supplement to the london gazette - ibiblio to the london gazette of tuesday, 2and march, 1949...

38569 1509

SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF TUESDAY, 2and MARCH, 1949

Registered as a Newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 23 MARCH, 1949

THE LANDINGS IN NORTH AFRICA

The following Despatch was submitted to theCommander-in-Chief, Allied Forces on the3Qth March, 1943, by Admiral of the FleetSir ANDREW B. CUNNINGHAM, G.C.B.,D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean,

Algiers.30th March, 1943.

OPERATION "TORCH"—REPORTOF PROCEEDINGS.

I have the honour to render the followingreport on Operation "Torch" .covering theperiod 22nd October to 17th November, 1942,from the sailings of the assault convoy from theUnited Kingdom until the occupation of Bone.This report deals mainly with the British navalassaults, since the naval operations of theWestern Naval Task Force have already beenreported in the Commander, Task Force 34'sletter of 28th November, 1942 to the Com-mander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.*

2. The early stages of the operation prior toD day were remarkable for lack of incident.This was indeed fortunate since, in the courseof this vast and complex movement, delayscaused by casualties or stress of weather wouldhave rendered the timely delivery of the assaultsimprobable.

3. The movement of the assault convoys andForce " H "f through the Straits of Gibraltar

Admiralty footnotes:—"The Naval Commander Western Task Force was

Vice-Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U.S.N. The publication ofthe report of this Task Force is a matter for the UnitedStates Navy Department, and it is therefore not includedwith these reports.

t Force " H "—a surface force covering the landingsand providing fighter support.

on the 5th/6th November and the continuousentry and departure of -all -classes of ships for'fuelling placed a heavy strain on the resourcesand organisation of Gibraltar. The manner in.which, this strain was withstood reflects crediton the Vice-Admiral, Gibraltar and Com-modore Superintendent, Gibraltar and theirstaffs.

4. It is also a tribute to the skill and seaman-ship of individual Commanding Officers thatthis continuous flow of movements and berth-ing in a congested harbour and anchorage inthe dark was accomplished with but a singleminor collision.

5. The only major incident inside theMediterranean before the assaults was thetorpedoing of United States Ship THOMASSTONE at 0535 on 7th November. A notablycourageous decision was taken by CaptainO. R. Bennehoff, United States Navy to sendon his escort and boats to the assault, leavinghis ship defenceless; tenacity and seamanshipwas displayed by His Majesty's ShipWISHART (Commander H. G. Scott, RoyalNavy) in towing United States Ship THOMASSTONE to Algiers.

6. Reconnaissance by submarine and Folbot*parties prior to the assaults was in the mainsuccessfully carried out. Inshore recon-naissance by Folbot teams had always beenviewed with misgiving as endangering security.That these fears were well grounded wasproved at A Beach when two officers werecaptured. Fortunately they kept their headsand imparted no information concerning the

• projected operation. The work of Lieutenant-Commander WUlmott, Royal Navy, both in

Admiralty footnote:—* Folbot—a collapsible rubber boat.

1510 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 MARCH, 1949

active reconnaissance and in his painstakingtraining and preparation before the operation,is worthy of special note. Credit is also dueto the Captain (S), Eighth Submarine Flotillaand the Commanding Officers of His Majesty'sSubmarines P.45, P.48, P.221, P.54 andURSULA for their efficient co-operation.

7. The arrival of the assault forces at theirinitial positions off their beaches proceededwithout a hitch. Contacts were made withbeacon submarines as planned. In fact theoperation up to this point proceeded with aflawless accuracy which reflects high credit onTask Force Commanders,* CommandingOfficers of His Majesty's Ships and Masters ofMerchant Vessels alike.

8. Assaults at Oran beaches passed off with-out a hitch; but at Algiers B and C Beachesthings went awry and delay and confusion re-sulted, which might well have endangeredsuccess had the opposition been determined oralert. These points are well brought out inthe report of the Naval Commander EasternTask Force (Vice-Admiral Sir Harold M.Burrough, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.) and that ofLieutenant-Commander H. M. C. Willmott,D.S.O., Royal Navy.f I would only wish tostate my entire concurrence with the remarksof the former and re-emphasise that these diffi-culties are not " lessons learnt", but recognisedand foreseen disadvantages which had re-luctantly to be accepted owing to the speed withwhich the operation was staged and the con-sequent short time available for training,coupled with the difficulty of co-ordination ofunits scattered initially from Scapa to SierraLeone.

9. The actual landings when the troopsreached their beaches appear to have goneaccording to plan and the work of the beachparties was excellent, but unnecessarily largenumbers of landing craft were crippled as thedisembarkations proceeded. These losses weremostly avoidable and due to lack of trainingand bad seamanship. In this connection it isrecommended that the use of new entries, notproperly disciplined, in this type of operationbe avoided.

Various suggestions have arisen, chiefly fromUnited States Army reports, that landing craftshould be manned and operated by the Armyon the score of improved co-ordination andtraining. In fact, it is felt that it matters littlewhat uniform the crews wear provided thatthey are disciplined, trained and practisedseamen and provided that they are organisedand operated by officers competent in theirjobs and in close touch with the requirementsof the troops they are required to land andmaintain. As, however, the ships taking partin an assault are tied to a great degree to theirlanding craft during the period of unloading,it remains essential that the control of the lattershould rest in the. hands of those responsiblefor the safety of the ships.

10. The direct assaults planned against theharbour of Algiers and Oran (Operations"Terminal" and "Reservist") were in nosense planned as imitations of Zeebrugge butAdmiralty footnotes:—

* The British Naval Task Force Commanders were:—Eastern Task Force, Vice-Admiral Sir Harold M.Burrough, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.6.; Centre Task Force,Commodore T. H. Troubridge, D.S.O., R.N.

t Lieutenant-Commander Willmott's report is notbeing reproduced here.

were intended to be launched just before thesurrender or capture of the ports with thepurpose of preventing sabotage of ships andport installations. The choice of the correctmoment for entry was a difficult one, depend-ing on the existing situation and the largedegree of resistance encountered.

In the event, neither operation was successfulin its object but both were remarkable for thedetermination arid gallantry with which allconcerned tackled their task, and both weresuccessful in forcing an entry through thebooms.

Operation " Terminal".11. His Majesty's Ship BROKE (Lieutenant-

Commander A. F. C. Layard, Royal Navy) suc-ceeded in getting alongside in Algiers and dis-embarked her troops, but they were pinnedby machine-gun fire and did no good. It isconsidered that the Commanding Officer's de-cision to retire from a 'position rapidly be-coming untenable was a correct*one. It ismuch to be regretted that an underestimate ofdamage sustained should have led to the sub-sequent foundering of this ship when she mightby then have been safely berthed in Algiersharbour.

Operation " Reservist".12. The choice of the ships for this operation

had rested on their American appearance, andtheir chance of a friendly reception lay largelyin this appearance and the use of the AmericanEnsign. In the face of serious opposition itcould not be expected that they would succeedin their task. In the event, the moment chosencould hardly have been less fortunate, sincethe French alarm to arms was in its first fullflush, whilst darkness prevented any Americancomplexion to the operation being apparent.

The expedition was a failure, redeemed bythe gallantry displayed by officers and men ofboth nations as they strove to achieve theirobject in the face of hopeless odds. It is muchto be regretted that Captain F. T. Peters, V.C.,D.S.O., D.S.C., Royal Navy, the leader, havingsurvived this ordeal, lost his life in an aircraftaccident on his way to the United Kingdom.

Support Fire.13. The experience of units detailed to pro-

vide supporting fire for soldiers ashore servedonly to re-emphasise the well known fact thatship gunfire cannot be expected to knock outforts by obtaining direct hits on gun positions.Ships' gunfire is capable of very considerablemoral effect when using heavy calibre guns,and of smothering effect from the rapid volumeof medium calibre fire of any calibre gun atclose range, but that is the most that shouldbe expected. Cases reported of delays in re-sponding to calls for fire are attributable totwo main causes, namely, inability of militaryauthority to appreciate that a ship cannotremain waiting indefinitely in her bombardingposition in submarine infested waters, andfailure to make proper use of the support wavefor rapid communication.

Air Support.Fighters.14. Taken as a whole the provision of fighter

support over the shipping and beaches leftlittle to be desired. It suffered from all theknown limitations of carrier-operated aircraft,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 MARCH, 1949 1511

but was fully effective within those limitations.In general, it is considered, that the operationsof carrier-borne fighters reflected great crediton the foresight and planning of the Rear-Admiral Aircraft Carriers, on the spirit andtraining of the Fleet Air. Arm and the efficiencyof the carriers alike.

Bombers.15. The provision of close support bombing

by carrier-borne aircraft suffers from similarlimitations to those referred to in paragraphs13 and 14 above. In spite of these drawbacksit proved remarkably effective whenever oppbr-tunity was given.

In particular the dive bombing of La Seniaaerodrome was most striking not only for itsaccuracy and effect, but also for the extremelygallant and determined manner in which itwas pressed home.

16. A point which emerged was the ineffec-tiveness of the means provided for the destruc-tion of the Fleet Air Arm aircraft in the eventof landing in hostile territory.

Communications.17. The complication of the communications

inherent in any Combined Operation was en-hanced in " Torch " by the fact that a W/Torganisation had to be evolved for a newstation concurrently with carrying out a majoroperation therein.

18. Further difficulties were the number ofservices involved and the manner in which theywere inextricably mingled in both the Easternand Centre Task Forces. The mounting of theWestern Task Force in the United States ofAmerica added considerably to the troubles ofthe planning stage.

19. Naval communications were generallysatisfactory and stood up well to the heavyload of traffic which was considerably in-creased by the failure of certain W/T linksof the other services.

20. The two Headquarters Ships—HisMajesty's Ships BULOLO (Captain R. O.Hamer, D.S.O., Royal Navy) and LARGS(Commander E. A. Divers, R.D., Royal NavalReserve)—were of inestimable value.*

Naval Operations.21. The complaisant attitude of the Italian

fleet, and the inactivity of the French mainfleet, unfortunately gave Force " H " no scopefor action. This powerful force had in factto be kept cruising idly in an area where itwas subject to sporadic air. attack and facedwith an increasing concentration of U-Boats.We were perhaps fortunate that torpedo casual-ties were limited to the two destroyers, HisMajesty's Ship MARTIN and Her NetherlandsMajesty's Ship ISAAC SWEERS.

22. The value of Force "R" was amplydemonstrated. These two oilers, Royal FleetAuxiliary DINGLEDALE and Royal FleetAuxiliary BROWN RANGER, did yeomanservice. It was not my intention that largecruisers should fuel from this force, nor shouldI have permitted it except in emergency. It

Admiralty footnote:—* These H.Q. ships for the conduct of combined opera-

tions, accommodating combined service staffs, were thefirst to be converted for this purpose, and this was thefirst occasion on which they were used..

64061

is considered very fortunate that His Majesty'sShip BERMUDA (Captain T. H. Back, RoyalNavy) escaped damage in her prolonged fuel-ling at dead slow speed on a steady courseinadequately screened.

23. In this connection it has been observedfrom numerous reports that many CommandingOfficers without Mediterranean experiencelacked appreciation of the problem with whichthey were faced in these narrow submarineand aircraft infested waters. It is clear thatadvice on this subject should have been pro-mulgated beforehand. This has now been donewithin the "Torch" area, and will be avail-able for future operations.

24. Such surface actions as did take placewere somewhat distasteful and one sided en-counters with the French destroyers trying tobreak out of Oran. His Majesty's ShipBRILLIANT (Lieutenant-Commander A. G.Poe, Royal Navy) fought a satisfactory duelwith the French destroyer LA SURPRISE.His Majesty's Ship AURORA (Captain W. G.Agnew, C.B., Royal Navy) polished off heropponents on each occasion with practisedease. The performance of His Majesty's ShipJAMAICA in expending 501 rounds to damageone destroyer was less^praiseworthy.

Unloading.25. The weather only held in our favour long

enough to enable the smooth working of theassault and early maintenance. The break ofweather on D +1 was not sufficient to stop dis-embarkation, but speedily reduced the flow ofsupply and served to show up the need forgreater robustness in the landing craft and fortraining in rough water and surf conditions forthe crews.

26. The early seizure of Arzeu and the sur-render of Algiers were invaluable in assistingunloading of the convoys. Even so, we wereleft with the great anxiety of vast masses ofshipping anchored in open roadsteads for manydays. Had the enemy shown more enterprisewith his U-Boats or had more torpedo aircraftbeen at his call, our losses might well havebeen uncomfortably high. This had of coursebeen recognised as an unavoidable and accept-able risk.

Shipping Casualties.27.1 was concerned to get shipping away as

soon as possible from these crowdedanchorages. Orders had been issued on thissubject in accordance with which the fasttroopships were sailed independently forGibraltar as soon as empty. We were mostunfortunate, I consider, in that two of theseships blundered on to U-Boats and weredestroyed. It was an even chance whetherthey would be safer at sea proceeding at highspeed for Gibraltar alone, or anchored in themass, escorts not being available.

28. This ill fortune with the big troopshipspersisted with the destruction of ETTRICKand WARWICK CASTLE in convoy M.K.F.lafter they had passed clear of theMediterranean.

29. Other personnel ship losses, notablyNARKUNDA, CATHAY, and His Majesty'sShip KARANJA (Acting Commander D. S.Hore-Lacy, Royal Navy), were part of the pricewhich may be expected to be paid for takingsuch large and valuable vessels into the for-

A I


'ward area in order to ensure the early occupa-tion of a port, in this case, Bougie. Theselosses and the damage suffered by various ships

•at Algiers serve to point again to the essentialimportance of establishing properly directedfighter protection at the earliest moment. Thiswas a lesson well learnt in the Western Desertcampaign, and well digested by all concerned;but now in the novel circumstances of am-phibious entry to a new theatre of operationsnew lessons had to be learnt by bitter experi-.ence. These lessons all relate to the necessity,in the combined planning stage, of assuring the

.necessary priority for the establishment ofR.A.F. ground control and servicing equipmentashore at an early stage.

Anti-Aircraft Gunfire.30. A striking feature of the operation at

Algiers and to eastward of that port was thenumber of enemy aircraft shot down by ships'gunfire, warships and merchant vessels alike."This was perhaps the first great undertaking byour seaborne forces in which ships entered thearea of operations adequately armed. Wesuffered loss, but the toll paid by the enemy

.was high.31. The presence of the anti-aircraft ships at

occupied ports was invaluable.

Administrative Arrangements.32. The administrative arrangements for this

operation worked well, due chiefly to the de-tailed planning carried out by the Admiraltydepartments and the administrative staff at.Norfolk House.*

The efficiency with which, the administrativesection of the Plans Division at the Admiraltymet all my requirements and interpreted them.to the Supply Departments, where they werewell implemented, fully justified the establish-ment, of this section and, together with theassistance rendered by .the Second Sea Lord's.office. and the department of the Director of.Personal. Services, contributed greatly to the.success of the operation.

In future operations the planning should en-sure an adequate supply of clothing for naval•and merchant seamen from D day.

The Naval and Victualling Store Depart-ments at Gibraltar were inadequately mannedto achieve, their full functions.

'Advance to the East.33. No sooner was Algiers occupied than the

Flag Officer, Inshore Squadront in co-operationwith the General Officer Commanding 1st Armypressed on energetically with the task of ex-panding the occupation eastward. Theacquiescence of the French enabled the occu-pation of Bone to be quickly undertaken, and' it was not until we were within 16 miles of: Tunis that the Axis forces were able to stopihe tide of our advance.

•'. 34. During the initial planning stage, I advo-cated a landing at Bizerta, and it is a matter oflasting regret to me that this bolder conceptionwas not implemented. Had we been preparedto throw even a small force into the eastward

•ports, the Axis would have been forestalled

.-Adrmralty footnotes:—. * Norfolk House—in St. James's Square, London; the

pre-operational H.Q. of the Allied Commander-in-chief.f Flag Officer, Inshore Squadron—^Vice-Admiral Sir

•Harold M. Burrough, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O

in their first token 'occupation and successwould have been complete. They were sur-prised and off their balance. We failed to give'the final push which would have tipped thescales.

35. To sum up, there were few new lessonslearnt, but many old ones received fresh em-phasis. Those which require most firmly tobe borne in mind are

(a) The need for boldness and the valueof holding even a small highly mobilereserve to exploit success .daringly.

(b) The importance of not overestimatingthe enemy's resources, exemplified in thiscase by the infra-red equipment bogey,which led us to lie too far offshore at theinitial landings.

(c) The importance of training in a ser-vice which is no longer manned by amajority of prime seamen, and the need forcombined training with the soldiers with'whom they are to work.

(d) The importance of carrying out suchbeach reconnaissance as is required well inadvance, to gain security.

(e) The vital necessity for immediate in-stallation of a proper air defence system atoccupied ports.

CO The need of co-ordination in the. various elements of Naval Port Parties who

should be assembled and organised underone command before embarkation.

(g) The necessity for promulgating experi-enced advice about conditions in a theatreof operations to units joining from otherstations.36. That the operation achieved the success

it did was due, in so far as general operationsare concerned,

(a) To the high measure of secrecy. achieved, which enabled us to gain surprise.

(6) To the sound planning and forethoughtshown in the Naval sphere by Admiral SirBertram H..Ramsay, K.C.B., M.V.O.*, whomade a contribution not easily measured tothe smooth running of the seaborneoperations.

(c).To the excellent co-operation whichexisted through all ranks of the services ofboth nations, the foundations of which werelaid during the period of combined planningat Norfolk House.

.(flQ To the compact and efficient arrange-ment of the. Combined Headquarters atGibraltar..

(e) To the high standard of seamanshipand. technical efficiency which is mercifullystill maintained in the units of the Fleet. In

'. this connection the value of the WesternApproaches training is outstanding.

(/) To the courage, determination andadaptability of the Merchant Navy.

37. In conclusion I feel it should beplaced on record that in this most difficult ofall types of operation with a number of ser-vices involved and despite the difficulties in-herent in welding together the systems of com-mand and organisation of two nations, therereigned a spirit of comradeship and under-

. standing which provided that vital force which

Admiralty footnote:—* Deputy Naval Commander Expeditionary Force.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 23 MARCH, 1949 1-515

brought success to our undertaking. The em-bodiment of that spirit was exemplified in ourCommander-in-Chief, General Dwight D..Eisenhower; we counted it a privilege tofollow in his train.

(Signed) A. B. CUNNINGHAM,.Admiral of the Fleet.

The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces.

ENCLOSURE I..

The Office of Flag Officer, Inshore Squadron,H.M.S. BULOLO.

8th December, 1942.The following report on Operation " Torch "

is forwarded.

Prior to leaving. U.K..2. In compliance with Admiralty instruc-

tions I hoisted my Flag as Flag Officer, Force"E", in H.M.S. BULOLO at Greenock at0800 on 14th October. ,1942.

3. Most ships who were to form the fastand slow convoys, K.M.F.l and K.M.S.1 res-pectively, had assembled in the Clyde area by17th October. I took the opportunity on thisand succeeding days of visiting all L.S.I.s*.with General Ryder, U.S. Army (in commandof the assault on Algiers) and Major-GeneralV. Evelegh, O.B.E. (in command of the Brit-ish 78th Division), and spoke briefly to theships' companies, landing craft crews, beachparties, and military and R.A.F. personnelembarked. *

4. Whilst in the Clyde every endeavour wasmade to exercise both naval and military per-sonnel and to prepare them for the parts theywould be required to play in the operation.In this connection great difficulty was experi-enced by the Senior Naval Officers of Land-ing in making contact with the M.T. ships ofthe slow convoy; this was due partly to delayin preparing ships and concentrating them andpartly to the fact that berths were many milesapart. In the event, it proved impossible forthe M.T. ships and their landing craft to beexercised at all..

5. H.M.S. BERMUDA and aU Hunt classdestroyers taking part in the operation carriedout practice bombardments on the Arranrange. All destroyers ' who were availablewere also given bombardment communica-tion exercises with their own military F.O.O.sfashore.

6. On 17th October, the Fleet minesweepersACUTE (Commander M/S), CADMUS,ROTHER, SPEY, ALARM, ALBACORE,ALGERINE, HUSSAR and SPEEDWELLwere exercised in special night sweeping opera-tions which included the laying of lit dansj.These exercises were designed as far as pos-sible to reproduce the actual requirements ofthe operation and proved most valuable.

'7. On the night of 20th/21st October,Exercise "Flaxman", which had been pre-pared by the staff of Rear-Admiral Combined

Admiralty footnotes:—* L.S.I.—Landing Ship, Infantry,t F.O.O.—Forward Observation Officer.J Dan—a marking buoy.

Operations, was carried out in the Loch Fyne.area. Owing to many ships not being avail-able, " Flaxman ", which was designed to ex-ercise fully all ships, military and R.A.F. per-sonnel and units in combined operations, wason a very reduced scale. Moreover, as it wasurgently necessary to conserve landing cra^t,which could not be replaced if damaged, onlya minimum of troops, vehicles and equipmentcould be landed. In consequence, communi:cation with the beaches was bad and little in-formation of what was going on was receivedin the VL.Q. Ship. Discussions on return toGreenock proved that while the exercise hadbeen of value to the S.N.O.L.s,* military,landing craft crews and beach parties, etc.,it was quite inadequate owing to the restric-tions which had to be imposed.

8. On 22nd October, Convoy Conference torK.M.S.1 was held on board H.M.S. AVEN-GER ; and on 25th October, the Convoy Con-ference for K.M.F. 1 was held on board theREINA DEL PACIFICO. At both these con-ferences the orders for the operation were gonethrough in detail with the Commanding Offircers of naval forces and the Masters andS.N.O. (T)sf of Red Ensign ships.From U.K. to passage of Straits.

9. Convoy K.M.S.1 sailed from the Clyde on22nd October, 1942. At 2100 B.S.T. on 26thOctober, I sailed in H.M.S. BULOLO withConvoy K.M.F.l from the Clyde in single lineahead at 9 knots.

10. In view of the danger of moored mines,the Fleet minesweepers and twin-screw cor-vettes escorting K.M.S.1 and K.M.F.1 carriedout Oropesa search ahead of both convoysfrom longitude 06° W. to the 100 fathom line.The search was made with double Oropesa in."H" formation and covered a 3 mile front5 miles ahead of leading ships of the convoys,

11. At 0900 on 27th October, H.M.S. SHEF-FIELD, wearing the Flag of Rear-AdmiralC. H. J. Harcourt, C.B.E., Rear-Admiral Com-manding, 10th Cruiser Squadron, joinedK.M.F.l with the escort from Belfast, whereshe had embarked some 600 U.S. troops underthe command of Lieutenant-Colonel Swenson,U.S. Army, and 50 naval ratings commandedby Captain H. St. J. Fancourt. R.N., who wereto take part in the direct assault on Algiers(Operation " Terminal").

12. The passage of the convoy from theUnited Kingdom to the rendezvous with theadditional escort off Cape St. Vincent, andthe division of the convoy into K.M.F.A.l andK.M.F.O.l on 4th November, was wholly suc-cessful, and there is reason to believe that theconvoy was never sighted or reported byU-Boats.

13. From 30th October to 3rd November,A/SJ patrols were flown from H.M.S. BITER,and at 1700 on 30th October a Swordnshsighted a U-Boat on the surface 25 miles, 270°from the convoy. The1 U-Boat dived beforethe aircraft could attack, but the aircraft kepthim down for sufficient time to enable the con-voy to pass unreported. BITER's last Sword-fish became unserviceable landing on in a swellafter the dusk patrol.on 3rd November. NoA/S air patrol was provided on 4th NovemberAdmiralty footnotes:—.

* S.N.O.L.—Senior Naval Officer Landing.t S.N.O.(T>—Senior Naval Officer (Transport).t A/S^^inti-submarine. . • :


as the weather at Gibraltar was unsuitable.Shore-based A/S aircraft took over protectionfrom 0700 5th November.

14. During the passage the convoy was fre-quently exercised in emergency turns and inchanging from one cruising disposition toanother. Outstanding in these exercises wasthe Polish BATORY leading the fifth column,who was consistently handled with the pre-cision and skill of a well trained naval unit.All ships carried out functioning trials of theirA.A. weapons in preparation for the air attacks .we expected in the Mediterranean.

15. The convoy should have rendezvousedwith the destroyers -ESCAPADE, ISAACSWEERS and MARNE in position 45° 50' N..26° 08' W. at 0800 G.M.T. on 31st October.These destroyers had sailed from Ponta Del-gada on 29th October and were joining asadditional escort. Owing to the incorrect re-ceipt of a cypher message, the rendezvous was,however, missed, and ROTHER was detacheda.m. 31st to look for them but was unsuccessful.At 1815 on 1st November, H.M. Ships CLEVE-LAND, ALBRIGHTON and ESKDALE weresighted northbound to join K.M.S. 2 and theyreported having seen ESCAPADE earlier inthe day steering south-east. ISAAC SWEERSand ESCAPADE eventually joined the screenat 1200 on 2nd November, and MARNE at0800 on 3rd November.

16. At 1830 3rd November, H.M.S. SHEF-FIELD was detached and proceeded ahead in-dependently .to Gibraltar. Her fuelling ofescorts had throughout been conducted mostenergetically under difficult conditions due tothe following swell. On the passage out, escortswere fuelled from SHEFFIELD and ORBITA.

17. From 0930 4th November, the convoywas re-disposed preparatory to the Oran sec-tion parting company. At 1150 on 4th Novem-ber in position 36° 13' N., 13° 07' W., H.M.Ships JAMAICA, VERITY, WISHART,VELOX, WESTCOTT, ACHATES andANTELOPE joined as additional escorts forK.M.F.O. 1 and K.M.F.A. 1; and at, 1400K.M.F.O. 1 proceeded independently "underCommodore T. H. Troubridge, R.N., flying hisFlag in H.M.S. LARGS. After re-disposingthe screen .K.M.F.A. 1's course was set for093°, speed 12 knots.

18. At 0730 5th November, the A.A. shipsPALOMARES and POZARICA and thedestroyer AMAZON joined from Gibraltar.Dutch Ship ISAAC SWEERS was detachedat 0745 to join Force " H" which had beensighted 10 miles to the northward at 0720.The 0800 position of convoy K.M.F.A. 1 was36° 07' N, 09° 09' W.

19. A merchant ship bearing 110°, 7 milessighted at 0925 5th November proved to bethe Vichien CAUDEBEC. bound for Casa-blanca with a cargo of wood. WIVERN wasordered to close her and to place an armedguard on board to take her to Gibraltar. Ourfirst prize.

20. From 1600 to 1630 5th November, theconvoy was formed into Cruising Order No. 24for passage of the Straits. This was in threecolumns led by KEREN, BULOLO and

.KARANJA in that order from port to star-board column.

21. At 1830 on 5th November, ROYALULSTERMAN, ROYAL SCOTSMAN,ULStER MONARCH and LEINSTER left

the convoy for Gibraltar. They were escortedby SPIREA and JONQUIL who had joinedfrom Gibraltar at 1700 for this purpose.

22. The passage of the Straits was unevent-ful. Several unidentified vessels, on a westerlycourse were passed when the convoy was abeamCape Spartel at 2245, but no action was taken.

23. At 0230 6th November, BROKE,MALCOLM, VANOC and WRESTLERjoined the screen as reliefs for AMAZON,ACHATES, ANTELOPE and WIVERN, whoproceeded into Gibraltar.

From passage of Straits to Assault.24. At 0925 on 6th November, the convoy,

being ahead of time, was turned back on itscourse to 275° by emergency turns. Thiscourse was continued until 1010 when coursewas altered back to 080°.

25. A£ this time Force " H " and K.M.S.A. 1were in sight against the Spanish coast to the.westward. SHEFFIELD and supporting forcehad been sighted at 0900 to the eastward.

26. At 1045 6th November, the screen wasaugmented by the arrival of ACUTE,ALGERDSfE, ALARM, ALBACORE, CAD-MUS, SPEEDWELL, HUSSAR, BLYSKA-WICA, WILTON, LAMERTON andWHEATLAND, whilst IBIS, ENCHANT-RESS, CLARE, BROKE, MALCOLM,WRESTLER and VANOC were detached tojoin K.M.S.A. 1.

27. At 1230 6th November, the Spanish fish-ing vessel JESUS DEI GRAN was sighted tothe south-east. I ordered LAMERTON toboard her and to send her under armed guardto Gibraltar. The crew were apparently veryfriendly and in no way resented this interrup-tion of their peaceful occupation.

28. At 1415 6th November, the first enemyaircraft to be seen passed over the convoy from

; south to north. It was identified as a Germanreconnaissance Ju.88. One salvo was fired byPOZARICA but with no apparent effect.

29. Additional and most welcome escortsjoined K.M.F.A. 1 at 1430 from K.M.S.A. 1.They were BRAMHAM, BICESTER, COW-DRAY and ZETLAND, all of whom were toplay an,important part in the later operations.

30. At 1500, the convoy was again turnedback on its course to 277° .and this course washeld until 1600 when it was altered back .to086°.

31. At 1630, another German Ju.88reconnaissance plane was to the south of theconvoy steering east. Information was re-ceived at this time that a large naval formationhad been reported by German aircraft offCape Gata.

32. The night of the 6th November passedquietly until at 0520 (received 0535), H.M.S.TYNWALD reported low-flying .aircraft bear-ing 010°, closing. At 0535, two guns or ex-plosions were heard from the port side -of the(convoy and several H.A. bursts were alsoobserved. Two emergency turns of 45° weremade at 0553, making the final course for theconvoy 016°.

33. At 0630, Captain C. D. Edgar, U.S.N.,S.N.O.L.(Q*. in U.S.S. SAMUEL CHASE, re-ported that an underwater- explosion hadAdmiralty footnote:—

* S.N.O.L.(Q.—Senior Naval Officer Landing (CSector). ' " '


damaged the stem of THOMAS STONE, aCombat Loaded Transport of his sector, andhad caused her to stop. H.M.S. SPEY wasdetached to stand by her and V.A.C.N.A.* wasasked to send tugs. At first it was thoughtthat a T/Bf aircraft had done the damage, butthe weight of evidence now indicates that asubmarine was responsible. At 0706, convoyresumed course of 086°.

°34. At 0954 7th November, a submarinecontact was reported on the port bow. Theconvoy made an emergency turn of 45° tostarboard. BICESTER attacked with depthcharges. Course of 086° was resumed at 1000.. 35. At 1130 7th (November, Force "H"was manoeuvring about 8 miles ahead of theconvoy. Shortly afterwards SHEFFIELD andForce " R " were bearing 030°, 8 miles steeringWest. At 1400, H.M. Trawlers JULIET,RYSA, CAVA, HOY, OTHELLO, INCHOLMand MULL and the M.L.s 238, 273, 283, 295,336, 338, 444, joined K.M.F.A. 1 from Force"R". M.L. 307 had joined at 1055 fromeastward, and H.M. Trawler STROMA at. 1545also from eastward.

36. Hostile shadowing aircraft were in evi-dence at intervals during the afternoon of 7thNovember. From 1700-1745 considerable A.A.fire was observed from Force "H" to thenorthward and many aircraft passed over and-astern of the convoy in that direction. Severalships opened fire but no results were obtained.

37. At 1800, the convoy was wheeled to 180°and SAMUEL CHASE (Captain C. D.Edgar, U.S.N.—S.N.O.L.(C)), LEEDSTOWN,ALMAACK, EXCELLER and DEMPOescorted by TYNWALD, COWDRAY, ZET-LAND, ALGERINE, HUSSAR, SPEED-WELL, CAVA, OTHELLO and ML.s 273and 295, proceeded independently td C Sector.

38. At 1900, the convoy wheeled to 200°and at 1920 formation was changed to2 columns. • At 2130, the starboard columnconsisting of KARANJA, VICEROY OFINDIA and MARNIX escorted byPOZARICA, BICESTER, BRAMHAM,ROTHER, CADMUS, RYSA, JULIET,STROMA and ML.s 283, 336 and 338, pro-ceeded independently to A Sector, and the course.of the remainder was altered to 110° by two.45° turns to port.

39. At 2140, radar from submarine P.48 waspicked up. Speed was reduced to 6 knots at2150, and at 2154, P.48 was sighted bearing105°.

40. At 2230, BULOLO (H.Q. Ship) and theships of B Sector, KEREN, WINCHESTERCASTLE, OTRANTO, SOBIESKI,AWATEA, STRATHNAVER, CATHAY,escorted by PALOMARES, ACUTE,ALARM, ALBACORE, LAMERTON,WHEATLAND, WILTON, BLYSKAWICA,HOY, INCHOLM, MULL, and MJL.s 444,238 and 307, were stopped in position36°52i'N., 02°49'E.

41. At this tune there was a moderate N.E.breeze, slight sea, clear sky and good visi-bility. Cap Caxine and all coastal lights wereburning, which was a re-assuring sign for themilitary.Admiralty footnotes:—

* V.A.C.N A.—Vice-Admiral Commanding, NorthAtlantic, whose H.Q. were at Gibraltar.

f T/B—torpedo bomber.

The Assault on Algiers.'42. The ships of the fast assault convoy,

with the exception of U.S.S. THOMASSTONE, were at their release positions asarranged by about 2230z* on 7th November.Submarines marking the release positions wer.ein place in all three sectors and homingarrangements worked well.

43. From the time of arrival at the releasepositions until the move into Algiers harbourand Bay on D + l escorts carried out an end-less chain A/S patrol round the stopped trans-ports.

44. Minesweeping was carried out entirelyto plan, except at Sector B where it was decidedthat sweeping was unnecessary, and it wascancelled. No mines of any kind were sweptor detonated throughout the operation.' Fleetminesweepers did valuable work in the A/Spatrol.

45. During the period that boats were beinglowered, manned and assembled, a south-westerly set caused °by the N.E. wind resultedin ships drifting as much as 5 miles from theirproper release positions by the end of the first1£ hours.

The Landings.46. A Sector. The landing at A Sector was

carried out most satisfactorily. S.N.O.L.(A)personally supervised the transfer of the pilotsfrom the submarine to the motor launches, andat 2349, the assault flights moved off to theA GREEN and A WHITE Beaches. A GREENflight beached at H hour (OlOOz) and A WHITEflight at H hour + 8 minutes, both withoutincident.

47. B Sector. The landing at B Sector wasmarred by avoidable mistakes. The motorlaunch detailed to embark the pilot from sub-marine P.48 for B WHITE Beach first embarkedthe P.B.M.f from KEREN who assumed com-mand of the ML., and having failed to pickthe pilot from the submarine, led a flight forB GREEN to A WHITE Beach, which was somesix miles to the southward. In the meantime,as the submarine had to leave the release posi-tion for thp: inner beacon position, the pilot forB WHITE embarked in the nearest landing craft,which proved to be one of a flight bound forB GREEN Beach. He led in the first and secondflights, and gave the order "Go" offB GREEN Beach at H hour + 3 minutes. Thefirst flight instead of following the approachdirections went some way to the east beforebeaching; the second flight on the pilot'ssuggestion went straight in and touched downfirst.

'The only craft to beach at B WHITE beforedawn (0600) were 3 L.C.P.sJ destined forB GREEN Beach. Other craft for B WHITElanded wrongly to the south-west of SidiFerruch and as far west as A Sector.

The mistakes at B Sector can largely betraced to lack of training and uncertaintywhether the submarine and the ML.s hadreceived the latest orders. This caused theS.N.OL. to delay the ML. until the P.B.M.could be embarked and resulted .hi the M.L.failing to embark the pilot from the submarine.

Admiralty footnotes:—* The suffix " z " indicates G.M.T.t P:B.M.—Principal Beach Master.J L.C.P.—Landing Craft, Personnel.


It is of the utmost importance that similaruncertainty should be avoided in any futureoperation and that Flotilla Officers should bethoroughly trained.

48. Scramble Landings. Landing craft forRED 1, 2, 3 and 4 Beaches were very late ingetting away from AWATEA, and one grouphad to be left behind. A number of craft losttouch with the escorting motor launch on theway inshore, in spite of reductions of speed.Troops were landed at Bains Romans andvarious beaches to the west. The two craftdetailed for RED 1 Beach found their objectiveunaided, though 1£ hours late. Six landingcraft approached the Hot de la Marine, sometwo miles south-east of their intended beach,and came under heavy fire. Four were sunkand the remaining two withdrew.

. 49. C Sector. . Owing to the delay in thereceipt of orders some confusion arose as tothe beaches to be used. The pilotage partywere only briefed for Ain Taya beach whereasthe use of three beaches was contemplated.

A short conference was held in U.S.S.SAMUEL CHASE where it was decided thatM.L. 273 should take a flight to C BLUE, theoriginal beach; that ML. 295 should lead aflight to C RED Beach, keeping station on theport quarter of ML. 273 until reaching Borde-laise Rock, where they would break off; andthat the pilot in Flotilla leader's craft shouldlead the Commando flight to C GREEN for theassault on Matifou.

Owing to delay in forming up, the assaultflights.for C BLUE and RED Beaches did notleave until H hour - 50 minutes. At BordelaiseRock, M.L. 295 attempted to lead off the craftfor C RED, but they all continued to followM.L. 273 to C BLUE, where they touched downat H hour+25 minutes. Several craft forC GREEN were also mixed up in this flight, in-cluding those with ammunition for the Com-mando at C GREEN.

The flights for C GREEN were not finallyloaded and assembled until H hour - 15 minutes,and as the convoy had by now drifted some4 or 5 miles from its release position they didnot touch down at C GREEN Beach until Hhour +1 hour 50 minutes.

50. General. Generally speaking all landingswere hampered by the unfortunate necessity oflong delays in lowering craft and forming upinto flotillas. The obvious solution to this isthat all L.S.I.s carry sufficient landing craft toembark their own first flight and that theselanding craft be lowered with their full load.

All landings, except that at Hot de laMarine, were effected without opposition, whichwas fortunate, as, had there been any seriousnaval or military opposition, the confusionwhich arose at B and C Sectors might well havebeen disastrous.

51. At 0040, the ships of the slow convoyK.M:S.A. 1 began to arrive at B Sector, whereH.M.S. BULOLO was lying, and they arrivedat the correct times at the release positions*ofA and C Sectors.

52. At A Sector the L.S.I, of the fast con-voy started to close the beach at 0100, the slowconvoy following them in. Owing to the driftfrom proper release positions ships were not

finally anchored until 0356. The ferry servicethen began to operate satisfactorily.

53. At 0130, as Cap Matifou battery showedno signs of activity, S.N.O.L. (C) moved hisL.S.I. in to within 4,000 yards of the beach.At 0200, searchlights from the battery pickedup and held H.M.S. ZETLAND, but neitherside opened fire'. H.M.S. ZETLAND turnedaway and made smoke and the transports werenot illuminated. At 0340, ZETLAND wasagain picked up by this searchlight, and CapMatifou battery opened fire on the westwardtransports. ZETLAND closed the battery andopened fire on the searchlight, which went outshowing a glow as though it had been hit.At 0400, ZETLAND was picked up by anothersearchlight and the battery again opened fire.ZETLAND closed the battery, dealing success-fully with this searchlight too.

54. At 0131,1 ordered H.M. Ships BROKEand MALCOLM to carry out Operation"Terminal".*

55. At 0237, information was received thatSidi Ferruch Fort had been captured withoutopposition, and I ordered KEREN and theships at B Sector to close B WHITE Beach.Ships had by now drifted some 7 miles to thesouth-westward, and it took them over 2.hoursto reach the anchorage. Once anchored, theferrying of personnel ashore proceeded rapidly.

56. By 0515 D day, the information receivedin H.Q. Ship was as follows: —0131 From C.E.N.T.F.f—BROKE and MAL-

COLM proceed in execution of previousorders.

0159 Landing B WHITE successful.0220 Signal station A GREEN open—nothing to

report.0220 From BROKE—MALCOLM in company

and proceeding.0223 Landing successful B GREEN.0225 S.N.O.L.(Q—1st and 2nd wave landed,

am closing beach.0237 Sidi Ferruch and infra-red installations

captured.0238 S.N.O.L.(B)—Loaded M.T. very slow due

to conditions.0246 C.E.N.T.F. to KEREN—Close beach as

convenient; sweep B will not be carriedout.

0246 S.N.O.L.(A)—L.S.I. anchored A WHITE.Landing delayed by swell. Assault flightlanded 0147.

0257 S.N.O.L.(B)—B GREEN and WHITE land-•ings successful. Sidi Ferruch captured.No RED Beach report.

0255 A Sector—No resistance reported so far.0301 S.N.O.L.(Q—Am under way, all quiet

here.0315 Flares bearing 045° to seaward. Possibly

BROKE and MALCOLM.0327 S.N.O.L.(Q—Landing successful. Beach

secure. No report from troops inland.0332 B RED SCRAMBLES—Two forts captured.0335 S.N.O.L.(B)—Ships are closing the

beaches now.0344 S.N.O.L.(B)—Division 1 close beaches.

KEREN'S speed 8 knots. Division 2and 3 follow.

Admiralty footnotes:— . .* See paragraph.il.t C.E.N.T.F.—Commander Eastern Naval Task Force.


0345 Gunfire between 075° and 085°.0351 S.N.O.L.(A) to RYSA—Contact P.221

and escort her to sanctuary.0415 Occasional flashes bearing 090°.0421 From CE.N.T.F: to BROKE—Report

progress.0430 BULOLO position—260° 13 miles

Caxine.0435 From B WHITE flight to S.N.O.L.(B)—

Have been landed on A WHITE Beachrequest instructions.

0435 From S.N.O.L.(Q—Matifou defences ap-parently not taken.

0435 From C.T. 168 to A.M.L.O. B WHITE—260 men 2nd Battalion apparentlylanded A WHITE Beach.

0456 From Control B Sector—Serials 1 to 68despatched. Serials 44 to 52 appear tohave landed A WHITE. Difficulty withL.C.M.*, only 5 L.C.M. disembarkedfrom W.2. Shackles of lifting gear bent.

0500 BULOLO manoeuvring to close BBeaches.

0515 From BROKE to C.E.N.T.F.—MAL-COLM damaged, two boilers out ofaction. Searchlights on Brise Lames Estvery troublesome. Have made threeattempts to find entrance. Am makinganother attempt with BROKE. Entrancewould be easier if searchlights could beput out of action.

57. At 0600, BROKE reported that she hadberthed alongside in Algiers harbour and waslanding troops, and a few minutes later thatshe had little difficulty in entering.

58. At 0632, BROKE reported that a sub-marine was leaving harbour. This was attackedand forced to dive by aircraft from VIC-TORIOUS, and STORK and two A/S vesselswere detached to search for it.

59. At this time news from shore was veryscarce. The landing of the llth Brigade at ASector appeared to be going well; and GeneralMast, Commanding Algiers Division, was re-ported at Sidi Ferruch to be offering full co-operation and urging that our forces shouldpush on to Algiers without delay. On the otherhand it was known that Cap Matifou had notyet surrendered; and at 0625 WILTON, whowas in support of landing craft at SCRAMBLElandings, reported that she was under fire fromFort Duperre. No hits were made and WIL-TON withdrew to the westward, joining patrolat B Beaches until the military situationclarified.

60. At 0827, the welcome news that MaisonBlanche aerodrome had been captured wasreceived. At 1000 the aerodrome was reportedserviceable, and a few minutes later a squadronof Hurricanes flown from Gibraltar landed on.Although the R.A.F. did not formally takeover the defence of Algiers until D+2, R.A.F.fighters were operational on D day, makingseveral sorties on D day and D +1. This helpedmaterially to supplement the extremely efficientair support given by the hard-pressed fightersand squadrons of R.A.A.f

61. At 0856, information was received thattanks were concentrating and moving along theroad from Algiers in the direction of MaisonBlanche. Three of these tanks subsequentlyAdmiralty footnotes:—

* L.C.M.—Landing Craft, Mechanised Vehicles,t R A.A.—Rear-Admiral Air. . .

64061

returned to the harbour in an effort to dislodgeBROKE; she had, however, made good herwithdrawal before they came into action.

62. The unloading of M.T. was proceedingvery slowly. B GREEN Beach had to be aban-doned owing to the swell and general unsuit-ability. B WHITE had to be restricted to awidth of 100 yards. C Beach was a lee shore,and felt the full effects of the slight swell, andmany landing craft broached to.

63. At 0930, BROKE requested bombing ofthe battery on Jetee du Nofd to cover her in-tended withdrawal at 1030, as her position wasbecoming untenable. Bomber support was alsocalled for urgently on Fort Duperre at 1030.R.A.A. was asked to fulfil these commitments.

64. At 0934, a Martlet landed on Blidaaerodrome and reported a friendly reception.

65. At about 1000, BROKE left harbour.The battery on Jetee du Nord was bombedmost, successfully at 1030. Twelve hits wereobtained on this small target and severedamage, was done to the buildings and livingquarters in the fort. BROKE was engagedby a number of batteries on her way out andwas badly damaged. ZETLAND went to heraid, steering between her and Cap Matifoubattery. This was successfully bombarded,hitting the control tower and putting the range-finder out of action. ZETLAND then stoodby BROKE.

66. I consider that much credit is due toCaptain H. St. J. Fancourt, R.N., CommandingOfficer " Terminal" Force, for his courage anddetermination in pressing on with the attackafter the initial repulse of his ships, and alsoto Lieutenant J. V. Wilkinson, CommandingOfficer, H.M.S. ZETLAND, for the gallant andskilf ul manner in which he took his ship to therescue of BROKE.

67. At 1130, Blida aerodrome was occupiedby the military. One Ju.88 was sighted overB Sector at this time.

68. Shortly after 1300, Fort Duperre wasbombed by naval Albacores. Subsequent re-ports say that the bombing broke the resist-ance of the defenders and the Commandos wereable to take possession of the fort unopposedat 1515.

69. In response to urgent calls for supportfrom F.O.O.7, Cap Matifou battery and Fortd'Estrees were bombarded by BERMUDA andbombed by naval aircraft almost simultaneouslybetween 1400 and 1530. Both bombing andbombardment were most successful, and hav-ing driven the defenders underground, theCommandos occupied the forts without oppo-sition.

70. At about 1600, the military situation didnot appear to H.Q. Ship to be progressingfavourably, llth British Brigade in A Sectorhad reached all its objectives, but 168th U.S.R.C.T.* from B Sector was held up in highground, to the west of Algiers, and FortL'Empereur was reported as being stronglyheld. As a result, the 6 Royal West Kentswere ordered to land to give additional weightto the attack. This order was subsequentlycancelled. 39th U.S. R.C.T. from C Sectoradfvancing on Algiers from the east were heldup by shelling from Hussein Dey areas andAdmiralty footnote:—

* R.C.T.—Regimental Combat Team.B


reported heavy casualties. A concentration oftanks was also believed to be forming in thisarea.. Unloading of M.T. at C Sector prac-tically stopped, due to the rising wind, andswell, and was proceeding very slowly at othersectors. It was therefore with considerablerelief that the following signal was receivedfrom General Ryder at 1658 : " Darlan wishesto negotiate immediately. He will not dealwith any Frenchman. Recommend thatarrangements for Algiers be presented. Re-sistance of Navy in isolated batteries has beensevere. Resistance of Army has been token ".

71. At dusk the first Axis air attack de-veloped. Ships at C Sector were the objectivesof dive and torpedo bombers. H.M.S.COWDRAY was hit and seriously damaged.U.S.S. LEEDSTOWN's steering gear was putout of action by a hit on the stern andU.S.S. EXCELLER suffered minor damagefrom a near miss. I had previously orderedscreening ships to cover concentration of ship-ping with smoke and this undoubtedly pre-vented more serious casualties. One enemyaircraft was shot down.

72. Unloading of M.T.s had to be stoppedduring the night due to the heavy swell andrising wind which caused large casualties tolanding craft at all sectors.

73. At 2200, H.M.S. SPEY arrived withAmerican soldiers from the damagedTHOMAS C. STONE. They had left theirship 140 miles N.W. of Algiers in landingcraft, escorted by H.M.S. SPEY, in a spiritedattempt to take part in the assault. Weatherand breakdowns necessitated abandoning thelanding craft on passage.

74. I wish particularly to draw your atten-tion to the courageous decision of CaptainO. R. Bennehoff, Commanding U.S.S.THOMAS STONE, to send his landing craftand troops off on a journey of 140 miles totheir beaches under the escort of the onlyA/S vessel then available to screen his ship,and also to the fine display of seamanship anddetermination given by Commander H. G.Scott, R.N., Commanding Officer, H.M.S.WISHART, in towing the helpless U.S.S.THOMAS STONE safely to Algiers hi spiteof bad weather and the perils of air and sub-marine attacks.

75. At 0500,1 proceeded to Algiers harbourin BULOLO, berthing alongside at 0700. Onthe.way round BULOLO was attacked twiceby single Ju. 88s; the first attack was un-observed, but in the second attack the enemyplane received a hot reception from the close-range weapons, and after complaining of hisrough handling crashed into the sea.B 76. An enthusiastic reception was given tous by the large crowd assembled on the dockside and on the road overlooking the harbour.

77. At 0800, all shipping was ordered intoAlgiers Bay. This concentration of shippingwas attacked by about 30 Ju. 88s at 1630.Twelve of these were shot down by Spitfireswho were, directed by visual control fromBULOLO.

The Assault on Bougie and Djidjelli.78. At 1700 10th November, the slow assault

convoy sailed for Bougie, consisting of theM.T. ships GLENFINLAS (Commodore),STANHILL, URLANA, and OCEAN

VOLGA, escorted by H.M. Ships ROBERTS,BLYSKAWICA, SAMPHIRE, PENSTEMON,HOY, INCHOLM and RYSA. The fastassault convoy consisting of L.S.I.s KARANJA,MARNIX and CATHAY escorted by H.M.Ships SHEFFIELD, TYNWALD, BRAM-HAM, CADMUS, ALBACORE, ROTHERand SPEY, sailed at 2000.

79. The oiler DEWDALE left Algiers at1800 10th November, having been delayed byoiling ships. H.M.S. MULL of the slowassault convoy escort remained behind toescort her to Bougie. DEWDALE and MULLarrived Bougie at 0600 HtJrNovember.

80. At 2310, L.S.I. AWATEA escorted byBICESTER and WILTON sailed for theassault on Djidjelli. STRATHNAVER hadbeen detailed to carry out this task but haddeveloped engine-room defects which restrictedher speed; R.A.F. Commandos, stores andpetrol had been transferred to AWATEAduring the day.

It was then intended that STRATHNAVERshould accompany the fast assault convoy toBougie but she was not able to get away hitime.

81. The Armistice at this time had not beensigned, but I had been assured of a friendlyreception. The Commandos for the assault ofcoast defence batteries were not despatched.Information was received after the assaultshipping had sailed that the landing at Bougiemight be opposed and in consequence I senta signal to that effect to the Naval Commander,Captain N. V. Dickinson, R.N. On receiptof this signal at about midnight, CaptainDickinson ordered all landings to take placeon D WHITE Beach, this beach being outsidethe range of shore batteries.

82. At 0345, H.M.S. SHEFFIELD (C.S. 10)left the fast assault convoy and acted inde-pendently to give surface cover to the assault.

83. H.M.S. ROBERTS escorted by PEN-STEMON and SAMPHIRE parted companyfrom the slow assault convoy when off CapCarbon and stood off prepared to bombard.

84. At 0445, L.S.I.s stopped in the' releaseposition (105° Cap Carbon 7). Troops forthe assault had been embarked in L.S.I.sMARNIX and CATHAY. KARANJA'sboats were despatched to ferry CATHAY'sassault troops ashore. The assault flight leftfor D WHITE Beach at 0530 from MARNIXand at 0600 from CATHAY. First troopslanded at about 0615.

85. At 0609, KARANJA, MARNIX andCATHAY followed up astern of the assaultflight, being swept in by ALBACORE, SPEYand CADMUS, and stopped one mile'off DWHITE Beach.

86. At dawn, Force " O", consisting ofH.M. Ships ARGUS, SCYLLA, CHARYB-DIS, escorted by VANOC and WRESTLER,were off Bougie and provided a continuousfighter patrol off the beaches. The directionof fighters was carried out by TYNWALD.It was the intention that Fleet Air Arm fightersshould provide fighter cover until the R.A.F.Spitfires could, be established at Djidjelli :aero:drome—the nearest suitable aerodrome toBougie. H.M.S. ARGUS had been hit by abomb at 1717/10 and had .only 7 Seafiresserviceable. At dawn, I ordered H.M.S.AVENGER, at the time in Algiers with engine


defects, to put to sea and to fly off two sortiesof four Hurricanes each to reinforce ARGUS.One of these sorties was unable to locateARGUS and returned to AVENGER.

87. The slow assault convoy hove in sightat 0547 and closed the L.S.I.S. At 0614,AWATEA and escort were sighted. TheS.N.O., Commander P. Stu'bbs, R.N., had de-cided to abandon the assault on Djidjelli bercause of the swell, which was causing heavysurf on the beaches. AWATEA carriedR.A.F. stores, maintenance personnel, andpetrol, it having been the intention to operateR.A.F. fighters from Djidjelli aerodrome bynoon at the latest to provide cover. This de-cision was to have far reaching effects.

88. In the meantime, friendly signals hadbeen received from the coastguard station, andat 0540 ships were invited to enter. At 0702,BRAMHAM was ordered by the Naval Com-mander to enter the port and to find out theFrench intentions. At about the same time,Rear-Admiral Commanding, 10th CruiserSquadron ordered WILTON to carry out asimilar mission..

89. At 0720, the Naval Commander decidedto hoist all craft and close the harbour. Com-mander Thery and the Military Commanderof Bougie boarded WILTON at .0800. As aresult of the ensuing interview, KARANJA,CATHAY, MARNIX and AWATEA wereanchored in Bougie Bay at 1000. The M.T.ships of the slow convoy anchored soon after-wards.

90. At 1140, Rear-Admiral Commanding,10th C.S. received my order for Force " O " towithdraw to the westward. SHEFFIELDtherefore closed ARGUS and her screen andwithdrew as ordered. Fighter protection ofshipping ceased at 1200. R.A.F. fighters wereto have flown on to Djidjelli aerodrome duringthe forenoon of the llth, but when the newsof the failure to land petrol and stores atDjidjelli reached Algiers, their, departure wasdelayed until the following day.

91. At 1345, the shipping in the bay wasattacked by five S.M. 79 torpedo bombers. Onewas shot down, one probably destroyed, andtwo were damaged. There was no damage toships.

92. During the afternoon the M.T. shipsURLANA, GLENFINLAS and STANHELLentered harbour. Unloading of personnel fromKARANJA, CATHAY, AWATEA andMARNIX continued from the bay.

93. At 1305, BLYSKAWICA and BRAM-HAM sailed for Algiers, where they arrived at1740. They were required to escort STRATH-NAVER to Bougie.

94. At 1625, AWATEA had finished un-loading R.A.F. personnel, stores and petrol,and sailed for Algiers with H.M.S.BICESTER and H.M.S. WILTON as escorts.

95. At 1640, a very heavy dusk ah- attack byabout 30 Ju. 88s developed. This was followedby a T/B attack by He. Ill aircraft. OneT/B was shot down.

96. S.S. AWATEA was hit by four bombs,one bomb causing a fire in No. 2 hold andothers flooding the engine-room, causing a listof 40°. PENSTEMON, detached from A/Spatrol by S.N.O., immediately proceeded along-side. Later BICESTER proceeded alongside

too, but efforts to extinguish the fire were abor-tive and the ship was abandoned. About 300survivors were taken off by PENSTEMON, .26others were rescued from 1 lifeboat byBICESTER, and 3 boat loads by MULL. Theship sank by 2300 in deep water.

97. H.M.S. ROBERTS was hit by twobombs. One of these exploded in the issueroom and one on the sloping side armour.Boiler room fans were put out of action andthe inner and outer bilges on the port sideflooded, but otherwise the ship's fightingefficiency was not impaired.

98. CATHAY was hit by one bomb in thegalley, which did not explode, and had somenear misses. She still had 1,200 troops onboard. All the available landing craft weresent over and the majority of the soldierslanded. The ship was abandoned by all. At2315, a fire started. This took hold and theship burned all night.

99. As CATHAY was known to have depthcharges on board, KARANJA and MARNIXshifted berth. MARNIX anchored off CapAokas outside the A/S patrol.

100. The vital petrol for the fighters atDjidjelli had been landed from AWATEAbefore 1630, but as the AWATEA carried noM.T. (except a few Bren-gun carriers whichwere appropriated by the 5th Buffs) and as theM.T. ships had not yet been unloaded, theR.A.F. Servicing Commandos had no trans-port to take it to the aerodrome. It was notuntil 2030 that the S.N.O. ex AWATEA,Lieutenant R. H. H. Webber, R.N., who hadtaken over Beach Master in control of landingcraft at the Eastern Boat Slip was asked by theM.L.O.,* Major Jordan, if the Navy wouldundertake the transportation of petrol to theaerodrome as there was no army transportavailable, priority one having been allocatedto the 5th Buffs. Lieutenant Webber thenvolunteered to take the petrol, stores andR.A.F. Commandos by landing craft at dawnthe next day.

101. At 0445 12th November, H.M.S.TYNWALD weighed anchor in readiness forthe expected dawn air attack. Thirty minuteslater, two violent explosions occurred and theship settled down in seven fathoms of water.The ship was abandoned and survivors werepicked up by boats from ROBERTS andSAMPHIRE. The cause of the explosion isnot known, but it is thought to be mines laidby aircraft as flares were dropped over theharbour at 0205.

102. At dawn (0540), a small sharp air attackwas delivered by a number of Ju. 88s from lowcloud. KARANJA was hit by at least twobombs. An oil fuel fire immediately brokeout and the amidships. portion burst intoflames.

103. The fire spread very rapidly. Survivorsfrom CATHAY and some military personnellowered the lifeboats without orders. Theship's company of KARANJA behaved in anexemplary fashion, salvaging some Oerlikonguns and ammunition, and eventually abandon-ing ship at 0830 when nothing further couldbe done. The ship.was empty except for somepetrol.

Admiralty footnote:—. * M.L.O.—Military Landing Officer.


104. At 0630, STRATHNAVER arrived,escorted by BRAMHAM and BLYSKAWICA,and secured alongside in the outer harbour.

105. Between 1000 and 1100, a heavy attackby about 30 Ju. 88s developed. The principal•targets of this attack were MARNIX andDEWDALE, but individual vessels on patrolwere also attacked. Most of the planes werekept high by A.A. fire. The gunnery efficiencyof DEWDALE and MARNIX undoubtedlysaved these ships. The only damage was anear miss on BLYSKAWICA. Two Ju. 88swere shot down by DEWDALE.

106. At 1100, MARNIX escorted byBICESTER sailed for Algiers. Unloading hadnot been fully completed.

107. Landing craft were delayed by all theseattacks but left for Djidjelli with petrol andR.A.F. stores between 1100 and 1200, arrivinglate that night.

108. At 1240, the harbour was attacked bysix torpedo bombers. At least two of thesewere shot down, one, the first, by a Spitfirepatrol from Algiers; the other is claimed byDEWDALE. The attack was broken up andturned away, torpedoes being dropped at longrange.

109. Two high level bombing attacks werecarried out between 1330 and 1430. One attackwas by ten planes, the other by four planes.One aircraft was shot down by A.A. fire.BLYSKAWICA sustained further casualtiesand damage from a near miss and was sailedfor Algiers at 1600.

110. At 1655, Ju. 88s carried out dive attacksfrom scattered low clouds. When the lightwas failing two waves of torpedo bombersattacked. The attack was directed againstDEWDALE, who again came through un-scathed. Two planes were shot down.WILTON was hit by a bomb which fortunatelypassed through the ship without exploding andonly caused superficial damage. WILTONthen sailed for Algiers, being practically outof ammunition.

111. At 2115, STRATHNAVER sailed forAlgiers escorted by BRAMHAM.

112. Fighters had been providing coverintermittently throughout the day, but were-only once present during an air attack. Theyhad to be flown to and from Maison Blanche-aerodrome at Algiers, which only permitted 20minutes of patrol over Bougie. R.A.F. fightersat Algiers also had other commitments and thecover provided at Bougie was consequentlythin and inadequate..113. R.A.F. fighters were flown to Djidjelli

aerodrome in the early morning of the 12th,but were not able to -operate continuously untilthe 13th, because the attempts to land petroland ammunition by, landing craft did notsucceed until midnight 12th/13th. By usingup all the petrol in the tanks of its aircraft,the squadron was able to cany out one sortiein defence of Bougie, destroying a number of«nemy bombers, before being groundedthrough lack of petrol.

114. At 1210, a bombing attack was carriedout by fourteen Ju. 88s, the attack being wellpressed home. The M.T. GLENFINLAS washit alongside whilst unloading and subsequentlysank. The French ship ALCINA was also hitand set on fire. Fighters drove off the raiders.ROBERTS shot down two .of the attackers.

115. It was decided as a result of this raidthat two French ships, unable to raise steam,should be scuttled to prevent them catchingfire. Both ships rolled over and lay on theirbeam ends.

116. During the night the M.T. shipsOCEAN VOLGA and STANHILL and theoiler DEWDALE sailed for Algiers, togetherwith five French merchant ships.

117. The M.T: URLANA, the last ship ofthe assault convoy to be unloaded, was sailedduring the night of the 17th.

118. On Sunday, 15th November, the A.A.ship POZARICA arrived at Bougie. I hadsent her there on relief by DELHI from herduty as A.A. guardship, Algiers. Enemy airactivity since then has been on a very reducedscale.

119. Before concluding my report, I wouldlike to refer to the very happy relations whichexisted in H.M.S. BULOLO between theNavy, the- Army, the Air Force and theAmerican Army. In my quarters I wasprivileged to have Major-General C. W.Ryder, U.S. Army, Major-General V. Evelegh,O.B.E., 78th Division, and Air CommodoreG. M. Lawson, C.B.E., M.C., R.A.F., andthroughout the whole period there was com-plete understanding and co-operation betweenus and our services.

120. The operation was in many ways farmore difficult than a straightforward Com-bined Operation in that the political factorswere very strong and denied us the initiativein offensive action. The quick success of theoperation was undoubtedly due mainly tosurprise, good weather, and the number ofplaces at which landings took place whichgave the impression of overwhelming force.Had the operation taken place in bad weatherand with strong opposition it might well havefailed due to lack of training and rehearsal,and this fact should not be overlooked whenplanning further operations.

(Signed) H. M. BURROUGH,Vice-Admiral.

ENCLOSURE II.Office of Naval Commander Centre

Task Force,c/o Admiralty, S.W.I.

27th December, 1942.I have the honour to forward herewith the

report of proceedings of the Centre NavalTask Force in Operation "Torch".

2. An operation of such magnitude andscope must of necessity produce many lastingimpressions and of these the zeal andenthusiasm of every man, British andAmerican, were the most outstanding.

3. With Major-General L. R. Fredendall,the Commanding General, and his staff, co-operation was easy, and from first to last weworked as one.

4. The altogether admirable discipline of theAmerican troops evoked much favourable com-ment. Once they understood what was ex-pected of them, they were untiring until thejob was properly performed.

5. The value of preliminary practice incombined operations needs no emphasis andgreat value was.gained from the exercise inLoch Linnhe and elsewhere prior to sailing.


6. Finally, it should never be forgotten bythose who seek to draw conclusions from whatfollows, that the operation was to all intentsand purposes unopposed, and it is importantto bear constantly in mind this essential factwhen planning combined operations in thefuture.

(Signed) T. TROUBRTOGE,Commodore.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS—OPERATION"TORCH."

NAVAL COMMANDER CENTRE TASK FORCE.Narrative of Events.

Monday, 26th October.Under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir

Harold Burrough, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. inH.M.S. BULOLO, the combined fast convoy(K.M.F. 1), of which I acted as Vice-Commodore in H.M.S. LARGS, sailed fromthe Clyde after dusk and proceeded, withoutincident and in favourable weather, towardsGibraltar on the route ordered.

Wednesday, 4th November.2. The Oran section, K.M.F.O. 1, parted

company from the remainder of the convoy at"1315. The three "Ulstermen" (L.S.I. smaU)continued with the Algiers section, K.M.F.A. 1,until proceeding into Gibraltar to fuel. Coursewas altered to the westward and subsequentlyadjusted so as to lose 1\\ hours on K.M.F.A. 1in order to pass through the Straits after darkon 6th November.

Thursday, 5th November.3. Rendezvous was majde with AURORA at

1700 as previously arranged.4. Several A/S contacts were obtained

during the day by the screen and attacked butwithout visible results.

Friday, 6th November.5. BITER flew off A/S patrol at daylight.

Catalinas from Gibraltar carried out A/Spatrol in the vicinity of the convoy.JAMAICA flew off Walrus to Gibraltar whichreturned before dark.

6. At 1600, the convoy formed into threecolumns for passage of the Straits. CapeTrafalgar was sighted shortly after dark. Thepassage of the Straits was uneventful. OffGibraltar, WIVERN, ANTELOPE,BRILLIANT and BOADICEA relievedWESTCOTT, VERITY, WISHART andVELOX on the screen, the latter proceedingto Gibraltar to refuel. Many small fishingcraft were passed at the eastern end of theStraits.

Saturday, 1th November.7. At daylight the M.L. Flotilla was in

sight ahead, the "Ulstermen" in sight to thesouthward, and DASHER, escorted byAMAZON and ACHATES, astern.

The "Ulstennen" reported they had beensighted at some distance on the previous nightby a French destroyer and two submarines pro-ceeding eastwards.

K.M.S.O. 1* was sighted ahead at 0700.

• Admiralty footnote:—* K.M.S.O. 1—the slow convoy for bran, "which had

sailed from the Clyde on Thursday, 22nd October.

8. From daylight, A/S patrols were carriedout over the convoy by (a) Swordfish fromBITER, (fc) Walrus from JAMAICA, and (c)Catalinas from Gibraltar.

9. K.M*S.O. 1 was ordered to form CruisingOrder No. 40 by 1330 in preparation for join-ing company with K.M.F.O. 1, up to whichtune the fast convoy was manoeuvred in broadsweeps astern of the slow convoy.

10. Commencing at 1330, the two convoysand their escorts were joined together anddivided into groups as previously arranged.

At this time there was a total of 97 vesselsof all types in company, all of which had theirallocated position to take up.

The manoeuvre was completed by 1630 andwas well carried out.

11. At 1815, the two southernmost columnsof the convoy parted company and, led byAURORA, proceeded towards the westernmarking submarine off X and Y Beaches. Theymade a successful rendezvous and then divided,5 ships with their escorts for Y Beach and 7ships with escorts for X Beach. The lattersighted a- French convoy of four ships and anarmed trawler straggled out across their lineof advance and were obliged to slow down toavoid it. This made them late on the schedule,but the assault craft were eventually loweredand beached successfully half an hour afterH hour (zero hour).

The assault craft for Y Beach were loweredand beached according to plan, their landing,in common with the remainder of the assault,being unopposed and undetected.

12. The column (of 7 ships) for Z Beach ledby JAMAICA parted company at . 1825,making for the eastern marking submarine,HM.S. URSULA. TEGELBERG, the fifthin the line, lost touch with her next ahead andthe column straggled badly in consequence.LARGS, which accompanied this column,acted as whipper in and by 2000 all ships werein station. The submarine's signal was sightedright ahead at 2100, and at 2205, Arzeu Islandlight and the glare over the town ofMostaganem were in sight.

By that tune the wind was nil, the seasmooth, and even the stars obscured by cloud.Conditions were perfect.

13. The ships were stopped by orders from.JAMAICA at 2315 and anchors lowered* onto the bottom in fifty fathoms. At the sametime the assault . craft were lowered andmanned, and .after assembling proceeded in-shore. From LARGS, five cables on the beamof the anchored column, no sound was heardand not even the flash of a torch was observed.

Sunday, &th November.14. H hour (0100).—At Z Beach the assault

craft touched down undetected within a fewminutes on either side of zero hour and thetroops and beach parties proceeded on theirseveral missions unopposed. A company ofU.S. Rangers whose mission was to capture.the fort above Arzeii landed on a small beach.near Cape Carbon. They did not even get theirfeet wet. The remainder of the Rangers landedin Arzeu harbour and quickly secured -the dockarea.

Admiralty footnote:— , ,* To avoid noise.


15. At 0100, seven M.T. ships from the con-voy led by DEPTFORD and under the ordersof Commodore Elliott in S.S. ALPHARDarrived at Arzeu Bay and anchored close toseaward of the assault ships. They began atonce to unload.

16. An hour and a half after the landingthere was still no sign of fighting ashore andalthough all along we had been sceptical, theCommanding General and myself werebeginning to wonder whether the persistentclaim of Mr. Rounds, the U.S. Vice-Consulat Oran (a passenger in LARGS), that therewould be no resistance was justified. It seemedunbelievable that. the French lookouts couldbe so indifferent. Shortly after 0230 tracerbullets were seen inshore by Arzeu.

17. At 0300, searchlights and gun flashesfrom the direction of Oran were seen in thesky over the hills above Cape Carbon. This,as it later transpired and was at the timesuspected, was the French reception of H.M..Ships WALNEY and HARTLAND, whichwere due to enter Oran harbour at that hour..Their mission,* though gallantly undertaken,,failed, and both ships were sunk" in theharbour.

18. It being now evident that the Frenchwere resisting, orders were sent to thecarriers to attack the enemy aerodromes, withthe main weight on Tafaraoui, the naval aero-drome, at dawn. The reception of this signalwas much delayed and the aircraft were air-borne before it arrived. The Senior Officerof the Carriers, Captain T. O. Suited, R.N. inH.M.S. FURIOUS, having received no ordersby 0430, had correctly used his judgment tocarry out tasks laid down in the operationorders and concentrated the main weight ofthe attack on La Senia aerodrome where thebulk of the enemy fighters were located.

The attack was devastating in its thorough-ness, eighty per cent, of the enemy aircraftbeing put out of action. The fact that mostof the French fighters were destroyed either inthe air or in the hangars at La Senia in allprobability deterred such few bombers as re-mained serviceable from later taking off andinterfering with the landings.

Later inspection of the aerodromes revealedthe preparedness of the French; bombers werebombed up and fuelled, fighters were completewith ammunition and petrol, and at the sea-plane station at Arzeu the aircraft had theirtorpedoes in place complete with pistols andready in every respect for immediate action.

19. At 0456, the success signal indicatingthat the batteries covering Arzeu were in ourhands was observed, and there being at thetime no further use for the two destroyersdetailed to support the landing with gunfire,they were sent to reinforce the Oran Bay patrolunder AURORA.

The latter ship was soon busy in intercept-ing French destroyers which started to comeout of Oran as soon as the alarm was raised.Aided by the destroyers she either sank orseriously damaged three of them soon afterdaylight but was obliged to keep her distance

Admiralty footnote:—* Their mission was to capture the port by a coup de

main before harbour works could be put out of action orships scuttled.

from the shore batteries, whose accurate fireat long ranges was one of the noticeablefeatures of. the operation.. The French, shipsfought well against .odds, their gallantry beingworthy of a better cause..

20. Although unobserved by the patrolswhich were well inshore during the darkness,the submarines in Oran also came out andboth AURORA and later RODNEY wereattacked, happily without result.

21. At first, light (0600), orders were givenby the Senior Naval Officer Landing for shipsto proceed to the inshore anchorage. REINADEL PACIFICO was the first to anchor offArzeu and shortly afterwards was fired at bya field gun battery behind the town. It scoredthree (hits which luckily caused neither materialdamage nor casualties.

Landing craft in the vicinity put up an effec-tive smoke screen round the ship, whereuponthe battery shifted fire on to the two Mara-caibos* which were in process of unloadingtheir M.T. on the beach. No hits were scoredand on the arrival shortly afterwards ofVANSITTART the battery prudently ceasedfire and withdrew.

22. The Maracaibos 'had beached themselvesin accordance with plan at 0400. Owing to theogradual slope of the beach it was necessary to"make use of a floating roadway to get thevejiicles ashore. This had been brought in theships and proved an outstanding success, theships being cleared by 0800. The Maracaibosthen backed off and later, when the weatherbecame bad, were used for unloading the M.T.ships, the Maracaibos discharging on to theseaplane 'ramp in Arzeu harbour.

23. Tlie remainder of the convoy consistingof low priority store and personnel shipsarrived at daylight and all ships were anchoredinshore by 0640. Unloading then proceededin earnest.

24. The minesweepers which had swept achannel into Arzeu Bay ahead of the ships,and later swept the anchorage, now formed to-gether with available sloops and destroyers anendless chain patrol off the anchorage. Thiswas maintained day and night for the re-mainder of the week.

25. At X and Y Beaches the landing oftroops and unloading of stores proceeded well,though at Y Beach a sandbar off the beach, acommon feature in the Mediterranean, madethings very difficult for the big L.CM.s con-veying heavy vehicles. At all beaches therewas much grief among the propellers, ruddersand " A " brackets of these craft and the needfor a large number of spares was apparent..

26. At 0900, the Du Santon battery aboveMers el Kebir opened fire on the ships offY Beach and scored hits on MONARCH OFBERMUDA and LLANGIBBY CASTLE.The former was ordered out of range andwould have been followed by LLANGIBBYCASTLE but for a call for fire on the batteryfrom RODNEY being promptly and accuratelyanswered ; it ceased fire. Thereafter RODNEYwas frequently engaged with Du Santon fromextreme ranges and her fire, though it did

Admiralty footnote .v-t Maracaibos—the earliest and at that time the only

existing " Landing Ships, Tank."


not knock out the battery, was always suffic-iently accurate to cause it to cease firing.

27. Y Beach was also visited by the Frenchchasseur LA SURPRISE which, according to.statements.made later by prisoners, had ordersto attack the ships there. She was engagedand finally sunk by BRILLIANT, the support-ing destroyer off the beadh.

28. At noon, information was received thatthe U.S. armoured force, for the most partlanded from the Maracaibos, had takenTaf araoui aerodrome and an immediate requestwas sent to Gibraltar for the U.S. ArmySpitfires.

29. The naval aircraft, after the attack onthe aerodromes, maintained standing fighterpatrols over the area of operations and these.aircraft directed by LARGS were used ex-tensively for tactical reconnaissance. The latterwas one of the features of the operation andwas all the.more important owing to the veryscanty and uncertain nature of the army..communications.

30. Twenty-four U.S. Spitfires arrived atTaf araoui by 1600 and whilst airborne were intouch with LARGS by W/T.

Monday, 9th November.31. During the night a considerable swell

came in at all beaches and landing operationswere delayed in consequence.

32. GARDENIA and FLUELLEN onpatrol off X Beach were in collision, the formerunfortunately sinking with the loss of threemen.

33. During the forenoon JAMAICA andAURORA engaged two destroyers which cameout of Oran, both destroyers being seriouslydamaged and beached under the batteries.

34. A French Zouave battalion from Mosta-ganem gave some trouble to the Americanbattalion guarding the eastern flank of thebeaches, and owing to the lack of good com-munications, which made the situation ob-scure in LARGS, together with a panickymessage from the British F.O.O. in that area,caused for a short time some anxiety. Thesituation was, however, quickly restored whenJAMAICA arrived off the beach to give sup-porting fire and some accurate high levelbombing by FURIOUS's three remainingAlbacores caused the enemy to withdraw.

35. More U.S. Spitfires from Gibraltararrived in the course of the afternoon togetherwith a half squadron of Swordfish for A/Spatrols. I therefore ordered the carriers toreturn to Gibraltar on completion of their lastfighter patrol of the day. Then: co-operationhad been invaluable and was carried out withall the dash and efficiency that characterisesthe operations of naval aircraft.

36. By the evening, the situation ashore,both from the positions gained by the advanc-ing troops and the quantity of the ammunitionand stores that had been got up to them, de-termined the Commanding General to carryout a general assault on Oran at 0800 on thefollowing day.

RODNEY, AURORA and JAMAICA weredetailed to assist by bombardment of the twobig forts at Du Santon and Cape Canastel,and FARNDALE and CALPE, under theorders of Captain J. S. Bethell, R.N., my Chief

of Staff, were ordered to be ready to seize theearliest practicable opportunity of enteringharbour to endeavour to stop any blockingoperations, which all.along I was convincedthe French would undertake.

37. Early morning reconnaissance of the har-bour from the air, however, revealed that thishad already .been carried out; consequently Idecided to keep our ships clear. There wasnothing they could have done and their pres-ence at that stage would only have causedadditional aggravation.

Tuesday, Wth November.38. The assault went off as planned and by

noon General Fredendall who had gone ashoreearly was taking the surrender of Oran.

39. News was received shortly afterwardsthat much of the French shipping in the porthad been sunk, but that like most blockingoperations hurriedly conceived and under-taken, the results were not so bad as they atfirst-appeared.

40. The first follow-up convoys were due thefollowing day and I ordered the five personnelships of the fast portion into Mers el Kebir andthe slow portion into Arzeu Bay.

Wednesday, llth November.41. RODNEY was sent to join Force "H"

cruising between Algiers and Oran.42. I embarked in AURORA during the

forenoon and visited X- and Y Beaches. Asat Z Beach they had been much impeded bybad weather but with perseverance and re-sourcefulness were getting on very well. Thebig L.S.I.S, BATORY, MONARCH OFBERMUDA and LLANGIBBY CASTLE,had already been sailed empty for Gibraltar.

43. The MEUW ZEELAND, which hadbeen sailed independently from Arzeu, wasunhappily sunk by a submarine when almostwithin sight of Gibraltar. I therefore arrangedfor all further returning ships to be escorted,and thereafter none were sunk in the Medi-terranean.

Thursday, \2th November.44. Unloading proceeded with great rapidity

at all the beaches. At Z the unloading wasconfined to the harbour at Arzeu and it wasfound possible to get no less than seven shipsinside, four of them alongside.

The congestion in the docks was bad andthe stores, mostly petrol and ammunition,mountains high. It was as well that therewere no air raids.

45. I visited the airfields of Tafaraoui andLa Senia during the day, and to avoid disturb-ing the minds of those it was our policy topropitiate, covered my uniform with anAmerican overcoat and tin hat. The localpopulation appeared for the most part in-different to the coming and going of theAmerican troops.

The efficiency of the naval air attack on LaSenia was impressive and I counted over fortywrecked aircraft on the aerodrome. The twoihangars containing the fighters were com-pletely wrecked, but the other hangars werevirtually undamaged save for fragmentaryperforation.


46. I. went into Oran for an unofficial lookat the port, which was now in charge of Rear-Admiral Bennett, U.S. Navy. The Americanshad already cleared a passage through theblocked entrance sufficient to admit a freighterof average size, and a part of the follow-upconvoy, which had been sent round under es-cort from Arzeu, was already in harbour orwaiting off the entrance to berth.

47. A number of personnel ships and supplyships of the original convoy which had com-pleted unloading at Arzeu were sailed es-corted for Gibraltar in the evening. AURORAalso sailed.

Friday, 13th November.48. Further ships of the follow-up convoy

went round to Oran and JAMAICA sailed 'forGibraltar. S.S. BROWNING was sunk on herway to Oran, presumably by torpedo, thoughno track was seen and the escorts gained nocontact. The ship was laden with T.N.T. andmotor transport and it is not impossible thatthe explosion was internal. Witnesses saw nocolumn of water usually associated with an

external explosion. The ship was sunk well,outside the 100 fathom line.

Saturday, 14th November.49. All ships, save one which had a broken

derrick, having now completed unloading atArzeu, I collected them into three convoys andpicking up the ships off X and Y Beaches andescorted by all available craft, sailed forGibraltar, where they arrived safely the nextand following days.

The ZEBULON B. VANCE with the brokenderrick was sent round with the four last re-maining ships of the follow-up convoy to Oranto unload.

50. Thus the forty-seven ships which hadtaken the resources of a number of Britishports and three weeks to load were unloadedfor the most part over beaches inside a week.Under the weather conditions prevailing, Imuch doubt whether the work could have beengreatly bettered.

51. On Monday, the Centre Naval TaskForce ceased to exist. At sunset I struck mybroad pendant in LARGS.


OPERATION TORCHNORTH AFRICA — NOVEMBERJ942.

LANDING BEACHES10' IS' ZO' ZS'

Release Position Q C

Release Position OB

ReleasePosition O A

Scole of Sea MilesO S 10 ALGIERS

*:•'.:':'• • 40' 45' SO

Based on Admtratty Chert l$O9

1° 55' 50' 45' -W 35' 3O' Z5' 2O' '5'

Based on Admiralty Chart 243r

S' 15' ZO' 5?25' 30' 35' 4O'

50-

O Release Position

GULF OF BOUGIE

. ' • • • ' • '• v?»>"•.:• .• •:• .: Scale of Sea Miles

Based an Admiralty Chart 1910

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1949Price Is. Qd. net

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