structured reading exercise · case follows this structured reading exercise. an original copy of...

READ THIS CASE AND COMPLETE THIS EXERCISE BEFORE ORIENTATION. COME PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE CASE. YOU WILL NOT TURN IN THIS STRUCTURED READING EXERCISE; IT IS SOLELY FOR YOUR OWN BENEFIT. THE ANNOTATED CASE FOLLOWS THIS STRUCTURED READING EXERCISE. AN ORIGINAL COPY OF THE CASE IS ALSO INCLUDED.

1

Structured Reading Exercise Johnson v. Weedman, 5 Ill. 495, 4 Scam. 495, 1843 WL 4116 (Ill.) Torts - Conversion

Vocabulary and legal terminology from Black’s Law Dictionary: (10th ed. 2014)

Action on the case

See trespass on the case. (15c)1 At common law, an action to recover damages that are not the immediate result of a wrongful act but rather a later consequence. • The lawsuit was instituted by a writ of trespass on the case. It was the precursor to a variety of modern-day tort claims, including negligence, nuisance, and business torts. — Often shortened to case. — Also termed action on the case; breve de transgressione super casum.

Agister

(15c) Someone who takes and pastures grazing animals for a fee; a person engaged in the business of agistment. • An agister is a type of bailee for hire. — Also spelled agistor.

Assumpsit

(16c) 1. An express or implied promise, not under seal, by which one person undertakes to do some act or pay something to another <an assumpsit to pay a debt>. 2. A common-law action for breach of such a promise or for breach of a contract <the creditor's assumpsit against the debtor>.

Bailee

(16c) 1. Someone who receives personal property from another, and has possession of but not title to the property. • A bailee is responsible for keeping the property safe until it is returned to the owner. 2. Someone who by warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document of title acknowledges possession of goods and contracts to deliver them. See BAILMENT.

Bailment

16c) 1. A delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain purpose, usu. under an express or implied-in-fact contract. • Unlike a sale or gift of personal property, a bailment involves a change in possession but not in title. Cf. PAWN.

1 The parenthetical indicates the origin date of the word or phrase defined. So, “15c” means the word or phrase arose in the 15th century.

Chattel

(14c) Movable or transferable property; personal property; esp., a physical object capable of manual delivery and not the subject matter of real property.

Conversion

2. Tort & criminal law. The wrongful possession or disposition of another's property as if it were one's own; an act or series of acts of willful interference, without lawful justification, with an item of property in a manner inconsistent with another's right, whereby that other person is deprived of the use and possession of the property. — convert, vb. — conversionary, adj.

Smart money

(1926) 1. Funds held by sophisticated, usu. large investors who are considered capable of minimizing risks and maximizing profits <the smart money has now left this market>. 2. See punitive damages under DAMAGES <although the jury awarded only $7,000 in actual damages, it also awarded $500,000 in smart money>.

Trover

(16c) A common-law action for the recovery of damages for the conversion of personal property, the damages generally being measured by the property's value. — Also termed trover and conversion. Cf. DETINUE; REPLEVIN.

Writ of error

1. A writ issued by an appellate court directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review. Cf. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

Pre-Reading Questions Before you begin reading, skim the caption, the headnotes, and the synopsis and answer the following questions:

1. What is the case name? Who are the parties? How many parties on each side? Individuals or corporations? __________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the case in federal or state court? Which court? What year? __________________________________________________________________________________

3. Who owned the horse? __________________________________________________________________________________

4. When did the horse die? __________________________________________________________________________________

5. When is an agister (someone who cares for animals for a fee) liable for the death of a horse? __________________________________________________________________________________

6. What was the jury verdict in the case below? __________________________________________________________________________________

7. Who made the motion for a new trial? What was the result of that motion? __________________________________________________________________________________

8. Why did the defendant have possession of the plaintiff’s horse? __________________________________________________________________________________

9. What did the defendant do with/to the horse? __________________________________________________________________________________

10. Who was the lawyer for the defendant? __________________________________________________________________________________

11. According to the defendant’s lawyer, what harm did the plaintiff’s horse suffer BECAUSE OF defendant’s actions? __________________________________________________________________________________

Reading the Case With a general idea of the case in mind, you can now read the opinion. As you read and after you finish reading, answer the following questions:

1. The first paragraph of the opinion describes the procedural posture. What happened at the trial court level? __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. The second paragraph of the opinion summarizes the facts in one long sentence. Rewrite the facts in 3 short sentences, using your own words: __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. The Supreme Court of Illinois resolves two questions in this case. List them below. You may use your own words, but keep each issue in the form of a question: __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. The court answers both questions. These are the holdings. What is the one-word answer to each issue question? __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. The court then lays out the legal rule of “conversion.” What are the elements of the tort of conversion? The following questions will help you parse the elements of conversion:

a. IF a bailee for one purpose uses the owner’s property for ________________ purpose without ___________________ from the owner, THEN:

b. the bailee is ____________________ for conversion; BUT ONLY IF: c. the bailee’s use of the property _________________ damage to the property THEN: d. the owner of the property can recover damages from the __________________ use

and cannot recover the ____________________ value of the property, IF: e. the __________________________ is returned.

6. The court applies this rule to the facts of Johnson’s case. What is the key fact the court relies on in its ruling that the defendant is not liable for conversion? What rule element outlined above does this key fact relate to?

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. The second issue in the case is whether plaintiff deserves a new trial. In the second-to-last paragraph of the case, the court explains a rule about when courts will grant new trials. What is the rule?

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Why does the court refuse to grant a new trial?

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. The last sentence of the opinion disposes of the case. How does the Supreme Court of Illinois resolve this case?

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Is there a dissenting opinion in this case? Is there a concurring opinion?

______________________________________________________________________________________

Johnson v Weedman Sample Brief Now comes the easy part. Use the answers to the questions above to fill out the chart. This is one possible method for a case brief.

Case Johnson (plaintiff dead horse owner) v. Weedman (defendant horse rider and possible horse converter)

Court/Year Illinois Supreme Court, 1843

Facts Plaintiff bails horse to D (left D to care for horse); D rode horse w/out permission; horse dies, but not because of riding; D cannot return horse to plaintiff.

Procedural Posture

Jury Trial; Defendant not guilty; P moved for new trial (denied), Judgment for defendant; P appeals.

Issues 1. Is P entitled to recover for conversion of his horse?

2. Should the trial judge have granted a new trial?

Holdings: 1. No, P not entitled to recover for conversion where there was no evidence of damage

from his conversion

2. No new trial where only nominal damages may be won

Rules:

1. Conversion = IF (i) bailee for special purpose; (ii) uses property for another purpose; (iii) without bailor’s permission; THEN (iv) liable for conversion; SO LONG AS (v) such use causes injury/damage; THEN (vi) measure of damages is the damage/injury, not value of property; IF (7) property is returned.

2. No new trial if only nominal damages are recoverable.

Analysis

1. Horse died w/out fault of D. Not in consequence of the riding. Because use was “without detriment” the use is not conversion. Use was wrong but not conversion. Might support some other claim (assumpsit).

2. Unauthorized use can only constitute a conversion allowing recovery of nominal damages; no new trial where only nominal damages available.

Conclusion D wins on both counts

Concurrence or Dissent

None.

Johnson v. Weedman Supreme Court of Illinois, at Springfield

December, 1843, Decided

No Number in Original

Reporter 5 Ill. 495; 1843 Ill. LEXIS 70; 4 Scam. 495

ADREW JOHNSON v. JOHN WEEDMAN.

Prior History: [**1] Error to De Witt.

THE proceedings in this cause in the court below were had before the Hon. SAMUEL H. TREAT; but at what term, the agreed case does not show. The jury found the defendant not guilty. A motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled, and a judgment rendered for the defendant for costs. The cause was brought to this court by writ of error, and submitted upon briefs.

Disposition: Judgment affirmed.

Case Summary Procedural Posture

Plaintiff owner sought review of a judgment of a trial court (Illinois), which found defendant bailee not guilty in a trover action for a horse, denied the owner's motion for a new trial, and rendered judgment for the bailee for costs.

Overview

The owner bailed a horse to the bailee to be agisted and fed for a valuable consideration. While the horse was in the bailee's possession, and without the owner's authority, the bailee rode the horse 15 miles. The horse died within a few hours afterwards, but not in consequence of the riding. In affirming, the court held that the owner was not entitled to recover. While the bailee might not have had a right to use the horse, such use did not amount to a conversion because the use was without detriment. Another form of action would have been better adapted to adjust the real rights of the parties. A new trial should not have been granted because even if the owner would have been entitled to recover, a new trial might have been refused as

This tells you where and when the lawsuit took place. The U.S. common law system depends on court hierarchy, so this information is important.

A Reporter is a series of books, ordered by volume, containing judicial opinions AND editorial remarks written by the editors. Reporters used to be named for the editors who compiled and published the opinions. Now, reporters are generally named by state and region. But editors of reports still add comments to opinions.

This case is in two reporters, the Illinois Reports (Ill.) and the Scamihorn reporter (Scam.). The case is also available electronically on Lexis (Ill. LEXIS).

This is the case name. The plaintiff is usually listed first. So Andrew Johnson is suing John Weedman. Notice there is a typo in the word "Andrew." Sometimes computer publishers make mistakes so it can be important to check the original source of the opinion.

This tells you that the opinion you are about to read is an appeal from a trial court in De Witt county, Illinois.

All of this text was written by editors. It is not law. The case summary, headnotes, and syllabus are meant to help you get a sense of the case before reading the opinion. But only the opinion, written by the judge, is the law.

This is what you’ll see when you look up a case on Lexis Advance.

This is the title, or caption of the case

the only damages sought was for the wrongful use, which must have been vindictive damages.

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment, with costs.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Relief From Judgments > Motions for New Trials

HN1 Courts will not grant new trials, where vindictive damages only are sought to be recovered, or merely nominal damages.

Headnotes/Syllabus

Headnotes

1. BAILMENT--wrongful use of property. If a bailee for a special purpose use the property for another purpose, without leave of the owner, he is liable as for a conversion; yet this should be understood only of such an use as occasions an injury or damage; and that damage or injury, and not the value of the property, would be the measure of damages to be recovered, if the property be returned. Where no injury is sustained only nominal damages can be recovered. a

2. SAME--no injury. Such use of property by a bailee, as is without detriment to the bailor; does no amount to a conversion. 3. SAME. Where a horse was delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, to be agisted and fed, for a valuable consideration, and the defendant, without the authority of plaintiff, rode the horse fifteen miles, and the horse died a few hours afterwards, but not in consequence of the riding: Held, that the plaintiff could not sustain an action for trover and conversion. b

4. NEW TRIAL--vindictive damages. Courts will not grant new trials where vindictive damages only, or merely nominal damages, are sought to be recovered. c

Counsel: WELLS COTTON, for the plaintiff in error; Weedman being bailee of the horse, for a special purpose, to wit, agistment, was guilty of a conversion in using him without leave. What is a conversion? See 6 Bac. Abr. 677,

This section summarizes the plaintiff’s arguments.

Still text written by editors – not a Judge.

691, last paragraph; Reynolds v. Shuter, 5 Cowen 323; Whelock v. Wheelwright, 5 Mass. 104; Bristol v. Burt, 7 Johns. 258.

Conversion may be temporary or permanent. Keyworth v. Hill et ux. 5 Eng. Com. Law R. 422.

Change of property is only made by a judgment for a permanent conversion. Brown v. Sax, 7 Cowen 97.

A return of the property converted goes in mitigation of damages. 6 Bac. Abr. 680, 690, last paragraph,--in D, 708, last paragraph but one; Reynolds v. Shuter, 5 Cowen, 323.

The above points, made to establish the position of the plaintiff [**2] are that the taking of the horse of the plaintiff from the pasture, and putting him to defendant's use, constitute a complete conversion, on which an action could be sustained. If the horse had been returned, the action would still lie, and the return would be in mitigation of damages. As he never was returned, the verdict should have been for the plaintiff, to the amount of the horse's value, when converted; and the instruction that the defendant was entitled to a verdict, unless it "appears the horse died through bad usage," was erroneous.

A demand need not be made by the plaintiff to maintain suit, even where the original possession of the defendant was lawful, if an actual conversion be proved. Refusalon demand is only evidence of conversion, and not in itself a conversion. 6 Bac. Abr. 706, fifth paragraph, letter G; Tompkins v. Haile, 3 Wend. 407.

If the case shows a conversion, the verdict was clearly contrary to evidence, and there should be a new trial.

6 Bac. Abr. 662, states: "It is the general rule that if the verdict be contrary to evidence, the court will grant a new trial," citing Strange 1106, 1142; 2 Tidd's Pract. 908; 3 Barn. & Ald. 692; 3 Bing. 610; 4 Bing. [**3] 195; 1 Caines 25, and note.

A. LINCOLN, for the defendant in error: 1. The riding of the horse was not such an abuse of the lawful possession as amounts to a conversion; and,

2. If the riding was a conversion, the injury done by the riding, and not the value of the horse,is the measure of damages. Murray v. Barling, 10 Johns. 176.

This section summarizes the defendant’s arguments. This is still text written by editors.

Still text written by editors – not a Judge.

In the latter case it is said: "as if a man takes my horse to ride, and leaves it at an inn, that is a conversion; for though I may have him by sending for him, and paying for his keeping, yet it brings a charge upon me. It is this charge that is to regulate the damages."

3. Though the riding of the horse may be a conversion, still, as it did no injury to the horse, the damage can but be nominal; and after verdict, a new trial is never allowed to enable a plaintiff, to recover nominal damages merely. 2 Cowen, 483, last sentence of the opinion; 3 Johns. 239; 10 Wend. 119.

Judges: SCATES, Justice.

Opinion by: SCATES

Opinion

[*496] SCATES, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court: Trover for a horse; issue not guilty; trial and verdict not guilty. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, which the court denied, and rendered a judgment for costs. [**4] The agreed case shows the following facts; That the plaintiff bailed a horse to the defendant to be agisted and fed, for a valuable consideration; that while the horse was so in the defendant's possession, and without the plaintiff's authority, he rode the horse fifteen miles; that the horse died within a few hours afterwards, but not in consequence of the riding. And the cause is submitted for the opinion of the court upon two questions:

First. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover upon the facts stated? and,

[*497] Secondly. Ought a new trial to have been granted?

In answer to the first point, we say he is not. While we admit that if a ballet for a special purpose, as he is here, viz. agistment and feeding, use the property for another purpose, without leave of the owner, he is liable as for a conversion, and, as is laid down in the books, for assuming and exercising ownership over the goods. 6 Bac. Abr. 667, 691; 5 Cowen, 323; 5 Mass. 104; 7 Johns. 258; yet it should be understood only of such an use as occasions an injury or damage, as is said in Murray v. Burling, 10 Johns. 174; 6 Modern 212; 6 East 540; [**5] and that damage or injury, and not the value of the property, would be the measure of damages, to be recovered, if the property be returned. Here it is admitted

This is where the opinion begins. The judge deciding the case writes the opinion.

This tells you what judge wrote the opinion.

This is the procedural posture. The narrative facts as to how the case came to this court.

These are the facts of the case.

Here are the two issues the court will decide in this case.

This paragraph contains the legal rules governing the first issue and the court’s analysis and reasoning in its resolution of the first issue.

that no damage was done, or injury sustained, unless the law deemed the use a conversion; in which case nominal damages only could be recovered. The horse died, and therefore could not be returned, but without fault of the defendant, as it was not in consequence of the riding. If the doctrine of the books is to be literally understood, that any and every use, by the bailee, not falling strictly within the terms of the bailment, is a conversion, the mere temporary exercise of the animal for his own health and improvement, might, in like manner, be charged as a temporary conversion, subject to be made permanent, and the right of property changed into the defendant by a judgment, or if the defendant could and would return the property, the damages are mitigated by the amount of the value of the property, as is laid down in 6 Bac. Abr. 680, 690, D 708; 5 Cowen 323. So that finally the party would recover only the true damages, which, in this case, could be nothing, as there was no evidence of actual damage. No demand [**6] and refusal was necessary in this case, as the plaintiff does not seek to recover the value of the horse, but only the supposed damage, for an illegal use of the horse. I would by no means be understood as saying that the defendant had a right, or that it was proper to use the horse, but only that, that use, in this instance, being without detriment, does not amount to a conversion. Another form of action would be better adapted to adjust the real rights of the parties. Peradventure in an action of assumpsit for the use of the horse, the value of his services might be recovered, or in a special action on the case, on the bailment.

In answer to the second question, we answer also in the negative. Even if the plaintiff should be entitled to recover, still a new trial might have been refused, as the value of the horse is not sought by the proof; the only damages that could be recovered would be in the nature of smart money, for the wrongful use, which must be in their nature vindictive, as there is no proof of special damage or injury. And it is a rule that HN1 courts [*498] will not grant new trials, where vindictive damages only are sought to be recovered, or merely nominal damages. [**7] 2 Cowen 433; 3 Johns. 239; 10 Wend. 119.The judgment is affirmed with costs.

Judgment affirmed. Footnotes

a In action against bailee for negligence whereby ballot lost chattel bailed, return of chattel uninjured before suit goes in mitigation of damages, which are confined to actual

This paragraph contains the legal rules governing the second issue and the court’s analysis and reasoning as to that issue.

This is the conclusion. What the court actually did to resolve the lawsuit.

You’ll notice that these footnotes refer back to the headnotes. Remember, the headnotes are not part of the opinion, and neither are these footnotes. They were written by editors.

loss. American Express Co. v. Brunswick 4 Bradw. 606, 610.

b Where bailment, e. g. of horse, is gratuitous and for bailee's benefit, he is bound to extraordinary care. Phillips v. Condon, 14 Ill. 84.

c New trial will not be granted merely to enable party to recover vindictive or nominal damages. Comstock v. Brosseau, 65 Ill. 39, 44.

WE WILL WORK THROUGH THIS EXERCISE AT ORIENTATION. YOU SHOULD ARRIVE AT ORIENTATION HAVING READ THE LAPLACE CASE, BUT YOU DO NOT NEED TO COMPLETE THIS EXERCISE BEFORE ORIENTATION. YOU WILL NOT TURN IN THIS STRUCTURED READING EXERCISE

Structured Reading Exercise LaPlace v. Briere, 962 A.2d 1139, 404 N.J. Super. 585 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2009) Torts - Conversion

Vocabulary and legal terminology from Black’s Law Dictionary: (10th ed. 2014)

"Operation of law"

(17c) The means by which a right or a liability is created for a party regardless of the party's actual intent <because the court didn't rule on the motion for rehearing within 30 days, it was overruled by operation of law>.

Negligence

(14c) 1. The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others' rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under the circumstances.

Common law

n. [fr. Law French commen ley “common law”] (14c) 1. The body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions; CASELAW <federal common law>. Cf. STATUTORY LAW. … Where the common law governs, the judge, in what is now the forgotten past, decided the case in accordance with morality and custom and later judges followed his decision. They did not do so by construing the words of his judgment. They looked for the reason which had made him decide the case the way he did, the ratio decidendi as it came to be called. Thus it was the principle of the case, not the words, which went into the common law. So historically the common law is much less fettering than a code.” Patrick Devlin, The Judge 177 (1979).

2

Prima Facie

[Latin] (15c) At first sight; on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information <the agreement is prima facie valid>.

Prima Facie Case

(1805) 1. The establishment of a legally required rebuttable presumption. 2. A party's production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor.

Rebut

vb. (14c) To refute, oppose, or counteract (something) by evidence, argument, or contrary proof <rebut the opponent's expert testimony> <rebut a presumption of negligence>.

Third Party

n. (1818) Someone who is not a party to a lawsuit, agreement, or other transaction but who is usu. somehow implicated in it; someone other than the principal parties.

Presumption

(15c) 1. Something that is thought to be true because it is highly probable. 2. A legal inference or assumption that a fact exists because of the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. • Most presumptions are rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given case unless the adversely affected party overcomes it with other evidence. A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption. See BURDEN OF PRODUCTION.

Cross-Motion

(1827) A competing request for relief or orders similar to that requested by another party against the cross-moving party, such as a motion for summary judgment or for sanctions.

Complaint

(n) (14c) 1. The initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the demand for relief. • In some states, this pleading is called a petition. 2. Criminal law. A formal charge accusing a person of an offense.

Summary judgment

(18c) A judgment granted on a claim or defense about which there is no genuine issue of material fact and on which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. • The court considers the contents of the pleadings, the motions, and additional evidence adduced by the parties to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact rather than one of law. This procedural device allows the speedy disposition of a controversy without the need for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. — Also termed summary disposition; judgment on the pleadings. See JUDGMENT (2).

3

Action

4. A civil or criminal judicial proceeding. “An action has been defined to be an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. But in some sense this definition is equally applicable to special proceedings. More accurately, it is defined to be any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or decree. The action is said to terminate at judgment.” 1 Morris M. Estee, Estee's Pleadings, Practice, and Forms § 3, at 1 (Carter P. Pomeroy ed., 3d ed. 1885).“The terms ‘action’ and ‘suit’ are nearly if not quite synonymous. But lawyers usually speak of proceedings in courts of law as ‘actions,’ and of those in courts of equity as ‘suits.’ In olden time there was a more marked distinction, for an action was considered as terminating when judgment was rendered, the execution forming no part of it. A suit, on the other hand, included the execution. The word ‘suit,’ as used in the Judiciary Act of 1784 and later Federal statutes, applies to any proceeding in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues in such court the remedy which the law affords him.” Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3 (2d ed. 1899).

4

Pre-Reading Questions Before you begin reading, skim the caption, the headnotes, and the synopsis and answer the following questions:

1. What is the case name? Who are the parties? How many parties on each side? Individuals or corporations? __________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the case in federal or state court? Which court? What year? __________________________________________________________________________________

3. Why did the plaintiff sue in this case? __________________________________________________________________________________

4. How many holdings did the court make in this case? __________________________________________________________________________________

5. Which headnotes are relevant to the conversion claim? __________________________________________________________________________________

6. What happened to the horse? __________________________________________________________________________________

7. Was the person taking care of the horse when it died found liable (i.e. responsible) for the death of the horse? __________________________________________________________________________________

8. Why or why not? __________________________________________________________________________________

9. How many judges decided this case? How many wrote the opinion? __________________________________________________________________________________

5

Reading the Case With a general idea of the case in mind, you can now read the opinion. As you read and after you finish reading, answer the following questions:

1. The opinion is divided into sections. I, II, III A and III B. Why might this be? __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. The court describes the procedural posture of this case in the second paragraph of the opinion and the second-to-last paragraph of section I of the opinion. What happened at the trial court level? __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. The third paragraph of the opinion lists two “questions presented” (i.e. issues) in the case. Why are there only two questions presented, but four “holdings” listed in the synopsis? __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Section I describes the facts in greater detail. What were the mutual obligations between the plaintiff and the defendants surrounding the horse? Plaintiff was supposed to: __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Defendants were supposed to: __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. What caused the horse’s death?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

6

6. The last paragraph in section I describes the relief plaintiff seeks on appeal and plaintiff’s four arguments on appeal. List those below:

a. Relief sought:

__________________________________________________________________________

b. Arguments:

i. First

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ii. Second

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

iii. Third

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

iv. Fourth

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Section two discusses the tort of conversion. The court describes two competing fairness concerns: on one hand, we want to hold people accountable when they use someone else’s property without permission; our sense of fairness and justice suggests that we should respect each others’ stuff. On the other hand, we don’t want to hold people accountable for minor infractions; courts are busy and don’t have time to resolve petty disputes when there is no real harm done. How does the court in this case determine whether an unauthorized use of someone else’s property is serious enough to warrant a legal remedy?

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

7

8. Is the interference with plaintiff’s rights in his horse serious enough in this case to warrant a legal remedy? Why or why not?

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. What is the crucial rule element and the crucial fact that lead the court to decide that defendant Bridgwood is not liable for conversion?

a. Crucial rule element:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Crucial fact:

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Is there a dissenting opinion in this case? Is there a concurring opinion?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Briefing LaPlace v. Briere Use the answers to the questions above and fill out the chart below. This chart is one possible method for creating a case brief.

Case

Court/Year

Facts

Procedural Posture

Issue(s)

Holding:

Rules:

Analysis

Conclusion


Soper, Christopher 6/29/2015 For Educational Use Only

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

LaPlace v. Briere Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. | January 12, 2009 | 404 N.J.Super. 585 | 962 A.2d 1139

Document Details Standard Citation: LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585, 962 A.2d 1139 (App. Div. 2009) Parallel Citations: 962 A.2d 1139 Search Details Jurisdiction: New Jersey Delivery Details Date: June 29, 2015 at 9:51 PM Delivered By: Christopher Soper Client ID: SOPER CHIRSTOPHER Status Icons: Comment:

404 N.J.Super. 585 Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Michael R. LaPLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

Pierre BRIERE, individually and trading as Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, and Pierre Briere Quarter

Horses, LLC, Charlene Bridgwood, Douglas Gultz and Sherry Gultz, husband and wife, Defendants-

Respondents, and

Pierre Briere, individually and trading as Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, and Pierre Briere Quarter Horses,

LLC, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v.

Charlene Bridgwood, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Argued Sept. 16, 2008. | Decided Jan. 12, 2009.

Synopsis Background: Horse owner brought action against stable and against person who exercised horse, after horse died while being exercised. The Superior Court, Hunterdon County, Law Division, entered summary judgment in favor of stable and exerciser, and owner appealed.

Here is the case caption. Just as in the last case, the caption tells you the “where” (i.e. what court), the “when” (the date of the opinion, and in this case, the date of the oral argument), and the “who” (the parties involved in the lawsuit) of the case. The caption also contains a citation to at least one reporter.

These are the editorial comments on the case. They can be quite helpful as background information before you read the opinion.

This is what a case looks like on Westlaw Next.



Holdings: The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Chambers, J.A.D., held that: [1] person who exercised horse could not be liable under the tort of conversion; [2] horse was left in a bailment arrangement with stable; [3] stable, as bailee, could not be liable under a theory of conversion; and [4] stable, as bailee, could not be liable under a theory of negligence.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (25)

[1]

Animals Conversion

Person who exercised owner’s horse without

permission to do so did not exert such control and dominion over the horse that she seriously interfered with owner’s rights in the horse, and thus person could not be liable under the tort of conversion when the horse died during the exercise, absent evidence of the cause of the horse’s death or evidence that the exercising was done negligently. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(2).

Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

Conversion and Civil Theft In general; nature and elements

“Conversion” is an unauthorized assumption and

exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.

13 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Conversion and Civil Theft Intent

Still editorial comments



A defendant need not knowingly or intentionally act wrongfully for a conversion to occur.


[4]

Conversion and Civil Theft Assertion of ownership or control in general

“Conversion” is the wrongful exercise of

dominion and control over property owned by another inconsistent with the owners’ rights.


[5]


Conversion and Civil Theft Destruction of or injury to property

To constitute a conversion of goods, there must

be some repudiation by the defendant of the owner’s right, or some exercise of dominion over them by him inconsistent with such right, or some act done which has the effect of destroying or changing the quality of the chattel.


[5]






[6]

Animals Loss of or Injuries to Animals

Horse that owner left in stable’s care for

safekeeping was left in a bailment arrangement, for purposes of determining whether stable could be liable for horse’s death while being




exercised by a third party; although owner sometimes removed the horse from stable, temporarily suspending bailment arrangement, while horse was at stable, stable provided horse with shelter, food, water, training, grooming, and on occasion arranged for its medical care and shoeing.


[7]

Bailment Nature and elements in general

A bailment may be created by contract, either

express or implied, or by operation of law or statute.


[8]

Bailment Delivery and acceptance

A bailment arises when a person leaves his

chattel on the premises of another if the latter is given primary control of the chattel for the time being.


[9]


For a bailment to arise, the bailor must have

possession and primary control over the chattel.


[10]


Stable where horse was boarded under a

bailment arrangement could not be liable under a theory of conversion for horse’s death occurring when a third party exercised horse without permission, since third party did not exert such control and dominion over the horse that she seriously interfered with owner’s rights




in the horse; sole fact that stable was unable to return the horse due to its death did not mean it was liable for the loss.


[11]

Bailment Care and Use of Property, and Negligence of

Bailee Bailment

Conversion by bailee

Where goods subject to a bailment are not returned or are damaged or lost, the bailor may be able to recover under theories of either conversion or negligence.


[12]

Bailment Conversion by bailee

A bailee commits the tort of common law

conversion when it commits an unauthorized act of dominion over the bailor’s property inconsistent with its rights in that property.


[13]


A bailee’s intentional or negligent conduct can

give rise to a claim of conversion, even though it acted in good faith.


[14]


A bailee will be liable for conversion due to its

negligent conduct if the bailee mistakenly destroys or disposes of goods although there is no intent to steal or destroy the goods.





[15]


The bailor’s proof of delivery, demand and

failure to return goods gives rise to a prima facie case of conversion against bailee.


[16]

Bailment Presumptions and burden of proof

Once a bailor had established a prima facie case

of conversion of goods arising from a bailee’s alleged negligent conduct, bailee then has the burden of producing evidence to show what happened to the goods; without this rule, the bailor, who was not in possession of the goods, would be in a difficult position to show what occurred.


[17]


A bailee who accepts responsibility for goods

should have the burden of producing evidence as to the fate of those goods, since it would be unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of conversion when knowledge of the fate of the goods is available only to defendant.


[18]


Even after a bailor had established a prima facie

case of conversion of goods arising from a bailee’s alleged negligent conduct, the burden of proof remains with the bailor; once bailee has produced evidence explaining what happened to the chattel, the bailor then must prove its claim of conversion.





[19]


Stable, as bailee of horse it boarded, could not

be liable under a theory of negligence for horse’s death, after horse died while being exercised without permission by a third party, absent a showing that third party failed to exercise due care in exercising horse; horse was undergoing ordinary exercises by a person experienced in handling and exercising horses when it died.


[20]

Bailment Bailments for Mutual Benefit

In a bailment for mutual benefit, a bailee has a

duty to exercise reasonable care for the safekeeping of the subject of the bailment and will be liable for any loss caused by its failure to do so.


[21]


When proofs are presented showing that goods

were damaged while in the care of a bailee, a presumption of negligence arises and in those circumstances, a prima facie case is established against the bailee.


[22]


The presumption of negligence, arising when

goods have been damaged while in the care of a bailee, may be rebutted by the bailee with evidence showing that the loss was not caused by his negligence or that he exercised due care.





[23]


The burden of proof always remains with the

bailor, in a claim for negligence for goods lost while in the care of a bailee.


[24]



be liable under a theory of negligence for horse’s death, after horse died while being exercised without permission by a third party, absent a showing as to cause of horse’s death; owner was in a unique position to determine cause of death, but refused to authorize a necropsy of horse’s remains.


[25]


Rebuttable presumptions in favor of a bailor

against a bailee for negligence or conversion are in place because the chattel is in the exclusive control of the bailee who is in a unique position to explain what happened to the chattel.


Attorneys and Law Firms

**1142 Frank D. Rivellini, Hackensack, argued the cause for appellant (Francis J. DeVito, P.A., attorneys; Michael Natiello, on the brief).

Marc B. Schuley, argued the cause for respondents Pierre Briere, Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, LLC, Douglas Gultz and Sherry Gultz (Barrett Lazar, L.L.C., attorneys; Virginia M. Barrett, Maywood, of counsel and on the brief).




Jon Robinson, argued the cause for respondent Charlene Bridgwood (Law Offices of Craig M. Terkowitz, attorneys, Piscataway; Mr. Robinson, on the brief).

Before Judges WINKELSTEIN, FUENTES and CHAMBERS.

Opinion The opinion of the court was delivered by

CHAMBERS, J.A.D.

*590 The unusual facts of this case require us to visit the common law principles governing bailment and conversion, not often encountered today. *591 Plaintiff Michael R. LaPlace brought this suit to recover for the loss of his horse which died while boarding at a stable owned by defendants Pierre Briere, trading as Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, and Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, LLC (“Briere stable”) and while being exercised by defendant Charlene Bridgwood. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiff now appeals.1

The first question presented by this appeal is whether a person who exercises a horse without permission to do so is liable under the tort of conversion when the horse dies during the exercise and there is no evidence of the cause of the horse’s death nor is there evidence that the exercising was done negligently. The second question is whether the stable where the horse was boarded and where the death occurred may be liable under the law of bailment under these circumstances. We answer both of these questions in the negative, and we affirm the granting of summary judgment to defendants and the denial of partial summary judgment to plaintiff.

I

In reviewing an appeal from a decision on motions for summary judgment, we employ the same standard applied by the trial court. **1143 Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167, 704 A.2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608, 713 A.2d 499 (1998). Summary judgment will be granted where no genuine issue of material fact is present and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact is present, we must look at the competent evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving *592 party” and determine whether that evidence is

You might notice that three judges decided this case, but only one wrote the opinion. This is common.

Here is the procedural posture.

Here the court lists the two issues on appeal.

And these are the holdings.

Notice how this opinion is organized into sections. Organization is critical in legal writing because it helps the reader analyze different holdings in an opinion.

Appellate courts usually include a statement on the standard of review. The standard of review determines how much deference an appellate court gives to a lower court in reviewing the lower court’s decision.



“sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995). If the evidence is sufficient to meet that standard, the motion will be denied. Ibid. Plaintiff was the owner of a horse named Park Me In First. In 2000, plaintiff entered into a verbal agreement with Briere stable for the care, maintenance, and training of his horses, which, beginning in 2002, also included Park Me in First. He paid Briere stable a monthly fee. Briere stable was responsible for providing shelter, food, water, training, and grooming to the horses when they were there. With the consent of a horse’s owner, Briere stable would also arrange for shoeing and medical care for horses at the stable. Since Park Me In First was a trained quarter horse who participated in horse shows and competitions around the country, plaintiff and his daughter would from time to time remove the horse from Briere stable in order to take it to these events. On February 12, 2006, plaintiff and defendant Pierre Briere were at a horse show in North Carolina, when they learned that Park Me In First had died while being exercised by Bridgwood at Briere stable. According to Bridgwood, whose horse was also kept at Briere stable, she had gone to the stable that day to help out. She thought that the stable might be shorthanded because Pierre Briere was away and the staff might not be able to get to work due to snow that had fallen the night before. She asked Douglas Gultz, whom she described as a person who oversaw the stable when Pierre Briere was away, if there was anything she could do to help. She testified that he replied that she could “lunge” the horses, although he denies saying so. Lunging is a way of exercising a horse by having it walk, trot, or canter in a circle while it is secured to a lunge line handled by a person standing in the center of the circle. Lunging is generally part of a horse’s daily routine and is not considered dangerous. *593 Bridgwood had owned horses for thirty-five to forty-five years and had trained, lunged, and cared for horses at her former husband’s facility for twenty years. Ten to fifteen years earlier, she had lunged plaintiff’s horses dozens of times over a period of three or four years when they were located at her former husband’s farm, and she had lunged at least one of plaintiff’s horses at a horse show. Pierre Briere, who had seen Bridgwood lunge horses fifty to one hundred times before February 12, 2006, testified at his deposition that he found her to be “very capable” of handling and lunging a horse. Bridgwood explained that on February 12, 2006, she first lunged her horse for about fifteen minutes without incident and then proceeded to lunge Park Me In First. She selected him for exercising because she knew he was a well trained, well mannered horse, and she thought that plaintiff, who was a friend of hers, would appreciate her doing so. She testified that

Here are the facts of the case as stated by the appellate court.

Facts of the case stated by the court continued.



the horse was well behaved for the first five minutes. He then suddenly reared up on his hind legs and collapsed on his side with blood pumping from his nose and died. The veterinarian was unable to determine the cause of death without performing **1144 a necropsy upon the horse. According to Pierre Briere, on the day of the horse’s death, plaintiff declined to authorize further examination to determine the cause of death, saying that he did not want to spend any more money on the horse. Plaintiff, however, does not recall having any conversation about a necropsy on the day the horse died. While Bridgwood offered to pay for a necropsy, the veterinarian would not do so without the consent of the owner, and Bridgwood did not ask plaintiff for such permission. Pierre Briere also asked the veterinarian to conduct an examination to determine the cause of death at his expense, but she would not do so without the owner’s authorization. Plaintiff testified that when he requested a necropsy a couple of days later, he was told it was too late because the horse’s remains had been removed. As a result, the record has no *594 expert proofs on the cause of death.2 It is unknown whether the horse had any underlying medical condition that caused its death, unrelated to Bridgwood’s conduct in exercising the horse. There are no proofs that the lunging caused the horse’s death. Plaintiff maintains that the only people authorized to handle his horses at Briere’s stable were Briere’s employees and that he never gave Bridgwood permission to handle his horses outside of his presence. He acknowledged that he had once allowed her to ride Park Me In First for a few moments in his presence, which she did without incident. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Briere stable, asserting breach of the bailment agreement, breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. He also asserted claims in conversion and negligence against Bridgwood. On October 10, 2007, the trial court granted defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motions for partial summary judgment on liability. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied on November 16, 2007. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for partial summary judgment. He argues that Bridgwood is liable for conversion of the horse. He maintains that Briere stable, as the bailee for the horse, is liable in conversion and in negligence for the loss of the horse. He further asserts that due to the bailment relationship, Briere stable bore the burden of coming forward with evidence that the horse did not die as a result of its negligence, and that it failed to do so.

II

Facts of the case stated by the court continued.

These two paragraphs might be thought of as procedural posture, because they describe how the case came to this appellate court and what exactly is before the appellate court.



[1] We will first address plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his request for partial summary judgment as to *595 Bridgwood. According to plaintiff, Bridgwood committed a conversion when she lunged the horse without authorization to do so, and that as a result, she is liable for the loss of the horse. For purposes of this analysis, we will assume that Bridgwood was not authorized to exercise the horse since we must give plaintiff all of the favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See R. 4:46-2(c). [2] [3] [4] Conversion has been defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. Holt, 228 N.J.Super. 77, 83, 548 A.2d 1161 (App.Div.1988) **1145 (quoting McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J.Super. 505, 526, 218 A.2d 408 (Ch.Div.1966), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 409, 235 A.2d 901 (1967)). Conversion is an intentional tort in that the defendant must have intended “to exercise a dominion or control over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.” Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 92 (5th ed. 1984). However, the defendant need not knowingly or intentionally act wrongfully for a conversion to occur. Ibid. Conversion is “the wrongful exercise of dominion and control over property owned by another inconsistent with the owners’ rights.” Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 393 N.J.Super. 55, 84, 922 A.2d 782 (App.Div.2007) (quoting Port-O-San Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 863 Welfare & Pension Funds, 363 N.J.Super. 431, 440, 833 A.2d 633 (App.Div.2003)), certif. denied, 194 N.J. 270, 944 A.2d 30 (2008). As a result, the mere use of the property of another without permission of the owner does not necessarily amount to conversion. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 94 (5th ed. 1984) (stating “[i]t is not, however, every unauthorized taking of goods from the possession of another which is sufficiently serious to amount to conversion”); Frome v. Dennis, 45 N.J.L. 515 (Sup.Ct.1883) (borrowing a plow without the owner’s permission, using it to plow a field and then returning it four days later did not *596 constitute conversion); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 227 comment b (1965). Where the “casual and harmless use” of the chattel of another involves “no defiance of the owner’s right of dominion” over the chattel, then no conversion has occurred. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 101 (5th ed. 1984). [5] The law has long recognized that “[t]o constitute a conversion of goods, there must be some repudiation by the defendant of the owner’s right, or some exercise of dominion over them by him inconsistent with such right, or some act done which has the effect of destroying or changing the quality of the chattel.” Frome v. Dennis, supra, 45 N.J.L. at 516 (quoting Woodside v. Adams, 40 N.J.L. 417, 431 (Sup.Ct.1878)).

This is not a misplaced footnote. It is a reference back to the numbered headnotes written by the editors.

Now the court is moving into the first issue.

Remember the standard of review? The U.S. court system has certain rules that appellate courts must follow when reviewing trial court opinions.

Here, the court is explaining the legal rule of conversion.



The theory behind conversion is that the actor has exerted such a major and serious interference with the plaintiff’s rights to the chattel that in essence the law will force a judicial sale of the chattel upon the defendant. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 90 (5th ed. 1984). The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the tort in this way: “[c]onversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965). In weighing the seriousness of the interference with the owner’s rights to the chattel to determine if a conversion has occurred, we should consider the following factors:

(a) [T]he extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control;

(b) the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control;

(c) the actor’s good faith;

(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other’s right of control;

(e) the harm done to the chattel;

(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.

[Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(2) (1965).] In light of these legal principles, Bridgwood’s conduct in exercising the horse under the circumstances here, even if she was *597 unauthorized to do so, did not constitute a conversion. While her act was **1146 intentional, in that she intended to lunge the horse, Bridgwood did not exercise such control and dominion over the horse when lunging it that she seriously interfered with plaintiff’s ownership rights in the horse. She did not remove the horse from the Briere stable where plaintiff had left the horse for safekeeping. At the time, she was not interfering with plaintiff’s use or possession of the horse. Lunging is part of the daily care of the horse and is not conduct that would intrinsically be viewed as cloaking the actor with the rights of an owner. Bridgwood exercised the horse in good faith, with no intent to usurp plaintiff’s rights to the horse. The lunging was intended to be done for only about fifteen minutes and in fact lasted only five minutes. We must, however, factor into our analysis the circumstance that the horse died while the lunging took place. As the Restatement indicates, whether harm has been done to the chattel is a factor to be considered when determining whether a conversion has taken place. Ibid. To give this factor weight, a causal connection must exist between the defendant’s conduct in interfering with the chattel and the damage or destruction of the chattel. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion § 2 (2004) (stating that “[t]he view has also been expressed that to

Legal rule of conversion continued.

In this paragraph, the court is applying the rule to the facts of this case.

This is more application by the court. This particular aspect of the rule warrants an entire paragraph because this factor is the most important factor in determining this case.



establish a conversion claim, a plaintiff must prove that it had a possessory interest in the property, that the defendants intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s possession, and that the defendants’ acts were the legal cause of the plaintiff’s loss of property”). Here, plaintiff can show no such causal connection between Bridgwood’s conduct and the death of the horse. Although the horse did die while it was being lunged by Bridgwood, there is no showing that the lunging, whether done negligently or not, in any way caused the horse’s death. Because no rational factfinder could determine, based on these proofs, that Bridgwood’s conduct amounted to conversion of the horse, we affirm the granting of summary judgment in her favor.

*598 III

We now turn to whether Briere stable may be held liable to plaintiff under bailment law. We will first address whether a bailment relationship existed between plaintiff and Briere stable at the time of the horse’s death. If it did, then we will consider whether Briere stable is liable under bailment law for the loss of the horse.

A.

B.

[10] [11] Since a bailment relationship existed at the time the horse died, we must **1148 now consider whether, under the facts presented, Briere stable is liable for the loss. [ ] [12] [13] [14] We will first address whether Briere stable can be held liable under a conversion theory applicable to bailees.[ ] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] We now turn to whether Briere stable may be held liable under a theory of negligence. [ ] As a result, since no rational factfinder could determine, based on these proofs, that Briere stable was negligent or converted the horse, Briere stable cannot be held liable for the death of the horse under bailment law. Summary judgment in favor of Briere stable was properly granted. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and the denial **1150 of plaintiff’s motion for

Here is the court’s conclusion on issue number 1

The opinion continues for a number of pages. We’ve cut those pages because they aren’t important for the issue we’re covering – conversion of a horse. Many of your casebooks contain excerpted opinions like this. In this section (that we removed from the opinion), the court holds that a bailment did exist between plaintiff and Briere Stables.

The brackets indicate that we cut more here.

And here. The court holds that Briere stable cannot be held liable under a conversion theory applicable to bailees.

Here is the court’s conclusion on issue number 2

Here is the court’s ultimate conclusion and disposition of the case.



partial summary judgment.

Parallel Citations

962 A.2d 1139

Footnotes

1 Summary judgment was also granted to Douglas Gultz and Sherry Gultz who were named in the complaint as the owners of the land where Briere stable is located. Plaintiff does not argue in this appeal that summary judgment was improvidently granted to these two defendants. Hence, we do not address the claims made against them.

2 The veterinarian did give a differential diagnosis that included a fungal infection in the guttural pouch that could eat through a major artery wall and cause a massive bleed, a tumor or abscess in the lungs that could eat through a major artery and cause a massive bleed, or a fracture in a bone in the head from flipping over backwards.

These footnotes refer back to the text of the opinion, not the headnotes. So these footnotes are part of the opinion.



LaPlace v. Briere Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. | January 12, 2009 | 404 N.J.Super. 585 | 962 A.2d 1139

Document Details

Standard Citation:

LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J. Super. 585, 962 A.2d 1139 (App. Div. 2009)

Parallel Citations:

962 A.2d 1139

Search Details Jurisdiction:

New Jersey

Delivery Details Date:

June 29, 2015 at 9:51 PM

Delivered By:

Christopher Soper

Client ID:

SOPER CHRISTOPHER

Status Icons:


LaPlace v. Briere, 404 N.J.Super. 585 (2009)

962 A.2d 1139

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

404 N.J.Super. 585 Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Michael R. LaPLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

Pierre BRIERE, individually and trading as Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, and Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, LLC, Charlene Bridgwood, Douglas Gultz and Sherry Gultz, husband and wife, Defendants-

Respondents, and

Pierre Briere, individually and trading as Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, and Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, LLC, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-

Respondents, v.

Charlene Bridgwood, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Argued Sept. 16, 2008. | Decided Jan. 12, 2009.

Synopsis Background: Horse owner brought action against stable and against person who exercised horse, after horse died while being exercised. The Superior Court, Hunterdon County, Law Division, entered summary judgment in favor of stable and exerciser, and owner appealed.

Holdings: The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Chambers, J.A.D., held that: [1] person who exercised horse could not be liable under the tort of conversion; [2] horse was left in a bailment arrangement with stable; [3] stable, as bailee, could not be liable under a theory of conversion; and [4] stable, as bailee, could not be liable under a theory of negligence.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (25) [1]

Animals Conversion

Person who exercised owner’s horse without

permission to do so did not exert such control and dominion over the horse that she seriously interfered with owner’s rights in the horse, and thus person could not be liable under the tort of conversion when the horse died during the exercise, absent evidence of the cause of the horse’s death or evidence that the exercising was done negligently. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(2).


[2]

Conversion and Civil Theft In general; nature and elements

“Conversion” is an unauthorized assumption and

exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.


[3]

Conversion and Civil Theft Intent

A defendant need not knowingly or intentionally

act wrongfully for a conversion to occur.




962 A.2d 1139


[4]


“Conversion” is the wrongful exercise of

dominion and control over property owned by another inconsistent with the owners’ rights.


[5]






[6]


Horse that owner left in stable’s care for

safekeeping was left in a bailment arrangement, for purposes of determining whether stable could be liable for horse’s death while being exercised by a third party; although owner sometimes removed the horse from stable, temporarily suspending bailment arrangement, while horse was at stable, stable provided horse with shelter, food, water, training, grooming, and on occasion arranged for its medical care and shoeing.


[7]

Bailment Nature and elements in general

A bailment may be created by contract, either

express or implied, or by operation of law or statute.


[8]


A bailment arises when a person leaves his

chattel on the premises of another if the latter is given primary control of the chattel for the time being.


[9]


For a bailment to arise, the bailor must have

possession and primary control over the chattel.


[10]


Stable where horse was boarded under a

bailment arrangement could not be liable under a theory of conversion for horse’s death occurring when a third party exercised horse without permission, since third party did not exert such control and dominion over the horse that she seriously interfered with owner’s rights in the horse; sole fact that stable was unable to



962 A.2d 1139


return the horse due to its death did not mean it was liable for the loss.


[11]

Bailment Care and Use of Property, and Negligence of

Bailee Bailment

Conversion by bailee

Where goods subject to a bailment are not returned or are damaged or lost, the bailor may be able to recover under theories of either conversion or negligence.


[12]


A bailee commits the tort of common law

conversion when it commits an unauthorized act of dominion over the bailor’s property inconsistent with its rights in that property.


[13]


A bailee’s intentional or negligent conduct can

give rise to a claim of conversion, even though it acted in good faith.


[14]


A bailee will be liable for conversion due to its

negligent conduct if the bailee mistakenly destroys or disposes of goods although there is no intent to steal or destroy the goods.


[15]


The bailor’s proof of delivery, demand and

failure to return goods gives rise to a prima facie case of conversion against bailee.


[16]


Once a bailor had established a prima facie case

of conversion of goods arising from a bailee’s alleged negligent conduct, bailee then has the burden of producing evidence to show what happened to the goods; without this rule, the bailor, who was not in possession of the goods, would be in a difficult position to show what occurred.


[17]


A bailee who accepts responsibility for goods

should have the burden of producing evidence as to the fate of those goods, since it would be



962 A.2d 1139


unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of conversion when knowledge of the fate of the goods is available only to defendant.


[18]


Even after a bailor had established a prima facie

case of conversion of goods arising from a bailee’s alleged negligent conduct, the burden of proof remains with the bailor; once bailee has produced evidence explaining what happened to the chattel, the bailor then must prove its claim of conversion.


[19]



be liable under a theory of negligence for horse’s death, after horse died while being exercised without permission by a third party, absent a showing that third party failed to exercise due care in exercising horse; horse was undergoing ordinary exercises by a person experienced in handling and exercising horses when it died.


[20]

Bailment Bailments for Mutual Benefit

In a bailment for mutual benefit, a bailee has a

duty to exercise reasonable care for the

safekeeping of the subject of the bailment and will be liable for any loss caused by its failure to do so.


[21]


When proofs are presented showing that goods

were damaged while in the care of a bailee, a presumption of negligence arises and in those circumstances, a prima facie case is established against the bailee.


[22]


The presumption of negligence, arising when

goods have been damaged while in the care of a bailee, may be rebutted by the bailee with evidence showing that the loss was not caused by his negligence or that he exercised due care.


[23]


The burden of proof always remains with the

bailor, in a claim for negligence for goods lost while in the care of a bailee.




962 A.2d 1139


[24]



be liable under a theory of negligence for horse’s death, after horse died while being exercised without permission by a third party, absent a showing as to cause of horse’s death; owner was in a unique position to determine cause of death, but refused to authorize a necropsy of horse’s remains.


[25]


Rebuttable presumptions in favor of a bailor

against a bailee for negligence or conversion are in place because the chattel is in the exclusive control of the bailee who is in a unique position to explain what happened to the chattel.


Attorneys and Law Firms

**1142 Frank D. Rivellini, Hackensack, argued the cause for appellant (Francis J. DeVito, P.A., attorneys; Michael Natiello, on the brief).

Marc B. Schuley, argued the cause for respondents Pierre Briere, Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, LLC, Douglas Gultz and Sherry Gultz (Barrett Lazar, L.L.C., attorneys; Virginia M. Barrett, Maywood, of counsel and on the brief).

Jon Robinson, argued the cause for respondent Charlene Bridgwood (Law Offices of Craig M. Terkowitz, attorneys, Piscataway; Mr. Robinson, on the brief).

Before Judges WINKELSTEIN, FUENTES and

CHAMBERS.

Opinion The opinion of the court was delivered by

CHAMBERS, J.A.D.

*590 The unusual facts of this case require us to visit the common law principles governing bailment and conversion, not often encountered today. *591 Plaintiff Michael R. LaPlace brought this suit to recover for the loss of his horse which died while boarding at a stable owned by defendants Pierre Briere, trading as Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, and Pierre Briere Quarter Horses, LLC (“Briere stable”) and while being exercised by defendant Charlene Bridgwood. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiff now appeals.1

The first question presented by this appeal is whether a person who exercises a horse without permission to do so is liable under the tort of conversion when the horse dies during the exercise and there is no evidence of the cause of the horse’s death nor is there evidence that the exercising was done negligently. The second question is whether the stable where the horse was boarded and where the death occurred may be liable under the law of bailment under these circumstances. We answer both of these questions in the negative, and we affirm the granting of summary judgment to defendants and the denial of partial summary judgment to plaintiff.

I

In reviewing an appeal from a decision on motions for summary judgment, we employ the same standard applied by the trial court. **1143 Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167, 704 A.2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608, 713 A.2d 499 (1998). Summary judgment will be granted where no genuine issue of material fact is present and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material



962 A.2d 1139


fact is present, we must look at the competent evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving *592 party” and determine whether that evidence is “sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995). If the evidence is sufficient to meet that standard, the motion will be denied. Ibid. Plaintiff was the owner of a horse named Park Me In First. In 2000, plaintiff entered into a verbal agreement with Briere stable for the care, maintenance, and training of his horses, which, beginning in 2002, also included Park Me in First. He paid Briere stable a monthly fee. Briere stable was responsible for providing shelter, food, water, training, and grooming to the horses when they were there. With the consent of a horse’s owner, Briere stable would also arrange for shoeing and medical care for horses at the stable. Since Park Me In First was a trained quarter horse who participated in horse shows and competitions around the country, plaintiff and his daughter would from time to time remove the horse from Briere stable in order to take it to these events. On February 12, 2006, plaintiff and defendant Pierre Briere were at a horse show in North Carolina, when they learned that Park Me In First had died while being exercised by Bridgwood at Briere stable. According to Bridgwood, whose horse was also kept at Briere stable, she had gone to the stable that day to help out. She thought that the stable might be shorthanded because Pierre Briere was away and the staff might not be able to get to work due to snow that had fallen the night before. She asked Douglas Gultz, whom she described as a person who oversaw the stable when Pierre Briere was away, if there was anything she could do to help. She testified that he replied that she could “lunge” the horses, although he denies saying so. Lunging is a way of exercising a horse by having it walk, trot, or canter in a circle while it is secured to a lunge line handled by a person standing in the center of the circle. Lunging is generally part of a horse’s daily routine and is not considered dangerous. *593 Bridgwood had owned horses for thirty-five to forty-five years and had trained, lunged, and cared for horses at her former husband’s facility for twenty years. Ten to fifteen years earlier, she had lunged plaintiff’s horses dozens of times over a period of three or four years when they were located at her former husband’s farm, and she had lunged at least one of plaintiff’s horses at a horse show. Pierre Briere,

who had seen Bridgwood lunge horses fifty to one hundred times before February 12, 2006, testified at his deposition that he found her to be “very capable” of handling and lunging a horse. Bridgwood explained that on February 12, 2006, she first lunged her horse for about fifteen minutes without incident and then proceeded to lunge Park Me In First. She selected him for exercising because she knew he was a well trained, well mannered horse, and she thought that plaintiff, who was a friend of hers, would appreciate her doing so. She testified that the horse was well behaved for the first five minutes. He then suddenly reared up on his hind legs and collapsed on his side with blood pumping from his nose and died. The veterinarian was unable to determine the cause of death without performing **1144 a necropsy upon the horse. According to Pierre Briere, on the day of the horse’s death, plaintiff declined to authorize further examination to determine the cause of death, saying that he did not want to spend any more money on the horse. Plaintiff, however, does not recall having any conversation about a necropsy on the day the horse died. While Bridgwood offered to pay for a necropsy, the veterinarian would not do so without the consent of the owner, and Bridgwood did not ask plaintiff for such permission. Pierre Briere also asked the veterinarian to conduct an examination to determine the cause of death at his expense, but she would not do so without the owner’s authorization. Plaintiff testified that when he requested a necropsy a couple of days later, he was told it was too late because the horse’s remains had been removed. As a result, the record has no *594 expert proofs on the cause of death.2 It is unknown whether the horse had any underlying medical condition that caused its death, unrelated to Bridgwood’s conduct in exercising the horse. There are no proofs that the lunging caused the horse’s death. Plaintiff maintains that the only people authorized to handle his horses at Briere’s stable were Briere’s employees and that he never gave Bridgwood permission to handle his horses outside of his presence. He acknowledged that he had once allowed her to ride Park Me In First for a few moments in his presence, which she did without incident. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Briere stable, asserting breach of the bailment agreement, breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. He also asserted claims in



962 A.2d 1139


conversion and negligence against Bridgwood. On October 10, 2007, the trial court granted defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motions for partial summary judgment on liability. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied on November 16, 2007. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for partial summary judgment. He argues that Bridgwood is liable for conversion of the horse. He maintains that Briere stable, as the bailee for the horse, is liable in conversion and in negligence for the loss of the horse. He further asserts that due to the bailment relationship, Briere stable bore the burden of coming forward with evidence that the horse did not die as a result of its negligence, and that it failed to do so.

II

[1] We will first address plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his request for partial summary judgment as to *595 Bridgwood. According to plaintiff, Bridgwood committed a conversion when she lunged the horse without authorization to do so, and that as a result, she is liable for the loss of the horse. For purposes of this analysis, we will assume that Bridgwood was not authorized to exercise the horse since we must give plaintiff all of the favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See R. 4:46-2(c). [2] [3] [4] Conversion has been defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. Holt, 228 N.J.Super. 77, 83, 548 A.2d 1161 (App.Div.1988) **1145 (quoting McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J.Super. 505, 526, 218 A.2d 408 (Ch.Div.1966), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 409, 235 A.2d 901 (1967)). Conversion is an intentional tort in that the defendant must have intended “to exercise a dominion or control over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.” Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 92 (5th ed. 1984). However, the defendant need not knowingly or intentionally act wrongfully for a conversion to occur. Ibid. Conversion is “the wrongful exercise of dominion and control over property owned by another inconsistent with the owners’ rights.” Sun Coast Merch. Corp. v. Myron Corp., 393 N.J.Super. 55, 84, 922

A.2d 782 (App.Div.2007) (quoting Port-O-San Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 863 Welfare & Pension Funds, 363 N.J.Super. 431, 440, 833 A.2d 633 (App.Div.2003)), certif. denied, 194 N.J. 270, 944 A.2d 30 (2008). As a result, the mere use of the property of another without permission of the owner does not necessarily amount to conversion. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 94 (5th ed. 1984) (stating “[i]t is not, however, every unauthorized taking of goods from the possession of another which is sufficiently serious to amount to conversion”); Frome v. Dennis, 45 N.J.L. 515 (Sup.Ct.1883) (borrowing a plow without the owner’s permission, using it to plow a field and then returning it four days later did not *596 constitute conversion); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 227 comment b (1965). Where the “casual and harmless use” of the chattel of another involves “no defiance of the owner’s right of dominion” over the chattel, then no conversion has occurred. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 101 (5th ed. 1984). [5] The law has long recognized that “[t]o constitute a conversion of goods, there must be some repudiation by the defendant of the owner’s right, or some exercise of dominion over them by him inconsistent with such right, or some act done which has the effect of destroying or changing the quality of the chattel.” Frome v. Dennis, supra, 45 N.J.L. at 516 (quoting Woodside v. Adams, 40 N.J.L. 417, 431 (Sup.Ct.1878)). The theory behind conversion is that the actor has exerted such a major and serious interference with the plaintiff’s rights to the chattel that in essence the law will force a judicial sale of the chattel upon the defendant. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 15 at 90 (5th ed. 1984). The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the tort in this way: “[c]onversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965). In weighing the seriousness of the interference with the owner’s rights to the chattel to determine if a conversion has occurred, we should consider the following factors:

(a) [T]he extent and duration of the actor’s exercise of dominion or control;

(b) the actor’s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent



962 A.2d 1139


with the other’s right of control;

(c) the actor’s good faith;

(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other’s right of control;

(e) the harm done to the chattel;

(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.

[Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(2) (1965).] In light of these legal principles, Bridgwood’s conduct in exercising the horse under the circumstances here, even if she was *597 unauthorized to do so, did not constitute a conversion. While her act was **1146 intentional, in that she intended to lunge the horse, Bridgwood did not exercise such control and dominion over the horse when lunging it that she seriously interfered with plaintiff’s ownership rights in the horse. She did not remove the horse from the Briere stable where plaintiff had left the horse for safekeeping. At the time, she was not interfering with plaintiff’s use or possession of the horse. Lunging is part of the daily care of the horse and is not conduct that would intrinsically be viewed as cloaking the actor with the rights of an owner. Bridgwood exercised the horse in good faith, with no intent to usurp plaintiff’s rights to the horse. The lunging was intended to be done for only about fifteen minutes and in fact lasted only five minutes. We must, however, factor into our analysis the circumstance that the horse died while the lunging took place. As the Restatement indicates, whether harm has been done to the chattel is a factor to be considered when determining whether a conversion has taken place. Ibid. To give this factor weight, a causal connection must exist between the defendant’s conduct in interfering with the chattel and the damage or destruction of the chattel. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion § 2 (2004) (stating that “[t]he view has also been expressed that to establish a conversion claim, a plaintiff must prove that it had a possessory interest in the property, that the defendants intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s possession, and that the defendants’ acts were the legal cause of the plaintiff’s loss of property”). Here, plaintiff can show no such causal connection between Bridgwood’s conduct and the death of the horse. Although the horse did die while it was being lunged by Bridgwood, there is no showing that the lunging, whether done negligently or not, in any way caused the horse’s death.

Because no rational factfinder could determine, based on these proofs, that Bridgwood’s conduct amounted to conversion of the horse, we affirm the granting of summary judgment in her favor.

*598 III

We now turn to whether Briere stable may be held liable to plaintiff under bailment law. We will first address whether a bailment relationship existed between plaintiff and Briere stable at the time of the horse’s death. If it did, then we will consider whether Briere stable is liable under bailment law for the loss of the horse.

A.

. . .

B.

[10] [11] Since a bailment relationship existed at the time the horse died, we must **1148 now consider whether, under the facts presented, Briere stable is liable for the loss. . . . [12] [13] [14] We will first address whether Briere stable can be held liable under a conversion theory applicable to bailees. . . . [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] We now turn to whether Briere stable may be held liable under a theory of negligence. . . . As a result, since no rational factfinder could determine, based on these proofs, that Briere stable was negligent or converted the horse, Briere stable cannot be held liable for the death of the horse under bailment law. Summary judgment in favor of Briere stable was properly granted. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and the denial **1150 of plaintiff’s motion for



962 A.2d 1139


partial summary judgment.

Parallel Citations

962 A.2d 1139

Footnotes1

SummaryjudgmentwasalsograntedtoDouglasGultzandSherryGultzwhowerenamedinthecomplaintastheownersofthelandwhereBrierestableislocated.Plaintiffdoesnotargueinthisappealthatsummaryjudgmentwasimprovidentlygrantedtothesetwodefendants.Hence,wedonotaddresstheclaimsmadeagainstthem.

2

The veterinarian did give a differential diagnosis that included a fungal infection in the guttural pouch that could eatthroughamajor arterywall and cause amassivebleed, a tumoror abscess in the lungs that could eat throughamajorarteryandcauseamassivebleed,orafractureinaboneintheheadfromflippingoverbackwards.

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