ABSTRACTS J PROD INNOV MANAG 303 1986;4:292-306

may not be form; it may be a service, location, time utility, or other. But profit comes only from diseq- uilibrium in the marketplace (sometimes called monop-

oly). Appropriateness is also essential to entrepreneur-

ship. A merely bizarre product or service will not com- mand a profit-consumers must need or want it.

Transformation of materials (or other resources) into finished product (service) is essential to any entrepre- neurship. If there were no transformation necessary, there would be no reason to have the entrepreneurship. Every new product or new business creates new forms or new perspectives on forms.

Condensation consists of merging extremes, cer- tainly evident in entrepreneurship. Most new products are combinations of simplicity and complexity-soft soap, for example, was an extremely simple product in form (already available in public restrooms) but com- plex to forecast consumer demand.

So, entrepreneurship is itself a creative process, not just the determined push of an eager novice or the powerful thrust of an experienced capitalist. Without creativity (as defined above) the entrepreneurship is empty and will fail.

Other psychologists have offered other definitions of creativity, and this article also deals with a couple of them. But the point is made: entrepreneurship is a cre- ative process. Given that new products management is often viewed today as in-house entrepreneurship, it should be studied as a creative process too; concept generation is not the only creative dimension.

Strategy and Strategic Choice: The Case of Telecommunications, Richard J. Butler and Mick Carney, Strategic Management Journal (March-April 1986), pp. 161-177.

(CMC)

The purpose of this article is to help us to see the larger picture of strategy, how strategy takes one of four basic forms, and what determines when each form is approp- riate.

First, the author defines two basic forces that shape strategy. The first force is the degree of concentration in the industry. There can be concentration in supporter organizations (such as customers, suppliers, banks,

etc.) and/or in competition. Competitive concentration (the traditional concentration of economics) is the one that drives strategy and that interests us here. The sec- ond force is ambiguity in task knowledge. Ambiguity is high in such industries as aerospace manufacturing and higher education, but low in water and textiles. It is always high if there is rapid scientific development.

These two forces lead to a matrix of four situations, each of which calls for a different one of the four basic strategic alternatives.

High Concentration, High Task Ambiguity: this sit- uation leads to the strategy of cooperation. The aero- space and education industries are examples cited. The main problem for an organization in this condition is to ensure a supply of supporters and avoid the entrance of competitors. Joint ventures help in this, as do other kinds of agreements. The new products strategy of the telephone companies probably reflects this situation.

High Concentration, Low Task Ambiguity: this sit- uation leads to the strategy of consolidation-appro- priate where a firm operates a routine technology and enjoys a monopoly. The author cites the steel and water industries as examples. Activities here include: (1) de- fense of existing domain so as to restrict entry of com- petitors, (2) institution building, where the monopoly is legitimatized, (3) attempts to capture regulatory agen- cies, (4) integration, either vertical or horizontal, and (5) formulation, as where a major department store formulates standards for its suppliers to meet. New products projects would be primarily defensive.

Low Concentration, High Task Ambiguity: this sit- uation leads to the strategy of innovation, and the ex- ample cited is the electronics industry. The organiza- tion tries to gain an advantage over competitors, using innovation, but any monopoly is temporary. Differ- entiation and diversification are sought. It is a dynamic strategy. There might be, for example, joint ventures that included only the R&D function; there are too many competitors for joint ventures to yield monopoly advantage, yet the high task ambiguity yields itself to joint actions. Acquisition is also a viable alternative here.

Low Concentration, Low Task Ambiguity: this situa- tion leads to the strategy of competition, and the exam- ple cited is textiles. Conditions are not at all favorable to innovation, but instead lead to efficiency seeking, cost-cutting, attempts to restrict sources of supply, and in general just attempting to do one’s best. Process innovations are sought more than are product innova- tions, particularly since the latter are very difficult to come by in the setting of low task ambiguity.

304 JPRODINNOVMANAG 3986:4:292-306

ABSTRACTS

The author then proceeds to analyze the British tele- communications industry in terms of those four settings and appropriate strategies.

Outcomes of Autonomous Workgroups: A Long-Term Field Experiment, Toby D. Wall, Nigel J. Kemp, Paul R. Jackson, and Chris W. Clegg, Academy of Management Journal (1986), pp. 280-304. (CMC)

According to the authors, this is the first research done on the long-term outcome of applying the autonomous Workgroup concept. Since such a concept is widely encouraged (and increasingly used) in the new products field, this research is relevant to us, though this experi- ment included only manufacturing people.

The key feature of autonomous workgroups is a high degree of self-determination by employees in the man- agement of their day-to-day work. Job characteristics are a property of group work, not individual jobs. The underlying assumptions are that this method is intrin- sically motivating and enhances employee satisfaction; from these reactions follow improved group perfor- mance and reduced turnover. There is to be increased organizational commitment and improved mental health.

This abstract cannot summarize the research design and measurement devices, but the study appears sound, is well explained, and offers an extensive bibliography. It involved a British candy company, opening a new plant in southern England.

The results were as follows.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Employees did indeed perceive their working con- ditions as more autonomous, and of unique design. Work design had significant positive effect on in- trinsic job satisfaction. Work design had significant positive effect on ex- trinsic job satisfaction. Work design significantly increased organizational commitment. But, the design had no effect on job motivation or on mental health. There were no specific measures of work output, but the authors felt that no increase in productivity took place.

At the start of the study managers reported high lev- els of stress, and of interpersonal and interfunctional conflict. Their personal jobs were perceived to be much more difficult than before. However, managers and employees alike supported the system, and wanted it continued. They especially enjoyed the absence of tight supervision, freedom to make decisions, and a gener- ally more democratic system (e.g., no time clocks, equal parking, common canteens, etc .)

The most disturbing result (to the authors, and to us) concerned the absence of job motivation. This is sup- posedly at the heart of the autonomous approach to work groupings. There was evidence that the firm in- volved did not employ all of the dimensions usually stipulated for this work form. For instance, they con- tinued an individual reward system, not the group re- ward system usually felt inherent to the team approach. Similarly, the study did not measure group commit- ment, just company commitment; in fact, there is a suggestion that the firm did not want group commit- ment to substitute for company commitment. Perhaps the management did not really understand the autono- mous Workgroup concept with its unique combination of risks and rewards.

The conclusion is that autonomous work groupings have many advantages, even economic ones. This par- ticular application, for example, found that one layer of supervision could be eliminated. But, one cannot as- sume increased productivity from the individuals based on enhanced job motivation. And, lastly, the research- ers expressed concern about (1) the threats such work- groups pose for the nature and continued existence of supervisory jobs, and (2) the necessity for cutting across defined job classifications and other job customs in the plant involved.

Managing Innovation: Lessons from the Cardiac-Pacing Industry, David H. Gobeli and William Rudelius, Sloan Management Review (Summer 1985), pp. 29-41. (CMC)

This is a report on 12 years (1972- 1983) in one indus- try, including a focus on the period during which the new lithium battery was developed for use in cardiac pacemakers. It offers observations on the five firms in the industry (Medtronic, Intermedics, Cordis, Cardiac