structures, shocks and norm change explaining the

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Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise

of Asias Defence Diplomacy

David Capie

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic

Affairs, Volume 35, Number 1, April 2013, pp. 1-26 (Article)

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

DOI: 10.1353/csa.2013.0004

For additional information about this article

Access provided by Northwestern University Library (29 May 2013 22:04 GMT)

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csa/summary/v035/35.1.capie.html
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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 35, No. 1 (2013), pp. 126 DOI:0.355/cs35-a

203ISEAS ISSN029-797Xprint/ISSN793-284Xelectronic

DaviD Capie is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at VictoriaUniversityoWellington,NewZealand.

Structures, Shocks andNorm Change: Explainingthe Late Rise o AsiasDeence Diplomacy

DAVID CAPIE

This article examines why Asias multilateral deence diplomacy has

been a relative laggard when compared to other orms o institutionalized

security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. It argues that

explanations that stress the catalytic role o external shocks such

as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution opower or threats are underdetermining. Rather, Asias new multilateral

deence diplomacy reects strategic emulation on the part o ASEAN

elites, who localized ideas initially put orward by outsiders in order to

maintain ASEANs central place in the regional security architecture.

Its rise has also been helped by the changing role o militaries in

some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much

to historical contingency, in particular the interests o two inuential

ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The inal part o the

article briey assesses the uture prospects and inuence o regional

multilateral deence diplomacy.

Keywords: deence diplomacy, ASEAN, ADMM, Shangri-La Dialogue, norms,

constitutivelocalization.

Asias multilateral deence diplomacy is an increasingly importantaspect o regional politics and a burgeoning area o interest orscholarship.ThecreationotheShangri-LaDialogue(SLD)in2002,


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2 David Capie

theinaugurationotheASEANDeenceMinistersMeeting(ADMM)inMay 2006 and the arrival o theADMM-Plusprocess in October200 has seen the establishment o amajor new stream o regional

dialogue and diplomacy. These arrangements also have a track twomultilateralpartnertheNetworkoASEANDeenceandSecurityInstitutes (NADI), a parallel arrangement to the long-running andinuential ASEAN-ISIS.

Theseprocessesareincreasinglyattractinginterestromanalysts,althoughthebodyoworkremainscomparativelysmallalongsidetheattention lavished on theASEANRegional Forum (ARF). In 202 aspecialissueothejournalAsian SecurityexaminedSoutheastAsiasdeence diplomacy, including Chinas activities in the region andthe contribution o the Five Power Deence Arrangements (FPDA).2Scholarshave askedwhether there isa SoutheastAsianmodel odeencecooperationthatmightbeemulatedorreerencedbyothers.3Theoriginsand unction o theSLDhave been the subjecto closeacademic scrutiny,4andthereisagrowingbodyoresearchlookingatbilateraldeencediplomacy5andtheconnectionbetweenbilateralandmultilateral arrangements.6

To date, however,most o this work has been more concerned

with describing the evolution o deence diplomacy in the region,its origins and purpose than it has been with considering recentdevelopmentsinthecontextotheoreticaldebates.7Thisarticleseeksto buildon theexisting literature by outliningsomeways inwhichAsias deence diplomacy can inorm and challenge contemporarydebatesininternationalrelationstheory. 8Inparticular,itlooksattherise o multilateral deence diplomacy against the backdrop o thescholarshipconcerningnormchangeandinstitutionalinnovation.Atitsheartare twoquestions:whywasmultilateraldeencediplomacy

so late to arrive in Asia, andwhat explains its rapid rise?The article is divided into three parts. The frst section briey

defnes deence diplomacy and outlines the general trajectory oEast Asias deence andmilitary diplomacy in recent decades. Thesecond part explores why deence diplomacy has been a relativelaggardwhen compared to other orms o institutionalized securitydialogue,andwhatexplainsits recentrise.Iarguethatexplanationsthat stress the catalytic role o external shocks such as theAsianFinancial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution o power

or threats (or example, the rise o China) are underdetermining.Rather, the explanation advanced here ocuses on agents andchangingnormsaroundmultilateraldeencecooperation.Usingthelenso constitutive localization, I argue that the institutional innovation


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The Late Rise o Asias Deence Diplomacy 3

that has occurred since 2006 reects a strategic calculation on thepart o ASEAN elites, who adopted and adapted ideas initially putorward by outsiders inorder tomaintain ASEANs central place in

the regional security architecture. Its rise has been helped by thechanging role o militaries in some East Asian states and its rapidinstitutionalizationowesmuchtohistoricalcontingency,inparticularthe interests o two inuential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia andVietnam. The fnal part o the article oers a brie assessment othe uture prospects and inuence o regional multilateral deencediplomacy.

Defning Deence Diplomacy

Deencediplomacyisarelativelynewarrival in the lexiconoAsia-Pacifcsecurity.Onestudyothevocabularyoregionalsecuritypub-lishedin2008includesnumeroustermsordiplomacyandengagementbut notably omits deence or military diplomacy.9 What then doesdeencediplomacymeaninAsia?Likemanyexpressionsinthesecuritystudies lexicon, theorigin andmeaningo the termare contested.

AnthonyForsterdescribesmilitaryanddeencediplomacyasthe

non-operationaluseothearmedorcesbythegovernmentinordertopursueoreignanddeencepolicyobjectives.0Althoughtheideathatthearmedorceshavearolebeyondthedirectuseoviolenceisnotnew,asadistinctconcept,deenceormilitarydiplomacyseemstohavegrowninprominenceinthelastdecade.AccordingtoStephenBlank,theideaemergedinpost-ColdWarEurope.Thebeliewasthatbyestablishingrelationshipso trustandmutualconfdenceamongormerrivalmilitaries,confdencecouldbebuilt,generalizedstandardscouldbeachievedwithregardtotheinteroperabilityomilitariesand

a broader democratization o civil-military relations could take partinwhatwasoncetheSovietBloc.2

Asa particularpolicy position, deencediplomacys origins areoten traced to the 998 British Strategic Deence Review. BritainsMinistry o Deence described the concept as involving the use omilitaryorcestodispelhostility,buildandmaintaintrustandassistinthedevelopmentodemocraticallyaccountablearmedorces,therebymaking a signifcant contribution to conict prevention and resolu-tion. Itsaidwerequirearmedorceswhichcanoperateinsupport

o diplomacy alongside economic, trade and development levers, tostrengthensecurity and avertconict.3

The British approach included three broad sets o activities:armscontrol,non-prolierationpolicies,andconfdenceandsecurity-


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4 David Capie

building measures; instruments that were designed to encouragestability, particularly in Russia, through bilateral assistance andcooperation programmes; as well as other assistance programmes

aimed at relationships beyond Europe.4 Within these broad areas,education and training programmes were regarded as particularlyimportant, along with the use o ship and aircrat visits, short-term advisory teams, as well as visits and interactions betweenministers,andmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelatalllevels.Accordingto one analyst, the philosophy underpinning British deencediplomacy is a cosmopolitan liberal vision o the promotion owestern principles and values. The assumption is that throughintensiveandsustainedmilitaryengagement[]sharedknowledgeand mutual trust will over a period o t ime enhance peaceandstability.5

Not long ater the British Review was released, a number ostates in the Asia Pacifc began to use the concept in their ownnational security policies. Ater decades in which regional stateshad preerred to use the term deence cooperation, the phrasedeence diplomacy suddenly became commonplace. In a 2006statement to Singapores Parliament, Deence Minister Teo Chee

Hean said the objectives o Singapores deence diplomacy wereto develop positive and mutually benefcial relationships withriendlycountries and armed orces, [and] to contribute toa stableand cooperative regional environment and international order.6The New Zealand Deence Force embraced the term, likeningdeence diplomacy to preventive diplomacy, and describing it asall the varied activities undertaken to promote peace andsecurity through constructive engagement and confdence building.Its aim is to dispel hostility, build andmaintain trust.7

InheranalysisoChinasmilitarydiplomacy,KristenGunnessargues that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is expected tosupport the larger oreign, diplomatic, political, economic andsecurity agenda set orth by the leadership o the Party/State.PLA interactions with oreign militaries are seen as a politicalundertaking using military means or strategic reasons, not asa reestanding set o military initiatives conducted by militaryproessionals or explicitlymilitary reasons.8 In terms o specifcactivities, Gunness lists high-level strategic security dialogues,

military unctional exchanges, proessional military educationexchanges, the import and export o military weapons andequipment, and participation in peacekeeping operations.9

Looking at Indias deence diplomacy, Saroj Bishoyi stresses


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the role o education and training in areas such as deencemanagement, civil-military relations and military justice as wellas a wide range o military-to-military contacts with other states;

oreign military fnancing in the orm o grants and loans; jointcombinedexchangetrainingospecialorces;[and]militarysales. 20Pankaj Jha emphasizes the importance o Indiasmilitary exerciseswith countries in Southeast Asia as an assurance strategy, sendinga signal o its benign intentions.2

Clearly then, Asian states quickly picked up on thelanguage o deence diplomacy. However, they did not embrace itwithout reservations. The British approach was grounded in a seto broader goals around the promotion o democratic civil-militaryrelations. In the 999UKDeence White Paper, deencediplomacywas included in a chapter called Building a better worldassociating it with the aims o the so-called ethical oreignpolicy.22Ater the terrorist attacksoSeptember200, counter-WMD prolieration eorts also became an important element oWestern deence diplomacy.23 The East Asian use o the termis, however, much more limited, ocusing primarily on buildingtrust and eschewing any role in the internal aairs o participant

states. It has none o liberal trappings that elevate the importanceo promoting democratic control o armed orces. Tan and Singhhave ramed this as a distinction between transormationalEuropean and more pragmatic Asian diplomacy, but the sameprocess could also bedescribed as the localization o an importedconcept, much in theway that ASEANhas borrowed and adaptedearlier European ideas such as common security.24 East Asianstates pruned away the aspects o the practice that they oundincompatiblewiththecharacteroregionaldiplomacy,butkeptthe

parts they ound useul.

The Patterns o Asian Deence Diplomacy

Ithetermdeencediplomacyisincreasinglycommonandevolvingin meaning, in practice it has a long history in Asia.Military anddeence ofcials rom across the region have met, consulted andshared strategic perceptions or decades. Not surprisingly, someo the closest deence diplomacy is based around the prevailing

security structures o the region, in particular Americas allianceswith Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia.As Atkinson notes: the U.S. alliances require a signifcant levelo person-to-person interaction, particularly at the more senior


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6 David Capie

ranks, as well as continueddiplomatic exchanges between theU.S.and allied military and political leaders. Personnel o all levelsinteractonadailybasiswithinestablishedinstitutionalizedsecurity

alliances.25Indeed,many o these alliances include ormal provisions that

establish institutions through which deence ofcials and militaryofcers meet to discuss security issues. The 95 Australia, NewZealand and the United States (ANZUS) Treaty, or example,established the ANZUS Council, which annually brought togethersenior military ofcers, along with oreign and deence ministersrom Australia, New Zealand and the United States. In the caseo the U.S.Japan alliance, high level deence talks date back to976 when a Sub-Committee on Deence Cooperation (SDC) wasestablished,madeupodiplomats,seniorAmericanmilitaryofcialsbased in Japan and the Japan Deence Agency. Its primary purposewas to discuss contingencies involving a possible attack on Japanandconictelsewhereintheregion,butitalsoaddressedactivitiesand consultations regarding the U.S.-Japan deence relationship.26U.S.-Thai deence relations include regular consultations andmorethan40combinedmilitaryexercisesayear.Accordingtoonereport,

tensothousandsoThaimilitaryofcershavetakenpartinU.S.training and educational exchanges.27

YetitheU.S.allianceshavelongprovidedvehiclesordialogueand exchange, bilateral deence interactions also have a historyamong non-allies. For example, under agreements that date backto 959, Malaysia and Thailand have maintained two committeesthat discuss deence policy and counter-insurgency operationsalong their shared border. In the 970s, they held joint exercisestargetedagainstcommunistinsurgents,andaJointBorderCommittee

Ofce (JBCO) provided a vehicle or broader security cooperationbased onmutual concerns overVietnamese expansionism.Malaysiaand Indonesia maintain a similar arrangement with a joint bordercommittee created in 972 and augmented with a 984 securityagreement.28 Following a 2008 meeting between IndonesianPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyonoandMalaysianPrimeMinisterAbdullahBadawi, the two countries committed to urther enhancebilateral deence cooperation, including intelligence exchanges,coordinated naval patrol, reciprocal visits o deence, security and

otherrelevantofcials,exchangesoprogrammesbytheirrespectivecommand and sta colleagues, joint disaster relie operations, andjoint disaster response, training and exercises.29

IndonesiaandthePhilippinessignedtheirownbilateralagree-


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ment or enhancing deence cooperation in 997. This created aJointDeenceandSecurityCooperationCommitteethatmetannuallyto implement, manage and monitor deence cooperation between

the two countries.30 Other examples rom inside ASEAN includeaMalaysiaPhilippines deenceagreement that provides or regularcombinedmilitaryexercises,exchangesomilitary inormation,andthe possibleuse oeach others acilities or logistics and repairs.3Singapore and Indonesia haveagreements that allow the SingaporeArmedForces(SAF)totraininIndonesianwaters,andmakeuseohelicopter training acilities and an air-combat range in Sumatra.

Alongside these numerous bilateral deence interactions,some ASEAN states were also regular and active participants inworkinglevelmultilateralactivities,althoughthesehaveotenbeenoverlooked in analyses o deence diplomacy. One o the mostdurableexamplesistheWesternPacifcNavalSymposium(WPNS),which has taken place since 988. Its goal is to have the leaderso regionalnaviesmeet or rank and opendiscussions topromotemutual understanding and to discuss common challenges. Itsinitial ocus was on common issues aecting naval proessionalsand not on political issues, nor on the maritime confdence and

securitybuildingmeasuresoccupyingthemindso thoseconcernedwith second track diplomacy, but over time, the WPNS agendahas evolved along with its membership.32

Held every two years,WPNSwas originally structured aroundsymposia, where service chies would receive briefngs on a rangeo common challenges and issues. However, at the second WPNSin 992, the chies agreed to establish a work programme with aseries o workshops involving mid-level ofcers. These producedpapers and non-binding recommendations to be considered by the

chies at the subsequent symposium. As WPNS has progressed,the range o activities it undertakes has also expanded. It nowencourages personnel exchanges, attendance at overseas StaColleges, study visits and tours (including visits by naval units),and senior ofcer visits.33 As WPNS members have grown moreaccustomed to interacting, exchanges have also allowed servicepersonnel to spend time on one anothers ships at sea. As oneAustralian analysis concludes:

Collaboration through multilateral activities including disasterrelie, and search and rescue, provides an understanding o howeach navy thinks and operates, and o their capabilities. It alsoprovidesanopportunity or personnel to interact, exchange ideasand proessional expertise, and gain an understanding o each


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8 David Capie

others cultures.34

A second long-standing example o working level multilateral

deence diplomacy is the Paciic Armies Management Seminar(PAMS), which has been meeting annually or more than threedecades. Formed in 978, PAMS is the largest gathering o seniorarmy/securityorcesofcersintheAsia-Pacifcregion.Ithasexpandedrom an original membership o nine states (China, Chile, Japan,Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and theUnitedStates)totwenty-nineby200.PAMShasbeendescribedasa orum or senior-level ofcers rom the Asia Pacifcs regionalgroundorcestoexchangeviewsandideas.Itprovidesopportunities

or uture leaderso regionalarmies todevelop strong interpersonalrelationships.35

Inmany respects theWPNS, PAMS and other similar arrange-ments resemble the regional multilateral institutions that haveattracted so much attention when oreign ministers and heads ogovernment are involved. Like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),WPNS and PAMS are mostly about building habits o dialogue,stressing the importance o inormality, and relationship building.

As one senior participant told the 200 WPNS in Sydney:thevalueobuildingrelationshipsandtrustbeginshere,inormalgatherings such as this plenary session, but just as importantly,in the individual meetings and inormal chats outside o thesedoors. Dialogue is the necessary frst step, and our ability to talk to each other here or in other settings because o the relationships we build today will put us in a better positiontomorrow to work together to overcome some o the challenges[we ace].36

They are also inclusive arrangements, involving U.S. allies as wellas non-like-minded states like China. They have modest inter-sessionalworkprogrammesthateedpracticalsuggestionsordeencecooperation to service chies or consideration by their respectivemilitaries and governments. Where they dier rom other Asiansecurity institutions is that they aremanaged and organizednot byASEAN,butbytheUnitedStatesmilitary,albeitoteninpartnershipwith an Asian state.

Theseworkinglevelmultilateralarrangementsnotwithstanding,untilvery recentlyEastAsia lacked any comparable interactionsatthe highest levels. There was, or example, no equivalent o theannual NATO DeenceMinistersMeeting or the Conerence o theDeense Ministers o the Americas, either within ASEAN or on


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the wider regional stage. This, however, began to change in 2002with the creation o the Asian Security Summit, or as it is betterknown, the Shangri-La Dialogue.

From Non-ofcial to Ofcial Multilateralism

The idea or an annual Asian Security Summit was developedby the London-based International Institute or Strategic Studies(IISS) in 2000. Its inspiration was the annual Munich Conerence,which brings together European and American policy-makers andstrategic thinkers. The inaugural meeting was held at SingaporesShangri-La Hotel in mid-2002. Twenty-two countries were repre-sented, with eleven deence ministers attending. While the SLDhadstrongsupportersinAustralia,Japan,SingaporeandtheUnitedStates,itreceivedacoolreceptionromsomeregionalstates,notablyChina,whichdid not sendministerial representation. However, theSLDgrewsteadilyandbythetimeitcelebrateditstenthanniversaryin20, twenty-eight countrieswere represented,with hundredsoofcials taking part alongwith the largest number o ministers yet,including,orthefrsttime,deenceministersromChina,Myanmar

and Vietnam.SLD is not a ormal inter-governmental summit and, in prac-tice, it represents an interesting accommodation between multi-lateralism and bilateralism. From one perspective, the SLD worksas a loose,multilateral ramework inwhichdeenceministers andsenior military ofcials interact. The main multilateral element isa series o lunches and dinners or ministers. By 2008 and 2009,therewere also trilateral andmini-lateral interactionsoccurring onthe sidelineso theSLD,but theseremainedinormal andnotpart

o the main meeting.Morevaluableorparticipantsthananymultilateralortrilateral

interactions, however, has been the chance to arrange bilateralmeetings during the SLD. Australia, or example, organized morethan twenty bilateral meetings with other regional military anddeenceofcialsonthesidelinesothe2009SLD. 37Singaporeusedthe200DialoguetoconcludeadeencecooperationagreementwithAustralia. But although the SLD quickly became established as adeence ministers meeting by deault, calls to transorm it intoa ormal inter-governmental meeting were consistently rejected.38Despitethis,theSLDhadanimportantdemonstrationeectintermso encouraging other orms o multilateral deence cooperation. Itshowedthatmanyregionaldeenceministerssawvalueinmeeting


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0 David Capie

asagroupandithelpedpavethewayorthecreationoadditionalmultilateral mechanisms, including an inter-governmental ASEANDeenceMinisters Meeting (ADMM).

ASEANs Regional Deence Diplomacy

TheoriginsoADMMcanbetracedbackto2004,whentheASEANSecretariatwasdirectedbyaspecialASEANSeniorOfcialsMeetingto draw up a concept paper or an ASEAN Deence MinistersMeeting. The idea was initially broached as part o the proposalor an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), laid out in the 2003Bali Concord II declaration. ADMM convened or the frst time inMay 2006 and has slowly become more institutionalized. Deenceministers now meet regularly and are supported by their ownsenior ofcialsprocess (ADSOM).The growthointeractions amongASEAN deence ofcials has been impressive. As Singh and Tannote, in 20 alone ministers or senior ofcials met almost oncea month. Alongside ministerial and senior ofcials meetings, aglance at the current ADMM calendar reveals an ASEAN MilitaryOperations Inormal Meeting (AMOIM), a Military Intelligence

InormalMeeting (AMIIM),anEastAsianSecurityOutlookSeminar(EASO) and aChies oDeenceForce InormalMeeting (ACDFIM).There is also a growing programme o practical activities. In 20,ASEANmilitariesconductedtheirfrstmultilateraltabletopexercise,a symbolically important step.39

Soon ater the frst ADMM in Kuala Lumpur, ministers beganto consider contacts with other regional states. The 2007 ADMMagreedonaconceptpaperthatsetoutthemodalitiesandprinciplesin the event that awidermeetingwithASEANsDialoguePartners

might be created.40 The third ADMM agreed a set o principlesor an expandedmembership in a paper drated by Singapore andThailand.4 This fnal step towards the establishment o a regionaldeence diplomacy architecture came to ruition in October 200whentheASEANDeenceMinistersMeeting-Plus(ADMM-Plus)wasinaugurated at ameeting in Hanoi,withASEANdeenceministersjoiningtheircounterpartsromChina,Japan,SouthKorea,Australia,India, New Zealand, Russia and the United States.

Three years ater the frst meeting in Hanoi, ADMM-Plus is

only beginning to get established.42 The eighteen ministers willmeet or only the second time in Brunei in August 203. A busyADMM-Plus Work Plan has begun but it remains ocused on lesssensitive, non-traditional security issues. Five Experts Working


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The Late Rise o Asias Deence Diplomacy

Groups (EWGs), each co-chaired by one ASEAN and one non-ASEANmember,addresspeacekeepingoperations,maritimesecurity,militarymedicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster relie, and

counter-terrorism.Mosthavemet two or three timessince200.Anumber o table top exercises have been held and in 203 therewillbethreefeldtrainingexercises,addressingHADRandMilitaryMedicine (Brunei, 720 June 203); maritime security (Sydney,28 September October 203) and counter-terrorism (Sentul,Indonesia, 93 September 203).

Notwithstanding, thelimitedcontactbetweenministers todateand the ocus on non-traditional security issues, the creation o aregion-wide grouping o deenceministers represents an importantinnovationinAsiassecurityarchitectureandabreakwiththepastpreerence or bilateralism.

Explaining Late Multilateral Deence Diplomacy in Asia

This pattern immediately presents two related puzzles or analysts.First,whywere oreignministers romAsia-Pacifccountriesable tomeet to discuss security issues in the ARF since 994, but it took

as long as 2006 or ASEAN deenceministers to assemble in theirown orum?Whydid it take sixteen years ater the creation o theARF beore a parallel region-wide deenceministersmeeting couldmeet? Second, what caused the deeply established norm in avouro bilateral deence cooperation to break down in the way that itdid? The existing literature provides much clearer answers to thefrst question, than it does or the second.

ThereiswidespreadacceptancethattheprevailingnormamongASEAN states or the groups frst ew decades was to maintain

bilateral (or at best trilateral), rather than multilateral deencerelations, at leastat thehighest levels.Malaysian DeenceMinisterNajib Tun Razak summed up the prevailing sentiment: ASEANmilitary orces are amiliar with each other on a bilateral basis.To me, thats good enough.43 Various proposals in the late 980sand 990s, whether or a deence community, regional multi-lateralexercises,ora ully-edgeddeenceministers summit,wereall rejected.44

Whatmadebilateralismthepreerredarrangementorhigh-level

deence diplomacy inSoutheast Asia? There are both instrumentaland normative explanations.45 Looking at the balance o threats,SoutheastAsianstateslackedtheglueosharedthreatperceptionsthat had propelled collective deence in Cold War Europe. During


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2 David Capie

the Cold War, some were more concerned about subversion andinsurgency, others about external aggression rom theSovietUnionor Vietnam. Many, including Indonesia, were more preoccupied

with state-making and internal security issues than the regionschanging security order.46

Second, multilateral deence cooperation also appeared tohave limited utility. In most cases, deence ties with neighboursoered onlymarginalpractical benefts compared to engagingwithoutside Great Powers such as the United States. There were alsochallengesintermsocapacityandinter-operabilitybetweenregionalmilitaries. Finally, suspicion and mistrust characterized severalbilateral relationships. Unresolved territorial disputes betweenMalaysia and Singapore, and Malaysia and the Philippines,aggravated relations rom time to time. ThaiMalay deencecooperation stumbledover thorny issues such as the hot pursuitoinsurgentsbyMalaysianorces.SingaporeandMalaysiatensionsared periodically over issues as diverse aswater and Singaporescontacts with Israel.

But the strong preerence or bilateralism was not simplyabout efciency or the nature o threat perceptions. Acharya also

outlines normative reasons why multilateral deence cooperationwasconsideredillegitimate,tracingtheoriginsothenormtopost-war ideas that saw regional pacts associatedwith colonialism andthe intererence o external powers.47 Thesedeeply held cognitivepriors undermined collective deence pacts such as the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and helped ensure that noAsian NATO appeared in the 950s or 960s.48 He argues thatthe norm against multilateral military cooperation has clearlysurvived into the post-ColdWar period.49

While there is a large literature explaining why ASEANmaintained its strong preerence or bilateralism, there is lesswork exploring how this strong norm was eroded so quickly withthe rapid rise o multilateral inter-governmental deence dialoguesbetween 2006 and 200. This is surprising, because as See SengTan notes, new processes like ADMM and ADMM-Plus stand atodds with the regions express rejection o collective deence andcollective security on the one hand, and its collective aspirationor neutrality on the other.50

Broadlyspeaking,thetheoreticalliteraturetakestwoapproachesto explaining the rise o multilateral institutions, one stressing therole o structure, in particular the inuence o material actors,suchas changes in the balanceo power.The second ocusesmore


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on the role o agents and emphasizes the importance o normsand ideas.5 Recent workhas stressed the indeterminacy owhollypower-based approaches, showing how they are unable to account

ortheparticulartrajectoryopost-ColdWarsecuritymultilateralismin the region.52 However, a modifed approach emphasizing theimportant role o external shocks, remains inluential.53 Thisasserts that critical junctures, such as war or depression call intoquestion the existing rules o the game and acilitate the rise onew institutions.54

A small number o analysts have begun to explore the puzzleo Asias late deence multilateralism in the context o theorieso institutional change. In his detailed survey o Southeast Asiasevolvingdeence diplomacy, Evan Laksmana argues that the recentriseodeencediplomacycanbeexplainedbythreedevelopments.First, that within the ASEAN context, multilateral deencediplomacy initially rose as a way to recover rom the regionalanxiety caused by the 996 Asian fnancial crisis.55 Second, thatit was related to the increasingly worrying trend in regionalarms development. The prolieration o ourth-generation fghteraircrat, advanced surace vessels and submarines arguably led

ASEANcountriestoreassesstheirpositiononintraregionaldeencecooperation and to gradually accept the notion that elevating theprofle and scope o deence diplomacy [was] becoming a strategicimperative. Third and related to this the growing numbero multilateral deence diplomatic activities under the auspices othe ARF between ASEAN and its regional partners concerning awide rangeosecurity issuescan be attributed to the concernwithChinasriseandtheensuingpotentialreturnogreat-powerpoliticsin the Asia-Pacifc.56

While these worries were all doubtless important topics onthe minds o ASEAN decision makers during the late 990s andearly 2000s, a ocus on the changing balance o power or externalshocks like the AFC seems to be under-determining when itcomestoexplaining institutional innovation in thefeldodeencediplomacy. Alarm bells about the potential or an arms race todevelop in Southeast Asia and the prolieration o advancedweapons systemswere regularly sounded throughout the earlyandmid-990s.57 Concerns about Chinas rising power and ears o a

conrontationwiththeUnitedStateswereeltinthemid-990s(the996Cross-Straitscrisis orexample)and againinthe earlypartothe Bush administration (the 200 EP-3 incident). Yet when callsweremadeor deenceministers tomeetofcially inamultilateral


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4 David Capie

context, they were consistently dismissed. For example, as late as2002 a suggestion by the head o the Japan Deence Agency toconvert the SLD into an Asian Deence Ministers Meeting was

blocked by ASEAN.58Nor is it clear why the AFC worked as an initial catalyst

to provide a rationale or closer deence dialogues.59 The primaryeect o the AFC as ar as regional militaries were concernedwas to see their budgets slashed and modernization programmesdelayed. Indeed, in his insightul assessment o Sino-Australiandeence diplomacy, Brendan Taylor argues the inancial crisiswas one o the main reasons holding back multilateral deencediplomacy in the region.60 In the atermath o the AFC, ASEANleaderswrestledwithrevisingthegroupsnormonon-intervention,andsteppedupeorts tobuildanEastAsianfnancialarchitecture(including through the creation o theASEANPlusThreeprocess),but proposals or multilateral deence interactions remainedunwelcome.6 Evenater another external shock the9/ attacks that might have been expected to lead to closer multilateraldeenceties,theinitialresponsesinASEANweretopursuebilateralor trilateral counter-terrorism cooperation.62

Finally, a ocus on structural actors or external shocks alsodoes not explain why it was even necessary to create a distincttrack o deence diplomacy. Concerns about arms control, thedevelopmentoconfdencebuildingmeasures,ortheengagementoarisingChinacouldhavebeenhandledexclusivelywithinexistingarrangements such as the ARF.

I structural explanations provide a less than adequate guideto institutional innovation in deence diplomacy, an alternativeapproach is to ocus on the role o agents, and examine hownew

ideas and norms are diused, challenged and adapted by a rangeo actors. This scholarshipdivides between so-called cosmopolitanapproaches which emphasize the role o norm exporting actors(oten in developedWestern states) and explanations which ocuson the way norm targets adapt and revise norms to make themcongruent with established local traditions or cognitive priors.63The most inluential o these latter accounts constitutivelocalization argues that a norm is more likely to be modifedand localized when it has the support o inluential insider

proponents and where it can be made compatible with localnormative traditions. Unlike structural explanations that seerapid change brought about through the catalytic role o shocks,constitutive localization sees norm change as an incremental


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and evolutionary process. It builds on the work o historicalinstitutionalists, who argue that pre-existing choices shape thedesign and ormation o new institutions.64

Agents, Path Dependence and Norm Change

Discussions about the rise o deencediplomacy domake reerenceto the role o agents in shaping the regions security agenda. Thecontribution o civil society groups and track two networks arepointed to as important in encouraging the development o abroader security agenda that looks at non-traditional as well astraditional security issues.65 But, surprisingly, ew analyses directattentiontotheprimaryparticipantsindeencediplomacydialogues,namely military ofcers and deence ofcials. I argue one reasonor their late involvement in multilateral diplomacy lies in theidentity o regional militaries and deence institutions and in thewaythesegroupshavehistoricallyseenthemselves.Asianmilitariesdid notmeetmultilaterally in an inclusive, dialogue-ocused orumbecause they saw their primary role not to discuss political issues,but to manage violence. In many important cases, militaries were

inward-looking institutions, whose primary security role was todeend the nation rom internal as well as external threats. OnePhilippines ofcial sums it up simply: ADMM and ADMM-PluswereslowtodevelopbecausedeenseministriesoASEANcountrieswere simply the last ministries to engage in direct dialogue withone another.66

This sel-perception on the part o regional armed orces anddeence ofcials was oten exacerbated by bureaucratic rivalries.As one survey o regional institutions in Asia notes, oreign

ministries have jealously guarded their prerogatives at multilateralmeetings.67 In U.S.Japan relations, the Japanese Ministry oForeignAairs long objected to closer ties between the JapanSel-Deence Forces and the U.S. military. Bureaucratic politics alsopreventedCanadaromparticipatingintheSLDuntil2008,becausethe Canadian oreign ministry didnt want the deence ministrystealing the limelight rom them in terms o taking on a moreprominent role in advancing Canadas engagement with Asia.68Canada was hardly unique in this respect. When deence ofcials

began attending ARF meetings in the late 990s, Chinese Ministryo Foreign Aairs (MOFA) ofcials inormally commented to theircounterparts, that they would preer the PLA not to be thesemeetings.69


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6 David Capie

Since the end o theColdWar, however, the ocus o regionalmilitaries has changed in several respects. First, armed orces,reectingbroadersocio-politicalinuences,havebeguntoembracea

rangeonewnon-traditionalrolesandunctions.70Foremostamongthese new roles was dealing with so-called transnational issues,including humanitarian and disaster relie, and countering piracyand transnational crime.7 These problems are by their naturediicult or states to respond to unilaterally and provide anincentive or cooperation.72 This is not to say that traditional taskssuch as war-ighting have become irrelevant. Indeed, in somestates they have become more, not less, salient, but in most casesthey are now augmented with a wide range o other unctionalresponsibilities.

Second, many regional militaries have also taken importantsteps towards proessionalization in the last decade, includingreducing their role in domestic politics and internal security.73For example,MarcusMietzner argues that the TNI has lostmucho its internal securityrole to thepolice, leaving itwithoccasionalmissions in disaster-relie, large-scale communal conlict andanti-separatist campaigns.74 Further, Gary Hogan notes that the

new generation o TNIs leaders are more sophisticated, worldly,and conscious o the wider implications o military actions orIndonesias international image and reputation.75 ThomasBickords analysis o the PLA similarly notes the arrival oa new generation o better-educated leaders, the developmento its own group o international experts and a more outwardlooking ocus.76

Changewithin regionalmilitarieswas ocourse highly unevenand is in itsel insufcient to explain the creation o institutions.

But these changesgavearmedorces and deenceofcials a greaterincentive to engage with one another and to seek a place in thegrowing number o regional multilateral security dialogues. Theyunoldedasanumber o external actorswerechallengingthenormaround bilateral deence cooperation by proposing the gradualinclusion o deence ofcialswithin ARF processes.77

The frst meeting o deence ofcials in the ARF context tookplace on the sidelines o an ARF Senior Ofcials Meeting (ARFSOM) at Langkawi, Malaysia in 997.78 The Malaysian oreign

ministrywas very dubious about including deence ofcials andalthough the only meeting was an inormal lunch, the Malaysianchair even reused to allow any kind o agenda or discussion.79Buttheeventpassedwithoutincidentandanothersmallstepcame


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later the same year when the heads o deence universities metunder the auspices o the ARF. In 200, deence ofcials wereinvitedtomeetinormallyonthesidelinesotheARFInter-sessional

Group on Confdence Building Measures (ISG-CBM). In 2002, thisprocess was augmented by an ARF Deence Oicials Dialogue(DOD), with meetings held several times a year, including onemeeting held back-to-back with the annual ARF ForeignMinistersmeeting.

According to one participant in these early encounters, onlya small number o countries were active andmost representativeswerelargelypassive.Thisslowlybegantochange,asparticipantsbecamemore amiliar with the process andmore comortable withthe broader pattern o multilateral interactions. Chinas attitudeto the inclusion o deence oicials is one example, relectingBeijings growing comort in participating in all orms o multi-lateralism. Chinese MOFA ofcials initially expressed reservationsaboutPLAinvolvementinARFactivities,butBeijingsoonchangedtobemoreproactiveandinnovativeinregionaldeencedialogues.80According to one participant, it went rom being hesitant, toplaying a lead role with proposals and wanting to chair.8 In

2004,Chinaproposed another deencemeeting, an annual ASEANRegional Forum Security Policy Conerence (ASPC) bringingtogether deence ofcials at the level o vice-minister. Because allthese early encounters took place in the context o the ARF, theyoeredwaryparticipants assurance that theywould operateon thebasis o established ASEAN norms. They could be sure that theocus would be solely on dialogue, not intrusive or constrainingconfdence-building measures.

I thenorm againsthigh-levelmultilateral deence interactions

began to be challenged incrementally ater 997, the arrival othe SLD provided an additional push actor. A key attraction othe initial dialogues was the participation o senior U.S. deenceofcials and military ofcers, including Paul Wolowitz, DonaldRumseld and the Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta. The SLDshowedthattherewasademandorhigh-leveldeenceinteractionsintheregion,andthestarpowerotheU.S.secretaryodeenceprovided a practical incentive or regional states to send theirownhigh-ranking delegations.82 As one analysthasnoted, theSLD

certainlyundercuttheawedassumptionthattheregion[was]notready or a ministerial-level deense orum.83

But although the SLD was highly valued by some SoutheastAsianstates(inparticularSingapore)italsorepresentedachallenge


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8 David Capie

toASEANand its drivers seat role in regional cooperation. TheSLD ater all was organized by outsiders a European think-tank, something that led to some grumblings in the region.84

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudds claim that SLDwas the pre-eminent deence and security dialogue in the Asia-Pacifc region pointed to a real risk that ASEAN and the ARFcould become marginalized.85 ASEANs decision to convene aninter-governmental deencediplomacy process throughADMM andthen ADMM-Plus, was part o a strategy to retain control overwhat was becoming an increasingly vibrant aspect o regionaldiplomacy. It is no accident that the Joint Statement issued

to mark the ounding o ADMM-Plus in October 200, bothreafrms ASEANs centrality and also pointedly declares thatADMM-Plus is the highest ministerial deence and securityconsultative and cooperative mechanism or regional securityissues among the ASEAN member states and the eight Pluscountries.86

Yet, i these push and pull actors provided incentives orgreater deence interactions, the rapid institutionalization odeence diplomacy also owes much to historical contingency and

in particular the inuential role o two ASEAN Chairs: Indonesiaand Vietnam.87 Indonesias time in the Chair in 200304 wascritical in providing a spur or greater multilateral deencecooperation, in particular with its tabling o ambitious proposalsor a regional peacekeeping orce and an ASEAN SecurityCommunity.The role okey individuals inadvancing thisprocess,in particular the work o Rizal Sukma, the Executive Director othe Jakarta Centre or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

has been well documented.88

Vietnams time in the Chair in 200also hastened the creation o ADMM-Plus. One regional deenceofcial recalls that in conversations with ASEAN counterparts in2008 the consensus was that the realization o a broader regionaldeenceministersmeetingwasstillsomewayo.AsASEANChairin 200, however, Vietnam was seeking to play a larger role ontheregionalandglobalstage,includingservingasanon-permanentmember o theUnitedNationsSecurity Council. Itwas determinedto put its mark on ASEAN and pushed more hesitant ASEAN

members toagree thata regional deenceministersmeeting shouldbe hosted in Hanoi.89 VietnameseDeputyDeenceMinister NguyenChi Vinh described the creation o ADMM-Plus as the highlighto Vietnams time in the chair.90


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Incrementalism and the Future o Deence Diplomacy

This analysis suggests that rather than being propelled by a series

o dramatic external shocks or changes in the balance o poweror threats, Asias multilateral deence diplomacy can be seen asan incremental process, shaped in important ways by SoutheastAsias pre-existing institutions. The erosion o the norm avouringbilateral deence cooperation and the creation o new deencediplomacy arrangements can best be explained by looking at theway in which new ideas were proposed by outsiders, and pickedup and adapted by local agents. Much o the initial impetus ormultilateral deence interactions came rom outside ASEAN: the

initial enthusiasm or the inclusion o deence ofcials in ARFdialogues was suggested by ASEANs Dialogue Partners, who wereat irst the most active participants in the ARF deence trackactivities. The SLD was conceived and driven by the London-based IISS, creating a de acto ministerial meeting by deault.Its strongest supporters included the United States and Australia.Thesedevelopments oundlocalsupporters inthe ormochangingregional deence establishments that increasingly saw themselvesas having an external role and a new range o non-operational

unctions. But they also challenged the norm o ASEAN centrality,demanding a response rom local elites in the orm o ADMM andADMM-Plus.

What does the above analysis suggest about the uture oAsias deence diplomacy? First, it is important not to overstatethe change that has occurred. Although the strong preerence ordeence bilateralism has been signifcantly modifed in the lastdecade, the norm has not been completely displaced. Multilateral

dialogues have become widely accepted, and there is supportor practical collaboration between militaries on a range o non-traditional issues and even or the frst time on shared approachesto deence industry within ASEAN.9 However, there is little signthatASEANstatesareinterestedinorminganykindomultilateralcollective deence pact.

Second, the emergence o multilateral deence diplomacy todate owes much to incrementalism and path-dependency, and islikely to continue to evolve in much the same way. ADMM-Plus

ministers will meet or only the second time in Brunei in August203 and ater that will still only meet in the ASEAN+8 ormatevery second year. Despite a stated desire to ocus on practicaloutcomes, progress in the work programme is likely to be slow.


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20 David Capie

This will not be helped by changes in EWG leadership. ThoseASEANmembers that did not get to co-chair a groupwhen theseroles were frst distributed in Hanoi in 200 are now seeking to

do so. As new chairs take over in 204 it seems likely that somegroups will losemomentum.

There is also little prospect or radical change in the kind oissues that eature on the regional deence diplomacy agenda. Inthe lead up to the 7thASEANDeenceMinisters Meeting inMay203, Vietnam (with the support o Cambodia and Laos) proposedthe ormation o a new EWG looking at Explosive Remnants oWar(ERW).ItisunclearhowmuchsupportthereisorthisacrossASEAN, in part because the ERW issue is seen to be a concernprimarily or Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. There seems lesschance still that ADMM or ADMM-Plus will move to tackle hardor traditional security issues in the near term, or that they willbe able to make rapid progress on initiatives such as an IncidentsatSea (INCSEA)agreement.Rather,amorelikelyscenarioistoseeincreasing levels o cross-pollination and joint activities betweenthe dierent working groups. Some synergies are already evident,or example, the potential or overlap between military medicine

andHADR.The frstADMM-Plus exercise scheduled or Brunei inJune 203 will incorporate a military medicine component into abroader disaster response scenario.

Finally, the analysis here suggests there is unlikely to be aneaterdeencediplomacyarchitectureanytimesoon.TheADMM-Plus agenda, especially its ocus on non-traditional security issuessuch as HADR, increasingly overlaps with the work o ARF inter-sessionals. In 203, or example, both the ARF and ADMM-Pluswill hold their own disaster relie exercises. The SLD continues

to meet and discuss many o the same issues. But to date, therehas been no agreement about how the respective processes canavoid duplication and make a distinct contribution. In July 202the ARF Foreign Ministers did agree to drop the one DeenceOfcials Dialogue (DOD) meeting that had been held back-to-backannually with the ARF Ministerial, but this is unlikely to signalany broader consolidation.92 Competing national interests stand inthe way o better coordination and consolidation. Indeed, as one

analyst argues, a certain level o incoherence suits ASEAN as itprevents the concentration o power in the hands o one or moreo its Dialogue Partners, something that might ultimately see theAssociation sidelined.93


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NOTES

For more inormation about NADI, seeTan SengChye, The Relevance o theNetwork o Asian Deence and Security Institutes to the ADMM, in From

Boots to Brogues: The Rise o Deense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia , editedby Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan, RSIS Monograph no. 2 (Singapore:RSIS, 20). See also: .

2 Ian Storey, Chinas Bilateral Deense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, AsianSecurity 8, no. 3 (202): 28730; Ral Emmers, The Five Power DeenseArrangements and Deense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Asian Security 8,no. 3 (202): 2786.

3 SeeSeng Tan, Talking TheirWalk?TheEvolutiono DeenseRegionalisminSoutheast Asia,Asian Security 8, no. 3 (202): 23250.

4

See or example, David Capie and Brendan Taylor, The Shangri-La Dialogueand the InstitutionalizationoDeenceDiplomacy inAsia,The Pacifc Review23, no. 3 (July 200): 35976.

5 BrendanTaylor,TheRiseoAsianDeenseDiplomacy:ConvergenceorDivergencein Sino-Australian Security Relations?, Contemporary International Relations2,no.3(20);RichardBitzinger,U.S.DeenseDiplomacyTowardsSoutheastAsia,inSinghandTan,eds.,From Boots to Brogues,pp.045;OnChina,seeIanStorey,ChinasBilateralDeenseDiplomacy,op.cit.,andalsoL.C.RussellHsaio, PLA Steps Up Military Diplomacy in Asia, China Brie XI, issue 8(6 May 20).

6

DavidCapie,TheBilateral-MultilateralNexusinAsiasDeenseDiplomacy,inBilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacifc Security: Contending Cooperation,edited by Brendan Taylor andWilliamTow (New York, NY: Routledge, 203);David Capie and Brendan Taylor, Two Cheers or ADMM+, PacNet, no. 5(20October200);RonHuisken,ADMM+8:AnAcronymtoWatch, East AsiaForum (8 October 200).

7 EvanLaksmana,RegionalOrderbyOtherMeans?ExaminingtheRiseoDeenseDiplomacy in Southeast Asia, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (202): 2570.

8 Alastair Iain Johnston, What (I Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us AboutInternationalRelationsTheory?,Annual Review o Political Science 5(202):

5378.9 David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Paciic Security Lexicon, 2nd ed.

(Singapore: Institute o Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).

0 Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave,2006), p. 79.

AndrewCotteyandAnthonyForster,Reshaping Deence: New Roles or MilitaryCooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper no. 365 (London: InternationalInstitute or Strategic Studies, 2004).

2 StephenBlank, Deense Diplomacy,ChineseStyle,Asia Times, November

2003.3 Strategic Deence Review (London: Ministry o Deence, 998), pp. 067.

4 Deence Diplomacy,PolicyPaperno.(London:UKMinistryoDeence,2000),pp. 23.


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22 David Capie

5 Forster,Armed Forces and Society in Europe, op. cit., p. 87.

6 Speech by Minister or Deence Teo Chee Hean at the Committee o SupplyDebate 2006, .7 New Zealand Deence Force Capability Review (Wellington: New Zealand

DeenceForce,2000).

8 Kristin Gunness, Chinas Military Diplomacy in An Era o Change, paperpresented to the National Deense University symposium on Chinas GlobalActivism:ImplicationsorU.S.SecurityInterests,NationalDeenseUniversity,20 June 2006, p. 2.

9 Ibid., p. 3.

20 SraojBishoyi,DeenceDiplomacyinU.S.-IndiaStrategicRelationship,Journalo Deence Studies 5, no. (20): 65.

2 Pankaj Kumar Jha, Indias Deence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,Journal oDeence Studies 5, no. (20): 4763.

22 Forster,Armed Forces and Society in Europe, op. cit., p. 87.

23 Storey, Chinas Bilateral Deence Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 294.

24 Singh and Tan, Introduction, Asian Security 8, no. 3 (202): 223;on localization, see Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose NormsMatter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,International Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 23975.

25 Carol Atkinson, Constructivist Implications o Material Power: MilitaryEngagement and the Socialization o States, 9722000, International StudiesQuarterly 50, no. 3 (2006): 520.

26 Michael Green and Koj i Murata , The 978 guidel ines or U.S.- JapanDeense Cooperation: Process and Their Historical Impact, National SecurityArchive Working Paper no. 7 (998) .

27 EmmaChanlett-Avery,Thailand:BackgroundandU.S.Relations,CongressionalResearch Service,Washington, D.C., 8 February 20, pp. 34.

28 SheldonSimon,TheRegiobalizationoDeenceinSoutheastAsia,The PacifcReview 5, no. 2 (992): 9.

29 JointStatementbetweentheRepublico IndonesiaandMalaysiaat theArmedConsultations,MinistryoForeignAairs,KualaLumpur,Malaysia,2 January2008, para 8.

30 DND Hosts Joint Deense and Security Cooperation Committee Meetingwith Indonesia, press release, Philippines Department o National Deence,6 December 200.

3 For a list o bilateral deence interactions in Southeast Asia, see Singh andTan, eds.,From Boots to Brogues, op. cit., p. 7.

32 The Western Paciic Naval Symposium, Semaphore, issue 4 (4 July2006).

33 Ibid.


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34 Ibid.

35 PacifcArmies Chies Conerence, act sheetpublishedbyU.S.Army Pacifc,.

36 RemarksoCaptainJohnBischeri,Heado InternationalPlansandPolicy,U.S.Pacifc Fleet at the 2th Western Pacifc Naval Symposium, Sydney, 2729September 200.

37 Capie andTaylor, The Shangri-La Dialogue, op. cit.

38 InterviewwithAmericanparticipantintheShangri-LaDialogue,KualaLumpur,4 June 2008.

39 Singh and Tan, eds., From Boots to Brogues, op. cit., p. 9.

40 ASEAN Deence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Concept Paper,.

4 Taylor, The Rise o Asian DeenseDiplomacy, op. cit., p. 3.

42 Capie andTaylor, Two Cheers or ADMM+, op. cit.

43 CitedinAmitavAcharya,Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia(London and NewYork: Routledge, 2009), p. 50.

44 For examples o earlier proposals, see Taylor, The Rise o Asian DeenseDiplomacy,op.cit.,pp.2;seealsoAmitavAcharya,AssociationoSoutheastAsian Nations: Security Community or Deense Community?, Pacifc Aairs

64, no. 2 (Summer 99): 5978.45 Foravolumethatemphasizestheinstrumentalandnormativeeaturesoregional

order, see Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, editedby Muthiah Alagappa (Stanord, CA: Stanord University Press, 2004).

46 DewiFortunaAnwar,Indonesia:DomesticPrioritiesDefneNationalSecurity,inMuthiahAlagappa,Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Inuences(Stanord, CA: StanordUniversity Press, 998), pp. 47752.

47 Seeor adetaileddiscussion seeAmitavAcharya,Whose Ideas Matter? Agencyand Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca and London:CornellUniversityPress,2009), Chapters 3 and 4.

48 See Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, Why Is There No NATOin Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism and the Origins o Multilateralism,International Organization 56, no. 3 (June 2002): 575607.

49 AmitavAcharya,Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia(Londonand New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 49.

50 Tan, Walking Their Talk?, op. cit., p. 234.

5 SeeorexampleDonaldCrone, DoesHegemonyMatter?TheReorganizationothe Pacifc Political Economy, World Politics 45, no. 4 (993): 5025. For amorerecentanalysisseeMarkBeeson,DoesHegemonyStillMatter?Revisiting

RegimeFormation intheAsiaPacifc,inGlobalisation and Economic Securityin East Asia: Governance and Institutions, edited by Helen Nesadurai (NewYork, NY: Routledge, 2006).

52 Hemmer and Katzenstein, Why Is There No NATO in Asia?, op. cit.


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24 David Capie

53 See or example the institutional bargaining approach set out by Aggarwaland Koo. This does not discount the role o elite belies and ideologies, butassigns primary importance to external shocks which create the impetus orchange. See Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, Asias New InstitutionalArchitecture: Evolving Structures or Managing Trade, Financial and SecurityRelations (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2008), p. 4.

54 Kent Calder and Min Ye, Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explainingthe Organization Gap in Northeast Asia,Journal o East Asian Studies 4(2004): 9226; Aggarwal and Koo, Asias New Institutional Architecture,op. cit.

55 Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means?, op. cit., p. 26.

56 Ibid., p. 253.

57 See or examples, Desmond Ball, Arms and Auence: Military Acquisitions

in the Asia-Pacifc Region, International Security 8, no. 3 (Winter 993/94):782; Asias Arms Race, The Economist, 20 February 993; AmitavAcharya,An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects or Control(Singapore: Institute o Southeast Asian Studies, 994).

58 See Seng Tan, From Talk Shop to Workshop: ASEANs Quest or PracticalSecurity Cooperation through ADMM and ADMM-Plus Processes, in Singhand Tan, eds.,From Boots to Brogues, op. cit., p. 30.

59 Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means?, op. cit., p. 264.

60 Taylor, The Rise o Asian DeenceDiplomacy, op. cit., p. 2.

6 For example, in Ral Emmers careul examination o the impact o thetriple shocks (the end o the Cold War, the Asian fnancial crisis and the9/ attacks) on Southeast Asias security institutions, he makes no mentiono deence diplomacy. See Ral Emmers, Southeast Asias New SecurityInstitutions, in Aggarwal and Koo, Asias New Institutional Architecture,op. cit., pp. 823.

62 Emmers, Southeast Asias NewSecurity Institutions, op. cit.; On the impacto 9/ on Southeast Asian relationswith theUnited States, see David Capie,Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The War on Terror and SoutheastAsiaU.S. Relations, The Pacifc Review 7, no. 2 (2004): 22348.

63 Acharya, How Ideas Spread, op. cit.64 See or example, Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and the

Three New Institutions, in Institutions and Social Order, edited by KarolSoltan,EricUslanerandVirginiaHauer(AnnArbor,MI:UniversityoMichiganPress, 200), pp. 543.

65 See or example, Laksmana, Regional Order by Other Means?, op. cit.,p. 257. For a critical perspective on the inuence o track two networks, seeDavid Capie, When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and AsianRegionalism, Review o International Political Economy, vol. 7, no. 2 (June200): 2938.

66 Philippines diplomat Hans Siriban reported in cable rom U.S. embassyManila PhilippinesOers Views onASEANDeenceMinistersMeetingPlus,8 February 2008, .

67 Time to Talk Deence,Japan Times, 8 July 2002.


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68 Author interview with ormer International Institute or Strategic StudiesCouncil member, cited in Capie and Taylor, The Shangri-La Dialogue,op. cit., p. 363.

69

Author interviewwith regional deence ofcial, February 203.70 Timothy Edmunds, What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature o

Military Roles in Europe, International Aairs 82, no. 6 (November 2006):05975.

7 Ian Storey notes that in 2004 the PLA denoted humanitarian assistance anddisaster relie and peacekeeping as new historic missions. Storey, ChinasBilateral Deence Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 293.

72 For a useul summary, see report rom the conerence on the Evolving Roleso the Military in the Asia-Pacifc, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2830 March 2000,.

73 See generally, Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The DecliningPolitical Role o the Military in Asia (Stanord, CA: StanordUniversity Press,200).

74 Marcus Mietzner, Overcoming Path Dependence: The Quality o CivilianControl o the Military in Post-authoritarian Indonesia, Asian Journal oPolitical Science 9, no. 3 (20): 276.

75 Gary Hogan, A PromisingNewGeneration o TNILeaders,Lowy Interpreter,6 March 203, .

76 See Thomas Bickord, Searching or a Twenty-frst Century Ofcer Corps,in Civil-Military Relations in Todays China: Swimming in a New Sea, editedby David Finkelstein and Kristin Gunness (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2007),pp. 786, p. 75.

77 One ofcial who took part in meetings at the time recalls Australia, Canada,New Zealand and the United States as being most supportive o this move.Author interview with regional deence ofcial present at series o ARF DODand ISM meetings, February 203.

78 Kavi Chongkittavorn, ASEAN Needs to Chart Clearer Path or the ARF,The Nation, 2 June 997.

79 AuthorinterviewwithregionaldeenceofcialpresentattheLangkawimeeting,February 203.

80 SeegenerallyEvanS.MedeirosandM.TaylorFravel,ChinasNewDiplomacy,Foreign Aairs (NovemberDecember 2003): 2235.

8 Author interviewwith regional deence ofcial, 2 February 203.

82 Author interviewwithAustralian deenceofcial, KualaLumpur,4 June 2008.

83 Tan, Talking Their Walk?, op. cit., p. 24.

84 Author interviewwithAmerican participant in theShangri-La Dialogue,KualaLumpur, 4 June 2008.

85 Cited in Taylor, The Rise o Asian Deense Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 2.

86 Hanoi Joint Declaration on the First ASEAN Deence Ministers Meeting-Plus,Hanoi, Vietnam, 2 October 200, .


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26 David Capie

87 On the inuential role o the ASEAN Chair, see Alastair Iain Johnston, TheMyth o the ASEAN Way: Explaining the Evolution o the ASEAN RegionalForum, in Imperect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space,edited by Helga Hatendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander(New York, NY: Oxord University Press, 999).

88 See or example, Donald K. Emmerson, Will the Real ASEAN Please StandUp? Security, Community and Democracy in Southeast Asia, ; Acharya, Constructinga Security Community in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 279, n. 50.

89 According to some reports, Vietnam initial ly supported an ASEAN+0membership or the ADMM-Plus, but in consultations that took place atera February 200 oreign ministers retreat in Danang, the consensus was thatthis should be reduced to Plus-8, omitting two oASEANs Dialogue Partners,

Canada and the European Union. See Vietnams Impressions o ASEANForeign Ministers Retreat in Danang, cable rom U.S. embassy Hanoi,February 200 .

90 Important Milestone in ASEAN Deence Ties, Vietnam News, 6 August200.

9 Tan Walking Their Talk?, op. cit., p. 240.

92 Thismeetingwasnotheldin20whenIndonesiawasinthe chair.The202ARFMinisterial ineect confrmedadecisionthathad alreadybeen takentheprevious year.

93 Tan Walking Their Talk?, op. cit., p. 245.

structures, shocks and norm change explaining the

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