supplemental judicial complaint against judge paul f. harris, jr

8/18/2019 Supplemental Judicial Complaint Against Judge Paul F. Harris, Jr.

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Stephen Drew Chamberlain March 9, 2015

Ms. Carol A. Crawford, EsquireInvestigative Counsel

State of Maryland

Commission on Judicial Disabilities

100 Community Place

Crownsville, MD 21032-2026

Re: CJD 2014-140 Harris/Chamberlain

Dear Ms. Crawford,

Subsequent to the formal complaint I filed with the Commission in December 2014,

Judge Harris has committed additional violations of Md. Rule 16-813 while continuing to preside

over Case # 02-C-09-139690 in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court.

With all due respect, it will be very difficult to view many of these allegations in an

isolated fashion. Many of the allegations require the entire transcript to be read, in concert with

the transcript from the April 18, 2014 Merits Hearing, in order to understand the context of the

statements, determine how dishonest they are, and realize these are not “errors of law” but

willful decisions to not apply the law. The totality of the transcripts also provide a clear picture

of a judge who, in the face of overwhelming evidence, is unable or unwilling to admit to the

mistakes or has colluded with one party to “fix” a case to achieve a predetermined outcome.

Attached is a copy of the Official Transcript of the January 16, 2015 Recusal and

Contempt Hearing and the February 5, 2015 conclusion of the Contempt Hearing. I have

highlighted areas of the transcript to assist with finding the evidence which substantiates my

contentions. References to evidence will be made by pleading name, page number and

paragraph, while references to transcripts will be as follows: April 18, 2014 Merits Hearing (A-

page number); January 16, 2015 Recusal and Contempt Hearing (J-page number); February 5,

2015 Contempt Hearing and Fee Issue (F-page number)

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Lastly, I would ask the Commission not provide Judge Harris with the evidence of the

violations. His conduct in this case strongly suggests he will do nothing more than find excuses

to justify his conduct and continue to be dishonest. Asking for clarification as to questionable

conduct on his part without supplying the evidence will allow the Commission to see first hand

the dissembling and dishonesty of this Judge as he attempts to protect himself from discipline.

I am alleging the following:

1. Judge Harris knowingly and willfully proceeded to hear a case which was facially

absent a controversy. The transcript from April 18, 2014 paints a clear picture of a Judge who is

well aware the only issue before him is moot and decides to proceed with the case. This cannot

be classified as an error of law. A review of the transcript shows a dialogue which indicates

Judge Harris is expecting a discussion about mootness and is prepared to dismiss it summarily.

(A-4)

Schaeffer: “But, Your Honor, a request for dismissal was filed by Mr. Brown on

Monday. It was responded to by me yesterday. I am - - I just got this

morning about one minute before you came on the bench a four page

document from Mr. Brown indicating that he wants the Court to ignore his

request. He alleged in the request for voluntary dismissal that the issue to

be tried today was moot. Now he’s saying it’s - - I guess he’s saying it’s

not moot and he asked you to ignore his request for dismissal.

The Court: “Are you withdrawing that request for dismissal?

Brown: “Yes, Your Honor.”

The Court: “Okay. All right. So that puts us in a posture of back to the Merits. What’s

the issue?”

This dialogue confirms that ex-parte communication between Mr. Brown and Judge

Harris must have occurred. Mr. Brown’s request that the Court ignore the request he made just 4

days earlier for Voluntary Dismissal was made in a Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s

Request for Voluntary Dismissal and was filed in open court. How would Judge Harris even be

aware of it’s existence if there was no ex-parte communication? If Judge Harris had been given a

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courtesy copy prior to taking the bench, and had read what Mr. Brown was asking the Court to

ignore, he would have been aware that the request he ignore the explicit declaration of mootness

Mr. Brown made just 4 days prior provided no justifiable reason for doing so.

A Circuit Court judge who has 10 years of experience on the bench does not

unintentionally ignore questions of jurisdiction. Formal motions were filed by both parties

declaring the only issue before the Court as being moot, both parties formally asked for the case

to be dismissed, and then, a third motion being filed contemporaneously with the beginning of

the hearing asked the Court to ignore the Request for Voluntary Dismissal. In the face of this

jurisdictional controversy, Judge Harris demonstrates his pre-disposition to conduct the hearing

by asking not one question about the issue of mootness. The dialogue shows a pre-planned

decision to allow the withdrawal of the request for dismissal. Any competent judge knows that a

party cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court because they want to proceed with a case. Nor does

a competent judge believe that withdrawing a motion declaring a matter before the Court to be

moot would somehow “un-moot” the issue. The dialogue at the commencement of the April 18,

2014 Hearing provides evidence Judge Harris intended to conduct the hearing and intended to

prevent discussion on the matter. Judge Harris does not ask a single question about any of the

three motions (the Req. for Voluntary Dismissal (filed 4 days before trial), the Response (filed

the day before trial and hand delivered to Judge Harris’s chambers (A-7)), nor the Reply to Def.Response(filed in open court at the hearing), nor does he question the claim of mootness. For a

Judge with over 10 years on the bench to ignore this red flag (mootness/lack of subject matter

jurisdiction) infers either negligence or collusion. The following 12 pages of the transcript are

evidence this was not a “good faith error” in the law. (A-4-12)

Rules violated:

Rule 1.1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW

A judge shall comply with the law, including this Code of Judicial Conduct.

Rule 1.2. PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY

(a) A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.

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(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception of

impropriety.

[5] Actual improprieties include violations of law, court rules, and this Code. The test for

appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,

impartiality, and integrity is impaired.

Rule 2.5. COMPETENCE, DILIGENCE, AND COOPERATION

(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently,

promptly, and without favoritism or nepotism.

[1] Competence in the performance of judicial duties requires the legal knowledge, skill,

thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilitiesof judicial office.

Rule 2.9. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS

(a) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider

other communications made to the judge out of the presence of the parties or their

lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter . . .

(b) A judge shall not investigate adjudicative facts in a matter independently, and shall

consider only the evidence in the record and any facts that may properly be judiciallynoticed.

2. I filed a Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial on May 16, 2014, nearly 3

weeks before Judge Harris signed his June 5, 2014 Consent Order. This 12 page Motion

provided clear evidence, statutory support, and case law in support of the contention the Court

lacked jurisdiction on April 18, 2014 the oral agreement made during that hearing was coerced

and made under duress, and that I did not give my assent to it. Even personal correspondence Mr.

Brown sent directly to Judge Harris on April 28, 2014 explicitly informs Judge Harris that I did

not agree with the Order. (Exhibit ???) Furthermore, my Response and Opposition to Plaintiff’s

Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Request for Declaration of Mistrial and Request for Scheduling

Expedited Merits Hearing, filed on May 28, 2014, also explicitly states I did not give my consent

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and was under duress during the hearing. Despite this, the following dialogue took place on

January 16, 2015 (J-66):

Chamberlain: “ . . . Knowing three weeks in advance that I did not give my consent,

Your Honor decides to sign a consent order.”

The Court: “I didn’t know you didn’t give your consent, sir.”

Chamberlain: “Your Honor, you - -”

The Court: “It was submitted as a consent order. How would I know that?”

Chamberlain: “Because you denied my motion for mistrial on the same day you signed

that order, and the motion for mistrial clearly lays out this entire thing.

May I ask Your Honor if you read the motion for declaration - -”

The Court: “Yes, I read everything that comes across my desk.”

Chamberlain: “But Your Honor just said that he wasn’t aware of this.”

The Court: “Wasn’t aware of what, sir?”

Chamberlain: “You weren’t aware of the 12 or 15 pages of misconduct, error, and duress

that I was under on April 18th.

The Court: “Sir, you haven’t - - take your time. I don’t want you to miss anything.”

The truth about one issue necessarily precludes the truth of the other. This dialogue

makes clear that either Judge Harris was dishonest about reading the Motion Requesting

Declaration of Mistrial which he denied on June 5, 2014, the same day he signed the Consent

Order against my will, and did not read Mr. Brown’s letter of April 28, 2014, which explicitly

stated I did not give my consent, or, he was aware of the lack of consent and claims of coercion

and duress and was dishonest about not knowing this before signing his June 5, 2014 Consent

Order. Furthermore, the dialogue indicates he was claiming not to be aware of the lack of consent

even after signing the order, which is evidence he never read the May 28, 2014 Response and

Opposition motion or the June 3, 2014 Motion to Dismiss, or, read those motions and was

dishonest with his claim that he ever was aware there was a lack of consent. If he had read those

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motions, he would have indicated he became aware I did not give my consent after he had signed

the order. To do so, however, would be to admit to the truth of the matter: that I was under

duress during the hearing, made the oral agreement under duress, made it clearly known I did not

give my consent after the hearing numerous time yet Judge Harris unilaterally signed the

Consent Order on June 5, 2014 pretending he believed I gave my consent to it.

Rules Violated:




(b) A judge shall avoid conduct that would create in reasonable minds a perception ofimpropriety.

[3] Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary. Because it is not

practicable to list all such conduct, the Rule is necessarily cast in general terms.


appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a

perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,


Rule 2.2. IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS

A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office

impartially and fairly.




3. The evidence is incontrovertible that Judge Harris was aware the issue before him

on April 18, 2014 was moot and not a justiciable issue. (See A-4-16; Motion Requesting

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Declaration of Mistrial filed on 5/16/15) The number and variety of excuses and explanations as

to why he proceeded with the hearing on that day provides evidence of a significant problem.

While improbable, if Judge Harris’s decision to proceed with the hearing was an “error,”

his denial of my Motion to Vacate the June 5, 2014 Order of October 6, 2014 (denied on October

21, 2015), the transcripts from the January 16, 2015 and February 5, 2015 Recusal Hearing and

Contempt Hearing demonstrate Judge Harris’s determination not to correct that error. A Judge

who decides to deny due process rights to a citizen rather than admit an error is unacceptable.

It is more plausible Judge Harris was aware of the untenable position Mr. Brown had

maneuvered himself into and had agreed to help extract him from it. Mr. Brown had filed a

meritless action (a Complaint to Enforce without identifying a single contractual provision which

needed enforcement and a request for declaratory relief when his own pleading explicitly states

his understanding of the clear and unambiguous meaning of the sentence in question), sustained

that action for 7 months, filed a second equally frivolous action during the litigation (seeking

increase in “child support” for an an 18 year old), and finally had to ask for a Voluntary

Dismissal the week of the trial. (Mr. Brown understood he was vulnerable to sanctions by the

attorney grievance commission for his conduct.) However, once Judge Harris was assigned to

the case, Mr. Brown had another option: go forward with the hearing despite having declared it

moot, and force me into an oral agreement during the hearing. The transcripts reveals that thiswas a coordinated plan. The evidence for this allegation is the frequency and variation of

excuses Judge Harris attempts to utilize to justify his clear disregard for the facts before him

when he proceeded to hear a moot case. Had this been an error, Judge Harris would simply

provide his reasoning for moving forward. Instead, he provides countless and vareid excuses for

his decision.

Examples:

(J-14-15)Chamberlain: “No, Your Honor, it is not. I agree. This is not about discretionary rulings.

Your Honor appears to have willfully ignored the law and conducted a

hearing in the face of clear evidence there was no justiciable issue before

the Court.”

The Court: “When was this, sir?”

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Chamberlain: “April 18th - -”

The Court: “Okay”

Chamberlain: “- - 2014”

The Court: “Now, just so the record is clear, it was on the docket that day as a

contested case. Mr. Schaeffer, your attorney, said he’d prepare for that

case that day”

(This is one of numerous times Judge Harris points to the fact that the hearing is on the

docket as being a contested issue. The comment about my attorney being prepared is

extremely disingenuous. Refer to A-12 for dialogue between Mr. Schaeffer and Judge

Harris when Mr. Schaeffer indicates we are not there to try a case because it is moot and

Judge Harris admonishes him as if he did not prepare. Mr. Schaeffer explained we were

in Court to argue for fees, that the case was moot. Judge Harris asked him if he had prepared and he responded that he had. In the above dialogue he attempts to create a

record showing my attorney was prepared to try the case.)

(J-16)

The Court: “All right. Let’s stop there, because I want to address these. If you

thought it was moot when you came into Court on April 18th, you

reversed that whole process by entering into a consent agreement, which

the parties do every day when they’re in court, so you rendered your own

motion moot because anything that transpired prior to that time, theconsent order fixed it.”

(The consent order signed by Judge Harris, came from an oral agreement placed on the

record under duress. Much of that duress came from being forced to stand trial for an

issue that was clearly moot: declared to be by both parties and proven to be so. To

suggest that 4 hours into a hearing that is being held without subject matter jurisdiction I

“rendered my own motion moot” is as absurd as a prosecutor saying a confession is valid

and issues of torture to obtain it became moot once a prisoner signed it.)

(J-20)

After reading the transcript concerning the discussion of mootness on April 18, 2014,

where Judge Harris asks Mr. Brown if he is withdrawing his motion and Mr. Brown says

“Yes, Your Honor. I am.”

The Court: “So that ended the issue.”

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(This is an acknowledgement that Judge Harris does not understand the law or is

attempting to cover up his willful decision to proceed to hear a case without subject

matter jurisdiction. Withdrawing a motion in which a party explicitly declares the only

issue before the Court to be moot and requests dismissal, without a single sentence

explaining how the issue could have possibly become “un-moot”, and with the other

party declaring the issue moot, proving it to be moot, and arguing it is moot...thisdemonstrates Judge Harris either believes a party can confer jurisdiction on the Court

because they decide they want to proceed with a hearing or is using that excuse for his

decision to proceed.)

(J-20-21)

Chamberlain: “. . . but case law indicates that parties do not have any authority or ability

to consent to offer a court jurisdiction. The Circuit Court has no

jurisdiction if there is not justiciable controversy before it, and just

because someone wants to hear a case with no controversy, the Court has

no authority by law to do that.

The Court: “You waived that, sir, by entering into a consent agreement.”

(Again, filing formal pleadings with the Court declaring mootness, and 12 pages of

transcript testimony arguing the issue was moot, was not a waiver of jurisdiction after

Judge Harris determined he was going to press forward and hear the moot case.)

(A-28)

Chamberlain: “To preserve time, I will tell you that Mr. Brown talks for a number of

pages and says absolutely nothing. He does not tell the Court in any waywhy it’s moot, why it’s not moot, why it’s justiciable, why we go forward.

The Court: “So at that minute, you knew it was a contested case.”

(This is grasping at straws that the issue was still contested when it was clear that it is

not. Again, the law is clear that whenever there “appears” to be a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction the case “shall” be dismissed. Just because an attorney attempts to retract an

explicit confession of mootness does not make the mootness of the issue go away.)

Chamberlain: “My attorney was telling me it’s a mistrial already.”

The Court: “Well, Your Honor attorney also, if you read that transcript further, I

believe I ask Mr. Schaeffer whether he was prepared on that day to go

ahead with the case, and he said, “Yes, I’ve been preparing as if it were

contested.” So where is the prejudice to your case?”

Chamberlain: “Well, I - -”

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The Court: “Your attorney was ready. I’m not getting your point.”

(Reference A-12 again. Mr. Schaeffer never even intimates he is wanting to go ahead

with the case. He aggressively attempts to get Judge Harris to understand that the issue

before him is moot and cannot be tried. Mr Schaeffer’s response that he prepared was inresponse to Judge Harris’s incredulousness that he was NOT there to try the case. That is

because we were there to ask for legal fees because the matter had been sustained 4

months after becoming moot. Judge Harris’s attempt in the January hearing to make it

seem like my attorney was ready, willing, and able to go forward is an overt attempt to

cover himself for proceeding with the hearing on April 18th.)

(J-29)

Chamberlain: “Well, I - - Your Honor, I believe that the law says that anything that

emanates from a hearing that a court holds with no jurisdiction is null and

void.”

The Court: “There was clear jurisdiction, sir. The minute Mr. Brown said there was no

agreement, the case was assigned to me to resolve, so that’s a bogus

argument.”

(This is another excuse. A trial judge with 10 years experience knows that he is not given

jurisdiction because a lawyer withdraws a motion declaring mootness, and that he had

been assigned to hear a contested case that day.)

(J-30)The Court: “But the issue - - the restricted issue of whether or not the case was either

settled and moot or viable for a court decision, you’ve just answered the

question. It was a viable issue to be decided that day. That’s the reason it

was assigned to me to make a decision, so you’ve - - already proven my

point.”

(This demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the law, or incompetence, because it

shows Judge Harris believes that because it is “assigned” to him that day, it is viable,

even when the evidence clearly shows that on that day, he did not have a justiciable issue

before him.)

(J-32)

The Court: “The minute Mr. Brown said it was not moot, it was still a viable issue.

It’s my job to decide that case.”

(This could not be more incorrect and is a clear indication that Judge Harris has colluded

with Mr. Brown to conduct the hearing. The transcript actually has Mr. Brown again

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confirming it is moot: “I called Mr. Schaeffer on Monday and I said, Kevin, he’s been

accepted to college . . .and I’m upset about this because - - we made a motion to dismiss

this thing for now for moot and I told Mr. Schaeffer, we’ll file in September when we

know how much tuition is so we can do it all at one time.” (A-15) The transcript is

absolutely devoid of a single sentence by Mr. Brown of even trying to explain how the

issue that was moot has now become live. My attorney has filed a formal pleadingacknowledging the issue was moot, and is on record for 12 pages explaining it to Judge

Harris. Declaring, in January, that the issue was “viable” just because he allowed Mr.

Brown to withdraw his Request for Voluntary Dismissal is another unjustified excuse.)

(J-40)

The Court: “Well, that’s the point of that hearing. It was to get clarification on what

everybody’s rights and obligations were.”

(This is another justification by Judge Harris for moving forward with the hearing. Both

parties had declared the issue moot. There were no rights and obligations to bedetermined on April 18, 2014.)

(J-81)

The Court: “When I was told that the motion to dismiss was withdrawn, I was

reinvested with jurisdiction to hear the case, because that’s what I thought

was going to occur when I took the bench that day. The case was not

settled. It was not moot. And what really reinforces that more was, after

we started the case, it was settled by agreement.”

(The issue was moot, it was clearly explained to Judge Harris, and his insistence he canconfer jurisdiction on the Court without statutory authority is indicative he does not

understand the law or willfully acted under the color of law to intentionally hear a case

without a controversy. Secondly, again Judge Harris references that fact that “that day”

he had jurisdiction because that was what he “thought was going to occur” when he took

the bench. Then straight denials of fact. Now, since an oral agreement was forced out of

me because the hearing took place and numerous other judicial errors and judicial

overreach occurred, he believes that he was “reinvested” with jurisdiction.)

(F-15)

Chamberlain: “Circuit Courts must abide by the decisions of the appellate courts, and

I’m trying to - -”

The Court: “I agree we do. We are always subject to - -”

Chamberlain: “And so when Your Honor says he signed a blue note saying that I

gave my consent, it is a very valid defense that none of that matters if the

Court had no authority to even convene the hearing.”

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The Court: “Well, I think we’ve already discussed that in great detail. The authority

was it was in front of me on that date on the docket. I certainly - - and no

trial judge wants to interfere if a contested case is settled. Your case was

settled. It was in front of me properly, I made a proper decision on it, and I

just don’t think you’re grasping that simple concept.”

(Judge Harris’s statement again demonstrates that he believes because a docket entry says

there will be a hearing, that he has jurisdiction over the matter, regardless of if it is

proven to be moot. Stating that he did not want to get “interfere” if a case is settled is

simply bizarre as the oral agreement was coerced from me 3 hours into the hearing.)

(F-16-31)

This dialogue is too lengthy to re-type here, and reading this portion of the transcript in

it’s entirety is critical to understanding the extent to which Judge Harris is willing to go to justify

his actions. He again says it was before him “on the docket for a contested hearing.” He again

argues that the oral agreement placed on the record gave him jurisdiction. He incorrectly states

that Mr. Brown’s motion was withdrawn because the matter was settled. He goes on to say that

even if he did not have jurisdiction, “it was waived by you and your attorney. As an

accommodation to you and your attorney, Mr. Brown and his client, I accepted a consent

agreement.” He states that the Court didn’t grant itself jurisdiction but rather “You all came in

front of me . . . and wanted to confirm a consent agreement.” Judge Harris then says “It became

live . . .” Then again, justifies acting without authority by saying “You’re missing the obvious. It

became relevant again because the matter that was on my docket that day was resolved by a

consent agreement.” Having to endure a trial without a controversy, and after numerous judicial

errors and overreach, and after a 20 minute in chambers discussion after which my attorney

abdicated his defense of me, I was coerced into placing an oral agreement on the record. While

under duress, which is clearly laid out in the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial, Judge

Harris, in February, still says: “Because you don’t want to accept this fact. Your attorney and

you, you were questioned, you were voir dired and the voluntariness of that agreement. You said,

yes, that was your agreement. That made it relevant. That gave me jurisdiction, and that’s the

bottom line.

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It should be clear to any reasonable, detached third party that there is no legal basis for

Judge Harris’s decision to conduct the hearing on April 18, 2014, and his reasoning as to why he

was justified in presiding over this hearing. Judge Harris understood the issue was moot at the

time, and this matrix of excuses is evidence he is either unwilling or unable to admit this, or

more probably, that he intentionally conducted the hearing for the purpose of mitigating Mr.

Brown’s exposure to numerous and egregious violations of the Maryland Lawyer’s Code of

Professional Conduct.

(F-26)

Chamberlain: “And, Your Honor, what was live at that point in your mind? I’m just curious.

What was live? What was contested?”

The Court: “When Mr. Schaeffer and Mr. Brown informed me that even though the matter

that was on my docket that day was really moot, or dismissed, they presented me

with a consent agreement that all parties and all attorneys agree to, so that hearing

on that date in April was bifurcated. There were two totally separate things that

happened in my courtroom. The one that entered you and bound you to a consent

order is the one you want to totally ignore. You keep going back to phase one,which you waived for all intents and purposes by entering into the consent

agreement. It’s crystal clear in my mind, sir.”

(These comments are evidence of further efforts to obscure the obvious, or worse, show mental

impairment. To now freely admit, or make a mistake by admitting, that both parties informed

him the issue was really moot is incredible. The record from the hearing, as well as numerous

pleadings filed with the Court after the hearing, clearly provide evidence of coercion and duressto obtain the oral agreement on April 18th. To claim the oral agreement was “bifurcated” from

the duress is to bifurcate evidence and fact from reality.)

(F-40)

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The Court: “Just for the record, and I have - - which I think I cited - - the hearing sheet from

the April 18th, 2014 hearing, where you were represented by Kevin Schaeffer,

your former wife was represented by Mr. Sam Brown, and that matter was on the

docket that day for a complaint to enforce settlement agreement and/or consent

agreement dated August 31st of 2011. That matter was not heard that day,

because after some discussions and a meeting in chambers, when I told the

parties to go out if you need to start the hearing on that issue, I’m more than

available, I had nothing else on my docket that day - - you made an issue over the

fact that I probably shouldn’t have even heard the case that day - - we resolved

that issue. Mr. Brown gave your client the impression that he was withdrawing

that motion that day, but he reinstated it that day. Mr. Schaeffer made a good

argument as to why due process did not allow him an opportunity to adequately

prepare for that hearing, but that subsequently became moot when I was advised

that the parties had reached a consent agreement.”

(“That matter was not heard that day...” ? Was Judge Harris on the bench or not during the

recorded and transcribed 3-4 hour hearing? After “some discussions” . . .? Judge Harris

interrupted a hearing after a number of hours, after direct examination, in the middle of cross-examination, and he says “I told the parties to go out if you need to start the hearing on that

issue”? Mr. Brown gave the impression he was withdrawing a motion but reinstating it? Judge

Harris’s effort to convolute the facts is obvious. Mr. Brown did not “give an impression” of

withdrawing a motion. Judge Harris asked him if he was and he said “Yes” . Mr. Brown did not

attempt to reinstate any motion. What Judge Harris allowed was the withdrawal of a declaration

of mootness and the reinstatement of a live controversy with no justification. My attorney did

not argue for 12 pages of the transcript that he had a “due process” issue with regard to being prepared. He argued vociferously that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a moot case, proved

it was a moot case, and Mr. Brown offered not a single sentence Judge Harris can rely on for

making the decision to move forward without jurisdiction.

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This soliloquy by Judge Harris indicates he is either mentally impaired, or again, doing

anything he can to avoid having to admit he either intentionally tried a moot case, or made a

significant error based on the clear evidence. The clarity with which the mootness issue was

presented gives more credence to the theory that Judge Harris willfully acted under the color of

law to hear the moot case.)

Rules violated:







impropriety.



perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,





(b) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of

court business.

(c) A judge shall not willfully fail to comply with administrative rules or reasonabledirectives of a judge with supervisory authority.


thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities

of judicial office.

Rule 2.9. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS

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(a) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider

other communications made to the judge out of the presence of the parties or their

lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter . . .

(c) A judge shall not investigate adjudicative facts in a matter independently, and shallconsider only the evidence in the record and any facts that may properly be judicially

noticed.

4. Judge Harris has intentionally withheld ruling on motions until he can deny them

“en masse” just prior to closing the case. (See outstanding motions denied en masse when case

first closed June 2014) The following motions and responsive pleadings were confirmed by the

Clerk of Court to be residing with Judge Harris:

10/23/2014 Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Response and Opposition to

Motion to Vacate Order and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Petition for Contempt, and

for Sanctions

11/13/2014 Defendant’s Motion to Revise Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Vacate

Order and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Petition for Contempt and Request for

Hearing

12/03/2014 Motion for Specific Assignment and Request for Expedited Ruling

Pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b)

12/09/2014 Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Compendium

12/17/2014 Motion to Bifurcate Hearing on Recusal From Hearing for Contempt

Not ruling on the Motion for Specific Assignment or the Motion to Bifurcate the two

hearings caused them to be moot. These were not moot issues until Judge Harris elected not to

rule on them based on their merits, or recuse himself from ruling on them and allowing another

Judge in the Circuit to rule on them. Judge Harris’s inaction resulted in his mooting the issue

himself.

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During the January 16, 2015 Recusal and Contempt Hearing, Judge Harris “We have a

bunch of motions we have to deal with first” at the commencement of the hearing. (A-5) He then

fails to address a single one of them.

After the hearing, I called and spoke with both a supervisor in the Clerk’s office and a

supervisor in case management about the disposition of the outstanding motions. Both indicated

they were with Judge Harris.

At the commencement of the February 5, 2015 hearing, Judge Harris stated (F-4):

“All right. Just to bring us all up to date, this case was called on January 16th, and we

ran out of time, quite frankly. We made a ruling. I denied the recusal request. I think I

denied most of the motions, and we were in the process of - - we took testimony and we

were in the process of closing arguments.”

The dialogue continued (F-4):

Chamberlain: “Well, Your Honor, before we get started, just a preliminary issue. There are still

some outstanding motions.

Court: “I got them, but they’ve all - - they’re all moot in light of my ruling. They came in

- -”Chamberlain: “The motion for - -”

Court: “They came in recently, and I looked at them, and I think in light of my ruling that

it kind of rehashed things that you had raised earlier, so - -”

Chamberlain: “I was specifically thinking about the October 23rd motion to strike their response

for lack of merit and for sanctions for - -”

Court: “All right.”

Chamberlain: “Okay. Yes”Court: “We already - -”

Chamberlain: “Yes, Your Honor. If it’s - -”

Court: “That’s already been decided by my decisions - -”

Chamberlain: “Okay. Yes, Your Honor.”

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Court: “- - and, you know, at the end of today, there will be a final ruling on everything.

Chamberlain: “Yes, Your Honor.”

Court: “So why don’t you finish with your closing argument?”

The fact is that Judge Harris never made a “final ruling on everything.” He is on record

during the January Hearing admitting “we have a bunch of motions we have to deal with first.”

He then is on record the February Hearing acknowledging that he had the outstanding motions,

had determined “they’re all moot,” then when challenged specifically about a motion involving

attorney misconduct and a request for sanctions, he says “there will be a final ruling on

everything” at the end of the day.

As of March 9th, 2015, more than 50 days after Judge Harris admitting he had motions to

address, and more than a month after he stated that he had ruled on the various motions, none

have been docketed nor sent to myself. The reason is because Judge Harris has NOT ruled on

these motions. If he ruled on the motions, they would be docketed. Judge Harris did not want to

make a ruling on the merits of the Motion for Specific Assignment or the Motion to Bifurcate the

Hearings because he did not want his colleagues on the bench to be aware of his conduct and

decision making. He bias toward opposing counsel is clearly transparent when he failed to rule

on the Motion for Sanctions, supplemented with a Reply in support of sanctions filed November5, 2014, which provided incontrovertible evidence of attorney misconduct. Despite Judge Harris

being aware of evidence opposing counsel lied, not once, but twice in filed pleadings, he failed

to take any corrective action.

Rules violated:






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impropriety.



perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,impartiality, and integrity is impaired.




(b) A judge shall cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of

court business.

(c) A judge shall not willfully fail to comply with administrative rules or reasonable

directives of a judge with supervisory authority.


thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities

of judicial office.

Rule 2.15. RESPONDING TO JUDICIAL AND LAWYER MISCONDUCT

(a) A judge shall take or initiate appropriate corrective measures with respect to theunprofessional conduct of another judge or a lawyer.

5. Judge Harris has made numerous, blatantly dishonest statements on the record.

These are in direct violation of the Preamble of the Judicial Code of Conduct, as well as various

rules. If not made intentionally, they seriously question whether Judge Harris is suffering from a

yet to be diagnosed mental impairment. While not exclusive, the more significant dishonest

statements or statements indicating mental disability follow:

(J-63 and J-77)

Court: motion to recuse. I’m hearing it because I know it’s an issue with

you and I want to resolve that before we go any further.”

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“Under the Surratt case, which is 320 Md., and particularlyat Page 467, “A

recusal motion must be made by a party” - - and, again, I don’t know that we even

have a recusal motion formally filed. There were some letters to Judge Hackner

where the issue of recusal was mentioned, so as an accomodation to Mr.

Chamberlain, we accepted that as his motion for recusal.”

(These statements provide evidence Judge Harris is delusional. The Motion to Recuse was filed

on November 13, 2014. Furthermore, Judge Harris’s own Order dated December 8, 2014 states:

“Upon review of the Defendant’s Motion for Recusal and Request for hearing . . .” (Exhibit ?)

Judge Harris was aware their was Motion for Recusal filed and signed an Order stating he had

reviewed it. Stating he did not have a Motion to Recuse before him was a blatant lie.)

(A-61)

Chamberlain: “If you felt that the order was unlawful, you would have vacated the order and

we’d be done. You would have realized that, hey, he made a case. It’s moot. I shouldn’t have

done it. It’s unlawful. Vacate the Order.”

Court: “Sir, this is getting very monotonous. You consented to that order.”

(I was coerced into making an oral agreement on the record on April 18, 2014. There are dozens

of declaratory statements made in formal pleadings, and in correspondence between Mr. Brown

and Judge Harris, that explicitly state I did not willfully give my consent to the oral agreement.

Judge Harris modified the draft sent to him by Mr. Brown and unilaterally signed it on the same

day he declares he read and then denied my Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial which

lays out the judicial errors, duress, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of consent. It is a direct lie to

state that I gave my consent to his Order. Within 3 days of being recognized by the Court (ie, assoon as was possible) I declared my lack of consent. There was no time gap between when I was

forced into making the oral agreement and when I was able to formally plead the truth of the

matter for the record.)

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(A-66)

Previously covered dialogue about consent shows blatant dishonesty. Judge Harris is

incredulous when he asks “I didn’t know you didn’t give your consent, sir.” He then states “I

read everything that comes across my desk” when asked if he read the Motion for Declaration of

Mistrial. He either is lying that he read the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial and

denied that motion without reading it, or, he read the motion which clearly and explicitly states I

did not willfully consent to the oral agreement and ignored that information as he signed the

Consent Order on the very same day. Both statements cannot be true.

(A-69-70)

Court: “Let me summarize again. You had an attorney. The attorney was advising you of

everything that occurred that day. You agreed on the record to certain terms. A consent order was

subsequently sent to me for my signature. You did not object to one thing that was placed on the

record that day. So what’s your point?”

(First, a consent order was sent to Judge Harris but he did not sign it. He modified the terms then

unilaterally made it an order without the consent of the parties. Secondly, a review of the three

pertinent motions, the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial, the Response and Oppositionto Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss that request for a mistrial, and the Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint, all provide serious and substantial evidence which contradicts that I “did not object

to one thing that was placed on the record that day.”)

(A-135)

Court: “I take every one of my decisions seriously, and I don’t make decisions until the

evidence is concluded.”

(Read pages F-49-50. Judge Harris refused to hear any evidence I was prepared to offer on the

issue of fees, started discussing awarding of fees under the family law section after having

explicitly stated himself this is a pure contract action, and threatened to call the Sheriff if I

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opened my mouth again in an effort to be heard on the matter. Keep in mind this was an award

requiring me to pay the other party’s fees when I was defending myself against charges of

Contempt. Read the defense. The Appellate Court will determine whether this was an abuse of

discretion or not, but he refused to hear evidence concerning why fees should not be awarded

and why any consideration of awarding fees based on the family law section would be an error of

law in this case.)

(Let me also mention how inappropriate, and evidence of his predisposition to award fees in this

case, something that is only done in extraordinary cases, when he said “Just remember one thing.

Her bill is running.” as I was attempting to present my defense to the contempt charges and it

appeared we would not have enough time to complete the hearing. (J-167)

(A-140)

Court: “Well, let me stop you. It’s very tough for one reason. You have 30 days to

challenge the validity of an order. We have two rules that allow that. You availed

yourself to neither of those.”

(For Judge Harris to have ruled on a Motion for Declaration of Mistrial which clearly laid outnumerous reasons his June 5, 2014 Consent Order was not valid, and then state that I did not

avail myself to either one two rules is evidence of mental impairment. Not only did he deny this

motion, he also denied a Motion to Vacate the order as being unlawful. The basis for this request

for relief was clearly stipulated as lack of subject matter jurisdiction equalled “mistake” as

defined by Maryland case law and the Court had revisory power at any time due to “mistake”

pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b) and Courts and Judicial Proceedings Rule 6-408. Judge Harris

denied not one, but two motions which specifically challenged the validity and lawfulness of hisorder yet directly lies by stating I did not challenge it.)

(F-3)

Court: “I think I denied most of the motions...”

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(Upon investigating the matter, there is no question that not only were those motions not denied

at the time he made this statement, but they still have not been ruled on.)

(F-25)

Court: “It’s the only point, sir. You keep arguing mootness when you brought the issue

before me to sign off on a consent agreement in which Mr. Schaeffer voir dired

you, you entered into it freely and voluntarily, you were asked that question, now

you’re raising issues of mootness, jurisdiction, duress, where there’s no proof of

any of that.”

(It is more than disingenuous to state that we brought the settlement to him. I was forced to

stand trial when it was patently clear that there was no controversy. The evidence is voluminous

that I did not enter into the oral agreement freely. I was NOT asked the question of whether I did

this voluntarily. Judge Harris himself declared that to be so. (A-90) And it was not “now” that

issues of mootness, jurisdiction, and duress were being raised. They had been ignored by Judge

Harris to cover up his intentional decision to proceed on April 18, 2014 without having statutory

authority to do so.)

(F-39-40)

Court: “Just for the record, and I have - - which I think I cited - - the hearing sheet from

the April 18th, 2014 hearing, where you were represented by Kevin Schaeffer,

you former wife was represented by Mr. Sam Brown, and that matter was on the

docket that day for a complaint to enforce settlement agreement and/or consent

agreement dated August 31st of 2011. That matter was not heard that day, because after some discussions and a

meeting in chambers, when I told the parties to go out if you need to start the

hearing on that issue, I’m more than available, I had nothing else on my docket

that day - - you made an issue over the fact that I probably shouldn’t have even

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heard the case that day - - we resolved the issue. Mr. Brown gave your client the

impression he was withdrawing that motion that day, but then he reinstated it that

day. Mr. Schaeffer made a good argument as to why due process did not allow

him an opportunity to adequately prepare for that hearing, but that subsequently

became moot when I was advised that the parties had reached a consent

agreement.”

(This soliloquy alone is adequate to prove the confusion, inability to reason, corruption, or gross

negligence.

• “That matter” WAS heard that day. There are 99 pages of transcription covering numerous

procedural arguments, testimony, and cross-examination. THAT was in open court on the

record.

• “After some discussions” ??? The hearing commenced, and was abruptly halted by Judge

Harris as my counsel was cross-examining the Plaintiff and proving substantial perjury.

• After a meeting in chambers Judge Harris told the parties to “go out if you need to start the

hearing on that issue” ??? Start the hearing? This is an overt attempt to pretend the

agreement came before he proceeded with a hearing without jurisdiction.

• Withdrawing motions and then reinstating them. This patently did not happen. JudgeHarris allowed the withdrawal of a motion without a verbal request. Mr. Brown’s request

in his “real-time” Reply to our response to his Request for Voluntary dismissal asked the

Court to “ignore” his request for voluntary dismissal.

• Mr. Schaeffer never made a due process argument about not having adequate time to

prepare. This was a red herring directly set up by Judge Harris himself (See A-12)

This part of the transcript demonstrates Judge Harris’s willingness to grasp at straws inexplaining how the events transpired.)

(J-80)

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Court: “What the court watches out for in a lot of these cases, a recusal should never be a

means to be abused as a trial strategy to get some judge off a case, so I don’t

know why, Mr. Chamberlain, you’re at all concerned about me hearing this case,

but you obviously are.”

(This statement is beyond explanation. Refer to Motion for Declaration of Mistrial, Motion to

Dismiss Complaint to Enforce, Motion for Recusal, Motion to Bifurcate, etc. Also, see personal

letter to Judge Hackner (Exhibit ???) which must have been discussed with Judge Harris.)

(J-87)

Court: “Do you recall appearing before this court on April 18th of 2014?

Chamberlain: “Yes, I do.”

Court: “Okay. And do you recall that, after a partial hearing was conducted, a consent

agreement was placed on the record?”

(This statement on January 16, 2014 is in direct conflict with his statement on February 5, 2014.

(see F-39-40))

(J-132-133)

Court: “- - right now, as we sit here, that consent order is a valid order - - because you’ve

done nothing to set it aside.”

(You cannot make this up. Judge Harris himself has denied relief to declare a mistrial for

numerous errors documented with evidence, as well as a motion to vacate his order as being

unlawful. When a Judge tells a citizen that they have “done nothing to set (an order) aside” butthat Judge has single-handedly denied the citizen every avenue of relief requested, this

commission had evidence of mental impairment, corruption, or gross negligence.)

(F-42)

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Court: “In any event, your argument today, you cited cases that you thought were

relevant. They weren’t. None of those cases are relevant on the jurisdiction, the

mootness of the issue, they’re - - none of those apply.”

(The record shows the cases and Rules cited as:

MCJP 1-501 (F-9)

Md. Rule 2-324 (b) (F-9)

MCJP 3-409 (a) (1) (F-9)

United States v. United Mine - - (interrupted) (J-139)

United Mine Workers v. America 1947 (F-160)

Reyes v. Prince George’s County (F-164) (F-10) (F-11-12)

Lord v. Veazie 1850 (F-166)

Hatt v. Anderson (F-11) (F-13)

Post v. Bregman (F-11) (F-13-14)

Hammond v. Lancaster (F-23)

Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Assn. (F-23)

Boyd’s Civic Association v. Montgomery County Council (F-24)

Coburn v. Coburn (F-24)Stevenson v. Lanham (F-27) (F-28)

Please read the quotes in the record from these cases regarding mootness and jurisdiction

on the annotated pages. Any judge who would claim that, after this evidence and case citations

were provided to him, and pertinent parts read to him, “None of those cases are relevant . . .” and

“. . . non of those apply.” was either mentally impaired during the hearing or was electing to

disregard it, making it a blatantly dishonest statement.)

(J-60)

Court: “Sir, if it’s a consent order - - and I need to state this for the record - - consent

orders, unless they were under duress,cannot even be appealed from. So when I - -

denied your request to reconsider without anything further than just you simply

saying, “Vacate that order,” I made the correct legal decision.”

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(Read the Motion to Vacate Order. It is disturbingly dishonest to state there was no supporting

legal reasoning, law, or case law fully supporting the motion.)

(F-48)

Court: “There’s been no evidence, even a scintilla of evidence, that that’s not a valid

order. I couldn’t find you in contempt if that order was invalid, so I find it to be a

valid order.”

(The evidence presented in motions denied by Judge Harris, and in the January 16, 2014 and

February 5, 2015 hearings is overwhelming, substantial and would be persuasive to an unbiased

judge. Interesting, Judge Harris slips when he explains the order is valid because he found me in

contempt. This is more than a clue that he had predetermined to put the cart before the horse.

He would find me in contempt of not obeying his order, therefore he would rule the order to be

valid despite the evidence presented.)

(J-21)

Court: “If that’s correct, if you truly believed you were coerced into entering into that

agreement, there’s a procedure. You could have asked to set that order aside.

There were lots of things that could have been done.”

(There were procedures followed a things done. I filed a Motion for Declaration of Mistrial.

This motion laid out the legal arguments and provided evidence of the numerous judicial errors

and duress present on April 18, 2014. Judge Harris denied this motion. There was my Response

and Opposition to the Plaintiff’s efforts to get my request for a mistrial dismissed. I filed a

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint to Enforce and Request for Declaratory Judgment after I

understood the law required that anything which emanates from a hearing held without subject

matter jurisdiction is null and void. That Motion was ignored. Then, I filed a Motion to Vacate

the Order which provided substantial law and case citations proving the Court did not have

jurisdiction over the matter before it, the Order was unlawful, void, and should be vacated.

Judge Harris denied this motion. His statement above indicates he is unaware of all these efforts

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to use the legally available procedures to obtain relief from his unlawful order. Or, he is fully

aware he is denying all relief and simply creating a record to give the appearance that I have not

asked for relief.

(J-22-23)

Judge Harris admits during this dialogue that he had another agenda on April 18, 2014 other than

what was before him. This dialogue is important. It begins with a summary that there was no

case to begin with, that it was not justiciable on the day of the hearing and then Judge Harris

says: “Sir, that is not the issue today. You’re wasting your time, actually. That’s - - that was not

the issue that we have to decide today, nor was it really the issue on April 18th.” There could be

not more clarity about what the issues are and yet Judge Harris says what is being discussed is a

waste of time. This dialogue took place during the recusal hearing, but is focused on the

legitimacy of his order which came from an oral agreement made during the April 18, 2014

hearing. The issue is all about jurisdiction, following the law, an allegation that Judge Harris

willfully elected not to comply with the law and subject me to a trial when there was no live

controversy, duress due to judicial errors and overreach, and allegations of favoritism or bias. If

it is not about these issues, what is Judge Harris talking about? What is the issue in his mind?

Rules violated:

C. PREAMBLE

C-101 -- An independent, fair, competent, and impartial judiciary composed of men and

women of integrity who will interpret and apply the law that governs our society is

indispensable to our system of justice. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in

preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained

in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and

honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence inthe legal system.

C-102 -- Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid both

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives.

They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public

confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.

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impropriety.


appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with competence,






thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilitiesof judicial office.

6. Judge Harris consistently demonstrated his lack of understanding about basic law.

Some examples follow:

(J-21)

Judge Harris states a consent waived the court’s lack of jurisdiction. No citizen or judge can

waive the court’s lack of jurisdiction. Anything that emanates from a hearing held without

jurisdiction is null and void.

(J-21)

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Judge Harris states there are procedures to follow if I believed I was under duress. I inform him

that he denied my motion to vacate that order. He states: “Well, that was filed a long time after

the revisory power of that court, if I’m not mistaken, but go ahead.” This is evidence that Judge

Harris does not understand the for issues of “fraud, mistake or irregularity” the Court has

revisory power at any time. Again, “mistake” is for acting without jurisdiction, which is a large

part of how I came to be under duress that day.

(J-29)

Judge Harris states his belief that if a party retracts a statement that the only issue before the

court is moot, when the other party has replied and explicitly concurred that it was moot, proved

it was moot in open court, then argued about it for 30 minutes, that the Court again had clear

jurisdiction. No party can confer jurisdiction on a court. Judge Harris also is completely

mistaken when he states his belief that because a case is assigned to him for resolution, that gives

him the authority to proceed.)

(J-29)

After I ask “Is the Circuit Court authorized or have the authority by law to hear a case with no

justiciable controversy - - hear a moot case?” Judge Harris states: “It depends on thecircumstances.” The Circuit Court clearly does not have any statutory authority in this regard.

Only the appellate courts in the state of Maryland have been given that authority under a few

limited exceptions. This could not be more clearly laid out in the law and supported by decades

of case law. I am alleging that Judge Harris is absolutely aware of this and yet again attempts to

shield himself from discipline as if he believes there are exceptions for him as a Circuit Court

Judge. If he is not aware of the limits to his jurisdiction, he is grossly negligent in understanding

and executing his duties as a judge.

(J-30-32)

Judge Harris shows his utter confusion about jurisdiction when he states the reason it was

assigned to him to make a decision was because it was a viable issue. Yes, that is why a hearing

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was scheduled. But Judge Harris fails to grasp that if the case is moot at the time of the hearing,

as the evidence overwhelming shows, he does not have jurisdiction to continue. When Judge

Harris declares “The minute Mr. Brown said it was not moot, it was still a viable issue. It’s my

job to decided that case” it demonstrates his lack of understanding of mootness, the limits of his

jurisdiction, and the fact a party cannot confer jurisdiction on the court.)

(J-81)

“When I was told that the motion to dismiss was withdrawn, I was reinvested with jurisdiction to

hear the case, because that’s what I thought was going to occur when I took the bench that day.”

This statement demonstrates that Judge Harris is unaware that once a motion is replied to, the

court must grant permission for it to be withdrawn. Judge Harris allowed this, but seems

confused when he says he was “told that the motion was withdrawn.” Again, our Response filed

the day before trial and hand delivered to Judge Harris’s chambers explicitly states the issue is

moot and the transcript shows definitively that the issue was moot. The other party did not offer

a single sentence explaining how it could be “un-moot” after declaring it moot 3 days earlier.

Judge Harris’s comment that he was “reinvested with jurisdiction” indicates he does not

understand a party cannot confer jurisdiction on the court.

(J-82)

Judge Harris declares, emphatically, that there is “absolutely no reason to recuse from the case.”

Please see issues concerning recusal below.

(J-140)

Judge Harris states he is familiar with the revisory power of the court. Yet he claims I never

“availed” myself to either of the rules that allow a party to challenge an order. But he himselfdenied both of those challenges to the validity of his order. He either read and willfully ignored

the law, legal reasoning and case citations support those motions he denied, or he is mentally

impaired and does not believe the Motion Requesting Declaration of Mistrial, the Motion to

Dismiss, and the Motion to Vacate Order were challenges to his order.

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(J-172)

“. . . that you’re contesting the contempt because the consent order from June of ’14 is an invalid

order, that ship has sailed. It’s presumed valid. I heard no evidence to the contrary.” This

statement is evidence that Judge Harris still is unwilling to accept the the revisory power of the

court with regard to “mistake”, defined in Maryland law as not having jurisdiction, can be raised

at any time. Judge Harris’s declaration that he has “heard no evidence to the contrary” indicates

someone without the mental capacity to hear evidence and apply the law, or, someone who is

willfully ignoring the clear evidence and not complying with the law.

(F-15)

“The authority was it was in front of me on that date on the docket.” It simply cannot be that

Judge Harris believes that because a contested case is scheduled, that he has the authority to hear

it even if it is declared moot (by both parties!) at the time of the hearing. This is cover for

knowingly proceeding without a live controversy and without authority to do so.

(F-16)

“It was contested. It was on the docket for a contested hearing on the issue of enforcement of theagreement.” Same excuse. Because it was on the docket as a contested case, I had the authority

to proceed.

(F-18-19)

This exchange clearly shows Judge Harris believes we can confer jurisdiction on the Court. He

admits what the plan was: proceed without jurisdiction . . . coerce a settlement agreement . . .

then say that because an oral agreement was placed on the record, it makes the jurisdictionargument go away. This is akin to saying that it is acceptable to withhold the reading of Miranda

rights then say that doesn’t matter because you got a confession. Or saying it’s okay to lock a

suspect up and torture him, but say that doesn’t matter because he signed a confession. You

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cannot try a citizen in a court of law when the court has no jurisdiction, then say it doesn’t matter

when that mistake and other egregious judicial errors lead to a coerced oral agreement.

(F-20-21)

This exchange again demonstrates Judge Harris’ lack of understanding about jurisdiction. Of

course an individual can waive personal jurisdiction, as my attorney unfortunately did when he

answered their complaint in Maryland when I am a resident of Colorado. But a party cannot

waive or confer jurisdiction on the court. Jurisdiction is statutorily given. It does not extend to

moot cases. Even if BOTH parties said they wanted to proceed on April 18, 2014, the evidence

before the Court prohibited hearing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

(F-24)

“But it was not moot, because you all entered into an agreement after all that happened.” This

statement again provides evidence Judge Harris has no concept that the Court does not have the

authority to hear moot cases. Whether the oral agreement is void, or voidable, as determined by

the Court of Special Appeals, is irrelevant to the facts and evidence at the time the hearing

commenced proving the only issue before the Court was moot.

(F-26-27)

“You keep going back to phase one, which you waived for all intents and purposes by entering

into the consent agreement. It’s crystal clear in my mind.” This admission, that Judge Harris

believes he can act under the color of law, without authority, because in the end an oral

agreement was placed (coerced) on the record is critical in showing his lack of understanding of

the law, or his willful intent to ignore it.

(F-29)

This passage again confirms Judge Harris belief that he can hear a moot case, but when he

obtains a settlement after proceeding, it somehow makes the mootness go away.

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(F-39)

“Mr. Chamberlain, there are several theories on which I can award counsel fees - - one is under

1-341, the other is under various sections of the Family Law Code . . .” Judge Harris explicitly

acknowledged this was a “straight contract case.” (J-6) This was about a declaratory relief action

regarding a single sentence in a contract provision concerning college applications. There were

no minors involved. No alimony or child support involved. Yet Judge Harris demonstrates his

lack of understanding of the law with regard to awarding of fees. First, it is an extraordinary

remedy he applied despite the substantial defense presented to the charges of contempt. Second,

the only request for fees made by the opposing party was based on Md. Rule 1-341. Lastly,

Judge Harris’s statement he could award fees based on the Family Law Code in this case

demonstrates his lack of understanding of the law.

(F-42)

Previously mentioned dialogue indicating that Judge Harris does not believe the cases cited

support or are relevant to questions of jurisdiction.

(A-43)

Court: “Your presented no evidence on duress.”

(The record reflects my understanding of the difference between void and voidable orders.

(F-70-71) I understand the a voidable order must be obeyed until overturned by the higher

court. My defense was clearly stated that the order was void, and unlawful, and therefore I could

not be held in contempt for disobeying it. That is why the record shows law and case citations

proving a lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to mootness. No evidence needed to be

presented to prove duress, nor would any evidence have helped prove the order was void,

therefore proving duress in the contempt hearing would not have been a valid defense. JudgeHarris’s focus on the fact that no evidence was presented proving duress demonstrates he is

either attempting to confuse the situation or is mentally unable to grasp the basic tenets of law

with regard to void, voidable, lawful versus unlawful orders, as they relate to holding someone in

contempt of court.)

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7. Judge Harris was required by Md. Rule 16-813 Rule 2.11 to disqualify himself. I

readily concede that just because a Judge makes an error, that alone does not disqualify himself

from ruling on a related matter. For example, if a judge authorizes a search warrant, he is not

disqualified from ruling on whether the evidence obtained through that search warrant might be

inadmissible due to a defect in the search warrant. But this case is different. It has gone past two

steps and is not into the third. This judge decided he could act outside of his statutorily

prescribed jurisdictional limits. Then, he signed an order which has been alleged to be unlawful,

and void, because he acted outside his jurisdictional limits. Then, he denied the request that his

order be vacated because it was unlawful, and therefore, void by law. And THEN, he will not

recuse himself and determines that he will sit and judge whether someone should be held in

contempt for disobeying that order when the declared defense to the charges, before the hearing,

are that the order is unlawful and contempt cannot be brought for disobedience to an unlawful

order. There could not be a more classic case of the need for one judge to step aside and have

another judge review the issue than in this situation.

Judge Harris has demonstrated over many months that he has more than a “de minimus”

interest in this case. Please read my Motion to Vacate Order and Dismiss Plaintiff’s Petition for

Contempt on October 6, 2014. Judge Harris denied this motion. By doing so, he has indicated

he has read the motion and disagrees with the legal support for it. In other words, he hasdeclared that his order is lawful and he will not vacate it. When a petition for contempt was

filed, a 30

Recusal

Time

First few sentences: ex-parte comm or decided without evidence / shows the decision was

predetermined

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Conclusion: Totality of evidence, from the denial of motions fully supported with legal merit and

case citations, to the failure to rule on other motions in a timely manner causing them to become

moot, to the substantial evidence of a failure to comply with clear law when it is discussed and

explained at length prior to his legal decisions,

C. PREAMBLE

C-101 -- An independent, fair, competent, and impartial judiciary composed of men and women

of integrity who will interpret and apply the law that governs our society is indispensable to our

system of justice. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice

and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges,

individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and

strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.

C-102 -- Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid bothimpropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. They

should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their

independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.


(a) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently, promptly,

and without favoritism or nepotism.

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thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a judge's responsibilities of

judicial office.

supplemental judicial complaint against judge paul f. harris, jr

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