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    SHMUEL SAMBURSKY

    PLACE AND SPACE IN LATE NEOPLATONISM*

    THREE basic notions characterize the physical world, namely space, time and

    matter, the first of which is usually held by scientists to be simpler than the

    other two. The history of physics and philosophy has shown, however, that

    even the concept of space abounds with difficulties, to which the doctrines of

    the later Neoplatonic philosophers form an impressive witness. It is proposed

    to give here a brief survey of the theories of topos meaning variously “place”

    or

    “space”,

    from Iamblichus at the beginning of the fourth century to

    Simplicius in the middle of the sixth. Although most of their treatises were

    clad in the modest garb of commentaries on works by Plato or Aristotle, the

    ideas of these thinkers undoubtedly represent one of the peaks of sophistication

    and metaphysical acumen in the whole history of philosophy.

    The deliberations and inquiries of these philosophers on the concept of

    topos

    took place against a long historical background, spanning nearly a

    thousand years from the Presocratics to Plotinus. A short synopsis, however

    condensed, of the earlier developments of the concept will serve as a useful

    introduction, leading up to the period in which Iamblichus and his successors

    started to elaborate their ideas on topos. This summary will be concerned with

    merely the conceptual aspects of the subject and thus will not adhere to a

    strict chronological order.

    First, the two opposed conceptions of Democritus and Aristotle must be

    mentioned. For Democritus, space was the infinite extension of the void,

    making possible the free movement of the atoms of matter and their various

    collisions. While collisions were characteristic of the very nature of matter as

    sheer resistance, the void, and thus space, was the embodiment of the sheer

    lack of resistance.’ Aristotle, on the other hand, who had many weighty

    reasons for rejecting the existence of a void, regarded the world as the sum

    total of the places of adjacent bodies, which constitute, in their totality, a

    three-dimensional material continuum. As a result of their movement, the

    relative positions of all of these bodies change with time. Since a place and the

    body occupying that place are intrinsically linked with each other, Aristotle

    rejected the definition of place as the volume occupied by a body. For, since

    the body itself has a volume,

    i.e.

    is three-dimensionally extended, this

    definition would lead to the idea that one material volume could coincide with

    another, in other words, that two places could simultaneously be in the same

    *The Neoplatonic texts discussed in this paper form part of a forthcoming collection of texts

    and translations on this topic.

    ‘H. Diels, Die F ragmenteder Vor sokratikep. 68A, 40.

    Stud. Hist. Phil . Sci. 8 1977). No. 3. Printed in Great Britain.

    173

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    Studies in H istory and Phil osophy of Science

    place, an obvious absurdity. This led to Aristotle’s definition of place as the

    inner boundary of all the bodies encompassing a body situated in that place.2

    An important corollary of this definition, one which follows from the finite

    extent of Aristotle’s universe, was drawn by Aristotle himself: no place can be

    assigned to the universe as a whole, since there does not exist a body

    encompassing it.3

    Despite the extreme antithesis between Democritus’ theory of the void and

    Aristotle’s theory of place, they have one common feature - the conception

    of space or place as a merely passive entity. With Democritus this passivity

    appears when he defines the void as a complete lack of resistance, while

    Aristotle’s purely geometrical definition of place as the encompassing boundary

    also has an outspokenly passive character. In contrast, the notion of

    “encompassing” has a definite tinge of activity in the utterances of some

    Presocratic philosophers. Anaximenes, who regarded air as the first principle

    of all things, said: “As our soul, which is air, holds us together, so do breath

    and air encompass the whole universe”.’ Some of Heraclitus’ statements

    emphasize the superiority of that which “encompasses”, such as: “That

    which encompasses us is rational and wise”.’ Elsewhere he expressly states

    that the origin of man’s reason is to be found in the rational nature of what

    encompasses.G One may also add what Aristotle himself said about the

    relation between the encompassing and encompassed: “The encompassing is

    like form, while the encompassed is like matter”.’

    In the context of this paper, Plato’s conception of space or room (chore) is

    obviously of special importance. In spite of the difficulties inherent in his

    allegorical language,’ the active character of Plato’s space cannot be denied.

    To be sure, space ranks on a level of reality lower than that of Being, of the

    realm of Forms, but it ranks on a higher level than Becoming, i.e. the physical

    world. Inasmuch as space cannot be grasped by the senses, it has an affinity to

    the intelligible Forms, although inasmuch as it is the receptacle of all their

    copies,

    i e

    of changing particulars, it is similar to Becoming. Nor is space a

    merely passive receptacle of Becoming, but rather “the nurse of all Becoming”;

    in other words, it has a definitely active function in giving shape to everything

    contained in it, so that in Plato’s conception of space, matter and space merge

    into one another. Incidentally, one should not overlook the lack of symmetry

    between Plato’s conceptions of space and time. Time is “the moving image of

    eternity”,g and thus its level is that of things becoming, while that of space is

    ‘Aristotle, Phys. 212a, 6.

    ‘Ibid. 212b, 22.

    ‘Diels, 13B, 2.

    5Sextus, Adv. moth. VII, 127.

    ‘Ibid. VIII, 286.

    ‘Aristotle,

    De Caelo

    312a, 12.

    “Plato,

    Timaeus

    47e-52d;

    choru

    is introduced at 52a.

    ‘Ibid. 37a.

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    Place and Space n Late Neoplatoni sm

    175

    intermediate between Being and Becoming. We shall come back to this

    asymmetry later on.

    The developments which took place in the notion of

    fopos

    during the

    Hellenistic period threw into relief the active aspect of

    fopos

    and of what

    “encompasses”. They had various origins, but their interaction brought about

    a crystallization of ideas which prepared the ground for the Neoplatonic

    doctrines. Admittedly, in the physics of the early Stoics the notion of place

    was restricted in meaning to signifying a region which is fully or partly occupied

    by matter, thus making place merely secondary to bodies in place.‘O However,

    another aspect of the Stoic doctrine, as well as of the Neopythagorean

    philosophy following in the wake of the Stoics, did further the tendency to

    see place as an active entity, and at the same time gave rise to an association

    between the notions of place and the universe.

    In broad outline, the following is the picture which emerges from the few

    fragments which have survived from the two or three hundred years of this

    critical period. The pantheism of the Stoics led to the identification of the

    universe with God. This is confirmed by various sources, and it suffices to

    quote Cicero:

    “Chrysippus said that the universe itself is God”.” Sextus

    quotes Zeno:

    “The rational is superior to the irrational, and the ensouled

    superior to the soulless. However, nothing is superior to the universe, and

    thus it is endowed with reason and soul”.” This parallelism had originally a

    definitely materialistic tinge, for the world-soul, the divine logos, was the active

    pneumu, the total mixture of fire and air, which completely penetrated the

    whole material universe and thereby endowed it with coherence and prevented

    its dispersion in the infinite surrounding void; the latter and the material

    cosmos together made up the space of Stoic physics. In the consciousness of

    later generations of Hellenism, however, a gradual change in the significance

    of pneuma took place. From having originally been a tenuous stuff or corporeal

    breath, it was transformed into abstract and incorporeal spirit, as can also be

    shown by many quotations from the Old and New Testaments.

    Two important fragments ascribed to Archytas, but in fact deriving from

    an unknown Neophythagorean philosopher, give some indication as to how

    the connection between

    topos

    and the universe as a whole was established.

    The first fragment emphasizes the superiority of place for the reason that

    without it bodies are unable to move. The association of place and movement

    points to the wider significance of the former as that in which the latter occurs:

    “Since all things in motion are moved in some place, it is obvious that one has

    to attribute superiority to the place in which things are moving or being acted

    ‘“Cf. von Amim, Stoic. vef. fr. II. 504, 505 (Aetius,

    Depfuc. hil . I , 20,

    1; Sextus,

    Adv. math.

    K 3).

    “Cicero, De not.

    deor. I , 39.

    “Sextus,

    Adv. mafh.

    IX, 104.

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    Studi es n Hi st ory and Phil osophy of Science

    upon. Thus, perhaps, it is the first of all things, since all existing things are

    either in place or not without place”.13

    In the second fragment,

    topos

    clearly alludes to the

    pan,

    the whole material

    universe of the Stoics: “It is peculiar to place that everything is contained in it,

    while place is contained in nothing. For were it in another place, this place

    would itself again be in another one, and this will go on ad inf ini t um. For that

    very reason, it is necessary for everything to be in place and for place to be in

    nothing. Thus its relation to existing things is always that of the boundaries to

    things bounded. For the place of the whole universe is the boundary of all

    existing things”.‘”

    Apart from this development in the conception of the divine Stoic universe,

    we have to take into account the old significance of “place” in the religions

    of the Middle East, as a holy site or the dwelling place of a god, where he

    happens to reveal himself to man. Such places were often hills or trees,15 as is

    amply documented in the Bible and occasionally also in Greek literature. Thus

    Socrates says to Phaedrus, while they are sitting under the plane tree near the

    Ilissus: “This place seems to be a holy place”.” As to the Bible (where such a

    holy site is called maqom, or topos in the Septuagint), two examples will

    suffice. Firstly: “Abram passed through the land unto the place of Sichem,

    unto the plane of Moreh...

    And the Lord appeared unto Abram...“”

    Secondly, the story of Jacob? dream: “He lighted upon a certain place and

    tarried there all night”;‘* later on Jacob exclaimed: “Surely the Lord is in this

    place, and 1 knew it not.. .this is none other but the house of God”.19

    Simplicius tells us that Atargatis, the goddess of fertility, and Isis, the

    Egyptian goddess, were called “the place of gods”, because “they comprise

    the specific properties of many gods”.‘O As Jewish monotheism became

    gradually purified from anthropomorphic elements and increasingly abstract,

    the place of the God of Israel as well as God Himself were identified with the

    whole universe, that entity identified in Stoic pantheism with the Supreme Being.

    The various components of this development are reflected in Philo’s

    commentary on Jacob’s dream. Here he ascribes three meanings to place:

    (1) place is the room filled by a body; (2) place is the divine logos, which God

    Himself has totally filled with incorporeal powers; (3) God Himself is called

    place, for He encompasses the universe, but is not encompassed by anything.”

    “Simplicius, Cuteg. 361.21-24.

    “Ibid. 363.22 24.

    “Jeremiah iii, 6.

    “Plato, Phue d rus 238~.

    “Genesis xii, 6-7.

    “Ibid. xxviii, 11. The AV obsoletely spells

    “plain(e)“.

    “Ibid. xxviii, 17-18.

    ‘OSimplicius, Phys. 641, 33.

    “Philo, DeSom niis 1,61-64 (ed. Cohn and Wendland. III, 218, 10-24).

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    A few centuries later the same figure of speech, reminiscent of the second

    fragment of Pseudo-Archytas,” is to be found in Jewish exegetic literature:

    “Why is God called place? Because He is the place of the world, while the world

    is not His place”.22 Place as a synonym for God became a generally accepted

    expression in the Hebrew language from the first centuries of the Christian era

    onwards.

    This brief survey must also take note of one more important development.

    The asymmetry in the levels of reality of space and time, mentioned above in

    connection with Plato’s cosmology, was finally eliminated by Plotinus. He

    expressly distinguished between physical space, which is the receptacle of

    matter and thus has a lower rank than the matter and bodies in it,2’ and

    intelligible space, which is “the very source of Soul and Intellect”.2’ Thus a

    hypostatic equality was established between intelligible space and intelligible

    time, later the main pillar of Iamblichus’ ontology of time.25 Since every

    hypostatic level participates to some extent in that above it, it follows that

    physical space is endowed with some of the properties of intelligible space,

    though to a restricted degree only.

    It is on this conception that the “intellectual theory of space” of Iarnblichus

    is based, as Simplicius terms it,” who also quotes from Iamblichus’ comment-

    aries on the Timaeus as follows: “

    .Space came into existence naturally united

    with bodies [...I And therefore the

    Timaeus

    reasonably introduces space

    primarily along with the beginning of the existence of bodies. For they who

    do not make space akin to cause, but drag it down to the boundaries of surfaces

    or to empty receptacles, or indeed to extensions of what kind soever, introduce

    foreign notions as well as miss the whole purpose of the

    Timaeus,

    which

    always associates nature with creation. Thus, in the same way as Plato primarily

    introduced bodies as akin to cause, one must also regard space as linked to the

    cause to which the

    Timaeus

    has guided us. And in the same way as we tried to

    interpret time as being of the same nature as the creation, one has to explain

    space to0”.27

    Iamblichus here emphasizes the inseparable bond between space and

    matter, as well as the superiority of space to matter, since space is the active

    cause of the coherence of bodies. In this connection Iamblichus uses figures

    of speech which appear in the Old and New Testaments in contexts related to

    the attributes or actions of God:

    “What notion gives a definition of space

    which is perfect and akin to its essence? That which assumes it to be like a

    “See e.g. Genesis Rabba Lxviii.9.

    “Plotinus, Em. II, 4, 12, 11.

    “&id. II, 5,3,39.

    ‘“Cf. S.

    Sambursky

    “The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism”, Proc. IV. Acud. of Sci

    u n d H um . I I (1 8), 153-67.

    “Simplicius, Cureg. 362.7-364.6.

    I7Simplicius. Phys. 639.25-36.

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    corporeal power sustaining and supporting bodies, raising the falling ones

    and gathering together the scattered ones, completing them as well as

    encompassing them on every side”.28

    It emerges from Simplicius’ ample statements about Iamblichus’ intellectual

    theory of space that this theory was a synthesis of Stoic, Jewish and Neopy-

    thagorean ideas. In view, however, of its detailed and systematic account of

    the superiority of space to matter, we may regard it as the intellectual property

    of Iamblichus. The central conception of this theory is that the encompassed

    is supported by the encompassing, that secondary entities are always contained

    in primary ones and have their place in them. Thus the physical world is

    encompassed by the superior reality of the Soul, and the Soul by the Intellect,

    which constitutes a still higher reality. Just as we speak about our soul as the

    seat or the place of our thoughts, space, being a non-corporeal entity, is a

    cause superior to bodies or matter, which are encompassed by it. For space is

    not the geometrical boundary of mathematical solids, but the physical

    boundary of real bodies; indeed, the forces acting in space do not merely

    encompass bodies, but totally penetrate them. Finally, Iamblichus reaches the

    peak of his adulation of space by likening it to a divine entity. Space is the

    supreme cause, which we have to identify with God, because it has the form

    of unity, holds all things together and accomplishes the whole world according

    to one measure.26

    At the root of Iamblichus’ theory of space one can discern some age-old

    ideas; only two should be mentioned here. One is the conception of matter as a

    passive, lifeless entity, which became more pronounced and finally culminated

    in some eastern religions as the representation of evil. The other is the

    cosmological principle that the higher layers of the universe are more tenuous

    than the lower, that grosser and more passive entities are enveloped by finer

    and more active ones. In Aristotle’s cosmology, for instance, earth, the solid

    element, is at the centre of the universe, surrounded by water, which again is

    surrounded by air, while above this there is the highest layer of the sublunar

    world - fire. The higher the layer, the greater its activity and subtlety. This is

    the doctrine of the hierarchy of worlds, according to which what is higher

    from a topographical point of view is also superior from a conceptual point

    of view.

    In this picture of the cosmological hierarchy, the archetypal number seven

    was of particular importance long before Neoplatonism. In later Neoplatonic

    sources the seven firmaments begin with three physical regions: the sublunar

    sphere, that of the planets and that of the fixed stars. Above them there are

    three aetherial regions, and finally the seventh region of fire, the empyrean.

    Allusions to this can be found in the Orphic hymns and the Chaldean Oracles

    “Ibid. 640.2. C_ Psalm cxlv, 10; Isaiah xi, 12; John xi, 52.

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    of the second century. Analogous views prevailed among the Jews of the same

    period; an account of the seven firmaments is given, for instance, in the

    Talmud.”

    Iamblichus’ doctrine influenced the philosophy of space in modern times.

    Henry More (1614-1687), the leading Platonist of Cambridge, postulated the

    existence of two kinds of extension, physical and metaphysical. Physical

    extension, like that assumed by Descartes, is material. Metaphysical extension,

    on the other hand, is pure space, it is eternal and infinite like God, and the

    manifestation of the essence of God, His omnipresence which cannot be

    directly perceived by man. Newton, influenced by More, called space the

    sensorium dei, the medium by which God unifies all the separate movements

    of the various bodies and makes them parts of one absolute and well-ordered

    motion.30

    Newton established a connection between the divine character of absolute

    space and the movements of bodies in space. A similar connection had formed

    the point of departure for Syrianus’ doctrine, a hundred years after Iamblichus.

    In contradistinction to Iarnblichus, who emphasized the connection between

    space and matter, Syrianus’ central idea associates space and motion. In

    accordance with the Neoplatonic doctrine of hypostases, he assumes the

    properties of physical extension to be derived from the different thoughts of the

    Soul and the irradiation of the creative Forms. By virtue of these, extension

    appropriates the various bodies and makes itself the proper domain of the

    elements fire, earth, etc., and thus everything moves naturally towards its natural

    place or remains in it. The nature of the various bodies is thus subjected to that

    of extension, is secondary to that of extension.”

    From here Syrianus arrives at an analysis of the connection between place

    and movement, an analysis which passes from place in the restricted sense to

    place in the broader sense, and from there to the cosmic extension, to absolute

    space. He argues as follows: “How, could one say, are bodies in motion moved

    in space? They certainly move from one place to another, for generally things

    in a place seem to rest, whereas things in motion are in place as well as not in

    place. They are not in their own primary and, so to say, proper place, except

    when they rest; however, they are in the broadly defined place, in the sense in

    which we say that the sun is in the sign of the Lion when the breadth of the

    Lion contains her, and that the flying eagle is in the air, or that the sailing ship

    is in the sea. All these have a place within a certain range, and when they are in

    motion they do not occupy their primary and proper place”.32 Again and

    again, Syrianus emphasizes the essential difference between the proper place

    “CJ Hagiga 12b.

    aONewton.

    Opticks,

    Queries 28 and 3

    1

    “Simplicius,

    Ph ys. 618 29-619 2.

    “Ibid 628.26-34.

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    St udi es in H i stor y and Phil osophy of Science

    of a body, which in fact is identical with its volume, and common place, place

    in the broader sense, in which movement occurs. This latter “belongs to a

    more universal body and is inseparable from it”.l’ There is little doubt that

    the term “universal body” refers to the universe, i.e. absolute space, in

    contrast to relative space,

    i.e.

    the place of a body relative to other bodies,

    which is subject to change.

    Striking evidence for this view of Syrianus’ can be found in his commentary

    on Aristotle’s

    Metaphysics.

    He agrees with those “who assume that extension

    goes through the whole universe and receives in itself the whole nature of the

    body, and who say that it neither cuts the air nor is cut and divided together

    by it and other bodies, but that it is placed steady and firm and immobile,

    and detached from all change through the whole universe, conferring room

    and receptacle and boundary and outline and all suchlike upon all that fills the

    sensible universe. Those who hold this view say openly that this kind of space

    and extension is not a mathematical body, though like a mathematical

    body

    in

    respect of immateriality and immobility and impalpability and freedom from

    resistance and altogether from every quality subject to influence”.3’

    While discussing the nature of absolute space, Syrianus seems to disavow

    the Stoic doctrine of the total penetration of two bodies, which caused so much

    commotion in the Hellenistic world. In fact, however, he accepts this doctrine

    with some qualifications. He argues that two “immaterial” bodies,

    i.e.

    very

    tenuous ones, can co-exist in the same place, and the same holds for the

    interpenetration of a material body and an immaterial one. He gives a very

    instructive illustration:

    “Immaterial bodies are like lights emitted from

    different lamps and propagated throughout the same room, penetrating each

    other unmingled and undivided. These lights, though one would call them

    incorporeal; are yet extending together with the bodies and spreading like

    them in three dimensions, and there is nothing to hinder them and the bodies

    from occupying the same place, for the very reason that they are elementary

    and immaterial and are not split up when divided”.35 To these explanations

    Syrianus characteristically adds the following words: “This we say in order

    that some of the strange doctrines of the physicists should not frighten us,

    who transfer to the whole of extended nature the properties of material and

    resistant bodies that are subject to influence”.”

    Syrianus’ illustration of the interpenetrating lightbeams apparently induced

    some association of ideas in his pupil Proclus, who based his systematic

    doctrine of absolute space on the concept of light. Proclus’ exposition is

    quoted in detail by Simplicius, who enters into a lengthy polemic with him.3’

    “Ibid.

    637 26-28.

    “Syrianus

    M et.

    84; 31-85 3. Here and below “room” translates choru.

    ‘5/hid. 85 19-25.

    ‘6/bid . 85 28-3 1.

    “Simplicius f’hys. 611 10-614.7.

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    Proclus, like his predecessors, rejects Aristotle’s concept of place. He declares

    the primary place of a body to be the spatial extension between the

    boundaries of its receptacle; it has to be regarded as a reality, for otherwise

    the concept of locomotion, of movement from one place to another, would lose

    its meaning. Furthermore, the level of reality of this specific extension does

    not differ essentially from that of the extension of the whole universe.

    Iamblichus had emphasized the incorporeal character of space for two

    reasons -

    the superiority of the encompassing to the material encompassed,

    and the comparison of space with divinity. In contradistinction to this,

    Pro&s, like Syrianus, regarded space as a corporeal entity, in conformity with

    the Platonic tradition according to which interaction is possible only between

    entities of the same kind. By analogy with the well-known thesis that the

    human eye could not perceive the light of the sun were it not itself a luminous

    object, it stands to reason that space could not exert any influence on bodies in

    space were it not itself of a corporeal nature. This is the first link in Proclus’

    logical chain of arguments, which continues as follows: space must be a body

    at rest, for were it in motion, there would need to exist another space in order

    to define this motion, and this would lead to an infinite sequence of spaces. If,

    however, space is at rest, it follows that it must be indivisible. For every

    divisible body moves along the sides of the body dividing it, air, for instance,

    along the sides of a missile, or water along those of a sailing boat. Consequently,

    the concept “a divisible body at rest” contains a contradiction in terms, and

    thus space must be an indivisible body. If this is the case, it is either a material

    body or an immaterial body. Proclus defines a material body as a body which

    reacts on another body because of its susceptibility to influences, and what

    characterizes such influences is precisely the property of divisibility. Space

    must thus be an immateriaI body, i.e. a passive non-reacting body without any

    resistive power whatsoever. The final result is that space is an indivisible,

    immaterial body in the state of rest.

    Here Proclus introduces light as the most elementary and immaterial of

    bodies in order to explain the total interpenetration of space and body, which

    are both of a corporeal nature. Plato himself, he says, had declared light to be

    a kind of fire, less corporeal than a flame, fire itself being the most tenuous of

    all the elements.38 Space is thus nothing but light, the purest of all bodies. And

    Proclus continues: “Let us now suppose two spheres, one made of light and

    the other of many bodies, both equal in volume. One of them is placed at the

    centre of the universe, and the other immersed in the first sphere. The whole

    universe will thus be seen in its place in the immobile light. As a whole it will

    be immobile, so as to imitate space, but each of its parts will be moving, so

    that in this respect the universe will be inferior to space”.Jg

    “Plato, Timaeus 58~.

    ‘ mplicius, Phys. 612,29-35.

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    Proclus’ sphere of light constitutes an ancient version of absolute space,

    or, in modern terminology, the general reference system whose absolute rest

    furnishes a constant coordinate system to which one can refer the various

    movements of bodies in the physical world. As is well known, in the 19th

    century physicists were still looking for a concrete representation of Newton’s

    absolute space. Some thought to have discovered it in the hypothetical aether,

    others even postulated the existence of a body in a state of absolute rest, as

    did Carl Neumann in 1875, who gave this body the name “the body Alpha”.

    What is the nature of the sphere of light which represents absolute space? It

    cannot be the light of the sun, for the sun is a part of the physical world, one of

    the partial worlds immersed in that sphere. This light must rather be of a

    primary character, and Proclus recalls the myth at the end of the

    Republic,

    where the wanderers “could see a line of light, like a column let down from

    above, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in

    colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer”.‘O

    In this connection Proclus also quotes the Chaldean Oracles, which say of

    the primal Soul that “on high it animates light, fire, aether, the worlds”, the

    inference being that this kind of light is above the empyrean, aetherial and

    material regions. It is “the light which received first the eternal allotments of

    the gods and manifested in itself revelatory visions to those who deserve it”.”

    It is not altogether out of the question that these words were influenced by the

    Jewish literature of two or three centuries before Proclus, in which the nature

    of the light created on the first day of Creation was discussed; this light, it

    was said,‘2 had been concealed by God because of the wickedness of the early

    generations of man, but He would reveal it to the righteous in days to come.

    Proclus adds another remarkable comment to his explanation: in this light,

    the shapeless things acquire shape and it causes unextended things to be

    extended; it thus may well be said that topos hints at space as being a certain

    typos (shape, matrix) of the whole cosmic body.43 We shall see presently that

    this play upon words acquired an even deeper significance in Damascius’ theory

    of space.

    Darnascius was the last head of the Platonic Academy; on its closure by

    Justinian in 529, he left Athens for exile in Persia with his pupil Simplicius and

    a few other scholars. They returned to Athens after a short time, where, from

    about 535 on, Simplicius continued his commentaries on Aristotle’s writings.

    A considerable part of Simplicius’ Corrolar ium de loco in his commentary on

    Aristotle’s Physica” contains critical comments of his own on the subject.

    His exposition amounts to a penetrating and comprehensive analysis of the

    ‘@Plato,Republic 616b.

    “Simplicius, Ph_w.~613,3-7.

    ‘*Genesis Rabba iii, 6; Hagiga 12a

    “Simplicius, Phys. 613,7-10.

    “Ibid. 601-645.

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    183

    notion of absolute space, finally resulting in a complete rejection of Aristotle’s

    conception of place. It is worth mentioning that his conclusions are almost

    identical with those of his contemporary and sworn enemy John Philoponus,

    the Christian Neoplatonic who held the chair of philosophy in Alexandria.

    Some of Simplicius’ words may be quoted here in full: “There exists one

    single extension which penetrates into all things and receives with its different

    parts all the various bodies. For the wine jar is in a certain extension penetrating

    that of the body of the jar as well as the body of the wine, and when it is shifted,

    the extension will not be carried along with the jar, but the jar is translated

    from one part of the extension to another. This extension, since it is of a

    separate nature, is fixed and immobile”.‘5

    Simplicius compares this extension, i.e. absolute space, to a receptacie at

    rest: “

    . ..the whole extension with every part of it, which always receives the

    bodies that happen to be in it, is immobile; it is like the immobile channels

    through which water flows, whereby at different times the water is contained

    by another part of the channel without carrying with itself the former part of

    that charmel”.4B Simplicius also clearly polemizes against Aristotle: “There is

    nothing absurd about two lumps of matter being in one and the same place,

    for matter does not exclude mutual interpenetration. Nor is it absurd for two

    extensions to co-exist in the same place, if one of them is corporeal, the other

    void, one a kind of room, the other something in the room. For its seems that

    extension has four meanings: (1) one that does not include a spatial dimension,

    such as the boundary of the extension; (2) extension as an idea, such as the

    mathematical body; (3) material extension possessing physical qualities and

    resistances, for instance, the body; (4) material extension, but without qualities

    in any respect, and incorporeal [...I Space is not plain extension, but it is an

    extended room”.”

    Let us compare this with one sentence from Philoponus’

    elaborate and devastating polemic against Aristotle: “We do not maintain that

    extension is a body, but that it is the room of a body and mere empty

    dimensions without any substance and matter”.”

    Whereas Simplicius’ analysis is in the main a summary of a conceptual

    crystallization extending over many generations, Damascius’ theory contains

    an important innovation insofar as his concept of place implies the elucidation

    of its connection with that of position. Damascius’ theory of space is part of

    a comprehensive theory of entities which in the intelligible wor d are unextended,

    but which acquire extension when they descend into the physical world.4g The

    three unextended and indivisible magnitudes in the intelligible world are the

    45Ib i d . 78 4-g.

    ‘OIbid. 21.20-24.

    “Ibid. 623 12-20.

    “Philoponus, Ph ys. 577 15-16.

    “Simplicius,

    Ph ys. 624.37-625 24; 644

    10-645,

    14.

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    Studies in H istory and Phil osophy of Science

    numerical monad, the “now” and the spatial point. In our world the numerical

    monad is transformed into the plurality of numbers, and the sequence of

    integers clearly exhibits a definite order, for instance, the alternation of odd

    and even numbers, or the interval between square numbers, which each time

    increases by two. This well-ordered arrangement of the series of integers is

    based on the significance of the position of every term in that series. In the case

    of the transition from the pointlike “now” to the linear extension of time, one

    can also apprehend that the flux of physical time is marked by the fixed

    position of each of its events. Finally, through the transformation of the

    intelligible spatial point into a section of finite length, the spatial extension of

    the physical world is created, which has three dimensions and is the measure

    of the position of body as a whole as well as the position of its parts relative to

    that whole and to each other.

    Damascius’ theory of space centres around this idea of his that space

    measures the position of bodies and thus endows everything in it with its

    specific structure. Space is the cause of the structure of bodies, the cause of the

    structural differentiations and the symmetrical or asymmetrical ramifications

    of bodies and their parts, which are the sum total of their relative positions.

    Space forces a definite length upon every extended thing, a length which falls

    to its share within the frame of the Whole. It also forces a definite structure

    upon every body, a structure in consequence of which its left side differs from

    its right side; for instance, the heart of an animal being on the left and its liver

    on the right, the head of a man being up and his feet down.

    In Damascius’ conception, the full significance of that play upon words

    mentioned before comes into its own:

    topos

    is

    typos.

    “Space is, so to say, a

    kind of outline of position as a whole and of its parts, and, as it were, a matrix

    into which the thing situated must fit, should it be suitably situated and not be

    confounded and behave contrary to nature.“5” The shaping power of

    Damascius’ space can be recognized by the structure of bodies in space,

    precisely as the divine power of Iamblichus’ space can be recognized by the

    coherence of the bodies encompassed by it.

    This space of Damascius is an absolute space; it is nothing other than

    Proclus’ primary and extended light, as is shown by a passage of his treatise

    De primis principiis: “Space has three meanings, (1) an entity inferior to its

    content, as the light of the sun is said to be in the air; (2) an entity equal to its

    content, like the sun when we locate her in her own sphere as being in her

    place; (3) an entity superior to that contained in it, as the sun itself, which is

    contained in the extended light. This latter kind of space is space in the absolute

    sense, while the others are relative spaces”.”

    It may be worth drawing attention here to a certain similarity between

    “I bid. 645.7-10.

    “‘Damascius, Lkprimisprincipiis (ed. Ruelle) II, 219,21-220.2.

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    Damascius’ doctrine and Einstein’s theory of general relativity, according to

    which the metric of space determines the movement, and generally the

    behaviour, of bodies. However, one should not forget that in modern physics

    the superiority of the encompassing over the encompassed does not hold, but

    it is rather maintained that there exists a mutual influence between both. Today

    we are

    far from regarding matter as passive; on the contrary, it represents an

    enormous concentration of energy, and by virtue of this it imposes a definite

    metric upon the spatial (and temporal) surroundings of bodies, a metric which

    for its own part imposes upon bodies a definite dynamical behaviour in the

    neighbourhood of large concentrations of matter.

    Simplicius, following in the footsteps of his teacher Damascius, expounds in

    detail the notions of position and space and their relative and absolute

    significance; in this connection, he clarifies the relation between the whole and

    its parts. By means of striking illustrations, he succeeds in analyzing cases

    where the relative positions of the parts are conserved while the position of the

    whole changes. He uses a bold ideal experiment: “If somebody should displace

    the earth from its position around the centre of the universe, it would still

    keep the well-ordered arrangement of its proper parts within its proper whole,

    but then it would not occupy its position as a part of the universe. Therefore,

    were it set free as a whole, it would be carried towards the centre, although

    its parts would preserve their relative configuration, even if the earth itself

    happened to be outside the centre. Similarly, a man raised high in the air will

    keep the correct order of his proper parts, but no longer their order relative

    to the whole”.”

    In the course of his analysis, Simplicius emphasizes that everything must

    preserve its due place within the universe for as long as it continues to exist

    as an organic part of the whole; this is a statement conforming to the Stoic

    notion of universal harmony: “A specific thing everywhere is dead and lifeless

    if it is separated from the common whole and deprived from the union due to

    it with the whole; plants, for instance, even if one tears them up by their roots

    together with all their parts, will immediately wither away, having been

    separated from the common whole. For all things live through the one cosmic

    living Being. Thus, as long as each thing is rooted in the universe through the

    appropriate whole, it will live and be preserved, but if it is separated from

    the appropriate whole, it will be separated also from the common one”.53

    Most instructive is the parallel which Simplicius draws between intellectual

    time, as conceived by Iamblichus and his followers,5’ and absolute space,

    which he regards also as a kind of intelligible reality. He says: “As was

    explained, space has a twofold meaning: intrinsic space, existing absolutely for

    “Simplicius

    Phys. 627 32-628 2.

    “Ibid. 628.7-14.

    “Cf. Sambursky op cit. note 25 pp. 16Of.

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    St udi es in H i stor y and Phi l osophy of Science

    every body whether at rest or in motion, and that of becoming different at

    different times in the changes of place relative to the position of the universal

    system of the world. Intrinsic space, inasmuch as it is naturally united with

    Being, is hardly distinguishable from Being, whereas that which becomes

    different at different times, while Being remains the same, is easily noticeable

    and excites our faculty of discernment as to its otherness relative to Being.

    This is just like time, which also has a twofold nature: on the one hand

    measuring the intrinsic motion, on the other hand the external and active

    motion [...I And while the intrinsic motion is unknowable, the active is

    obvious”.55

    Simplicius wants to regard absolute space as an intelligible entity out of

    which there evolves relative and changing space. He adopts a simile which had

    been employed by his teacher Damascius, one which likens Becoming, i.e. the

    flux of time, to “a kind of unfolding, unwinding out of Being”.56 Admittedly,

    this mode of expression does not fit space quite as well as time; still, Simplicius

    repeats it in the following passage:

    “The intrinsic outline of the position of

    the Whole always remains the same, whether all the world moves or rests; and

    the multitude of the various changes of positions of this abiding Whole will be,

    so to say, a kind of unfolding”.57

    And Simplicius goes on to elaborate the

    analogy between space and time. Precisely as time is on the one hand intelligible,

    i.e.

    perpetual

    and abiding in the same position, and on the other hand physical,

    i.e.

    having its reality in generation and corruption, so space too measures on

    the one hand the intrinsic extension or position, and is of a permanent nature,

    and on the other hand the changing position, which has its existence in

    Becoming. 58

    Damascius, however, went still farther in his theory of time and declared the

    totality of changing time, “the river of becoming” whose waters are flowing

    from the beginning of creation till the end of days, to be a single reality

    existing as a simultaneous oneness .58 Man cannot be aware of this simultaneity,

    for his consciousness transforms the side-by-side of the parts of intelligible

    time into the one-after-the-other of the parts of physical time, consisting of

    past, present and future. In his

    Corollurium de tempore

    Simplicius makes one

    of the rare observations of a personal nature to be found in the literature of

    that period: “However, these words of Damascius [that becoming is a kind of

    unfolding of being] have not worried me so much as those he used to say to me,

    without convincing me, when he was still alive, namely, that time as a whole

    simultaneously exists in reality”.60

    ‘“Simplicius. Phys. 638.23-35.

    “I bi d. 775,30.

    “Ibid. 632.29-3

    1.

    “I bi d. 632.33-633.8.

    ‘ Cf. Sambursky, op. cit. note 25, p. 165.

    *OSimplicius, Phys. 775, 32-34.

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    Although Simplicius was not convinced by Damascius, he still arrived at an

    analogous formulation of the connection between relative and absolute space,

    which in its abstractness does not fall short of what Damascius said about time.

    Simplicius declares that “the single intrinsic position encompasses ah the

    positions of the whole universe”.61

    In other words: even if we are unable to

    attain an immediate and direct perception of absolute space, we can still

    perceive it indirectly as the sum total of all the varying positions in physical

    space. Behind all these relative positions which ever happened to be realized in

    the past or are yet to be realized in the future, there is hidden the position of

    absolute space, as the permanent and unchangeable mean. This definition of

    Simplicius doubtless constitutes the pinnacle of his doctrine of space.

    The lesson which can be drawn from the story of the concepts of space in the

    doctrines of the late Neoplatonists - a story which could be told here only

    in a rather cursory way - is that even the historical development of this

    notion alone is fraught with problems which transcend physical and epistemol-

    ogical considerations and enter into the realm of metaphysical reflections.

    Porphyry formulated it very strikingly: “It is not the business of the physicist

    to inquire whether there exist principles of physical things, but this is the

    business of him who ascends to a higher level of knowledge. For the physicist

    makes use of them as given data. And still more it could be said that it is the

    business of the man on the higher level to inquire of what kind these principles

    are [. . . for the cognition of the causes of his own principles transcends the

    capacities of the physicist and belongs to a domain of higher knowledge - that

    of metaphysics”.62

    I srael Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem

    “Ibid. 632.31-32.

    “fbid. 9 11-13; 15.32-34.