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Indonesia

Ex-post Evaluation of Japanese ODA Loan Project

“Sumatra East Coast Highways”

External Evaluator: Keishi Miyazaki

(OPMAC Corporation)

Field Survey: June 2009

1. Outline of the ODA Loan Assistance

Map of the project site Project target road

(Seputih Banyak – Manggala Section)

1.1 Background Sumatra Island has an area of 482,000 km2, stretching 1,700km from north to south and

300km from east to west, which is about 1.25 times larger than the land area of Japan. In

1995, the total population of Sumatra Island was about 40 million; about 20 percent of the

total population of Indonesia. The trunk roads in Sumatra Island have been well developed

with the Java Island and Trans Sumatra Highway already serving the people of Sumatra,

which has a total length of 2,500km starting from Bakauheni port, located at the south end

of Sumatra, and ending in Banda Aceh, located at the north end. The road passes through

the central mountain ranges and through major cities like Padang in the center and Medan in

the north. However, this Trans Sumatra Highway does not directly connect with other major

cities in the east side of Sumatra such as Dumai, Jambi, and Palembang. Therefore, the

preparation of a master plan for a new trunk road development to directly link other major

cities in the east side of Sumatra was supported by JICA, and “Development Study of Coastal

Roads on the East Coast of Sumatra”1 was prepared in 1992.

1 Development Study of Coastal Roads on the East Coast of Sumatra proposed the widening and improvement of the existing national highways and provincial roads for the existing 1,900km from Medan in the north to Bakauheni in the south. For some sections new road construction such as for bypass roads was proposed.

Official

Use Only

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Whilst the east coast area of Sumatra has a favorable climate condition and is rich in

natural resources, the area also has great potential for plantation agricultural development,

paddy cultivation and energy resource development. Lampung Province, the southern

part of Sumatra, where the project target road is located includes Bakauheni port

operating ferry transport between Sumatra Island and Java Island. Lampung Province is,

therefore, a strategic point for the land transport and distribution of goods in Sumatra.

1.2 Project Objective

The objective of this project was to upgrade and improve a part of the Sumatra East

Coast Highway in order to cope with the increasing traffic volume, thereby contributing

to the development of the Island of Sumatra.

1.3 Borrower / Executing Agency

Government of Indonesia / Directorate General of Highways (Bina Marga), Ministry

of Public Works

1.4 Outline of the Loan Agreement

Approved Amount / Disbursed Amount

6,652 Million Yen / 4,763 Million Yen

Exchange of Notes / Loan Agreement

January 27, 1998 / January 28, 1998

Terms and Conditions - Interest Rates - Repayment Period - Grace Period - Conditions of Procurement

2.7% p.a. (Consultant portion: 2.3% p.a.）

30 years 10 years

General Untied

Final Disbursement Date February 2007

Main Contractor (Over 1 billion yen )

PT ADHI KARYA (Indonesia), SSANGYONG (South Korea), PT. HUTAMA KARYA (Indonesia)-PT. WIJIYA KARYA (Indonesia) (JV)

Main Consultant (Over 100 million yen)

Pacific Consultants International (Japan)

Feasibility Study, etc. (F/S) Development Study of Coastal Roads on the East

Coast of Sumatra, JICA, (1992)

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2. Evaluation Results (Rating: B)

2.1 Relevance (Rating: a)

This project has been highly relevant with the Indonesia’s national policies and

development needs at the times of both appraisal and ex-post evaluation; therefore its

relevance is high.

2.1.1 Consistency with Indonesia’s Development Policy

At the time of appraisal, the policy goals for the road sector in the Sixth Five-Year

National Development Plan (1994-1998, REPELITA VI) were more efficient road

transportation and smoother traffic between regions by the extension of road networks,

better road conditions, and the improvement of service levels. Also, a reinforcement

plan for trunk roads (1989)2 included improvement of the road surface and road widening

for the trunk road networks in Sumatra and Java regions as one of its main priority

projects. This project was planed based upon the Development Study of Coastal Roads on

the East Coast of Sumatra (total length of the target road: 1,900km) in 1992.

At the time of the ex-post evaluation, in the Medium-Term National Development

Plan (RPJM 2004–2009), the government considered road transportation as one of the

most important means of

transport in Indonesia, and

regarded road transportation

as an important area for

passenger and commodity

transport in national

development. This transport

mode played an essential role

in passenger and freight traffic.

Also, one of the targets of the

Road and Bridge Improvement

Program under RPJM is the

development of primary

arterial roads in national

economic centers, including

Sumatra Island. The

2 This plan was prepared based upon the study conducted by Bina Marga in 1989. In this plan, in order to deal with an increase of heavy vehicles, the government proclaimed the policy to upgrade the pavement standard from 8t to 10t axle load across total 9,000km sections, out of which 5,000km were scheduled to be improved by the end of fiscal year 1997.

Banda Aceh

Medan

Pekanbar

Jambi

Palembang

Bandar Lampung Bakauhen

i

Menggala

Padang

Bengkulu

Dumai

Sumatra East Coast Highway

Trans Sumatra Highway

Legend :

Figure 1: Sumatra East Coast Highway and Trans Sumatra Highway

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Development Study of Coastal Roads on the East Coast of Sumatra, including the target

sections of the project, has been promoted by the Indonesian government and the priority

of the project is still high.

2.1.2 Consistency with Development Needs

At the time of appraisal, the Trans Sumatra Highway (total length 2,500km) was

already in existence running through the north and south of Sumatra Island, but it did not

directly link major cities in the east coastal area such as Dumai, Jambi, and Palembang.

This was a problem for inter-city networks. Also, there had been less development of road

infrastructure in the east coastal area in Sumatra leaving problems such as missing links and

unpaved road surfaces in many sections which in turn produced a disincentive for the

development of land and natural resources. Furthermore, since there was a ferry port in

the Ketapang area in Lampung Province – the gateway between Sumatra and Java –

frequent traffic congestion occurred in Lampung Province and the neighboring areas due

to the large traffic volume of trucks and large vehicles travelling between Sumatra and

Java. It was estimated that traffic volume would increase with the development of the

area in the future.

At the time of ex-post evaluation, one of the objectives of the Strategic Plan of

Lampung Province (2004-2009) was to increase the quality and quantity of infrastructure

services such as roads, irrigation, energy, and telecommunications. The plan sets a

target to increase good road conditions to 80% of the 2,400km of provincial roads and to

support the acceleration of good national road conditions to 90% of the 851km of national

roads. The main industries in Lampung Province, which is a project target area, are

plantation agriculture such as rubber and sugarcane production and aqua culture. The

project target road plays an important role as a transportation route for these primary

commodities. In addition, the transport volume by ferry between Bakauheni port in

Sumatra and Merak in Java has increased year by year, and the traffic volume in Lampung

Province is expected to grow in the future. Therefore, the development needs of the

project are still high.

2.2 Efficiency (Rating: c)

Both project period and cost extended the planned value respectively, therefore

efficiency of the project is low.

2.2.1 Outputs

The outputs of the project were the improvement of roads and the construction and

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replacement of bridges in the Ketapang – Manggala section, which was a part of the target

section of JICA’s Development Study of Coastal Roads on the East Coast of Sumatra.

The project outputs actually realized were almost the same as those planned except for an

extension of 18km road length. This extension was caused by: (i) design change of a

part of the Jepara – Seputih Banyak section (CA-2) passing through the town center of

Sukadana to a bypass road detouring the town center due to the difficult land acquisition

negotiation with the residents in Sukadana, and (ii) design change of a part of the Seputih

Banyak – Manggala section (CA-2) due to the geographical condition. However, 24km

of the road, which consists of 22.7km in the Ketapang – Jepara section and 1.3km at the

Jepara - Seputih Banyak section, out of a total 186.1km in the Ketapang – Manggala

section was not yet completed as of May 2009. A percentage of completion was

therefore 87% (see Table 1).

Table 1: Comparison of Planned and Actual Outputs

Planned Outputs (at Appraisal) Actual Outputs (at Ex-Post Evaluation)

(1) Road improvement (CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara: 68km (CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak: 50km (CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala:50km

Total: 168km

(1) Road improvement (CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara: 69.5km (CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak: 601km (CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala: 56.5km

Total: 186.1km (note) Total 24km of the road, consisting of 22.7km in the Ketapang – Jepara section and 1.3km in the Jepara - Seputih Banyak section was incomplete as of May 2009. The entire section is scheduled to be completed in December 2009.

(2) Consulting services - Foreign consultants: 75 M/M - Indonesian consultants: 314 M/M

(2) Consulting services - Foreign consultants: 104 M/M - Indonesian consultants: 528 M/M

The major reason for the incomplete project outputs was the delay in the land

acquisition process. Construction works for the incomplete section were ongoing at the

time of the ex-post evaluation, and the executing agency expects to finalize the pending

land acquisition processes by August 2009 and to complete the construction of the

unfinished section by December 2009, resulting in the full operation of the entire section.

Since the expiry date of the Japanese ODA loan agreement for this project had already

passed in February 2007, the project cost for the incomplete section has been financed by

the Indonesian government. Details regarding the delay in the land acquisition process

are explained in “2.2.2 Project period” and “2.4.6 Social impact relating to the

resettlement of people and land acquisition”.

Regarding the consulting services, the actual work volume was 632 M/M (104 M/M

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for foreign consultants and 528 M/M for Indonesian consultants) against the planned 389

M/M (75 M/M for foreign consultants and 314 M/M for Indonesian consultants). This

was equal to 1.6 times of the planned work volume. The main reason for this increase

was the extra work volume caused by the detailed design for an additional 94.9km road

connecting with the project target section and including the following three sections: (i)

the Ketapang – Bakauheni section (17.3km), (ii) the Manggala – Pasir section (39.9km),

and (iii) the Pasir - Pematang Panggang section (37.7km)3. This additional consulting

service was included in the project scope by the request of the executing agency.

Figure 2: Map of Project Target Section

2.2.2 Project period

The actual project period was 12 years from January 1998 to December 2009 against

a planned period of 5 years and 5 moths from November 1997 to March 2003, which was

equal to 222% of the planned period. In December 2004, the expiry date of the loan

agreement for the project was extended another two years to February 2007 as project

completion by February 2005, the original expiry date of the loan agreement, was 3 These three additional sections were a part of the target section of the Development Study of Coastal Roads on the East Coast of Sumatra, but they are not part of the target section of the project. Whilst the improvement work of (i) the Ketapang – Bakauheni section had already been completed with Indonesian government funds, neither land acquisition nor the improvement work of (ii) the Manggala – Pasir section and (iii) the Pasir – Pematang Panggang section had been implemented as of May 2009.

Pematang Panggang

Manggal

Sukadana

Seputih Banyak

Jepara

Ketapang

Bakauhen

BandarLampung

Pasir

Gunungsugi

Metro

Merak

Java Island

South Sumatra P i

Bengkulu Province

Project Target Road

Lampung Province

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unlikely at that time. Despite this, the entire section of the project had still not been

completed by February 2007 due to the delay in land acquisition. In this ex-post

evaluation, the effectiveness and impact of the entire target section of the project are

principally examined but not of the individual completed sections. Therefore, the actual

project period is deemed to last from the signing of the loan agreement to the completion

of the entire target section of the project which is scheduled to be completed in December

2009.

The major reasons for the delay were: (i) a prolonged procurement process caused by

higher tender prices against the estimated project cost4, (ii) additional time spent on

detailed design for the additional sections5, and (iii) delay in construction works caused

by low performance of the contractor in charge of the Jepara - Seputih Banyak section6.

The most important reasons, however, were (iv) the delay in the preparation of budget for

the land acquisition by the local governments and the prolonged land acquisition process

due to difficult negotiations with land owners.

The Seputih Banyak – Manggala section (CA-3) (56.5km) was completed in January

2005. Regarding the Ketapang – Jepara section (CA-1) (69.5km), the contract period of

the Indonesian contractor for CA-1 expired in July 2006 and the civil works for the

incomplete section of 22.7km were implemented under a new contract with another

Indonesian contractor (new contract period: March 2008 – December 2009). Regarding

the Jepara – Seputih Banyak section (CA-2) (60.1km), the contract period of the Korean

contractor also expired in March 2006 and the civil works for the incomplete section of

1.3km were implemented under a new contract with another Indonesian contractor (new

contract period: March 2009 – September 2009).

4 During the tender process for the contractors, the following problems arose such as: (i) the lowest bid prices exceeded the estimated budget sum and (ii) there was deficit in the document submitted by one of the lowest bidders. As a result, 10 month delayed. 5 In addition to the change of detailed design for a part of the project target road, the detailed design for the following three additional sections linked to the project road such as: (i) the Ketapang – Bakauheni section (17.3km), (ii) the Manggala – Pasir section (39.9km), and (iii) the Pasir - Pematang Panggang section (37.7km) was included to the project scope, which required an additional period. 6 Although the construction work at Sukadana Bypass was available since the commencement of the contract date, the implementation of its construction work was delayed since the contractor of CA-2 gave the first priority on the cost, thus mobilization of engineers and workforces, procurement of construction equipments and materials, and financial arrangement were delayed.

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Ketapang – Jepara Section

(at Pasir Sakti) Ongoing road improvement work(at the 2-3 km south from Jepara)

Ongoing road widening work (at the 2-3 km south from Jepara)

2.2.3 Project cost

The actual project cost was 11,627 million yen (of which the Japanese ODA loan was

4,763 million yen) against the planned cost of 8,869 million yen (of which the Japanese

ODA loan was 6,652 million yen), equal to 131% of the planned cost and 72% of planned

loan amount (see Table 2). The first reason for the cost-overrun was the increase in

construction costs caused by the prolonged project implementation period. The second

reason was the increase in land acquisition costs. The project cost disbursed by

February 2007 was financed by the Japanese ODA loan, but the remaining project cost for

the 24km incomplete section was financed by the Indonesian government.

Table 2: Comparison of Planned and Actual Project Cost (Unit: million Yen)

Actual

Plan Before project implementation period

(until Feb. 2007)

After project implementation period* (Feb. 2007 – Dec. 2009)

Total

1. Civil work

Package CA-1 n.a. 1,899 1,289 3,188

Package CA-2 n.a. 1,656 1,150 2,806

Package CA-3 n.a. 1,898 755 2,653

Sub-total 6,377 5,453 3,194 8,647

2. Contingency 447 - - -

3. Consulting services 759 710 0 710

4. Land acquisition 738 499 907 1,406

5. Tax and duties 548 545 319 864 Total

(of which Japanese ODA loan) 8,869

(6,652)7,207

(4,763)4,420

11,627(4,763)

Source: Bina Marga, Ministry of Public Works Note 1): *The actual project cost under the finance of the Indonesian government includes the estimated

project cost to December 2009. Note 2): Since there was a time lag between the progress of the construction work for each target section

and payment to the contractor, even after the construction work was completed for some sections before February 2007, the final payment disbursed late after February 2007.

2.3 Effectiveness (Rating: a)

In the target section, a significant increase in traffic volume as well as a saving in

travelling time and an improvement in average speed (velocity) were realized. Also,

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positive impacts such as the promotion of commodity distribution and the movement of

people and regional development were observed. Therefore, in general, this project has

largely produced the planned effects, and its effectiveness is high.

2.3.1 Increase in Traffic Volume

Although traffic volume data for the project target section of pre-project

implementation could not be collected, the Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) of the

three sections increased 6 to 18 times between 2005 and 2008. Likewise the Passenger

Car Unit (PCU7) of the three sections increased 4 to 18 times in the same period (see

Table 3). For the purpose of reference, this ex-post evaluation survey conducted a

24-hour sample traffic count in Jepara. As shown in Table 4 below, the surveyed traffic

volume was 16,675 in AADT and 10,304 in PCU. The ratio of motorcycles was 81% of

the total traffic, implying that the use of motorcycles was promoted by the widening of

the road and the improvement of the road surface under the project. The traffic volume

of the three sections commonly increased after 2007 when over 80% of the entire target

section was completed, and particularly there was an outstanding increase in the traffic

volume of the Jepara – Seputih Banyak section (CA-2). The possible reasons for this are

that the Jepara – Seputih Banyak section is located in the populated area including Jepara

and Sukadana towns and more and more local people became to use this target road as

their community road. It is supported by the result of the sample traffic count that about

80% of the traffic consisted of motorcycles. Whilst from the viewpoint of the role of the

target road as an alternative distribution route in the entire Lampung Province, the

utilization of the target road for this purpose is still limited because a part of the section is

still incomplete.

Table 3: Traffic Volume

Section km 2005 2006 2007 2008 Growth rate vs.

2005

AADT (No. of vehicle/day/year) (CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara 69.5 2,566 2,679 9,984 15,488 604%

(CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak 60.1 1,180 1,224 13,860 21,609 1,831%

(CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala 56.5 1,180 4,638 4,834 7,537 639%

PCU (PCU/day/year) (CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara 69.5 1,818 1,900 5,644 8,756 482%

(CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak 60.1 727 754 8,642 13,473 1,853%

(CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala 56.5 727 1,525 2,944 4,590 631%Source: Bina Marga, Ministry of Public Works

7 PCU (Passenger Car Unit) is a transport engineering term to convey the heterogeneous traffic concept (i.e. passenger cars) as oppose to the homogeneous traffic concept (i.e. trucks, buses, passenger cars, motorcycles, etc) by using a conversion factor. In Bina Marg, the Ministry of Public Works adopts the conversion factors for each type of vehicles as 1.0 for passenger car, 0.5 for motorcycles, and 1.3 for heavy vehicles.

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According to JICA’s Development

Study of Coastal Roads on the East

Coast of Sumatra (1992), the estimated

traffic volume of the target section in

2010 was estimated as 18,000 PCU/day.

If the actual PUC of each section in

2008 in Table 3 is compared with the

estimated PCU in 2010, the

achievements for each section are 48%

in the Ketapang – Jepara section (CA-1), 75% in the Jepara – Seputih Banyak section

(CA-2) and 26% in the Seputih Banyak – Manggala section (CA-3)8.

However, considering the fact that a part of the project section was still incomplete

as of April 2009, assessment of the degree of achievement in traffic volume at the time of

ex-post evaluation should be made some reservations. It is expected that after the

completion of the entire target section in December 2009, when travelling from

Bakauheni port in Lampung Province to Palembang in South Sumatra Province, it will be

faster and more convenient to use the east coast detour route of Bakauheni – Jepara –

Seputih Banyak – Manggala than the existing route of Bakauheni – Bandar Lampung –

Gunungsugi – Manggale which is usually congested. Since the number of cargo trucks

and vehicles for the distribution of goods is expected to increase in the project area, it is

also estimated that there will be an increase in the traffic volume in the target section of

the project. It is therefore possible that the target traffic volume of 18,000 PCU/day will

be achieved by the end of 2010.

Meanwhile, according to statistical data of traffic volume at major roads in Lampung

Province in 2007, the highest traffic volume (AADT) in Lampung Province was 23,000

vehicles/day at Tanjungkarang, which is located in the center of Bandar Lampung, capital

city of the province. When comparing this AADT with the AADT for Jepara – Seputih

Banyak which were 13,860 vehicles/day in 2007 and 21,609 vehicles/day in 2008, there is

no large gap between these two AADTs. Particularly after 2007 when improvement

work for the majority of the target section was progressing, a dramatic expansion in the

traffic volume was observed. Hence it can be concluded that the project has brought

about the expected outcome to some degree.

8 The information regarding the traffic volume estimation for each target section for each year was not available in the appraisal documents. Therefore, the estimated traffic volume of the target section in 2010, which is 18,000 PCU/day, described in the JICA’s Development Study was used as a reference to measure the achievement of the traffic volume.

Table 4: Result of Sample Traffic Count 1. Date 20-21 April 2009 (24 hours)

2. Place Inside Jepara

3. Traffic

Volume

16,675 vehicle/day

10,304 PCU/day

4. Break

-down

Motorcycles: 13,449 (81%)

Jeeps, sedans, wagon cars: 1,855 (11%)

Small wagon cars: 191 (1%)

Mini-buses, large buses: 123 (0.7%)

Trucks: 1,057 (6.3%)

Source: Ex-post evaluation team.

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However, there are concerns that there is no progress on the planned improvement of

the Manggala – Pasir - Pematang Panggang section (77.6km) which directly links with the

target section, and this may have a negative effect on the sustainability of the project

outcome. The Indonesian government must continue to make efforts to realize the

improvement of the above section9.

2.3.2 Savings in travelling time and the improvement of velocity

Although exact data regarding travelling time and velocity in the target section

before and after project implementation is lacking, according to an interview survey by

people from the executing agency who were directly in charge of project implementation,

the travelling time in the Ketapang – Manggala section shortened from 435 minutes (7

hours 15 minuets) to 191 minutes (3 hours 11 minutes), and velocity improved from 26

km/hour to 60 km/hour comparing before and after project implementation (see Table 5).

It can be seen that the cars were able to travel the target section in less than half the time

after the project implementation10. Considering the fact that part of the target section

was still incomplete as of April 2009, it can be expected that the positive effects of saving

of travelling time and the improvement of velocity will be further increased after the

completion of the entire project target section in December 2009.

Table 5: Travelling Time and Velocity Before Project After Project (April 2009)

Section km Travelling time (minutes)

Velocity (km/hour)

Travelling time (minutes)

Velocity (km/hour)

(CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara 70 120 35 87 48

(CA-2) Jepara – Sukadana 30 45 40 50 36

(CA-3) Sukadana – Manggala 90 270 20 54 100

Total 190 435 26 191 60Note: Travelling time and velocity before the project implementation are based on the results of an interview

survey to the executing agency.

9 The detailed design of this section was already completed by the consulting services of the project. Although the periodic maintenance such as patching, cleaning of the drainage facilities, and overlay has been carried out by the executing agency using the Indonesian government’s own fund and the financial assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), a part of this section is still badly damaged due to the heavy traffic exceeding 8t of the design weight of the road. The executing agency anticipates that the land acquisition of this section will be easier than that of the project (i.e. the Ketapang-Manggala section) since the majority of land is owned by the state-owned plantation company and many immigrants from Java island live along this section. However, the improvement work of this section has not yet started due to a difficulty in arrangement of the project budget. 10 The possible reasons why the travelling time and velocity of the Jepara – Sukadana section are not improved after the project implementation are: (i) the dramatic traffic volume expansion to 18 times of this section might compensate the expected positive effects on the travelling time and velocity of this section, and (ii) the lower car speed is enforced at many locations of this section than other two sections since this section is located in the populated area including Jepara and Sukadana towns.

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2.3.3 Results of Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR)

The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR), based upon a cost-benefit analysis at

the time of appraisal, was 18.2%. The re-calculated EIRR adapting the same

preconditions (i.e. cost: project cost and operation and maintenance cost; benefit: saving

of vehicle’s operation cost and time saving cost) of cost-benefit analysis at the time of

appraisal was 8.4% at the time of ex-post evaluation11. It is difficult, however, to

identify the reasons why the re-calculated EIRR at the time of ex-post evaluation is lower

than the original EIRR at the time of appraisal due to lack of detailed information on the

original data. Possible factors for the lower re-calculated EIRR might be associated

with the increase in project cost, the difference in the unit costs for saving of vehicle’s

operation and time saving, and the difference in the traffic volume estimation between the

appraisal and ex-post evaluation. But it is not certain.

2.3.4 Satisfaction level of the project beneficiaries

According to the results of a satisfaction survey of local residents, local transporters,

and local businesses, 44.9% of respondents (79 respondents) said that they were “Very

much satisfied”, 39.2% of respondents (69 respondents) answered “Yes, satisfied to some

extent”, 10.2% of respondents (18 respondents) said “Not much satisfied”, and 5.1% of

respondents (9 respondents) replied “Not satisfied at all”. Considering the fact that

more than 80% of the total respondents answered either “Very much satisfied” or “Yes,

satisfied to some extent”, it can be assumed that the project met the needs of the

beneficiaries.

Table 6: Satisfaction Level of Beneficiaries

Local Residents Total Satisfaction level

Male Female

Local Transporters

Local Businesses No. of

Responses %

Very much satisfied 11 9 31 28 79 44.9%

Satisfied to some extent 9 5 25 30 69 39.2%

Not much satisfied 1 0 10 7 18 10.2%

Not satisfied at all 0 0 1 8 9 5.1%

Do not know 0 0 1 0 1 0.6%

Total 21 14 68 73 176 100%

Source: The results of the beneficiary survey conducted by the ex-post evaluation team.

11 The operation and maintenance cost, saving of vehicle’s operation cost and time saving cost used for the calculated EIRR are referred from the information in “Project Benefit Monitoring Evaluation Report: JBIC IP-487, 2008” prepared by the executing agency.

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2.4 Impact

2.4.1 Impact on commodity distribution and the movement of people

The main industries in the project area are plantations producing pineapple,

sugarcane, tapioca, banana, rubber and pulp and the aqua-culture of prawns. Products

are exported to overseas markets or transported to domestic markets in major cities like

Jakarta through Bakauheni port. Since the project target road plays an important role in

transporting produce, it can be said that the project contributed to the improvement of

commodity distribution and the movement of people to a certain degree.

The transport volume of ferry boats between Bakauheni in Sumatra and Merak in

Java has also been increasing year by year 12 . For example, the number of cars

transported by ferry increased about two times from 3,471 vehicles/day in 2003 to 7,035

vehicles/day in 2007 (see Table 7). With a constant increase in the number of vehicles

transported by ferry through Bakauheni port linking with the project target section, the

traffic volume in Lampung Province travelling between Sumatra and Java is also

increasing. It is expected that after the completion of the entire section of the project in

December 2009, more and more cargo trucks and transporters will begin use the target

section of the project as a detour route in order to avoid traffic congestion on the existing

route of Bakauheni – Bandar Lampung – Gunungsugi – Manggale. Therefore, the role

of the project in the promotion of commodity distribution in the region will be more

important.

Table 7: No. of Passengers and Vehicles transported by Ferry between Bakauheni and Merak

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Annual 9,042,844 9,376,520 4,630,963 5,697,428 3,582,201 No. of passengers Daily Average 24,775 25,689 12,688 15,609 9,814

Annual 1,267,082 1,428,862 1,658,939 2,338,702 2,567,714 No. of vehicles Daily Average 3,471 3,915 4,545 6,407 7,035

Source: Ferry Company.

2.4.2 Impact on the local economy and regional development

The Gross Regional Domestic Project (GRDP), the agricultural output and the

industrial output in Lampung Province have increased stably since 1997. Also the

volume and the number of foreign and domestic investments in Lampung Province have

shown an upward trend after 2004 (see Figure 3 and 4). 12 The construction of ferry terminals and related facilities in Bakauheni and Merak ports was financed by three Japanese ODA loan projects: (i) the Lampung - Merak Road and Ferry Terminal Project (ferry terminal component in 1976 (2,300 million yen, completed 1981), (ii) the Bakauheni - Merak Ferry Terminal Extension Project in 1985 (2,200 million yen, completed 1988), and (iii) the Merak - Bakauheni Ferry Terminal Extension Project (2) in 1993 (4,580 million yen, completed in 2002). (Source: ex-post evaluation report on Merak - Bakauheni Ferry Terminal Extension Project (2)).

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After 2007 the establishment of new factories and the development of economic and

commercial activities have been observed along the area of the project target road. For

example, two large-scale sugar refinery factories in Menggala and Seputih Banyak, a

large-scale tapioca processing factory in Seputih Banyak, and two small factories in

Purbalingga located at the middle point between Seputih Banyak and Sukadana have been

newly established. Similarly the number of businesses has increased.

Table 8 indicates the number of registered foreign and domestic companies in the

four regencies in Lampung Province where the project target road is located. The

number of registered companies increased 10 times between 2000 (before the project) and

2008 (after the project). The number of commercial services such as shops, restaurants,

petrol stations and car repair workshops expanded along the project target road. The

result of the beneficiary survey says that the increase in new business and the expansion

of business opportunities have been widely noted by the beneficiaries. Therefore, it can

be concluded that the project played a key role in facilitating regional development in the

target area.

Table 8: Number of Registered Companies in the Four Regencies in the Project Area

Regency 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 6Tulang Bawang

Domestic 2 3 3 4 4 8 11 11 14Foreign 2 3 4 4 7 9 12 14 15Central Lampung

(Lampung Tengah) Domestic 1 6 6 11 11 13 14 15 15Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 4East Lampung

(Lampung Timur) Domestic 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3Foreign 1 2 2 5 6 12 14 14 14South Lampung

(Lampung Selatan) Domestic 3 10 11 11 17 19 23 24 24Total 9 24 26 35 45 69 85 90 95

Source: Lampung Province Statistic Department.

Source: Lampung Province Statistic Department. Source: Lampung Province Statistic Department.

Figure 3: GRDP, Agricultural and Industrial Output in Lamping Province

(Constant Price)

Figure 4: Foreign and Domestic Investmentin Lampung Province

0

10,000,000

20,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

50,000,000

60,000,000

70,000,000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Million Rp.

GRDP Agriculture Manufacture

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

No.

0

1,000,000

2,000,000

3,000,000

4,000,000

5,000,000

6,000,000million Rp.

No. of Investment Volume (million Rp.)

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2.4.3 Improvement in living standard of the local residents

According to the results of the beneficiary survey, the promotion of business

activities and increases in income as well as the improvement of access to various

services such as hospitals, schools and health care services were recognized as major

positive changes. As explained above, economic and commercial activities were

promoted and the convenience for residents improved along the project target road after

2007. Therefore, it can be assumed that the project contributed to the improvement of

living standards for local residents.

2.4.4 Traffic accidents

Although statistical data of traffic accidents is only available for the period after

2007, the number of traffic accidents in the four regencies of the target area dramatically

increased - about three times - from 187 in 2007 to 584 in 2008, and the number of

deaths increased accordingly (see Table 9). Whilst traffic accidents in Lampung

Province also increased from 1,363 in 2007 to 1,562 in 2008, 26% of the total traffic

accidents and 32% of the total deaths were concentrated in the Tulang Bawang Regency

and the Central Lampung (Lampung Tengah) Regency. Since Table 9 shows the total

number of traffic accidents in both regency and province, individual traffic accident data

for particular target sections cannot be identified. However, considering the fact that the

number of traffic accidents in the four regencies increased after 2007 when the project

was nearly completed, it can be assumed that quite a few number of traffic accidents

occurred along the target project road belong to the number of the traffic accidents in the

four regencies. Since the increase in traffic accidents was raised by the beneficiaries as

one of the major changes after project implementation in the results of the beneficiary

survey, there must be a high possibility that there was an increase in traffic accidents

along the target project road after the project implementation in comparison with the

situation before project implementation. According to the Lampung Province Police

Authority, the major cause of accidents is speeding.

Table 9: Number of Traffic Accidents in the Project Area and Lampung Province

2007 2008 Jan. 2009 Feb. 2009 Mar. 2009 Regency and City

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

Tulang Bawang 56 65 207 96 11 2 15 8 12 10

Central Lampung 15 14 206 109 8 6 7 5 9 8

East Lampung 57 60 94 84 7 7 8 12 4 2

South Lampung 59 66 77 91 4 4 6 5 7 9

Sub-total 187 205 584 380 30 19 36 30 32 29

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2007 2008 Jan. 2009 Feb. 2009 Mar. 2009 Regency and City

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

No. of Accidents

No. of Deaths

Bandar Lampung 855 96 691 78 47 12 53 4 47 12

North Lampung 46 45 111 93 7 3 7 5 8 6

West Lampung 36 32 66 16 0 0 7 2 4 4

Tanggamus 38 31 n.a. n.a. 9 3 8 1 17 11

Way Kanan 27 26 59 61 3 4 5 2 4 3

Metro 174 92 51 14 6 1 5 1 7 1

Total 1,363 527 1,562 642 102 42 121 45 119 66

Source: Lampung Police Authority.

The issue of the recent rise in traffic accidents has been well recognized by the

Lampung Provincial Authority, and they have been taking measures for traffic accident

prevention such as the installation of traffic lights and traffic signs, the improvement of

inter-changes, and the promotion of traffic safety campaigns.13

2.4.5 Impact on the natural environment

An Environmental Impact Assessment was not conducted, though a brief survey had

already been conducted at the time of appraisal. According to the beneficiary survey of

local transporters and businesses (sample size: 141) in the ex-post evaluation survey, 50%

of respondents answered that there had been environmental impacts (of which 27% of the

respondents replied “very much” and 23% replied “to some extent”). The perceptions of

the above respondents to dimensions of the environmental impact were: “increase in air

pollution (65%)”, “increase in noise (83%)” and “increase in vibration (69%)” after

project implementation. However, as environmental data was not collected in the

project area, an analysis of whether actual data surpasses environmental standards is not

available. Due to the lack of objective data, the beneficiaries’ opinion cannot be

referenced.

According to the executing agency of the project, the installation of environmental

monitoring equipment and the conducting of environmental monitoring activities during

project implementation became compulsory for all road development projects in

Indonesia which had contracts signed after 2009. For this project, the environmental

monitoring equipment at a station located in 3km from Sribawono towards Jepara was 13 Examples of the traffic safety measures are: (i) the installation of one unit of traffic lights between Sribawono and Jepara in 2010, (ii) the installation of 500 units of traffic signs between Bahauheni and Menggala, (iii) the improvement of the inter-change at Menggala, (iv) the implementation of a weekly traffic safety campaign for all regencies and cities in Lampung Province for one a year after 2009. The components of the traffic safety campaign are: the organization of a driving skill course and the distribution of booklets on safe driving, the wearing of helmets, safe walking and the safe road crossing of pedestrians. In addition, traffic safety activity has been conducted in collaboration with local governments every three months.

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already installed and its operation is scheduled to start from September 2009.14

2.4.6 Impact on the social environment associated with the resettlement of residents and

land acquisition

At the time of ex-post evaluation the acquisition of 85.7 ha, which is equal to 91.5%

of planned area for land acquisition, was complete. According to the executing agency

of the project, the remaining 7.93ha of land was scheduled to be acquired by August 2009.

The number of households compensated totalled 427 including 400 households in the

Ketapang – Jepara section (CA-1) and 27 households in the Jepara – Seputih Banyak

section (CA-2). In general, compensation was in money. Most of the land owners sold

a part of their compounds; hence there was no relocation of buildings except for 7 or 8

cases (see Table 10).

The main reason for the substantial delay in the project period and even now in the

construction work for a part of the target section was the prolonged land acquisition

process. The primary reason for the prolonged land acquisition process was the delay in

preparing the required land acquisition budget by the central and local governments. In

principle the land acquisition cost was to be shared equally by the central and local

governments. However, due to the financial difficulties of the provincial and regional

governments, for example, the arrangement of the land acquisition budget became

difficult. A difficulty in the negotiation with the land owners of compensation prices

was also one of the reasons that caused delay. Finally, a measure to prevent further

delay was taken by the executing agency through the taking over of the financial

obligation of local governments for the land acquisition through a special budgetary

arrangement with the central government after 2008.

Table 10: Comparison of Planned and Actual Land Acquisition Plan Completed On-going

Section and Regency Length (km) Area

(ha) Build -ing

Area (ha)

Build -ing

Area (ha)

Build -ing

(CA-1) Ketapang - Jepara South Lampung 14.8 4.97 110 4.97 100 - 10East Lampung 54.7 17.77 173 14.54 134 3.23 39

(CA-2) Jepara - Seputih Banyak East Lamoung 51.8 31.32 181 26.62 102 4.70 79Central Lampung 8.3 1.50 9 1.50 9 - -

(CA-3) Seputih Banyak - Manggala Central Lampung 39.4 17.65 24 17.65 24 - -Tulang Bawang 17.7 20.42 3 20.42 3 - -

Total 186.1 93.63 50085.7

(91.5%)372

(74.4%) 7.93 128

Source: Bina Marga, Ministry of Public Works

14 The purpose of the installation of the environmental monitoring equipment is to monitor air pollution near the station as there is an asphalt production factory near Sribawono.

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It should be noted that there still exists a pending case on land acquisition with the

Hindu temple and Hindu community located in the Ketapang – Jepara section (CA-1)15.

According to the executing agency, negotiations with the Hindu temple and community

have been proceeding only with difficulty, and the resolution of this issue was not

expected by August 2009. If there is no progress in the negotiation process in 2009, the

executing agency plans to take appropriate legal action. Therefore, it is necessary to

continue monitoring progress of the remaining land acquisition.

Summary Results of Beneficiary Survey Conducted in this Ex-Post Evaluation In the ex-post evaluation of the “Sumatra East Coast Highways”, a questionnaire survey and group interviews (Focus Group Discussions) with the beneficiaries were carried out. A summary of the results of the beneficiary survey is as follows. <Focus group discussion with local resides living along the project target road> (1) Place: Jepara (2) Time: April 2009 (3) Target group: Local residents near Jepara (4) No. of samples: 35 (21 male and 14 female) (5) Top Five “Changes” that Participants Consider Most Important

Male group: 21 participants No. of vote

Female group: 14 participants No. of vote

1. Increase in business and income 23 1. Increase in traffic accidents 112. Change of driving attitude and

discipline (become worse) 20 2. Expansion of economy 7

3. Increase in traffic accidents 10 3. Improvement of driving comfort 74. Increase in inter-town connections 8 4. Increase in job opportunities 65. Increase in social and cultural changes 2 5. Increase in investment 4

Note 1: At first, all the participants discussed the key question, “How has the project changed your life?” and major common changes were extracted through group discussion. Then each participant, who had three votes, was asked to allocate their votes to the “changes” that they thought most important.

Note 2: Focus Group Discussions were organized separately for male and female groups.

(6) Results of Analysis Positive changes in economic aspects such as the increases in business, income and job

opportunities, and in investment were commonly recognized. At the same time, negative impacts such as the increase in traffic accidents and changes in

driving attitudes and discipline were perceived. It can be assumed that factors such as the increase in traffic volume and velocity, coupled with

the lack of traffic safety education and awareness of the drivers, increased the risk of traffic accidents.

15 The land to be acquired from the Hindu temple is approximately 3,000 square meters of land which makes up part of the compound but does not include buildings. According to the executing agency, the Hindu temple and Hindu community request as a condition of selling their land that not only compensation for the land, but also provision of the entire reconstruction costs of the temple.

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FG male group

FG female group Voting

<Questionnaire survey to local businesses and transporters > (1) Place: Ketapang-Menggala section (2) Time: April 2009 (3) Target group: Local businesses and transporters (4) No. of samples: 141 (73 businesses and 68 transporters) (5) Results of Analysis 90% of businesses perceived an increase in the convenience of traffic after project

implementation. Major reasons for this answer were: time saving (74%), reduction of vehicle operation costs (17%), reduction of traffic congestion (15%) and so on.

70% of businesses recognized the socio-economic impact of the project. These were: increase in new business activities (80%), increase in accessibility to a variety of services (78%), increase in business opportunities (72%), increase in land prices (94%), increase in population (92%) and so on. It can be assumed that the project contributed to the promotion of commercial activities and the activation of the local economy in the project area after the project implementation.

60% of transporters recognized an increase in traffic volume after project implementation. In addition, 94% of transporters perceived an increase in the volume of freight vehicles such as trucks.

50% of transporters saw an increase in the frequency of transport services, but 44% of them replied that this was unchanged.

85% of transporters recognized time saving after project implementation.

65% of transporters thought that the number of traffic accidents had increased. They analyzed the causes of traffic accidents as: speeding (20%), drivers’ bad manners (15%), increase in traffic volume (7%), lack of traffic signs (4%) and so on.

<Opinions and recommendation for the project from beneficiaries>

A major common opinion expressed by local residents, businesses, and transporters was the necessity for the installation of fly-overs, traffic lights, and street lights for traffic accident prevention along the project target road. Also, the necessity for better periodic maintenance of roads and bridges was suggested.

2.5 Sustainability (Rating: a)

No major problem has been observed in the capacity of the executing agency nor its

operation and maintenance (O&M) systems; therefore, sustainability of the project is

high.

2.5.1 Executing Agency

2.5.1.1 Structural Aspects of Operation and Maintenance (O&M)

The executing agency for operation and maintenance (O&M) of the project is the

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Directorate General of Highways (Bina Marga), Ministry of Public Works. In particular,

the Sub-Directorate of the West Region II (Balai Beswar II) under the Directorate of

Roads and Bridges for the West Regions is directly in charge of O&M of the project target

section (see Figure 5).16 Balai Beswar II is responsible for the supervision of roads in its

territorial area including the project target road. Balai Beswar II makes decisions about

O&M work plans while the Bina Marga head office decides which sections require

maintenance by using the road management system. Balai Beswar II collects and reports

on data for the road management system and, meanwhile, the Bina Marga head office

administrates the database. It can be concluded that there is no problem in the O&M

system as the managerial responsibilities for O&M are clear.

Figure 5: Organizational Chart of Directorate General of Highways (Bina Marga)

2.5.1.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

Balai Basar II has approximately 15 engineers. As these engineers belong to Balai

Basar II directly, they can visit the sites frequently and become accustomed with crucial

16 At the time of appraisal, it was expected that the department of public works in Lampung Province would maintain roads while the regional offices of the Ministry of Public Works would conduct O&M planning or give technical guidance to the province. After the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998, as a result of the review of administrative organization, regional offices (Balai) which are in charge of more than one province under Bina Marga take charge of routine maintenance (inspections, cleaning up, minor civil works, etc.), periodic maintenance and emergency maintenance of roads. Ten Balai are placed across Indonesia.

Secretary of Directorate General

Directorate General of Highways

Ministry of Public Works

Directorate of Program Directorate of Technical AffairsDirectorate of Road and Bridge

for West RegionDirectorate of Road and Bridge

for East RegionDirectorate of Toll Road and

Urban Road

Program and Budgeting

General Planning

System Development &Monitoring Evaluation

Data and Information

Risional RoadDevelopment Facilitation

Road Technology

Bridge Technology

Material and Equipmentfor Road and Bridge

Standard and Guidance

Environment

West Region I

West Region II

West Region III

West Region IV

West Region V

East Region I

East Region II

East Region III

East Region IV

East Region V

Development Toll andToll Road

Land Acquisition for TollRoad

Monitoring andEvaluation for Toll Road

Technical Planning forUrban Road and Bridge

Implementation for Roadand Bridge of

Metropolitan City

: Sub Directorate

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information such as landform and soil condition. Meanwhile, this system allows Balai

Basar II to use the technical knowledge of engineers at regional level. Engineers

directly under Balai Basar II are given training for assessment of road condition, survey

methods of traffic volume, electronic procurement, project management, quality control,

and etc.

2.5.1.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance

The O&M cost for the project target section is allocated from the central government

general budget. After the O&M budget in FY2008, budget allocation was over 120% of

that planned by RENSTRA of the Ministry of Public Works (see Table 11). Budget

allocation has increased since 2005 and it has become clear that there is more focus on

road maintenance.

Table 11: Operation and Maintenance Budget

(Total of daily maintenance and regular maintenance) (unit: billion Rp.)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

RENSTRA (planned) 8,400 9,700 11,400 13,100 15,100

Budget allocation 5,900 7,300 9,800 16,000 19,000

% of sufficiency 70.2% 75.3% 86.0% 122.1% 125.8%Source: Bina Marga, Ministry of Public Works

2.5.2 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance

Bina Marga classifies Indonesian road conditions into the following four types using

the International Roughness Index (IRI), which is the index for showing the unevenness

of roads. IRI is often used as a benchmark in preparing maintenance plans.

IRI 0-4 m/km : Good - Appropriate for daily maintenance

IRI 4-8 m/km : Fair - Appropriate for regular maintenance

IRI 8-12 m/km : Poor - Appropriate for rehabilitation

IRI >12 m/km : Bad - Appropriate for reconstruction including the sub-base

IRI for the project target sections are shown in Table 12. Except for the Bunt

(Ketapang) – Labuha Maringgai section, the road conditions of all sections are classified

either “Good” or “Fair”. A possible reason why the IRI at Bunt (Ketapang) –Labuha

Maringgai was 8.14 (Poor), was that a part of the section is still incomplete and the old

deteriorating road surface remained in some sections. At present, Bina Marga has

implemented a project for the installation of weighting stations in Indonesia financed by

the World Bank, and they plan to install a weighting station near Ketapang by 2011.

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Table 12: IRI for the Project Target Section

Section Location IRI

（2007）

(CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara Bunt (Ketapang) –Labuha Maringgai 8.14

(CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak Sukadana – Purbolinggo 4.13

(CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak (CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala

Purbolinggo – Mandala 3.2

(CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala Mandara – Bujung Tenuk 3.47

Source: Bina Marga, Ministry of Public Works

3. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

3.1 Conclusion

Whilst the relevance of the project is high due to the high consistency between the

project objective and Indonesian development policy and development needs, the

efficiency of the project was low as project completion was delayed and project costs

increased against the plan. After project implementation, expected project effects such

as an increase in traffic volume, savings in travelling time, and an increase in velocity

were observed. Also, impacts on the promotion of commodity distribution and the

movement of people and impacts on the local economy and regional development were

recognized. The sustainability of this project is high in terms of the O&M system,

technology, and finance by the executing agency as the roads improved by the project are

maintained in good condition. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be

satisfactory.

3.2 Lessons learned

In this project, the difficulty of local government in budgeting for land acquisition

was one of the major factors which caused delay in project implementation. Despite the

fact that the expiry period of the loan agreement was extended, as a result of this delay

the project could not be completed by the extended project period. Financial issues are

expected finally to be cleared by the arrangement of a special central government budget

to be used for the purchase of remaining land after 2008. If such a counter measure had

been taken in an early stage, the project would have been completed before the expiry

period of the loan agreement.

Insufficient information sharing on the land acquisition process between the

executing agency and the local governments revealed the problem of project monitoring.

It would be preferable to establish a system to carry out land acquisition smoothly by

assigning certain staff to land acquisition monitoring in the executing agency and by

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improving the capability for monitoring land acquisition through training, specialist

dispatch and the consulting service of the ODA loan projects.

Furthermore, JICA, who is responsible for project monitoring as a financer, should

carefully assess the feasibility of land acquisition at the project appraisal and

implementation stages.

3.3 Recommendations

As the increase in traffic accidents has become a social issue, Lampung Provincial

Government and the local police authority should continue to actively promote effective

traffic safety measures such as the installation of traffic lights and road signs as well as

the implementation of traffic safety education campaigns.

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Comparison of Original and Actual Scope

Item Original Actual

(1) Outputs a) Road improvement by widening and

upgrading of roads

・ (CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara

68 km

69.5 km

・ (CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak

50 km

60.1 km

・ (CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala

50 km

56.5 km

Total: 168 km Total: 186.1 km (note) A total 24km of the road, which consist of 22.7km in the Ketapang – Jepara section and 1.3km in the Jepara - Seputih Banyak section was incomplete as of May 2009.

b) Rehabilitation and construction of bridges

・ (CA-1) Ketapang – Jepara

23 bridges (527m)

28 bridges (700m)

・ (CA-2) Jepara – Seputih Banyak

11 bridges (172m)

11 bridges (170m)

・ (CA-3) Seputih Banyak – Manggala

6 bridges (265m) 40 bridges (964m)

6 bridges (265m) 45 bridges (1,135m)

c) Consulting services ・ Detailed design ・ Assistance for tender ・ Construction supervision ・ Technical advisory service to the

executing agency

Foreign consultant: 75 M/M Local consultants: 314 M/M

Foreign consultant: 104 M/M Local consultants: 528 M/M

(2) Project period ・ Signing of loan agreement

Nov. 1997

Jan. 1998

・ Selection of consultant Oct. 1997-Sep. 1998 (12 moths)

Oct. 1998-July 1999 (10 months)

・ Selection of contractor May 1999-Nov. 2000 (19 months)

Nov. 2000-Dec. 2002 (26 months)

・ Land acquisit ion Aug. 1999-Nov. 2000 (16 months)

Jan. 2000-Aug. 2009 (estimates)(104 months)

・ Civil works Apr. 2001-Mar. 2003 (36 months)

Dec. 2002-Dec.2009 (estimates)(85 months)

・ Consulting services Sept. 1998-Mar. 2003 (55 months)

Sept. 1999-Dec. 2006 (88 months)

(3) Project cost Foreign currency Local currency Total ODA loan portion Exchange rate

5,300 million Yen 3,569 million Yen

(68,635 million Rp.) 8,869 million Yen 6,652 million Yen 1 Rp.=0.052 Yen

(April 1997)

n.a. million Yen n.a. million Yen (n.a. million Rp.)

11,627 million Yen 4,763 million Yen 1 Rp.＝ 0.014 Yen

(Weighted average between 1997-2006)