even more than the

actual effect of their action it was the reeogaizability of the effect

of their action which wa3 driven into the background in positioa war

fare,

fo be sure, the consaand is not the sole deciding factor in the

struggle for victory in warfare, fher@ are also the quality and

number of the combat forces and of the means of combat (armament and

equipment), A superiority ia th© latter can only to a limited extent

be compensated for by superior leadership,8$ven the best man fails

when he is up against the force of circumstances,"

These limitations do not, however, in any way change the fact

that the commanding officers of the larger units and the high coisaand

have at all times had snd will always continue to have a surpassingly

great influence on victory and defeat in warfare, for this is embodied

in the very nature of warfare*

The qualifies of leadership are inborn, but ths science of com

manding needs to be studied lite ®VBif other science. And this is

also applicable to the science of commanding large units in warfare.

A properly organized course in the history of warfare is an ex

#

cellent means for teaching this science to all those who may b© called

-3



to act as commanders of higher units or their assistants in warfare

in the future.

In serious studies of military history pursued towards this

end two methods may be adopted:

wThe first method consists in tracing the historical event back

to its causes, Starting with the event itself, we trace its course

back and attempt to determine the causes of the ultimate outcome,

victory or defeat. Then we deduce how certain measures influenced

the course of the &vent •&•&& the ultimate result, We follow this up

by a study of the measures adopted with regard to their fitness to

the occasion, and at the same time endeavor to determine whether

another course of action would probably have broiaght about a more

decided or more certain success or failure* finally we try to de

termine the motives which led the commanders in the historical event

to choose the course of action which they did. We then evaluate these

motives on the basis of the knowledge of the situation probably

possessed by the commanding officers in the actual operation and try

to determine whether the means selected was the right one for the

aims in view.

The second method is the indirect one. Breaking off at any criti

cal situation in the course of an historical event, we try to put our

selves in the place of the officer commanding at that time. On the

basis of the knowledge of the situation possessed by that officert w©

determine ~ just as in a tactical problem » what the situation was and

make a definite decision* We compare this decision with that made by

the historical commanding officer. Then by studying the historical

event we trace the consequences of the decision made by the commanding

officer in question and its influence upon the ultimate outcome, and

-3



by comparison with it attempt to determine the consequences and the

bearing of our own decision, (1)

The latter method is especially well adapted for use for giving

a correct idea of the uncertain "basis upon which decisions must "be

made ia warfare* It is also a good means for training that moat

important quality ia a coasnanding officer, thie ability to make de~

cisioas. This method wae first applied to the teaching of military

history as th© so-called "acnlicatory method11

V General *• Verdy

du Veraois (2)»

The author himself used this iaethod in his classes at the

Bavarian Military Academy 'Bayerische Kriegsakadenie) 1911-1914 and

he hopes that the present work will aid in training the commanding

officers of the fufcure.

The author would also like to help all those participants of the

(Jreat flar who, now looking back upon it, are engaged in chronicling

Its events, to reaclx a fair estimate of it, fh© many beer-table

strategists are invited to use the problems given in this work as a

basis, putting themselves in the place of the actual commanders aaS.

Baking the decisions required in the situations* Their estimate will

then be just, and probably more akodost, especially if they take into

consideratioa the fact that the aorananders in these historical events

were personally responsible for the decisions they made and had to

Bake them under the exigencies of warfare.

(1) "Ziele and Wege fur das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte* $y Captain

C. Hierl, 12th supplement to the Militar Wochenblatt, 1910, page 419,

(2) 1870/71 Chief of Section, General Staff, and aide to Moltke, As

Minister of War in 1890 Terdy took a stand in favor of the actual en

forcement of the general compulsory military service law but was de

serted ty Kaiswr Wilhelm II in that matter.



Considering the aim* in view, the Marne Campaign seemed to be

•specially good material for this study, since the Reichsarchiv has

compiled its events in particularly excellent form. (1)

The historical bases for the "problems'1have "been taken chiefly

from the compilation in the Beichsarchiv.

I recommend that comrades who wish to get real training "by

studying the problems given in this work, write out the answers to

the exercises given at the end of each part, at least in a brief

form, and compare their own solution with ray discussion to be found

at the end of each problem only after they have worked out all parts

of each problem*

Munich, September 1926*

The author,

Bsnarks; The special map supplement will also do for all problems

to be published in the future. As the map supplement is published

separately, those who already have the strategic maps on the scale of

1:300,000 (not indicating the location of the troop units) need not

purchase it.

(1) Der Welfkxieg 1914-1918, compiled by the Eeichsarchiv, Volumes

III and IV, The Marne Campaign, E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1926,

-5



TlkBLS OF CONTENTS

Page of Page of

Original . Translat ion.

Preface • 1 2

Problem 1 ,

In 3 pa rt s 17

Problem 2

Discussion of Problem 2 . 20 ZZ

Discussion of the Cormand of trie German 3rd kxxjy August 29-29,

In 5 T>arts 6 14

Discussion of Problem 1 11 20

1914 26 39

- 6



PROBLEM I .

PAKE I .

The Cteneral Combat Si tuation as i t might have

been viewed lay the Coraraander of the

German 3rd Araay on the eve

ning of August 27,

1914.

The German 1st Array defeated the British at Mons (August 23)

and the German 2nd Army de feated the main body of the French 5th

Army to the south of the Charleroi-Hamup line (August 22 and 23),

the German 3r d Army forced the passage of the Meuse on both sides

of Dinant (August 23) i n the face of opposit ion on the pa rt of small

•units of the French 5th Army, By the re t r ea t s t ar ted the night of

August 23rd the French 5th Array has ex tri ca te d i t s e l f from the envel

opment. The surrounding movement t hru Fumay, to "be made wi th a pr o

vi si on al di vi si on , for which at the in st ru c ti ons of the High Consnand,

orders were not is su ed by th e Commander of the 3rd Army u n t i l the

morning of August 24, i s no longer ef fect ive .

While the German 1s t and 2nd Armies have followed i n a d i rec t ly

southwesterly direction with a view to overtaking the left wing of

the enemy, the German 3rd Army has s tar ted the purs ui t in a southerly

d i rec t io n . The commander of the 3rd Array in th i s way complied with

the wish of the eomnandsr of the 4t h Army, who asked fo r "c lo se co nt ac t8

with the rig ht wing of the 4t h Array which st a rt ed for C ha rl ev il le a ft er

the victorious Battle of Heuchateau (August 22),

I t s r ear guard engaging in ski rmish es , the 3rd Army reached the

Soraonne sector (s ou th of Hocroi) on Jtoagust 27 • The re si st an ce of the



enemy's rear guards in the high country between Sormonne and Audry

creek was checked after a short fight. The eneiay has retreated in a

southerly direction. No news has been received from the region to

the southwest of the Thon sector*

The situation of the 3rd Army was as follows on the evening of

£i£ust 27. The head of the Xllth Reserve Corps - less the 34th

Reserve Division which it had left with the heavy army artillery in

front of Fort Qlvet - had reached Auvillers lea Forges,

Of the XIIth Army Corps, the 32nd Infantry Division in purs-uit

of the enemy who wa« retreating to Signy l»Abbays, had reached Marlemont,

fighting its way thither; the 23rd Infantry Division was r#iting on

and to th* north of the Blombay-Le Chatelet line.

The XIX th Army Corps, the divisions of which had been greatly

exhausted by the extraordinary difficulties of their march and of the

work of bringing Tip supplies, had been unable to reach the objective

assigned it, Thin le Moutier, and was resting along the Benves-Revin

road.

The staff of the 3rd Army had reached Rocroi the morning of the

27th.

The staff of the 2nd Array at A^esnes had reported that the left

wing of the 2nd Array had reached the region of La Capelle (northwest

of Hirson) on the 27th and that the commanding officer intended to

halt on the 28thMin order to give the 3rd Army the ^opportunity to

move up to the left wing of the 2nd Army."

The following is known about the 4th Anflys

The right wing of the army, which had started from the region of

Qedinne (16 km to the east of lhaaay) for Mezieres, was diverted on

August 25 toward Sedan and only one siege detachment was sent to the

-8



antiquated barrier Fort Leg Ayvelles (to the south of Mezieres). The

right wing of the 4th Army crossed the Mease at Donchery and Sedan

August 26 and engaged in hard fighting on the hills south of the

Ueuae,

During the 27th of August the headquarters of the 3rd Army re

ceived several wireless messages from the commander of the 4th Army

containing increasingly more urgent requests rto enter the Battle on

the Meuse. A general request for a "further advance" , which arrived

in the morning, was followed during the early hours of the afternoon

"by the request: "Combat to the south of Sedan. Assistance urgently

requested0, and a few hours later came the same request in a more

emphatic fora: "Inaediate entry into action of the 3rd Army to the

w««t of Meaieres, from there and almost to Cheveuges, is mot urgently

requested.** It had also been reported that the heavy guns apparently

had been withdrawn from Fort Ayvelles and that the siege detachment

had been brought on the battle field.

The High Command at Coblenz, with which there was wireless com

munication aa well as with the headquarters of the 2nd Army at Aveanes

and the headquarters of the 4th Army at Bouillon, reported on the 34th

of August that the right wing of the 4th Army had started the pursuit

to Mezieres. Fo ftether instructions have been received from it since

then.

It is very hot, The troops of the 3rd Army are vejry much

fatigued.

Exercises to be written out:

1. Line of reasoning and decision of the commander of the

3rd Anay on the evening of the 27th of August.

2. Orders of the commander of the 3rd Army for the 28th

(content only).

3. Text of wireless report to the High Command.



PAB3? 2 .

Development of the Situation up to the Morning of August 28.

The coamandfir of th e 3 rd Army, Gen era l von Hausen, p la nn ed t o

tu rn off toward Le Chesne-Chemery on August 28 in a so u th -e a st e rl y

d i r e c t i o n to the suppor t of the 4 t h Army. Be l iev ing th at a decis ion

of such importance did not f a l l w ithin hi s powers, on the afternoo n

of August 27 he re po rt e d h is in te n ti o n to the High Consaand and at

f i r s t rec eiv ed in rep ly merely the statement t ha t the array would

re ce iv e d ir e c t in s tr u c t i o n s from the High Command on the 26 th. Then.

the commander of the 3rd Array reported: !t$he army w il l not c a rr y ou t

i t s i n t e n t io ns as r epo r t ed fo r August 28 | awai t s the r ec e ip t of

the expec ted in s t ruc t ions .* 1

The st a f f of th e 2nd Array move informed of th e pr es en t in te n ti o n

of turning off to the southeast on the 28th of August to the support

of th e 4t h Army, with the req ue st Mto cover th e r e a r of th e 3r d Array

in th a t ev en t" . • i n s tr u c t i o n s from the High Command expected ; a f t e r

they a rr iv e you w il l "be informed of the d e c is io n 8 .

General von Bulow refused the request of the 3rd An^y for a "coverf o r t h e r ea r 8 , 'because he con side red tha t the missio n of ik * h is a n #

was embodied in a close cooperation with the 1st Array.

At 10:30 p.m. the following orders were received from the High

Command by w ir e le s s a t th e he ad qu ar te rs of th e 3rd Array: "Continue

advance in a gen era l southw ester ly d i re c t i on . Orders fo l low.M

According to the anry order sent out at midnight the head of the

ma in body of the 3r d Army was to re ac h th e Rumigny (XII Reserve Corps)

- Liart - Signy l«Abbaye (XII Array Corps) - Launois (XDtth Army Corps)

l i n e by 4 P.M. on August 28 .

During the night of August 27 and the morning of the 28th several

- 1 0



a p p e a l! fo r he lp were ag ain r ec ei ve d £rom the 4t h Anoy. The w ire -

l e t s message sen t at 5.15 A.M. from the he ad qu ar ter s of the 4 th

Army conta ined more d e ta i l s about i t s s i tu a t i o n . I t repor te d tha t

the r ight wing of that army (the VIII th Corps and the VHIth Reserve

Corps) was to the south of Sedan on the Frenois-Koyers line, the

Corps of the center (the XVIII and the XVIII Beserve) had taken the

w es te rn bank of t he Meuse "between Mouzon and H auc our t, and th e l e f t

wing of t he army (the IV Corps) had gained a footh old to th e no rt h

of Sten ey on th e we ster n bank of the Meuse, The 4 th Array inte nd ed

to continue the attack on the 28th, which so far did not seem to

pr og re ss , appar ent ly ch ief ly due to the ef fe ct s of the enoughs a r t i l

le ry f i r e . The re po rt concluded with the fol lowing words: "Immediate

e n tr y in to a ct io n to the v:est of &e ziere s on the Vendresse-Sapo^ne

l ine u rgen t ly des i red ,1 1

On the morning of the 28th of August the exp ected in s tr u c ti o n s

from the High Coinraand arrived.

They read as fo l lows ( e x t r a c t ) :

••Divided into three groups, the eneny has tried to check the

Gera&n of fe ns iv e. On the no rth ^i ng , o ppo si te our 1 st , 2nd and 3rd

Arm ies, suppo rted £y the B ri t i s h and p a rt of the Belgian Army, he has

remained chiefly on the defensive between Maubeuge-Namur and Dinant.

H is p la n , to o ut fl an k the ri g h t wing of the Gjterman Army, was f r u s tr a te d

by the movement of our 1st Army in extending its line*

MTh8 c e n te r of t he energy fo rc es was lo c a te d between Me zieres

and Verdun. I t s l e f t wing took the offe nsiv e and moved ag ai ns t our

4 th Army in the Semois s e c to r . When th is offen sive f a i l e d , the cen te r

of the enery fo rc es t r i e d t o dr iv e th e l e f t wing of our 5t h Army away

from Mets by an a tt a c k from Verdun, This attem pt als o fa il e d ,

M l third and stronger force of the enexny at tempted to break thru

- 1 1



t« Lorraine and the upper Rrdne Vailay. Our bth and ?th Armies suc

ceeded in defeating tiiis attempt b/ iieavy fighting.

"Ail the reg-'ilar army corps of the French Aruiy have already been

engaged in action and have suffered considerable losses; tbe greater

part of his reserve divisions have also already bean in action and

have been severely shaken.

*We cannot bare at present judge hov? great zhQ power of resis

tance of the French-British Arm;/ is at this tine,

The French are at present in full retreat in a southwesterly and

westerly direction, at least th.eir northsi.i and central groups, are,

hence in the direction of Paris, On their wa/ they '/rill presuroably

effer rex>eated and stubborn resistance.

After having lost tne Meuse Line, the nortiiera and central groups

of the French and British can offer renewed resistance behind the

Aisne, taeir extreme left «rir.g probably advanced tc the St. ^uentin

La Fere - Laon line, their right wing to the west of the Argonne, near

St. Uenehould. Ths next line would probably be the Marne, «ith tha

iring rsstiug on Paris*

low success depends upon preventing the French Ar&y from ,getting

any rest, preventing its reorganisation, and depriving the country of

ad Oi&ny means* of combat as possible, all to bs accomplished by an

ixaojediate advance of the German forces on Paris,

' !Uhe 1st Army, with the 2nd. Cavalry Corps under it, is to inarch to

the west of the Oi«e towards the lower Seine,

The 2nd Armyt with the 1st Cavalry Corps under it, is to advance

on Paris on the Le Fere -Laon line, ^pon it devolves the envelopment

and capture of Maubeuge and l;*ter of La Fore, raid, in cooperation with

the 3rd Ar qy, of Laon, Xho 1st Cavalry Corps will reeonnoiter before the

-12



front of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. The 3rd Arnsy is to be provided

with information on the situation,

Th« 3rd Arny will continue the advance on Chateau Thierry

on the Laon-Guignicourt line to the west of Heuchatel. Hirson it

to be captured, and Laon with Ifort Conde (1) in cooperation with

the 2nd Army.

The 4th Army is to march on Spernay via Betas.

•The line of separation between the 2nd and 3rd Armies is to

run from Vervins to Laon, Soissons and La Ferte Milon, the towns

going to the 2nd Army.

uThat between the 3rd and 4th Armies: Signy l'Abbaye to Chateau

Porcien along the Aisne ie Guigni court to Crugny, west of Hheims to

Treloup, w«st of Dormans; the towns going to the 3rd Army.

All the armies must act by mutual agreement and must support

each other in the combat in the different sectors, A powerful resis

tance .which will be offered on the Aisne said later aikfc at the Marne,

may makB it necessary for the armies to turn from the southwesterly

direction and proceed south*

Exercise: Re commendation by the chief of staff of the 3rd Army

to his commanding officer, after the arrival of the instructions

from the High Command,

(1) To the east of Soissons.

-13



3rd Part.

Situation shortly after noon on August 28.

Shortly after noon on Aigust 28th a wireless message reached the

headquarters of the 3rd A m y from the headquarters of the 4th A m y

reporting that the left wing of the 4th Army had to retreat over the

Meuse toward 0].i*y and once moro urgently requesting the "entry into

action of the XIX Army Corps in the direction of Vendresse". A

report came from the front that the 32nd Infantry Division had again

met with resistancenbefore Si^ny 1'Abbaye. No other reports of im

portance came in*

Exercise: Write the decision of the commander of the 3rd

Army. Briefly state the reasons for his decision.

PROBLEM 2.

Part 1.

The General Combat Situation,

as it developed for the 3rd Array Headquarters up to Midnight

August 28th, 1914.

I>uring the afternoon of August 28th, General v. Hauaen had de

cided to digress from the instructions issued bv the High Command

and answer tbe repeated calls for help, sent "by the commander of the

4th Army, "by sending strong forces off to the east to the support of

the 4th Army,

At 3 P.M., the Twelfth Army Corns, whose 32nd Infantry Division

had taken Signy 1'Abbaye about noon, received orders to march on

•endresse. The advance guard of the 32nd Infantry Division (1) met

dnoi

£all

(1) A reinforced infantry regiment, which, according to the army order

issued at 9:30 A.M,, was to be sent via Poir Terron toward Vendresse-

Sapogne against the enenqy1* heavy artillery to the south of Sedan.

-14



night of August 28th. The main body 01 the 32nd Infantry Division

bivouacked on the Signy L« Abbaye-Domaery road.

At nightfall the 23rd Infantry Division reached Slgny lfAbbaye

and retted there.

The Nineteenth Army Corps which was marching via Thin le Moutier

on Launois had met with strong forces of the enemy (Zouaves, Sen

egalese, marines and a strong force of cavalry) in the afternoon to

the north of La Fosse a l'Eau, whose resistance the 24th Infantry

Division, marching on ahead, was unable to "break by nightfall. The

24th Infantry Division spent the night on the battlefield; the 40th

Infantry Division reached Thin le Moutier after a trying march.

The commander of the German 3rd Army had ^ons to Thin le Moutier

on the afternoon of the 28th of August &nd had there decided to have

the XlXth Army Corps also turn aside to the east to go to the aid of

the 4th Artsy* An anay order issued at 6;45 in the evening ordered

that both am y corps should pass tha line of Bouvellemont - Singly

at 6 A.M., August 29.

The advance guard of the XIIth Reserve Corps (minus the 24th

Be serve Division) reached Mont St. Jean August 28 without meeting the

enemy, the main body of the seme corps reached the Rumigny - Champlin

region.

The connnander of the 3rd Array did not return to Army Headquarters

at Hocroi until about midnight and learned from thc- messages which

had arrived in the meantime (1) that a weak energy force was entrenching

-

(1) See Der Weltkrie^f Heichsarchiv, Volume 3, page 57« Who sent out

these reports andupon what they were based cannot be determined from

the information in this volume.

-15



i t s e l f a t Coingt (8 tan. west of Mont St . J e a n ), th at t ro op s were

be ing det ra in ed a t Montcornet-presumably tha French 1s t C orps-and

an oth er array corp s was advancing from Re the l . Beports from a ir pl an e

observers d id not contain anyth ing conf i rming th is news.

The decision to swerve the Xllth Array Corps aside was inmediately

re po rt ed by w ir e le ss to the High Comaand and to the hea dqu arter*

of thft 4th Army,

Sx erc ise to be w ri t te n out : How i s the s i t ua t io n to be

es tim at ed on the ba si s of the l a t e s t nevfs? What measures t r i l l be

proposed for August 29?

(W rite i n th e form of a recomrnen&ation try th e ch ie f of s t a f f

of the 3rd Army).

P a r t I I .

Development of iis< Citn?.t^on up t:>

Noon AV^IF+ 29,

At 1.1 5 A.M. August 2 9, G ene ral von Hau»er= orde re d th a t th e

X l l t h i.nc the XlXth Army "or-?!*r i r : ; t p lr ,' c thans elvc s in read ines s

at »Cagnon and Poix T-:rron nt we.it for further information on the

s i t u a t i o n . The XIIfch ?»e-?rT9 Corps (??rcl Reserve D iv is io n) was to

ta k e chor^:? of th e de fi ne* of th e r i g h t fl an k of the ^T.cy a t Hjaiai csy-

L i a r t .

The following wirel«ss it.essv'e was sent to tl\a High Oomrand:

TJae.V i" ».°id tn bf» en tr en ch in g a t Coingt and eneny fo rc es ar e sa id to

be locs.ted p t Mon trorn et an?. F^^Vsel, In case tAo fo rc e s of tiia enemy

<?re only week, th** 3rd Amy w il l s t a r t off to th e l e f t on tine 29t h,

in or de r, i f p os si V U , to con* t o the aid of the 4th Ar;*;r in an

a t t a ck ag a i n s t a a ap e r i o r

n



At 5.30 A.M. August 29, General von Hauaen reached Signy 1'Abbaye

and ordared the Xllth Army Corps to advance on Novion Porcien via Wagnon

for the purpose of clearing up the situation, while the XlXth Army

Corps was to start in the direction of Vendresse,

As early as ? a.m., the Commander of the 3rd Army got the inqpression

that the advance of strong ene ay forces from Montcornet and Hethel was

not to be expected (1), He therefore also gave the Xllth Inpy Corps

orders to march on Bouvelleioent.

This was reported to the headquarters of the 4th Aray,

Before the -units of the 23rd Infantry Division, which were advancing

via Hovion Porcien to Corny la Ville, the division having started after

midnight from Signy l'Abbaye for Wagnon, a weak enemy force - apparently

a part of an enemy cavalry division - swerved towards the south* The main

body of the 23rd* Infantry Division which was turning off toward the

east, at Tieil St. Hemy met an enemy column laarching toward the south

and forced it back to the east.

Fighting, the 32nd Infantry Division did not reach Launois until

about noon.

Also in the XlXth Array Corps the morning was spent before the enemy's

resistance was finally definitely broken in the region of La Fosse a

lijau by the 24th Infantry Division, The enemy moved off in a southeasterly

direction. The 40th Infantry Division followed to the right via Domnery

to Launois.

The Xllth Beserve Corps reported the region up to Bosoy free of the

enemy, and apparently only one cavalry division being detrained at Mont-

cornet.

(1) It cannot be determined from th vsork in tbe Heich Reichsarchiv

upon what ground this impression was bas«d.

Ton Ilanaen, Marngffll

-17



During the night of August 28th the 4th Array Staff had reported

>y wire less tha t i t was expecting the entry into action of the 3rd

Arnjy rip Vendresse on the ~9th, Since then no further news concerning

\the 4th Axrny reached the headquarters of the 3rd Array*

It is very :ot. The heat h?.s greatly lowered the energy of

the troops.

Srercit e to be writte n out: A short estimate of the si tu at io n.

Order* issued ty the st aff of the 3rd Army,

(In the form of a recommendation oy the Chief of Staff)

H I .

Situation at 4 P.&-., August 29.

"General von Hausen (1) concentr^ied Ids aims en hastening with

hie might eastward to help tl»e 4th Arn,;,»w

Au army order, issued shor tly *ifter noon V the 3rd Aiay, assigned

Bouveliemont as marcli oLjecoive to t.-^e XIIth AiTxiy Corpt, the i-ftgion of

Singly to the XlXth Amy Cor st for tlie 29th« The XIItVi Reserve Corps

was to turn off toward the south and reach the region of Wasigny - La

Heuville. Anv headquart;

ci werf? rtoved to Signy l'Ablipye.

vAn av ia to r repor ted trtet

fl»e ene i^ we*e re tr ea ti ng to Leon to

the sov-th of the Marle-Pt^nt ::r .^t line*

At 4 ?.M. a wireless massage sent ty the Headquarters of the 2nd

Army war, received at the ho.ads. :<«rt-:f« of the ?rd Army, I t read as

follows: '!TA6 1^ft wing of the 2nd Array ties been engaged i^ hard

fighting uince the -^8th on t ie l ine of Guise-Utrtaupont end i t is

greatly desired that the 3rd Array should enter into action insaiediately

in the direction of Yervins."

(1) von Hausen, Marnof^ldzug, ^>age 157.

-18



Exercise t o be wri tt en out: Decision of the Commander of the

3rd Army. A "brief statement of Ms reasons*

JNLtfi IV.

Situation on th& livening of August 29.

At 6.30 in the evening the headnuarters of the 3rd krn& received

th ree wireless messages simultaneously from the 4th Army.

The fi r s t message st ate d *that Meziares was occupied "by the

4th Army at noon and th at Fort Ayvelles was q uie t.

The second, sent at 1:45 P.M., reported: "The enemy ifl marching

to the west thru Vendresse-Sauville, apparently covered ty enemy forces

there.*

This repor t was supplemented by a further report sent a t 2:30 P.M.

•Bnemy retreating from the Vendress-Buzancy line behind the Attigny-

Grandpre li n e . An advance th ru Rethel-Attigny promises great success ."

During the evening the 3rd Array headquarters received information

that the x tf th and XlXth Ari -- Corps were far from the march objec tives

se t for the 39th, due . to the gact th at the troops were very t i r ed .

The 2&rd Infantry D ivision of the Xllth Array Corps aad gone into

close b i l l e t s around Paiasaul t in the afternoon, the 32nd Infantry

Division of the same corps was resting in the region between La Crete

mouton - T i ll e rs le Toumeur.

The XlXth Army Corps wa& encamped with the 24th In fantry Division

around Poix Terron, lAtsm the 4oth Infantry Division near Barbaise.•Tith

The XIIth Reserve Corps was marching on Wasigny,

The contact with the eneify, wbo l id re tr eate d before the 3rd Array,

is los t .



B xe rc ia a t o be w r i t t e n o u t: Re~o.?t of t "? flhlef of 'Stpff of th e

3 rd Amy 01 the s i tu a t io n w) his v>r<y>osal for tbo continuation of the

operat ion on the 30th of August .

The s i t u a t i o n a t 11 P.M., the ?9fn of 'tfj/just,

At 11 P.M. the he ad qu ar te rs of t h e ? rd Army re ce iv ed rrord ••hm ar?

a v ia ti o n ob se rv er 01 the 2nd Amy th ?t the l e f t wing of *hr Cv^rd Corps

was be in g ha rd pr es se d to lhi» west of V er vi ns . I t sjni(^ t v the Gw.rd

Corps wa& as ki ng fo r su pp or t.

IZLBTCli* to "be w r i t t e n o u t: D ec is io n reac?hrd by th e Cor'Tm?nder of

the 3rd Anny, with s b r i e / ntpterre^t of the rep.r^rs for ivMr.^ i t .

DISCUSSION OJf.PKOBLjai 1 70. 1 .

Par t 1 ,

1. Line ot Reasoning and De cisio n of t iie Cor^.ianding O fficer of the

^ ra Arf-j' on the I^ening of August 27.

In t ri e pu rsu i t fo l lowing the v ic to r io us b a t t l e s on the f r on t i e r s

the two arm ies adj oin ing th e 3rd Angr aarche d off in dive rgen t d ir e c t i o n s .

While the 2nd Army went in a st ra ig h t southw esterly d ir e c t i o n , the r i g h t

wing of the 4th Array, which ims original ly star ted off toward i lezicrea,

was div er ted in a so uth er ly di re c t i on towards Sedan. In th is way ths two

neighboring *rmiee moved away from the 3rd Army, which was advancing on

bo th si a e s of E oc ro i. A g-p of about 35 ki lo m et er s was formed betweenthe 2nd and Crd Armies (s i r - l i n e from La Cspel le - A ur l l l er s le s Forces

is 3b kilometers) and e gap of about "0 kilometers between the 3rd and

^th Annies (air- l ine from Henwcs-Dorcvier^ i a 37 k i lo ra eW a) .

Cn lu^ubt Z7ta il& commanding o f ti c e r s of the two arm ies nex t to

i t te nt a requ es t to the neadquA rters of the 3rd Army askin g th a t i t

-P0



c l 0^P

tne6aP between them. Th© commanding officer of the 4th

Anqr which was fighting on the Meuse sent in this request repeatedly,

emphasising its agency,

Little is known about the situation of the enemy in the region

south of the Hirson-tteaieres line, into which the 3rd Army is ad

vancing. It is not known where the mass of the French 5th Army,

which was defeated between the Meuse and the Sambre, is located

at present. Sor has it been determined what enemy force* are directly

in front of the 3rd Army and to the south of the Signy l»Abbaye-

Metieres line.

The 3rd Army has neither been assigned a strategic mission

l}y the High Coamand, nor a sector into which to advance.

Therefore on the basis of his limited knowledge of the situation

as a whole, the commanding officer of the 3rd Army mast set his own

strategic objective for August 28.

The strategic aim of the great German offensive thru Belgium

was: envelopment and annihilation of the enemy's left wing. This ob

jective was not attained in the first battles on either side the Sambre

due to the timely withdrawal of the enemy. The German 1st and 2nd

Armies are now striving to attain this objective by outstripping

pursuit. The main effort of the pursuit operation of the German forceA

is to be made tor these two armies* TJds circumstance especially in

dicates that the 3rd Army should cooperate with the 2nd Army.

On the other hand, however, as a member of the continuous German

front the 3rd Army also must maintain contact with the 4th Army, which

Is moving toward the pivot of the great German maneuver.

A deviation of the 3rd Army to the right to join up with the left

wing of the 2nd Army, such as the commanding officer of the latter army

••ems to expect, would completely break off contact with the 4th Army.

The Gexfean forces of attack would in that way be divided into two

separate army groups.

-21



The decision to regroup the German forces of attack in this way

may, to be sure, seem worthy of consideration, but only the High Command

is in a position to jud^e of its entire significance due to the fact

of its better general knowledge of the situation as a whole.

In the present sittaation the staff of the 3rd Array is not forced

to anticipate this momentous decision which belongs to the realm of the

High Conraand; for a movement toward the west to close up with the 2nd

Army, hence on the base line, due to the loss of titae involved, would

not be in accord with the basic idea of pursuit. Hence a closer approach

to the 2nd Army in the forward movement with a view to a closer coopera

tion must be sought. And this line of reasoning would end in assigning

the 3rd Arar/ a south-westerly direction for the advance on August 28th,

with its center toward Rozoy.

Vow it remains to be seen whether this direction for the forward

movement is permissible if touch with the 4th Army is considered. This

"touch" is to be sure not to be taken as meaning the same as a close

contact, but it does Include the possibility of strategic and tactical

cooperation with the 4th Aiay at the right time.

Apparently the 4th Army encountered serious difficulties in

crossing the Meuse, which is not surprising when we consider the strength

of the lleuse sector.

For the support requested the commander of the 4th Army indicated

the direction of Cheveuges, only a few kilometers south of the Meuse.

That will mean a local tactical support in the combat to the south of

Sedan, It is astonishing that the 4th Army did not get the desired support

of the group fighting to the south of Sedan by moving up via Mezieres

after Tort Ayvelles apparently no longer offered any hindrance to this.

However, in any event the 3rd Army must not merely for the sake of

giving a local tactical support permit itself to be diverted from Its

-22



•a rc h In a southwesterly dir ec tio n, which i s the correct dir ec tio n

from the strategic point of view.

If the eneny is offering resistan ce to the 4th Army on the Meusv

for the sake of gaining time, the southwesterly advance 01 the 3rd

Anay wil l ac t as an. overtaking porsuit to that ene^ force and wil l

brin^ dir ect assistance to the 4tn knaj, However, i f the en*ny hangs on

too long at trie tteuse, so much the bett er , i'heu i t i s possible that

the 3rd Aray may reach the Ai3ne before the enei y and c*m cut off Ids

re t rea t to the southwest, A turn ing of th» 3rd Army as ea rly aa on

August <J8th into a southeasterly direction would draw t3iat army from

th e line of march that i s saost effec tive for purposes of pursuit*

That the eneoy, after having lost the battles en the frontier,

i t already preparing for a decisive bu tt le at the ileuee is not very

probable, but not impossib le. In that case ne would surely have to

count on the presence of strong forces of the eneioy in the region

between fttezleres and Bethel. '.These fo rces , and not the enemas

defensive front on the Me use, would tnen form the objective of the

3rd Army. The advance of the 3rd Ara^ on Aufurt 28 in & southwesterly

dir ec tion also conforms to th is* A preiap.ture turning toward the south

ea st might bring the 3rd Aruy I tse l f in to a bad po si tion i f the ene&y

were to make the counter-attack from the region of Bethel, or even

perhaps from Montcornet, In vi«w of the obscurity of the sit uati on

in both of thene regions and in view of the feet that the enemy has

complete contro l of t>*e railroads in hi a own country for the uiovement of

hi s troops , tiiese po ss ib il it ie s must not be lo st sight of.

The danger for the 4th Array which arises when the 3rd Army refuses

to give i t di re ct support on the 28th of August, must be run. If wont

comes to worst the parts of the 4th Army which have crossed the Meu&v

will be forced back on the eas te rn bank of the r iver . The dang&r which

- 2 3



would a r is e fo r th e 3rd Army i t s e l f i f the enemy were to succeed in

•leaking of f th® 4 th Army a t the Meuse and then throw i t s e l f w ith

sup erio r fo rc es a ga ins t the l e f t flank of the 3rd Army, as i t Marches

to the so ut hw es t,i s to be considered as more se ri o u s. Judging from

th e ex pariance alraady ga ined we can hope th it the Fyench w i l l not

e a s i l y aa3 q uic kly succ eed in shaking off the Gorman 4t h Army,

The 3rd Army i t s e l f mu st, however, by a gre at echelon ning in

dapth on i t s le ft *ing pro tect i t s f lank and prepare for a poss ible

necessary subsequent turn to the l e f t .

In view of the problems which th s 3rd Army, weak even at f u l l

str en gth , may have to meet in the next few days, i t i s not ju st if ia b le

to le av e a whole di v is io n "behind before the fro n ti er fo rt of G ivet.

The male body of the 24th Reserve D iv is io n t he re for e i s to be moved

up as quick ly as p os sib le to Hocro i. Aside from the heavy araty a r t i l

le r y , one rein force d infantr y regiment is a l l that need be l e f t before

G iv et, The moving up of the 34th Reserve D iv isi on raak»s i t p os si b le a ls o

to echelon TT«frfflr*te> nnwrmw in dep'h tlve right Fing of the army, which

has no support either.

To sum up, we reach the co nc lus ion tha t for the 28th of August

an unswerving advance of the 3rd Arojy in a so uth we sterly d ir ec ti o n

be st fo llow s out ths pu rsu it id ea and at the same time be st f i t s

in w ith the uncer tainty of th^ si tu a tio n , for by pursuing such a course

the po ss ib i l i t y e x is ts of ei th er placing the emphasis on a cooperation

wit h the 2nd Ar y or a support o? the 4 th Army as the o pe ra tion d ev el

ops , all depending upon further clearing up the situation and the aims

of th e High Coimand.

The refore the cojrroanding o ff ic e r of th e 3rd Army d ec id es to c on

tinue the advanc* on the 28th of August in a southwesterly direction

- 24



w ith a gr ea t echelonn ing in depth on the l e f t . I t i s h i s a im

t o re ac h th e Brunehaxael-Mainbreasy-Wasigny l in e w ith M a fro nt

*hdlYit ioai and to br ing up the main body of the 34/Beserve Division

a f t e r them from Givet to Ro croi . Ene rget ic reconnaissance w i l l

produce info rm atio n on th e s i t u a t i o n of the enen$/, snd qu est io ns

se nt in to th e High Command w il l make i t s in te n t i o n s c le a r .

2 . O rd srs I ss u ed by Cor~-usc^r of th e 3rd Arsy fo r August 28 ,

(Content?)

P.outes of march fo r the advance on August 28 :Of h i X l l t h Hei?..;:-, . C o:— , ~ ~: -l-tV. 2 .; - . - 1 - i n ^ .-, - - - c h

t o B r ; r J . i p : \ i e l '. i : P.'.uv.i i : " , V i i n i o : : c . . l i r u : i t r •

h e - v " r m y r r t i l l ; . . - - b E i n l e f t b e i o i G - i ^ i t , ';;.• n o n t < y- .- •" s R o c r o i •

Oi ..E X l l th A.:* -• Cor-;s the ^)3rd Infrja trv D iv isi on i s t o o?.rch

to M&iiLbresty v is Li a r t , irtjfc: th r 32nd In fa n tr y D iv is io n* to Wasigay

via Signy l 'A'b'bsy^.

The XlXth A.rny Corps is to pd.rrn.ee in one columr. to Thin le Moutier

via Lonny. J. a^.fll ('fttacliraent ( 1 - 2 - 1 , Div. Bridging Train) is? to be

•e nt toward M ezierer t o <3o recon naissa nce work pud to e st a b l i sh l i a is o n

with the right wing of the 4th Army*

A ll the co rps shou ld s t s r t a t 6 A.II*

Rr>connaiaa«nc«, covering ?«d l iaison (1) .

The X ll th Reserve Co rps: Recon naissance over the #hon from

Mart ingy to Aoiis te (ex clu s ive of tb» l a t t e r ) to Vervins-Montcornet ,

Covering t roo-os on tl*s r i g h t f lan k in the di re c t i o n of H irson , Is th e

for t there occupied?

The XTIth Amy Corp s: Keep watch on the roads le ad in g from the l i n e

(1) The X ll th and XlXth Arny Corp s, as wel l as the he ad qu arte rs

• f th e 3rd Army, had one recon naissa nce f l i g h t eac h.

- 2 6



of D li y l e Gros-Chateau. Po rcie n-H eth el to Liart-Si&ny 1«Abbaye-Laua.

Immediately get an Idea of the si tu at io n i n the vi c in it y of Bo soy

and at B eth el .

Th* XlXth Army Corpaj Beconna issance v ia Launo is-M ezieres t o

Le Chesne-Chemery to p ro te ct the l e f t fla nk of the ansy and to ge t

a c le a r Ide a of the s it u a t io n "between the Aisne and the Meuse, Watch

the roads (re tr e at movement* ?bringing of reinforcements? res erv es

behind the enersyis front on the Meuse?) leading from the Aisne from

B eth e l t o Y ouzier s toward the Mease from M ezieres to Sedan and the

Rethel -Mezieres-Youziers ra i lroads.

lec on na issa nc e f li g h t of the S*d Array: Watch the follo w ing

railroads: Laon-Vervins-Montcornet, Rethel-Hciias-Ls.cn. Get a c le a r

idea of the situation in the Hirson-Vervins-Marle-Montcornet-Rumigny

re gio n (l oc at io n of the French 5th Ansy?)

Send l i a i s o n o ff ic e r s on the morning of the 28th to the Head-

q-oarters of th e 2nd Army and vi a the Headquarters of the 4 th Army

to the r ig h t wing of th e 4 th Array at Sedan,

Amy headquarters will remain at Socroi on the 28th*

2 . Text o f W ireles s Message sent to the High Coranandj

"After offering resistance at Soraonne, inferior forces of the

enemy moved back to Signy lJAbbaye. The si tu a t io n of the enemy a t

Bozoy and to the south of Signy I^Abbaye-Mezieres bis not yet been

fully determined*

"The 3rd Army i s pa ssin g the night in the reg ion of A u vi lle rs

les Torges-Signy l»Abbaye-Bevin,

"The 4t h Army rep eat ed ly asked fo r h elp for i t s r i^ it wing,

which was fighting to the south of Sedan, the commander of the 2nd

- 26

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/Rethel-Hciias-Ls.cn

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/Rethel-Hciias-Ls.cn



Army requests contact with the left wing of the 2nd Army at La Ca

"On the 28th the 3rd Array will continue its advance in a south

westerly direction, deeply echelonned on the left. It is aiming to

reach the Brunefcanel-MainDressy-Wasigny line.

"The direction of march and the organization of the 3rd Aymy leave

the possibility open either of turning later to cooperate with the 4th

or the 2nd Army, or of continuing the advance with the idea of over

taking pursuit of the enemy on the Meuae, depending upon the clearing

up of the situation and the intentions of the High Command,

"In order that ^e may act according to the wishes of the High

Command, we ask for information concerning its strategic aims.

Headquarters reiaain at Hocroi on the 28th

Compandor of the 3rd Array.53

-27



2nd PAST.

KeeojM*nd&tion of the Ohlei of Staff of the 3rd Anny to his

ComLandlng O ffic er a f te r t he Hec eipt of th e I n

st ruct ions from the High.

The in s t r u c t i o n s from t h e High Command p la c e s t he German Arsgrin pu r s u i t , w i th ob j e c t i ve s t h a t a r e f a r apa r t and r i g h t wing sp read

f a r o u t .

JCue to th e a»arcn o b je c ti v e as sig ne d to i t , th e German 3r d Aragr

must ta£ e a sou thw este r ly d ir e c t i o n between Laon and Guignicou rt ( t o

th e northw est of Helms) tow&rd Chateau J h ie r ry ,

To be su re , the i n s tr u c ti o n s of the High Command s t a r t w ith the

err on eo us assum ption t ha t the eneii^r i s i n w fu l l r e t r ea t 1 1 "before the

4 t h ATIXJ^". The s tubborn res i s tance which, cont rary to the expecta t ions

of the High Cox&oand, the 4th Array has met with, is however no proof

ag ai n st the accura cy of the assumption th at the eneray IS f ig h t in g on

the Meuse only to gain t ime.

D esp i te the re pe ate d ca l l s fo r he lp sent out by the 4 th Anay,

the s i t u a t i o n of th a t army does not appear to be a larming , es pe cia l ly

when c&udidercd from the viewpoint of the whole operation.

The c l o se r the e n a c t s ce n t r a l am$r group s t ic k s to th© Meuse,

th e b e t t e r w i ll be the pr os pe ct of th e ri g h t wing of tha German Aj^^r,

where the main e ff o r t of the whole op era t ion i s located ^ to envelop

and de s t ro y the le f t wing of the enemy in the pu rsu i t op er a t io n.

From th s wo rding of th e i n s t r u c t io n s from th e High Command!

*The armies must support each oth er in the combat in the d if fe re n t

sec tors" , and f rom the author iza t ion to swerve f rom a southwester ly



to a southerly direction In case of a "strong resistance11, which

certainly ia not to be expected until at the Aisne and the Marne,

tha literal authorisation may be deduced to apnly this method against

the "strong resistance" at the Meuse.which was not expected V this

High Command.

The strategic idea upon which the pursuit by the {Jenaan Array is

based demands that the 3rd Army especially strive to avoid making a

premature turn to the left.

The problem is not to force the eneroy back from sector to

sector, but by a trostuit operation to attain that which could not be

attained in the frontier battles: the destruction of the enemy*s

left wing.

A turning aside of the 3rd Array to the left to the support

of the 4th Army would still further separate the 3rd Army from the

1st and 2nd Armies and thus weaken the power of the decisive German

right wing, or if the 2nd and 1st Armies were to follow the turning

in of the 3rd Army, the enveloping action would be decreased.

The 3rd Army not only must heed its neighbor on its left and what

is happening before the latter1s front, but must even pay more attention

to the liaison with its neighbor on its right; for it must alway?

bear in mind that the weight of the pursuit lies in the right wing.

Hence the 3rd Army may deviate from the march sector assigned it

"by the High Command only to the left if a critical situation requires

this or if a specially great success is in prospect. Heithor of these

factors enter into the present situation.

The enemy could easily evade the flanking effect of an advance on

Yendresse-Iapogne* such as the 4th Army desires, by retreating in good

-29



time. Then the 3rd Army would have lost energy, time and ground

for the pursuit by its action in swerving aside ,

However, that the aim of the enemy is to take a decisive stand

and defend the Me use sector is improbable according to the estimate

of the enemy* g situation given in the instructions issued lay the

High Command.

I therefore propose that the advance started in the south

westerly direction be continued unswervingly and that

the pursuit mission, the march objectives of the Xllth Beaeive Corps

and the Xllth Army Corps be advanced to the Brunehamel-Mainbressy

lasigny line. Instead of being sent toward Launois, the XlXth Army

Corps ought to be turned within the sector of march of the army to

Signy l*Abbaye. This also gives the left wing of the army the great

echelosning in depth required by the situation.

Bethel, that important highway junction point and crossing over

the Aisne, must be taken as soon as possible by parts of the 3rd Army,

even if it lies outside that array* s sector, in order to prevent its

use by the enemyiin his retreat and in order to keep it open for the

pursuit operation of the right wing of the 4th Army. The Xllth Army

Corps (32nd Infantry Division) ought to be directed to send forward a

nixed detachment as far as Bethel, if possible as early as on the 38th.

3. PART H I ,

Decision of the Commander of

the 3rd Army.

The 3rd Army remains within the zone of advance assigned to it by

the High Command, going unswervingly in a south-westerly direction.

-30



The request of the 4th Army for help cannot be met,

Brief Statement of Seasons.

The renewed call for help sent in by the 4th Army this time

is given so.ae weight by the report of the defeat on the left wing.

Whether this defeat is of more than a local importance for the 4th

Army cannot be estimated. At any rate it cannot be the reason for

a change in the estimate of the strategic situation as a whole by

the Commander of tbe 3rd Army,

The fact of e defeat at Stenay does not justify the 3rd Army

in • eiring from the direction of advance assigned it by the High

Command, The 3rd Army must not be influenced by the repeated

callt for help sent in by the 4th Army and must not permit itself

to be diverted from following the most effective direction in its

pursuit*

Uor can the request sent initoy the headquarters of the 4th Army

asking that one army corps be sent to Vendresse, be complied with*

If it were complied with it would mean that the 3rd Army, which is

composed of only five divisions, would be divided into two halves,

neither of which would be effective.

An unswerving advance by the 3rd Army in a south-westerly

direction will probably soon bring direct relief to the 4th Army.

Sven in case that it will, if worst comes to worst, later be

necessary to swerve the 3rd Army to go to the support of the 4th

Army si the orders of the High Conn and, a continuance of the advance

in a southwesterly direction on the 28th will prove a favorable pre

paratory measure for the subsequent attack deep in the flank and rear

of the enemy forces in front of the 4th Army,

Tor that reason the renewed call for help sent in by the 4th Army

could te not be complied with*



DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM II

Part 1.

How is the situation to be estimated on the feasis of the

latest news?

What measures are proposed for August 29thT

(In the fora of a recommendation by the chief of staff of

the 3rd Army.)

The news of the appearance of ne*r enemy forces at Montcoraet

and Hsthdl is still uncertain; Judging from the whole situation,

and in view of the stubborn resistance of the enemy at the Meuse this

news cannot at the outset "be characterized as improbable.

A policy of disregarding it would expose the army to the danger

of a surprise attack from Bethel against its right flank and from

Montcornet against its rear, during its advance toward the east.

The array must not expose itself to such a situation. Before

the 3rd Army dares to swerve aside with its main forces to the east

to the support of the 4th Army, the situation at Bethel and Montcornet

must be m d a clearer.

This is most certainly and surely accomplished, aside from the use

of air reconnaissance, by a thrust by that array in both directions.

If the army encounters enemy forces in th# vicinity of Bethel,

forces of the strength announced in the news, they must first be dealt

with. In order that this may be done M quickly and thoroughly as

possible should the occasion arise I consider it indicated not only for

the Xllth but <lso the XlXth Army Corps first of all to be started in a

southerly direction. If the XlXfh Army Corps in its advance toward the

east were to be left for the direct support of the 4th Army* it might be

-32



f«ar*d that tha 3rd Ax%-, divided c^id sent into three di

directio ns, would not &ain a decisive vic tory coywhere. I do not

ooniidsr the eiUsation of the 4th Aitsy *5O c r i t ic a l that i t oust be

given d ir ect and quick assistance ryjd everything els© muct "be sacri

ficed to i t . If the newt concerning the eno^j- forces at Stthel is

ez&vgeratoa or fa ls e , i t i t possible to swerve to the east or south

•a«t so as to come JO tut. aid of the <i-th An^ , turning froia the th rust

toward th» south with limited objectives, v.i first ordered VAC. ccrres

ponding to the iiitharto xirzvailing s t r - t ^ i c aims. It is ';me that in

that case ass is tanc e wo-old com* to the 4th Anny la te r , tut up extending

the racrersant to the south the .•draaee C?JI be made dewper into the flank

and rear of tha aneqj- in front of the 4th .Irs?,'-. £his direct ion is #t

paci^lly advantageous for th^ ©v^nt ivhich is not at all iiaoossible, namely,

if the eneuiy wil l not t ry to fight *. decisive b at tle before the 4th

Army but w ill try to withdraw fm a th«; ac tion of the 3rd Aray by a

re t r ea t .

The adranoB of th© XIIth. Hsserve Oorpa (23rd Heaerve Division) via

Bozoy most surely «rill throw a light on the si tuat ion at Mont£ornett

If a French Ar«y Corps is ac tual ly being detrained at Montcomet i t i s

the mission of the Xlltb Bsserve Corps to cover the flank and rsar of

ths array agains t t h is «neray, at la ast u n ti l the oneray force has been

defeated a t Bethe l. Under ce rta in c ircunstances the Xllth Reserve Corps

can best perform this covering .naission \ty breaking in on detraining

operations which are a t i l l under way. If the news of the enemy troops at

Montcomet i s fals e or exaggerated, ths march of the Xllth Reserve Corps

via Rosoy in any case means no great detour for moving up the right wing

of the •myjT army. In Ttiaat way trjj advance toward Bozoy can best be

mad* derjend* upon the direction of the advance of the 3rd Amy, which i s



in turn -governed by the development of tho situation at Hetbel and

that In front of the 4th Army.

Tor that reason I propose:

1. That th e aray orders fo r the advance of the X ll th and XlXth

Aragr Cores on the morning of the 29th via Boiavellemont-Singly bo

revoked.

2. That at 6 o fcloclr in the morning the Xllth ktay Corr.e advance

over the ft*eij-Ev-^arncB li n e to R eth el. If when advancing in t h i s

d ir e c ti o n the Corps does not ateet any gre at enemy fo r c es , i t s mein body

need not pass the Sery-Novion Porcien line.

Air reconn aissance: Chateau-Porcien-Hethel,

3. At 5 o' c lo ck in the morning tbe XlXth Array Corpe w i l l st ar t

on "both sides of the Thin le Moutier-Laimofc road;goin^ in a southerly

d ir e c t io n . The Wagnon-Lajprete Mouton ros.d i s not t o be cro sse d at f i r s t .

The l e f t flan k must be pr ot ec ted , &erial reconnaissance i s to be pro -

Tided on the system of roads and highways behind the front of the enenty

on the Meuse in the region Poix-TerJ»n-Chemery - Le Chesne-Attigny,

4 . Line of se-oaration between the X l l th and the XlXth Army Corps

fo r the advancei Doaarery-Coray l a B i l l e (towns goin g to the X ll th

Anay Corps).

5. The X ll th Reserve Corps (23rd Reserve D iv isi on ) w i l l advance

at 5 A.M. towards fiozoy* M ission ; Covering the »ig ht fla nk and the

rea r o f the army ag ain st the enemy for ced reported to be at Mont co rn et.

A speedy cle ar in g up of the sitv-atlo n at Mont cor net . If p o ss ib le , atta ck

against the detraining operations that are going on.

Withdraw t i n to Rocroy main fo rc es of the 24th Reserve Di v is io n ,

which are before Givet and can be spared. (See page 14).

6. The recon naissa nce f li g h t of the Artny sh al l do reconn aissance

-34.



on the situation at Montcornet and Rethel in the early morning boors.

7. Combat Headquarters of the Array: 6 A.M. at Signy l'Abbaye.

PART 2.

A Brief Estimate of the Situation - Orders that

night have been issued by the Staff of the 3rd Army.

(In the form of a recommendation by the Chief of Staff).

Ho new strong enemy forces hare appeared at Montcornet and Bethel.

The behavior of the enemy before the 3rd A m y may be characterized

a» a tenacious struggle to gain tira©. A col asm of the enemy was

encountered at Vieil St. Bemy retreating toward the south. Ho

further calls for help have come from the 4th Army during the course

of the morning. Judging from the behavior of the staff of the 4th

Army so far the conclusion to be drawn from tikis is that the situation

of the 4th Army has at any rate not become more critical and that

support is not urgently needed.

TakBn altogether this does not give the impression that the

enemy is striving to fig'it a decisive battle on the Meuse. fh©

picture of the situation in the sense of the interpretation given

it Tsy General Headquarters rather leads to an estimate of the

situation as a continuation of the eaeiay's retreat behind the Aiane.

Perhaps this retreat is already in progress. A continuation of the

advance of the 3rd Array toward the east then would mean that they would

not meet any eneroy and a jamming together with the 4th Ainr , would

result, which would greatly restrict a continuation of th*s operation.

I therefore propose that the advance toward the east be temporarily

stopped, that all means be used to clear up the situation of the

enemy forces opposing the 4th Army, that preparations be made for

-35



starting toward the south across the Aisne between Bethel and

Attigny, in the sense of/overtaking pursuit.

A pause in the operations lasting for several hours right

during the heat of the day recuperates the greatly exhausted forces

of the troops and makes possible the continuance of the march during

the hours of the evening and night.

I propose the following in particular;

1. That a wireless message be sent iismediately to the head

quarters of the 4th Army requesting particulars about the situation

there. That a staff officer be sent by plane to the headquarters

of the 4th Army.

2. That the reconnaissance flights of the XIXth and XlXth

Array Corps and of the army be set to watch the network of roads

te tire en the Iteuse and the Ai3ne before the front of the 4th Array.

3. That grouping be so arranged at halta that any subsequent

march to the south would be facilitated, in particular

The XlXth Arsjy Corps around Launois-Villers le Tourneur and

Jandun Poix Terron;

The Xllth Array Corps, arojnd Tieil St. Hemy and Faissault,

keeping the Launois-Villers le Tourneur roads free.

That contact be maintained bgr mixed reconnaissance detachments

from both corps with the enemy who is yielding before the army.

The parts of the 23rd Infantry Division which have been sent

via Hovian Porcian continue the advance to Rethel in order to capture

the crossing over the Aisne at that place,

4. That the Xllth Reserve Coros (23rd Reserve Division) be

moved up into the neighborhood of Seraincourt,

5. That orders be prepared beforehand for any possible march

toward the south for the units down to the divisions.

-36



PAST 3.

Decision reached by the Comuander of the 3rd Army. A Brief

Statement of his Reasons.

The wish of the 2nd Army cannot be complied with once the

commanding officer of the 3rd Array has decided to cooperate with

the 4th Army -nd has started the 3rd Army with that in view. It

is also to "be assumed that the Xllth Reserve Corps is already march

ing toward the south during this time.

We dare to hope that the 2nd Army will soon finish the French 5th

Army, which had already been defeated "by it at the Sambre (it can only

be this army). The air observer's report on the eneiny^s retreat to

the south of the Marie-Mont cornet line strengthens this hope.

PART 4.

Heport by the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army on the Situation

and a Proposal for the Continuation of the Operationx

on August 30.

At le ast since noon on the 29th of August the eneniy has been in

full retreat behind the Aisne.

A continuation of the advance of the 3rd Army on Jfeogust 30th in

an ea st er ly or so utheas terly d ire ct ion would under theae circumstances

lead to the ir st ri k in g no enemy and to a detrim ental jamming with the

4th Army.

The 3rd Army now must consider i t s mission th at of, i f po ss ib le ,

overtaking the enemy retr eati ng before the 4th Armyt and of serious ly

in ju rin g him. For th is purpose the 3rd Army must f i r s t of a l l st ri ve

to prevent the eneniy from offering a systematic resistance on the Aisne

-37



and from shaking off the pursuit,

A march towards the west in order once more to get into the

march route assigned by the High Command in tha instructions of August

27th, cannot be considered until after the southern bank of the

Aisne has been taken. Otherwise we would renounce the possibility

of reaping the benefits of quite a great victory which may possibly

be gained due to the decision to swerve the 3rd Army to the left so

that it roay cooperate closely with the 4th Arn$r,

Hence the decision: In compliance with the proposal of the 4th

Army, to advance on the 30th of August along the Aisne from Bethel to

Attigny in an overtaking pursuit*

So as not to leave the eneiqy any time to organize a defense on the

Aisne and to reach his forces concentrated to the south of that river,

the march to the south must be started tonight. The forces must do

their utmost to march onward, they will thus prevent & later loss of

human life,

I therefore make the following proposal, that the following forces

start the advance on the southern bank of the Aisne;

The 12th Reserve Corps (23rd Reserve Division) at 2 A,M,

from Wasigny via Chateau Porcien,

The 12th Army Corps in three coltaans via Novion Porcien,

Saulces Mouclin and Chesnois, its head passing this line at

3 A.M. toward the Aisne from Bethel Ambly;

TbB XIXth Army Corps (minus the 40th Infantry Division) at 1 A.M.

from Poix Terron via Boucellemont to Attigny,

That the head of the 40th Infantry Division at five o'clock in

the morning reach the crossroads at Faissault in order to be at

the disposition of the Commander of the Army,

~#rom obtaining mutual support when in contact with the enemy at or to

the north of the Aisne the following must be the guiding idea for all th©

-38



columns: help your neighbor on your right forward.

The army staff will reach Faissault at 5 A.M.

PART 7,

Decision of the Commander of the 3rd Array with a Brisf

Statement of the Seasons*

The commander of the 3rd Army cannot answer the calls for help sent

out by the guard corps.

The only troops to be considered for reinforcement purposes consist

&£ the 23rd Reserve Regiment which has just arrived at Wasigay from the

region around Samigny-Liart. Iven if this division were again granted

the right to march back into a northwesterly direction via Rozoy, it

could not came into action before August 31 at Yervins, This rmitra as

sistance therefore would probably come too late and would not be great

enough to have a decisive effect upon the battle of the 2nd Army, 3y

its advance via Chateau Porcien, on the other hand, the 23rd Heserve

Division may exert a decisive influence upon the rapid forcing of the

passage over the Aisne at Bethel by the 3rd Array.

The news from the left wing of the 2nd Army may, however, be inter

preted as an indication that at last the main body of the 24th Reserve

Division, which was at Givet, is no longer needed there and may for the

time being be moved up to Hocroi, so that troops may be available for

protecting the rear of the army if needed.

Remarks on the Command of the German 3rd Army

from the 27th to th© 29th of August, 1914.

A discussion of Problems 1 and 2 comprises an opinion in regard

to the main decision reached by the commander of the German 3rd Array

-39



from the 27th to the 29th of August 1914, an opinion which is not

limited to a mere criticism but also contains definite proposals

of our own.

In this concluding section the most important decisions made by

the staff of the 3rd Arajy during this time will once more be reviewed

and "briefly examined.

After the battle in the Meuse-Sambre salient the German High

Conraand had delayed assigning the three armies of the German right

wing new uniform strategic s&ssions and objectives in time* Hence the

staff of the 3rd Ansy, with its limited idea of the situation as a

whole, was thrown back upon its own interpretation of the strategic

situation for the continuation of the operation.

Beginning with the evening of the 25th of August it was constantly

more and more governed by the idea of helping the 4th Army to overcome

the strong enemy resistance expected at the Meuse, The main objective

of staff of the 3rd Away swerved from the pursuit of the eneasy, who had

been defeated between the Meuse -and the Sambre, and cooperation with the

2nd Am y and support of the 4th Ars r, Guided by this idea the commander

of the 3rd Army assigned to that array a more southerly direction of

march on August 26 and in that way moved it away from the 2nd Army

which was continuing the pursuit in a southwesterly direction.

The first step away from the correct strategic course of action

had been taken.

Following the strategic conception of the situation gained on the

25th of August and the repeated calls for help sent out by the commanding

officer of the 4th Army, the staff of the 3rd Army on the evening of

August 27 (Problem 1, part 1) contemplated swerving the 3rd Array on

August 28th in a aouthwuiterly direction to fcasten to the support of the

4th Array, vhich was engaged in hard fighting on the Meuse.

-40



The execution of this intention was prevented by the intervention

of the High Command. However, the orders sent by the High Command

ordering "that the advance be contined in a general southwesterly

direction* were complied with only incompletely and reluctantly.

At any r?,te the army orders issued at midnight August 27 (See

Problem 1, Part 2) can hardly be designated as orders to advance in

a southwesterly direction. The orders issued by the headquarters of

the 3rd Army for August 28 can much more correctly be designated as en

advance in a soutnerly direction with a strong echelonning on the right

and holding back of tne right wing of the army.

following out the pursuit idea and a possible cooperation with

the 2nd Army a sharp extension of the right wing and the center of the

army in a southwesterly direction and a great echelonning in depth on

the left wing r,ouid be appropriate (See discussion of Problem 5o. 1,

Part 1).

ffor when on the morning of the 28th the detailed written instruc

tions fx*om the High ConEaand issued August 27 arrived (See Problem 1,

Part 2) were the array orders corrected. (See discussion, Problem 1, Part

S).

#e do no t ga th e r from th e or de r of the High CoiKmnd the s t r a t e g i c

ba si c id ea "O vertaking pu rs ui t w ith the naain ef fo rt of the whole fo rce

on the r ig h t " . I t was no t as c l ea r ly and d i s t i n c t l y expressed in the

order as it might have been.

And th us i t remained in the ord er s iss ue d at midnight August 27,

by which the array was swerved fa r to the l e f t of the march ro ut e a s

s i g n e d i t .

Then when du rin g tiie cou rse of August 28, the c a l l s fo r h el p fcy

tiie 4t h Army were re pe at ed ana about noon the re p o rt of a re v er se on

tne l e f t ffiag of th at army a rr iv e d (See Problem 1, P ar t 3 ) , th e conraander

-41



of the 3ru Anay allowed niiasel:;1 be be persuaded , counter to the in s t ru c

t i o n s of Uie High Coiaoauc., f i r s t ol a l l t o swerve one army co rp s, the nthe main fore© of the 3rd Amy toward the @a3t in order to no to the

help of the 4th Lm&.

The fa l s e ae.'/a of th s ap pearan ce of &<*-./ s tr on g ane-.y Three s a t

M ontcornet sind B e th e l, sm ish the ;o _u iii ^'r of the 3rd Array re ce iv ed

a t a id n i^ n t August 2 3, .Yers a kin dn es s of f^to ^lii'sli ougM ":• > h*ive tarned

th e 3r d Army "back ag ain on the ri g h t s t r a t e g ic cours e (See D iscu ssion

of Problems 2 , Pa r t 1 ) .

However, aftsr a short period of hasifc&tion, ths conssandiug officer

of the 3rd Aru$r decided to aan^re to his once aôâd intent ion of giving

-diracfc a opport t o the 4 t h A ray in i t s cor^bai on fjis : f- r i se .

So f i rmly wer : a i l tii^ th o ^ h t s of His ôffioaading officer of Lie

3rd Aniv di»ectad at B iaast3ning toward the sast in order to help the

4t h A r r ^ , th at be was not surp r ise d "by the dsvsl jpnsn t of the a i t u i t io n

•op to noon August 29 (S-se Prcbli"^ Z f Fa r t 2} and d id not re a l i s e tha t

t h e co n ti n u a ti o n of the advance t c r a r d the er:.?t th re at en ed to b<?coia©

f u t i l e aa hs would enc oun ter no en^ro: . (D iscus sion Problem 2, Pa rt 2 ),

The l a s t p a r ts of tiie army -.Tsre a ls o swerved off towards tLs so ut he a st .

TLan ffiien at- 4 ?.M. A u g ^ t 29 th tbB news o e the Battl* of the Oise

in whicn tbs 2nd Aroy was e-i^ged,. arriTed, KB . -.vith i t ca»* a req-u«9t

fo r he lp (See frotlexi; 2, Pa rt 3 ) , which w»s rep eat ed diixing the n igh t

of A ugust £'?th ( &e Prcbleir 2, F rtrt 5) 9 as the resul t of i ts swerving

off to th e c a s t , the 3rd Army vp.s no longe r in a s i t u a t i o n t o ex er t

any influ en ce -opon the ev en ts happening to th e 2nd Anoy (See di sc us si on

of Problem 2, parts 3 and 5) ,

The ne^s con ce rn ing xae 2nd Aray threw a li g h t '3for> the d ang er i n to

which th e l e f t .%ing of th e feco nd A iry w-?.s t.irown by th e sw erv ing to

the l e f t of the 3rd Army, and on the o th er hand, als o upon the op po rtu nity

- 42



the 3rd Army missed of en te r in g in to ac t io n very ef fe c t iv e l y ag ain s t

tha Frenuii 5th. A r^ » the l e f t ;Mri£, of the j?ret»ch f o r c e s .

If th e Oerman Srd Army ha d, in obcsdinne© to th e in s t r u c t i o n of th e

High Oomnand, con t inued i t s advance in a s t r a ig h t so uthw ester ly d ir e c

ti o n ion August 28th «ad 29 th and had thu s been in a po si t i o n to coo pera te

w i t h fan 2ad A ro^ , the ?r en ch 5 th Aiay, which was de fe ate d fcy the Oerman

£ad Arscy August 2 9t h said 3 0t h on tiw O isa, (B a tt le of St.. q u e n ti n ), would

h a rd ly hs.ve esca ped sainihiiafc io n. (1 )

$i*ila in t h i s way the 3rd Aiia^ by i t s d av iac ion to the le f t de

p r i v e d i t s a l f of the p o ss ib i l i t y of coopera t ing wi th the 2nd Army,

wh ich T'o.J.d have been (3ecisiT© fo r the whol® caagpaiâ, t t e ex p ec ta ti o aa

of the H eadqu artei-s of the 3r d Arnvy con necte d with, a co op era tio n w ith

th a 4 th Array a ls o r&ilud* The Fre nch 4 th Anay s t a r t e d th e march from

th e Meuse to th e Aisn« on th e evening of August 38* I t was not u n ti l

6.2 0 on tha evenin g of August 23 (See. Problem 2, ? s r t 4^ tli^t head q\aarter»

of the 3rd i rs ty rece iyed news of th is r e t r e a t ,

!Phe djecis-jon of t he c o m ra d e r o.f rhe 3r d AriJ47 no>v to advs.ace in a

oa t s tr ip p in g p u rs u it on Aiaûst 3.) ac ro ss t iw Aisne between Chateau

P or ci en and Serauy to the s ou th, ?as in accordanco v;i th the s i t u a ti o n

(Dismx33ion, Problem 2, ? a r t 4 ) , bi t i t came too la t e #

The ene^y had alroad y obtain ed auch a gro at s ta r t on tham and i t t

re a r gîard on Au£a3t 20 offere d sach a cle ve r re si s t an c e to the no rth

of the Ai3ne v iat th e p"arsuit lad to no r e a l su cc es s .

On th e ev en ing of th e 3 0th of August t h e 3 rd Anay had reach ed tli®

l i n e of Chateau Fo reign - Beth el - re gio n no rth of Seamy, the 4t h Army

t to od wUh i t s r ig h t wing behina the 3rd Anay and wi th i t s f ive corps

pushed toge the r on a i ' roat of 18 k ilo m et er s oa the l in e of Ghagny-re&ion of

(1) 0n*» of th e nex t books in th i s s a r i e t w il l ta"?e UD a c o n s i d e r a t i o n

of t he o p er at io n s of 2nd Array and the B a tt le of S t.

-43



8ouaauw«. ou.-frli- no mo'.-i or A s t r a t e g i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of f o r c e s in

a pu reu i t ope ra teonI

However, in r ep ly to a ques t ion sent in by tho conwandint; officer

of the 3rd Arnty, the High Cam»vi.n& on the evening of August 30 ordered

t h a t the £rd i U ^ operate toward the aouU. UIK. ort^rud tiii..t the 2nd Army

move up to the 3rd A:ayv, the l e f t Wxiig of the 2nd Axi u oin£ al iaost

s t r a i g h t in the sLêcô i ; of fieias,

Tliei-^by lae Kigh Oonsnand gave up thf; s t r a t eg i c a ims ly ing at the

b a s i s of the ..a* t m ot io ns of A\i£ust 27th and followed the example^ set "by

tlia -3x-d Ara^jOf a prera&ture wh eeling fcoirjrci.s fc)sB l e f t .

The fctr^teîc basis; of tlse ctuopaign; M-^dnt&iaing the s t r e n g t h &nd

tut.- eiiVelopiag effect oil !i*.e rA^r.t rfin^ ol ilia Grbrru&n fo rce s fade d in to

-efcfcai_t>nuy the u^jifflandsr ui t:i£ 3rn .iii£y becsiie of

giv.at efftscfc for tne whole v#«nL£ . oper atx ona from ths 27th to ths 29tli

oi" Auûit ii^rely uacfeô tho IK 'ii Goasivîid did net adsqiii i taly parloiai i t s

COLJ:J£- .< !fi .i i^; f J J : i t i. Olifi .

DJB to the ffc-t t . .i t t i t3 l l ^h JoTiiuanu. l a ^ l c i tc give the three armie t

of tbs r i ^ i i t w ing t ime ly i ns t ruc t ions for the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the opera

t ion al t fcr t i ie o^t t le ir* t i c Jfoasei-wai-abre sector, the coaaaauder of the

3rd. U'i# for iu- i^ted a s t r^veîc Gst i ix^le 02' the s i t u a t i o n a i a whole wliicli

he ,,c dd ^ct îv^ u^ oven af te r the a r r i v a l af tii© in s t ru c t io n s ia t i ied

b ' t1^ Hiîi Cour-and on ^ u e - ^ t o?, mach the l eas because in the i n s t r u c

t i o n s of August 2?f t iia *aain ida a 'ov er ta kin g p u rs u i t vi t h the main effor t

of the fo rces or; the r i g h t " was not brought out c l ea r ly enough . Ins t ea d

of order ing the s t r a t e g i c j o i n i n g of fo rces on the r i g h t for the p u r s u i t

o p e r a t i o n ( r e l e a s i n g tha 5th -*ny ^rom ths f i xed p ivo t and ht;vin^ troops

before Terdun re l ieved by lai"gu u.iiU of t~& ota Amy) and a t Vie aarje time

p l a c i n g the r ignt wing of t i ie ler.nan forces onder t iae direct orders of the

44



High Coaanand itself, the instructions of August 27 placed the decision

concerning the wheeling movement to the left (eves* if only from the

Aisne) at the discretion of the armies.

And lastly it would still have been possible for the High Command,

•open receiving the report from the staff of the 3rd Axsy issued the

afternoon of the 28th, by immediately intervening to swerve the array

again into rthe southwesterly march direction as ordered. It neglected

to remind the 3rd Array of its mission of overtaking pursuit.

And in forming an estimate of the consaand of the 3rd Airay from the

2?th to the 29th of August the disastrous effect of the action of the

staff of the 4th Army must not be omitted*

The repeated calls for help sent in by tfche headquarter* of the

4th Army, which influenced General von Hausen to turn off to the east,

are, it is true, comprehensible in view of the difficult tactical situa

tion of that array, nevertheless whan considered from the higher strategic

point of view from which viewpoint tbe staff of the 4th Ar*ay was to

consider the situation, they were ix>t justifiable.

The route of march in the direction of Cheveuges and later Vendresse-

Sapogne, where the 3rd Army was requested to enter into action, is compre

hensible only if adopted for a tactical support in the combat around the

Meuse sector. However, the 3rd Army should not have been turned aside

from the direction in which it was advancing, that prescribed by the

situation as a whole and the orders issued by the High Command. In

his calls for help, tbe commander of the 4th Army only to too great an

extent kfc had his own situation too ranch in view and the whole situation

only too little, Sverybody, especially «very commander of a large unit

should always consider the situation of his own unit only from the stand

point of the situation of the whole forces, he must also be able to suffer

-45



without complaining if it is to be feared that his complaints may swerve

neighboring units or his superior officers from the right course.

Whereas the staff of the 4th Army Corps was hi$i commmicative when

it came to asking for the help of the 3rd Array, its communication seal

diminished greatly when it came to the matter of informing the head

quarters of the 3rd Ayoay about the indications of the en©n§r's retreat.

As early as 7 P.H, August 28, a fine report was sent ty airplane to

the Headquarters of the 4th Army Corps announcing the retreat of large

forces of the enen§r from Cheraery via Yen&resse to Ohagny and troop trains

running from Tendresse to Le Ghasne. This extraordinarily important report,

according to the History of the War written by th© Beichsarchiv (VolTane

III, page 39) was transmitted to the headquarters of the 3rd Army. It

evidently did not reach there, at least not to the knowledge of those in

charge. We should be grateful if the Hsichsarcfrlv would explain this

point.

It is striking that the headquarters of the 4th Ar^y was still asking

for the entry into action of the 3rd Ar w in. the direction of Tendresse

early in the morning of the 29th of August* This direction was known to

bs false as soon as indications of tbe enemy's retreat were known* The

headquarters of the 4th Army probably had not considered the retreat of

the ener/gr as quite certain ?nd bad placed the idea of the certainty of the

victory of its own army above the destruction connected with the general

situation. The whole morning of Au^mt 28 no intimation was sent to the

headquarters of the 3rd Army of the enemy*s retreat, which apparently had

already begun, It was not until 1:40 P.M. that the first wireless report

was sent in announcing the enemy's retreat, and unfortunately it took

this message almost five hours to reach the headquarters of the 3rd Army*

Tbe omissions of the staff of tbe 4th Army Corps made a proper estimate

of the situation t>y the headquarters of the 3rd Army on August 24 much more

-46



difficult, but they do not excuse tiv striking failure of the recon

naissance and comQunieation service of the 3rd Army itself on that

day.

Altho we have made a historical study of tlie actual decisions

made "by the staff of the 3rd A i w from the 27th to the 29th of August

1914 from tha military point of view, we find fcnat we are not in

accord with them, nevertheless the working out of Problems 1 and 2

ought to have shown us haw difficult many of these decisions are even

when reached in peace and quiet at a desk. These problems can partially

reproduce the uncertainty of the situation, the changing basis on

which the decisions had to "be made, out t-liey cannot make the student

responsible for his decisions or "bring him under the other exigencies

of actual warfare,

This fact .aust always be borne in mind when judging of historiaal

characters•

strategic & problems for the study of the marne campaign 1914, volume i. studies on the command...

Documents