Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31351 October 26, 1973

REMEDIOS T. FUENTES, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, and PATRICIA LIZARES, respondents.

Wenceslao B. Trinidad for petitioner.

Manaloto and Del Rosario for respondent Patricia Lizares.

ANTONIO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner Remedios T. Fuentes seeks: (a) the annulment of the order, dated April 25, 1969, of the respondent Judge, Hon. Pedro JL. Bautista, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, in connection with Civil Case No. 2866-P, denying the motion for execution, and his order, dated July 31, 1969, denying the motion for reconsideration, and (b) the issuance of an order for the immediate execution of the judgment, dated December 27, 1966, in Civil Case No. 6973 of the Pasay City Court, Branch II.

The pertinent facts which led to the issuance of the disputed orders of respondent Judge are as follows:

Respondent Patricia Lizares and her husband, Antonio Garcia, were lessees of petitioner's property located at No. 2443 Park Avenue, Pasay City, on a month-to-month basis in consideration of a monthly rental of P230.00, by virtue of a verbal contract of lease entered into sometime in September, 1959 (par. 2, Annex C of Petition).

On July 25, 1966, petitioner instituted an action for illegal detainer in the City Court of Pasay City, Branch II, against the said spouses Antonio Garcia and Patricia Lizares, as defendants, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6973 (par. 2, Petition). Petitioner alleged therein that defendants-spouses, who had been occupying the subject premises since September, 1959 until the date of filing of the complaint, had been in arrears in the payment of rentals for their occupancy of petitioner's aforementioned property, in the amount of P6,305.00 as of May 31, 1966, which they refused to settle despite oral and written demands upon them to pay, and she prayed the city court to order the defendants to vacate the premises and return the possession thereof to petitioner; to pay the rentals in arrears, with legal interest thereon until fully paid, as well as the rentals due petitioner from May 31, 1966 until the defendants vacate the premises; and to pay the costs of the suit (Decision of City Court, dated December 27, 1966).

The summons and a copy of the complaint were served, according to the Sheriff, at No. 2443 Park Avenue, Pasay City on the defendants-spouses thru their "overseer" Mary Padrolin, on July 30, 1966, and the latter delivered the same to respondent Patricia Lizares on the evening of August 7, 1966.

Petitioner orally moved that the defendants-spouses declared in default, but respondent Lizares opposed the motion in a pleading dated August 8, 1966, alleging, in substance, that (a) the defendants-spouses had fully paid the rentals due;(b) they had been residing at Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental since after the elections in 1963; (c) the service of summons on respondent Lizares was not effected in accordance with law, as she was

not residing at the subject premises where summons was served; (d) her co-defendant-husband likewise not received the summons issued in the case; and (e) the present occupant and/or lessee of the subject premises Manuel dela Pea. Respondent Lizares then prayed that the motion to declare the defendants in default be denied, and that an order be issued directing that service of summons be made anew on the defendants in accordance with law. The motion to declare the defendants-spouses in default was denied August 10, 1966 by the Pasay City Court.

On August 17, 1966, respondent Lizares filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that the city court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants or the subject matter of the action, reiterating the reasons relied upon in her opposition to the motion for default, viz; (b) and (c), and (2) that if defendants-spouses owed the petitioner sums of money for the arrears in rentals, this case is one for collection of a debt, hence, the venue of action should be at the residence of the defendants at Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental (Annex B, Respondents' Memorandum).

Respondent Lizares' motion to dismiss was denied, but she was granted five (5) days within which to file her answer. On August 25, 1966, respondent Lizares filed her answer, admitting that she had occupied and taken possession of the subject premises since September, 1959, under a verbal contract of lease, on a month-to-month basis, at a monthly rental of P230.00, but she specifically denied that she and her husband, Antonio Garcia, were still residents therein, claiming that they are presently residing at Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental, where they transferred after the elections of 1963, and, by way of special and affirmative defenses, alleged that the Pasay City Court has no jurisdiction over this case, as respondent Lizares is not residing at Pasay City and has fully paid all rentals due her. As counterclaim, respondent alleged that by reason of petitioner's malicious and unfounded complaint, she was forced to engage the services of counsel to whom she bound herself to pay P500.00 as attorney's fees (Annex C, Respondent Memorandum).

On September 15, 1966, petitioner filed a motion with City Court praying for the issuance of a "partial summary judgment declaring plaintiff Remedios Fuentes to be the lawful possessor of the subject property at 2443 Park Avenue, Pasay City, and ordering the defendants, their relatives ... to vacate the premises and restore to plaintiff possession thereof ... ." This was opposed by respondent Patricia Lizares on the ground that trial on the merit of this case had already commenced and "the plaintiff had in effect presented evidences (sic), the motion for partial summary judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff is rather too late and improper ... ."

After due hearing, where the parties submitted testimonial and documentary evidence, the Pasay City Court rendered a decision, dated December 27, 1966, ordering respondent Patricia Lizares to pay petitioner Remedios T. Fuentes the sum of Six Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Pesos (P6,370.00), representing the amount of rentals, proved and established to have been unpaid, as of October 15, 1966, the date when respondent and her husband left the premises, to pay the costs of suit, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim (Annex A, Petition).

Under date of February 8, 1967, petitioner filed a motion to correct decision requesting the city court to amend dispositive portion of its decision by including respondent's co-defendant Antonio Garcia as one of those directed to pay the amount adjudged. This motion was denied on February 20, 1967.

Subsequently, on February 9, 1967, respondent Lizares filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the Pasay City Court, paid the appellate docket fee and posted an appeal bond. On February 21, 1967, the Pasay City Court ordered the records of the case elevated to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, and the same was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2866-P. No supersedeas bond was however filed by respondent Lizares.

On November 5, 1968, petitioner filed in said Civil Case 2866-P a motion for execution of the judgment of the Pasay City Court, on the ground that respondent Lizares failed to post the necessary supersedeas bond, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court and therefore the said judgment is immediately executory (Annex B, Petition).

On December 4, 1968, respondent Lizares, in her opposition to the motion for execution, also asked the Court "to dismiss" the case on the argument that "in view of the failure" of the Pasay City Court "to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant Antonio Garcia" said court "did not acquire jurisdiction to try and decide the case" and that

the Court of First Instance before which the case was brought on appeal "only acquired jurisdiction to dismiss this case" (Annex C, Petition).

On April 25, 1969, respondent Judge, Hon. Pedro JL. Bautista, issued an order denying petitioner's motion for execution and also stating that "it appearing that defendant Patricia Lizares ... has raised matters pertaining to jurisdiction," the resolution of the motion to dismiss must be held in abeyance until after the trial of the case, the facts alleged therein not appearing to be indubitable (Annex E, Petition).

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated June 30, 1969 (Annex F, Petition), alleging that because of the failure of private respondent to file the required supersedeas bond, the execution of the city court's judgment becomes mandatory, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules, which motion was opposed by respondent Lizares on July 11, 1969, (Annex F-1, Petition), was denied in an order, dated July 31, 1969, of the respondent Judge in the following tenor: "Considering that defendants in the above-entitled case are no longer in possession of the premises in question for which reason there is nothing more to be restored to plaintiff, and considering further that the only issue in this appealed case is the correct amount of the unpaid rentals, the Court is constrained to deny, as it hereby denies, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of order dated April 25, 1969." (Annex G, Petitions.)

Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, wherein petitioner alleges that the denial of her motion for execution and motion for reconsideration constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and/or an unlawful refusal by respondent Judge to perform a duty specifically enjoined upon him by Section 8, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of Court, and prays that the said order of respondent Judge denying the motion for execution be annulled and another entered ordering the immediate execution of the appealed judgment in Civil Case No. 6973 of the Pasay City Court.

In the answer of respondents to this petition, they asserted that: (1) the Pasay City Court had "no authority to decide the case upon the failure (sic) to join respondent's husband as an indispensable party to the case" and (2) a supersedeas bond is not necessary to stay execution in the instant case for: (a) the main purpose of the appeal is to seek judicial declaration of the nullity of the judgment of the city court; (b) the moment defendant surrenders possession of the premises, the case partakes of the nature of an ordinary civil action for collection of a sum of money, and therefore an appeal from the judgment of the city court therein requires no supersedeas but only an appeal bond; (c) since the purpose of the execution is to restore the petitioner to the possession of the premises in question which had already been done before judgment was rendered, there is nothing more to execute; and (d) the only remaining issue is whether or not there are rentals in arrears which would require the presentation of evidence by both parties, a question entirely distinct and independent of possession, and to require respondent to file a supersedeas bond before the Court of First Instance has finally determined the amount of rentals in arrears, would be premature as it is only after such final determination that a writ of execution can issue.

I

It is not disputed that petitioner's complaint is one unlawful detainer over which the Pasay City Court has original exclusive jurisdiction 1 instituted against the spouses Patricia Lizares and Antonio Garcia. It is well-settled that what determines the jurisdiction of municipal or city courts in a forcible entry and detainer case is the nature of the action pleaded in the complaint. If the facts therein alleged constitute forcible entry and detainer, the municipal or city court may validly try and decide the case, regardless of whether the facts are not proved at the trial. 2

In the case at bar, the averments in the complaint filed with the Pasay City Court sufficiently show that the action is one for unlawful detainer. There cannot be any question that the Pasay City Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. It is, therefore, pertinent to inquire whether or not the City Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant-spouses.

According to the record, summons upon the defendants-spouses was duly served pursuant to the provision of Section 8, Rule 14, of the Rules, by leaving copies of the summons at said defendants' dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. While it is true that respondent Patricia Lizares contended that they were no longer dwelling at the subject premises at the time, it was found

as a fact by the City Court on the basis of the evidence, that said spouses left the subject premises only on October 15, 1966, or months after the summons was served and when said private respondent Patricia Lizares had already filed her answer with the City Court in the aforesaid unlawful detainer case. Moreover, it is admitted by respondent Patricia Lizares that she actually received from her "maid", Mary Padrolin, on August 7, 1966, copies of the summons and of the complaint and with the filing of her answer with counterclaim for damages, she thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 3 Since it has not been shown that the said spouses were living apart from each other, it is reasonable to hold that the service of the summons was also effective in so far as her husband to whom the summons was also directed, was concerned.

Thus in Duran v. Angco, 4 where the municipal policeman who served the summons did not find the defendant in his usual place of abode, but was informed by his wife that the defendant was in another place, and there was no adequate assurance that he could be served there, We ruled that the wife was a person of sufficient discretion to accept service of summons on behalf of her husband.

We explained the rationale of the rule in Montalban v. Maximo, 5 thus:

This construction is but fair. It is in accord with substantial justice. The burden on a plaintiff is not to be enlarged with a restrictive construction as desired by defendant here. Under the rules, a plaintiff, in the initial stage of suit, is merely required to know the defendant's "dwelling house or residence" or his "office or regular place of business" and no more. He is not asked to investigate where resident defendant actually is, at the precise moment of filing suit. Once defendant's dwelling house or residence or office or regular place of business is known, he can expect valid service of summons to be made on "some person of suitable age and discretion then residing" in defendant's dwelling house or residence, or on "some competent person in charge" of his office or regular of business. By the terms of the law, plaintiff is not even duty-bound to see to it that the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him.

It is immaterial then that defendant does not in fact receive actual notice. This will not affect the validity of the service (72 C.J.S., p. 1054). Accordingly, the defendant may be charged by a judgmentin personam as a result of legal proceedings upon a method of service which is not personal, "which in fact may not become actual notice to him, and which may be accomplished in his lawful absence from the country. (126 A.L.R., 1486). For, the rules do not require that papers be served on defendant personally or a showing that the papers were delivered to defendant by the person whom they were left. (Smith vs. Kincaid, 249 F. 2d 243, 245, citing Milliken vs. Meyer, supra; U.S. vs. Stabler, 169 F. 2d 995, 997; Maher vs. Deam, 137 N.E. 2d 149).

Reasons for the views just expressed are not wanting. A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.

It is, therefore, evident that the Pasay City Court acquired jurisdiction not only over the person of respondent Patricia Lizares but also over that of her husband, Antonio Garcia. It is worthwhile to note that in the pleadings submitted by respondent Lizares, either with the Pasay City Court or in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, she always included the name of Antonio Garcia as a party-defendant in the caption of said pleadings. The circumstance that the Pasay City Court did not adjudge defendant Antonio Garcia jointly liable with the

respondent Patricia Lizares, for the payment of the rentals in arrears of the premises in question, can not detract from the fact that the aforesaid defendant, Antonio Garcia, was actually impleaded as a party defendant in said proceedings.

Having shown that the Pasay City Court had acquired jurisdiction in the ejectment case over the subject matter and on the persons of the defendants therein, the subsequent events such as the departure of said spouses from the subject premises on October 15, 1966, or the failure of said court to include the other defendant Antonio Garcia in its judgment, can not change the nature of the action, much less divest the court of its jurisdiction over the case. It is well-settled that jurisdiction once acquired continues until termination of the case, and it is not affected by the subsequent alteration of the facts. 6

II

In refusing to issue the writ of execution, respondent court asserted that "defendants ... are no longer in possession of the premises in question for which reason there is nothing more to be restored to plaintiff, and considering further that the only issue in this appealed case is the correct amount of unpaid rentals the Court is constrained to deny ... plaintiff's motion for reconsideration ..." It must be noted that the judgment of the Pasay City Court did not order the restoration of the premises, since it is admitted that on October 15, 1966, during the pendency of the case, respondent Lizares and her husband had already vacated the premises. All that it ordered is the payment of the sum justly due as arrears of rent in the amount of P6,370.00.

The execution of the judgment is not only for the restoration of the possession of the premises leased but also for the payment of the rents due as determined by said judgment. 7 The defendant may, however, stay the execution of the decision of the municipal or city court (a) by perfecting his appeal and filing a supersedeas bond, approved by that court, to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment; and (b) by depositing from time to time, with the Court of First Instance, during the pendency of the appeal, the amount of rents or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the municipal court of city court in its judgment. 8

A supersedeas bond "has for its purpose to secure payment of the rents, damages and costs that may have been adjudged in the appealed judgment, which bond becomes unnecessary if defendant deposits in court the amount of back rentals fixed in the judgment. In other words, the supersedeas bond answers only for back rentals as fixed in the judgment and not for those that may accrue during the pendency of the appeal which are guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be made by defendant". 9 The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory, 10 and cannot be dispensed with by the courts. 11 When the supersedeas bond is not filed, the duty of the court to order the execution of the appealed decision is ministerial and imperative, 12 and the execution of the judgment shall then issue immediately. 13

In the instant case, while respondent Patricia Lizares had perfected her appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, she has not posted a supersedeas bond to answer for the payment of the back rentals amounting to P6,305.00 as of October 15, 1966, as fixed in the judgment of the City Court, in order to stay the execution of the appealed judgment much less has she asked for time to do so. Her failure to comply with said requirement is therefore a ground for the outright execution of the judgment upon petition of the prevailing party. As heretofore stated the duty of the court to issue the writ under such circumstances became ministerial. 14 Hence, it is clear that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to order the execution of the judgment of the Pasay City Court upon the failure of respondent Patricia Lizares to post the necessary supersedeas bond.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are granted. Accordingly, the questioned orders, dated April 25 and July 31, 1969, are set aside and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to issue a writ for the execution of the judgment rendered by the City Court of Pasay City in Civil Case No. 6973, with double costs against respondent Patricia Lizares.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Section 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

2 Lizo v. Carandang. 75 Phil. 649; Vencilao v. Camarenta, L-24308, September 30, 1969; 29 SCRA 473.

3 Tenchavez v. Escano, L-19671, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 674.

4 L-23561, August 28, 1967, 20 SCRA 1127.

5 L-2297, March 15, 1968, 22 SCRA 1070.

6 Insurance Company of North America v. United States Lines Co., L-21021, May 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 301; Lampay v. Judge Moscoso, L-11723, May 29, 1959.

7 Acierto v. Laperal, L-15966, April 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 1088; Sison v. Bayona, L-13446, Sept. 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 557.

8 Sec. 8, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court; Romero v. Pecson, 83 Phil. 308; Villaroman v. Abaya, L-4833, March 21, 1952; De la Cruz v. Burgos, L-28095, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 977.

9 Aylon v. Jugo, 78 Phil. 816; University of Sto. Tomas v. Ocampo, 85 Phil. 144; Hilado v. Tan, L-1964, August 23, 1960; Bagtaas v. Judge Tan, L-6050, September 25, 1953; Sison v. Bayona, L-13446, September 30, 1960; Acibo v. Macadaeg, supra.

10 Yu v. Barrios, 79 Phil. 597; Acibo v. Macadaeg, 11 SCRA 449.

11 U.S.T. v. Ocampo, 85 Phil. 144; Sison v. Bayona, supra; Acibo v. Macadaeg, supra; De la Cruz v. Burgos, supra.

12 Igamo v. Soria, 42 Phil. 11; Tombo v. CFI of Pangasinan, 46 Phil. 851; Gillena v. Borja, 53 Phil. 379; Cora v. Rodas, 79 Phil. 595; De Pages v. Canonoy, L-18588, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 583; Acibo v. Macadaeg, supra, 11 SCRA 446; Clemente v. Court of Appeals, L-18686, January 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 74; De la Cruz v. Burgos, supra, 28 SCRA 977; Prieto v. Lucidine, L-9673, Aug. 21, 1956; Arcilla v. Del Rosario, 74 Phil. 445: Cunanan v. Rodas, 78 Phil. 800; Ang Ching Gi v. De Leon, 79 Phil. 580; Galewsky v. De la Rama, 79 Phil. 583; Lee Tian Po & Co. v. Rodas, 81 Phil. 395; Pangilinan v. Pela, 89 Phil. 122; Laurel v. Abalos, L-26098, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 281.

13 Pascua v. Nable, 71 Phil. 186.

14 De Pages v. Canonoy, supra; Acibo v. Macadaeg, supra; De la Cruz v. Burgos, supra; Clemente v. Court of Appeals, L-18686, Jan. 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 74.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998]

SPOUSES MARCIANO CHUA and CHUA CHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MARIANO C. MORENO and SHEILA MORENO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To stay the execution pending appeal of a judgment in an ejectment suit, the Rules require the defendant to file a supersedeas bond. What is the nature of this bond? How is the amount to be computed? In what court should it be presented? At what point in the litigation should it be filed?

The Case

The Court answers the foregoing questions as it resolves this petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 15, 1993 Decision [1]of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 32236, which disposed as follows:[3]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the orders dated June 10, 1993 and June 17, 1993 are SET ASIDE, and respondent court is ORDERED to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision dated March 5, 1993 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2592, insofar as the right to the possession of the lots is concerned.

Petitioners also challenge the February 15, 1994 Resolution of Respondent Court which denied their motion for reconsideration. [4]

The Facts

The facts of this case are undisputed. As found by Respondent Court, they are as follows:[5]

Coming now to the merits of the case, it appears that on March 5, 1993, the Municipal Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered judgment for petitioners [private respondents herein] with respect to four lots located in Galicano St., Batangas City, ordering the ejectment of private respondents [petitioners herein] and ordering them to pay

monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to petitioners and the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

It appears further that a copy of the decision was received by private respondents counsel on March 10, 1993; that on March 11, 1993 he filed a notice of appeal; and that on March 16, 1993, the MTC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the RTC.

On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that although private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make [sic] a deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8.

Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution of the decision would render their appeal moot and academic. They later filed a supplement to their opposition, claiming that while they were after all willing to file a supersedeas bond, but that they had been kept busy attending to their businesses and thus unable to secure a bond.

On June 10, 1993, the trial court issued the first of its disputed orders in which it denied petitioners motion for execution on the ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal, prevented private respondents from filing a supersedeas bond on time. The order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the urgent Motion for Execution filed by plaintiff-appellees is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the defendant appellants are hereby directed to:

a) To file with this Court a supersedeas bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P550,000.00) PESOS within five days from receipt of this Order;

b) To deposit, within the period afore-mentioned, an amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS by way of accrued

rentals for the months of April, May and June, 1993; and

c) To periodically deposit on or before the tenth day of each succeeding months [sic], starting from July 1993, and an [sic] amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS representing the reasonable monthly

rental fixed by the lower court.

On June 17, 1993, the RTC issued another order giving petitioners an extension of five days within which to file a supersedeas bond. After initially admitting a cash bond of P550,000, the RTC granted on September 20, 1993 petitioners motion for the substitution of the cash bond with a surety bond. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the said three orders.

Respondent Courts Ruling

Invoking Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Respondent Court ruled that the RTC erred in extending the period for filing a supersedeas bond. This error was compounded when the same court issued its second order on June 17, 1993 which gave herein petitioners an additional extension of five days within which to do so. The Court of Appeals held that the said provision was mandatory and gave the said trial court no discretion with regard to its application. In dismissing petitioners claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond, the Court of Appeals noted that said argument was made for the first time on appeal before it, petitioners opposition to the motion for execution before the RTC being based only on their alleged co-ownership of the said property. Respondent Court also distinguished the present case from Laurel vs. Abalos,[6] holding that there was no basis for the application of an exception to the mandatory provision of Section 8 of Rule 70.

While sustaining the order of September 20, 1993, Respondent Court set aside the two other orders issued on June 10 and 17, 1993. Subsequently, said Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review.[7] In a Resolution dated March 11, 1996, this Court noted that petitioners had no objection to the substitution of the deceased Mariano Moreno by his surviving heirs.[8]

The Issues

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors: [9]

I

The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it found that petitioners herein, the private respondents in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 32236, could have filed the supersedeas bond on time and before June 10, 1993 when RTC, Branch I of Batangas City fixed for the first time the amount of supersedeas

bond which ruling, if implemented, would have condoned and would have resulted to the violation of theequal protection clause of the Constitution.

II

The Court of Appeals committed grave error of law when it made grossly erroneous conclusions arising from admitted and undisputed facts which led the said Court of Appeals to apply the general rule as stated in Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and not the law on exceptions to said rule.

III

The Court of Appeals committed grave error of law in making findings of fact contrary to the admitted and proven facts by the petitioners and private respondents in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 32236 and not supported by evidence on record.

IV

The Court of Appeals committed an error of law when it ordered the RTC, Branch I of Batangas City to issue a writ of execution which, if implemented, would necessarily result to the deprivation of petitioners herein of their property without due process of law in violation ofSection 1, Article III of the Constitution.

In the main, the case hinges on whether, after the expiration of the period for perfecting said appeal, the RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal. This encompasses several questions regarding the nature of a supersedeas bond: What is the amount of the bond? Who, if any, determines the amount? Where and at what point in the litigation should the bond be filed? We shall deal with each of these questions.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue: Late Filing of the Supersedeas Bond

The applicable rule in this case is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:[10]

SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of

First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed.

x x x x x x x x x

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question.[11] To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal.[12] The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. [13] Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In the present case, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, a day after their receipt of the MTCs decision. On March 16, 1993, or five days later, the MTC transmitted the records of the case to the RTC. On March 29, 1993, the private respondents filed a motion for the immediate execution of the decision. As noted earlier, petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that they were co-owners of the property. On June 10, 1993, the RTC denied the motion for execution and directed petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. On the authority of the RTC order, petitioners filed a cash bond, which was later substituted with a surety bond.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the bond was filed out of time. The motion for execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the MTCs decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the aforecited rule.

Petitioners contend that the delay should be excused because the MTC, without fixing the amount of the bond, transmitted the records of the case to the RTC even before the perfection of the appeal,[14] i.e., the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.[15] Hence, they did not know whether to file a bond with the RTC or with the MTC. Neither were they certain of the amount of the bond.

How the Amount of Supersedeas Bond Is Determined

Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo and De Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the judgment:[16]

x x x. Under the provisions of Section 8 of the Rule, a justice of the peace or a municipal court may require the defendant to file a bond for an amount which would cover the stipulated rentals, as found by the judgment of the Court, or the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, at the rate determined by the judgment, damages and costs down to the time of the final judgment in the action. The reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, the possession of which is sought to be recovered, is that fixed by the Court in the judgment, because the rental stipulated in the contract of lease that has expired or terminated may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in values. But the bond together with the appeal is only to prevent the immediate execution of a judgment rendered against the defendant in forcible entry and detainer cases. Such execution must be prevented further by paying to the plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance, during the pendency of the appeal, the stipulated rental due from time to time under the contract, as found by the judgment of the Court, or, in the absence of a contract, the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, at the rate determined by the judgment. (Underscoring supplied).

Under Section 8 of Rule 70, the supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals, damages and costs which accrued before the decision was rendered, as determined by the MTC in the said decision.[17] The bond does not answer for amounts accruing during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic deposits to be made by the defendant.[18]

In the present case, the MTC clearly stated in its March 5, 1993 decision that petitioners should pay rentals of P50,000 a month from April 7, 1992 until they shall

have vacated the lots. The amount comprising the supersedeas bond and the periodic deposits, therefore, is evident and computable from the MTCs decision.

Where Is the Supersedeas Bond Filed?

In the light of the peculiar circumstances of this case, petitioners allege that they could not determine whether to file the supersedeas bond with the MTC or the RTC. Thus, they argue:[19]

28. In the facts of the dispute involved in his petition, the court of origin cannot fix the amount of supersedeas bond since the records are no longer with it. The RTC on the other hand cannot fix the amount of supersedeas bond since the appeal has not yet been perfected and, after the same has been perfected, the unlawful detainer case records or expediente (case folder) must first pass through several administrative processes such as docketing, checking for completeness of expediente, raffle and finally taking cognizance or initial action of the said appeal by the branch of the RTC to which it was raffled.

Petitioners submissions are meritless. As earlier observed, there is no need for either the MTC or the RTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond, the same being manifest in the face of the MTCs decision. Moreover, petitioner failed to file the bond on time not because they did not know where to file it, but because they believed that they should not do so. Hence, their opposition to the motion for execution was based on their alleged co-ownership of the property. It was only before the Court of Appeals that they claimed confusion on where the bond should be filed. The Court of Appeals discarded petitioners argument in this wise:

Their claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond is being made only now. Indeed, in opposing petitioners motion for execution they based their opposition not on this ground but on the claim that since they were claiming to be co-owners of the lots in question, their claim would be rendered moot and academic if execution were ordered pending appeal. It is, therefore, not true that they were prevented from filing a supersedeas bond because the MTC transmitted the records of the case to the RTC before the expiration of private respondents period of appeal.

Petitioners also argue that Laurel vs. Abalos[20] should be applied here. In that case, this Court held that [w]here supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring about a material change in the situation of the parties, which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.[21] They also allege that the immediate execution of judgment of the inferior

court will cause irreparable injury[22] to the petitioners herein who stand to lose their home, business and source of livelihood x x x.[23]

We are not persuaded. We do not find in this case any supervening circumstance or any material change in the situation of the parties, which would render inequitable the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal. We agree with the disquisition of Respondent Court on this point:

It is also argued that this case falls under the exception to the rule making Rule 70, sec. 8 mandatory because of supervening events which bring about a material change in the situation of the parties and make the execution pending appeal inequitable or because there is no urgency for the execution under the circumstances.

The case in which this exception was applied was that of Laurel v. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 (1969). The present case is, however, a far cry from that case. In Laurel v. Abalos there was probability that the plaintiff in the ejectment case would lose the property and therefore, his right to eject the defendant became doubtful because, while the appeal of the defendant was pending, another court declared the plaintiffs title to be null and void at the instance of plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest. In the present case, no such probability exists. What is there is only an allegation by private respondents ejectment suit, that they are co-owners of the lots in question. What is noteworthy in this case is that the titles to the lots are in the names of petitioners and, except for the claim of ownership put up as a defense by the defendants, there is otherwise no action questioning the validity of petitioners titles. Indeed no heirs of Chua Hai has ever claimed ownership of the lots in question.

There is, therefore, no basis for private respondents contention that because of a supervening event -- of which there is none -- there is no compelling necessity for ordering execution of the decision in the ejectment case based on private respondents failure to file a supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals within the time provided by law.

The allegation of Petitioner Marciano Chua that he, as a co-owner of the subject property, has filed an action for partition does not constitute a compelling reason to further delay the execution of the judgment. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material possession or possession de facto of the property under litigation, [24] not on the issue of ownership. Section 7[25] of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is clear on this:

SEC. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. -- The judgment

rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession.

The pendency of the action for partition, where ownership is one of the principal issues, does not preclude the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit. Such action for partition is entirely independent of the ejectment suit. [26] On the other hand, the issue of ownership is considered in an ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining who between the contending parties has the better right to possession.[27] Moreover, it should be stressed that we are not being called upon here to decide which of the parties has a better right of possession, let alone, a better title to the property. The only issue in this case is whether or not a writ of execution should be issued pending appeal of the ejectment suit.

In any event, it is erroneous to characterize the partition suit as a compelling reason to stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. On the contrary, the fact that the titles to the disputed lots are in the name of Private Respondent Mariano C. Moreno, and not in the name of petitioners or their father Chua Hai, justifies the transfer of possession of the said property to the private respondents, at least during the appeal. The question of irreparable injury to petitioners, on the other hand, cannot be discussed at this forum, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[28] In any case, this question of irreparable injury is, at best, speculative and conjectural, and deserves no further disquisition.

Coming back to the original question, the bond should be filed before the MTC or, where the records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it should be done during the period of appeal.

Secondary Issue:

Deprivation of Property Without Due Process

Petitioners submit that they are the exclusive and absolute owners of successful and profit[-]generating businesses located in [the] parcel of land in question. Thus, if the judgment of ejectment is to be executed, private respondents will get possession not only of the parcel of land, but also of the improvements thereon which are integral to the business of petitioners.[29] They further argue that the rights of the petitioners over the improvements located in the land are still to be resolved in the ejectment suit on appeal and in the partition case.[30]

Petitioners submissions are irrelevant. In the first place, the present case involves only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending the appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land [31] -- let alone the improvements therein[32] -- which is the main issue in the appealed ejectment suit. In the second place, any of the perceived injuries to their business could have been avoided by the simple expedient of

filing a supersedeas bond pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70. Petitioners had an opportunity to file the bond, but they did not do so on time. They cannot now complain of alleged deprivation of property without due process.

In an action for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real property, it is well-settled that the defendants claims for the value of the improvements on the property or necessary expenses for its preservation should be interposed as compulsory counterclaims.[33]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 235-244.

[2] Second Division composed of J. Vicente V. Mendoza (now associate justice of this Court), ponente; and JJ. Jesus M. Elbinias and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, concurring.

[3] Rollo, p. 243; Decision, p. 9.

[4] Rollo, p. 283.

[5] Rollo, pp. 237-239; Decision, pp. 3-5.

[6] 30 SCRA 281, October 31, 1969.

[7] This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Courts receipt on May 20, 1996 of petitioners memorandum.

[8] Rollo, p. 431.

[9] Rollo, pp. 75-76; Petition, pp. 10-11; original text in upper case.

[10] Rule 70, 8 of the old Rules; See also Rule 70, 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for changes.

[11] Acibo vs. Macadaeg, 11 SCRA 446, June 30, 1964.

[12] Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon, 247 SCRA 145, 173, August 11, 1995; San Manuel Wood Products, Inc. vs. Tupas, 249 SCRA 466, 475, October 25, 1995; Felizardo vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 220, June 15, 1994; Galan Realty Co., Inc. vs. Arranz, 237 SCRA 770, October 27, 1994.

[13] Acibo vs. Macadaeg, 11 SCRA 446, June 30, 1964, per Regala, J.

[14] Under par. 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, which applies to this case, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Under the 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court, however, the prevailing rule states that a partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. (Rule 41, . 9.)

[15] Rollo, p. 467; Petitioners Memorandum, p. 8.

[16] 78 Phil. 816, 818-819, July 31, 1947, per Padilla, J.

[17] Cordova vs. Labayen, 249 SCRA 172, 178, October 10, 1995.

[18] De Laureano vs. Adil, 72 SCRA 148, July 29, 1976.

[19] Rollo, p. 470; Petitioners Memorandum, p. 11.

[20] 30 SCRA 281, October 31, 1969, per Castro, J.

[21] Ibid., p. 291.

[22] According to petitioners, immediate execution of judgment will result in the following:

a. Dispossession of the petitioners herein of the parcels of land which, according to their knowledge, are theirs by virtue of their inheritance. b. Dispossession of the petitioners herein of their business and property established, maintained and made a success through their own hard labor and thriftiness, and which business are [sic] the sole source of livelihood of the petitioners herein inclusive of the members of their family. c. Dispossession of the petitioners herein and their family of their homes built through their own labor, sweat and blood without any other alternative to go to. d. Giving to the private respondents herein possession of the entirety of the land in question which they will not be able to oversee personally since they live in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. e. Giving to the private respondents herein the successful business and property of the petitioners herein without even said private respondents doing anything to put up said business and property thereby depriving the petitioners of their property and source of livelihood. f. Giving to the private respondents herein dwelling places they may not even use for they live in their own house at Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

g. Worse, in the event that the petitioners herein are upheld in their action for partition pending before and to be decided by the branch of Regional Trial Court which is the same court that was called to order the immediate execution of the judgment of the inferior court, the private respondents herein will lose their right to eject the petitioners herein who in turn will be declared co-owners of the parcels of lands in question. Thus, the court a quo will then be constrained to put the petitioners herein in possession of the parcels of lands they inherited from their father, Chua Hai, the business and property they established and maintained through their own hard labor, and the homes they have known as theirs for so long.

[23] Rollo, p. 476; Petitioners Memorandum, p. 17.

[24] University Physicians Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 86, 89, June 13, 1994; De Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276, August 6, 1992; Presco vs.Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 232, December 10, 1990; Alvir vs. Hon. Vera, et al., 130 SCRA 357, July 16, 1984.

[25] Now Rule 70, 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[26] Cf. Ramirez vs. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187, 194, July 30, 1981

[27] Lao vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 115307, July 8, 1997, p. 1, per Panganiban, J.

[28] Laureano Investment & Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100468, May 6, 1997, pp. 15-16, citing Trade Unions of the Philippines vs.Laguesma, 236 SCRA 586, September 21, 1994.

[29] Rollo, p. 485; Petitioners Memorandum, p. 26.

[30] Rollo, p. 487; Petitioners Memorandum, p. 28.

[31] Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 398, March 18, 1991.

[32] See Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220, March 4, 1996 citing Joven vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700, August 20, 1992; Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613, September 11, 1980.

[33] Meliton vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 485, 493, December 11, 1992, per Regalado, J.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136751. January 15, 2002]

NATIVIDAD CANDIDO and MARIVELES PAWNSHOP, INC., petitioners, vs. RICARDO CAMACHO and MARILOU HERNANDEZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari impugning the May 25, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which dismissed the petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioners NATIVIDAD CANDIDO and MARIVELES PAWNSHOP, INC. and affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court enjoining the immediate execution of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in the forcible entry case.

The records show that in November 1994, petitioner NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, as a representative of Mariveles Pawnshop, Inc., filed a forcible entry case before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga, Bataan, against respondents RICARDO CAMACHO and MARILOU HERNANDEZ. In her complaint, petitioner alleged that on July 21, 1994, she was excluded by the respondents from physical possession of the Mariveles Pawnshop stall in Bataan, by means of strategy and stealth when the respondents padlocked the pawnshop premises and took control and possession thereof. In December 1994, after respondents filed their Answer, the case was submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings.

In February 1995, respondents filed a Motion To Dismiss alleging that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves an intracorporate dispute and jurisdiction belonged with the SEC. On March 8, 1995, the MTC judge denied petitioners motion to set the case for hearing the motion to dismiss.

On April 16, 1997, the MTC of Balanga, Bataan, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner in the forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 1701), thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and their representatives to immediately vacate the premises of Mariveles Pawnshop,

Inc., located at the Plaza Arcade, Balan, Bataan, and to restore to plaintiff

Natividad Candido the full possession thereof including all articles and money

found therein, valued at P2,000,000.00 and to pay rental which is fixed

at P8,000.00 per month beginning July 21, 1994.

The counterclaim of the defendants are hereby dismissed, they not being substantiated by evidence.

Cost against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.[2]

On May 13, 1997, petitioner Candido filed a motion for immediate execution of the MTC decision. On May 9, 1997, upon receipt of the MTC Decision, respondents filed a notice of appeal[3] with the MTC and requested that all court records be forwarded to the RTC of Bataan. On May 22, 1997, respondents filed their Opposition to the motion for execution on the ground, inter alia, that the MTC could no longer grant the immediate execution as the filing of their notice of appeal stayed execution.

In its Order,[4] dated June 5, 1997, the MTC of Bataan granted petitioners motion and directed the immediate execution of its decision for failure of the respondents to post a supersedeas bond.

In the meantime, petitioner Mariveles Pawnshop, Inc. and one Nelson Rodriguez filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition, [5] dated May 30, 1997, for accounting, injunction, attachment, receivership and declaration of constructive trust attachment against petitioner Candido, et al.

On June 9, 1997, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan, a petition for certiorari (Civil Case No. 6651),[6] with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing both the decision of the MTC in the forcible entry case and the Order granting immediate execution. Accordingly, in an Order dated June 30, 1997, presiding RTC Judge Lorenzo R. Silva, Jr., issued a preliminary injunction against the MTC restraining the enforcement of its writ of execution.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus[7] with the Court of Appeals assailing the injunction order issued by the RTC on the following

grounds: (1) the certiorari petition filed by the respondents with the RTC cannot substitute for the appeal respondents had earlier made and did not withdraw; (2) the same certiorari petition should not have prospered as they already made an appeal and this plain, speedy and adequate recourse is available; and (3) private respondents were guilty of forum-shopping.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated March 25, 1998,[8] dismissed the petition on two grounds: First, petitioners failed to move for reconsideration of the RTC Order enjoining the immediate execution of the MTC Decision. Second, the RTC

judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the injunction Order because the MTC, in awarding the amount of P2,000,000.00 exceeded what can be properly awarded as damages. Citing the case of Hualam Construction Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[9] the Court of Appeals held that the damages recoverable in an ejectment case cover only the reasonable rent for the loss of the use or occupation of the premises. It ruled that the amount of P2,000,000.00 in the MTC decision

representing the value of pawned articles inside the padlocked pawnshop could not be subsumed under the concept of damages for purposes of inclusion in the supersedeas bond. It held that the filing of the supersedeas was unnecessary to stay execution pending appeal.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review on the following grounds:

I

The general rule in ejectment cases is (to grant) execution pending appeal. Such

execution can only be stayed by the posting of a supersedeas bond equal to the

amount of accrued rentals and damages directly affecting the loss of material

possession.

II

Even if the requisite supersedeas bond has been posted, execution shall nevertheless

issue if subsequent rentals are not deposited in court Sec. 8 (now Sec. 19), Rule 70.

III

Respondents multiple resort to the RTC Balanga through appeal and then certiorari and at the same time invoking the jurisdiction of the SEC to obtain the same relief, to wit: enjoin the execution of the MTC Balanga Decision, is a

glaring case of forum-shopping.

IV

The CA should have struck down respondents resort to certiorari after having invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the RTC of Balanga.

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is a need to discuss a procedural matter which, although not raised in the petition before this Court, is relevant to the full disposition of the case at bar.

One of the grounds relied by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition before it was petitioners failure to move for a reconsideration of the impugned RTC injunctive order. This omission is not fatal. We have ruled that (a) prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensable for commencement of certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in such proceedings had been duly heard and passed upon or were similar to the issues already resolved by the tribunal or agency

below. Accordingly, the Court has excused the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration when such a motion would be basically pro-forma in nature and content, and where x x x the questions raised are essentially legal in nature. [10] In the case at bar, the

parties have argued their positions and have been duly heard by the RTC before it issued the assailed injunction order. Moreover, as the issues involved therein are essentially legal, the filing of motion for reconsideration assailing the RTCs injunction order may be properly dispensed with.

We now go to the legal issues.

Anent the first two issues, Section 8, Rule 70 of the old Rules of Court provides that to stay the execution of the MTC decision in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment case, the defendant must: (1) perfect his appeal, (2) post the supersedeas bond, and (3) periodically deposit the rentals accruing during the pendency of his appeal. Compliance with all three requisites is mandatory to stay execution.

The respondents contend that the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the RTC order enjoining the immediate execution of the MTC Decision as the amount of two million pesos damages in the supersedeas bond was improperly adjudged. It is urged that the amount of damages recoverable in an ejectment case is limited only to the fair value of the rent for the loss of the use of the premises. Thus, respondents posit their theory that as the amount of two million pesos adjuged by the MTC was struck down as damages in the ejectment case, they were relieved of their duty to post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTC decision.

We disagree.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals decision insofar as it held that the supersedeas bond in the amount of two million pesos, representing the value of the pawned articles, was incorrectly included as damages in the ejectment case as the damages recoverable are limited only to the fair rent for the use of the premises. However, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that as the two million pesos was improperly adjudged as damages, immediate execution may be enjoined without need of posting a supersedeas bond.

In the case at bar, the MTC decision in the forcible entry case ordered the posting of the supersedeas bond in the following amount: two million pesos as damages (representing the value of the pawned articles and operating capital inside the pawnshop) and payment of rentals in the amount of P8,000.00 per month reckoned from July 21, 1994 (the date when petitioner was first deprived possession of the

pawnshop). The respondents filed a notice of appeal with the MTC but did not pay the damages and rentals adjudged. Instead, they went to the RTC on certiorari and

assailed the fixing of the two million pesos as damages.

The failure of the respondents to post the supersedeas bond to the extent of the amount of the back rentals as adjudged in the MTC decision rendered said decision immediately executory. The fact that the respondents assailed the inclusion of the two million pesos in the supersedeas bond as damages does not excuse them from posting the bond to the extent of the back rentals adjudged. To be sure, the supersedeas bond consists not only of the damages adjudged as it also includes the back rentals mentioned in the MTC decision.[11] Thus, for failure to post the supersedeas bond to the extent of the amount of the unpaid rentals, the MTC

decision became immediately executory. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, as the damages was improperly awarded, the respondents need not post a supersedeas bond.

Anent the third and fourth issues, respondents contend that they did not engage in forum-shopping as their notice of appeal and petition for certiorari before the RTC involved different issues --- the former was filed to assail the MTC decision on the main case, and the latter, to impugn the RTC injunction order.

We find their contention untenable.

There is forum-shopping when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different venues, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, all raising substantially the same issues and involving exactly the same parties.[12]

In the case at bar, the remedy of the respondents is to file an appeal within the reglementary period after the issuance of the MTC decision. However, insofar as assailing the MTCs order of execution, we hold that the respondents appeal thereof would be too slow and inadequate to prevent the injurious effect of respondents imminent dispossession of the property.[13] Thus, respondents filing of a petition for certiorari to assail the MTCs order for immediate execution of its decision is proper. However, we note that respondents petition for certiorari was not limited for said purpose as they likewise assailed the main decision of the MTC in the same petition. This is improper as appeal is still their appropriate remedy under the former Rules of Court (Section 1, Rule 40 -- Appeal from Inferior Courts to Courts of

First Instance). What compounded the matter is that the respondents had already a pending notice of appeal with the MTC to assail its decision in the forcible entry case. Clearly, by also assailing the decision of the MTC in the forcible entry case in their subsequent petition for certiorari, respondents are guilty of forum-shopping which carries the sanction of dismissal of both the petition for certiorari and the appeal filed by the respondents with the RTC.[14]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 25, 1998, and its Resolution, dated December 9, 1998, in C.A. G.R. No. 44633 are SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court in its Order, dated June 30, 1997, in Civil Case No. 6651 against the immediate execution of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in the forcible entry case is LIFTED AND SET ASIDE. In addition, both the appeal and the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan in Civil Case No. 6651 are DISMISSED for violation of the non-forum-shopping rule.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] First Division, penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices (now Supreme Court Justice) Arturo B. Buena and Portia Alio-Hormachuelos; Rollo, pp. 75-84.

[2] Rollo, p. 38; penned by Balanga, Bataan MTC Judge Rodolfo S. Gatdula.

[3] C.A. Rollo, p. 37.

[4] Rollo, pp. 41-42.

[5] Rollo, pp. 102-110.

[6] Rollo, pp. 43-56.

[7] Docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 44633, Rollo at pp. 59-72.

[8] Rollo, pp. 75-84.

[9] 214 SCRA 612 (1992).

[10] Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos, 232 SCRA 448 (1994).

[11] Aznar Bros. Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 327 SCRA 359 (2000), citing Once vs. Gonzales, 76 SCRA 258, 261 (1977).

[12] Sps. William and Jane Jean Diu vs. Ibajan, et al., G.R. No. 132657, 322 SCRA 452 (2000).

[13] Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 628 (1992).

[14] Administrative Circular No. 04-94; Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 614 (1996).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 117667 March 18, 1996

INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO and SOLAR RESOURCES, INC., respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

On February 10, 1994, private respondent Solar Resources, Inc. filed a complaint 1 for ejectment against petitioner for failure to pay rent.

On May 26, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 77, rendered judgment ejecting the petitioner from the leased premises and ordering it to pay the rental arrearages. Petitioner having received a copy of the MTC decision on June 3, 1994, filed a Notice of Appeal on June 7, 1994.

Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of the decision with the MTC based on Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Due to petitioner's failure to post the required supersedeas bond to stay execution of the ejectment decision, the MTC issued a Writ of Execution on June 30, 1994 to enforce the said decision. The following day, July 1, 1994, the Sheriff levied on the properties of the petitioner pursuant to the Writ of Execution.

On July 6, 1994, petitioner fled with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, a Petition for Certiorari, 2challenging the writ of execution by the Metropolitan Trial Court for being issued without jurisdiction. While the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the said writ of execution, it rendered judgment dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner.

On August 26, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review 3 assailing the decision of the RTC, but on October 27, 1994, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition.

On November 10, 1994, petitioner brought before us the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 to set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals. Thereupon, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the MTC.

In essence, the petitioner vehemently maintains that the MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the subject Writ of Execution on June 30, 1994, upon the claim that the Motion for Immediate Execution, which was dated June 23, 1994, 4 was filed by the private respondent one day late, that is, on June 24, 1994. Petitioner contends that when the private respondent received a copy of the MTC decision on June 8, 1994, he had only until June 23, 1994 to file a motion for execution, it being the last day of the fifteen-day period to perfect the appeal and, likewise the last day for the MTC to have jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Hence, the contention is that, when the motion for execution was filed on June 24, 1994, the MTC clearly had lost jurisdiction over the case, and the motion for immediate execution under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, should have been brought before the Regional Trial Court.

Private respondent contends otherwise. According to the private respondent, the motion for execution was filed with the MTC on June 22, 1994 and not June 24, 1994 as erroneously submitted by the petitioner. Hence, the motion was brought well within the private respondent's fifteen-day period to appeal.

We sustain the private respondent in the circumstances.

Apparently, the sole issue presented before us is: What is the true date of filing of the motion for execution with the MTC? Is it June 22, 1994 as averred by the private respondent or June 24, 1994 as alleged by the petitioner?

This is indubitably a pure issue of fact. It is settled that pure questions of fact may not be the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This mode of appeal is generally limited only to

questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition, 5 subject only to a few well-defined exceptions not present in the case at bench.

Verily, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, before whom the same question was earlier raised by the petitioner, were unanimous in finding that the Motion for Execution was actually filed with the MTC on June 22, 1994 and not June 24, 1994 as falsely alleged by the petitioner. Respondent Court of Appeals held:

. . . The Motion for Execution was actually filed on June 22, 1994

. . . As a matter of fact, a copy of said motion was received by counsel for the petitioner on

June 21, 1994. Also, Solar received a copy of the Decision only on June 8, 1944 and not June 3, 1994, as pretended by the petitioner. Computation wise, cut off time therefore of the period to appeal was June 23. Necessarily, the Court [MTC] still has jurisdiction when aforesaid motion was filed.

We see no circumstance to disturb this factual finding of the appellate court. We have consistently and emphatically declared that review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a function that this Court normally undertakes inasmuch as such findings, as a rule, are binding and conclusive. 6

Furthermore, the failure of the petitioner to file with the MTC a supersedeas bond to stay execution pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70 rendered the issuance of a Writ of Execution by the MTC not only proper but also unavoidable. Section 8 of Rule 70 on Forcible Entry and Detainer reads:

Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the justice of the peace or municipal court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. . . .

The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and so, if the bond is not filed, the

execution of the judgment is a ministerial duty of the court. 7 This rule was reiterated in our recent pronouncement in San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals 8 where we held that:

Judgments in ejectment cases which are favorable to the plaintiff are immediately executory. They can be stayed by the defendant only by: a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing a supersedeas bond; and c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 8778.

2 Docketed as Civil Case No. 94-0089.

3 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34992.

4 Annex "C"; Rollo, pp. 36-37.

5 Section 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

6 De la Serna v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 325 [1994] citing Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18; Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 763; Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138; Korean Airlines, Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 213; Pan Amerian World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 153 SCRA 521; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97; Collector of Customs of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3.

7 Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Fifth Revised Edition, pp. 518-519 citingFuentes v. Bautista, et al., L-31351, October 26, 1973.

8 235 SCRA 145 [1994].

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143395. July 24, 2003]

WILFREDO SILVERIO, ERNESTO DEL CASTILLO, and HONORATO DEL CASTILLO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GELARDA TOLENTINO represented by her attorney-in-fact MATILDE T. BADILLO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the resolution [1] dated February 15, 2000 of the Court of Appeals[2] denying the petitioners appeal from the decision [3] dated November 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 146, of Makati City which in turn affirmed the decision dated February 25, 1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 62, of Makati City.

Petitioners Wilfredo Silverio, Ernesto del Castillo and Honorato del Castillo, Jr. claim that their aunt, Eugenia del Castillo, owned a 355 square-meter lot (evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17283 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal) and three residential houses erected thereon located at Economia Street, Makati City. When she died in 1983, they, as forced heirs of Eugenia, became the co-owners of the subject lot and so they lived in the houses thereon.

In 1997, petitioners discovered that a certain Manuel del Castillo already owned the subject lot by virtue of a deed of donation executed by Eugenia in favor of Manuel who later had it titled in his name. On March 10, 1997, petitioner Honorato annotated an

adverse claim on Manuels title. Despite the notice, the property was nonetheless transferred to Manuels wife, Blesilda del Castillo, and their minor children and a new title issued in their name. Blesilda and her minor children then sold the property to herein respondent Gelarda Tolentino. After the sale was judicially approved by the RTC of Quezon City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 211301 was issued in the name of respondent.

Thereafter, respondent went to the subject premises and verbally asked the petitioners to vacate the premises. When petitioners pleaded to be given sufficient time to leave, respondent granted them until June 15, 1998 to vacate. However, the said period lapsed without the petitioners vacating the subject lot. Respondents legal counsel then sent a demand letter to the petitioners but the latter refused to receive the same and even threatened to hurt the messenger if he insisted on having the document officially received. Hence, the letter was served by registered mail and a copy of the same was posted at the entrance of the subject property.

On August 25, 1998, petitioners filed a case for reconveyance of property and damages against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. On September 19, 1998, respondent countered by filing before the MTC of Makati City the subject ejectment case against the petitioners.

On February 25, 1999, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Three days after the receipt of the decision, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the docket fee. Since no supersedeas bond was filed within the reglementary period, respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of execution.

Thereafter, the RTC of Makati City denied the petitioners appeal in a decision dated November 10, 1999.

Said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the petitioners failed to attach (1) a duplicate original or true copy of the decision of the MTC (2) material pleadings and (3) documents to support their petition, in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] The appellate court also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration because they did not bother to correct the deficiencies in the petition. [5]

Hence, this petition arguing that the Court of Appeals erred:

I

IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN CA-G.R. NO. SP. 56306 ON

MERE TECHNICALITY AND IN DISREGARD OF THE MERITS OF

PETITIONERS CAUSE; and

II

IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION PURSUANT TO AND IN

ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY

THIS HONORABLE COURT ON IDENTICAL CASES.[6]

According to the petitioners, the appellate court erroneously denied the petition on a technical issue without considering its substantial merits. The petitioners also seek the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that respondent did not sufficiently prove that a demand was effected prior to the filing of the ejectment case. The courts a quo likewise erred for its failure to suspend the ejectment proceedings on account of the pendency of the petitioners civil case for reconveyance and damages against the respondent. Lastly, the petitioners argue that the RTC erred in issuing a writ of execution pending appeal despite the fact that their appeal was filed within the reglementary period.

We deny the petition.

Petitioners argue that the rigid application of procedural rules should be avoided when it frustrates substantial justice. Hence, the appellate court should have disregarded the procedural lapses in their petition, i.e., the absence of a clearly legible duplicate original or true copy of the decision of the MTC, pleadings and other relevant portions of the records, and should have instead looked at the substantial merits of their claims.

Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for the failure of the petitioners to attach a duplicate original or true copy of the decision of the MTC, material pleadings and documents to support their petition? In Paras vs. Baldado,[7] this Court, thru then Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, ruled that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense. He ought not to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application based on technicalities will only frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. We held that the alleged failure of a party to attach to the petition certified true copies of the impugned RTC orders did not merit the denial of the petition because the records indubitably showed that duplicate original copies of the said RTC orders were in fact attached to one of the seven copies of the petition filed in the Court of Appeals. Moreover, copies of the same orders were submitted by the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration.

In the case at bar, it was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to deny the petition on the ground alone that the petitioner failed to attach to the said petition a duplicate original or true copy of the MTC decision because it was supposed to review the decision not of the MTC but of the RTC, notwithstanding that the latter affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC. In short, the failure to attach the MTC decision did not adversely affect the sufficiency of the petition because it was, in any event, accompanied by the RTC decision sought to be reviewed.

All this notwithstanding the petition has no merit.

Petitioners pray for the dismissal of the ejectment case due to the failure of the respondent to prove that she made a demand on them to leave the premises prior to the

filing of the suit. What prevents a trial court from acquiring jurisdiction in ejectment cases is the failure to allege in the complaint that a demand was made, not the fact that plaintiff failed to prove said allegation. In ejectment cases, the trial court does not assume jurisdiction if the complaint fails to allege that a demand has been made. [8] In case the plaintiff fails to prove said demand despite allegations in the complaint to that effect, the case should be dismissed not because of lack of jurisdiction but because the complainant did not meet the evidentiary requirement (preponderance of evidence) to merit the judicial eviction of a defendant.

In the case at bar, the complaint shows that respondent made an oral and thereafter a written demand on the petitioners to vacate the premises. Paragraph 9 of the complaint reads as follows:

9. On 01 September 1998, the undersigned counsel, conformably (sic) to the

instruction of plaintiff, effected a demand against defendants to vacate the subject

property. Although the intention was to have the aforestated demand letter personally

delivered, this was not effected by reason for (sic) defendants repeated refusal to receive the same. Hence, resort to service through registered mail was adopted and a

copy of the demand letter was consequently posted in the entrance of the Subject

Property.[9]

Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint expressly alleged that respondent made a demand on petitioners to leave the subject premises. And, based on the records, both the MTC and RTC found that respondent proved that she made oral and written demands on the petitioners. We have no reason to depart from this factual disquisition of the courts a quo in view of the rule that findings of fact of the trial courts are, as a general rule, binding on this Court. [10]

Petitioners also allege that the subject ejectment case should have at least been suspended pending their action for reconveyance and damages filed against respondent. We do not think so. The pendency of an action questioning the ownership of the property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein.[11]

Lastly, petitioners question the order granting the writ of execution on the ground that the same was issued despite the perfection of their appeal. The filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the necessary docket fees should have stayed the execution of the decision. We disagree. In conformity with Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, we have consistently ruled that, to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case while appeal is pending, the defendant must: (a) perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) periodically deposit the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. [12] Because petitioners did not file a supersedeas bond, the trial court, upon motion of the respondent, correctly ordered the execution of the judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Costs against

the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Angelina S.

Gutierrez (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Andres R. Reyes; Rollo, p. 36.

[2] Fifth Division.

[3] Penned by Judge Salvador Tensuan; Court of Appeals Records, pp. 28-29.

[4] SEC. 2. Forms and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial