CORDA A BAeSEMA Company

Sufficiency of Force in Conventional

Warfare

Rowland Goodman CORDA

Geoff Hawkins MOD

A presentation for 12 ISMOR on an ongoing MOD study of the validity of static measures as predictors of combat outcome at campaign level in

conventional conflicts under modem conditions.

September 1996 CORDA Repon C4082MI"l

@ Crown Copyright 1996

Biwata House, Ponsnouth Road. Esha. Surrey, KTlO 9SJ Telephone: 01372 466660 Facsimile: 01372 470444

CORDA is a asding NIILC of BAcSEMA Limited

The opinions, observations and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be construed as representing policies or perspectives of the MOD or any other British governmental institution.

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Introduction

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1. (vf 1) There are times when it is necessary for a state to go to war. In planning for war it is useful to assess how much force is sufficient. Static measures are a tool for comparing different forces. They have been used for at least 2000 years and include:

a. Counting numbers of men. b. c.

Counting numbers of legions, divisions, and other “standard” military units. Counting numbers of infantry, cavalry, artillery pieces and tanks.

This last method has the disadvantage of not producing a single number that describes each side. Ingenious people have come up with systems that ascribe different values to different equipments, which allow the user to produce a single score for each side. Examples include the America WEI/WUVs and the British BAMS. 2. The view-foil, incidentally, is a static analysis by the Comptroller of the Royal Navy, Sir Baldwin Wake Walker, comparing the projected battleship strength of the British and French Navies in 1859. The measures he used were number of ships, number of guns, and nominal horsepower. 3. You might think that as static measures have been used for such a long time, they have been tested, and that the relationship between force ratio and combat outcome is well understood. (vf 2) Despite a number of studies, the relationship is not clear. One problem is differences in equipment; we can solve this by using a method such as BAMS that gives different scores to different equipments. CDA/HLS have done a study of breakthroughs in 20th Century campaigns that shows that five key factors are correlated with success. Four of these are reasonably independent of each other. The fifth, shock is often the result of surprise, especially when the victims are of inferior quality, or faced with unfamiliar demoralising weapons. General Langlois did a study of engagements in both Boer Wars,’ which showed the importance of troop quality. He concluded that, whether in attack or defence, five or six professional British soldiers were the equal of one Boer militiaman. 4. (vf 3) This presentation describes a study that looks at land warfare under “modem” conditions. It is in three, possibly four phases.

Phase I (in Summer 1994) was a scoping study. It established that BAMS scores could be assessed for equipments going back to wars in the 1930s. and that data was available to support analysis at campaign level for 210 stages of campaigns.2 Phase I1 (Autumn 1994 to Spring 1995) collected data o n 20 stages of campaigns and drew conclusions on the validity of BAMS and other static measures, without taking account of the effect of key factor^.^

0

1 English edition pub HMSO 1909. See pages 85-94. 2

“Enseignements de deux guerres rkentes” (Lessons from two recent wars), by GCneral H Langlois,

The reports from Phase I are:

“Availability of Data on Campaigns 1930-1994 for the Validation of Static Measures”. by RC Goodman. CORDA Report C4082/2m/1, dated October 1994.

“Historical Validation of Static Measures, Concept of Analysis”, by N Ferguson and RC Goodman, CORD Report C4082/2/T”/2, dated October 1994.

The reports from Phase I1 are: 3

CORA4 C408216~11

0 Phase III (Summer 1995 to Spring 1996) is collecting data on a further 35-40

Phase N is a possible phase to validate the results of Phase 111 against a fresh stages of campaigns, and will take account of the key factors.

but comparable data set. 0

5. (vf 4) The overall aims of the study are: 0 to find out how good static measures are as predictors of campaign outcome,

whether BAMS is a better measure of force strength than the other methods and in particular

considered, and 0

0 to examine whether the identified key qualitative factors can be combined with static measures to obtain a better prediction of campaign outcome.

“BAMS Validation Study, Do Force-Ratios Predict Campaign Out-Come?”, by RC Goodman, dated April 1995, CORDA Report C4082/4m/’2. “Data on Force Ratios in Conflicts Since 1948 - Volume I”, by RC Goodman and MJ Young, dated April 1995, CORDA Report C4082/4m/1.

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The Design of the Experiment

6. (vf 5 ) The study is data driven. We needed to collect enough data on a “typical” sample of modem campaigns to support our projected analyses. From the CDA/HLS work on breakthroughs there were four key independent factors, surprise, air superiority, aggressive attack recce, and “nationality factors”. We calculated that a sample of 50-60 campaign stages would give a coverage of all four factors. We selected a data sample that contains a number of examples of both attacker victory, and defeats or draws for each of the factors being present or absent. (vf 6) If Phase IV is undertaken, then we will have covered all the conventional campaigns between 1945 and 1991, for which we can find good data, as well as a number of earlier campaigns. The projected Phase IV sample has the same balance both in terms of factors, ratio of victories and defeats, and time as the combined Phase MI1 sample. 7. (vf 7-9) The data-base we are compiling contains the information shown here. As a result of a conference at Byfleet in July, it has been proposed that we add data on casualties. 8. The data-base is-a+&&k on paper, and in magnetic form. It exists in a package called 4th Dimension, but can be exported as text files that can be read into Excel, Access or other data-bases. This shows the data-base structure in 4th Dimension. 9. (vf 10) With, for example the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict, the stages of the campaign were:

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, The Iraqi offensive at Khafji, and Operation Desert Sword.

10. Stages have been broken down into geographical sectors. This is because the attacker usually concentrates force at the point of main effort. There can also be differences in terrain, or factors between sectors. 11. To make an assessment of force using BAMS we need detailed information on ORBATS. This is done using standard orbats and making assumptions, using whatever information is available, as to the extent they were complied with.

Results

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12. (vf 11) One way of comparing data on campaigns is to draw cumulative frequency graphs for stages where the attacker wins, and for those where he doesn’t. If the force ratio calculated was a good predictor of campaign outcome, then the graph would look like this. If it was less good, then many of the stages would be in this zone of uncertainty, where the force ratio does not predict success or failure. 13. One reason for doing this is that the attacker does not normally attack unless he believes he can win. It is not surprising, that most stages of campaigns result in some degree of attacker victory. 14. (vf 12-13) These graphs show that for stages of campaigns, simple measures such as counting divisions, and complex measures such as BAMS both fail to predict the outcomes of the campaign stages in the sample. (vf 14-15) When we split the front into sectors, static measures are only successful, if one side outnumbers the other by more than three or four to one (depending on the measure used). 15. This is not surprising. It has always been accepted that qualitative factors such as surprise and troop quality are important. 16. (vf 16) Our conclusions from Phase I1 are shown here. The reason why military judgement was successful is that it took account of both force strengths and qualitative factors.

Current Work 17. As I explained, we are currently part way through Phase 111, which will extend the sample from 20 to 55 and undertake an empirical analysis combining the four key qualitative factors with static scores. We expect that the results will be available in Spring 1996. 18. We would like to thank Army Historical Branch, the MOD and CDA/HLS Libraries, the Public Record Office, and DSc(Land) for their assistance in this project.

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Analysed stage Conjlict Stage

Suez 1956 - Anglo French Amphibious landings Suez 1956 Op Musketeer - Anglo-French landing

Air superiority 11 Attacker I Attacker Date start

Aggressive Attack 11 Attacker Recce

UKBrEranCe Nov 6,1956

we* Date end

DefenderUnfamiliat I Demoralising Weapons

, E m t Nov 6,1956

Initial Surprise Subsequent Surprise Nationality

Training Defeatism

Permanent Fortifications 11 None 2 Neither 2 Neither 1 Defender inferior

1 Attackerbetter 3 Defender

Shock 12 Yes Amphibious Aujtragtaktik All A r m Coordination

YeS 2 Neither 2 No failures

Notes on factors

Going for MBTS I MOW good.

BAMS Scores Attacker D#ender MBT I 5,298 I 85

ARCISRC I 0 I 0 Lt Tk uu AIFV uu APC uu Artillery U-

DirectfireSP I 0 I 179 ATk wpns I 3,664 I 282

Mortars 1 2,625 I 601 Small Arms I 11,845 I 7,817 ArmedHelos I 0 I 0 AD Systems I 0 I 1,769 BAMS ratio 1 2.192 Regularsonly I 2.548

Aggressive attack recce given fop arracker racing down canal just before cease fire. Defeatism due to Egyptian attempt to surrender previous night. Attacker classed as better trained than norm as paratroops and marines, while defenders second line mops.

Numbers Attacker D#ender

MBT uu AFVs uu Arry uu Major ATk Wpn I 70 I 4 RegularDivisions I 1 I 0.33

IrregdarDiviswns I 0 I 0.11

RegdarBrigds I 3 I 1 IrregularBrigaaks I 0 I 0.33 Regular Men I 4,600 I 5,000

Terrain - cover

Irregular Men RegularInfBn I 8 I 5 IrregularInfBn I 0 I 1

Tk Bn uu LArmd Bn uu Arty Bn uu Degree of victory 10

,Part sandy dese6 pm cultivated and grassland.

Comments

I I

Egyptain resistance at Port Said collapsed. Other Egyptian forces in area of Cairo and Alexandria still intact at end of fighting.

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Attacker UCCWUCY

Comments on Daa Accuracy

0.8 Llefehr accwaq 10.5

Most of fighting in and around town. Large discrepancy in Egyptian forces between potential numbers fighting (calculated from numbers of units and unit strengths) and accounts of battle which speak of only handfuls of weapons. Anglo-French forces counted if landed before cease-fire.

I 1

Name Nwnber Centurion Mk 5 84" 48

Class Tank

3.5" Bazooka M20 I 3 12 I AT Rckt Lnchr

I I 201 MMG rMMG

120" mortar (misc) 1 121 TowedMortar

2"mortar I 601 TowedMortar

3" mortar I 201 TowedMortar

Name Nwnber SU-100 100" 4

81" mortar I 241 TowedMortar

106" US I 701 RCL Rifle

Class VdUe

Asslt Gun 179.20

VdUe I

Only 4, but sometimes reported as more. T-34/85 I 11 Tank

Assault rifle I 400 I Rifle Claimed that Russian diplomats issued these to civilians.

Regular

Regular

Irregular

85.96

1,400.00

Suez 1956 - Anglo French Amphibious landings

1

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Name Bolt-action rifle

Nwnber Class Value 1,940 Rifle 5,975.20

3.5" Bazooka M20

BRIlEB26 I 85 I LMG

Czech M1952 I 301 LMG Claimed that Russian diDlomats issued these to civilians.

-4TlAT Rckt Lnchr 7

Regular

Regular

Irrermlar

327.25

115.50

2" mortar I 181 TowedMortar

81" mortar I 111 TowedMortar

6 inch Naval Gun I 1 1 TowedGun

90" Coastal Gun I 21 TowedGun

3.7 inch AA I 41 AAA

Coastal Artillery

324.00

277.20

49.28

60.40

1 94 .00

Regular

. Regular

Regular

Regular

Suez 1956 - Anglo French Amphibious landings

Bofors 40" I 3 1 AAA

Single 30" I 48 I AAA Hispano suza

2

135 .OO

1.440.00 Regular

Regular

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loo: 1

10: 1

3: 1

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2 Q) 1:l 2 0 LL

1:3

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1:loo.

Figure A1 - BAMS Ratio for Stages Cumulative Frequency Comparing Winners and Non-Winners

Attacker Victory

Attacker Defeat

I

I I I I I I I I I I

Percentage

1 1

CORDA

100: 1

10: 1

3: 1

1:3

J

Figure A4 - Force Ratio for Numbers of Divisions (Stages)

Cumulative Frequency Comparing Winners and Non-Winners

I I

Attacker Defeat I I I I I I I t

I I I I I

Attacker Victory

1: 10

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Percentage

14

CORDA

1oo: l '

1O:l '

3: 1

1:l

1:3

1:lC

Figure B1 - BAMS Ratio for Sectors Cumulative Frequency Co m pari ng Winners and Non- Wi nners

I 4

I

7- - / 2 Attacker Victory I I

I I

Attacker Defeat I

I I I I I I I / / I

I I

ru 0

18

CORDA C408214fI”I2

Figure 84 - Force Ratio for Numbers of Divisions (Sectors) Cumulative Frequency Comparing Winners and Non-Winners

loo: 1

3: 1

0 .- c z 8 1:l.

5

1:3

1:lC

1: 100

I r------

I I I I I I I I I

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Percentage

21

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