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StudiesinIntelligence

Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Unclassified articles f rom Studies in IntelligenceVolume 54, Number 2

(June 2010)

Center for theStudy ofIntelligence

In the Se rvice of Empire: Imperial ism and the B rit ish S py

Thriller, 19011914

Office of Strateg ic Se rvices Training Durin g World War II

Claire Lee Chen nau lt and the Problem of

Intel ligen ce in China

The Frenc h Nap oleonic Staff View of HUMINT

A Conve rsat ion w ith Forme r CIA Director Michael Hayd en

Lessons for Intel ligenc e Supp ort to Pol icyma king during

Crises

Rev i ewed:

Opera t ion Hotel Ca l i fornia: The Clan des t ine War Ins ide

Ir a q

Decip h er in g t h e R isin g Su n: Na vy a n d Ma r in e Corp s Cod e-

br ea k er s, Tr a nsla t or s, a n d In t er p r eter s in t he Pa ci fi c Wa r

Securin g th e Ci ty: Ins ide Am ericas Bes t Counter t error

ForceTh e NYP D

The Intell ige nce Office rs Books he lf
http://%28u%29%20chambers-oss%20training%20in%20wwii.pdf/http://%28u%29%20bergin-chennault%20and%20intelligence-v2.pdf/http://%28u%29%20bergin-chennault%20and%20intelligence-v2.pdf/http://%28u%29%20chambers-oss%20training%20in%20wwii.pdf/http://%28u%29%20bergin-chennault%20and%20intelligence-v2.pdf/


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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2010)

CSIs Missio n In 1974, Director of Centr al In telligence J am es Schlesinger app roved th e estab-lishm ent of the Center for th e Stu dy of Intelligence (CSI) in order t o have within

CIA an organization t hat could think thr ough th e functions of intelligence and

bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems. The center,

compr ising pr ofessiona l historians an d experienced pr actitioners, at tempt s to

document lessons learned from pa st a ctivities, to explore t he n eeds an d expecta-

tions of int elligence consumers, a nd t o stimulate ser ious deba te a bout cur rent

and futur e int elligence challenges.

To carry out th is mission, CSI publishes S tud ies in I ntelligence, as well as

nu merous books a nd m onograph s addr essing historical, operat ional, doctrina l

and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers th e CIA

Museu m a nd m ain ta ins t he Agencys Hist orical Int elligence Collection of pub -

lished litera tu re on intelligence.

Contributions S tud ies in I ntelligence welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communica-tions. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be

mailed t o:

Editor

S tud ies in Intelligence

Center for th e Stu dy of Int elligence

Central Intelligence Agency


Awards The Sh erma n Kent Award of $3,500 is offered a nn ua lly for th e most signifi-can t cont ribut ion to th e li terat ure of intelligence submitted for publicat ion in

Studies. The pr ize may be divided if two or more a rt icles ar e judged t o be of

equal mer it , or i t may be with held if no ar ticle is deemed sufficiently out sta nd-

ing. An additional a mount is available for other p rizes.

Another monetar y award is given in th e na me of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the

graduat e or un dergraduate s tu dent who has wri t ten the best ar t icle on an

intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise an nounced from year t o year, articles on a ny subject with in th e

ran ge ofStudies purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the

award s. They will be judged prima rily on su bstan tive originality and sound ness,secondarily on literar y qua lities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are

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The Edit orial Boar d welcomes read ers nomina tions for awa rds.


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EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for Studies in Intelligence maybe written on any historical, opera-tional, doctrinal, or theoretical aspectof intelligence.

The final responsibility for acceptingor rejecting an article rests with theEditorial Board.

The criterion for publication iswhether, in the opinion of the Board,the article makes a contribution to the

literature of intelligence.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Peter S. Usowski, Chairman

Pamela S. Barry

Nicholas Dujmovic

Eric N. Heller

John McLaughlin

Matthew J. Ouimet

Valerie P.

Michael RichterMichael L. Rosenthal

Barry G. Royden

Ursula M. WilderMembers of the Board are drawn from theCentral Intelligence Agency and otherIntelligence Community components.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Andres Vaart, Editor

C O N T E N T SCENTERfor the STUDYofINTELLIGENCE


Vol. 54, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2010) ii

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Of N ovels, In telligence and Policym akin g

In the Se rvice of Empire: Imperial ism and the

Britis h Spy Thriller, 19011914 1Dr. Christopher R. Moran an d Dr. Robert J ohnson

Trainin g for War and Espionage

Office o f Strategic S ervices Training During

World War II 23Dr. J ohn Whiteclay Chambers II

A Win dow on the Developm ent of Modern Intell igence

Claire Lee Chen nau lt and the Problem of Intel li -

gence in China 49Bob Bergin

A Historical Perspective on In tell igence

The French Napoleonic

Staff View of HUMINT 59

As tr an slated from Germa n by Rick Sa nders

INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW

R eflections on S ervice

A Conve rsat ion w ith Forme r CIA

Director Michae l Hayde n 63Mark Mansfield

Workin g for the War Czar

Lessons for Intel ligenc e Sup port to Pol icymak-ing during Crises 71Pa ul D. Miller


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iv Vol. 54, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2010)

INTELLIGENCE IN PUBLIC LITERATURE

Operat ion Hotel Ca l i fornia: The Clan des t ine War

In sid e Ir a q 79Matthew P

Decip h er in g th e R ising Su n: Na vy a n d Ma r ine

Corps Codebreak ers , Tran s la tors , an d Interpre t -

er s in the Pa ci fi c War 83Stephen C. Mercado

Securin g t he Ci ty: Ins ide Am erica s Bes t Counter-

t er r or For ceThe N YPD 87Reviewed by Stephen J. Garber

The Intell ige nce Officers Boo ksh elf 89Compiled an d Reviewed by Ha yden B. Peak e


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Contributors

Vol. 54, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2010)v

Bob Ber g in is a former foreign service officer wh o has spent ma ny years in Tha i-

land. He ha s written on t he history of aviation in South east Asia a nd China and

on operat ions of th e OSS in th at region.

Dr . J oh n Wh it ecla y Ch a m ber s II is Pr ofessor of Hist ory a t Rutgers Un iversity,

New Br un swick, New J ersey. He is a lso editor-in-chief ofTh e Oxford Comp anion

to Am erican Military Hist ory and aut hor most recently ofOSS Training in the Na

tional Park s and S ervice Abroad in World War II, a report for th e National Par k

Service, with a n u pdat ed version t o be published by Rutgers Un iversity Pr ess.

S te ph e n J . Gar be r is acting Chief Historian a t th e National Aeronau tics an d

Space Administ ra tion in Washin gton, DC. He ha s ma sters degrees in Pu blic an d

Int erna tional Affairs from th e University of Pitt sbur gh an d in Science and Tech-

nology Stu dies from Virginia Tech.

Dr . R ober t J oh n son is Lectu rer in t he H istory of War at th e University of Oxford.

He ha s part icular in terest in World War I, the Indian Arm y, an d conflict in Centr al

and South Asia.

Ma r k Ma n sfi el d is CIA officer-in-residence at Un iversity of Miami. Dur ing 2006

2009, he was CIAs Director of Public Affairs.

Stephen C. Mercad o serves in t he Open Sour ce Center of th e Director of Nat iona l

Int elligence. He is a frequent , and a ward -winning, contribut or to Studies.

P a u l D . Mi l ler is an an alyst wit h th e CIAs Directorate of Intelligence.

Dr . Ch r is top h er R . Mo r a n is a resear ch scholar at th e University of Warwick.

He focuses on th e development of governm ent secrecy in Cold War Brita in. Int er-

ests in clude spy fiction an d growth of int elligence commun ities in t he 20t h cent ur y

Ma t t h ew P . is a clandes tin e service officer a ssigned t o th e CIA Hist ory Sta ff.

Ha yd en B. P ea k e is cur at or of th e CIA Hist orical In telligence Collection. He h asserved in th e CIAs Directora te of Science an d Technology and th e Directorat e of

Operations.

R ick S a n d er s is sen ior DIA officer on d eta il to CIA. He is a ret ired U S Army Re-

serve colonel a nd foreign a rea officer.


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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) 1

All st at em ents of fact, op in ion , or an alys is exp ressed in th is ar ticle are t hose of the

auth ors. Nothin g in the article should be constru ed as asserting or im plying US gov-

ernment endorsem ent of an art icles factual st atements a nd interpretations.

Of Novels, Intelligence and Policymaking

In th e S ervice of Emp ire: Imp erial ism a nd the

Britis h Sp y Thriller, 19011914Dr. Christopher R. Moran and Dr. Robert Johnson

In the decade before theFirst World War, the

British spy thriller was acultural phenomenon

drawing large andexpectant readerships

across all classes.

In t he decade before t he First

World War, th e Brit ish spy

th riller was a cultur al phenom-

enon dr awing large and expect-

an t reader ships across all

classes an d cat apult ing its

au th ors t o prominence as

spokesmen for t hen widelyprevalent concerns a bout impe-

rial st rength, n at ional power,

an d foreign espionage. Three

hun dred is a conservative esti-

ma te of th e nu mber of spy nov-

els that went into print between

1901 and 1914. This ar ticle

reflects u pon some of th e semi-na l publicat ions from t he

period, including Rudyar d

Kiplings Kim (1901), th e ta le of

a str eetwise orpha n who tr ainsas a spy and becomes em broiled

in t he int elligence duel on

India s North -West F rontier ;

Er skine Ch ilderss The Riddle

of the Sand s (1903), th e st ory of

two gent leman yacht smen who,

cruising in the North Sea,

stum ble upon a secret Germa n

plot t o invade En glan d; and

William le Qu euxs S pies of the

Kaiser(1909), a dire prophecy

of Germ an espiona ge inadva nce of an invas ion.

In r ecent years, int elligence

historians have become increas-

ingly inter ested in spy fiction. A

sur e sign of this was a special

issue of th e jour na l,In tell i-

gence and N ational S ecurity,

published in 2008, devoted

ent irely to Spying in Film an d

Fiction. Anoth er indicator wa s

the a ppeara nce in J une 2009 of

a supplementa l edition ofS tud -ies in Intelligence in which pra c

ticing in t elligence officers

consider ed contem porar y fic-

tion in litera tu re, film, an d tele-

vision.

Hist oriograph y on t he su bject

has tended to hinge on t he issue

of realism or, put an other way,

the symbiosis between rea l

spies an d fictional spies. In

keeping with t he growing influ-ence of new lit era ry h istori-

cism, which seeks to

demonstr at e how both can oni-

cal literat ure an d, perha ps even

more so, low or popular

works can be qua rr ied for his-

torical mean ing, scholar s like

Allan Hepburn have scruti-

nized Kim and The Riddle to

see whether th ey reconst itut e

th e int elligence cycle with

accuracy or even disclose

tradecraft. 1

In Th e Great Gam e: Th e

Myt hs and R eali ty of Esp io-

nage, Fred H itz, a form er

inspector genera l of the Cen-


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British Spy Thrillers

2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010)

tral Intelligence Agency, sug-gested th at ther e is a clear

overla p bet ween rea l int elli-

gence, and t he fiction of Kiplingand Childers. 2 In a r ecent ar t i-cle for th e J ourn al of Tr an sa t-

lantic Stud ies, Adam Svendsen

proposed tha t the works of

ma ny spy novelists offer a nea r

perfect window ont o intelli-

gence processes. 3 In a field

notorious for its lack of declassi-

fied material, Svendsen contin-

ues, int elligence hist ory would

be great ly enriched if scholars

invested a little more time

thu mbing th rough fictitious

ren derings of th e sub rosa

world. The fact t hat ma ny

aut hors were themselves veter-

an s of int elligence is frequ ent ly

highlighted t o add credibility to

th is sort of appr oach.

We ar e not , however, of th e

opinion t ha t t he spy thr iller ismim et ic of rea l-life spying.

While gener ally t ru e-to-life

when it comes to th e period

det ails of int elligence (dis-

guises, sk et ch-books, etc.), spy

novels a re a ffected by comm er-cial concern s such as t he need

for dr ama tic impact. As th e

best-selling spy writer Gr aha m

Greene concedes: A novel

based on life in Secret Service

must necessarily cont ain alar ge elemen t of fan ta sy. As

outsiders, moreover, how can

we hope to distin guish, with

any certa inty, the aut hent ic

intrigue nar rat ives from the

apocryphal yarn s dressed up a s

real? The words of Allen

Dulles, former director of th e

CIA, seem a pposite: The opera -tions of an int elligence service

an d th e plots of most spy st o-

ries par t compa ny, never tomeet a gain.4

Rather t han appraising fin de

sicle spy novels as docum ent a-

tion for th e scholar of int elli-

gence (and then immediately

finding t hem want ing), we will

consider th e hist orical cont ext

within which they were pro-

duced a nd r eceived. Wha t inter-ests us a bout these texts is that

th ey reflected rea l geopolitical

anxieties that existed at the

time. Set against t he backdrop

of th e Grea t Ga me, th e pro-

tr acted s tr at egic conflict

between Britain, Fran ce, and

Tsarist Russia in Cent ra l Asia,

Kim is dark m editation on Rus-

sian imperial expansion a nd

intrigues toward India. Brewed

within th e atm osphere ofnat iona l soul-searching at t he

end of th e Boer Wa r, The Rid-

d le is a prophet ic vision of the

Great War, making graspa ble

th e growing capa city of Ger-

many as an adversarial seapower. S pies of th e Kaiser,

mea nwh ile, ostensibly chr oni-

cled th e dis covery of foreign

espionage networks at a time

when m inds were increasingly

cent ered on th e actual ma chi-na tions of Germ an int elligence.

We cont end in t his ar ticle tha t

ear ly 20th centu ry spy fiction

was designed, a bove a ll else, to

alert both t he government and

th e people of En gland t o the

vulnerabilities of the British

Empire.

Una sha medly patriotic, their

political sensibilities finely

tu ned t o th e caden ces of impe-

rial decline, authors wanted to

see more being done by theauthorities. 5 For exam ple,

Kipling supported Lord R ob-

ert ss call for a more r obust

defense of Empir e; Childers

sought t o gar ner public opinionin supp ort of new na val bases

an d a r apid expansion of th e

fleet; and le Queux deman ded

th e creat ion of a domest ic intel-

ligence service to comba t th e

German ogre, an enemy with

whom th e day of reckoning was

inevitable. We will also show

here that certain aut hors

quickly realized t hat whipping

up popular concern s was a prof-

itable enterpr ise. Le Queux was

by far the wiliest, reaping mas-

sive financial rewards by sensa-

tionalizing the extant threats

facing the n ation.

Admitt edly, this is not ent irely

new ground. In t heir larger his-

tories of th e British in telli-gence comm un ity, Chr istopher

Andrew an d Bernar d Port er

ha ve both s hown convincingly

how popular a ut hors from th e

period were implicated in the

business of scare-mongering,

giving voice to a ra nge of publicanxieties, from the vulnerabil-

ity of Brit ain s defensive prep a-

ra tions t o the s pecter of foreign

espionage.6 David F rench,

David Trott er, an d NicholasHiley ha ve also provided impor-

ta nt cont ribut ions on the role of

spy fiction in st irr ing up a h or-

net s n est of tens ion before th e

First World War. 7

We nevertheless feel that

there ar e two avenues that

Unashamedly patriotic, their political sensibilities finely tunedto the cadences of imperial decline, authors wanted to seemore being done by the authorities.


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require furt her a nalysis. First,

ther e is a tendency in t he exist-

ing literat ure to suggest tha t

the th reat s discussed in spy fic-

tion ha d little or no groundingin r eality. Authors, it is often

said, were spinning mysteries

out of airy noth ings, so moti-

vated wer e th ey by comm ercial

gains. Yet su ch a judgm entseems too conclusive: ther e is a

difference between exaggera -

tion a nd pur e invention. Rus-

sia did ann ex strat egically

sensitive ar eas in Cent ral Asia

with th e intent ion of putt ing

diplomat ic pressure on Britain;

German y was building a batt le-

fleet wit h wh ich t o cha llenge

Brit ish imper ial hegemony.

Auth ors, moreover, recognized

tha t th e best an d most profit-

able fant asy conveyed some r eal

t ru th .

Second ly, we would lik e t o

show how cert ain spy novels

carried huge weight in th edefense councils of Empire, pre-

cipita tin g significant cha nges in

actu al policyma king. Alth oughhistorically, officials demurred

at giving credence to works of

fiction, between 1901 an d 1914,

th e opposite was t rue: intr igue

narr atives were taken seri-

ously in t he corridor s of power.

I. Kim a nd t he Ex t ern a l

Threa t to Emp ire

In Kiplings en igmat ic story

Kim , the orpha ned boy with

mixed parent age is perfectly

suited t o move between t he

world of Eur opeans a nd t he

people of th e colony an d, as

such, is by far th e best as set for

ma inta ining surveillan ce and

gather ing HU MINT. 8 Chal-

lenged by Colonel

Creight on, t he fic-tional h ead of th e

Intelligence Depart -

ment , to join his tea m

of tr ain ed local

agents, his missions

ranged from eaves-

dropping to the inter -

ception of sedit ious

messa ges. Kipling

gave moral backing to

int elligence work by

suggesting tha t it

safeguar ded th eempire and t hwarted

heinous plots. Mah -

bub Ali reassu res

Kim tha t h is delivery

of a k ey messa ge

ensu red: The gam e is

well played. That wa r

is done n ow an d t he evil wehope nipped before the flower,

than ks to me and t hee.

The litera tu re on Kim is volu-

minous and well-trodden. 9 Crit-

ics of colonial d iscour se point to

a r an ge of mora l flaws in

Kiplin gs work . 10 Edward Said,

who in 2000 wrote an int roduc-

tion to a repr int ed edition, felt

tha t orienta list values perme-

at ed the n ovel to the extent

tha t it was a m ast erwork ofimperialism.11

Other scholars have dis-

missed the idea tha t Kim con-

ta ins a ny reality at all. Gerald

Morga n believed tha t it owed

practically everything toKiplings ima gina tion; th e only

thing that was not an inven-

tion was h is use of the t erm

The Grea t Ga me.12 Morgan

argued t here was n o secretworld of intelligence t hr ough-

out eith er northern India or

Centra l Asia. He argued th at

even th e Indian Survey Depart -

ment , employing a num ber of

Asian agents, was n ot engaged

in intelligence work, stating

tha t it was str ictly limited to

gath ering topograph ical infor-

ma tion. Morga n played down

the importan ce of th e actual

Intelligence Depart ment in

India, maintaining that its

ta sks were only really th ose of

collat ing in form at ion, whilst

the Political Service, formed in

1820, was little more th an a

diploma tic corps designed to

send a gents t o neighboring

states. 13

Certain spy novels carried huge weight in the defense councilsof Empire, precipitating significant changes in actual policy-making.

Drawin g of Rudyar d Kipling published in Th e Book-m an in 1903. Lebrecht /Corbis


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Agent s r ar ely collected infor-mat ion on the Russians an d

had n o powers to make tr ea-

ties. Their special duty wascarr ied out qu ite openly with

lett ers of intr oduction for t he

ru lers t hey visited. Brit ish offic-

ers, meanwhile, never ent ered

Russian t erritory without per-

mission. Morgan even ques-

tioned th e success of th e actua l

int elligence officers, doubtin g if

there was anything tha t th ey

rea lly achieved, beyond gat her -

ing t idbits of geograph ical

knowledge. 14

II . Refl ect ions of R ea l i t y in

Kip l in gs Kim

If, as we suggest, spy th rillers

reflected a nxieties an d aspira -

tions of th e period, to what

extent does Kim fulfill these

concern s? Kim is port ra yed as aboy fam iliar with in tr igue. Ini-

tia lly, he a cts as a courier even

though he did not underst and

the cont ents of the messa ges he

carr ied, for wha t he loved was

th e game for its own sa ke.15

Over t ime, however, he is

dra wn deeper int o th e world of

espiona ge. He delivers a vita l

documen t to the h ead of Brit-

ish int elligence in In dia. Its

cont ents revealed t he a ctivities

of a H indu ban ker in Pesha -war, a firm of gun m ak ers in

Belgium and an importan t

semi-independent Moham -

medan ruler.16 For spy chiefs,

the documen t h ighlight ed a cat-

alogue of th reat s: Imperial Rus-

sia, disloyal India ns in

positions of influence, an d gun -ru nn ers from Eur ope who could

supply th e latest firear ms t o an

India n force. The reference t o a

Moha mmeda n ru ler not onlyevoked concerns t ha t a p rincely

sta te m ight secretly foster sedi-

tion a gainst t he Raj in defiance

of Brit ish pa ra mount cy, but also

drew on imper ial Islam ophobia.

In th e novels clima x, Kim

steals th e plans of a Russian

and a Frenchman, who are car-rying out clandestine su rvey

work on th e mounta in

approaches t o India. He passes

th em, at th e cost of his cover

an d a lmost h is lifeto Colonel

Creight on back in Simla. Her e,

Kipling art iculat ed a deep-

seat ed an xiety of th e period. In

1894, th e Fr an co-Russia n Alli-

an ce brought t ogether Br ita ins

chief colonia l rivals a nd r aised

the specter th at Britain mightha ve to wage war on several

front s. Between 1894 and 1899,

when th e novel was writt en, the

Russian arm y marched into the

Pamirs and, at Somat ash,

clashed with the Afghans,whom Br itain was pledged to

protect.

Anxieties in Whiteh all about a

Russian t hreat to the landward

border s of India can be tr aced

back to th e 1830s. They were

magnified, however, from the

1870s onwards by the Tsarist

ann exation of th e khan at es of

th e old Silk Rout e, which

brought t he Russians closer to

the subcontinent. Statesmen

an d milita ry planners faced an

all t oo fam iliar in telligence

dilemma : what were th e

enemys r eal int entions an d

capabilities in the region, and

what should the response be?

While some deplored alar mist

reactions t o Russian expan -

sion, other s pointed t o evidence

of more sinist er designs: th e

discovery of secret Ru ssian mil-

ita ry plan s (1886); border skir-

mish es between th e Tsars

forces a nd Br ita ins Afgha n

allies (1885, 1892, and 1894);

an d th e ar rival of shootin g par-

ties, scient ific explorer s, an d

arm ed Cossack patr ols in themount ain pa sses on Indias

northern border (1887 and

1888). Such groups seem ed to

suggest an intent ion to stir up

th e peoples of Sout h Asia

against British ru le, perha ps as

a pr elude to a more serious

attack through Afghanistan.

Although the British ha d

ma naged to crush the Indian

Mutiny in 1857, there waswidespread concern th at they

might h ave to fight a border

war against tr ibesmen and Rus-

sian forces, while tr ying to sup-

press an internal r evolt at the

sam e time. This inter na l

dimension is often overlooked,

but t he m ood of th e Indian pop-

ulat ion was an importan t ele-

ment in t he calculat ions of th e

British aut horities.

Kipling was certa inly well-

informed a bout th e Great

Game. As a young journ alist a t

Simla, he read Maj. Gen.

Ch ar les MacGregors Defence of

In d ia (1884), which was

regarded as the h andbook of

th e ha wkish Forwa rd S chool.

[The documents] contents revealed the activities of a Hindubanker in Peshawar, a firm of gun makers in Belgium and animportant semi-independent Mohammedan ruler.


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He was a lso briefed on t he Ru s-

sian th reat to the borders of

India by Maj. Gen. (lat er Lord)

Frederick Roberts, commander-

in-chief of the Indian Army.Affectionately known as Our

Bobs, Robert s was a na tional

her o, celebrat ed in novels,

paintings, and music. Kipling

was in Simla with Robertswhen t he Penjdeh Incident

occurreda moment when war

with Russia a ppeared to be

imm inent . Moreover, Kipling

knew that the frequent skir-

mishes on the North-West

Fr ontier wer e fought to pacify

the t ribesmen who lived astr ide

th e poten tia l lines of comm un i-

cations into Afghanistan,

wher e, according to Robert s, the

British India n Army would

have to fight the Ru ssians.

Robert s a dvocated a Scien-

tific Frontier for India, not

along the a dministra tive line

which mar ked th e political bor-

der of India , but deep inside

Afghanista n a long the wat er-shed of the Hindu Kush. Dis-

guised as a native, Kipling

emulated the Great Game

agents t o move among the

Afghans and Pathans. 17 He vis-

ited Jamrud and interviewed

soldiers with experience in fron-tier wa rfare. He gleaned infor-

ma tion t hrough th e social

events of Simla. Kipling also

drew inspir at ion from hiking in

the Himalayan foothills.In deed, t he clima x of Kims mis -

sion is acted out in th e same

remote mount ain setting.

Kiplings conver sa tions wit h

Roberts were critical in shap-

in g Kim . Robert s believed th at

the Russian thr eat to India was

the single most importan t fea-

tu re of Imper ial defense. He

drafted no less tha n 20 report s

on the defense of India between

1877 and 1893, advocated a n

increase in t he size of th e

India n Army (especially Brit-

ish bat ta lions), and cham pi-

oned t he creat ion of an Indian

Int elligence Bra nch t o scout

beyond th e frontier.18 As an

adm irer of Robert s, Kipling nat -

ur ally seized on thes e concernsan d adapt ed them in h is story. 19

To fash ion th e n ovels ba ck-

drop, Kipling used h is kn owl-

edge of Simla t o crea te both

atm osphere and character: the

slum s of Lah ore pr ovided th e

set tin g for Kims ea rly life,whilst Lurgan Sa hib was based

on th e Armen ian Jew, A.M.

J acob, who ar rived in th e can -

tonment in 1871, and who waslater r uined in 1891 after a pr o-

tr acted legal case with the

Nizam of Hyderabad. 20

In Kim , Kipling fus ed fic-

tional Brit ish int elligence oper-

at ions with the r eal work of th e

Indian Survey Departm ent,

which employed Asian a gents

with cryptonyms like The

Mirza or E5, to crea te a

hybrid organizat ion deeply

engaged in coun ter int elligence

activities on th e frontiers and

within th e Indian subcont i-

nent . Other tha n Colonel

Cre ight on (who, as Cont rol, is

na tu ra lly British), Kiplings

heroes are a ll Asian: the

Afghan horse tr ader, Mah bub

Ali; th e Indian ma ster of dis-

guises, Hur ree Babu; and the

mysterious agent E23. For

Kipling, it was essential t hat a

successful int elligence organ i-

zation r ecruited from a t arget

region em ployed expert lin-

guists a nd, where possible,

exploited t hose who alr eady

worked in t he enem ys sen ior

ranks.

The h irin g of local Asianagent s was comm on pra ctice.21

Attachs, consuls and news-

writersthe nam e given to

local spies hir ed by Brit ish

political officersgradually

becam e a more perma nent

arr angement . There were lis-

tening posts at Peshawar,Gilgit, Chitra l, Kandah ar,

Kabul, Tehra n, an d Meshed

from wh ere local a gents could

be dispatched. Ad hoc ar ra nge-ment s were made by more

nomadic expeditions too, for

example, by boun dar y comm is-

sions an d by agents t raversing

the Hindu Kush or Pamirs.

Indian m erchants could also

be used as th e eyes an d ears of

the Em pire. Ja mes Onley has

shown, with reference to the

Persian Gulf, that In dian mer-

chan ts were importa nt in creat-

ing access t o local elites an d

their networks, and pr ovided a

chea p an d useful tool for est ab-

lishing a presence and perha ps

influence.22 The Cont rol at

the consulat e at Meshed in

1887, Colonel C ha rles

MacLean, emp loyed Asian per-

In Kim, Kipling fused fictional British intelligence operationswith the real work of the Indian Survey Department, which em-ployed Asian agents with cryptonyms like The Mirza or E5.


14/114



sonnel in dangerous work.23

Hereport ed tha t two messengers

had been ar rested in Merv, a

sma ll oasis settlement in Rus-

sian Cen tr al Asia. Agents Ian d J were compr omised a nd

ha d to be discharged. An a gent

in r ing C went missin g in

November 1888 after being dis-

patched to get photos of Rus-

sian guns, tr oops an d

barracks.24

Accord ing t o Ma cLea nsrecords, there were systemat ic

searches at the border, and

despite pr ecau tions such a s

usin g invisible ink in mes -

sages, more agent s were going

missing. 25 The consuls duties

in Meshed were domina ted by

monitoring relations between

Afghanista n a nd Persia, but

th ey also involved keeping a

close watch on Russian Centra l

Asia, part icularly th e routestha t a ny tr oops destined for

India would ha ve to take. 26

Asian an d British agents,

newswriters and att achs all

sent t heir informa tion either

directly to the in telligence

departm ents of London a nd

Simla, or to th e Foreign Minis-

tr y of th e Governm ent of India ,

th e governor of th e Pun jab

(which had responsibility for

the North-West Frontier P rov-

ince unt il 1901) or, in t he case

of Persia an d th e Gulf, to the

Foreign Office. 27 The Indian

nat ive sur veyors, th e Pun -

dits, sent th eir geograph ical

mat erial t o the Topographical

and Sur vey Departm ent, some

of which was subsequ ent ly pub-lished. Copies of reports con-

taining intelligence with

potent ial milita ry value went t othe In dian In telligence Bran ch.

The need to gather intelli-

gence on Centra l Asia was t o

assu age consider able fear s of

Russian capabilities and int en-

tions a nd to detect a ny

att empts by Tsarist agents t o

convert the natives. This was

especially importan t in t he caseof th e Afghans a nd Pat han s,

who, living on or n ear th e fron-

tiers, were beyond th e full

reach of th e au thorities. The

mounta inous environmen t

made British fears about t he

security of th e front ier even

more acute.

III. Kip l in g a nd t he En em y

Within

The t argets of British intelli-gence in t he E mpire were n ot

ju st exter nal en em ies, bu t

internal subversives. Since all

empires a re, ultim at ely, cre-

at ed an d held by coercion, gat h-

ering int elligence about

potent ial or actua l threat s was

regarded as essential to th e

sur vival of Britain s E mpir e.

What is str iking about British

leader s, even in th e heyday ofimper ialism in t he 1890s, is

their consistent concern about

security. Joseph Chamberlain

wrote in 1898: We a re t he m ost

powerful Em pire in th e world,

but we ar e not a ll-powerful.28

The simple fact was th at the

colonial administrators were so

sma ll in nu mber th ey did not

ha ve the capacity to const ru ct

police stat es. Indeed, as Rich-ar d Popplewell point s out , ther e

was cont empt for t he sta te

appar at uses of Russia and

other Orient al despotism s: A

str ong aversion t o th e use ofspies was one of th e alien tr adi-

tions of governm ent which the

British brought to India.29

Tra cing nu mer ous episodes of

where th e British were badly

informed, he shows that they

sought t o avoid har assmen t of

th e people, concluding: Wha t

th ey could not afford was t o

alienate t he Indian pu blic on a

substa ntial scale. The maint e-

na nce of British rule in India

depended upon the acquies-

cence and pa rt icipat ion of th e

ruled.30

Kiplings In dia r eveals th e

depth of concern a bout th e

th reat t o th e Raj from the

na tive populat ion, which lin-gered beneat h t he sur face long

after t he tra umas of the Indian

Mut iny. The police were t ask ed

to detect subversionthey

would a chieve var ying degrees

of successbut the authorities

were also eager to influen ce theelites, the potential leaders of

revolt, a nd, wher e possible, to

sh ap e public opinion. As C.A.

Bayly argues, the idea was t o

regulate t he m eans of comm u-nication so as to establish an

emp ire of opinion.31

The sett ings in Kiplings work

are pr ecisely at the m ar gins of

aut hority in the informa tion

order, seeking out th e sinister

hidden ha nd of rebels an d for-

Since all empires are, ultimately, created and held by coercion,gathering intelligence about potential or actual threats was re-garded as essential to the survival of Britains Empire.


15/114



eigners. More tha n th at , the

as su mp tion of Kiplings Ind ia is

tha t disorder itself is threa ten-

ing, with no acknowledgemen t

of the inh erent ly undemocrat icna tu re of Brit ish colonial r ule

tha t would ma ke protest neces-

sary. Indeed, th ere was a ten-

dency to conflate pr otest an d

thr eat a nd to see all pubicexpressions of an ger an d fru s-

tr ation as indicat ive of latent

nat ive fanat icism. The sheer

size of the n at ive popula tion

mean t th at pu blic disorder ha d

to be tak en ser iously, and, as a

genera l ru le, prompt coercive

action was preferred. Muslims,

part icularly those ast ride the

frontier, were not only well

armed a nd num erous, but also

saw th e Afghan king as t heir

nat ura l leader or, in th e

extrem e, th e caliph of th e Ott o-

man Em pire.

When it came t o the intercep-

tion of nationalist agitators,

who began a bombing and

assas sination campa ign beforeth e First World War, ther e was

little enth usiasm to consider

political reform s. There were,

nevertheless, considerable

efforts t o tra ck down t he con-

spirators wh o were directing

the t errorist campaign fromoutside In dia. As Popplewell

ha s demonstr at ed, th is led to

the surveillance of agitating

movement s in Britain an d

Asia.32

Kiplings n ovel suffered t oo

from t his imper ial blind spot;

ther e is no sense th at the con-

spirators with which Kim a nd

his colleagues do batt le have

any legitimat e cau se, and t heir

mora l weaknes s is confirm ed by

th eir treachery toward t heEm pire and their dependence

on foreign support. Instead,

Kiplings idea lized world is onewhere British intelligence is

alert t o the da ngers, operat es

within th e sub-stra ta of nat ive

society, and t hwar ts t he con-

spirat ors to ma intain British

security.

Between 1899 an d 1901, when

Kipling was writing Kim , the

Army in India was deployed torestore order no fewer tha n 69

times. 33 Concerns that the

police were un reliable to th e

point of mu tiny, not t o ment ion

th e difficult ies of gat her ing

int elligence before a n insu rr ec-

tion broke out, meant tha t t he

army was a vital instrument in

maintaining order. Kipling was

awa re of its import an ce, and it

is not purely coincidenta l tha t a

British regiment featu res soprominently in Kim, making its

presen ce felt by showing th e

flag. Lord Robert s wr ote:

We can not afford to let

our Native troops or the

peopl e of In d ia doubt the

m aintenan ce of our

suprem acy, wh ich t hey

certainly w ould if w e were

to allow Russia to over-

run Afghanistan. We must

let it be clearly seen th at

we do not fear Ru ssia,

and that we are deter-

m ined she shall not

approach near enough to

In dia to cause u s ser iou s

trouble in our rear. 34

Roberts felt t hat the Br itishpeople supported a robust impe-

ria l defen se policy. 35 The press

and the enfra nchised public

could be used as tools t o exertpressure on government s tha t

did n ot exhibit su fficient

resolve. When Robert s r etur ned

from t he Sout h African War, he

was convinced th at Brita ins

volunta ry system of enlistm ent

was no longer a dequate. He set

up t he Na tional Ser vice League

an d as ked if Kipling would

write some stir ring lines to

bring home to the pu blic the

dan ger of allowing ourselves t o

be a second tim e in the sa me

risky position without a ny prop

erly trained t roops in t he

country.36

Kipling was an eager recruit.

He was a ppalled by the fact

th at successive Libera l govern -

ment s ha d neglected th e arm y,given concessions to t he Boers,

an d vacillat ed over Home Rule

for Irela nd, a ll of which were

critical issues for t he Em pire.

Kipling, however, did n ot sha re

Robert ss faith in th e Britishpeople and publicly criticized

the complacency tha t seemed t o

prevail.

IV. A Ya ch t ing S tory w i t h

a P urp ose: Ersk in e

Chi lders and The Riddle of

the Sands

The Edwar dian period was a

time of much a nxiety and inse-

curity for t he British Empire.

Alth ough t he South African

Kiplings novel suffered too from this imperial blind spot; thereis no sense that the conspirators with which Kim and his col-leagues do battle have any legitimate cause,


16/114



War (18991902) ha d been won,

man y Britons were left wonder-

ing how th e British Arm y, num -

bering alm ost ha lf a m illion

soldiers, had ta ken nea rly three

years t o defeat a guerr illa force

of rough ly 60, 000 men. Goaded

int o th e conflict by th e British ,

the outn umbered Boers evoked

great inter na tional sympat hy,

especially in Fr ance an d Ger-

ma ny, leaving th e British

devoid of both friends andallies. In a n a ge increa singly

influen ced by the doctr ine of

survival of the fittest, as

much between nat ions as indi-

viduals, certa in voices su g-

gested that England had

somehow gone soft and that

the na tion was deteriora ting

physically.

Testam ent to the pu blic mood,

in 1905 a pam phlet entit ledThe Decline an d Fall of the

British Em pire sold 12,000

copies in just six month s. 37 Brit-

ish eyes also began to tur n n er-

vously t owar d Ger ma ny, which,

seeking its place in the su n

comm ensur at e with it s rising

industrial strength, deter-

mined t ha t Weltpolitik was

impossible without th e con-

struction of a High Seas Fleet.

In challenging t he Royal N avysdominan ce of the seas, the t ra-

ditional linchpin of nat iona l

security, the kaiser u nder-

mined th e wisdom of diplo-

ma tic isolat ion a nd pr ovoked a

sta te of profound u nea se con-

cerning the vulnerability of

Brita ins defensive prepa ra -

tions.

The air th ick with fear a nd

un cert ain ty, the spy novel

began to reproach the a uth ori-

ties for wha t it saw as a chronic

lack of preparedness against

potential invasion. By any yard-

stick, the most famous spy

thr iller to address th is was

Er skine Childerss 1903 n ovel

The Ridd le of the Sand s. Bornint o th e governin g class a nd

schooled a t Ha ileybur y College,

the principal Victorian t ra ining

groun d for Br ita ins colonial

elite, Childers was a sta unch

imperialist. 38 One can set no

limits t o the possibilities of an

alliance of the English speak-ing ra ces, he declared in a let -

ter to Basil William s, a close

friend, in October 1903.39

The Sout h African War deeply

colored Childer ss th ink ing.

Shocked at the ease with which

British forces had m et t heir

mat ch at th e han ds of guerril-

las, he developed an u ncomfort -

able feeling tha t t he Em pire

was in mortal danger. Childers

became particularly concerned

about Germany, which had

made no secret of its sympath y

for t he Boers (even supplying

arma ments against the British

tr oops). Like m ost of his fellow

count rymen, he h ad been

appa lled by th e notorious

Kruger Telegram in 1896, a

messa ge sent by Kaiser Wil-

helm II t o the president of th e

South African Republic, con-

gratu lating him on repelling

the J ameson Raid, a sortie on

th e Transvaa l from the British-

cont rolled Ca pe Colony. Upon

his return from the Boer War,th erefore, he r esolved himself to

write a yachtin g story, with a

pur pose. Tha t pu rpose was to

rouse the government to the

German threat .

The Riddle occupied m uch of

Childerss time bet ween sprin g

1901 and wint er 1902. He was

not, by his own a dmission, a

na tur ally accomplished writer

of fiction. It is clear from h is

corr espondences tha t h e feltconstr ained by the medium a nd

ha mpered by the need to pro-

vide titillation and a sense of

climax consistent with litera ry

convent ions. I fear th e st ory is

beyond m e, he la men ted in one

letter. 40 Ther e is no sensat ion,

only what it mea nt to be con-

vincing fact, he grieved in

another.41

Having finally submitted th edraft sh ortly before Chr istma s

1902, Childer ss wors t fear s

were soon confirmed, wh en h is

publisher, Reginald Sm ith of

Smith, E lder & Co, retur ned

the ma nuscript fort hwith, ask-

ing for dra st ic revisions. My

experience is tha t people will

not ta ke th eir litera ry publica-

tions in t he close pemm ican

fare wh ich you adopt,

explained Sm ith.42

With itsforensic att ention to deta il, par -

ticular ly with respect to all

things nau tical, the draft ha d

none of th e flow a nd glow

requ ired of a work of fiction.

While caviar to the yachting

frat ern ity, Ch ilderss extens ive

use of cart ographic mat erials

In challenging the Royal Navys dominance of the seas, the tra-ditional linchpin of national security, the Kaiser undermined thewisdom of diplomatic isolation and provoked a state of pro-found unease.


17/114



(see below), delineating (with

exact depth indications) the tel-

lurian sa nds an d archipelagos

of the North Sea mudflats ha d

the potent ial to frighten t he[gene ra l] re ad er a way. The

ma n who read s a work of ima gi-

na tion, however clearly found ed

on fact, is in a word not ener -

getic, tu tored Sm ith . 43

What really troubled the pub-

lisher about th e manu script

was t he complet e omission of

women. As it stood, The Riddle

was very m uch a ma ns book. It

is worth remem bering th at, by

the dawn of th e 20th centu ry,women (ever m ore litera te fol-

lowing advan ces in educat ion

provided for girls, but s till

lar gely excluded from th e pub-

lic sph ere ) had become big con-

su mer s of fiction. At Sm ith s

insistence, therefore, the n arr a-

tive ha d to offer m ore in t he

way of feminin e inter ests.

For Childers, th e th ought of

less sailing, fewer charts andmore women was a nath ema.

Sa iling wa s a school of cha ra c-

ter, saying mu ch for t he gritan d ha rdih ood of young Brit-

ons; maps demonstr at ed the

ease with which England could

be invaded; while lashin gs of

romance undermined the seri-

ous m essage conta ined in th e

book. After mu ch pr ocra stin a-

tion on both sides, a compr o-

mise was eventua lly reached:

th e ma ps would not be cut ; the

book would now h ave a love

int erest . I was wea k en ough

to spat chcock a girl int o it a ndfind her a h orrible nuisan ce,

grumbled Erskine in a private

letter. 44

What th en of th e finished

product? Drawing u pon

Child ers s own exper iences of

sailing along th e Germa n coast,

which brought to the nar rat ive

an ast onishing verisimilitu de,

The Riddle tells th e story of two

pat riotic duffersMessrs. Car-rut hers and Daviesembody-

ing all that was good about t he

adventur ous E nglish chara cter,who lark a bout in a sma ll

seven-ton yachtthe Du lci -

bellaand explore islan ds in

the North Sea.

When off the Fr isian Islands

duckshooting and incidentally

fat homing the shoals and inlets

ther eabouts, t hey discover th at

the Germa ns, with the a id of an

arm ada of shallow dra ft boats,

plan to send t roops across from

the sand berms that a dorn thelonely st ret ch of coast between

Holland an d Denmar k. This

was to be a sur prise att ack or,

in milita ry par lance, a coup de

main.

With no shore defense on th e

Ea st Anglian coast , and no

British fleet perman ently sta-

tioned in the North Sea , the

two sailors conclude th at a Ger-

ma n D-Day, if lau nched, wasbound t o succeed. Mr. Davies

point s th e finger of blame a t

Brit a ins blockh ea ds of

statesmen.45 At another point

in th e text, he gives th e bluffdeclar at ion, Those Admira lty

chaps want waking up.46

Thankfully for England, the

mu dlar k an d his compan ion foil

th e fiendish plot before it is t oo

late. As if the pr opaganda ma s-

quera ding as fiction was not

enough, Childers also provided

a postscript, which reminded

readers a bout the growing

capacity of Germ an y as a sea

power We ha ve no North S ea

naval base, no Nort h Sea Fleet,

an d no North Sea policyand

What really troubled the publisher about the manuscript wasthe complete omission of women.


18/114



called for the creation of a vol-

unt eer naval reserve, one th at

would ta ke advant age of the

unquenchable enthusiasm a nd

unt apped ta lents of the cruis-

ing fra ter nit y.

The pu blished version ofThe

R id d le is less acerbic in it s

treatm ent of German y than th e

draft manuscript. Whereas the

draft is embroidered with Ger-

ma nophobia, describing itscafs a s hostile an d referrin g

to the unconqu ered spirit an d

iron heel of Pru ssia, th e pu b-

lished copy rejects na tionalist

stereotyping and implies tha t

German y is motivat ed by Real-

politik rat her t han

ruthlessness. 47 Nevertheless,the ka iser banned th e book, and

it is said that when Childers

next went sailing in th e Baltic,

Germ an spies followed hismovements.

The Riddle was published in

May 1903. Sa les of th e book

were more th an ample to jus-

tify th e effort pu t int o it. By th e

end of th e year, it h ad become a

best seller, going thr ough th ree

editions, plus a cheap penn y-

packet issue that sold more

than 100,000 copies. Reviewed

widely in t he pr ess, the book

was greeted with widespread

critical a cclaim . The Westmin-

ster Gazette, which, as its t itle

indicates, sought t o be influen-

tial in pa rliament ary circles,

called it a litera ry a ccomplish-

men t of mu ch force an d origi-

na lity; an an onymous crit ic of

a Boston N ewspaper rh apso-

dized: The au th or mu st be

credited with a n a bility

am ount ing to genius, to be com-

pared in th e minut ia of his art

only to Defoe an d in t he

resources an d fertility of his

ima ginat ion t o Robert Louis

Stephenson.48

As En glands newest liter ar y

sensa tion, Childers received

man y letters of congrat ulation.You ha ve writ ten one of th e

most original books, gushed

W.D. Howells. Your people ar e

wonder fully life-like. Davies is

extraordinarily good, and the

whole thing per fectly

circumstanced.49 In a particu-

lar ly sycophan tic letter, a Mr.K. Ward from Stanthorpe

County Durham , wrote th at the

book had stirr ed in me a fresh

desireto do a little for m ycoun tr y, pr ompt ing him to form

a local rifle club pr esum ably

from wher e well-int ent ioned

pat riots could be tra ined to kill

the Boche.50

Among Ch ilderss m ore distin -

guished adm irers was Kipling,

who, from the 1890s on, was

repeatedly denouncing his

count rymen in t he pr ess for

failing to prepare or ta ke a firm

sta nd against th e sham eless

Hu n. As well as excellent sales

and reviews, The Riddle

brought Ch ilders, an eligible

bachelor, to th e front ra nk s of

Londons social scen e.

The books su ccess wa s n o

fluke. Childer ss skill as a n

auth or was to sense and to

seize on glib contemp ora ry t alk

about im peria l collapse a nd for-eign t hrea ts. The t iming of its

publication was in one sens e

brilliant ly done t o make maxi-

mu m imp act of th e fallout from

th e South African War, whenquestions about na tional

str ength an d efficiency, as well

as th e wisdom of diploma tic iso-

lation, dominated both public

a nd official d iscour se.

The books r elease a lso coin-

cided with t he first wave of rea lpublic anxiety about Germany,

with whom relations had soured

ma rk edly. By 1903, ma ny

islan d-folk were concern ed th at

th e Royal Navy was a bout to

lose its ma stery of th e seas, thus

increa sing th e possibility of

invas ion. Only a year ea rlier, in

a s peech to th e Reichst ag, Vice

Admira l Livonius of th e Ger-

ma n n avy had boldly pro-

nounced:

Carrying out a lan din g on

the E nglish coast has been

greatly increased by the

introduction of steam

power. The poss ib il it y of

steam ing by night with

light s covered in order to

escape th e enem ys obser-

vation, have mu ch

reduced the ad vant ages of

Englan d s in su la rposi tion . 51

Under Kaiser Wilhelm II, Ger-

ma ny had begun launching its

pre-drea dnought fleet, some of

the largest and fastest war-

ships ever bu ilt. A popular

image was tha t of the ka iser

Among Childerss more distinguished admirers was Kipling,who, from the 1890s onwards, was repeatedly denouncing hiscountrymen in the press for failing to prepare or take a firmstand against the shameless Hun.


19/114



kitted out in m edals, sword a nd

polished bootsbrea king cham -

pagne bott les over t he bows of

impressive steam-powered ves-

sels. Convinced that Nemesiswas close at han d and saddled

with xenophobic paranoia, the

British press did nothing to

subdue ten sions, beating the

pat riotic drum an d whipping uppopular en thu siasm for rem e-

dying the very st ra tegic defi-

ciencies of which Childers ha d

protested.

Demands for the government

to do some th ing were not in

fact being ignored. Weeksbefore The Riddle was due t o go

to press, the Admiralty

ann ounced that it had selected

a sit e on t he Fir th of Fort h for a

new North Sea na val base,

causing Childers t o insert a

ha sty postscript t o the effect. A

year ea rlier, His Ma jestys Gov-

ernment ha d set up a Commit-

tee of Imperia l Defence to

consider the expanding Ger-

man batt lefleet and its poten-tial inten tions.

Lord Selbourne, the First

Lord of t he Adm ira lty, took

great interest in The Riddle (I

rea d [it] with m uch pleasu re),

but with reservations. In a pr i-

vate letter, he disputed th e

claim of No North Sea Policy,

suggesting that, like so many

other writers, he [Childers]

takes it for grant ed that noth-ing goes on at th e Admira lty, or

is done by the Adm ira lty, except

what t he public ha ppens to

know.52 Selbourne rejected the

books emp ha sis on t he Forth as

an essential buffer against Ger-

ma n att ack as representa tive of

a very comm on delu sion; th e

only thing which r eally ma t-

ter s, he went on, is sh ips

believe me.53

By cont ra st, H ugh Arn old-For-

ster, then pa rliament ar y secre-

ta ry to the Admira lty, was

unr eservedly impressed.54 As

was t he h ighly influent ial Vic-

torian war hero, Lord Wolseley,

formerly commander-in-chief of

th e British forces:

Th e subjects it deals with

are m ost int erestin g. Few

m en in En gland have

stud ied the question of the

invasion of these islands

m ore closely than I h ave

done. When m en perhaps

laugh at this expression of

m ine, I alw ays content

m yself with rem inding

them th at I attach m ore

weight to the opinions ofN ap oleon , Welli ngton ,

N els on and Col lingw ood,

than I do to theirs. 55

For Wolseley, what ma de t he

book more than ordinarily

interesting was the minuteness

of detail with which t he na rra -

tive was loaded, th e appar ent

perfect familiarity with th e

scene of the event s described.

Sailing th e Nort h Sea was

kn own to be one of th e au th orshobbies, and it was clear th at

his personal experiences ha d

added a sem blance of truth to

what was, at its core, a prett y

far-fetched narrative.

Pressu re from backbenchers,

especially those representing

Ea st Coast const ituencies,

eventually prompted Lord Sel-

bourn e to ask th e Naval Intelli-

gence Division (NID) for a

deta iled report on the feasibil-

ity of a Germa n invasion as out-

lined in t he book. The m ost

recent inquiry, car ried out in

1902 on th e assum ption th at

France represented t he ma in

thr eat, ha d concluded tha t

invasion was not an eventual-

ity which we need ser iouslyconsider.56

After s end ing a coup le of

experts to reconnoiter t he Fr i-

sian Coast, the NID rea ched

th e sam e conclusion, point ing

out th at th e want of railways

and roads, the shallowness ofth e wat er, th e configur at ion of

the coast, n ot t o mention t he

terr ific amount of prepara tion

of wha rves, lan ding-places,causeways, sheds and what not

besides, would ha ve render ed a

secret emba rka tion

impossible.57 As a novel it is

excellent; as war plan it r ub-

bish, was th e assessm ent of

Lord Louis Bat ten berg, direc-

tor of nava l int elligence. 58

This was n ot, h owever, the

last of establishment interest in

The Riddle. On 27 Janua ry

1906, Childers r eceived a let-

ter mar ked Secretfrom

Ju lian Corbett , who, only

month s before, ha d become the

Admira ltys unofficial st ra tegic

adviser. Corbett explained that

th e Admir alt y was an xious to

get some inform ation about t he

Pressure from backbenchers, especially those representingEast Coast constituencies, prompted Lord Selbourne to askthe Naval Intelligence Division for a detailed report on the fea-sibility of a German invasion as outlined in the book.


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Frisian Coast but ha d not

th ought it expedient to sendan yone to get it just now.a 59

Being an expert on th e Nort h

Sea, Childers was invited t o

lunch with Capta in Charles

Ott ley, Bat ten bergs successor

as DNI. During th e luncheon,

Childers h an ded over copies of

all of his na ut ical char ts, delin-

eating pilotage and topographi-

cal deta ils. A few mont hs la ter,

Childers was cont acted by

Fra ncis Gath orne-Hardy fromth e War Office Sta ff College.

With a view to possible ra ids on

the North German Coast, in the

event of war, th e War Office had

instructed Gathorne-Hardy to

collect geostrategic intelligence

on t he ar ea a nd on th e locali-

ties. During his resear ches, he

had found t ha t t he existing War

Office cha rt s wer e h opelessly

out of dat e, notin g: I find [us]

rat her lacking oninformation.60

Having identified Borkum,

Wan gerooge an d t he S ylt

Islan ds as possible bases fromwhich t o laun ch a n a mphibious

assault upon the German m ain-

a In 1910, the somewhat dilatory Admi-

ralt y did send two spies to the F risian

Islands. Unfortu nat ely, in what becamean intern ational cause clbre, Lt. Vivian

Bran don and Ca pt. B.F. Trench were both

detected and arrested by the Germans

and pardoned by the kaiser three years

later. During his tria l in the imperial

court at Leipzig, Brandon caused scenes of

hysteria when he revealed that h e had

read The Riddle not once, but thr ee

times. See British Spies Sentenced,

Daily N ews, December 1910.

land, he asked Childers the fol-

lowing:

Are they are defended and towhat extent?

What facilities do th ey pos-

sess both on h ar bors a nd on

th e open beaches for lan ding?

What size ships can approach

an d lie in their ha rbors?

Have the buoys been removed

since t he publication of yourbook?

In your opinion, is there an

easier landing th at could be

effected on an y oth er point? 61

Once again, Childers fur-

nished the au th orities with a ll

tha t h e could. On Gat horne-

Ha rdys insist ence, Childers

was required t o keep secret his

dealings with th e War Office,

since it was not consider edgood form in E nglan d even t o

th ink of protection, much less

retaliation.62

Over time, The Riddle becamecore r eadin g for an yone

involved in naval policy or espi-

onage. In April 1908, th e Admi-

ra lity ordered 117 copies for u se

in it s Fiction Libra ries.63 In

1912, the War Office issued a

secret handbook, entitled The

S pecial Mi litar y Resources of

the Germ an Em pire, which

praised t he brilliant imagina-

tion of th e au th or of The Rid-

dle of th e Sa nd s an d imp lored

agents to familiarize them-

selves with its content. 64

In illustrat ing both th e com-

mercial rewards and political

leverage th at could be ha d from

the deceptive blending of fact

a nd fictionor fa ctionit s ett he s ta ge for a whole slew of fic-

tionalized spy stories th at dealt

with t he specter of German

invasion. As th e next s ection

will discuss, per ha ps Ch ilderssgreatest legacy was in laying

th e founda tion for th e an ti-Ger-

ma n crus ades of William le

Queu x, who, in concert with

military careerists like Lt. Col.

Ja mes Edm onds, played a part

in t he crea tion of Brit ain s m od-

ern in telligence service an d

th us changed t he course of an

empire.

V. The Germ an s are

Comi ng !: The Ficti on of

Wi l l iam le Queux

After The Riddle, as Chr isto-

pher Andrew ar gues, an

increasingly prominent featu re

of Edwa rdia n s py fiction wasth e seditious work of Germ an

spies.65 If not for litera ry st yle

an d grace, th en certa inly for

success a nd influence, th e

au th or typically ass ociat ed with

th e devilish intr igues of th e

German Secret Service was

William le Queu x. Averaging

five novels a year u nt il his

death in 1927, he was among

th e highest pa id fiction wr iters

of his tim e, ear nin g 12 guinea sper 1,000 words (rough ly $1,000

in t odays m oney), the s am e

rat e as H.G. Wells a nd Thomas

Ha rdy. An h abitu of London

clubland an d inexhaust ibly

well-tr aveled across some of the

Continen ts most elite r esorts,

le Queux claimed t o know

[The Riddle] set the stage for a whole slew of fictionalized spystories that dealt with the specter of German invasion.


21/114



everyone in E ur ope wort h

knowing, from Qu een Alexan-

dra, r eputedly his biggest fan,

to Em ile Zola, th e celebrat ed

French writer who was instr u-ment al in exonera ting the

falsely convicted ar my officer

Alfred Dreyfus. Throughout his

career, le Queux presented him-

self as a spyma ster, who, withan intim at e knowledge of for-

eign espionage, battled das-

ta rdly foreign nat iona ls in th e

service of the Br itish govern-

men t. To th is day, ma ny of le

Queuxs dista nt relatives ma in-

ta in th at he was killed by Bol-

shevik th ugs, while workin g as

a secret a gent in t he Soviet

Union. 66

The lessons of th e Boer War

bit d eeply int o le Queuxs

psyche: Hist ory tells us t ha t a n

Em pire which cann ot defend its

own possessions must inevita-

bly perish, he would la ter

write.67 Like Childers, he set

out t o use fiction a s a vehicle

for political pa mph leteerin g,designed to awaken the govern-

ment to the uncomfort able

trut h th at England had become

idle and complacent, whereas

rival nat ion sta tes were fast

becoming virile and pur poseful.

In common with m ilitar y

threat assessment a t th e turn

of th e centu ry, he ha d in fact

sta rted h is literar y car eer not

as a German ophobe, but a s aFr an cophobe, predicting con-

flict between En gland and

Fra nce. In 1894, he sh ot t o

fame with Th e Great War in

Englan din 1897, which

depicted an a tt empted French

invasion. Unlike George

Chesn eys ea rlier ta le of war-to-

come, Th e Battle of Dorking (1871), which en ded with th e

British being soundly defeated,

Th e Great War in Englan dcon-cluded with En glish victory.

Five year s lat er, published

only mont hs a fter the Fa shoda

Incident, th e terr itorial dispute

between Britain and Fr an ce in

the Sudan,Englands Peri l

(1899) int roduced reader s to

Gast on La Touche, the villain-

ous chief of th e Fr ench SecretSer vice. In Englands Peri l, a

member of Parliam ent ha s his

head blown off by, it eventually

tr an spires, an explosive cigar.

By 1906, as bad blood began to

arise between Britain a nd th e

ka iser, following th e sta rt of th e

dreadnought race that th reat-

ened t o ren der obsolete Brit ish

batt leship su premacy,

German y replaced France

as th e main enemy in leQue uxs novels. As David

Stafford argues, like any

successful a ut hor, he

kept a n eye on t he shift-

ing tides of publicopinion.68

Obsessed with th e end

of empire a nd fearing th e

encroachment of beast ly

foreigners int o the

Un ited Kingdom, le

Queu x began to forward

report s to the Foreign

Office, which, ta ken at

face value, confirmed th e

existence of a Ger ma n

spy network in Brit ain.

These reports, he

claim ed, cam e from a n

informa nt in Berlin.69

With n oevidence t o corrobora te his a lle-

gat ions, however, th e au th ori-

ties dismissed th e reports as

wishful thinking.

His pleas falling on dea f ears,

le Queux adopted a new

appr oach, us ing his social skills

and immense clubability to

seek, and a cquire, the friend-

ship of senior crown ser vant s.

By early 1906, he ha d gained a

valua ble ally in Admira l LordCha rles Ber esford, one of th e

most a dmir ed na val officers of

his genera tion, considered by

ma ny t o be a per sonificat ion of

John Bu ll. Eager to promote h is

views about t he developmen t of

th e fleet, Beresford lent his

great public voice to num erous

Obsessed with the end of empire and fearing the encroach-ment of beastly foreigners into the United Kingdom, le Queuxbegan to forward reports to the Foreign Office.


22/114



ar ticles writ ten by le Queu x onthe need for pr eparedness.

Le Queuxs most import an t

coadju tor was Lord Robert s.

Just as the famous general had

assisted Kipling, he shared le

Queuxs a nxiety a bout Brita ins

unr eadiness for a ma jor cont est

of ar ms: My dear William, t he

world th inks me a lunat ic also,

becau se, after fort y year s ser-

vice in In dia, I h ave come h ome

and dar ed to tell England tha tshe is un prepa red for war.70 As

president a nd moving spirit of

the National Service League, a

pressu re group for compulsory

milita ry tr aining, Roberts sa w

an a llian ce with le Queux as an

opport un istic way of canvass -

ing public support for conscrip-

tion, opposed by man y people at

th e tim e for s ma cking of cont i-

nental militar ism.

Having secured the priceless

imprim at ur of Lord Roberts, le

Queux began to plan for The

In va sion of 1910 , a graphic

ima gining of a successful in va-

sion of Englan d by a 40,000-

strong Germa n ar my. Funding

for th e pr oject was provided by

Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of

Brita ins first ma ss-circulat ion

newspaper, th eDa il y M ail . As a

pat hological Ger ma nophobe,

with a n inst inctive flair for a

profitable story, Northcliffe was

only too willing to stu mp u p th e

cash in r etu rn for exclusive

serializat ion rights.

Str iving for r ealism, le Queux

consulted military experts like

Col. Cyril Field and Ma jor Ma t-son; he even spent four mont hs

touring the sout heast of

England in order to map outth e most likely invasion route.

As he wrote in t he preface, th e

aim wa s to bring home to th e

British public vividly and forc-

ibly what rea lly would occur

were an enem y suddenly to

appear in our midst.71

A tough t askm ast er, Nort hc-

liffe rejected th e first dra ft. Hismain objection was t hat th e

invading Germa n a rmy a voided

the m ajor cities, and t hus t he

ma jority ofDaily Mail readers.

To rectify this, le Queu x was

required to devise a new route,

one where sa les took pr ece-

den ce over a ccur acy.

Th e Invasion began its serial-

ization on 13 Mar ch 1906. In

London, itineran t sandwich-boar d men , employed by th e

Da ily Mai l and dressed in

spiked helmets, Prussian u ni-

form s a nd bloodst ain ed gloves,

bellowed at city workers, war n-

ing th em of th e Hun s ar rival in

th e nat ions capita l. The st ory

was centered on German tr oops

advancing inlan d, until they

eventu ally rea ched London. As

th ey went, t he fierce, jack-

booted soldiers des poiled farm -

land , looted churches, violat ed

women, mut ilated babies an d

bayoneted resistance fighters.

Le Queux described how a hun -

dred Germa n spies, prior t o the

assa ult, had para lyzed Brit-

ains defenses by cut tin g tele-

phone lines and destroying

bridges, rail tracks and coal

staithes.

Newspaper serialization cam e

with a special map, illustra ting

th e regions a nd towns where

th e Germa ns were t o be concen-

tr ated. Just sout h of Cam-

bridge, there was to be the

Grea t Ba tt le; in t he fields

between Loughborough and

Leicester, th ere wa s t o be Con-

sidera ble Fighting.72 Readers

were instructed to keep the

map for referenceIt will be

valuable.

Th e Inv asion was explicit inagitat ing for a system of

nat iona l service an d in its

denu nciation of Brita ins slum -

bering stat esmen for failing to

prepa re for a possible invasion.

Splash ed across th e top of each

extract was th e eye-cat ching

headline, WHAT LORD ROB-ERTS SAYS TO YOU, followed

by: The catast rophe that may

ha ppen if we still remain in our

present sta te of unpr epared-ness is vividly and forcibly

illustr at ed in Mr. le Queu xs

new book, which I r ecomm end

to th e peru sal of everyone who

ha s th e welfare of the Br itish

Empire at heart .73

The Invasion was a h uge suc-

cess, boosting t he Daily Mails

circula tion a nd, in book form ,

selling over 1 million copies in

27 languages. Although th e lit-

erar y cognoscent i berat ed th e

somewhat primitive composi-

tion of th e writin g, le Queux

could not h ave been ha ppier.

With Roberts on h is side, he

established his bona fides as a

serious a ut hor; with North-cliffe

offering colum n-inches, he h ad a

Northcliffe rejected the first draft. His main objection was thatthe invading German army avoided the major cities, and thusthe majority ofDaily Mail readers.


23/114



suita ble forum for h is an ti-Ger-

ma n views; and with high sa les,

he now had a mple privat e

mean s t o fund his count erespio-

na ge work. E ncour aged by thepublics r esponse, le Queu x an d

Roberts founded a volunt ar y

Secret S ervice Depart ment , a

group of am at eur spy hunt ers

devoted to gath ering inform a-tion that might be u seful to our

coun tr y in case of need.74

By contr ast, the government

was not am used. In Parlia-

ment , Prime Minister Sir

Henry Campbell-Bannerman

said th at le Queux was a per-nicious s carem onger and su g-

gested that t he story risked

inciting war between E ngland

and German y. 75 This is not t o

sa y, however, th at officials could

ignore th e inva sion bogey. Pu b-

lic press ur e to reconsider th e

quest ion of oversea s at ta ck

caused Campbell-Bann erma n to

appoint a subcommittee of

Committ ee of Imper ial Defence,

which m et 16 times between27 November 1907 and 28 July

1908, and included dignitaries

like David Lloyd George and

Edward Grey. On t he first day

of th e groups conven ing, tes ti-

mony was given by none oth er

tha n Lord Roberts. During histime in t he spotlight , the aging

milita ry hero reha shed the

invasion plan a s predicted by le

Queuxs m elodra ma . To th e

delight of Sir J ohn Fish er, th enfirst sea lord a nd fath er of th e

ultra -modern dreadnought, the

sub-committ ee concluded th at

an invasion was un tena ble so

long as a large, technologically-

advanced navy was

maintained. 76

Le Qu eux wa s, of cours e, notth e only fiction wr iter tra ns-

fixed with th e sinister ma china-

tions of Germ an spies. Le

Queu xs biggest rival wa s t heself-st yled Pr ince of St orytell-

ers, E. P hillips Oppenh eim. An

outspoken critic of un prepa red-

ness, Oppenheim demanded th e

intern ment of enemy aliens and

support ed Lord Robertss cam -

paign for t he int roduction of

compu lsory na tional s ervice

am ong able-bodied men .

Cent ra l to Oppenh eims yarn s,

as with th ose of Childers a nd le

Queux, was th e importan ce of

th e gifted ama teu r. Typically

well-born an d wea lth y, her oes

were accidental rather than

professiona l spies, a lways pr ov-

ing, un der severe t est, t o be of

sterling wort h. In The Great

S ecret(1907), th e lead cha ra c-

ter while in London playingcricket for his count yis ina d-

vertently dra wn int o defending

his na tion when he discovers a

German spy ring operat ing

from t he Ca f Suisse in Soho.

As both David Sta fford a ndDavid Trotter h ave argued, rul-

ing-class amateurs were not

only her oes in t heir own right

but a lso guar dian s of th e social

hierar chy; set apa rt by their

gentlemanliness, they repre-sen ted a symbol of sta bility in

a t ime of increasin g work ing-

class agitation. 77 Moreover,

becau se they were gentleman,

they somehow made spying

acceptable, even h onoura ble, to

a rea dership brought up to

believe th at espiona ge was adirty trade.

Though others had muscled in

on the genr e, le Queux ulti-

mately trumped th em a ll with

S pies of the Kaiser. Published in

1909, an d preceded by an

advertising campa ign in t he

Weekly N ews offering rea ders

10 for in form at ion on Foreign

Agents in Brita in, Spies pitted

Ray Raymonda pa tr iot t o his

hea rt s coreagainst litera llythousan ds of Germa n spies,

most of th em nest led in t he

En glish coun tr yside, disguised

as lan dlords, waiters, an d bar-

bers. In deta iling the Germa n

hidden han d, le Queux was a da-

man t th at h is novel was based

on serious facts, unear th ed

over a 12-month period touring

the United Kingdom:

As I wri te, I hav e beforem e a file of amazin g docu-

ments, which plainly

show th e feverish activity

with w hich this advance

guard of our enem y is

working to secure for their

emp loyers the most

detailed in form ation. 78

To combat t his men ace, the

book cha mpioned th e creat ion

of a professiona l coun ter intelli-

gence service, a messa ge tha tchim ed with public fear s of

invasionnow at fever-pitch

with t he ka isers an nounce-

men t in la te 1908 of an a cceler-

at ed shipbuilding progra m. 79

Frightened m embers of th e

public inu nda ted th e novelist s

Moreover, because they were gentlemen, they somehow madespying acceptable, even honourable, to a readership broughup to believe that espionage was a dirty trade.


24/114



ma ilbox with a lleged sightin gsof German spies. Letters

detailed German espiona ge in

all its form s, from t he su rveil-lan ce of beaches, fort ificat ions,

and sh ipyar ds to the purloin-

ing of secret tr eat ies, war pla ns,

and blueprints. Although the

ma jority of th ese reports wer e

pure fantasy, le Queux ear-

nestly forwarded t hem t o

Lt.Col. Ja mes E dmonds, head

of MO5, the fledgling counterin-

telligence section of the War

Office Directorate of Military

Operations.

Convinced of the existence of

enemy s pies (nea rly every Ger-

man clerk in London spends his

holidays on biking or walkin g

tours in t he eastern

counties),80 but a lso with one

eye on securing fund ing for his

own fledgling outfit, E dmonds

ha d long been na gging Richa rdHa ldan e, secreta ry of sta te for

war, on t he sh ort comings of

British espionage. Ha ldane,

who still ha rbored h opes of a

rappr ochement with Germ any,

had hitherto demurred at thisassessment , believing tha t

enemy agents were really the

appar at us of th e white slave

traffic.81 For Edmonds, there-

fore , le Queu xs eviden ce was

a godsend.

By early 1909, the tradition-

ally unflappable Haldane ha d

ju dged t ha t le Qu eu xs rep or ted

sightings, however far-fetched,

had just enough plausibility to

merit an investigat ion. In

March, he set up a comm ittee to

consider the n at ure a nd extentof foreign espiona ge tha t is a t

present t aking place with in this

country.82Edm onds, th e com-

mit te es chief witn ess, inform edmembers of a ra pid rise in

cases of alleged Germa n espio-

na ge: five in 19 07; 47 in 1908;

and 24 in the first t hree months

of 1909. 83 Of th e 24, le Queu x

ha d pr ovided fivealthough, in

th e ser vice of anonymity, he

was r eferr ed t o only as a well-

known a ut hor. The individua ls

accused by le Queux of being

German spies included: a

cyclist wh o swore in Germ an

when nea rly run over by the

aut hor in his motorcar ; a Ports-

mouth h airdresser, na med Sch-

weiger, who appar ent ly took

much int erest in navy gossip

an d consort ed with officers; a nd

a r etired captain, called Max

Piper, who was believed to act

as a go-between for Germanagents based in the United

Kingdom.84

Astonish ingly, le Queu x an d

his associat es ma ter ial was

instrumenta l in persuadingmembers to reach t he conclu-

sion:

Th e evidence wh ich w as

pr oduced lef t no d oubt in

the min ds of the com m it-

tee that an extensive

system of German espio-

nage exists in th is

coun try, and t hat w e have

no organ izat ion for keep-

ing in touch w ith that

espionage and for accu-

rately determin ing its

extent or objectives. 85

This assessmen t, derived not

from ha rd facts reported by the

police aut horities, but from

information ascertained from

am at eur spycat chers, led

directly to the form at ion of th e

Secret Service Bureau, forerun-

ner of MI5 an d MI6, in lat e

1909.

Historical resear ch h as now

proved beyond a ny doubt th at

no such exten sive system of

Germ an espiona ge existed.Between August 1911 and t he

outbrea k of th e Grea t War, MI5

apprehen ded and t ried only a

ha ndful of sus pected spies.

Alth ough t he spy ring of Gust av

Steinha uer was rounded up, th e

German spymaster ran no more

tha n 20 poorly trained a gents,focused for t he m ost par t on r iv-

ers and beaches rather t han

military insta llations. What

th is underlines is the fact th atin 1909 officials h ad be en com-

pletely deceived. In success-

fully hoodwinking t he

establishment int o a sta te of

tota l delusion, le Queuxunbe-

lievablyha d played a key role

in th e crea tion of th e modern

Brit ish int elligence comm un ity.

Th e Great Wargave le Queu x

th e ideal canvas on which to

pain t h is political beliefs. In no

fewer tha n 40 novels relating to

th e conflict, pu blished between

1914 and 1918, he a rgued for

more coun ter espionage, bigger

ships, an d a stronger stand

against immigration. Con-

vinced that every stra nger with

a gutt ura l accent was a spy in

This assessment, derived not from hard factsbut from infor-mation ascertained from amateur spycatchers, led directly tothe formation of the Secret Service Bureau.


25/114



disguise, he continued to flood

government departments with

rep orts of Ger ma n officers in

mufti.

By th e war s end , however, evi-

dence suggests th at the aut hori-

ties h ad finally wised up to le

Queu xs febrile ima ginat ion. In

August 1914, para noid tha t th e

German s were out to get h im on

accoun t of his coun ter int elli-

gence work a nd involvemen t

with M05, he wrote to the Met-

ropolitan Police r equesting t ha t

local Bobbies give him an d his

family special protection:

Owin g to the fact th at for

a nu m ber of years I have

interested m yself in th e

tracing and identification

of Germ an spies in

Englan d an d in la ying

th em before the proper

authoritiesthreats have

been conveyed to me th at

the gentry in question

intend to do me bodily

harm!

A reply was sent to th e effect

th at th e local police would

mak e a short beat near his

house. Not sa tisfied with t his,

le Queux t ook t o car rying a p is-

tol before protestin g to Edward

Hen ry, comm issioner of th e

Met ropolita n P

studies in intelligence june 210

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