subject: the suez crisis: a brief comint history · 2018-07-18 · 1956. (u) during the winter and...

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united states cryptologic history

The Suez Crisis

A BriefComint History (U)

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Contents of this publication should not ie reproduced or further disseminated outside the US Intelligence Community without the permiulon of the Director NSACSS Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Oftice ofCryptologic Archives and History T54

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series Crisis Collection

Volume2

The Suez Crisis A BriefComint History (U)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959 50 USC 3605 (PL 86-36)

OFFICE OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCYCENTRAL SECURITY SERV~CE

1988

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Table ofContents

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Foreword -middot-middot-middot------------------middot-middotmiddot---middot-----------------middot-----middot--------- v

Background ---------middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--------middotmiddotmiddot-------middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot------------------------middotmiddotmiddot-middot 1

The Rise ofNasser ------------------------~-----middot----------middot-------------------middot 3 A Search for Weapons ------middot---------middot-----------------middot---- 4 The Soviet Factor ---------------------middot-----middot-------------------------- 8 Soviet Surprise and Vacillation ---------------------middot----middot--middot--middotmiddot-middotmiddot----- 11 Nassers Answer to Superpower Ambivalence ------~----middot--middot----middot--middot---- 11

Israel Grows Anxious -------middot----middotmiddot---------------------------middot- 12 British-French Fears - Real and Imagined ------middot----middot------middotmiddotmiddot------------------middot- 12 Eisenhower as Peacemaker ------------middotmiddotmiddot----------middot-middotmiddotmiddot------------------- 13

NSA Spots a Plot ---------------~-----------middot------------middot-middotmiddot-- 16 The PlotThickens ------------------------------------middot-- 17 Contradiction -middot-------middot--middotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot--middot--middotmiddot---------------------- 19Attack bullbull_______________________________________________________________ 20

Not Mth a Bang But a Wimper --~-----------------middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot--middot-middotmiddot-middotmiddot-middotmiddot--middot----- 23 Suez A Sobering Reflection for Politics and Intelligence ---middot--middot-----middot--middot-middot-- Z4

Shifl in Perspective ---middotmiddot--middotmiddot---------middotmiddot---------------middot------~--------middotmiddot-middot-middot 24 NSAs Performance ---------middotmiddotmiddot-------------middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middot----middot-middotmiddotmiddot------middot-middot-c-middot 28 A Diligent Delicate Endeavor ---middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot--middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot--middotmiddot--middot--middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot--------middot----- 29 Lessons Learned Lessons Ignored middotmiddot--middot--middot--middot-------------------middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot--middot- 31

Notes 33

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Foreword (

QPSC-NF) The Saez Crisis is another addition to the Special Series Crisis Collection published by the NSA History and Publications Division The Suez crisis of 1956 is an interesting study of US intelligence especially its Sigint aspect during a brushfire situation The crisis pre11ented United States policymakers with a unique intelligence dilemma Two US allies Britain and France opposed American policy obj~tives Working with Israel they conspired to take the Suero Canal and preserve their influence in the area This study by l lprovides remarkable insights into AngloshyAmerican relations US relations with Egypt France and [srael and American concerns over the Soviet Union and its reaction to the crisis The study is based on a review ofover three thousand intercepted messages ~-NF)MsI ltraces the crisis from its historical roots with the construction

of the Suez Canal in 1869 through the rise of Nasser to negotiations over arms and aid in constructing the Aswan Dam to Nassers nationalization ofthe Suez Canal Company to British-French-Israeli plots to the actual invasion She clearly shows that the attack

middotOccurred without our kncgtwledge and eame as a complete surprise to 11s - despite President Eisenhowers public statements to the contrary US intelligence especially Sigint provided key clues to the coming offensive US Comint closely followed the allied invasion and closely monitored Soviet reaction I Istudy alampo reveals that despite British-United States estrangement the United States was dependent on British collection efforts on most Middle East targets and that the close working relationship between the AngJo poseurs in the Sigint area was never seriousiy threatened In fact during the height of the crisis US and British elements continued to exchange the most sensitive information I lstudy is an important contribution to our understanding ofthe Second Party relationship and to the use ofSigint in a brushfire situation

Henry F Schorreck NSA Historian

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The Suez Crisis A Brief Comint History


(U) The Suez crisis of 1956 which erupted only days before the Souiet irwasion of Hungary on 4 November was the first major test of the National Security Agency (NSA) durirllJ a shtJrt-term brushfire crisis The war for Suez also presented th~ U nited States with a unique political and intelligence dilemma two close US allies Britain and France opposed American policy objectiues The Suez crisis raised many provocative questions about when and how much the United States knew about British French arnl Israeli plans for the invasion of Egypt and how US officials reacted to theseplans In additionmiddot the Suez war prouided a fascinatiTllJ case study of the role of CommunicatiottS Intelligence (Comint) in the US decision-making process Finally the battle for Saez

served as a model for e0mining the effect of political dissension and conflict on the intimate Anglo-American intelligence relationship How this strange and troubling crisis developed what role Comint played in US planning and policy and how the Suez conflict affected Anglo-American relations are the issues this paper addresses

JK-CCO) Before arnl during the Sun crisis NSA analyzed more than three thousand diplomatic and seven hundred military messages from Near and Middle Eastern nations as well as from other countries worldwide Euen considered in isolation from other intelligence this intercept prouided US officials witlt a remarkable insight into events leading to the surprise attack on Egypt by nationa friendly to the United States

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(U) The Suez crisis created a painful predicament for US policymakers Without American support or knowledge two staunch US allies in colfusion with Israel plotted to go to war for a cause the Eisenhower administration believed was rash unjustified and potentially very oongerous Ultimately France Britain and Israel would become the overt aggressors against Egypt As a result the United States was in the awkward position of siding with Nasser against its allies The Soviet factor further complicated the situation especially for the United States The US allies implicitly relied upon America to counter any belligerency by the Russian ~Bear The US administration was never sure how far the Soviets would go to assist Nasser or resist Western aggression in the region EisenhtJwer described the Soviets as both furious an~ scared by the concurrent crises in Eastern Europe and the MiddleEast This he averred made for ~the most dangerous pouible state ofmind~ For this reason Soviet movements and actions were ofprimary interest lb the US intelligence community

Background (U)

(U) The roots of the 1956 Suez crisis can be traced at least to the construction of the Suez Canal which opened on 17 November 1869 and to the original Suez Canal Company ownership agreements The Viceroy of Egypt (then part of the Ottoman Empire) granted the Suez Canal Company founded by French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps a concession to operate the canal In exchange the Canal Company agreed to pay certain taxes rents and percentages of gross profits to Egypt Furthermore Egypt retained an agreement for middot the canal to revert to Egyptian control after 99 years

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(U) Although British ships were the largest ~ingle users of the canal Britain did not obtain its interest in the Suez Canal Company until 25 November 1875 when in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy Egypt turned over 177642 shares in the company to the British Govemment An 1888 agreement between major canal users and the Turkish government guaranteed free passage for ships of all nations made the company responsible for operating the canal impartially in war and peace and placed responsibility for the canals protection with Egypt bull

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ln 1936 the British negotiated a new treaty with Egypt In exchange for a British naval base at Alexandria Egypt would regain representation on the Suez Canal Companysboard of directors and receive annual rental payment for use of company facilities World War II interrupted the normal course of business between Britain and Egypt and it was not until after the war in 1949 that Egypt was effectively reinstated as a board member and also began to receive seven percent of the companys gross profits However beginning in 1936 Egypt became a real factor in the Suez Canal Company for the first time since 1875amp

(U) Before the First World War much of the Middle East was under the control or influence of the Ottoman Empire With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and Germany British and French influence greatly expanded during the postwar period After World War II the region again underwent radical changes brought about in part by a weakening of the major colonial powers especially Great Britain and France the middotbirth of the nation of Israel and an explosion of Arab nationalism

(U) France Britain and the United States drew up a Tripartite Declaration in 1950 in recognition of the growing threat to Western power and influence in the region the importance ofoil shipments to the West and the potential impact of the Cold War on the Middle East Under the terms of this accord the three nations agreed to act in concert to thwart any seizure of Middle Eastern territory by an outside force The allies also promised to ensure a balance between arms shipped middotto Arab countries and to Israel Further the three agreed the number of weapons shipped to either side would be only enough to maintain internal order

The Rise ofNasser (U)

(U) The 1952 Egyptian coup that overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk also set the stage for the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the 1956 crisis The real power behind the coup was Gamal Abdel Nasser who formally assumed the Egyptian presidency in October 1954 Nasser vocalized and manipulated pent-up Egyptian resentment over the occupation of the Suez Base by nearly eighty thousand British troops After lengthy negotiations the British agreed to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone by June 1956

(U) During the winter and spring preceding the nationalization Egypt also negotiated new agreements with the Canal Company The accords specified greater company investment in Egypt and increased employment of Egyptian pilots In return Egypt agreed to exempt the company from certain Egyptian taxes 8

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Gamal Abdel Nasser

A Search for Weapons (U)

(U) While he solicited agreements with the Canal Company and the British government Nassermiddot also began to seek arms from the United States In early 1955 the US State Department responded to Nassers request for $27 million worth of weapons by demanding payment in cash - knowing full well Nasser did not have the money The Eisenhower administration was not then a major weapons dealer in the region and did not wish to become one Furthermore administration officials reasoned that such an arms sale would drastically disturb the balance of power in th~ Middle East Nasser also threatened to purchase weapons from the Soviets uthe United States refused to sell him the arms he had requested Nassers warning sounded suspiciously like blackmail to Eisenhower who was not about to play into Nassers hands7

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(U) Spurned by the Americans Nasser during the summer of 1955 secured an arms deal with the Soviet Union estimated to be worth between $80 and $200 million An Egyptian military delegation concluded the deal in August 1955 during a meeting in Prague Czechoslovakia with its Soviet counterpart The Czechoslovak role was arranged at Moscows request in order to create the fiction that the arms were Czechoslovak and not Soviet

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The Soviet Factor (U)

Ctn It was however the Egyptian-ampviet arms deal that complicated the negotiations for Western financing for the Aswan High Dam project11 Initially the Soviet arms deal intensified Western resolve to provide financing for the High Darn project and thus counter Soviet influence In November 1955 the United States Britain and the World Bank jointly offered $70 miliion for the first stage of the dam ~NF) The Eisenhower Admin1stration gradually backed away from the financing

plan however as it became convinced that Nasser was playing the West against the East He probably was In April 1956 Nasser publicly stated he was considering a Soviet offer to build the dam18 United States officials were annoyed and apprehensive They reasoned that Egypt would have difficulty meeting its fmaneial obligations to the dam project with the added burden of an expensive new arms debt In addition the administration feared that given Nassers overtures to the Soviets it would be unable to convince Congress to go along with the long-term financing such an arrangement necessitated Whatever the ultimate reasons for the deals collapse events moved quickly upon Egyptian Ambassador Dr Ahmed Husseins return to Washington on 17 July middot Journalists who met Hussein at the ai ressed hi f1 r sti n vmiddot - -vi Hi h Dam project

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On the morning of 19 July Ambassador Hussein went to the State Department

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(U) for a meeting with Secretary ofState John Foster Dulles According to published accounts ofthat meeting Dulles began the discussion with an explanation in tonesrather sad and firm of the many difficulties he was encountering in securing the loan Ambassador Hussein reportedly became agitated as Dulles droned on Finally the ambassador blurted out Dont please say you are going to withdraw the offer because we have the Russjan offer to finance the Dam right here in my pocketmiddot According to these accounts Dulles immediately retorted Well as you have the money already you dont need any from us M offer is withdrawn20 middot

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Smiddotrelary of Stale John Fogtt~r Dulls

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(U) The real reasons behind the Eisenhower adminstrations rescission of the High Dam deal remain umlear It does not appear with the benefit of hindsight that pulling out of the agreement was a wise decision for the United States In effect the United States and Britain left Egypt largely in the hands of the Soviets Both the Egyptian military and the Egyptian economy were under Moscows sway As Dulles suggested at least part ltif the US administrations reluctance to follow through on the agreement may be explicable as fear of failure That is with any vast undertaking there is an enormous danger of the deeI going sour The country responsible for financing a bad risk would be held liable for its failure and could become enshrined in Egypts collective memory as the cause of great misery misfortune and humiliation Another factor must have been the impending US elections The High Dam rmancing was not a very popular issue with the American public Eisenhower in the throes of an election campaign was not eager to press for massive funding for a ~untry flirting with Moscow during the middotheight of the Cold War Moreover US officials did not believe the Soviets would come through with the funds if the Western nations revoked their offer This assumption was not wholly unjustified Moscow immediately started to hedge when Dulles rescinded the US offer and in fact the Soviet-Egy tian deal took several more years to complete

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Soviet Surprise and Vacillation (U)

p8C-NF) The Egyptian jf9vernment was certainly much less surprised by the US action than was Moscow The US revocation apparently caught the Soviet Union totally off guard as its contradictory and confused behavior attests On 21 July Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov told newsmen that his government was not considering aid to Egypt for oonstructio of the m The E tians were shocked and an ered b middotthis a nt betrayal

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U) Soviet Ambassador to Cairo Yevgeni Ule ev contradicted Shepilovs statement with an announcement on 23 July that the Soviet government was willing to finance the High Dam scheme if Egypt requested such assistance That evening however Kieelev issued a formal denial qf the remarks attributed to him The following day 24 July Kiselev again reversed himself telling foreign correspondents We are now ready to finance the dam ifEgypt wishea129 It took three more years however before the Soviet Union and Egypt rmalaed a contract providing for the construction of the first stage of the HighDam80

(U) In the interim Egypt was left in the lurch by both the East and the West The rescission of the US aid offer and the tenuity of the Soviet position as well as the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone undoubtedly influenced Nassers decision tO nationalize the canal Ir either superpower had agreed in 1956 to assist Egypt with the High Dam construction Nasser might very well not have nationalired the canal which in any event was scheduled to revert to Egyptian ownership in 1968

Nassers Answer to Superpower Ambivalence (U)

Jl)SC-NF) When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in a fiery speech on 26 July 1956 he precipitated a crisis that was to preoccupy his country and much of the world for months Nassers decision came as a complete shock to US officials

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(U) Nationalizing the canal elevated Nassers steture among the Arabs At the same time Nassers action pleased Moscow which saw in Egypts inevitable alienation from the West an even greater opportunity for expanding its influence in the region The British and French however were outraged They feared freedom ofpassage through the canal might not be guaranteed by Nasser thus threatening Western Europes oil supplies Both London and Paris took steps to ensure that tolls would continue to be paid to the Canal Company and not to the Egyptian government In response Egypt issued an

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ultimatum demanding that all users begin paying tolls to the newly nationalized company within one week

Israel Grows Anxious (U)

(0) Western Europe and the United States were not the only parties made apprehensive by Nassers action The nationalization also intensified Israeli anxieties laraels primary concern was that Nassers decision presaged a renewal of hostilities with its Arab neighbors Israel had never been permitted passage through the Suez Canal King Farouk had instituted prohibitions against Israeli shipping on the day Israel declared its independence in May 1948a2 Moreover Egypt subsequently blockaded the Straits ofTiran at the mouth of the Gulfof Aqaba Israels on1y other seaway to Asia and Africaas

(U) The evacuation of British troops from the canal in June 1956 only served to heighten Israeli fears despite Israels mistrllllt of the British which dated back to the bitter Israeli fight for independence from the British mandate The Suez base represented the last large Western outpost in the region and Israel felt even more isolated in the midst of the Arab world Moreover FedayeenM raids from neighboring countries were taking a continually higher toll on Israel fhe formation of a joint Egyptian-Syrian command ln October 1955 coupled with the new commands rapid acquisition of Sovietmiddot bloc weapons compounded Israeli fears

BritishmiddotFrench Fears-Real and Imagined (U)

(U) Britain and France each had its own motive for imbuing the Suez issue with major international overtones The British claimed Nasser had illegaUymiddotseized control of the Suez Canal Company in which the British government was the largest single shareholder The French as well as the British viewed the seizure as a direct threat to their stralegic interests especially their oil-supply routes

(U) France had a special reason for wanting to see Nasser humiliated In addition to strategic considerations many French leaders placed blame for Frances troubles in Algeria squarely with Nasser The chimerical theory in French circles was that if Egyptian moral and material support to the Algerian rebels could be stopped the rebellion in Algeria would magically disappear This same mentality helped justify major new French arms sales to [srael

(U) When he nationalized the canal Nasser promised to pay for any property seized if the Suez Canal Companys assets were turned over to Egypt Naturally the companys British- and French-dominated Board of Directors refused to surrender assets that extended far beyond the Suez Canal itself On 29 July Nasser seized the Canal Companys offices in Egypt imposed martial law in the Canal Zone and forbade all Canal Company employees to leave their jobs

(U) The British and the French immediately began agitating for aetive measures to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the canal They asserted that the Egyptians lacked the technical expertise necessary to keep the canal functioning smoothly President Eisenhowersoon suspected that Britain and France were forwarding this argument only as a pretext for military intervention on their part The President warned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden a few days after the nationalization that his claim of Egyptian middot inability to operale the canal would never be considered bull as a legitimate cause for immediate occupation by iorceia5

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British Prime Minister Anthony Eden

Eisenhower as Peacemaker (U)

(U) On 31 July a portentous message from Prime Minister Eden arrived in Washington The message warned the United States that Britain was determined to break Nasser and was already developing military plans toward this purpose Eisenhower who firmly believed the British decision was mistaken and based more on emotion than on fact and logice responded swiftly and unequivocally He warned Eden that no US help could be expected if Britain resorted to force The President made it clear to the British Pritne Minister that the United States was convinced of the unwisdom even ofcontemplating the use ofmilitary force 37

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0) Meanwhile Secretary Dulles flew to London on 1 August to convince the British and French to settle the Suez dispute peaceably There he secured an agreement with the allies for a multinational conference aimed at restoring international authority over the Suez Canal On 12 August Nasser formally declined the invitation to attend the conference This refusal could hardl havecome asa su rise to US or British officials

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(U Despite Nassers efforts 22 of the 24 nations invited did attend the conference which opened in London on 16 August The conference resulted in an agreement among 18 of the participants for a U $-sponsored plan that included respect for the sovereignty of Egypt just compensation to Egypt for the use of the canal and international supervision ofthe canal

(U A peaceful resolution of the crisis seemed within reach when Nasser agreed to meet with a five-nation committee headed by Australian Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menziesbull The Menzies mission traveled to Cairo to present the Dulles plan to the Egyptian President Nasser however quickly rejected the -plan and the crisis intensified

(U) Even as the negotiations continued US suspicionf about Anglo-French intentions increased Before the Menzies mission reached Egyptian soil the British had granted the French permission to station French troops on Cyprus - a highly unusual step and hardly a sign ofnonbelligerency Moreover both the French and the British ordered their nationals to begin evacuating Egypt Jordan Syria and Lebanonbullo

(lSCNF) With the Menzies mission a failure Secretary ofState Dulles next turned his efforts to a plan for a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA The idea behind SCUA was to organize the using iations to ensure free pas~ge should the canal be blocked or blockaded or should the flow of Middle Eastern oil be di~upted SCUA members would use their own pilots to transit the canal and would collect their own users fees out of which Nasser would be reimbursed for use of the canal Although it is now widely known that Dulles originated the SCUA plan at the time Anthony Eden was credited with devising the Users Association This deception was part of an effort to keep the United States out of the limelight Nonetheless the E tians were sus ieious that Dulles was the man behind SCUA

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(J)SC-NF) The Egyptians believed that US acceptence of SCUA was an onilnoua sign because it indicated the depth of US angermiddotwith Egypt and plaeed the United States squarely in the British-French camp Moreover Cairo labeled SCUA an open and flagrant aggression on Egyptian sovereignty and publicly proclaimed that its implementation means warltIS As expected Nasserrejected the SCUA plan Within daysmiddot events i11 Egypt made SCUA a dead issue

(U) On 15 September Egyptian pilots not only took charge ofoperating the canal but did so with increased efficiency With one of their major arguments for international control of the canal underIQined Britain and France now took the issue to the United Nations without first consulting their US ally Eisenhower was disturbed lnd deeply mistrustful of Anglo-French intentions As he recorded in his memoirs he wondered about Britains and Frances true purpose in going to the United Nations Was it a sincere desire to negotiate a satisfactory peace settlement or was this merely a setting of the stage for eventual use offorce in Suez

(U) Whatever the middotreality negotiations at the United Nations dragged on throughout the month of October without conclusive results The British French and Israelis used

middotthe time to finalize their plans for resolving the Suez problem by means of military intervention ~ In September 1956 Allen Dulles the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

submitted to the National Security Council two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) on possible Anglo-French military action in the Suez Canal In the first Probable Repercussions ofBritish-French Military Action in th~ Saez Crisis dated 5 September the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC45 began with the assumption thamiddott indications were sufficient to warrant an estimate of the possible repercussions of British-French military action in Suez The IAC members concluded that Britain and France were most likely to resort to the military option if they were-confronted with another direct and major Egyptian challenge However the SNIE pointed out that even without further provocation Britain and France might resort to force ifconvinced that negotiations were not going to produce a prompt settlement satisfactory to them ln these cireumstanees

( the assessment continued London and Paris would attempt to document Nassers refusal to negotiate such amiddot settlement The British and French would then dramatize the refusal before world opinion as justification for the use of force46

piBfThe second SNIE Tiu Likelihood of a British-French Resort to MililarY Action Agairnt Egypt in the Suez Crisis was published on 19 September and evinced awareness in the US intelligence community of the potential for imminent cynflict The SNIE concluded that the UK and France will almost certainly 5eek to keep the way open for the use of force Although the report concluded that the British and French were likely to resort to force only in the event of some new and violent provocation the SNIE clearly stated that should this happen the two US allies would probably use force against Egypt even without US support Clearly then the Eisenhower administration was cognizant of the possibility ofjoint British and French action behind the hack of the United States The SNIE also averred that it was possible though unlikely a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities might furnish an occasion for UK-French military intervention against Nasser7 Taken together the conclusions of the various intelligence estimates submitted before the Israeli attack on Egypt and the subsequent Anglo-French intervention clearly illustrate that the United S~tes actively considered the possibility of an Anglo-French plot

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(U) The Anglo-French role in the conspiracy began with the news that Nasser had nationalized the canal The British and French immediately undertook war preparations I

I General Hugh Stockwell commander of the 1st Corps of the British Army was summoned to London on 3 August to prepare secret war ptans code-named Operation Musketeer0

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(U) Meanwhile without Britains knowledge France took steps to include Israef in the conspiracy On ~e day afr the nationalization Isra~l quietly requested and was granted a substantial i_ncrease in French aims shipments in violation of the 1950 Tripartite Agreement Simultaneously French Defense Minister Maurice BourgesshyMaunoury approached Israeli Director General of the Defense Ministry Shimon Peres about a joint Franco-Israeli assault against Egypt Peres responded positively to the suggestion Further action on the issue however was suspended until I September when the French told Israel about Operation Musketeer 50

(U) Not until 13 October did France inform Britain about plans for Israeli participation On 16 October British Prime Minister Eden French Prime Minister Mollet British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau met secretly in Paris to put the finishing touches on the Anglo-French portion of the conspiracy A crucial element in the agreement was a guarantee that Israel would not attack Jordan with whom Britain had a defense treaty The Frenchmen assure~ their British counterparts that Israel would middotmove ageinst Egypt and not against Jordan51

(U) Finally on 21 October representatives of all three colluding nations met in 6erres just outside Paris to finalize arrangements Their plan called for braels first moves against Egypt to mimic raids against Fedayeen camps in Egypt These raids would mask a full-scale invasion by British and French troops In the event the Anglo-French forces tailed to live up to their agreement to invade Egypt Israel couJd then quicklywithdraw its troopsM

(U) Despite their deep mistrust of the British the Israelis agreed to this plan because they were convinced that the blockading of the Straits of Tiran the recent addition of Jordan to the Arab Joint Command113 end the massive influx of arms into Egypt indicated Arab plans for a full-scale war against lsraels1 middot

(U) Another important decision agreed upon in Paris was to keep the circle of those bl()wledgeable about the plan very small In France and Britain only the Prime Ministers Foreign Ministers Defense Ministers and a very few oftheir closest confidants knew ofthe plot~~ Who in the Israeli government knew about the plan is much less clear At the very least Prime Minister David Ben Gurion Foreign Minister Golda Meir Chief ofStaff Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres knew the details of the plot 58

The Plot Thickens (U)

(U) On 15 October Eisenhower was briefed on U-2 flights that revealed the presence in Israel of 60 French Mystere jets - a clear violation of an earlier agreement whereby France was allowed to sell 24 not 60 Myst~res to Israels7 Eisenhowers worst fears were confirmed France was maneuvering behind the back ofthe United States The President re led in ism moirs tha at his moment he felt w were c t off from our alliessu

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U) During the last two weeks of October communications between Paris and Tel Aviv were extremely heavy Simultaneously there was a virtual blackout on communication between the United States on the one side and the French and the British on the other1 Regular reports from London and Paris to the US State Department suddenly disappeared63 Moreover the British French and Israeli ambassadors to the United States were all rather mysteriously and conveniently out of the country

llSC-NF) An even more ominous development now arose According to Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose American Sigint collectors began to pick up unusually heavy radio traffic between Britain and Frarice US codebreakin efforts against the interce t re rtedl were unsuccessful 611

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Contladietion (U)

(U) Despite all the evidence provided by US intelligence that some kind ofBritishshymiddotFrench operation was in the works US officials avowed ignorance of the plot Eisenhower in his memoirs asserted that as late as 15 October when Israel began to mobilize its forces the administration could not fathom the reason for the mobilizatione1 Eisenhower claimed the United States did not fully realize that Israel planned offensive action until the day of the attack Even then until Israeli troops actually crossed into the Sinai the administration expected Israel to attack Jordan and not Egypt According to Eisenhower the administration still did not believe Israels attack was part of an orchestrated ))lot involving Britain and France On 30 October the day after the Israeli invasion of Egypt Eisenhower met with Secretary Dulles and other advisers According to Eisenhower One thing the conference reflected our lack of elear understanding as to exactly what was happening in the Suez area due to our break in communications with the French and British We were in the dark about what they planned to do66

(U) Moreover Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose asserts that White House Press Secretary James Hagerty told reporters the attack came as a complete surprise~ Worse still Secretary Dulles in a 16December1956 press conference stated It is quite true that the actual jlttack occurred without our knowledge and came as a complete surprise to usu These reports infuriated Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Allen Dulles who a month later leaked stories to the press that the intelligence community had predicted Suez Allen Dulles told reporter Anthony Tully My brother

middot said the State Department was taken by surprise That was only technically correct What he meant was that the British French and Israeli governments had not informed middot our ambassadors But we had the Suez operation perfectly taped We reported that there would be a three-nation attack on Suez And on the day before the invasion CIA reported it was imminent as middot

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psNF) Contrary to published accounts of US ignorance preceding the Suez wiir the US intelligence community rapidly pieced together the bits of information it had acquired On 28 October the IAC sent the findings of its Wateh Committee meeting ta the National Security CouncilG The Watch Committee after an examination of new evidence of heavy Israeli mobil~ation concluded that an Israeli otTensive against its Arab neighbors was imminent The report stated that Israeli mobilization was on a scale which would permit lsrael ta occupy Jordan west of the Jordan river penetrate Syria as far as Damascus penetrate Egypt ta the Suez Canal and hold parts of[the] Sinai for [a] considerable time The Watch Committee concluded that

put Egyptian provocatioris the key role ~fEgypt in the Arab tlreat snd UK involvemerit with Jordan indi~ate the attack wiU be laregcbed against Egypt in the very near fWure under the preteiit ofretaliation and esceiding paat raids in strellgth bull Possible motivations tor auch an lsrseli mobilization were considered to be bullbullbull to provide a diversionary threat against Egypt in order lo alford greater lfeedoin of action for France and the U K in the Suez situation and to

4relieve Egyptian P~lSureson France in North Aampica 7

The Watch Committee report proved prophetic Within days Israeli forees attacked Egypt crossed the Sinai and were virtually poised on the banks of the Suez Clinal

Attack(U)

(PSC) The surprise attack began on 29 October 1956 when Israeli columns with an estimated strength of at least six brigades thrust into the Sinai at Kuntilla and Ras al Naqb The Israelis overran relatively small Egyptian defense forces and raced unopposed almost to the banks of the Suez The swiftness of the Israeli advances placed the defenders of Gaza Rafah al Arish and Abu Aweigila in indefensible positions The Egyptian troops were faced with a large Israeli force which had not yet been rommitted and outflanked by the Israeli columns that had s ed from Elath to Nakhl

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On 30 October Britain and France concurrently issued an ultimatum demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all combatants from the canal zone The ultimatum was the cornerstone of the tripartite plot France and Britain warned that unless both Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire and withdrew ten miles on either side of the canal an Anglo-French force would intervene to keep the warring parties apart The conspirators ofcourse were certain Egypt would reject the demand and were equally sure Israel would comply An Israeli withdrawal to within 10 miles of the canal would in fact constitute an advance If their plan succeeded Israel would gain the Sinai the French and British would occupy the canal and Nasser would be neutralized

The Eisenhower administration was outraged by the ultimatum The President sent Eden and Mollet a warning In his message Eisenhower told the allies I feel I must urgently express to you my deep concern at the prospect of this drastic action It is my sincere belief that peaceful processes can and should prevail to secure a solution Eisenhower put Britain and France on notice that the United States could not be counted on to come to their

I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

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_____I The Soviets embroiied in their own conflict in Eastern Euro e offered onl moral support to E t

I25X1 and 6 E013526

(U) At the same time the middotus Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge informed the UN General Assembly of US plans to introduce a resolution that called Coran immediate cease-fire Israels withdrawal to its borders allmiddotUN members refraining from the use of force and an embargo against Israel until it withdrew its troops84 British Prime Minister Eden essentially ignored the United States and refused to have anything to do with the U N resolution

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UNCLASSIRED

MAPll THE IATIUFIELD Oe1ober-Wovemb1t UIS bull r shyA raquo( amp AirfldtJ~T11tt112JClaampWz

$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I

The Battlefield OctobermiddotNovember 1956

UNltLASSIFIED 22

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The following day the first British troops disembarked on the beaches of Port Said while French troops landed at Port Fuad67

(U) The Soviet Union delivered a strongly worded protest to the British and French on 5 November In its complaint the Soviet Union denounced British and French actions and threatened to intervene on behalf of the Egyptians88 Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganins letters to the French British and Israeli governments declared that Moscow was fully resolved to use force to crush the aggressors and to restore peace in the Middle East and even contained a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against L1gtndon and Paris ifhostilities continued89

(U) Bulganins letter to Eisenhower had an entirely different tone The Soviet Premier suggested that a joint Soviet-American force intervene in the Middle East if Britain France and lsrel refused to agree to a cease-fire The qnited States not only reiected this proposal but threatened nuclear retaliation if London or Paris were attacked~0 Despite strong US disagreement with its allies position President Eisenhower would not stand by and let his old friends and NATO partners be intimidated

middot -EampCCO) Moreover the US administration had reason to believe the Soviets were bluffing NSA reports disclosed that the Soviets while quietly advising Egypt to appeal for volunteers arms and assistance from all countries provided nothing more than verbal support to the Egyptians Comint indicated there was no movement middotof Sovietmiddot fighters into Syria or any other Middle Eastern country Early on 6 November the US presidential election day Eisenhower ordered U-2 fights over Syria and Israel _to ascertain whether there were any Soviet fighters at Syrian bases By noon the U-2 flights had confirmed that there were no Soviet fighters in Syria91

middot

Not with a Bang But a Wimper (U)

(U) Just as the British troops at Port Said were preparing to advance southwaros into lsmailia and Abu Suweir the British government under heavy US and international pressure agreed to a cease-fire at midnight on 6 November The French and Israelis reluctantly followed suit Thus ended the Suei war of 1956

I I Israel was especially bitter about the outcome I

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Suez A Sobering Reflection for Politics and Intelligence (U)

~CCO) The Suez crisis highlighted not only discord between the United States and its allies but also the lack ofArab unity - a recurrent theme in recent Middle East history The fractious Arab allies never managed to agree on any coordinated plan of attack Instead they expended most of their time and energy worrying about being sabotaged by one another Throughout the crisis Comint clearly illustrated their disarray

CPSC) For example Comint reflected Syrian and Egyptiaymiddot suspicion about proshyWestern Iraq The presence of Iraqi troops in proximity to British forces in Jordan gave rise to an anti-Iraq propaganda campaign Syria and Egypt spread rumors that Iraq was working in league with Israel and Great Britain to partition Jordan and Syiia reported inter~pting Iraqi arms shipments to dissident Syrian tribes93 The Jordanian General Staff ordered units to observe closely all activities of Ira i troo s in Jordan es ciall those encamped near the British base in Mafraq94

In early December l956 Iraq withdrew its troops r-om---~o-r-a-n-~~~~~~~--

(U) Perhaps a more ominous and far-reaching effect of the Suez crisis was the erosion of Western influence in the Middle East and the deepening of Soviet penetration into the region Before the war there was some hope that Nassers professed poliey of nonshyalignment might translate into an evenhanded approach toward Western and Sovietmiddotbloe nations However the aggression against Egypt by two close US al lies ensured that both Egypt and Syria would rely much more heavily on Soviet and Soviet-bloc countries for both economic and military assistance Egyptian suspicion of the West deepened The Suez crisis helped middotset the stage for years of conflict-by-proxy between the United States and the USSR in the Middle East

(lSC) The Suez crisis also illuminated a significant weakness in the US Comint effort Unquestionably NSA made a major contribution to the US intelligence effort during the crisis The United States nonetheless was profoundly deficient in the Comint resources it devoted to the Middle East and relied instead on British interce t

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~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~

Shift in Perspective (U)

jllSCCO) As early as the spring of 1956 US policymakers recognized the potential 1 dangers inherent in US dependence on British sites and the lack of US intercept stations devoted to Mi~dle Eastern targets In response to the growing tensions in the region the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USC18)98 decided on 17 April 1956_ to emphasize Middle Eastern targets at the expense of the Soviet Black Sea

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coverage Central to this plan was the conversion of the CIA site at to an all Middle East station effective 3 May 195699 The USCIB decision al~that NSA would request GCHQ as an allied agency to make concurrent changes in their Middle East and Black Sea coverage middot Soon after the USCIB dfrective middot NSA and Britains GCHQLondon Communications Security Agency (LCSA) convened a Middle East Planning Conference The first formal conference meeting was held on 7 May 1956

(TSCJ Even before the conference began GCHQ and NSA had already agreed to certain changes in coverage The Senior US Liaison Officer in London SUSLOL) Captain Prescott H Currier USN informed the Director NSA Lieutenant General Ralph Canine on 16 April that the British had decided to increase their Middle East intercept effort at UKM-257 by eight teams (about 40 operators) immediately Previously there were only three people inwJlved in the processing effort at UKM-257 In addition GCHQ agreed in principle to the transfer of US naval personnel from USF-61 to provide continuity ofcoveqige of Black Sea naval and naval air targets too

Major General Ralph J Canine

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JPSC-NF) As had been agreed upon at the conference two Arabic linguists from NSA (David B Nuckols and Gene M McKee USA) were ordered toc==Jfor a 90-day period beginning 22 June 1956 In addition Emanuel Azar Chief of NSAs Near and Middle Eastern Branch went to[=Jon temporary duty from 1-8July as an expert linguist 109

ltJlS-CCO) In order to augment USF-61 as le Canine with CIA and State Department concurrence planned to dispatch carefully screened Army personnel as well as operators from the NSA civilian pragram uo Although th~re was space for 80 operators at USF-61 at that time only 47-48 positionswere manned and the number ofpositions wired and installed was 64

(~CCI) Becaj5e the CIA did not have a pool of intercept operators available for duty at the site in May NSA requested the Army Security Agency (ASA) to supply 35 o~ to bolster the stations personnel strength In July the men began arriving on L_Jin increments of five enlisted men a~d two offuers per week for sixshymonth tours ofduty This however did not entirely alleviate the personnel problems at USF-61 and NSA was required to furnish five additional communications experts to themiddot si 1n

CO) On 15 August CIA Director Dulles indicated his desire to phaseout CIAs roe at USF-61 because the CIA had neither a rotation program nor a personnel pool to properly maintain this station on a continuing basis With the growing tensions in the MiddtemiddotEast and USCIBs decision to make USF-61 the primary US Sigint site targeting that region the CIA believed it would be unable to meet these increased demands Representatives of NSA CIA and tl)e Navy Security Group met and deeided that the best course of action was to transfer control of USF-61 to the Navy The military personnel would be overtly associated with the US Navy but purported1y in support of a State Department Communication (Radio Relay) Station114

n ine wit t e recommendations o t e i e ast anmng o erence Canine concurred with the British request to assign Egyptian Syrian and Arab Joint Command callsign identification and plain text to Category I should fighting occur

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ftBC-NF) Whether or not NSA targeted and exploited British communications remains an enigma Following the Suez crisis George Wigg a Labor Member of Parliament claimed in a news conference that the United Statesmiddot had broken British French and Israeli codesuo Wigg did not reveal his sources or justify his claim and no NSA records can be found t-0 substantiate his accusation

NSAs Performance (U)

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not ahare some or its most valuable and revealing intelligence data with the British What the British kept from the United States remains purely in the realm ofspeculation

A Diligent Delicate Endeavor (U)

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JPSC-NF) Despite the closeness of the Anglo-American Comint relationship N A was very interested in GCHQs unilateral response to the Suez operation On 2 November Canine requested Curriers assessment ofany changes in GCHQ cover assignments in the area any changes in GCHQs effort and processing the possibility of GCHQ diverting middotcover to close support any other changes made by GCHQ during the previous two weeks or any changes OCHQ was contemplating In response Currier reported on 5 November that the 2d Wireless Regiment at Famagusta Cyprus had raised all Egyptian traffic to foll 24 hour-a-day coveragemiddot and added four additional full positions on Egyptian targets New positions were manned by troops from the 128th Close Support Training Group Some extra oover of Arab Joint Command traffic was also added but no further cover changes were noted j middot IIn Curriers opinion there was no evidence that the British would implement close support plans because virtually all troops that could be used for close support were stationed at UKMshy257121

(lSe) ln spite of the strain in relations between their respective governments NSA and GCHQ apparently managed to maintain a close working relationship throughout the crisis According to one of NSAs Deputy Liaison officers John J Keenan who was in Cheltenham England during the Suez crisis his British counterparts went out of their way to reassure the Americans there that the friction between Washington and London

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would not damage or curtail the NSA-GCHQ working relationship Keenan added that he did not detect any change in the US-British partnership Most US and Bri~ish

personnel at Cheltenham regarded the crisis as a high-level tiff that did not affect day-toshyday relationships121 Mark Pattie eehoed Keenans sentiments According to him there was no detectable decrease in either the quantity or the quality of British intercept provided to NSA during the Suez crisis LIB Moreover Canine told Currier on 5 November the consensus at NSA was that UKM-257 was doing an excellent job and that current US requirements from Britain were being fully met 29

L

QCCO) Regardless of the generally harmonious Comint relationship between the middotUnited States and Britain the Suez crisis revealed numerous problems in the processing and reporting of intelligence within the US Comint establishment As the volume aiid scope of the crisis increased US communications became overburdened inefficierit and erratic Despite these handicaps NSA provided invaluable intelligence to its customers

5CCO) NSAs shortcomings as well as its strengths quickly became apparent during the critical months in the autumn of 1956 The Suez crisis was the first major test of the Comint Alert System outlined in NSAmiddotCircular Number 53-2 (Revised) Basically the circular defined the four Comint Alert categories (Alpha Bravo X-ray and Yankee) and delineated the conditionsrequiring that an alert be instituted A Yankee Alert was indicated when a planned US or Allied activity may stimulate a foreign communieations reaction or provoke military or paramilitary action hY a foreign nation with respect to the US130 Once an alert was declared all US Comint units involved were responsible for ensuring thet the facilities under their control continuously analyzed foreign communications developments in order to keep abreast of significant or abnormal conditions Moreover all units were responsible for rapid and secure forwarding of information to DIRNSA and other agendes in accordance with a special time and distribution schedule contained in the NSA Circular For example in a Yankee Alert intelligence reports were to be issued every six hours at immediate precedence while a periodic summary was to be issued every 24 hours18L

~-NF) [n reaction to Israels attack on Egypt USF-61 declared Alert Yankee EgypUlsraeli at 2048Z on 30 Oetober In less thanthree hours Canine requested the Army Security Agency Europe (ASAE) and USN-40 (Bremerhaven West Germ1micro1y) to initiate a Yankee Alert to cover possible Soviet reaction tothe Middle East crisis The Office of General Studies (GENS)m assumed the rol~ of Executive Agent within NSA Headquarters On the following day the alert was expanded to include Hungary Poland and East Germany The alert was so extensive in time geographical scope and areas of activity that the Comint community was provided with a test of Comint operational and reporting capabilities and limitations as close as possible to actual war conditions133

CCO) The alert pushed an already_-saturated Comint communications net over the edge Canine quickly discovered that the alert instructions contained in NSA Circular 53-2 did not envision an alert of the scope and complexity necessitated by the simultaneous Suez and Hungarian crises 134 As aresult at 1650Z on 6 November the Director canceled all previous Yankee Alert instructions and issued new instructions adapted to this unique situation Comint units were ordered to issue spot reports as the situation developed not at fixed times_ Furthermore only the Executive Agent was allowed to release negative rePQrts that is reports showing a lack of activity

5CCO) The technical procedures by which alerts were declared and implemented aJso revealed their insufficiencies There was for example a seven-hour delay between the time DIRNSAs alert declaration message was drafted and the time it was actually released This distressing time lag largely resulted from a lack of specific instructions for declaring an alert The failure o some elements to eliminate or lower the precedence of

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normal daily reports generated other problems Consequently somemiddot important alert materials were delayed while regular reports were cleared135

~CCO) The primary US concern vis-a-vis the Middle East situation was clearly the possibility of Soviet ~ntervention there US Sigint sites in Europe were tasked to watch for any signs ofSoviet reaction or impending intervention middotA DIRNSA message on 1 November 1956 illustrated the US fear of Soviet involvement in the tense Middle East arena

I25Xl and 6 E013526

~-CCO) In particular NSA was so concerned about a stand-qown of Soviet long-range bomber forces that a special NSA emergency processing team was set up at USM-1 (Vint Hill Virginia) with the sole purpose of scanning civil traffic for any positive or negative reflections of Soviet long-range air force activity 131 By 6 November however the consen5us was that the stand-down was related to an annual Soviet holiday celebration and not to an intended intervention in the Middle East156

Lessons Learned Lessons Ignored (U)

(jSC) The worldwide Sigint alert implemented in the middotfall or 1956 provided the impetus for certain changes in alert and reporting procedures within NSA The novel concept ofdecentralized reporting that is reporting capability as close as possible to the source of intercept proved to be Ute most timely and efficient means of disseminating reports NSA Headquarters encouraged and expanded the use of canned (ie predetermined) distribution indicators usually designated by digraphs that substituted for lengthy addresses on reports [n addition the Director of NSA clarified the chain of command of those authorized to declare alerts required field sites to prepare a set of emergency procedures for future crises and most importantly reviewed and upgraded communications capabilities 139

CPSC) According to the Critique of the 1956 Yankee Alert inadequacy of communications represented the major problem of the entire alert140 Overloading was due to communications facilities inadequate to handle the volume of data produced greatly increased demands on circuit time and faulty reporting procedures 10 The alert critique stated unequivocally that the YankeeAlert made it appallingly apparent that an investigation of the communications capabilities of the National Co mint Establishment is urgently needed142

~) Despite this caveat and the other lessonsofYankee Alert EgyptIsrael NSA once again faced a crisis in the Middle East as the Lebanese and Iraqi situations brought the United States into direct military involvement in the region during the summer of 1958 Again the US Comint establishment experienced annoying and dangerous delays caused by inadequate communications capability and unclear alert instructions

fl2I Even though the United States closest ally had maneuvered behind its back to take military action against another sovereign nation the US-UK Comint relationship continued without interruption This patent British deception Qf the United States might have been expected to inspire a US effort to es~blish a reliable well-equipped and independent intelligence-gathering operation vis-A-vis the Middle East It did not NSA was again heavily dependent upon British intercept during another Middle East crisis

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CONFIBENRAL

less than two years after the Suez imbroglio In 1958 t~e US Navys collection facility atI ras still small understaffed and ill-equipped and NSA continued to rely upon the Bnfash aamp its prime source ofMiddle East Comint middot

(U) Perhaps one lesson to be derived frommiddot the Suez crisis is that whether by dint of loyalty or the inertia inherent in any establishedmiddot system or bureaucracy the AngloshyAmerican Sigint alliance was easily strong enough to continue unabated despite a disruption in the political relationship In spite of British duplicity before and during the Suez crisis our Sigint interdependence was untouched by the temporary spat between allies The interesting question raised by this phenomenon is At what point is the Sigint relationship between allies affected by the current political environment Evidently the Suez ~sis was not of sufficient political magnitude to warrant any disruption in the Sigintrelationship

(U) The other important lesson of Suez is a familiar one intelligence is valuable only to the extent that those in power not only have access to it but use it wisely Those at the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration did receive intelligence data warning them of the Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy This information was either ignored mistrusted or covered up for the sake of political expediency Despite public denials and disavowals in the aftermath ofSuez the fact remains that the intelligence data was made available to top US policymakers The intelligence oommunitymiddotfulfilled its commitment to provide timely and accurate information Beyond this intelligence officials relinquish their authority to political decision-makers However as the Suez crisis showed intelligence is not an erid in itselbut a tool to be wisely employed badly mishandled or simply ignored

middotshy

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NOTES

l (Ui NSA Report to the Presidents Board ofCltlnsultanta on Foreign Intelligence Activities 9 January l 957 Crises Filu Boz Number 6 Ristorieal Collection NSA pp ll HI hereafter referred to $8 laquoNSA RQport 1BC 2 (U) Steph~n E Ambrose Eimihower tui lresident Volume n ltNew York Sim_on amp SchWlter 1984) p 368 3 (U) Although this mede the British government the luge11t slngl shareholder in the Suez Canal Company (witb 44 percent of the share11J private French citizens held more tluin 50 percent of the ahares Chester L Cooper TIM Litmdaid Roar Suiz 1966 (New Yolk Harper amp Row 1965) pp 13-14 4ltU) Terence Robertson Crisits Tlw fnsidii Story(New York Atheneum 19641pp iiii-iiv 6 Ul Cooper flte Lions lalll Roar p 33 6(U) Kenneth LltgtveSzu1 The Twice Fought WorNew York McGraw-Hill 1969) p160 7 (Ui Dwight D Eieenhower Wtllfint Peatraquo 1956-i961 (Garden City NiW York middotooubleday amp Co n~ 1965) p24 8 (lJl Diplomatfo Summary 19 October 1955Serisl Number 2311 p 14 Accession Number 9597 Location CBSF 23 CAHA NSA These reports were included in an eJecutive aummary prepared every weekday brthe State Departments Special Projects Staff (SPS) liaison at NSA Headquarters Known ae the Diplomamptie Summary they incl11ded the most important reports and translaUrme ofthe day with commentary ampddelti by the SPS 9 CU) OiplomatieSummary 12 October 1955 Serial Number 2306 pp 4-5 Accession Number 9691 Location CBSF 23 CAHA NSA CJgtSC) 10 (U) Diplomatic Summary 17 October 1955 Serial Number 2309 p t l Accession Nwnber 9597 Location CBSF 23 CAHA NSA lt2SCJ 11 IUl Diplomatic Summary 20 October l955 Serial Number 2312 p 2 Aeteseion Number 9597 Location CBSF 23 CAHA NSA (2() 12(U) bullNSA Report p 12lt1amp) 13ltU) NSAampportpp13250SCI 14 (U) bullNSA lbgtport pp 56 12poundlBCl Ui (U) DiplomaticSummary 12June 1956 Serial Number2474p15Acces9ioa Number9597 LoationCBSF 27CAHA NSA(tse) 16 (U) Diplomatic Swnmary lll June 1956 Serial Number 2474p l9Accessioa Number 9597 Location CBSF 27CAHANSATSCJ 17 (U The comet appellation is laquoffigl1 Dam British engineera built the Aewan Dam between 1898 and 1902 about folll miles north ofthe present High Dam LoveTwicf-Poaght p 299 18 (U) Eisenhower WtllJlng Peace p 3 l 19 (U) Diplomatic S11111m11ry 19 July 1956 Serial Number 2500 pp 4-14 Accession lilPher 9597 Locatfon CBSF 27 CAHA NSA (ISC middot

20 (U) Herman Finer Dulks Ou~r Su~t CCbieago Quadrangle Books 1964J pp 47-48 This account agreee aubatantially with other published accounts ofthe meeting 21 CUgt Diplomatic Summary 23 July 1956 Serial Number 2502 pp 4-5 Acceseion Number 9597 Location CBSF27CAHANSAltllSdegCJ 22 (UI Diplomatic Summary 25 July 1956 Serial Number 2604 pp 4-5 Accession Number 9697 Location CBSF 27 CAHA NSAQBCJ 23 (U) Diplomatic Swnmary 25 July-1956 Serial Number 2504 pp 4-9 Accession Number 9597 Location CBSF 27CAHA Archives NSA 18Cl 24 CU) Diplomatic Summary 25July 1956 Serial Number 2504 p10 Acceaalon Number 9597 Location CBSF 27 CAHANSA cRCl 25 (tJ) Diplomatic Swnmary 24 July 1956 Serial Number 2503 p 8 Accession Nwnber 9597 Location CBSF 27CAHANSACFampl 26 ltUl Diplomatic Swnmary 26 July 1956 Serial Number 2505 p 10 Accession Number 9597 Location CBSF 27 CAHA NSAClBC) 2T cist-NFl Love T111w~middotFought p 319

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28 (U) Diplomatic Swnmary 4 July 1956 Serial Nwnber 2503 p 4 Accesaion Number 9597 Location CBSF 2T CAHA NSA t8t) 29 (U) Robertson CriBia pp xiii-xiv

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EeNFIDENllAL

SO (U) Oleg M Smolansley 71ie Soalet Uniart and the Arab Batst Utukr Kltruhdwv (Lewisburg Bucknell University Presa 1974)pp45-46 31 ltU) DiplomaticSummary 26July 11156Serial Nwnber 2505 p 16 ACCltlsaion Number 9597 Location CBSF 27 CAHA NSA (tSC) 32(U) Love Twice-Fouglll p163 33 fl Donald Nd WarriorsatSuu(New York Linden Press 1981 lp103 middotmiddot 34 (U) Fedayoon which in Arabic means they wbo sacrifice them1K1lves is tho telm gen11rally applied to Palestinians engaged in attacks against Israel in an elfon to regain the homeland they loet during the araeli war of independence To the Israelis Fedayeen is a synonym ror ~tarrorists to the Palestiniafll llnd their suppamprteraFedayeen is an hampnorific term meaning freedom lightera

middot 35(Ul Eisenhower WagingPeacep40 361 Ul Eisenhower Waging Peace p 40 37 (UI Eienhower Wogitll Peace Appendiii Sp 664 38 ltlJ) DiplomaticSwnmuy3 August 1956 Serial Number 25 tl p 5 Accession Number 959l Location CBSF 28 CAHA NSA 1FBCgt 39 (I) Diplomatk Summary 6 August Serial Number 2512 p 6 AccelSion Number 9597 Location CBSF 2B CAHA NSAlmtl 40 ltUl Eisenhower Waging PeatJ p 48 41 ltUl Diplomatic Summary 14 September 1956 Serial Number 2540 p 6 Accession Number 9697 Location CBSF 28 CAHA NSA Clampl 42 ltUJ Diplomatic Summary 17 September 1956 Serial Number 2541 pp 9-10 AcceSllion Number 9597 Location CBSF 28 CAHA NSA lt18(1 43 IID Diplomatic Summaey 17 September 1956 Serial Number 2541 pp 6-7 Accession Number 9597 Location CBSF 28 CAHA NSA ArchivesaBC) 44 CU) Eisenhower Wagi111 Peae p 62 45 (U) The AC was created by the National middotSecurity Council in t947 it was originally composed of the principal intelligence officers from State Army Air Force the Joint Chiefs of Staff and tbe Atomic Energy C-Ommission to provide coordination between the Central fntelligence Agency and other intelligence ageruies The Director of the FBI joined the IAC in 1949 The Director of Central Intelligence was the AC chairman although he was not technically a committee member One respansibilampy or the rAC waa to craft National lntelligence Estimates thatwere then submitted by t1111 DCI to the President and Lhe National Security Council The 1AC and the United States Conuiiunications Intelligence Board ltUSC1Bl were combined in 1958 to form the United States lntelligence Board ltUSIBl NSA and the Armed Forces ~curity Agency before it were always members of VSCIB and NSA became a member of USIB in 1958 Steve i Reardon History oftlis Offfcs oftlw Secrdary of Defenstt Thi Farmatiw Years 1947-1950 Weshingtan DCbull Historical Office Office or the Secretary ofDefense 19841 p 143 middot 46 (UJ SNIE 30-40-56 5 September 1956 Safe NWlber 152311 Drawer4 Arcbiveii NSA (iS) It is impossible to determine NSAs eontribltion to eitherSNlE 47(UfSNIE30-5-5619September 1956Safe Number 15231IDrawer4 ArchivesNSAlt~ 48 ltID ~NSAReport p 13 49 (U) Love Twice-Faught p 392 50 ltVJmiddot Love TwicemiddotFaught p 433 51 (U) Finer Dutle1 OverSUltr11 p 328 5~ IUJ Chaim Heriog Tile Arab-lsraeti Wars New York HendomHolllie 1982) pp113 114117 53 ltUl Thia ao-called aPact ofAmm11nM was an extension ofthe Egypdan-Jordanian agreement of the previous middot year It publicly called for increased militarycooperation and in the eveniqfa war with Israel the placementof Jordanian and Syrian forces qnder an Egyptian commander Eiaellhower Wa1ing Peooe p 66 54Ul HenogArab-l1trlhlliWaramppp l3-14 56 (U) Finer Dulks DuerSun pp 330-3 t 56 (U) Henog Arub-lsrueli Wars p 114 57 (U) Ambro11ampEise111towerpp351-52 58 (U Eisenhciwer Waging Peace p 56 59 (V) NSA Report p 13 CPSCl 6() l1J) NSA liteportw p13 CllSC) 61 ltUl Ambrose Eisenhower p 353 62(V) FinerDulkaOverSuecz p335 63 (U) Ambrose Eisenhower p 353 64 (lJ) Mellorandum from Richard E C11rl SPS 10 September 1956 Field Branch Correspondence July-December 1950Special State Department Collection HistoryCollection NSA (TSC) 65(Ul E~howerWagingP-p 66 66(U) Eisenhower WogingP~~p 75

EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

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67 ltUl Stephen E Ambrose IAea Spies EisenhoUJer alld the EspianageEstablishment (Genen City Doubleday amp Co lnc 1981)p 266 middot 68 (lJ) New YorJt Timea 19 December 1966 page 14colwnn 2 Emphasis added 69(Ul Ambrose~vsSpiup256

70 (U) Cover Letter to NSA Reportt G B Erskine Gen USMC ltRetgt Assistant to the Secretary of OefeDSe (Special Operations) middot 71 (U) Diplomatic Summary 27 September 1956 Serial Number 2549 p 19 Aceeeaion Number 9697 Location CBSF28CAHA NSA~l

72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526

to by 0 umber Emphaaia added 71gtIU) NSA Report 11 17 16Cl 76ltUl OPSUM Number 177middot66(r8Cl 71 cm Eisenhower Waging Peacepp 7M8 78 (U) NSA Report p l~l 79 (U) NSA Report p13 ClSCl 80 IUl NSA Report p 1l ~) 81(U) NSARepGrt p14flBCl 82ltU) OPSUMNwnher 178-06CllSCl 83 CUJ OPSUMNumber 177-56 (ff() 84(U) AmblQlle8-nhlgtiuerp3111 86 (Ul OPSUM Number 180-56 m3Cl 86 CU) OPSUM Number 18(56 WSC) 87ltU) NSA Report p l 7~l 88 (U) Smolaneky Klrr1LBhcheu pp 45-46 89(Ul TextofBulganin9letter was printed in Pravda 6November1956 90 (U) Smoleneky Khrualtcluw p 46 91 (U) Ambrose Eiunhlgtwer p 368 middot $2 tUgt Copy ofmessege 30IZ-QODfll 216-56Crisis FiAls Box Number 6 CAHA NSA (~NFl 93 CUI ~NSA RltlPort~ p U tlSSl 94 (IJ) NsA Report p18 (1ffCl 96 U) OPSUMNU111ber 186-66(1118C) 96 (U) lrskiue cover letter NSA Reports llfSCl 97 (U) Interview Mark T Pattie 24 January Ul86 by Robert Farley andl loH 05-86 NSA Cll5tshyNFgt 98 ~) Formed on 13 June 1946 USCIB originally consisted of representatives of the Armed Services the State Department the CIA and the FBL National Security Coll1cil Intelligence Directive (NSCID) Number 9 ill8ud on l July 1948 be~arne USCIBs charter lt designated the Board as the Councils agent to coordinate snd provide policy guidance for US Comint activities When NSC1D 9 w88 revised in 1952 USCIBs memberahip was eicpanded to include the Director of the newly established NSA the DCI (es Chairman) the FBI tbe Army Navy and Afr Foru the CIA and the Departmente of State and Defell$ In 1955 USCIB alao became the national policy body for Electronic Intelligence CElint) George F Rowe Tlw NanuJue Hiatory ofAFSAINSA Part l pp 24-29 PartJI pp 239 240253 254 NSA Historfoal Collection VA1 (lSCNF) 99 (Ul Message from DIRNSA to SUSLO London 20 April 1956 Accession Number A62-144 Box Number 43949 Retired Records NSA (ieCl 100 (Ul Message from SUSLO London to DlRNSA 16 April 1956 Aeceasion Nwnber A62-144 Box Number 43949 Retired Records NSA CPSC 101 (U) Message frorn Commander 6901 Special CommlJJ)ications Group to SUSLO London 21 AprH 1956 Accession Number A62middot144Box Nwnber 43949 Retired Records NSA lttSCl 102 (U) Message from Chief NSA E~pe to SUSLO GCHQ 2 May 1956 AcceBSion Nwaber A62middot144 Sox Number 43949Retired ampcGlda NSA 1t8Cl

35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL

103 (U) Meese~ from OlRNSA to SUSLO London 9 April 1956 Accession Number A62middot144 801 N~r 43949 Retired Records NSA CPBCl 1()4 (U) Messege from Director GCHQ to OISUSLO 2 May 1966 Accession Nwnber A62-144 Box Numblr 41949 Retired Records NSA ltRICI middot 105 ltUl Meseage from SUSLO Lendon to DffiNSA 12 April 1956 Accession Number A62middot 144 Box Numblr 43949 Retired Records NSA (RfCJ 106Je=CCO) NSA-GCHQ Middle Eaet Comint Planning Discussions 14 May 1956 p 1 Accession Nwnber A6Z-144 Box Number 4949 Retired Records NSA~)

107 ~-CCOl NSA-GCHQ Middle East Comint Planning DiscWions p 2 (P51) 108 ~CO) NSA-GCHQ Middle East Comint Planning OiseussiomtAnnex 2 1iscgt 109 (J) Letter from SUSLO London to Colonel W B Rowett MI8 Office 28 May 1956 AcceampSion Number A62shy144 Box Number43949 Retired Records NSA(SC) middot UO (U) MeISampge frltgtm NSA to )USLO London 25 April 1956 Accession Number A62-144 Box Number 43949 Retired Records NSA lJl0C) 111 (U W H Jester LCDR USN DCS Transfer of Operntions of USF-(H 26 November i956 p l Box Numher43613Stored Rerords NSAjiBCl 112 (U) Me$68ge from OIRNSA to SUSLO London 8 June 1956 Accession Number A62-144 ampx Number 43949 Retireli Records NSA ci8el middot US UJ Message from USF-61 to OlRNSA 6 Ocblber 1956 Accession Number 62-144 Box Number 43949 Retired Records NSA lreC) 114(U) Jester ~TransferofOperationap3a8Cl

115 ltUl Me8$8ge from GCHQ to SUKLO Washi11gton 21 AQgWlt 1956 Accession Number A62-144 Box Number 43949 Retired Record11 NSA lPampl Emphasis added 116 (U) Memorandum from GCHQ to SUKLO Washington 29 August 1956 Accession Number A58-062 Box Number 43613 Retired Records NSA (18C) 117 (U) Message lrom SUKLO Washington to GCHQ 27 August 1956 Accession Number A58-062 Box Nwnber 43613 Retired Records NSA liBCgt SUKLO put the last phrase in quotes 118 (U) Message from Deputy Director LCSA tranamitted by SUSLO London to OIRNSA 23 August 1956 Accession Number A62-l 44 Box Number 43949 Retired Records NSA 1Sel middot 119 (Ul Pef1JOnal message from Deputy Director LCSA Ui DlRNSA routlld by SUSLO London 23 August 1956 Third Party (CominrJComsec) French Accession Number A62-144 Box Number 4394~ Retired Records NSAlt2Cl middot 120 (U) David Kehn The Codebreokers ltNew York Macmillan 1967) p 729 121 tUl Pattie interview 1isc-NFl 122 (U) Pattie interview CESC-NF) 123 (U) Pattie interview (fSC-NFl 124 (U) OPSUM Number 178-56 llBCl 125 I Ul Pattie intetview iSC-NFl 126 (U) Me~sage from SUSLO London to DlRNSA November 1956 Accession Number A62-144 Box Number 43949 Ratired Records NSA~I 127 (lJ) Interview John J Keenan by-1-----~January 1986 NSA(15C) 128 U Pattie interview OBC-NFl 129 ltUl Message from DlBNSA to SUSLOLondon5 November 1956Accession Number A62-144 Box Number 43949 Retired Records NSA lt8Cl 130 (Ul NSA Circular 53-2 CRevisedl Octoblr 1953 p 3 Accession Number 10938-39 Location CBRI 72middot73

lllSC) 13 l UJ NSA Circular 53-2(Revieedl Appendix A 118C)

132 tGltCCOJ GENS was responsible for exploitable Soviet and Sovietbloc targets 133 fe-CCOJ Executive Agents Critique of Yankee Alert 30 October to 20 November 1956 bull p 5 Crisis Files Box Number 6 NSA herealter referred to as Critiquebull cTSCmiddotNFl 134 IUJ Critiquebull p 8 lliSCmiddotNFl 135IUgt bullcritiquebull pp11-12(~-NFI 136 (Ul CritiqUt Appendix 1 p 6 CiBCmiddotNFgt 137 (U) Critique~pp 6-7 aBe-NF) 138 UI OPSUM 183-56Supplement fFSCmiddotNFJ 139CUl Critiquetpp13-15aac-NFl 140 (UJ Critique-p IOffSS-NFl 141 ltUl Critique~ p 13aBCmiddotNFJ

CONlllDfNTIAL 36 HANDLE VIACOMNTCRANNELSONLY

TOP SECRET



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II

Contents of this publication should not ie reproduced or further disseminated outside the US Intelligence Community without the permiulon of the Director NSACSS Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Oftice ofCryptologic Archives and History T54

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fOP SECRET UMBRA



Volume2





1988


a UNCLASSIFIED

Table ofContents

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Foreword (





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1


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EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

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35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

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Volume2





1988


a UNCLASSIFIED

Table ofContents

Page








Notes 33

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Foreword (





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T61 sieKlT UMBRA






1


Background (U)



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UNCLASSFtED

I

UNCLASSIFIED


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EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

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I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSFtED

I

UNCLASSIFIED


(U)

3







3 UNCLASSIFIED

UNClASSIFIED

Gamal Abdel Nasser



UNCLASSIFIED 4

SEERff


I25Xl and 6 E01352~


UN

CLA

SSIFIED


t ~ A

~

~ f ~

~

UN

CL

ASSIFIE

D

UN

ClA

SSIFIED

7 U

NC

lASSIFIE

D


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

I

UNCLASSIFIED


(U)

3







3 UNCLASSIFIED

UNClASSIFIED

Gamal Abdel Nasser



UNCLASSIFIED 4

SEERff


I25Xl and 6 E01352~


UN

CLA

SSIFIED


t ~ A

~

~ f ~

~

UN

CL

ASSIFIE

D

UN

ClA

SSIFIED

7 U

NC

lASSIFIE

D


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UNClASSIFIED

Gamal Abdel Nasser



UNCLASSIFIED 4

SEERff


I25Xl and 6 E01352~


UN

CLA

SSIFIED


t ~ A

~

~ f ~

~

UN

CL

ASSIFIE

D

UN

ClA

SSIFIED

7 U

NC

lASSIFIE

D


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

SEERff


I25Xl and 6 E01352~


UN

CLA

SSIFIED


t ~ A

~

~ f ~

~

UN

CL

ASSIFIE

D

UN

ClA

SSIFIED

7 U

NC

lASSIFIE

D


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UN

CLA

SSIFIED


t ~ A

~

~ f ~

~

UN

CL

ASSIFIE

D

UN

ClA

SSIFIED

7 U

NC

lASSIFIE

D


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UN

ClA

SSIFIED

7 U

NC

lASSIFIE

D


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET


fflP SECRET UMBRA




I25X1 and 6 E013526


I


25X1 and 6 E013526


UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED9

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

l8P SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526


I25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526





I25Xl and 6 E013526



UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UNQASSIFIED










UNCLASSIFIED 12

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

~ middot - middot-

T9P SECRET UMBRA




I I 25Xl and 6 E013526


T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

T6P SECRIT UMBRA

J 25Xl and 6 E013526


I 25Xl and 6 E013526





j 25Xl and 6 E013526


WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

WP SECIHlUMBRA









l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

l

ceNFl6ENllAL

[



J 25Xl and 6 E013526




u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

u

t J

I I

rep SECRET UMBRA








I25Xl and 6 E013526


UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

UN

CLA

SSIFIED

Jll

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

feP 5EERET UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526

Contladietion (U)





TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SlCHf UMIRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





Attack(U)






25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET


25X1 and 6 E013526



I

(U)

(U)

assistance77

I 25X1 and 6 E013526


I25X1 and 6 E013526


21 TOP SeeRET UMBRA

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIRED


$- --shy TJlltU

lmiddot

1 I


UNltLASSIFIED 22

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526





middot




I25Xl and 6 E013526


I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

I

i

TOP SKRET UMBRA







I25Xl and 6 E013526

~ M lO rI

0 -lt

~ IS = = ~ -lt

M ~



TOP SECAET UMBRA 24





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET





TOP SECREl UMBRA

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

MP SECREf UMBRA

I25Xl and 6 E013526








J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET







J 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SEERE~ UMBRA

I 25Xl and 6 E013526



j 25Xl and 6 E013526


TOP SECRET UMBRA



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lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET UMBRA



I 25Xl and 6 E013526




lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

lGP SECRET UMBRA



L







TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TSP SEEReT UMBRA



I25Xl and 6 E013526







31 TOP SECRET UMBRA

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

I f

I tt

CONFIBENRAL




middotshy

32 CONPIDENffAb

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET UMBRA

NOTES



I25Xl and 6 E013526



EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

EeNFIDENllAL



EeNFIDEN=FIAL 34

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TSP SECRET UMBRA



72(UJ NSAampportp26

I25Xl and 6 E013526


35 JQP SECRET UMBRA

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

EeNflfgtlNliAL







TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

subject: the suez crisis: a brief comint history · 2018-07-18 · 1956. (u) during the winter and...

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