strategic success factors in counter- insurgency campaigns: with discussion of the modelling...

Strategic Success Factors in Counter- Insurgency Campaigns:With Discussion of the Modelling Approach

Dstl/CP23836/1.2 (ORS10)Presentation to ORS Defence Special Interest Group, 24 Feb 2010

Dr Andrew HossackDstl Policy & Capability Studies Dept

© Crown Copyright 2010

© Dstl 2010

10 April 2023 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence

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Before I Start…

• This is a recycled presentation:

– Most of it has been previously presented at:

• Cornwallis XII, Nova Scotia, Apr 07 (CP23836) (Best Paper)• UCSD IGCC CT Conference, San Diego, May 07 (CP24670)• MORS IW Workshop, Monterey, Dec 07 07 (CP26591)• Etc…

– The central research is (mostly) published in the Cornwallis XII Proceedings

– The background terms, definitions, scope etc are published in the Cornwallis X Proceedings similarly

• My apologies to anyone who has heard this all before…

…Please feel free to doze quietly for the next 40-60 minutes!

Recycled Presentation!

Background to this Presentation

© Dstl 2010


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The Overall COIN Research Study

• FYs05-07: An ongoing multi-year research programme into Counter-Terrorist/Counter-insurgency (CT/COIN) campaigns:

– Building upon previous HA studies of CT, stabilisation etc

– Undertaken to inform development of PSO/OOTW models by Dstl etc

– Phase I (Aug 04 – Jul 05): Identify generic BLUE success factors

– Phase II (Aug 05 – Sep 06): Identify generic RED success factors

– Phase IIIA (Oct 06 – Mar 07): Initial Study of Campaign Evolution

• A possible Phase IIIB (analysis of the strategic dynamics within campaigns) has not yet been agreed

© Dstl 2010


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Previous Historical Analysis of OOTW

• This work builds upon a number of prior HA OOTW studies:

– Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Study (1999 - 2001)

• tactical analyses of patrols, ambushes etc in 8 COIN campaigns – Counter-Terrorism (CT) Strategies “Fastball” (2001)

– Counter-Terrorism Overseas (CTO) Study (2002 - 2004) *

• Focused on structure, attributes of “International Terrorist” groups– Iraq Campaign Assessment I (Nov 2003) *

– Stabilisation Operations Study (2004)

• Identified success factors for external stabilisation of states

*Key results included in Cornwallis IX presentation

Review of Analysis Methodology

© Dstl 2010


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Study Approach

• Undertaken as a “historical analysis” (HA) study, i.e.

• Historical Analysis:

– Is operational analysis of quantified data describing the actual behaviour of systems across a wide range of historical cases

– Is empirical, statistical and holistic

– Involves the testing of hypotheses using established statistical techniques

– Focuses on understanding the enduring, underlying mechanisms of conflict

– Is about the “analysis of real operations” …..ongoing, recent and historical!

© Dstl 2010


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The Spectrum of Conflict

“Conflict Intensity” (Level of Violence)

(Counter)-Insurgency

Civil War

Limited War

Theatre War

Global War

Humanitarian Relief Ops

Strikes & Raids

(Counter)-Terrorism

Peace Enforcement

Disaster Relief

Peacekeeping/ Enforcement

(Counter)-Terrorism

(Counter)-Insurgency

Civil War

Show of Force

General War

Regional Conflict

Low Intensity Conflict

Mid Intensity Conflict

High Intensity Conflict

Peacetime & Crisis

Symmetric (conventional) conflictNon-Conflict

Asymmetric (unconventional) conflict

Scope of CT/COIN Study

US:

UK:

© Dstl 2010


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Study Scope• Counter-Terrorism (CT) & Counter-Insurgency (COIN)

assumed to represent adjacent & overlapping regions of some spectrum of “asymmetric conflict”

• No a priori distinction made between major terrorist & minor insurgent campaigns

• Boundary Issues: – Micro/Urban Terrorist Campaigns excluded (E.g.: November 17) – Genuine “Civil Wars” excluded (E.g.: Chinese Communists)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

0.0001 0.01 1 100

(Terrorists/Insurgents + Sympathisers) per 1,000 Popn

Cu

mu

lati

ve

Fre

qu

en

cy

"Insurgent" Campaigns

"Terrorist" Campaigns

Iraq 2003 (Estimate) c. 1.2 Terrorists/Sympathisers per 1,000 Popn

© Dstl 2010


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Terrorism & Insurgency (1)

• “Terrorist”, “Terrorism” are emotive words, open to multiple (mis-) interpretations and abuse

• “Terrorist” typically used to refer to groups that predominantly use terrorism tactics……e.g.:

– bombings

– shootings

– assassinations

• …but identical tactics also often present in “insurgency” campaigns as well to lesser degree

© Dstl 2010


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Terrorism & Insurgency (2)

• UK / NATO doctrine defines “terrorism” to be:

“…..the unlawful use or threatened use of violence against individuals in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve

political, religious or ideological objectives”

• UK / NATO doctrine defines “insurgency” to be:

“….an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”

• Only terrorism by Non-State actors against the State is considered in this study

© Dstl 2010


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Study Definition

CT/COIN Campaign

Any extended, essentially two-sided, asymmetric conflict in which some non-state player largely within a (possibly de facto) state

attempts to force some change in either the nature and/or leadership of said state predominantly through some mixture of

terrorist and/or insurgent tactics.

As defined from UK / NATO terminology!

© Dstl 2010


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Conceptual Model of Campaign

State in Conflict (SiC)

Area of Conflict Location (ACL)

Neighbouring StateNeighbouring State

Neighbouring State

Terrorist / Insurgent

Group (TIG)

State Security Forces (SyF)

External Intervening State

(EIS)

© Dstl 2010


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Examples of Campaign Structure

Years ExternalIntervening State

State in Conflict Area of ConflictLocation

Terrorist /Insurgent Group

1941 - 1945 N/R German 3rd

ReichFormer Kingdom

of YugoslaviaYugoslavPartisans

1955 - 1960 UK Crown Colonyof Cyprus

Crown Colony ofCyprus

EOKA

1954 - 1962 France Department ofAlgeria

Department ofAlgeria

ALN

1965 - 1972 USA Republic ofVietnam

Republic ofVietnam

Viet Cong

1969 - 1994 N/R UK Northern Ireland PIRA

1975 - 1999 N/R Indonesia E Timor FALANTIL

© Dstl 2010


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Outline of Analysis Method

• C. 100 possible success factors identified and tested for statistically significant association with campaign outcome:

– FY05: c. 40 possible SyF success factors tested

– FY06: c. 60 possible Insurgent success factors tested

• Assessment criteria for ordered categories defined for each factor:

– Category “-1 ”: “Poor, incompetent or no usage/presence”

– Category “ 0 ”: “Moderate, mixed or occasional usage/presence”

– Category “+1”: “Good, competent or extensive usage/presence”

• Assessment criteria, categories for outcome measures defined similarly

© Dstl 2010


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Coding of Success Factors

Field Title Flexibility of Security Forces C2 Degradation of Key State Economic Sectors

Field Type Security Forces Capability Insurgent Tactic

Field Value

-1

The Security Forces were unresponsive, inflexible and incapable of either

achieving surprise in planned operations or of exploiting targets of opportunity.

The Insurgents did not significantly seek to destroy or seriously degrade

any part of the State’s economy

0

The Security Forces had limited responsiveness and flexibility and were sometimes able to act sufficiently rapidly

to achieve surprise in planned operations or to exploit targets of

opportunity

The Insurgents occasionally or inconsistently sought to destroy or

seriously degrade key sectors of the State’s economy

1

The Security Forces were responsive, flexible, capable of planning

innovatatively and of acting rapidly to achieve tactical/operational surprise or

to exploit targets of opportunity

The Insurgents constantly and consistently sought to destroy or

seriously degrade key sectors of the State’s economy

• Factors judged on 3 point ordinal scale:

© Dstl 2010


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Outcome Measures Used• Two types of campaign success considered:

– Military Success (judged on achievement of monopoly of violence)

– Political Success (judged on achievement of initial objectives)

• Military Success assumed zero-sum a priori: – ‘(State) Success’ State monopoly of violence at end campaign

– ‘(State) Partial Success’ Both State & Insurgents retain capacity for violence

– ‘(State) Failure’ Insurgent monopoly of violence at end campaign

• Political Success coded independently for all Actors (Internal State, External State, Insurgents):

– ‘Success’ Most initial objectives achieved at end campaign

– ‘Partial Success’ Some initial objectives achieved at end campaign

– ‘Failure’ Few initial objectives achieved at end campaign

© Dstl 2010


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Data Collection & Coding

• Data for 44 COIN campaigns collected & categorised by external researchers

– FY05: Data collected on overall campaign, context, SyF factors etc

– FY06: Additional data on Insurgent & social factors only

• Case selection was pseudo-random:– Stratified sampling across geographic regions

– Spread over post WWI-period

• Each data point currently represents an entire campaign:

– Static analysis only; takes no account of development of campaign over time

© Dstl 2010


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Statistical Analysis

• Candidate success factors tested for association with success using Somers’ D statistic at 90% confidence

• Essentially assessing distributions of data in 3 x 3 Contingency Tables:

“Is there a tendency for better (or worse) values of variable X to be

consistently paired with better (or worse) campaign outcomes?

Analysis Results (1):(Attritional) Efficiency of SyF, Insurgents

© Dstl 2010


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Efficiency of SyF & TIG

0.1

"Force Ratio“ (Ratio of Median Annual Forces)

“Eff

icie

nc

y”

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

1 10 100

Security Forces

Terrorists/Insurgents

• Plot shows efficiency of each combatant vs Force Ratio: – Efficiency: No. Opponents killed per 1,000 Man-Years force deployed

© Dstl 2010


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0.1


“Eff

icie

nc

y”

y = 56.5x-0.9

R 2 = 0.4

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

1 10 100

Security Forces


• SyF efficiency decreases significantly with increasing FR – Each additional soldier/policeman adds less than the one before

© Dstl 2010


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0.1


“Eff

icie

nc

y”

y = 19.0x0.3

R 2 = 0.1

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

1 10 100

Security Forces


• No evidence that Insurgent efficiency changes with FR: – Each Insurgent is as efficient as the one before

© Dstl 2010


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0.1


“Eff

icie

nc

y”

y = 56.5x-0.9

R 2 = 0.4

y = 19.0x0.3

R 2 = 0.1

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

1 10 100

Security Forces


• Possibly this is because Insurgents are typically too small to experience effects of diminishing returns on scale?

Analysis Results (2):The relationship between Force Ratio & Campaign Outcome

© Dstl 2010


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Force Ratio & Campaign Outcome (1)

• There is a weak relationship between odds of military campaign success and whole-campaign Force Ratio:

– Statistically significant at 93% confidence

– A conservative and reasonable result given expected “noise” in data

– Military success used because a zero-sum outcome

– Strictly, tested against the Ratio of Median Annual Forces (used as a surrogate approximation to Force Ratio)

• Can use ordinal logistic regression to estimate the rate of change of odds with change in Force Ratio

© Dstl 2010


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Military Success

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0.00

10.

01 0.1 1 10 10

010

00

1000

0

1000

0

1E+0

6

"Force Ratio" (Log Axis)

Ou

tco

me

pro

ba

bil

ity

SyF Failure

SyF Partial Success

SyF Success


• Ordinal Logistic regression estimates that:– Odds(Win), Odds(Lose) change by x3 with each x10 change in FR– 90% Confidence that true rate of change is between x1+ - x8

x10 increase in FR

x3 increase in Equivalent Odds

© Dstl 2010


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• The Force Ratio-Outcome Model may provide:

– A basis for future development of a model incorporating key success factor values as well as Force Ratio

– A method of quantifying the value of changing outcome odds in terms of the change in Force Ratio required to give an equivalent effect

• That is, each x2 change in campaign odds is:

– Estimated to be equivalent to a x4 change in Force Ratio

– At least equivalent to a x2+ change in Force Ratio (90% confidence)

© Dstl 2010


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Military Success

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0.00

10.

01 0.1 1 10 10

010

00

1000

0

1000

0

1E+0

6

"Force Ratio" (Log Axis)

Ou

tco

me

pro

ba

bil

ity

SyF Failure

SyF Partial Success

SyF Success


• Each x2 (x4) change in campaign odds is:

– Estimated to be equivalent to a x4 (x16) change in Force Ratio

– At least equivalent to a x2+ (x4+) change in Force Ratio (90% confidence)

x16 Change in FR

x4 Change in Odds

Analysis Results (3):Generic Security Forces’ Success Factors

© Dstl 2010


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SyF Success Factors (1)Magnitude of Estimated Equivalent Force Multiplier

Military Campaign Success for State & SyF

Political Campaign Success for State & SyF

x50 < FM- Pop Support for Conflict

- Pop Support for SyF

x20 < FM ≤ x50SyF Doctrine -

Pop Support for SyF -

x10 < FM ≤ x20

Pop Support for Conflict SyF Doctrine

SyF Training -

Flexibility of SyF C2 Targeting TIG Leadership (-)

x5 < FM ≤ x10

Resource Availability SyF Counter-Intelligence

SiC Legitimacy Winning “Hearts & Minds”

SyF Counter-Intelligence Flexibility of SyF C2

x1 < FM ≤ x5

Winning “Hearts & Minds” Overall SyF Intelligence

Overall SyF Intelligence State Legitimacy

SyF Strategic Posture Integration of SyF C2

Integration of SyF C2 Legal Status of Campaign

They only tell us the What? not the

How? (Context specific?)

These are the same factors that were reported to

Cornwallis X!

© Dstl 2010


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SyF Success Factors (2)

• Generically, the factors most important to State military and political success in COIN at the campaign level are those concerned with:

– Wresting the campaign initiative away from the Insurgents:

• good Counter-Int; proactive Strategic Posture; Hearts & Minds

– The directed & precise application of Security Forces’ capability:

• flexible & integrated C2; good Int; good Training and Doctrine

– Creating/maintaining the necessary political context for success:

• Popular Support for Security Forces; Hearts & Minds; good Training and Doctrine

© Dstl 2010


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SyF Success Factors (3)

• These generic, campaign level success factors include no factors relating to:

– Security Forces’ capability itself:

• Firepower, mobility, use of ‘Special Forces’ etc– the specific methods by which Security Forces’ capability is applied

against Insurgents

• degradation of infrastructure, direct attrition, control of population

• These factors may still be significant in specific contexts

• There is some requirement for boots-on-the-ground:

– force ratio advantage & resource availability

– Needed to avoid losing, but not in itself sufficient for winning?

Analysis Results (4):Generic Insurgents’ Success Factors

© Dstl 2010


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Insurgent Success Factors (1)Magnitude of Estimated Equivalent Force Multiplier

Military Campaign Success for Insurgents

Political Campaign Success for Insurgents

x50 < FM Pop Support for Insurgentsx20 < FM ≤ x50 (Insurgent Doctrine) -

Pop Support for Insurgents -x10 < FM ≤ x20 Destruction of SyF (Insurgent Doctrine)

- Attempted Destruction of State Infrastructure

x5 < FM ≤ x10

Insurgent Firepower -Insurgent Counter-Intelligence -

Overextension of SyF -Overthrow State Leaders -

Insurgent Training Insurgent Experience (-)Legitimise Claim to Power Insurgent Internal Structure (-)

x1 < FM ≤ x5

Attract External Intervention Attempted Destruction of State Institutions (-)

Insurgent Concealment in Terrain -Subversion of Population Legitimise Claim to Power

Overall Insurgent Intelligence Subversion of Population

• CAVEAT: The Insurgent Doctrine Factor is unsafe – use with caution!

© Dstl 2010


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Insurgent Success Factors (2)

• Proportionately fewer factors are identified as generically associated with success for Insurgents compared to SyF

• Is Insurgent success more context-specific than for SyF?

– Fewer generic “rules of thumb” for guidance?

• Emphasises need for SyF Int to “get inside Insurgents’ heads”?

• Or a reflection of reduced robustness of Insurgent data compared to SyF data?

© Dstl 2010


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• Possibly 3 broad themes discernible among Insurgent Success Factors:

– Possession of favourable political context for success:• Having popular support;• establishing legitimacy of cause;• subverting population into detaching itself from the State

– Maintaining an Intelligence Superiority over SyF

– Possession of ‘kinetic’ military strength: • Firepower;• Trained insurgents;• Relevant Doctrine?

© Dstl 2010


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• Firepower / kinetic military strength may be more important to Insurgents than to SyF

– Possession of heavy weapons firepower is a military success factor for Insurgents but not for SyF!

– Insurgents do not suffer diminishing returns on increasing forces

• Presumably because Insurgents are much smaller than SyF so gain greater benefit from improvement in military capability

• As much a hypothesis as an inference!

• Suggests the necessity of modelling both the military as well as the political component of CT/COIN!

© Dstl 2010


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• Importance of military capability may explain some of the less immediately understandable Insurgent success factors:

– Insurgent Internal Structures (with hierarchical better than cellular)

– Destruction of SyF

– Overextension of SyF

– Overthrow of State Leadership

– Concealment within Terrain (but not within populations)

• These all require (relatively) large Insurgency size to be worth pursuing

• Or, they may be spurious results (“False Positives”)

Caveats on Results

© Dstl 2010


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Caveats on these Results• Static, whole-campaign analysis:

– Effectively considers the average state of factors across geography and time

• Robustness of Insurgent factor design:

– Wide range of possible Insurgent strategies for different contexts / campaigns

– Hard to write generic definitions that cover 44 campaigns over 85 years!

– Problem of Intent vs Action (Threatening vs Actual Destruction etc…)

• Spurious or “False Positive” Results:

– An inherent limitation of inferential statistics!

– At 90% confidence, it is statistically likely that up to:

• 4 of the SyF “success factors” found for each outcome type

• 6 of the Insurgent “success factors” found for each outcome type

are false

Summary & Conclusions

© Dstl 2010


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Conclusions on Success Factors

• The Political Component of CT/COIN: Popular support factors for Insurgents and SyF potentially offer some of the largest modifiers to campaign odds of success:

– Affecting both military and political campaign outcomes

– Up to twice as important to political as to military success

• The Military Component of CT/COIN: Although Force Ratio has a weaker effect upon campaign outcome than key SyF and Insurgent Success Factors:

– There is still some requirement for boots-on-the-ground

– SyF suffer diminishing returns on manpower at typical FRs

– Insurgents gain at least some benefit from numbers, training, firepower

© Dstl 2010


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Conclusions on Research

• Method provides technique for quantifying the payoff from adopting given strategies / capabilities….if done appropriately

• Results demonstrate the necessity for modelling the military and the political components of CT/COIN together

– Endorses a Rational Expectations perspective of PSO/COIN

• There is potential for further exploitation of existing, static campaign data

• Further major research will require more detailed, campaign-phase resolution

© Dstl 2010


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Published Research

• A HOSSACK. 2005. Historical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns, with observations on Current Operations in Iraq (Dstl/CP10135). Published In: A WOODCOCK, G ROSE, eds., The Cornwallis Group IX: Analysis for Stabilization and Counter-Terrorist Operations (2004) pp 393 – 417.

• C IRWIN, A S MORLEY, 2005. Drawing lessons from the past. A historical analysis of stabilization operations. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, Vol. 150 No. 1, February 2005, pp49 – 53

• A HOSSACK, K SIVASANKARAN. Success Factors in CT/COIN Campaigns: Preliminary Results arising from Current Research (Dstl/CP14230). Published In: A WOODCOCK and G ROSE, eds., The Cornwallis Group X: Analysis for New and Emerging Societal Conflicts (2005) pp 469 - 491.

• A HOSSACK. Security Force & Insurgent Success Factors in Counter-Insurgency Campaigns (Dstl/CP23836). Published In: A WOODCOCK and G ROSE, eds., The Cornwallis Group XII: Analysis for Multi-Agency Support (2008).

© Dstl 2010


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Contact Details

Dr Andrew Hossack FORS CMath FIMA

Principal Analyst & Associate FellowHistorical and Operational Data Analysis (HODA) Team

Analysis, Experimentation & Simulation (AES) GroupPolicy & Capability Studies (PCS) Department

Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (Dstl)iSAT “K”, Rm C036, Grenville Bldg West Court,

Portsdown Hill Road, Fareham, HANTS PO17 6AD

Tel: +44(0) 2392 532889Fax: +44(0) 2392 533458

Email: adhossack<at>dstl.gov.uk[dstl] is part of the UK Ministry of Defence

strategic success factors in counter- insurgency campaigns: with discussion of the modelling...

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