sts-104 (bi108) flight readiness review program june · pdf filests-104 (bi108) flight...
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STS-104 (BI108)
FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW
PROGRAM
June 28, 2001
Solid Rocket Booster
SRB-2
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
• Changes Since STS-100/BI107 – None to present• Nonconformances - None to present• Technical Issues
• BSM Residual Propellant
• Readiness Assessment• Certification Sheet
AGENDA
SRB-3
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
Unburned Propellant
DOF
BSM Orientation on Pad
IFA #STS-100-B-01
Observation• Unburned propellant in RH Forward Booster Separation Motor
(BSM) S/N 3003009• Centered approximately 180 degrees from top dead center• Approximate measurement 100 degrees circumferentially and 1/3
length of BSM case axially
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
Unburned Propellant
BSM Igniter
BSM S/N 3003009
SRB-4
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
Concern• Rupture, burn through or debris ejection
• Criticality 1
• Failure to ignite, low thrust, premature or delayed ignition• Criticality 1R
BSM Cluster Postflight PhotoBSM Cluster Closeout Photo
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
SRB-5
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11TECHNICAL ISSUE
BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANTCause• Moisture contamination at launch pad
• Water intrusion through Aeroheat Shield (AHS) cover seal
Discussion• Failure Mechanism for incomplete BSM burn
• Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) leaches out of propellant • Burn rate slowed
• Ignition not accomplished in heavily soaked areas• Final extinguishment when case pressure drops below ~ 7 psia
• AHS Failure Modes• Improper cover seal configuration and installation• Improper frangible link configuration and installation
• Post-installation degradation (mechanical, chemical and environmental)
SRB-6
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
Discussion (cont.)• Failure modes identified on Fault tree
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
R e ce iv ingIn sp e ction1 .2.3.1 .1 .1
S torage1 .2.3.1 .1 .2
O S F1 .2.3.1 .1
A R FD e live ry/S tag ing
1 .2.3.1 .2
P re -In stalla tion
1 .2 .3 .1
B S Min to Frus tum
1 .2 .3.2 .1
O p en G ra inInsp e ction1 .2 .3.2 .2
A H S a n d S e alIns talla tion
1 .2 .3.2 .3
L e a k C he ckA sse m b ly1 .2 .3.2 .4
C D F In it ia torIns talla tion
1 .2 .3.2 .5
In stalla t ion1 .2 .3 .2
A R F1 .2.3.3 .1
V AB1.2.3.3 .2
S ta ck1 .2.3.3 .3
L e ak T h ruN o zzle C lo su re
1 .2.3.3 .4 .1
W a te r LeakT h ru Ign ite r/Ig n ition T ra in
1 .2.3.3 .4 .2
L e a k Th ruA H S C o ver
P o rt P lug1 .2 .3.3 .4 .3
A sse m b lyT o lera nceS ta ck-up
1 .2 .3.3.4.4 .1 .1
C o ver S e alC o m pre ss ion
S et1 .2.3.3.4.4 .1 .2
D e sign1 .2 .3.3.4 .4 .1
C o m p one ntN o t to P rint
1 .2.3.3.4 .4 .2
In stalla tionIssues
1 .2.3.3.4 .4 .3
C o ve r S ealM a te ria l
C o m p ata b ility1 .2.3.3.4.4 .4 .1
P re -In sta lla tionP h ys ica lD a m a ge
1 .2.3.3.4.4 .4 .2
P o st-Ins talla tionP h ysica lD a m a ge
1 .2.3.3.4.4 .4 .3
E n viro n m e nt1 .2.3.3.4 .4 .4
L e a k Th ruA H S C o verA sse m b ly1 .2.3.3 .4 .4
L a un chP ad
1 .2.3.3 .4
P o st-In stalla tion
1 .2 .3 .3
S u rface C o nta m in a tion a t K SC1 .2 .3
In h ib it in g M a teria l on S urface1 .2
In hib ited Ig nit iona n d/o r Bu rnin g o f G ra in
1 .0
A n om a lo u s B S M M o tor B u rn0 .0
SRB-7
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
SRB Forward AssemblyBSM Seals
(Aeroheat Shield Removed)
BSM Cluster
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
RTV 133
Frustum Skin Panel
RTV 102
RTV 102
Dual O-Rings
Dual O-Rings
SRB-8
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11TECHNICAL ISSUE
BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
Booster Separation Motor Aeroheat Shield Assembly - Exploded View
SRB-9
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
FSA0026
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
Frangible Link
Pawl
Hinge Pin
AA
RatchetBooster Separation Motor Aeroheat Shield
FSA0026
Frangible Link Cover Attach Holes (Installed at Vendor)
Frangible Link Screws (Installed at Vendor)
Cover Seal
BSM Nozzle Exit Cone
Aeroheat Shield Ring
Aeroheat Shield Cover
View A-ABSM Nozzle Added
(Frangible Link not shown)
Aeroheat Shield Installation Screws (ARF)
Strongback
SRB-10
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
Discussion (cont.)• Cover seal compatibility testing with processing fluids used in
BSM area• Materials: DC-55 grease, Conoco grease, cleaning solvents, leak
detection fluid, buffer solution simulating pH of bird feces• No long term gross compatibility issues identified
• BSM Nozzle/AHS rain test• Fifty-two tests performed with 1200 in/hr water flow
• Nominal assemblies tested
• Incorrect installation and seal damage simulated and tested
• Damage after assembly simulated and tested
• Frangible link failure/slippage simulated and tested• Oversized and undersized conditions simulated and tested
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
SRB-11
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11TECHNICAL ISSUE
BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
Polycarbonate Plug
Nozzle
Throat
Polycarbonate Plug
Nozzle
Throat
H2O Supply(40 Psig Min.)
Spray Nozzle
90º
45º
0º
20 IN.
AEROHEAT SHIELD / NOZZLE ASSY.
Direction of Spray
H2O Supply(40 Psig Min.)
Spray Nozzle
90º
45º
0º
20 IN.
AEROHEAT SHIELD / NOZZLE ASSY.
Direction of Spray
BSM Nozzle/AHS rain test (cont.)
TEST SETUP
SRB-12
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11
Discussion (cont.)• BSM Nozzle/AHS rain test (cont.)
• Test conclusions• No water leakage with Minor GN2 leaks (localized) • Very minor leakage into nozzle (if at all) with “kissing seal”
• Minimal, if any, seal compression)
• Gross leak or damage required for significant water entry• Simulated broken frangible link
• Three inches removed from upper leg of seal
• No seal installed
• Minor leak with loose frangible link bolts• Seals that pass GN2 test will not allow water leakage into nozzle
TECHNICAL ISSUE BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
SRB-13
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11TECHNICAL ISSUE
BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANT
Discussion (cont.)• Additional AHS testing performed in VAB 06-09-01
• Testing designed to address all failure modes
• Successfully performed on STS-104
Failure Mode Addressed
Test Title Test DetailsAcceptance
Criteria
STS-104 (BI108) Results
Proper Frangible Link Installation
High Pressure
Measure Strongback to Ring Distance; Apply +7.5 to +8.0 psi; Measure Strongback to
Ring Distance
Delta distance: +0.010 / -0.005
inch
Delta distance ≤ 0.002 inch
Low VacuumPressure Decay
Apply -0.5 to -1.0 psi; Perform 5 minute Decay Test
Mid-VacuumPressure Decay
Apply -4.5 to -5.0 psi; Perform 5 minute Decay Test
Mid-Positive Pressure Decay
Apply +4.5 to +5.0 psi; Perform 5 minute Decay Test
Positive Pressure Bubble Leak Test
Apply +4.5 to +5.0 psi; Perform bubble test
No Leaks No Leaks
Proper Frangible Link Installation
Final Cover Movement
Measure Strongback to RingDelta distance: +0.010 / -0.005
inch
Delta distance ≤ 0.003 inch
Proper Seal Installation and Post-Installation
Degradation
Pressure change ≤ 0.1 psid
No Pressure changes
SRB-14
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11TECHNICAL ISSUE
BSM RESIDUAL PROPELLANTRationale for Flight• STS-104 BSMs inspected at receiving and prior to AHS
installation and verified dry• AHS seals passed pressure leak test in ARF• M&P analysis and testing confirm AHS seals remain functional
after exposure to known contaminants• AHS testing demonstrates robust AHS design • System margins allow for loss of one forward BSM’s thrust per
SRB at separation• Integrity of AHS and cover seals reconfirmed
• Inspected and leak tested in VAB (5-10-01) 10 months after ARF inspection and test
• Additional extended testing successfully completed 6-09-01 refuting all identified failure modes
• STS-104 is safe to fly
SRB-15
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11READINESS ASSESSMENT
• Pending completion of open work, there are no constraints to launch for STS-104
SRB-16
STS-104 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW PROGRAMPresenter:
Roger ElliottOrganization/Date:
USA-SRB/6-28-01
ST
S-1
04/1
08-1
11CERTIFICATION SHEET