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7 ’ "»0 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC ;~&¢ F I‘ ~e~ 0 J ~A W Comment on Soviet space vehicle. (D ‘ /

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II. ASIA-AFRICA J apan--Kishi facing increasing opposition to new US-Japanese security treaty. @ Djakarta and Peiping continue friction over repatriation of Chinese merchants. @ Thailand, bitter over US-Indian rice deal, permits TASS to reopen Bangkok office. Afghan-Pakistani dispute may become cold war issue as both nations seek international support on Pushtoonistan case.

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III. THE WEST France--Debré cabinet may encounter growing parliamentary opposition to authoritarian trend.

@Colombia backs Venezuelan view that OAS action against Trujillo should pre- cede steps against Castro.

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I THE COMMUNIST BLOC 1.;

USSR For comment on the space vehicle launched NU on ll May, see Page 1. \

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USSR: fifilhrushchev. is encountering unspeci-

E fied opposition in his policy of detente with the West. These concerted leaks appear to be a last-minute effort to empha-‘

1 Size Khrushchev's "sincerity" at the summit conference and to induce the Western participants to agree to at least some of Kh ush he ' osals ' P ris the ds that fa'l

, r c vs prop 1Il a on groun 1 ure to reach a measure of agreement would force him to concede to "opposition" elements whose attitude toward the West is much hm] wage 2>

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_East Germany: East Germany's collectivization drive has. cause wi espread passive resistance and large-scale defec- \

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ons w c pa y au or 1es ave priva ely a mi e ey can- “ not stop. More than 50,000 East Germans, including many

farmers and others with badly needed skills, have fled to the ‘ West in the first four months of this year--17,183 in April

. alone. The Ulbricht regime, making some concessions to § certain farmers, at the same time is attempting to strengthen A

. security measures and step up party efforts to curtail defec- ,

tions. The re ‘me fears that excessive force at this time could V

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lead to hi hl ‘embarrassing and possibly serious repercussions.

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I.I.- ASIA-AFRICA

Japan: Prime MinisterKishi's efforts to obtain ratification o the new US-Japanese security treaty are encotmtering increasing opppsition in the-Diet. While the Socialists have intensified their attacks on the treaty as a result of the U-2 plane incident, the greatest obstacle to ratification stems from con-

lL tinued attempts by Kis:hi's rivals in his own party to use the treaty issue to bring about his downfall‘, New difficulties may have been raised by the government's announced view on 10 May that the treaty does not prohibit US reconnaissance flights from Japan over Communist territory. (Page 4)

Communist China_- North Vietnam: The joint communique issued during Chou En.--lai’s visit to Hanoi suggests that neither Communist China nor North Vietnam will launch a major propaganda campaign against Laos at this time. The Communists hint they would prefer to negotiate with the new government in. Vientiane. While commenting that continuation of the present situation "would be dangerous," the communique avoids criticism of the recent

O KL election and says the Laotian situation canpbe restored to normal by peaceful consultation. . The communique's support for the summit meeting, together with a similar statement by Mao Tse-tung on 14 May, suggests that Peiping and Hanoi do not intend to hamper Khrushchev's smnmit tactics by creating a Far Eastern crisis at

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Indonesia_- Commjunist China: Frictioncontinues between theflndonesian Government andlocal Chinese Communist diplomatic personnel over repatriation of Overseas Chinese. The Chi- nese Communist Embassy in Djakarta has protested the alleged

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I€€§§\l;§§ :_§j<I~“&.>\" "forcible house arrest" on 27 April of a Chinese Communist con-

sul who was observing the processing of a group preparing to em- barkfrom Borneot The alleged unauthorized departure of a Chinese Communist repatriation ship from a Sumatran port in late April is still under investigation. The Indonesian Govern- ment has also just banned a pro-Communist Chinese-language newspaper in Djakarta for "tendentious" reporting on the renatri- u bl .

16 May so DAILY BRIEF 11

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1 Thailand-USSR: Thai Government decision on 13 May to

llow the U§§R to reopen a “TASS office is probably designed to how Bangkok's bitterness over. the recent US surplus grain deal ith India. According to one report, the USSR has initiated nego- \

tiations to buy‘$4,500,0~00 worth of Thai rice] The Bangkok press, taking its cue from the government, is embarked on a cam ai of harsh criticism of A.merican surplus grain sales.

Lv"?Zighanista11-' Unite<fKingdom: The Afghan-Pa_5tistan1 dis puteovér Pushtoonistan threatens to expand from a regional di - pute into a cold war issue. Pakistani President Ayub has per-

= suaded the British Government to issue an early statement reiterating its recognition of thelDurand line--the existing,border-- p

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as oun ary een i an an ghani an, ghans, who have accepted Soviet support in the dispute, will probably be angered by any such statement, re ardin it as further evidence of free world support of Pakistan. 5) ,

Belgian Congo: The failure of Belgian authorities to take effective action 1n the “face of spreading tribal and election disorders in the Congo has reportedly damaged morale in the 28,000-man Force Publique, the main security force there, The consulate general in Leopoldville has characterized the governor general's threat to in- voke. a state of emergency as his strongest statement to date, but observes that it will be only an empty gesture unless backed by effective measures. In Brussels, the cabinet reportedly met on_13 May to discuss the Congo situation. and the press urged stronger securitv measures in the Congo. \

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France: The failure by more than 70 members of the Debré government majority to support the cabinet in. the 11 May National Assembly vote on a proposed constitutional amendment may indicate that serious o osltion is devel in to the trend tow rd author- Z9 ‘ PP =1 °P 8 R

itarianism. Ifithe amendment, which would permit newly independent African states to be members of the French Community fails to

16 May 60 DAILY BRIEF

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pass in-the Senate, subsequent readings will have. to be held. This could delay the planned June independence of the Mali Federation and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). 6)

Caribbean: [Colombian Foreign Minister Turbay told the.Amer- ican amfiassador in Bogota on 10 May that action within the Organ- ization. of American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic would provide "a precedent for inter-Ame rican action against Cuba _.

The Colombian position is in. line with that of Venezuelan President Betancourt, who in late.Apri1 called the ouster of Trujillo from control in the»Dominican Republic a prerequisite for any OAS effort to condemn the Castro regime. The Venezuelan driveto isolate Tru- jillo through persuading other Latin American governments to break

abandoning a wait-an -- ee policy seems to having some effect.) relations is meeting opposition, although Venezuelan pressure for

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16 May 60 DAILY BRIEF 1v

‘Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160549 l. 5 *1

Soviet Space Vehicle

from the Tvura Tam missile test range has been confirmed The orbiting of the Soviet space vehicle launched on 14 May

The 4,540-kilogram. payload=--about 10,000 pounds-=announced by the USSR is more than three times the approximately 3,000- pound payload of Sputnik III and theeSoviet ltmar vehicles, but still within the previously estimated orbital payload capability (5,000- 10,000 pounds) for the basic Soviet ICBM vehicle. There appears to be no reason to doubt the validity of the Soviet announcement re- garding the payload weight.

The USSR apparently had been preparing for two types of space operation in the month preceding the summit conference. Objects assessed to be lunar vehicles were launched from Tyura Tam on 15 and 16 April. One is believed to have reached an altitude of 115,000 miles before fal.ling back, and the secondfailed after launch Since then, practices of an undetermined nature, not lunar-asso- ciated, have taken place at the Tyura Tam range on 25 and 27 April and 8 and 10 May.

It appears possible that the latest satellite launching may have been accelerated as a result of the mid-April failures. In an un- hurried event of this nature, a recovery attempt would be logical. The USS-R has announced that the payload will be called out of orbit by radio command, but will burn up on re-entering the atmosphere. This could reflect either an advanced launching date before prep- arations for recovery could be completed, or a plan to attempt recovery but avoid adverse publicity if the attempt fails.

The USSR probably has the capability to attempt recovery of an earth satellite. NIE 11-5-60 estimates thatxrecovery of a man from orbit could occur in late 1960, after a numb er of attempts using instruments and animals.

\

‘an aircraft flight ban between 1500 and 1900 GMT on 15 May for an undetermined area north of a line in the Caspian Sea area, and a probable tracking exercise at Kamchatka. There is no apparent association between the flight ban and the latest satellite, inasmuch as the satellite was not in the vicinity at the time. The Kamchatka tracking, however, could have been for observation of the satellite, which was apparently nearby at the time.

\ \

1e Mav so CElAPP£°§/_ed.fQtB§l¢@l$§5 292°/9%/1§§Q316°549 Page 1

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160549 .

—SEGR~E-T- _B10c Sources Xllege "Qpposition" to-Khrushchevvls Foreign _

-Policy Line

[In discussions over the past week with Western officials and journalists,

\

Khrushchev is encountering opposition within the bloc and at home to his policy of detente with the West.3

\

_

\ any softer reaction by the USSR to the .U-2 incident would have given ammunition to those who feel that Khrushchev is "soft on capitalismfl -

[The source of Kh:r-ushchev's opposition is not clearly identi- fied. The opposition is variously described as from "certain circles in the socialist: bloc," "pressure from the East Germans and Chinese Communists," and in such vague terms as "Khru- shchev is in some kind of troublefl

[The Soviet premier is probably under pressure from some bloc regimes, particularly the East German and the Chinese, and possibly from elements within the Soviet regime itself, to take a strong line in dealing with the West. He.does not, however, appear to be either "in trouble" or under so much pressure as to place limits on his freedom of negotiation in Paris beyond those limits which his own policy objectives have already estab- lished,)

[The purpose of these concerted leaks appears thereforeto be a last-minute effort; to emphasize.Khrushchev's "sincerity" in seeking a detente, and to induce the Western participants at the Paris talks to make concessions to Khrushchev on the, grounds that otherwise he may be forced to make concessions to the "0p- position," whose attitude toward the West is allegedly much harder These reports are also in keeping with longerterm Soviet efforts, dating from October 1959 following Khrushchev’s trip to Peiping, to turn Chinese opposition to his foreign policy line--a source of genuine embarrassment to Khrushchev--to the USSR’s advantage in negotiating at Paris

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.

East Germangwv aries_ Tactics in Effort to llaivnefections\

East Germany’s intensive collectivization drive‘ in the first four months of this year has resulted in-widespread passive resistance and in large--scale defections, which party authorities have admitted they cannot stop. More than 50,000 East Germans have fled to the West from January to April. Many of the col- lectives formed during the drive are merely paper organizations, and farmers are steadfastly refusing to heed regime urgings to adopt collective farming methods. The regime fears that the use of" excessive force at this time would lead to repercussions that would be highly embarrassing and possibly very serious.

The Ulbricht regime has resorted to carrot-and-stick methods in an attempt to stem the flights and induce farmers to plant crops. Party First Secretary Ulbricht instructed Potsdam Dis- trict First Secretary Kurt Seibt on 12 Mayto inform certain farmers that they will be permitted to maintain their bank accounts in West Berlin. Ulbricht warned Seibt not to publicize this lest a large number of people rush-to open bank accounts in West Ber- lin.

\

\Seibt ordered special groups to be organized to combat the continuing flow of de- fectors to the West. The groups are to include leaders in the party, tradeunions, and youth organizations and responsible of- ficers of the security organs located in the district. Seibt ordered that a daily estimate of the situation be made, that mass organization and party work be stepped up and improved, and that security measures be implemented more efficiently. He added that "in vari ous circles--not only among farmers, but also among. the workers, officials, and members of the intelligentsia--the number of defec- tors is rapidly growing."

The situation appears to be especially serious in the Potsdam District--probably because of its proximity to Berlin--but there has also been evidence of difficulty in the Schwerin, Neubranden- burg, and Dresden districts.

\ \

15 May 69 CFA]55rB\}éd f6r'?aE'|éé§aTéb§6/0§i1'é'6cT:%i60549 Page 3

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I L ASIA-AFRICA

Ratification of US-Japanese Treaty to Be Delayed Again

Prime Minister Kishi's efforts to obtain ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty are encountering increasing opposition in the Diet. . While the opposition Socialists have intensified their attacks on the treaty as a result of the U-2 plane incident, the.greatest obstacle to ratification stems from attempts by Kishi's rivals in his own Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) to exact his promise to relinquish the premiership in exchange for their support on the treaty issue. Were he to agree, his resignation probably would be timed to coincide with the expiration of his term as party president next January.

The chairman of the LDP policy board has informed Am- bassador MacArthur that the timetable for passage of the treaty by the lower house has had to be extended until some time late this month, with upper house approval to follow in about 30 days. New difficulties, however, may arise from the government's announced view on 10 May that the treaty does not prohibit US reconnaissance flights from Japan over Communist territory. Anti- Kishi elements of the LDP reportedly are holding out for even more time for. lower house debate on the measure.

The Socialists appear likely to abstain from the vote on the measure and may even plan to resort to strong-arm tactics to try and prevent it. The government hopes the splinter Democratic Socialists will take part in the balloting, even if they vote against the treaty, so as to indicate that minority party rights are being respected. The Democratic Socialist party is being subjected to increasing pressure, however, to follow the Socialist lead and has indicated it will go along with a Socialist resolution demanding that the government ne otiate withdrawal of all U-2 aircraft from

16 May 6° C’/3TE>‘5F8\7eé§ ?or'F3B'|'¢%'a1E;'zE>’z‘67d‘eI/'1‘ 5“ c‘6el'1'6oB4'3T1N Page 4

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Approved f0rARe|ease: 2020/03/13 C03160549 Pushtoonistan ispute in Danger of Becoming ’ ld War Issue

‘ ' 7 " % The Afghan-Pakistani dispute over Pushtoonistan appears

to be in danger of being converted from a regional dispute, to a cold war issue. Pakistani President Ayub has persuaded the British Government to issue a statement soon reiterating its recognition of the Durand line, originally drawn by the British in. 1893, as the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The effective border today generally follows the Durand line. The Afghans will probably be angered by the British statement, no matter how moderately worded, and regard it as further evidence of free world support of Pakistan in the Pushtoonistan dispute.

Afghan-Pakistanil_ propaganda exchanges have been intensified as a result of Pakistan's decision last September to abandon its policy of restraint--a policy generally endorsed by its CENTO allies--and to reply in kind to Afghan propaganda abuse. In view of Khrushchev's strong support for Kabul on the Pushtoonistan issue and the statement of 12 March to the press by the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan that the USSR does not recognize the Durand line, Rawalpindi wants its allies to take a more positive stand in its support.

The Afghans resent the strengthening of Pakistan through its alliances with free world powers. Accordingly, Kabul reacted strongly against the final communique issued on 30 April by the CENTO Ministerial Council, which expressed concern over inter- ference by outside powers "in the internal affairs of other countries" to increase international tension, "as for example the recent Soviet statement on Pushtoonistan." The Afghan Government may have felt that the term "internal affairs" implied support for Pakistan's position tha.t the status of its Pushtoons is an internal matter and not subject to negotiation with Afghanistan. Since Kabul regards Pakistan as the heir of British imperialism in the Pushtoon tribal area, it will probably be especially provoked by any statement on the problem issued by Londonr-and W'OU1d.;-pfi.1’hi3-P5 =I‘~6<I0I1Side1.7 Pre- mier Daud's scheduled. visit to London in June.

Kabul's reaction to free world support for Pakistan would probably take the form of increased reliance on Soviet support in press- ing its Pushtoonistan campaign. This would make it more difficult for Af hanistan to maintain its neutralit .

16 May 60 CE|APpr0ved for Release: 2020/03/13 003100549 Page 5

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160549 —€9N-Fl-BE-PHLIA-L- , e

II I. THE WEST

Parliamentary Opposition to Debré';_GoveVrnment l3e@Strengthening

Failure by more “than 70 members of the Debré government's majority to support the cabinet in the 11 May National Assembly vote on a proposed constitutional amendment may indicate that a serious opposition group is forming. The substance of the amendment--to permit newly independent African states to be members of the French Community--was not in question, and the proposal was passed by a vote of 1280-1'74, with 88 abstentions. There was, however, strong criticism, led by the Socialists, of the government's choice of procedure for handling the amendment.

The government failed to justify to the assembly's satisfaction why it invoked in this matter the.constitutional provision calling for a simple majority in both houses of parliament plus approval by the Community Senate rather than the constitutional provision calling for a three-fifths majority by both houses sitting as a special congress. There appeared to be widespread suspicion -among the deputies that the government feared that parliament, when sitting as a congress, might "act up." The deputies were further irritated by the governmentls refusal to admit consideration of changes in its bill.

The opposition now threatens to carry the fight to thevSenate, where it has a better chance of defeating the bill. . A negative vote by the-Senate could lead to lengthy shuttling. of the bill between the two houses, risking delaying the-June independence plans of the Mali Federation and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). ..

Parliamentary opposition to the Debre government is- largely based on the regime's trend to authoritarianism and the declining influence of parliament. However, the increasing seriousness of this opposition may later present an occasion for the extreme right to undermine the authority of the regime.\

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c 1:'r~|1r:'_J"_ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160549

Possible OAY :7onsi_deration of Cuba and the pl‘ "ninican Republic "' \ F

[Colombian Foreignllf/Iinister Turbéty told the American ambassador on 10 May that action within the Organization of American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic would provide a precedent for inter-Ameriean action against Cuba. Turbay believes that accusing the unpopular Trujillo regime of intervention in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries would obtain the widest possible agreement of OAS members, who have always in previous years been reluctant to criticize any member specifically. The Colombian position is in line with that of Venezuelan President Betancourt, who stated in late April that ouster of Trujillo from control in the Dominican Republic was a prerequisite for any OAS effort to condemn the Castro regimej

[Most Latin American governments have become increasingly irritated with Cuba in recent weeks, although few advocate OAS action at this time. Latin American ambassadors in Havana met with Fidel Castro on 10 May to impress Castro with their concern at Cuba's apparent abandoning of the Latin-American community and at Cuba's deteriorating relations with the United States. The. meeting was called by the Argentine ambassador without consultation with American Ambassador Bonsal. Canada--which apparently is considering joining the OAS--was represented at the meeting__.]

[fgespite Latin American concern, Bolivian President Siles stated on 11 May that his soundings as to the possibility of joint Latin American action on the Cuban problem had elicited the reaction that the time was not yet rightr This may be a reflection in part of the feeling that the Dominican problem has priority;]

(Although Venezuelan pressure for abandoning a wait-and-see policy seems to be having some effect, and Bolivia on 14 May reportedly severed relations with the Dominican Republic, the Vene- zuelan drive to isolateTrujillo by persuading other Latin American governments to break relations is meeting opposition. The Chilean foreign minister believes that adiplomatic break by a government not directly concerned would border on intervention in internal Dominican affairs and that the Dominican problem should be handled in the OAS The Ar entine f rei n ' '

t l t l O gt.‘ o g m1n1s er a so s ron 0 oses the Venezuelan suggestion for a diplomatic breakfl

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—S-EGR-E—'I'—

15 May 69 CZ}>bT5v1aZ1 rE§r'§E|'e'a's'é;"§d§o7o§7iZ5 'o'5§'1‘e'o549 Page 7


ii yd THE PRESIDENT The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activitie$ Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research '

-

The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Jfoint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce '

The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman National Security Agency

The Director National Indications Center

The Director

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