strike and lockout case

8/11/2019 Strike and Lockout Case

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/strike-and-lockout-case 1/33

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 158158. January 17, 2005]BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINESFOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER) AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO,MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNOSILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FormerFifteenth Division), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), and CLOTHMAN KNITTINGCORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for review of the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73353 filed by theBukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting Corporation – Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowermentand Reforms (the petitioner union) and Raymond Tomaroy, Roel Sardonidos, Joseph Sederio, Maritchu Javellana,Enrique Omadto, Efren Mogar, Francisco Bertulfo, Judy Roquero, Paterno Silvestre, Cayetano Palmon, Teodoro Ocopand Joseph Estifano.Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged in knitting/textiles.[2] It hasapproximately one hundred forty-four (144) rank-and-file employees. The petitioner union is a legitimate labororganization of rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners were rank-and-file employees of the respondent andwere also members and officers of the petitioner union.In the year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and formed the petitioner union. It wasregistered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on February 23, 2001. In reaction thereto, therespondent, headed by its President, Paul U. Lee, gathered the employees and advised them not to listen to outsiders.[3] Meanwhile, another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the Nagkakaisang Lakas ngManggagawa sa Clothman Corporation – Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate ofregistration on April 23, 2001 by the DOLE.[4] A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner unionwith the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the respondent issued a Memorandum[5]

dated March 2,2001, informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders from thecustomers.On March 10, 2001, another Memorandum[6]

was issued by the respondent informing its employees at the Dyeing andFinishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be effected for one week, from March 12

to 17, 2001. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave, and were asked to verify any changes in the schedulefrom the Human Resources Division on March 17, 2001.Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily shutdown its operations at the Dyeing andFinishing Division effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It notified the DOLE of the saidshutdown on May 26, 2001.[7] The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal.For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the textiles to Crayons, Inc., a sister company. OnJune 11, 2001, while the respondent’s service truck with plate number TBK-158 was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan, thegroup of petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and some companions approached the truck as it made its way towards Don

Pedro Street and blocked its way. As a result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to the respondent’s

compound. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of the petitioner union, staged a picket infront of the respondent’s compound, carrying placards with slogans that read:

1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER.2. Mr. Paul Lee – Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER.

3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department.4. Mr. Paul Lee – Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay dimo maibigay. BMC-SUPER.5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon. BMC-SUPER.[8] On June 14, 2001, twenty-three (23) members of the petitioner union gathered in front of the respondent’s compound

carrying the same placards. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to the management with the followingpriority demands: (a) resumption of work; and (b) 13th

month pay.[9] The next day, members of the petitioner union andtheir supporters gathered in front of the respondent’s compound.[10] From June 16, 2001 up to June 18, 2001, themembers, as well as supporters of the union, gathered again in front of the company’s compound.[11]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jan2005/158158.htm#_ftn1












































On June 25, 2001, the respondent filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the arbitration branch of theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR 06-03332-2001.[12] The respondent alleged that thepicket of the members of the union from June 11, 2001 to June 18, 2001 in front of the company’s compound

constituted an illegal strike. It cited the following reasons:a) The strikers/picketers did not conduct a strike vote and no cooling-off period was observed; b) The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;c) The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeable issue;d) The work slowdown/picket caused damages to the petitioner in the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00);

e) The illegal acts of respondents constrained petitioner to seek the services of undersigned counsel for an attorney’sfee of P50,000.00 and P2,000.00 per appearance.[13] In a Decision dated October 18, 2001, the Labor Arbiter granted the petition, declared the strike illegal and theemployment status of the union officers who participated therein as terminated:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition filed by the petitioner is hereby GRANTED. The strike conducted by the respondents is hereby declared as illegal.Consequently, due to their illegal activities, the respondents namely: RAYMOND TOMAROY, President, ROELSARDONIDOS, Vice-President, JOSEPH SEDERIO, Secretary, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, Treasurer, ENRIQUE OMADTO,Auditor, EFREN MOGAR, P.R.O., and FRANCISCO BERTULFO, P.R.O. and Board of Directors: JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNOSILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP and JOSEPH ESTIFANO are hereby declared to have lost theiremployment status with the petitioner.[14] The Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the respondent to implement a reduced workingday from the original six (6) days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of job orders, whichfurther led to its decision to temporarily stop the operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for one (1) week – March12 to 17, 2001. The affected employees were then requested to utilize their vacation leaves and were, thereafter,admitted back to work. However, Tomaroy and members of the union staged a strike, and the labor unrest resulted inthe cancellation of job orders amounting to P6,380,817.50. The aforestated losses prompted the petitioner to close andstop the business operations of its Dyeing and Finishing Division.It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that it was only the workers in the Dyeing andFinishing Division who were affected by the temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents conducted a picket in frontof the company’s premises, the whole business operations of the respondent was affected. As borne out by the recordsthe Labor Arbiter found that the petitioners therein failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike, to wit:1. It was not based on a valid factual ground, either based on Collective Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor

Practice;2. No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE;3. There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union;4. There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended date of the strike;5. The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed; and6. The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report was not fully observed.[15] Thus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal; hence, the union officers whoknowingly participated in an illegal strike, already lost their employment status.[16]

Aggrieved, the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-CA-030216-01. In a Resolutionpromulgated on May 10, 2002, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the Labor Arbiter a quo, the

assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

[17]

The NLRC reasoned that it found no instances and/or situation befitting grave abuse of discretion on the part of theLabor Arbiter.Dissatisfied, the petitioner union filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution[18]

dated July 24,2002.The petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73353, raising the followingerror:I. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSED (SIC) OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESSOF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY FAILED TO APPRECIATE FACTS AND EVIDENCES, APPLICABLE LAWS AND EXISTINGJURISPRUDENCE AND, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS.[19]


































In a Resolution[20] dated October 25, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that, contrary to Section 3, Rule

46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner union did not contain the fullnames and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, as the petition merely mentioned “BMC-SUPER,et al.” as the petitioners. Further, the petition and the certification on non-forum shopping were signed by Raymond P.Tomaroy, who claimed to be the union president/authorized representative of petitioners without, however, any suchauthorization from the labor union and the other petitioners covered by the abbreviation et al. Moreover, the petitionwas not verified as required by Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, did not produce legaleffect as provided for in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

In addition, the petition was signed by petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy in his capacity as union president/authorizedrepresentative, assisted by Enrique T. Belarmino, Legal Head of Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowermentand Reforms, neither of whom was a duly authorized member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hence, accordingto the appellate court, neither of them had authority to conduct litigation before the CA.[21] A motion for reconsiderationwas filed by the petitioner union which was similarly denied in a Resolution[22]

dated April 21, 2003. The CA reasonedthat, contrary to the petitioners’ insistence that the verification was signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, page 16 of thepetition filed before it did not bear such signature. Moreover, the special power of attorney attached to the motion forreconsideration was subscribed and sworn to by the signatories therein before Notary Public Orlando C. Dy only onNovember 20, 2002, i.e., more than one (1) month after the filing of the petition on October 15, 2002. Consequently,the special power of attorney did not cure the defect in the certification against forum shopping signed by RaymondTomaroy, which was, likewise, not accompanied by proof that he was authorized to file the petition on behalf of thepetitioner union.The CA clarified that the authority of non-lawyers to represent the labor organization or members thereof applies onlyto proceedings before the NLRC or Labor Arbiters, as provided for in Article 222 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, anon-lawyer may appear before it only if he is a party-litigant. However, Raymond P. Tomaroy did not appear to be aparty in the case before the CA as his name was not mentioned in the caption nor in the body of the petition.[23] Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition contending that:I PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF

TECHNICALITIES.IIPUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED [WHEN] IT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THEHONORABLE LABOR ARBITER THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED ILLEGAL STRIKE.[24]

On the first ground, the petitioners allege that they complied with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rulesof Court. They contend that the petition filed before the CA by the petitioner union’s president was sanctioned by

Article 242 of the Labor Code, and the cases of Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. CFI of Bulacan ,[25] Davao Free

Workers Front v. CIR ,[26] and La Carlota Sugar Central v. CIR.[27] The petitioner union insists that it would be illogical forthe union, as an entity, to require all its members to sign the said petition and the certificate of non-forum shopping. Itavers that a labor union is a judicial entity which functions thru its officers. Thus, the president, as an officer of theunion, needed no special power of attorney to sign for the union. It stresses that it did not violate Section 34, Rule 138of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner union further invokes the policy that the “rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of

substantial justice;” when the rules strictly applied resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote

justice, this Court is empowered to support the rules.

The petitioners argue that they did not stage a strike, much more an illegal strike. They explain that a strike means workstoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of the respondent was shutdown, it could not have causeda work stoppage. The union members merely picketed in front of the respondent’s factory to urge the respondent to

open and order the resumption of the operations in its Dyeing and Finishing Division. There was, thus, no need tocomply with the requirements laid down by Article 263 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules.For its part, the respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the petition filed before the CAfailed to comply with Section 1 of Rule 65, Section 3 of Rule 46, and Section 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and thatthe requirement as to the signatories in the petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Therespondent reiterates that the petitioners staged an illegal strike, and that as officers of the union who participatedtherein, the petitioners are deemed to have lost their employment status.


































The contention of the petitioners is erroneous. They are of the erroneous impression that the only respondent in theNLRC was the petitioner union and that it was sued in its representative capacity. The fact of the matter is that therespondent sued not only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and members of its Board of Directorsas principal respondents, and sought the termination of the employment of the said officers. The Labor Arbiterrendered judgment against all the respondents therein and declared the officers to have lost their employmentstatus. The NLRC affirmed the decision on appeal. It was not only the union that assailed the decision of the NLRC in theCA, but also the dismissed officers. The petitioners (respondents therein) prayed for the reversal thereof and thatanother judgment be rendered as prayed for by them in their position paper in the NLRC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Labor Arbiter that, after submission of thisPosition Paper, the above entitled case be considered submitted for resolution, and the decision be rendered in favor ofthe respondents employees: 1. Declaring Petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of working days, shutdown and UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES againstindividual respondents;2. Ordering petitioners be, jointly and severally, liable to pay respondents actual damages, payment of MORAL andEXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of not less than P50,000.00 each individual employees and 10% of the totalmonetary award for the Office of BMC-SUPER plus P10,000.00 litigation expenses;3. Ordering that Petitioner Paul Lee be in contempt of court and be fined to pay individual respondents in theamount of P50,000.00 each or imprisonment of Two (2) to Four (4) Years or both.Other relief and remedies equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.[28] Under Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari shall containthe full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that the failure of the petitioners tocomply with the said requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition:Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition shall contain the fullnames and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, thefactual background of the case and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with theoriginal copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legibleduplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such materialportions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certificationshall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer ofthe court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of

copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commencedany other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, orany other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if heshould, thereafter, learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, theCourt of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform theaforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount

of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for thedismissal of the petition.

Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action indicates the names of the parties whoshall be named in the original petition:Section 1. Caption. – The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number, ifassigned. The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition;but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with anappropriate indication when there are other parties.Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.In this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA does not contain the names of the petitioners officers ofthe petitioner BMC-SUPER and of the members of the Board of Directors; even the petition itself does not contain the







full names and addresses of the said officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner union. We quotethe title of the petition and the averments thereof having reference to the parties-petitioners:BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINESFOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL., Petitioner,-vs-CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION,Respondents.[29]

… Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT ANDREFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al ., is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be served withsummons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.Private Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under andby virtue of Philippine Laws engaged in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don Pedro Street, DonPedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City.Public Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, herein impleaded as the tribunal exercising judicial functions who issued the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.[30] The petitioners’ reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR[31]

is misplaced. In the said case,the Court held that the failure to specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking members of a laborunion in the decision or in the complaint was of no consequence. This is due to the fact that it was established that allthe union members went on strike as a result of the unfair labor practice of the employer, in consonance with the rulethat it is precisely the function of a labor union to carry the representation of its members, particularly against theemployer’s unfair labor practices against it and its members, and to file an action for their benefit and behalf without

joining each and every member as a separate party.Significantly, the full names and addresses of the officers and members of the Board of Directors of the petitioner unionare set forth in their petition at bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and addresses of all thepetitioners to be stated in the title of the petition and in the petition itself. We quote the title of the petition and theallegation therein having reference to the parties-petitioners:BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINESFOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO,MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO

SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, Petitioners.[32] … 1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT ANDREFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFRENMOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP ANDJOSEPH ESTIFANO, the former is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, and the latter aremembers of the former; they can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court at c/o H.O.

VICTORIA AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Unit 305 Web-Jet Building, 64 Quezon Avenue cor. BMA Avenue, QuezonCity.[33] On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint orother initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filedtherewith: (a) that he has not, therefore, commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in anycourt, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pendingtherein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) ifhe should, thereafter, learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that factwithin five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or otherinitiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, uponmotion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakingstherein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal






















actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall beground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrativesanctions.As gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the certification ofnon-forum shopping in his capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The officers and members of the Board ofDirectors, who were, likewise, principal petitioners, did not execute any certification of non-forum shopping asmandated by the said Rule. The rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitionersand that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.[34] Although petitioner Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his

position as president of the petitioner union to execute the certification for and in its behalf, he had no authority to doso for and in behalf of its petitioners-officers, as well as the members of the Board of Directors thereof. The executionby the individual petitioners of a special power of attorney subsequent to the dismissal of the petition by the CAauthorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite certification does not cure the fatal defect in their petition.[35] The respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA was correctly dismissed as it was not signed bycounsel. The respondent noted that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that petitioner Enrique Belarmino did notmanifest in the petition that he was the lawyer. The respondent, thus, contends that Tomaroy and Belarmino engagedin the illegal practice of law, in violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.We do not agree.Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representinghim.[36] Considering that the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the pleading. For thisreason alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition.Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the petitioners and resolved the petition on its merits, we find that thepetitioner union, along with its supporters, staged a strike without complying with the requirements laid down in Article263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.The petitioner union alleges that it could not have staged a strike because the operations at the Dyeing and FinishingDivision were temporarily stopped. It insists that it merely protested the unjustified closing of the respondent’s Dyeing

and Finishing Division by forming a picket in front of the respondent’s compound to urge the re-opening thereof.We do not agree.A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labordispute.[37] A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or theassociation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms andconditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and

employee.[38] The members and the supporters of the petitioner union, headed by petitioner Tomaroy, thru concerted action, causeda temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial dispute. This is evidenced in the June 13, 2001 spot report ofthe Atlantic Security & Investigation Agency:On or about 1445H of June 11, 2001, Mr. Jojo Flores and Mr. Rene Fabian were about to deliver fabrics in Bulacan withservice truck TBK-158. Upon reaching the corner of Don Pedro St. and McArthur Highway, they gave way to a big truckturning to Don Pedro St. and at the same time the group of Mr. Raymond Tomaroy, the leader of BUKLURAN NGMANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS –

BMC SUPER were on their way to CKC compound. Seeing the group, Mr. Fabian greeted them by giving a quick forwardmotion of his head. But instead, according to Mr. Fabian, Mr. Tomaroy with finger pointing on to Mr. Fabian accusinghim as the one responsible for the delay of their 13th

month pay. Mr. Fabian just told the group BMC-SUPER to read the

Memorandum of the HRD dated June 8, 2001. Mr. Flores and Mr. Fabian returned to CKC, Don Pedro St., Marulas,Valenzuela, to report the matter. At about 1517H of same date, Mr. Tomaroy with 16 members of BMC SUPER staged a rally and/or gathered in front ofClothman Knitting Corporation gate carrying placards with slogan read as follows:1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER;2. Mr. Paul Lee – Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th

month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER;3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department;4. Mr. Paul Lee – Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay dimo maibigay BMC-SUPER;5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon BMC-SUPER.























On or about 1640H at the same date, a PNP-Valenzuela Mobil car had SPO1 Palma, PO2 Manresa and PO1 Isip onboard. The police with the BMC-SUPER. The Valenzuela Police left at about 1727H.At about 1810H of the same date, the group of BMC-SUPER abandoned the area.[39] The subsequent Reports dated June 14, 15, 16 and 18, 2001 of the same agency further stated that members of thepetitioner union, along with other employees particularly from the knitting department, joined in the picket.[40] It is,thus, apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters caused a temporarywork stoppage. The allegation that there can be no work stoppage because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing

Division had been shutdown is of no consequence. It bears stressing that the other divisions were fullyoperational. There is nothing on record showing that the union members and the supporters who formed a picket linein front of the respondent’s compound were assigned to the finishing department. As can be clearly inferred from thespot reports, employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. The blockade of the delivery of trucks andthe attendance of employees from the other departments of the respondent meant work stoppage. The placards thatthe picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of employment as well as theassociation or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms andconditions of employment.Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike. In order for a strike to be valid, thefollowing requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) anotice of strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported tothe DOLE.[41] It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes thestrike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonablyregulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.[42] Considering that the petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid requirements, the strike staged on June 11 to18, 2001 is illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who participated therein are deemed to have lost theiremployment status.[43] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

STEEL CORPORATION G.R. Nos. 169829-30

OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO,

*

CORONA,AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-

NATIONAL FEDERATION

OF LABOR UNIONS,

Respondent. Promulgated:

April 16, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J .:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition is seeking to setaside the Decision[1] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R.
















http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/april2008/169829-30.htm#_ftn1














SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the Resolution

[2] dated September 22, 2005 denying petitioner’s motion f or

reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials,supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials.[3] On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Unionof the Energy Leaders – General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to

represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner .[4] Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) – NationalFederation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election [5] but the samewas denied for having been filed out of time.

[6]

On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with ―FUEL-GAS‖ and ―NO UNION‖ as choices. Said

election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast theirvotes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete with

irregularities.[7]

On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for CertificationElection for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner .

[8] The Med-

Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU andfurther ordered the

conduct of the election with ―NAFLU‖ and ―NO UNION‖ as choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to theSecretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.[9]

On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a consolidateddecision ordering the conduct of a certification election with ―FUEL -GAS,‖ respondent and ―NO UNION‖ as

choices.[10] Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18, 1999.[11] Unsatisfied, petitioner andFUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.[12]

On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participatedwithout prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent emerged as winner; hence,

the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.[13]

On July 12, 2000, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721, rendered a Decision[14] which annulled and set asidethe August 27, 1999 decision and October 18, 1999 resolution of the Undersecretary. The CA further directed the holdingof a certification election with ―FUEL-GAS‖ and ―NO UNION‖ as choices, to the exclusion of respondent.[15]

On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS’ election protest but deferred the request of respondent to bedeclared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA.[16] Not satisfied

with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent appealed to the Labor Secretary.[17]

It further filed aManifestation before the CA pointing out that in theApril 14, 2000 certification election, it emerged as winner, and thus,

the election should be considered as an intervening event sufficient to bar another certification election .[18] The CA,however, dismissed said manifestation on December 28, 2000.[19]

Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision [20] certifying respondent as the exclusive

bargaining agent of petitioner’s employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of theaforesaid decision.[21]

As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion forreconsideration.

[22]

Finding no justification in petitioner’s refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the

National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latter’s refusal to bargain with it.[23]























































































On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CAdecision.

[24] On February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision.

[25]

On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for

compulsory arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.[26] Again, on April 2, 2001, another Notice of Strike[27] was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discriminationagainst union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later consolidated withthe certified case.

On December 13, 2001, acting on the January 19, 2001 petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiterrecommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent and FUEL-GAS as contenders.[28] Thedecision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct certificationelection in a Resolution dated October 17, 2002.[29]

Meanwhile, in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated April 17, 2002, declaring petitioneras having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor

practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the officers of theunion.

[30] Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration

[31] of the resolution praying that additional employees be

dismissed. For its part, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[32]

On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner’s refusal to bargain and union

busting.[33] The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike .[34]

On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union busting.[35] Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the Labor Secretary certifiedthe dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work .[36] The second certified case was docketed as

NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision[37] ordering petitioner to bargaincollectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the reinstatement of theemployees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of seniority rights anddiminution of salary.[38] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution[39] dated January26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.

Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision[40] dated February 12,

2003 opted to resolve the parties’ respective motions for reconsideration collectively. In said decision, the NLRCmodified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the union officers whom it previously ordered terminated,which in effect denied petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration.[41] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but

it was denied in a Resolution dated June 30, 2003.[42] These decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.

The petitions before the CA were later consolidated. In CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, herein petitioner argued that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONIN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS

CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.[43]

In the other case, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, petitioner herein argued that:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONIN DIRECTING PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OFTHIS COURT DIRECTING THE HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

II


















































































PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINALAND EXECUTORY.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONWHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.



IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETIONIN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER

OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR .[44]

On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[45] denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314. The decretal portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is DENIED while the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, decreeing herein contending parties to comply with the directives of thisTribunal in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.

SO ORDERED.

In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioner’s claims are based on pure allegations and notsupported by any substantial evidence.[46]

In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect, nullified and set aside. It is to be notedthat FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA added thatsince it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was voted as the duly-elected bargaining agent of petitioner’s rank -and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its claim and it has no right to

demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.[47]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[48]

which was denied in the Resolution[49]

dated September 22, 2005.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE LAW AND ESTABLISHEDJURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE REINSTATEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN

ILLEGAL STRIKE.

II

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE AS

ILLEGAL THE STRIKE HELD BY THE UNION ON FEBRUARY 4, 2003.

III

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INVALIDATETHE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DIRECTING THE REINSTATEMENT OFTHE STRIKERS WHO DEFIED THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE LABOR SECRETARY.

IV

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THATTHE NLRC HAS RECONSIDERED ITS CONCLUSION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MARCH 2001 STRIKE.

V

























[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDEDTHAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION MAY RECONSIDER IN THE SECOND CERTIFIEDCASE ITS DECISION ON THE FIRST CERTIFIED CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.[50]







Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim, petitionerargues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent as the

bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to conductanother certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike was

to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-strike, it is illegal .[51]

Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code, particularly Art. 264,[52] which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration between the parties.[53] Since the labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still pending

compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said strike was based substantially onthe same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal by express provision ofthe law.

Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already resolved by the NLRC in

Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor dispute, namely, the alleged refusal of petitioner to recognize respondent. As such, the NLRC’s decision in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 constitutes res judicata in

the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.[54]

Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost theiremployment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that theycommitted illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their termination from

employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of the unionofficers was warranted.[55]

Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision[56] ordering thereinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with theFebruary 4, 2003 strike. It argues that since

the termination of the employees was due to their refusal to comply with the return-to-work order issued by the LaborSecretary, not to their alleged participation in an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the decision .[57]

Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the NLRCmay reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.[58]

The petition is meritorious.

Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in thenegative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the

only issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union; andthe validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation.

The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effectiveweapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be

valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice isnever meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.[59]

In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following

reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the disputehad been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary’s return-to-work order.

Respondent’s notices of strike were founded on petitioner’s continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged thestrike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-strike. As itslegal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one’s union and not othercontending groups, as the employees’ bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite thestriking union’s doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive

representative in the bargaining unit.[60]










































The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, ithas no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask

petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled bythe court with finality,

[61] petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain

respondent’s imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannosustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.

Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent’s purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strikewould be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary’s return-to-work order and after thedispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strikesuccessively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds – petitioner’s continued

refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.

Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:

When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industryindispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the disputeand decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall

have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption orcertification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked outemployees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit allworkers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor andEmployment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this

provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.[62]

The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted

―great breadth of discretion‖ to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automaticenjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.[63]

The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to nationalinterest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not

even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance of anassumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive toreturn to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order .[64]

A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the

workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer .[65]

Says the Labor Code:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. – x x x

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or aftercertification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involvingthe same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker mustreturn to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continueserving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at























arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of theirmotives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermineor tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order isissued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company,

to justify their action.[66]

Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC forcompulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of laborlaws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier

consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CA’s decision. That way, thecollective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to

bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it asthe bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to thereturn-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.

Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace

and progress of

society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy theunion and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision towield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and

tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical tothe public welfare. In every strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare areinvolved.

[67]

Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the

union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.

Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — x x x

Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to

reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker orunion officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost hisemployment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground

for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.

It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a

strike that he may be declared to have lost employment

status. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, thelaw provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of

declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.[68]Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to theirwork and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and

preventing management from filling up their positions.[69]

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in theconsolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED inthat the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal

strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No costs.


















SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 155679 December 19, 2006

BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION (NAFLU), PATRICIA VILLANUEVA, EMILIA BANDOLA, RAQUEL CRUZ, DELIA RELATO,REGINA CASTILLO, LOLITA DELOS ANGELES, MARISSA VILLORIA, MARITA ANTONIO, LOLITA LINDIO, ELIZA CARAULLIA,LIZA SUA, and FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU), MYRNA DELA TORRE, AVELINAAÑONUEVO, BERNICE BORCELO, NARLIE YAGIN, EVELYN SANTILLAN, LEONY SERDONCILO, TRINIDAD CUYA, ANDREALUMIBAO, GYNIE ARNEO, ELIZABETH CAPELLAN, JOSEPHINE DETOSIL, ZENAIDA FRANCISCO, and FLORENCIAANAGO, petitioners,vs.FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Assailed via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision1 of May 28, 2002 setting aside the NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC) Resolution2 of August 14, 1995 which reversed the December 15, 1992 Decision3 ofthe Labor Arbiter.Petitioners Patricia Villanueva, Emilia Bandola, Raquel Cruz, Delia Relato, Regina Castillo, Lolita delos Angeles, MarissaVilloria, Marita Antonio, Lolita Lindio, Eliza Caraulia, and Liza Sua were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union.Petitioners Myrna dela Torre, Avelina Añonuevo, Bernice Borcelo, Narlie Yagin, Evelyn Santillan, Leony Serdoncilo,Trinidad Cuya, Andrea Lumibao, Gynie Arneo, Elizabeth Capellan, Josephine Detosil, Zenaida Francisco, and FlorenciaAnago were officers of Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union.The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective

collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations.

Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation (respondents) are sister companiesengaged in the garment business. Situated in one big compound along with another sister company, General GarmentsCorporation (GGC), they have a common entrance.On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating prices of oil. On even date,petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days,prompting respondents to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to complywith procedural requirements.4 On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations.5 Petitioners, claiming that they were illegally locked outby respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and theapprehension that violence would erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’

workers were prevented from reporting for work.Petitioners further assert that respondents were "slighted" by the workers’ no-show, and as a punishment, the workers

as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company premises.On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’ premises, petitioners, who claim

that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,6 explain that those were for the convenience of union memberswho reported every morning to check if the management would allow them to report for work.Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the following requirements for thestaging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submissionof a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.7 The Labor Arbiter, by Decision of December 15, 1992, finding for respondents, held that the strike was illegal.8Thedecretal text of its decision reads:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_155679_2006.html#fnt1

































WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the respondents guilty of an illegal strike. Consequently, theirfollowing officers are declared to have lost their employment status:BIFLEX LABOR UNION (NAFLU)

1. Reynaldo Santos President

2. Patricia Villanueva Vice President

3. Emilia Bandola Secretary

4. Raquel Cruz Treasurer

5. Delia Relato Auditor

6. Regina Castillo Board Member

7. Lolita delos Angeles Board Member

8. Marissa Villoria Board Member

9. Marita Antonio Board Member

10. Lolita Lindio Board Member

11. Eliza Caranlia Board Member

12. Liza Sua Board Member

FIFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU)

1. Myrna dela Torre President

2. Avelina Anonuevo Vice President

3. Barnice Borcelo Secretary

4. Nerlie Yagin Treasurer

5. Evelyn Santillan Auditor

6. Leony Serdoncilo Director

7. Trinidad Cuga Director

8. Andrea Lumibao Director

9. Gynie Arneo Director

10. Elizabeth Capellar Director



11. Josephine Detosil Director

12. Zenaida Francisco Director

13. Florencia Anago Director

SO ORDERED.9 Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, it holding that

there was no strike to speak of as no labor or industrial dispute existed between the parties.10 It accordingly orderedrespondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full backwagesfrom the date of their termination. 11 On respondents’ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 28, 2002, reversed that of the NLRC andreinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.In finding for respondents, the appellate court discredited petitioners’ claim of having been illegally locked out, giventheir failure to even file a letter of protest or complaint with the management,12 and their failure to comply with the

legal requirements of a valid strike.13 The appellate court further noted that while petitioners claimed that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,no copy thereof was ever produced before the Labor Arbiter.14 Hence, the instant petition which faults the appellate court to have:

I. . . ERRED IN INTERPRETING ART. 264 (A) OF THE LABOR CODE TO BE MANDATORY AND CALLING FOR THE AUTOMATICDISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS FOR HAVING ENGAGED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.II. . . ERR[ED] IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ERRED IN IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION OF THE LABORARBITER . . . DISMISSING PETITIONERS FROM WORK DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOMEFINAL AND EXECUTORY.III. . . ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF HOLDING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE WHEN CIRCUMSTANCESSHOWED THAT RESPONDENTS WERE THE ONES WHO WERE GUILTY OF AN ILLEGAL LOCKOUT.The petition fails.

That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga ng bayan organized by thelabor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is not disputed.Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike. It affectsnumerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with their employees regarding their terms andconditions of employment.15 Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work, refuse to workand instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.16 Even if petitioners’ joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression,freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is notabsolute.17 For the protection of other significant state interests such as the "right of enterprises to reasonable returnson investments, and to expansion and growth"18 enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise,oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be sanctioned. And it would

give imprimatur to workers’ joining demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to makethe necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel"principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers"19 aimed at fostering industrial peace.There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they were allowed byrespondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.Petitioners, nonetheless, assert that when they returned to work the day following the welga ng bayan on October 24,1990, they were refused entry by the management, allegedly as punishment for their joining the welga. Hence, theyclaim that they were illegally locked out by respondents.If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the management or a complaint thereforagainst respondents? As the Labor Arbiter observed, "[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of theircontention for normally a locked-out union will immediately bring management before the bar of justice."20



















































Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would justthe same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they violated Article264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "*n+o person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free ingress to or

egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares." Even the NLRC, which ordered their reinstatement, took note of petitioners’ act of "physically blocking and preventingthe entry of complainant’s customers, supplies and even other employees who were not on strike."21 In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means bywhich it is carried out.

Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts of knowingly participating in an illegalstrike, conformably with the third paragraph of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which provides:. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowinglyparticipates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employmentstatus: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground fortermination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,22 this Court, passing on the use of theword "may" in the immediately quoted provision, held that "[t]he law . . . grants the employer the option of declaring aunion officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment." Reinstatement of a striker or retentionof his employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management prerogative which this Court may notsupplant.Costs against petitioners.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.SO ORDERED.Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Tinga, and,Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 144899. February 5, 2004]ELIZABETH C. BASCON and NOEMI V. COLE, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO CEBUCOMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., and GREGORIO IYOY,respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision[1]

in CA-G.R. SP No. 51690, dated March 13,

2000, which set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 4th Division, dated November 25,1998, in NLRC Case No. V-00234-97. The NLRC had reversed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter, dated April 24, 1997, inNLRC-RAB-VII Case No. 07-0828-96, which held valid herein petitioners’ dismissal from employment. Petitioners also

challenge the appellate court’s Resolution,[2] dated August 9, 2000, which denied their motion for reconsideration.The petitioners in the instant case were employees of private respondent Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCH)and members of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Metro Cebu Community Hospital (NAMA-MCCH), a labor union ofMCCH employees. Petitioner Elizabeth C. Bascon had been employed as a nurse by respondent MCCH since May 1984.At the time of her termination from employment in April 1996, she already held the position of Head Nurse. The other

petitioner, Noemi V. Cole, had been working as a nursing aide with MCCH since August 1974. Both petitioners weredismissed by the respondent hospital for allegedly participating in an illegal strike.The instant controversy arose from an intra-union conflict between the NAMA-MCCH and the National Labor Federation

(NFL), the mother federation of NAMA-MCCH. In November 1995, NAMA-MCCH asked MCCH to renew their CollectiveBargaining Agreement (CBA), which was set to expire on December 31, 1995. NFL, however, opposed this move by itslocal affiliate. Mindful of the apparent intra-union dispute, MCCH decided to defer the CBA negotiations until there wasa determination as to which of said unions had the right to negotiate a new CBA.Believing that their union was the certified collective bargaining agent, the members and officers of NAMA-MCCH stageda series of mass actions inside MCCH’s premises starting February 27, 1996. They marched around the hospital putting

up streamers, placards and posters.On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) office in Region 7 issued two (2)certifications stating that NAMA-MCCH was not a registered labor organization. This finding, however, did not deterNAMA-MCCH from filing a notice of strike with the Region 7 Office of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board(NCMB). Said notice was, however, disregarded by the NCMB for want of legal personality of the union.







http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/feb2004/144899.htm#_ftn1












Meanwhile, the MCCH management received reports that petitioners participated in NAMA-MCCH’s mass actions.

Consequently, notices were served on all union members, petitioners included, asking them to explain in writing whythey were wearing red and black ribbons and roaming around the hospital with placards. In their collective responsedated March 18, 1996, the union members, including petitioners, explained that wearing armbands and putting upplacards was their answer to MCCH’s illegal refusal to negotiate with NAMA-MCCH.Subsequently, on March 28, 1996, MCCH notified the petitioners that they were to be investigated for their activities inthe mass actions, with the hearings being scheduled on March 28, 1996 and April 1, 1996. Petitioners, however, deniedreceiving said notices. In a notice dated April 8, 1996, MCCH ordered petitioners to desist from participating in the mass

actions conducted in the hospital premises with a warning that non-compliance therewith would result in the impositionof disciplinary measures. Petitioners again claimed they did not receive said order. Petitioners Bascon and Cole werethen served notices terminating their employment effective April 12, 1996 and April 19, 1996, respectively.The dismissal of petitioners did not deter NAMA-MCCH from staging more mass actions. The means of ingress to andegress from the hospital were blocked. Employees and patients, including emergency cases, were harassed, according toMCCH management, which also complained that mass actions held inside the hospital had created an atmosphere ofanimosity and violence, aggravating the condition of ailing patients. Furthermore, the hospital also suffered heavy lossesbrought about by a notable decline in the patient admission rates and the refusal of suppliers to extend credit. Toaddress its labor problems, MCCH sought an injunction from the NLRC on July 9, 1996 in Injunction Case No. V-0006-96.Meanwhile, on July 1, 1996, Bascon and Cole filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, docketed as NLRC-RAB-VII Case No.07-0828-96. They denied having participated in said mass actions or having received the notices (1) enjoining them fromwearing armbands and putting up placards, with warning that disciplinary measure would be imposed, and (2) informingthem of the schedule of hearing. They admit, however, to wearing armbands for union identity while nursing patientsas per instruction of their union leaders.On July 16, 1996, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was duly issued in Injunction Case No. V-0006-96.On August 27, 1996, the local government of Cebu City ordered the demolition of the picket staged by the members ofNAMA-MCCH for being both a public nuisance and a nuisance per se.On September 18, 1996, the injunction was made permanent by an NLRC Resolution in Injunction Case No. V-0006-96,the fallo of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for injunction is hereby GRANTED enjoining respondents in the course oftheir strike/picket from committing the illegal acts mentioned in Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code more particularly theblocking of the free ingress to and egress from petitioner hospital and from committing threats, coercion andintimidation of the non-striking/picketing employees/workers reporting for work, vehicles/patients desiring to enter for

the purpose of seeking admission/confinement in petitioner hospital and for such other lawful purpose. SO ORDERED.[3] In a Decision[4]

dated April 24, 1997, the Labor Arbiter found the termination complained of in NLRC-RAB-VII Case No. 07-0828-96 to be valid and legal, and dismissed the complaint. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were justly dismissedbecause they actually participated in the illegal mass action. It also concluded that petitioners received the notices ofhearing, but deliberately refused to attend the scheduled investigation.Petitioners then appealed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling to the NLRC, 4th

Division, which docketed the appeal as NLRC CaseNo. V-00234-97.

In its Decision[5] dated November 25, 1998, the NLRC, 4th

Division reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and orderedthe reinstatement of petitioners with full backwages. First, it found that petitioners merely wore armbands for unionidentity, per instruction of their union officials. Said wearing of armbands while nursing patients, is a constitutional right,

which cannot be curtailed if peacefully carried out. Second, it ruled that the placards complained of by MCCH did notcontain scurrilous, indecent or libelous remarks. Finally, it concluded that, in a belated but crude attempt to camouflagethe illegal dismissal of petitioners, MCCH merely fabricated the notices allegedly sent to petitioners.Anent the charge of gross insubordination, the NLRC ruled that petitioners were not guilty thereof, because theelements thereof had not been sufficiently proven, to wit: (1) reasonableness and lawfulness of the order or directive,(2) sufficiency of knowledge on the part of the employee of such order, and (3) the connection of the order with theduties which the employee had been engaged to discharge.Unconvinced of the correctness of the NLRC decision, MCCH filed a motion for reconsideration presenting the followingdocumentary evidence:1) Affidavits of Paz Velasco, Luciano Quitoy, Joseph Dagatan, and Gina Jumao-as to show that petitioners were dulyserved the notices in question;














2) Letter reply of NAMA-MCCH dated March 18, 1996 wherein petitioners, together with the rest of the union members,collectively acknowledged receipt of the March 15, 1996 directive;3) Position Paper of terminated co-employees where the receipt of the subject notices were admitted as well as thecommission of the aforementioned protest mass actions; and4) Appeal of private respondents, who did not join the protest mass action, to the Board of Trustees of MCCH to showthat reinstatement is no longer feasible in view of strained relationship.On February 4, 1999, the NLRC denied the plea for reconsideration of MCCH.Undeterred, MCCH filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the

Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51690.In its Decision[6]

dated March 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 51690 as follows:WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision of public respondent NLRC 4th

Division dated November 25, 1998 inNLRC Case No. V-00234-97 is hereby REVERSED and the complaint of private respondents is dismissed for lack of merit.Petitioner Metro Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH) is however ordered to pay the private respondents separation payequivalent to one-half month for every year of service in the interest of equity. No costs.SO ORDERED.[7] The appellate court held that Bascon and Cole were validly terminated for their gross insubordination or willfuldisobedience as:1) The order for petitioners to refrain from wearing armbands and putting up placards was legal, fair and reasonable.2) The order was connected with the duties, which the petitioners had been engaged to discharge.3) Said order was sufficiently made known to petitioners as receipt of the same by the latter was convincinglysubstantiated by hard evidence.The appellate court stressed that petitioners’ gross insubordination constituted unlawful acts undertaken in conjunction

with an illegal mass concerted action akin to an illegal strike. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners’ union

activities violated the rights of patients and third parties such that they were outside the ambit of legality and beyondthe mantle of protection of the freedom of speech.Hence, the instant case, with the petitioners submitting for resolution the following issues:ICAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SUPPLANT ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS WITH THAT OF THE COMMISSION?

IICAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO

FINDING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION? IIICAN AN EMPLOYEE BE TERMINATED FOR INSUBORDINATION FOR IPSO FACTO NOT SHOWING UP FOR THEINVESTIGATION?[8]

Anent the first and second issues, as a general rule, the findings of facts of the NLRC are deemed binding and conclusiveupon the Court. We have repeatedly said that the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, resort to judicial review of thedecisions of the NLRC in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to thequestion of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[9] However, where, as in the instant

case, the findings of facts of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, a departure from the general rule iswarranted. Thus, the Court may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[10] Where theNLRC and the Labor Arbiter disagree on their finding of facts, the Court can review the records to determine which

findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

[11]

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC ,[12] we held that the special civil action of certiorari is the mode of judicial review ofthe decisions of the NLRC either by this Court or the Court of Appeals, but the latter court is the more appropriate forumin strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and that, in the exercise of this power, the Court ofAppeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the NLRC.[13] With regard to the third issue, note that petitioners were terminated for allegedly participating in an illegal strike andgross insubordination to the order prohibiting them from wearing armbands and putting up placards, not foripso

facto failing to show up in the scheduled investigation. Thus, the real issue is whether or not petitioners were validlyterminated for (1) allegedly participating in an illegal strike and/or (2) gross insubordination to the order to stop wearingarmbands and putting up placards.As to the first ground, Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides in part that:



































…Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowinglyparticipates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status…

(Emphasis ours) Thus, while a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike, an ordinary striking employee,like petitioners herein, must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike (underscoringsupplied). There must be proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike.[14] But proof beyond reasonable doubtis not required. Substantial evidence, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.In this case, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners’ actual participation in the illegal strike was limited to wearing

armbands and putting up placards. There was no finding that the armbands or the placards contained offensive words osymbols. Thus, neither such wearing of armbands nor said putting up of placards can be construed as an illegal act. Infact, per se, they are within the mantle of constitutional protection under freedom of speech.Evidence on record shows that various illegal acts were committed by unidentified union members in the course of theprotracted mass action. And we commiserate with MCCH, patients, and third parties for the damage they suffered. Butwe cannot hold petitioners responsible for acts they did not commit. The law, obviously solicitous of the welfare of thecommon worker, requires, before termination may be considered, that an ordinary union member must have knowinglyparticipated in the commission of illegal acts during a strike.As regards the appellate court’s finding that petitioners were justly terminated for gross insubordination or willful

disobedience, Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in part:An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative inconnection with his work.However, willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, envisages

the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, madeknown to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.[15] In this case, we find lacking the element of willfulness characterized by a perverse mental attitude on the part ofpetitioners in disobeying their employer’s order as to warrant the ultimate penalty of dismissal. Wearing armbands and

putting up placards to express one’s views without violating the rights of third parties, are legal per se and evenconstitutionally protected. Thus, MCCH could have done well to respect petitioners’ right to freedom of speech instead

of threatening them with disciplinary action and eventually terminating them.Neither are we convinced that petitioners’ exercise of the right to freedom of speech should be taken in conjunction

with the illegal acts committed by other union members in the course of the series of mass actions. It bears stressingthat said illegal acts were committed by other union members after petitioners were already terminated, not during thetime that the latter wore armbands and put up placards.Finally, even if willful disobedience may be properly appreciated, still, the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. Not everycase of willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-connected order of the employer may be penalized withdismissal. There must be reasonable proportionality between, on the one hand, the willful disobedience by theemployee and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed therefor.[16] In this case, evidence is wanting on the depravity ofconduct and willfulness of the disobedience on the part of petitioners, as contemplated by law. Wearing armbands to

signify union membership and putting up placards to express their views cannot be of such great dimension as towarrant the extreme penalty of dismissal, especially considering the long years of service rendered by petitioners andthe fact that they have not heretofore been subject of any disciplinary action in the course of their employment with

MCCH.The termination of petitioners’ employment not being for any of the just or authorized causes, it constitutes illegaldismissal. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that:…An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rightsand other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetaryequivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatementHence, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to both reinstatement and full backwages as a matter ofcourse. MCCH alleges that due to strained relations, reinstatement is no longer possible. We disagree. In Quijano v.

Mercury Drug Corporation,[17] we stated that the doctrine of “strained relations” is inapplicable to a situation where the

employee has no say in the operation of the employer’s business. Petitioners herein are nurse and nursing aide,



















respectively in MCCH and thus, have no prerogative in the operation of the business. As also held in the Mercury

Drug case:To protect labor’s security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of “strained relations” should be strictly applied soas not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost always resultsin “strained relations,” and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation, otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated.[18]

We cannot in our conscience allow MCCH to unjustly deny petitioners their lawful occupation, especially at this latepoint in their lives when it would be a near impossibility for them to find another employment. The employer’s power to

dismiss must be tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure. Time and again we have said that thepreservation of the lifeblood of the toiling laborer comes before concern for business profits. Employers must bereminded to exercise the power to dismiss with great caution, for the State will not hesitate to come to the succor ofworkers wrongly dismissed by capricious employers.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51690 dated March 13,2000 is REVERSED. Private respondent Metro Cebu Community Hospital is hereby ordered to reinstate petitionersNoemi V. Cole and Elizabeth C. Bascon without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay them fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits computed from the time they were dismissed up to the time oftheir actual reinstatement.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 163942 November 11, 2008NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSITHOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth Division), THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC),PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., owner and operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V.ALVEZ, respondents.

x----------------------------------------xG.R. No. 166295 November 11, 2008NUWHRAIN-DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO CHAPTER, petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., respondents.D E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR., J.:In G.R. No. 163942, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the National Union of Workers in the Hotel

Restaurant and Allied Industries Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter (Union) seeks to set aside the January 19, 2004 Decision1 and

June 1, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which affirmed the October 9, 2002

Decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02.

In G.R. No. 166295, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Union seeks to nullify the May 6, 2004 Decision

4

andNovember 25, 2004 Resolution5 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 which affirmed the January 31, 20026

and March 15,20027

Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Secretary).Evolution of the Present PetitionsThe Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a five starservice establishment owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. located in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto andEsperanza V. Alvez are impleaded in their official capacities as the Hotel's General Manager and Director of HumanResources, respectively.On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel.As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargainingdeadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the




http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_163942_2008.html#fnt1




























National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01. Thereafter,conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike Vote8

was conducted by theUnion on January 14, 2002 on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike.Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly at its office located in theHotel's basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, or onJanuary 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented theseworkers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards.In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also

prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lackof manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them andcharging them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfairlabor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts duringthe illegal strike. The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair laborpractice and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout, which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by theHotel, while they continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotel's compound.On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members;and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Unionengaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blockedthe ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB which was docketed asNCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting.On the same day, the Secretary, through her January 31, 2002 Order, assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute andcertified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, which was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02. TheSecretary's Order partly reads:WHEREFORE, in order to have a complete determination of the bargaining deadlock and the other incidents of thedispute, this Office hereby consolidates the two Notices of Strike - NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01 and NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-02 - and CERTIFIES the entire labor dispute covered by these Notices and the intervening events, to the NATIONALLABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended,

under the following terms:x x x xd. the Hotel is given the option, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to merely reinstate the dismissed or suspended workersin the payroll in light of the special circumstances attendant to their reinstatement;x x x xSO ORDERED. (Emphasis added.)Pursuant to the Secretary's Order, the Hotel, on February 1, 2002, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum,9directing someof the employees to return to work, while advising others not to do so, as they were placed under payroll reinstatement

Unhappy with the Secretary's January 31, 2002 Order, the Union moved for reconsideration, but the same was deniedper the Secretary's subsequent March 15, 2002 Order. Affronted by the Secretary's January 31, 2002 and March 15,2002 Orders, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70778.

Meanwhile, after due proceedings, the NLRC issued its October 9, 2002 Decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02, inwhich it ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRCalso held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts were committed by theUnion; and that the strike violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA, which thereby caused the dismissalof 29 Union officers and 61 Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61 dismissed Union membersfinancial assistance in the amount of ½ month's pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits under theirretirement plan whichever was higher. The NLRC explained that the strike which occurred on January 18, 2002 wasillegal because it failed to comply with the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period10

and the seven-day strike ban,11 as thestrike occurred only 29 days after the submission of the notice of strike on December 20, 2001 and only four days afterthe submission of the strike vote on January 14, 2002. The NLRC also ruled that even if the Union had complied with the



















temporal requirements mandated by law, the strike would nonetheless be declared illegal because it was attended byillegal acts committed by the Union officers and members.The Union then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision which was denied in the February 7, 2003NLRC Resolution. Unfazed, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SPNo. 76568, and assailed both the October 9, 2002 Decision and the February 7, 2003 Resolution of the NLRC.Soon thereafter, the CA promulgated its January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which dismissed the Union'spetition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC. The CA ratiocinated that the Union failed to demonstrate that the NLRCcommitted grave abuse of discretion and capriciously exercised its judgment or exercised its power in an arbitrary and

despotic manner.For this reason, the Union filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA, in its June 1, 2004 Resolution, denied for lackof merit.In the meantime, the CA promulgated its May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 which denied due course to andconsequently dismissed the Union's petition. The Union moved to reconsider the Decision, but the CA was unconvincedand denied the motion for reconsideration in its November 25, 2004 Resolution.Thus, the Union filed the present petitions.The Union raises several interwoven issues in G.R. No. 163942, most eminent of which is whether the Union conductedan illegal strike. The issues presented for resolution are:-A-WHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING ANILLEGAL STRIKE ON JANUARY 18, 2002 DESPITE RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION THAT THEY PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS ANDMEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTEL'S GROOMING STANDARDS-B-WHETHER OR NOT THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY VALIDLY BE DISMISSED AND MORE THAN 200MEMBERS BE VALIDLY SUSPENDED ON THE BASIS OF FOUR (4) SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS OF RESPONDENTS-C-WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS IN PREVENTING UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORKCOMMITTED AN ILLEGAL LOCK-OUT12 In G.R. No. 166295, the Union solicits a riposte from this Court on whether the Secretary has discretion to impose"payroll" reinstatement when he assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes.The Court's RulingThe Court shall first dispose of G.R. No. 166295.

According to the Union, there is no legal basis for allowing payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual or physicalreinstatement. As argued, Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code is clear on this point.The Hotel, on the other hand, claims that the issue is now moot and any decision would be impossible to execute in viewof the Decision of the NLRC which upheld the dismissal of the Union officers and members.The Union's position is untenable.The Hotel correctly raises the argument that the issue was rendered moot when the NLRC upheld the dismissal of theUnion officers and members. In order, however, to settle this relevant and novel issue involving the breadth of thepower and jurisdiction of the Secretary in assumption of jurisdiction cases, we now decide the issue on the merits

instead of relying on mere technicalities.We held in University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor :With respect to the Secretary's Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual

respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employersmust readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase"under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with theidea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.13 Thus, it was settled that in assumption of jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should impose actual reinstatement inaccordance with the intent and spirit of Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. As with most rules, however, this one is subject toexceptions. We held in Manila Diamond Hotel Employees' Union v. Court of Appeals that payroll reinstatement is adeparture from the rule, and special circumstances which make actual reinstatement impracticable must be shown.14 Inone case, payroll reinstatement was allowed where the employees previously occupied confidential positions, becausetheir actual reinstatement, the Court said, would be impracticable and would only serve to exacerbate the situation.15In


















another case, this Court held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed payrollreinstatement as an option in lieu of actual reinstatement for teachers who were to be reinstated in the middle of thefirst term.16 We held that the NLRC was merely trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festeringand serious problem.17 The peculiar circumstances in the present case validate the Secretary's decision to order payroll reinstatement insteadof actual reinstatement. It is obviously impracticable for the Hotel to actually reinstate the employees who shaved theirheads or cropped their hair because this was exactly the reason they were prevented from working in the first place.Further, as with most labor disputes which have resulted in strikes, there is mutual antagonism, enmity, and animosity

between the union and the management. Payroll reinstatement, most especially in this case, would have been the onlyavenue where further incidents and damages could be avoided. Public officials entrusted with specific jurisdictions enjoygreat confidence from this Court. The Secretary surely meant only to ensure industrial peace as she assumed jurisdictionover the labor dispute. In this case, we are not ready to substitute our own findings in the absence of a clear showing ofgrave abuse of discretion on her part.The issues raised in G.R. No. 163942, being interrelated, shall be discussed concurrently.To be determined whether legal or not are the following acts of the Union:(1) Reporting for work with their bald or cropped hair style on January 18, 2002; and(2) The picketing of the Hotel premises on January 26, 2002.The Union maintains that the mass picket conducted by its officers and members did not constitute a strike and wasmerely an expression of their grievance resulting from the lockout effected by the Hotel management. On the otherhand, the Hotel argues that the Union's deliberate defiance of the company rules and regulations was a concerted effortto paralyze the operations of the Hotel, as the Union officers and members knew pretty well that they would not beallowed to work in their bald or cropped hair style. For this reason, the Hotel argues that the Union committed an illegalstrike on January 18, 2002 and on January 26, 2002.We rule for the Hotel.Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employeesas a result of an industrial or labor dispute."In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we cited thevarious categories of an illegal strike, to wit:Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz.:(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions;or

(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a validstrike]; or(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practiceagainst non-union employees; or(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [forexample, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by theDOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or

(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.18 With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is liable forconducting an illegal strike for the following reasons:

First , the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action toundermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances ofthe Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that providesservice to top-notch clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings.The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of the Hotel with fullheads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something isamiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need toadvertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers andmembers deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by the fact thatafter coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had their heads shaved or their hair cropped at















the Union office in the Hotel's basement. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designedand calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union's proposals.In view of the Union's collaborative effort to violate the Hotel's Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the Hotel tochoose between allowing its inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of itsreputation, or to refuse them work, even if it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which ineither way would disrupt the operations of the Hotel. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Unionwas not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed toinflict serious damage to the Hotel's finances or its reputation. Thus, we hold that the Union's concerted violation of the

Hotel's Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel's operations is anunprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.Second , the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the CBA's "No Strike, NoLockout" provision, which reads:ARTICLE XXII - NO STRIKE/WORK STOPPAGE AND LOCKOUTSECTION 1. No StrikesThe Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slow-down of work, boycott, refusal to handleaccounts, picketing, sit-down strikes, sympathy strikes or any other form of interference and/or interruptions with anyof the normal operations of the HOTEL during the life of this Agreement.The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. Theconcerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted "no strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibitionis squarely applicable and legally binding.19 Third , the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated theHotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shavingtheir heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of theImplementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code.20 This rule prohibits the commission of any act which will disrupt orimpede the early settlement of the labor disputes that are under conciliation. Since the bargaining deadlock is beingconciliated by the NCMB, the Union's action to have their officers and members' heads shaved was manifestly calculatedto antagonize and embarrass the Hotel management and in doing so effectively disrupted the operations of the Hoteland violated their duty to bargain collectively in good faith.Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before itconducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatoryperiods before conducting or holding a strike. Records reveal that the Union filed its Notice of Strike on the ground of

bargaining deadlock on December 20, 2001. The 30-day cooling-off period should have been until January 19, 2002. Ontop of that, the strike vote was held on January 14, 2002 and was submitted to the NCMB only on January 18, 2002;therefore, the 7-day strike ban should have prevented them from holding a strike until January 25, 2002. The concertedaction committed by the Union on January 18, 2002 which resulted in the disruption of the Hotel's operations clearlyviolated the above-stated mandatory periods.Last , the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, asshown by the pictures21 presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human barricades andobstructed the driveway of the Hotel. There is no merit in the Union's argument that it was not its members but the

Hotel's security guards and the police officers who blocked the driveway, as it can be seen that the guards and/or policeofficers were just trying to secure the entrance to the Hotel. The pictures clearly demonstrate the tense and highlyexplosive situation brought about by the strikers' presence in the Hotel's driveway.

Furthermore, this Court, not being a trier of facts, finds no reason to alter or disturb the NLRC findings on this matter,these findings being based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA.22 Factual findings of labor officials, who aredeemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not onlyrespect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.23 Likewise, we are not duty-bound todelve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arrived atarbitrarily and/or bereft of any rational basis.24 What then are the consequent liabilities of the Union officers and members for their participation in the illegal strike?Regarding the Union officers and members' liabilities for their participation in the illegal picket and strike, Art. 264(a),paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides that "[a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and anyworker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared tohave lost his employment status x x x." The law makes a distinction between union officers and mere union members.



























Union officers may be validly terminated from employment for their participation in an illegal strike, while unionmembers have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to lose their employment status.25 Thus, it is necessaryfor the company to adduce proof of the participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts duringthe strikes.26 Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code which imposes thepenalty of dismissal on "any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike." We, however, are of theopinion that there is room for leniency with respect to the Union members. It is pertinent to note that the Hotel wasable to prove before the NLRC that the strikers blocked the ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent

that the Hotel failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the Union members in the commission of illegalacts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in judgment or diligence, we are constrained to reinstate the 61Union members.Further, we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal strike but were not identified to havecommitted illegal acts are entitled to be reinstated to their former positions but without backwages.27 We then held in G& S Transport Corporation v. Infante:With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor indetermining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, ofcourse, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwiseillegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work,the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officer's Guild v. Compañia Maritima, as affirmedin Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for thisexception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.28 In this light, we stand by our recent rulings and reinstate the 61 Union members without backwages.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA's May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 is hereby AFFIRMED.The CA's January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 is hereby SET ASIDE. The October 9, 2002 Decision of theNLRC in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02 is hereby AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS, as follows:[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005]CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSEBALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIOCOMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO,ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYSGEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL

EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABELBRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENABEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO,ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, andJESUS STA. BARBARA, JR.,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for review of the Decision[1]

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57500 and its Resolution

denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.The Antecedents[2] Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (the Union, for

brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc.had been the bone of contention between the Union and the petitioner. The petitioner’s refusal to negotiate for a

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike on April 15, 1993.The Union had to contend with another union – the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE) – which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter BrigidaFadrigon granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment(SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution on November 18, 1994 granting the appeal. He,likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to theCourt which rendered judgment on February 4, 1997 affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus:1. Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of ConcernedEmployees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and













http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/apr2005/147080.htm#_ftn1













2. Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical CenterEmployees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.[3] The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr.Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss matterspertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the Court.[4] However, in a Letter to the Uniondated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of RepublicAct No. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for theCancellation of the Union’s Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the

following grounds:3) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents asrequired by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union. 4) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the National Labor Relations Commission.[5] Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations in a Letter dated October 16,1997 and suggested the date, time and place of the initial meeting. The Union further reiterated its plea in anotherLetter[6] dated October 28, 1997, to no avail.Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary Laguesma as affirmedby this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board(NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the followingacts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.[7] A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. OnNovember 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike bedismissed;[8] the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of themeeting where the strike vote was conducted.On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes[9]

of the alleged strike vote purportedly held onNovember 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and

Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the resultswere as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.[10] On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on December 1, 1997, theUnion filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Unionlikewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions, not limited to contempt and other penalties, against

the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith, tobargain collectively with the Union, to adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guiltyof unfair labor practices, and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises.[11] On December 4, 1997, the SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor dispute. The decretalportion of the order reads:WHEREFORE, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center pursuant to Article263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all

striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to ceaseand desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and counter-

proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreements in compliance with aforementionedResolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court.SO ORDERED.[12] In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work.For its part, the petitioner filed a petition[13]

to declare the strike illegal with the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97. In its position paper, the petitioner appended the affidavit ofErwin Barbacena, the overseer of the property across the hospital which was being used as a parking lot, at the corner ofScout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Also included were the affidavits of Simon J. Tingzon andReggie B. Barawid, the petitioner’s security guards assigned in front of the hospital premises. They attested to the factthat no secret balloting took place at the said parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. of November 10, 1997.[14] Thepetitioner also appended the affidavit of Henry V. Vera Cruz, who alleged that he was a member of the Union and had


















































discovered that signatures on the Statements of Cash Receipt Over Disbursement submitted by the Union to the DOLEpurporting to be his were not his genuine signatures;[15] the affidavits of 17 of its employees, who declared that noformal voting was held by the members of the Union on the said date, were also submitted. The latter employees alsodeclared that they were not members of any union, and yet were asked to sign documents purporting to be a strike voteattendance and unnumbered strike vote ballots on different dates from November 8 to 11, 1997.In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those members whoalleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997.[16] In the meantime, on September 30, 1998, the Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition

for the cancellation of the respondent Union’s certificate of registration. The decision was affirmed by the Director ofthe Bureau of Labor Relations on December 29, 1998.In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision on December 23, 1998 in NLRC NCR CaseNo. 00-12-08644-97 in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal. The fallo of thedecision reads:1. Declaring as illegal the strike staged by the respondents from November 28, 1997 to December 5, 1997; 2. Declaring respondent Jaime Ibabao, in his capacity as union president, the other union officers, and respondentsRonald Q. Centeno, Michael Eustaquio and Henry Vera Cruz to have lost their employment status with petitioner; and3. Ordering the above respondents to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner the amount of Two Hundred ThousandPesos (P200,000.00) by way of damages.[17] The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting wasfurnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. According to theLabor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported

by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of thestrike vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code,the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesmawhich was affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike.The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered a Decision[18]

on June 14, 1999, granting their appeaand reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioner’s petition to declare the strike

illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled asfollows:We find untenable the Labor Arbiter’s f inding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10, 1997, claimingthat this is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across the hospital, and the

sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that no strike voting took place in the parkinglot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all because the same was conductedin the parking lot immediately/directly fronting, not across, the hospital building (Annexes “1-J,” “1-K” to “1-K-6”). Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strikevoting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro

forma (Annexes “H-2” to “H-19”).[19]

The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that the NCMBdecided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such

request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which the NCMB agreed,the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the strike vote was conducted.[20] The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the said motion on September

30, 1999.

[21]

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC on the followingallegation:PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONAMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, AND CONTRAVENED THE LAW ANDESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN REVERSING THE LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION DATED DECEMBER 23, 1998 (ANNEX “E”)

AND IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE STAGED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM NOVEMBER 28, 1997 TODECEMBER 5, 1997.[22] On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed decision andresolution of the NLRC.



































The petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the followingground:THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC’S FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH

THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT STRIKE.[23] The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a strike vote to theRegional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, ismerely directory and not mandatory. The use of the word “shall” in the rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably indicates

the mandatory nature of the respondent Union’s duty to submit the said notice of strike vote.

The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared that the respondentscomplied with all the requirements for a lawful strike. The petitioner insists that, as gleaned from the affidavits of the17 union members and that of the overseer, and contrary to the joint affidavit of the officers and some union members,no meeting was held and no secret balloting was conducted on November 10, 1997.The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held on the said date by therespondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular inspection of the area where the respondent’s

members allegedly held the voting. The petitioner also points out that it adduced documentary evidence in the form ofaffidavits executed by 17 members of the respondent union which remained unrebutted. The petitioner also posits thatthe CA and the NLRC erred in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter; furthermore, there was no need for therespondent union to stage a strike on November 28, 1997 because it had filed an urgent motion with the DOLE for theenforcement and execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118915.The petition is meritorious.We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, RuleXXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads:Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. – A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total unionmembership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for thepurpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer,corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise theconduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Boardand notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings aswell as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-offperiod provided in this Rule.

Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines,nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force andeffect of law.[24] Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intendingto stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24)hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the unionmembers for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and whenit decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC ,[25] the Court enumerated the

notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice tothe NCMB:1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the

NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union; 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30)days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of unionbusting where the union’s existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.… 4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice

to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membershipin the bargaining unit concerned.5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike orlockout, subject to the cooling-off period.







http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/dec1997/113466.htm











1. That I, Simon J. Tingzon, am a security officer of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency (hereinafter referred toas VPSSA), assigned, since July 1997 up to the present, as Security Detachment Commander at Capitol Medical Center(hereinafter referred to as CMC) located at Scout Magbanua corner Panay Avenue, Quezon City;2. That my (Tingzon) functions as such include over-all in charge of security of all buildings and properties of CMC,and roving in the entire premises including the parking lots of all the buildings of CMC;3. That I, Reggie B. Barawid, am a security guard of VPSSA, assigned, since June 1997 up to the present, as securityguard at CMC;4. That my (Barawid) functions as such include access control of all persons coming in and out of CMC’s buildings and

properties. I also sometimes guard the parking areas of CMC;5. That on November 10, 1997, both of us were on duty at CMC from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with me (Barawid)assigned at the main door of the CMC’s Main Building along Scout Magbanua St.;6. That on said date, during our entire tour of duty, there was no voting or election conducted in any of the fourparking spaces for CMC personnel and guests.[34] The allegations in the foregoing affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secretballoting took place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and PanayAvenue, Quezon City. The respondents failed to prove the existence of a parking lot in front of the hospital other thanthe parking lot across from it. Indeed, 17 of those who purportedly voted in a secret voting executed their separateaffidavits that no secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997, and that even if they were not members of therespondent Union, were asked to vote and to sign attendance papers. The respondents failed to adduce substantialevidence that the said affiants were coerced into executing the said affidavits. The bare fact that some portions of thesaid affidavits are similarly worded does not constitute substantial evidence that the petitioner forced, intimidated orcoerced the affiants to execute the same.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and NLRC are SETASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.





strike and lockout case

Documents