supplier buyer relationship

K. J. SOMAIYA INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES AND RESEARCH

RESEARCH PAPER (TRIMESTER – IV)

SUPPLIER-RETAILER RELATIONSHIP: AN INVESTIGATION OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE CATEGORY

10/14/2010

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SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

PROF. BRAJESH BOLIYA MOHIT JAIN

ROLL NO – 18

PGDM-RM (09-11)


ABSTRACT

The relationship between retailer and supplier or farmer in fruits and vegetables supply chain plays very important role in success of both parties because Supplier and retailer interact with each other very frequently and price fluctuation is very high in fruits and vegetables category. The success is in terms of financial goal and customer satisfaction. Supply chain get better efficiency if supplier and retailer have good relationship. This relationship can be measured by many parameters like sales of category, customer satisfaction from category, financial performance of both parties, relationship time, less stock out etc.

The aim of this research paper is to investigate retailer supplier relationship in fruit and vegetable category (F & V). First, it tells theoretical framework of retailer supplier relationship in F & V category which includes the behavioural approach and the political economy paradigm. It also includes impact of three key dimensions on performance of supplier and retailer in F & V category. In last, it includes factors which affect supplier retailer relationship in F & V category. These factors are trust, incentives, price satisfaction and information flow.

The trust between both parties is depended on satisfaction from each other, communication between parties, relationship specific investment, power dependence, personal relationship, and availability of alternatives. The dimensions for price satisfaction are price transparency, price quality ratio, relative price, and price reliability. Better information flow helps in building better relationship between both parties. The role of incentives is play significant role in building relationship.

2 K. J. SOMAIYA INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES AND RESEARCH


S. NO. TOPIC PAGE NO.1 ABSTRACT 2

2 INTRODUCTION 4

3 FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY 5

4 HYPOTHESIS 6

5 THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 6

6 LITERATURE REVIEW 10

7 TRUST 11

8 INCENTIVES 17

9 PRICE SATISFACTION 20

10 INFORMATION FLOW 23

11 FINDINGS 26

12 CONCLUSION 27

13 REFERENCES 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES

S. NO. FIGURE PAGE NO.1 FRESH FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 4

2 Theoretical Framework for Investigating Buyer-Supplier Relationships

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3 Price Satisfaction and the Interaction of Relational Performance in retailer supplier relationship

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4 Flows shared in retailer-supplier relationships 24

INTRODUCTION



Better retailer and supplier relationship in F & V category results in better efficiency of supply chain. Efficient supply chain management decreases cost for both parties. Both parties can get better financial results if both have good relationship. Supply chain management is critical in F & V category because fruits and vegetables need to reach from the seller to the final customer within few hours or maximum a day.

Globally, supply chain for F & V category involves several complexities. These complexities are –

Short shelf life Managing cold chain Number of middle man Lack of food processing infrastructure Huge difference in farm price and retail price Sources from many small suppliers/not uniform quality

Normally, suppliers of fruits and vegetables are established locally and they are small in size. The number of suppliers is also high in a local market. Thus it becomes very critical for a retailer to manage relationship with suppliers. Retailers have to look at many points for managing relationship. Suppliers also struggle because of lots of small players. Suppliers get high competition. Many factors are there which directly affect supplier retailer relationship and it results in performance of both parties.

FRESH FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN



Supplier and retailer should consider the entire variable that can affect their relationship. These variables also influence by many other factors. The variables are trust, incentives, price satisfaction, and information flow. Retailers and suppliers should try to be best in all these factors. These factors influence long term relationship of supplier and retailer. Long term relationship gives many benefits to both parties like smooth flow of money, material and information.

FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY IN INDIA

Food is the biggest consumption category in India with a market size of USD 181 billion. Domestically, the spending on food and food products amounts to 21% of India’s GDP and constitutes the largest portion of the Indian consumer’s spending – more than 31 % share of wallet. With a population of more than one billion individuals and food constituting a major part of the consumer’s budget, this sector has a prominence next to no other businesses in the country. Moreover the importance of this sector to India’s economy becomes all the more relevant, considering the fact that this sector continued to perform well, despite fall in GDP number and poor performance by many other industries, during recession in 2008-09.

India is the fruit and vegetable basket of the world. India being a home of wide variety of fruits and vegetables holds a unique position in production figures among other countries. Over 90% of India’s exports in fresh products go to west Asia and East European markets. However, it needs to augment its food and processing industry at a mega scale, according to an agriculture consultant.

India’s exports of Fresh Fruit and Vegetable has increased Rs. 3659.11 Corers in 2008-09 , which is including the products like Fresh Onion, Walnut, Fresh Mangos, Fresh Grapes and other fresh Fruits & Vegetables.

Abundant investment opportunities are there in expanding the export market. An increasing acceptance of new products with market development efforts has been witnessed lately given the fact that there is a good international demand for certain fruits and vegetable products. India ranks fifth in the world in cropped area under cultivation and production of potatoes. India produces 40% of world’s mangoes, 26 %bananas, 18 % cashew nuts, 28 % green peas and 12% onion. Exports of mangoes, grapes, mushrooms have started going to the United Kingdom, Middle East, Singapore and Hong Kong, and among vegetable, onion occupies first position Potatoes and green vegetables like okra, bitter gourd, green chillies have good export potential.

Exports

Exports of floriculture, fresh fruits and vegetables, processed fruits and vegetables, animal products, other processed foods and cereals rose to US$ 7891.8 million in 2008-09 from US$ 7877.07 million in 2007-08, according to DGCIS annual data published by APEDA.

Moreover, India exported schedule products, floriculture and seeds, fruits and vegetables, processed fruits and vegetables, livestock products, other processed



foods and cereals worth US$ 6.53 billion between April-February 2009-2010, according to APEDA.

HYPOTHESIS

H1: The greater the trust between buyer and supplier, the better relationship between buyer and supplier

H2: The higher the incentives get by both buyer and supplier, the better relationship between buyer and supplier

H3: The higher the price satisfaction, the better relationship between buyer and supplier

H4: The more information flow between the buyer and supplier, the better relationship between buyer and supplier

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The framework used to investigate buyer-supplier relationships was developed from two key disciplinary orientations in channel theory: the behavioural approach and the political economy paradigm. The key premise of the behavioural approach, as related to performance, is that performance is not solely determined by the structural arrangement of the channel but also by channel member behaviour. The majority of behavioural channel research has concentrated on power and conflict as the key behavioural constructs that influence performance.

In this way the behavioural approach has traditionally viewed relationships between channel members as power struggles, in which the power and dependence of each party controls the decisions and subsequently the performance of other firms. Other behavioural constructs such as co-operation, trust, commitment and satisfaction have also been widely studied due to their perceived influence on performance. The political economy framework, as developed by Stern and Reve (1980) for the analysis of distribution channels, advocates the division of inter organisational dyad into an internal economy and an internal polity, which interact to jointly influence collective behaviour and performance. In this way the political economy framework, integrates the behavioural power theories of organisations with the economic efficiency theories of organisations to gain a deeper understanding of the internal functioning of a distribution channel.

Specifically, the framework builds on the empirical work of Reve and Stern (1986) and the conceptual work of Robicheuax and Coleman (1994) who took a behavioural approach to the traditional structure-conduct-performance relationship.



Figure 2: Theoretical Framework for Investigating Buyer-Supplier Relationships

The premise of the model is that the structural elements of a buyer-seller relationship, such as activities and information flows, measured in the internal Relationships economy, and the nature of the power-dependence relationship, measured in the internal polity, influence each other but also influence the dominant attitudes and sentiments in the relationship and the performance outcomes achieved. Each part of the framework is briefly discussed in the following sections.

Conceptualization of the Structure of the Economy

The internal economy is defined in terms of the types of activities, resources and information flows that are used to support and co-ordinate the operation of the buyer-supplier relationship.

As such, the economy is conceptualised as existing on a continuum representing the more tangible and observable aspects of relationships. At one end, firms engage in low levels of joint activities and have low levels of operational integration and at the other they engage in high levels of joint activities and have high levels of operational integration.

Conceptualization of the Structure of the Internal Polity

The internal political structure is conceptualised as the level and nature of interdependence that exists in a relationship. A comprehensive view of interdependence encompasses both the asymmetry and magnitude of interdependence. Therefore, an examination of the relationship polity directs attention to the level of total interdependence in the relationship (i.e. the sum of both firms’ dependence) and the level of dependence asymmetry in the relationship (i.e. the difference in the firms’ dependence scores).



Conceptualization of the Climate

In line with Reve and Stern (1986) the climate examines the dominant attitudes and sentiments that exist in a buyer-supplier relationship. Researchers such as Stern and Reve (1980) and Skinner Gassenheimer and Kelley (1992) suggest that conflict and co-operation are the two dominant sentiments that regulate exchange relationships.Four theoretical constructs are used to capture whether the dominant attitudes and sentiments in relationships are co-operative or adversarial in nature. These are trust, commitment, relational norms and functional conflict resolution methods, which are constructs that indicate the presence of co-operative behaviour directed towards collective as opposed to individual goals. Functional conflict resolution is measured instead of measuring the level of conflict in a relationship as researchers suggest that conflict is not always detrimental to a relationship. Instead it is the manner in which partners resolve conflict that has implications for partnership success.

Conceptualization of Performance

The aim of this part of the framework is to examine the financial costs and benefits associated with different forms of buyer-supplier relationships. Because the focus of this study is concerned with the impact of partnerships on supplier performance, performance is viewed from the perspective of individual channel members. More specifically, the focus of performance concerns the supplier’s overall view of the performance outcomes of a specific customer relationship. This view is taken because suppliers often have many customers. As such it would be difficult to isolate the impact of any individual relationship on overall performance at the firm level.

Key Dimensions of Buyer-Supplier Relationships



All of these variables were found to exist in higher amounts in relationships classified as partnerships as opposed to relationships classified as having limited coordination. These variables were also all found to have significant and positive relationships with performance. The exception was the level of dependence asymmetry, which in accordance with the theory, was lower in customer relationships classified as partnerships and had a significant negative relationship with performance.

RELATIONSHIPS

Each of the three key dimensions of buyer–supplier relationships in Figure 1 are hypothesized as being key influences on performance. A brief review of the literature is given to support the hypothesized relationships between each of the constructs in the model and performance. It should be noted that each of these three dimensions was found to exist in higher amounts in relationships classified as partnerships, as opposed to arm’s-length relationships (Duffy and Fearne 2002).Therefore the overriding hypothesis in the model is that partnerships improve performance.

The relationship between the internal polity and performance

In general, researchers suggest that the higher the level of interdependence in a relationship the better the implications for performance. For example, Mohr and Spekman (1994) and Gattorna and Walters (1996) suggest that the essence of successful partnerships is the extent of interdependence between the partners.Several other researchers also suggest that high bilateral dependence is related positively to performance.

With regard to the nature of asymmetry in the relationship, the dependence literature does not offer unambiguous performance implications. Instead two points of view exist regarding the relationship between dependence and performance; they are referred to as the opportunistic and benevolent perspectives. The opportunistic perspective suggests that a dependence advantage will manifest exploitative tendencies. That is, the possession of more power will encourage action to gain a disproportionate share of resources from a less powerful partner. On the other hand, the benevolent perspective emphasizes co-operative exchange as those with the greatest power are able to manipulate other members to act in ways that achieve greater positive results for the whole system.

The relationship between the internal economy and performance

Numerous articles routinely exhort both customer and supplier firms to seek collaborative relationships with each other as a way of improving performance. For example, Spekman (1988) states that in an attempt to gain greater competitive advantage, buyers are forging closer, more collaborative relationships with a smaller number of vendors. Similarly, Mohr and Spekman (1994) suggest that more successful partnerships exhibit higher levels of co-ordination than less successful partnerships, while Narus and Anderson (1987) suggest that successful working partnerships are marked by co-ordinated actions directed at mutual objectives across organizations. Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) also suggest that suppliers in longterm, closer relationships achieve a higher level of sales growth and profitability



compared to supplier firms that used a transactional approach to servicing customers.

The relationship between climate and performance

The importance of variables such as trust and commitment are highlighted in the fresh produce food industry initiative ECR, which emphasizes that the benefit of joint working between retailers and manufacturers would only be fully realized if there was a move away from confrontational relationships to relationships based on cooperation, openness and trust (Fiddis 1997; Mitchell 1997).

In the inter-organizational literature commitment and trust are frequently highlighted as key mediating variables that contribute to relationship success in terms of efficiency, productivity and effectiveness. Researchers also suggest a positive relationship between the existence of relational norms and performance (Lusch and Brown 1996; Siguaw et al. 1998) and suggest that conflict can be productive for the relationship if disputes are resolved amicably (Anderson and Narus 1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Mohr and Spekman 1994).

LITERETURE REVIEW

Each of the four key factors that affects the buyer–supplier relationships are hypothesized as being key influences on relationship. A brief review of the literature is given to support the hypothesized relationships between each of the factors and buyer supplier relationship.

The marked increase in disposable income has substantially increased the demand for fresh food such as meat, fish, fruit and vegetables. Food is the most important item for consumers. Consumers spend 40% of monthly expenditure in food.

Most of the retailers purchase vegetables locally. However, there is a perception that the very big retailer may purchase greater quantities of produce from external sources. This is believed to be because local farmers are unable to meet the needs of these retailers, who demand continuity of supply, consistent quality and other value-added services.

In most developing countries like India, is no exception, local farmers often find it difficult to satisfy the retailers requirements, due to seasonal production, small land holdings, traditional cultivation methods, capital constraints and the lack of knowledge.

Retailers buy fruits and vegetables in three ways; (1) the specialist retailer who purchases only one kind of vegetable in large quantities from the major production areas; (2) Semi-specialist retailer who purchase two-three kind of vegetables in generally smaller quantities and (3) the diversified retailer who buy several kinds of vegetables in moderate quantities.

While farmers selling directly to the retailer are able to sell larger volumes and often negotiate a higher price, the retailer often has strict quality criteria. Furthermore,



many do not pay immediately for the produce they purchase. Consequently, unless the farmer or supplier is well known to the retailer, there is a heightened element of risk in the transaction.

TRUST

For any potential exchange, trust will be critical if two situational factors are present; risk and incomplete supplier information. Since most transactions present some degree of risk and uncertainty to the potential buyer, without some degree of trust, the perceived risk may be too great for the transaction to occur.Trust provides a means of coping with risk and uncertainty in exchange relationships. Risk arises because trusting behaviour potentially exposes one party to the presumed opportunistic behaviour of their exchange partner. In transaction cost economics, an exchange partner copes with the risk of opportunism by employing control mechanisms and by making opportunism costly. However, the existence of trust between exchange partners enables the transaction to occur without the rigidity and expense of hierarchical organisation, while, at the same time, minimising risk from opportunistic behaviour. Trust reduces transaction costs by enforcing honest behaviour. Trust focuses on the belief or the expectation that the vulnerability arising from the acceptance of risk will not be taken advantage of by an exchange partner.

Hence, trust as the belief that an exchange partner will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm and will not take unexpected actions that may result in negative outcomes. Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman define trust as the willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence.

While both of these definitions view trust as a behavioural intention that reflects reliance on the other partner, both definitions, in part, capture quite different aspects of the construct. Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) describe trust as a belief, a sentiment or an expectation about an exchange partner that results from the partner’s expertise, reliability and intentionality. This component of trust, which Ganesan (1994) describes as credibility, is based on the extent to which the buyer believes that the supplier has the necessary expertise to perform the activity effectively and reliably. However, trust also relates to the focal firm’s intention to rely on their exchange partner.

Ganesan (1994) describes this component as benevolence, because it is based on the extent to which the focal firm believes that its partner has intentions and motives beneficial to it. A benevolent partner will subordinate immediate self-interest for the long-term benefit of both parties and will not take actions that may have a negative impact on the firm (Geyskens et al 1998).

Trust can be defined as a global belief on the part of the buyer that a salesperson, product or company, will fulfil their obligations as understood by the buyer. As such, trust is not one-dimensional, but rather, comprised of three individual components; salesperson trust, product trust and company trust.

It necessary to differentiate between trust in an individual and trust in an organisation. Trust reduces the need for structural mechanisms of control and firms



learn to become more interdependent. When trust exists, buyers and suppliers believe that long-term idiosyncratic investments can be made with limited risk because both parties will refrain from using their power to renege on contracts or to use a change in circumstances to obtain profits in their own favour. Trust increases the partner’s tolerance for each other’s behaviour, facilitating the informal resolution of conflict, which in turn, allows the partners to better adapt to the needs and capabilities of the counterpart firm.

A buyer’s trust in their supplier reduces the perception of risk associated with opportunistic behaviour, it increases the buyer’s confidence that short-term inequities will be resolved over time and it reduces the transaction costs in an exchange relationship. Trust is the critical determinant of many factors related to performance including the more open exchange of relevant ideas and emotions; greater clarification of goals and problems; more extensive search for alternative courses of action; greater satisfaction with efforts; and, greater motivation to implement decisions. Buyers who trust their suppliers are less likely to use alternative sources of supply and are more likely to accept any short-term inequities that may arise in the exchange relationship.

TRUST BUILDING BEHAVIOUR

Satisfaction

According to the disconfirmation of expectations model, customer satisfaction is the result of a comparison between a partner’s performance and the focal firm’s expectations. Whenever performance exceeds expectations, satisfaction will increase. Conversely, whenever performance falls below expectations, retailers will become dissatisfied.

Between channel members, satisfaction has been defined as a positive affective state resulting from an appraisal of all aspects of a firm’s working relationship with another. Satisfaction should capture both the economic and non-economic (psychosocial) aspects of the exchange.

Economic satisfaction is defined as the channel member’s positive affective response to the economic rewards that flow from the relationship. An economically satisfied channel member considers the relationship a success when it is satisfied with the effectiveness and productivity of the relationship with its partner and the resulting positive financial outcomes. Channel members that are highly satisfied with the economic rewards that flow from their relationship generally perceive their partner as being more trustworthy. As satisfaction increases so also will trust.

However, satisfaction with the exchange also affects channel members moral and their incentive to participate in collaborative activities. Satisfaction with past outcomes indicates equity in the exchange. Equity generally refers to the fairness or rightness of something in comparison to others. Equitable outcomes provide confidence that neither party has been taken advantage of in the relationship and that both parties are concerned about their mutual welfare.



Conflict is one of the few constructs that is considered to have a direct negative effect on satisfaction. Firms those are able to lower the overall level of conflict in their relationship experience greater satisfaction.

Conflict in channel relationships most often occurs over economic issues. Channel members that are satisfied with the economic rewards that flow from their relationship generally perceive their partner as advancing their goal attainment as opposed to impeding or preventing it. Satisfactory conflict resolution will increase mutual trust and reinforce each members commitment and confidence that mutually satisfying outcomes will continue to be obtained.

However, not all conflict is negative, nor does a relationship mean that all conflict has been resolved. A small amount of conflict may prove necessary to keep the relationship between two firms healthy. Occasional conflict can reduce the inertia in a business relationship, reshaping existing routines into new, and potentially more effective solutions.

Nevertheless, what is more significant is the manner in which the conflict is resolve. The most pervasive channel construct known to influence satisfaction is the use of power. Satisfaction increases when non-coercive sources of power are employed. Non-coercive influence strategies include information exchange and the discussion of business strategies and requests.

Communication and information exchange

Communication has been described as the glue that holds together a channel of distribution. Communication in marketing channels serves as the process by which persuasive information is transmitted, participative decision-making is fostered, programs are coordinated, power is exercised and commitment and loyalty are encouraged. Communication enables information to be exchanged that may reduce certain types of risk perceived by either one of the parties to the transaction.

The more information a party has and feels they can obtain, the more likely they will be to trust their exchange partner. Trust develops from the constant and detailed exchange of information that reduces performance ambiguity.

In the context of the fresh fruit and vegetable industry, buyers and sellers want to know the extent to which their exchange partner has been buying or selling from others and whether their partner has been reporting the correct prices.

Tomkins defines trust as the adoption of a belief by one party in an exchange relationship that the other party will not act against their interests, where this belief is held without undue doubt or suspicion in the absence of detailed information about the actions of the other party. Trust implies adopting such a belief without full information.

However, trust building is a dynamic process dependent upon information. In the early stages of a relationship, commitments are usually less extensive and there will be little need for trust and information. However, as the relationship matures, there will be a positive association between trust and information, for trust cannot increase



without information. Meaningful communication between firms in a working relationship is therefore a necessary antecedent of trust.

Personal relationships

Interpersonal trust in business-to-business relationships is rarely offered spontaneously; rather, it results from an extended period of experience with an exchange partner (Dwyer et al 1987; Lane 2000). During this time, knowledge about the exchange partner is accumulated, either through direct contact, or indirectly through reliable third parties.

Interpersonal trust between individuals is based on familiarity, developed either from previous interactions or derived from the membership of similar social groups. Characteristics-based trust rests on social similarities that assume cultural congruence because both parties belong to the same social group or community.They may share a common religion, ethnic status, or family background. Trust evolves in relationships where common values and norms, often based on kinship, familiarity and common interests and backgrounds predominate.

In transitional economies, the absence of any effective mechanism by which information about bad payers can be widely shared, firms must carefully screen potential exchange partners. However, the costs of this screening process add appreciably to the costs of the transaction and may significantly reduce the firm’s reach. To reduce screening costs, firms may simply infer things about one another from easily observed characteristics including race, sex or ethnicity.

When contracts cannot be enforced, firms build up personalised trust relationships. Trust is developed on the basis of personal relationships within both narrow and specific social and economic networks. An evaluation of a person’s trustworthiness may be based upon the memberships that each share in the same clan, the same village, ethnic group or social group, or upon the membership that only one party holds of a specific group, where the process of acquiring and maintaining membership of that group involves some rigorous evaluation of personal character. Lyon describes how many business relationships are referred to in terms of personal friendships. These friendship ties mean that the party providing the goods has greater confidence that the exchange partner will repay the money because of moral obligations to reciprocate. Long-term friends are perceived as being more reliable. Trust is embedded in particular social relations and the obligations inherent within them.

Anderson and Narus seek to differentiate between trust as a construct in inter personal relationships and trust within working relationships. In interpersonal relations, participants expose themselves and their resources to potential loss, whereas in inter organisational relations it is the firm that potentially incurs the loss. In small family farms, since it is seldom possible to separate farm business activities from household activities, interpersonal trust is anticipated to assume greater importance.



The making of relationship-specific investments

If a firm wishes to improve its relationship with another, then in all probability, the firm will need to commit various resources to the relationship, whether expressed in terms of managerial or sales force time, product or service development, process, financial or administrative adaptations (Ford et al 1996). Any resource committed above and beyond that required to execute the current exchange transaction can be regarded as an investment (Campbell and Wilson 1996).

An investment is the process in which resources are committed in order to create, build or acquire resources that may be used in the future (Easton and Araujo 1994). Through interacting with other firms and committing resources to specific relationships, firms have the opportunity to use relationships as a resource for the creation of other resources, product adaptations and innovations, process improvements, or to provide access to third parties (Hakansson and Snehota 1995).Adaptations are a significant feature in the dynamics of business relationships. One or both parties may make adaptations to bring about an initial fit between their needs and their capabilities, but adaptations may also be necessary in an on-going relationship as the parties are exposed to changing business conditions (Hallen et al 1991). The better adapted to each other the firms become, the more efficient coordination becomes, thus paving the way for more and more adaptations.Inter-firm adaptations imply considerable investments by one or both firms. Since these investments are seldom transferable to other business relationships, adaptations tend to bond buyers and suppliers together in a closer relationship and to create barriers to entry for potential competitors (Wilson 1995). Inter-firm adaptations build trust by indicating one partner’s willingness to accommodate the needs of the other (Athaide et al 1996).

Firms adjust products and processes to their partner’s requirements, subject to the various constraints imposed by technology and economics (Easton 1992). Hakansson and Lundgren (1995) see technological innovation as being an interactive process, largely dependent on the exchange of technical information between individuals, organisations and institutions. Farmer’s technological choices are based primarily upon their exposure to information regarding the new technology. After each growing period, the actual yields, revenues and profits are realised and this added information, as well as the experience accumulated during the period and information gained from other farmers, updates the parameters the farmer uses in making the next decision. However, output prices are often highly variable and their uncertainty may affect the farmer’s technological choices.Where technological innovations are involved, firms should consider how they can help their partner to rationalise their decision making so as to achieve the full benefits from the innovation. Education and training includes the broad set of activities that a firm undertakes to help its partner get an innovation up and running (Athaide et al 1996).

Farmers often need to be educated about the potential applications of a new technology before they can evaluate its appropriateness. Often this education process revolves around managing their expectations, which may require providing tangible evidence of product performance. Providing tangible evidence of product performance will not only reduce the farmer’s perceived risk of adoption, but also



provide an opportunity to gain the farmer’s trust by being honest about the product’s performance.However, many of these investments are limited to a range of business opportunities and may be specific to a potential trading partner. The extent to which the firm making the investment is exposed to potential loss is dependent upon the asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to the ease with which an investment can be redeployed to alternative uses or alternative users without incurring a significant loss in value (Easton and Araujo 1994). Many of these relationship specific investments are not readily re-deployable, or at least, have a substantially reduced value in an alternative relationship, thus exposing the firm to the possibility of exploitation by an opportunistic trading partner(Williamson 1985).

Nevertheless, Williamson (1985) suggests that investments stabilise relationships by altering the firm’s incentive structure. By making relationship specific investments, the firm creates an incentive to maintain the relationship. Engaging in opportunistic behaviour and thereby risking the dissolution of the relationship is contrary to the self-interest of the channel member, for, if the opportunism is detected and the relationship is terminated, the investment may not have generated adequate returns.Furthermore, the making of such relationship specific investments may also provide a powerful signal to the other party. Observing the other party’s pledges causes the channel member to be more confident in the other party’s commitment to the relationship, because the other party will sustain considerable economic loss if the relationship is terminated (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Relationship specific investments offer tangible evidence that the supplier can be believed, that it cares for the relationship and are willing to make sacrifices (Ganesan 1994). Thus, the making of relationship specific investments may provide a strong signal of the channel partner’s trustworthiness.

Power-dependence

When the outcomes obtained from the relationship are important or highly valued, the focal firm is said to be more dependent (Heide and John 1988). The same is also true when the magnitude of the exchange is higher (Lohtia and Krapfel 1994). The higher the percentage of sales and profits that arise from handling a particular product line and the greater the expectations of sales and profit in the future, the greater the focal firm’s dependence (Frazier et al 1989). Thus, a firm is considered more dependent upon another when the exchange partner provides a larger proportion of its business.

Dependence is also increased when the outcomes obtained from the relationship are comparatively higher than or better than the outcomes available from any alternative relationship. Firms dealing with the best partner are more dependent because the outcomes associated from trading with that partner are better than those available from alternative partners (Heide and John 1988). In this respect, Anderson and Narus (1990) view dependence as the outcomes given comparison level for alternatives. Dependence is a measure that represents the overall quality of the outcomes available to the focal firm from the best alternative exchange relationship. Over many transactions, since the focal firm observes that the best available



exchange partner repeatedly follows through with its promises, they posit a positive relationship between dependence and trust.

However, it is the firm’s perception of its dependence relative to its partner that is of most interest in channel relationships. Relative dependence determines the extent to which a firm will have influence over or be influenced by its exchange partner. With increasing dependence comes greater vulnerability making one firm more susceptible to the power and influence of another. The more powerful partner may be in a position to create more favourable terms of trade for itself.

Dependence therefore refers to the firm’s need to maintain the channel relationship in order to achieve its desired goals (Frazier et al 1989). Dependence can be regarded as the price the focal firm has to pay for the benefits that it obtains from its relationships with others (Easton 1992). As such, dependence is partly a matter of choice and partly a matter of circumstances.

The manner in which power is distributed in the relationship will dictate the way in which the relationship both operates and develops. The manner in which the more powerful partner chooses to use its power will have a significant impact on the relationship. If the more powerful firm is perceived to be using its power to achieve collective goals and does not impede the other in attaining its desired rewards, a high level of goal compatibility will exist. Conversely, if the firm is perceived to frequently pressure the other into taking actions that are against its own interests, conflict will inevitably result and trust will decline (Frazier and Summers 1986). Partners will resist further influence attempts and try to enhance their power at the expense of the other. Trust is reinforced by a problem solving approach rather than those orientated towards control.

Availability of alternatives

Even when a dependent party does not trust its partner, it may maintain the relationship simply because of the benefits it derives (Andaleeb 1996). In such circumstances, dependence often arises because of the difficulty firms experience in finding alternative exchange partners; the more difficult it is to replace the channel partner, the more the focal firm is dependent on its partner (Heide and John 1988). The investment the firm needs to put into developing a new relationship in terms of time, effort and money, as well as the perceived costs of switching to an alternative exchange relationship can also contribute to its dependence on another firm (Frazier 1983).While exploiting a powerful position will make it difficult for the firm to establish trust, agents are less likely to behave in a detrimental manner when they are aware of the ability of the focal firm to readily find an alternative partner. The ease with which buyers can switch to alternative sources of supply gives them the ability to punish untrustworthy suppliers by readily discontinuing their relationship.

INCENTIVES

For us, the two most important questions regarding retailer-supplier relationships for fruits and vegetables category concern the nature of the commercial outcome and the nature of the interaction between the two parties. When we think about the



commercial outcome of a retailer supplier relationship, we can simply use the concept of surplus value provided by economics. The surplus value in a relationship between a retailer and a supplier can be broadly defined as the difference between the costs of production of the supplier (which, of course, includes normal profits) and the utility function of the retailer.

When we look at retailer-supplier relationships we are interested in the extent to which the two parties are able to obtain a share of the surplus value. The share of the surplus value obtained by the retailers is, of course, called the consumer surplus. The share of the surplus value obtained by the supplier is, of course, called the producer surplus.

Our assumption is that both parties are seeking to maximise their share of surplus value, albeit sometimes in the medium rather than the short-term. This would be true whether we adhere to a view of business behaviour characterised by simple self interest seeking or one characterised by opportunism, that is, self-interest seeking with guile. It is important to note, however, that the battle over surplus value is not always over a static amount of value. In certain retailer-supplier relationships the surplus value will be a static entity. However, retailer and suppliers, whilst still interested in obtaining the largest possible share of surplus value, can work together to increase the surplus value created by the interaction. Indeed, this brings us on to discussing the second dimension of retailer-supplier relationships – the nature of interaction.

When thinking about the nature of buyer-supplier interaction, we find it quite useful to begin from the starting point of an arm’s length relationship. We define such a relationship as consisting of interaction that merely consists of a level of contact necessary to exchange the essential commercial details regarding order placement, order fulfilment and payment. The key point here is that the nature of the relationship reflects a desire on the part of one or both parties to minimise on the costs of undertaking the transaction.

Relationships that involve greater levels of contact can then be placed along a continuum. This continuum concerns the level of investment that is required to undertake the different collaborative activities that might be suggested by one or both parties. What these activities might be will vary from relationship to relationship. The way in which buyers and suppliers interact could be divided into a number of dimensions. We have taken and slightly adapted four of these dimensions: product / process information exchange, operational linkages, co-operative norms and relationship-specific adaptations.

Product / process information exchange can include the transfer of proprietary technical information, the transfer of cost information and the transfer of forecasting information. Operational linkages are systems and procedures that are developed by the two parties to facilitate the flow of goods, services, payment or information.Examples could be a just-in-time arrangement or an e-procurement system, for example where the supplier posts its catalogue on the buyer’s intranet. Co-operative norms are the agreed standards of conduct that underpin the interaction between the two parties, whatever they might be in a particular relationship.



Finally, relationship-specific investments refer to the non-transferable investments that are often made in business relationships. These could be adaptations to products or processes, training in particular systems or the location of facilities close to either the buyer or supplier’s site. Different types of relationship-specific adaptations have been well documented over the years.

A pure arm’s length relationship, therefore, does not include any of these activities.Closer relationships, on the other hand, involve a greater or lesser investment in such activities. The key, however, is the level of investment required for the type of relationship being suggested.

Influences on the Types of Relationships Developed

In the previous section, we described what we believe to be the two key dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships: the share of surplus value and the nature of interaction.

However, what determines the way in which surplus value is shared and how the two parties interact? For us, there are a number of key variables. In terms of the share of surplus value, this is a function of the power relationship that exists between the two parties – or, to put it another way, the incentive structure that exists. Power has been defined as the ability of actor A to make actor B act in a manner that B would not otherwise have done (Lukes, 1974). From here it has been argued that power comes from dependency (Emerson, 1962) and information (Akerloff, 1970).

When viewed in this way four generic power structures can be identified: dominance, interdependence, independence and dependence (Emerson, 1962; Campbell and Cunningham, 1983; Cox et al, 2000; Cox et al, 2002). When applied to the surplus value created in a buyer-supplier relationship, power causes the division of that surplus value to vary. This is the case even if the surplus value has been increased through close working relationships – either through cost reduction or utility enhancement (Lonsdale et al, 2003). In the different circumstances of power, therefore, there will be different amounts of consumer and producer surplus.

The key influences on the nature of interaction in buyer-supplier relationships are more varied. The first factor is transaction salience. Purchases of small commercial value are unlikely to lead to a desire on the part of either party to undertake collaborative activities, unless it is of high operational importance to the buyer and then a case may be made (for example, a low cost, but high importance, valve in the oil industry might warrant investment in improved metal technology or the like). The reason for this is quite simply that the proportional transaction costs make such efforts unattractive. Second is transactional uncertainty. At the time of contracting, the two parties may not be totally clear about the exact nature of the good or service that is required by the buyer. As a result, two parties may need to work together in order to develop a solution. This could involve the exchange of proprietary information, the holding of joint design forums and the making of specific investments. Uncertainty over demand may also lead to an exchange of information if, for example, the two parties enter into a vendor managed inventory agreement. Uncertainty, therefore, is a driver of collaboration.



Third, even where there is little uncertainty over the buying firm’s requirements, there may be a need for relationship-specific adaptations if the transaction is of high or medium asset specificity. It might be argued that because of the absence of economies of scale, transactions of high asset specificity should be undertaken internally, but they often are not at the present time. Therefore, asset specificity is also a driver of collaboration.

However, we need to introduce a fourth element into the analysis. This is, again, the buyer-supplier power relation. We need to include this as just because one party might desire a particular type of interaction doesn’t mean that this desire will be shared by the other party. If the other party holds the power in the relationship then it is likely that its view will hold sway. For example, it may be that a buyer wishes to undertake joint investments with a supplier. However, if that supplier views the buyer as a ‘nuisance’ customer, it will probably not wish to dedicate its scarce resources to satisfying such a wish.

PRICE SATISFACTION

One important factor that has been considered in many exchange relationships is price, which is the financial value that is given out in exchange for a product. Retailers hold an internal reference price which serves as a standard against which newly encoded prices are compared. The reference price therefore provides base for retailer to determine their level of satisfaction with the exchange, the so called “Price satisfaction”.

The marketing concept states that to achieve success fruits and vegetables supplier should identify and satisfy retailer needs and wants more effectively than competitors. Furthermore the extant literature in marketing holds that retailer’s satisfaction is the main directive of marketing. This notion of retailer satisfaction is also connected to the concept of relationship marketing and the creation of long-term relationships which result in retailer’s satisfaction, incorporating satisfaction relating to price and its various dimensions. Holding true to the notion of satisfaction is that price maintains a central role in the purchasing decision making process and post purchasing behaviour, which results in retailer satisfaction. Retailer’s satisfaction is further linked to price issues as more than half of retailers switch to competitors’ products because of perceptions of price.

Price satisfaction is a consequence of price fairness and price perception and price perception has an effect on satisfaction. Price satisfaction is a multidimensional, higher order construct with many dimensions.

This is a particularly important concept as B2B actors’ satisfaction, relating to the price they pay (or receive) for products they produce (or purchase), will potentially differ. In a B2B context, channel members are highly satisfied with the economic rewards that come from the relationship (such as price, or sales) and non-economic reward which relate to psychosocial gratification. Financial performance, related to economic rewards, constitutes short term outcomes in the buyer seller relationship and includes factors such as profit, cost and sales. Non financial rewards



psychosocial noneconomic rewards, relates to behavioural dimensions such as satisfaction, commitment, communication and flexibility.

Furthermore, the notion of channel member satisfaction and economic reward is also linked to relationship performance in a B2B context. Relationship performance is also linked to financial and non financial performance in the relationship. Therefore, channel member satisfaction and relationship performance are linked in that economic and non economic rewards are the basis for B2B exchange and can be linked to the construct of price satisfaction.

Dimensions of price satisfaction in inter firm relationships

This section of paper discusses the dimensions of price satisfaction in the context of retailer-supplier relationships. The discussion on the dimensions described in consumer markets and explains how such dimensions may be relevant from the industrial suppliers’ perspectives. These dimensions influence relationship performance. The model in Figure 2 summarises the discussion that follows.

FIGURE 3: Price Satisfaction and the Interaction of Relational Performance in retailer supplier relationship

Price transparency

As information access and increased interaction by B2C consumers is a modern day norm, consumers are increasingly becoming more demanding on the honesty and completeness of information they receive on price. The benefits of satisfying consumers by providing honest and frank information regarding prices are increased trust and satisfaction with the company. It therefore stands to reason that price transparency is a dimension of price satisfaction. In relation to price transparency in a B2B context, the information access and completeness of information is a non-economic reward concerned by the supplier. Industrial suppliers of agricultural products are often concerned about the price formula that is used by their buyers.



Most price formulae take factors such as quality, quantity supplied, geographical location, length of relationship, nature of contracts etc into consideration.

Thus two or more suppliers of the may receive different prices under some circumstances. This therefore makes it imperative for retailer to keep a high level of transparency concerning how prices are determined and paid so that some suppliers may not feel discriminated against. Suppliers are therefore more likely to be satisfied if they are provided with information on how retailer determines the price that will be paid for their product. Thus, higher levels of price transparency are therefore more likely to result in a higher level of suppliers’ relationship performance.

Price quality ratio

Related to the discussion above is the dimension of price-quality ratio. From consumers’ perspectives, value represents a trade off between the benefits they perceive in a product relative to the price they pay for it. The notion of the trade off between benefits and cost is pertinent to customer value. If perceived quality exceeds perceived costs, customer value is high and vice versa.

Therefore a favourable price-quality ratio (i.e. high customer value) will increase customer satisfaction. In a B2B suppliers’ perspective, the price satisfaction the partner receives is a trade off between the benefits and the cost of the product. In fruits and vegetables market, where grading of produce based on quality is a common practice, suppliers must be satisfied that the prices that they receive from their buyer reflecting the quality of the product. Thus, the price-quality ratio dimension as discussed from the consumers’ perspective is also applicable to the supplier in a B2B context. Related to price-quality ratio is the notion of “value for money” (VFM). VFM is determined by a ratio between outputs (price/ money offered/obtained) and inputs (product offered). The concept of VFM can be viewed as applicable to the retailer in the B2B context due to the trade off between the prices paid for the quality of the product purchased and therefore relates to the level of customer value obtained. For example, a high quality product obtained for a low price will increase the retailer’s perception of VFM and therefore will increase their price satisfaction.

Relative prices

In a B2C context, customers make price comparisons during the purchasing decision making processes. The price comparison refers to relative prices and the effect of comparative price claims on consumer perceptions of price. Therefore a relative price of a product directly influences consumer satisfaction and constitutes a dimension of price satisfaction. From the business suppliers’ point of view, effects of relative prices may also influence the suppliers’ overall satisfaction and performance. This is a result of the fact that suppliers’ often compare prices which are offered by various retailers. Such comparison may lead to a reduced level of satisfaction if the suppliers’ feel they could had obtained a better price from other buyers even when the absolute price that they receive is high. The opposite also holds for the supplier when the price comparison is favourable. Not only do suppliers compare prices with other buyers but also with the highest prices that they have received from the same buyer. Such a comparison will also enable suppliers to determine whether the price



is also favourable and fair. Price comparison is linked to the fairness of the price and is exacerbated in asymmetrical power relationships whereby the price set by the retailer is more favourable to the buyer or seller due to the influence of market forces. Therefore the power asymmetry in the relationship will dictate the level of price fairness experienced by the two actors. Consumers gain satisfaction from a price of a product if they believe that the offered price is favourable and fair. Thus, relative prices, price fairness and price confidence are therefore likely to influence the suppliers’ overall price satisfaction

Price reliability

The notion of price reliability further relates to confidence and is linked to price expectations and whether they are met or not. Price reliability also relates to the idea that prices do not change unexpectedly and that the suppliers are informed in a timely manner.

If price reliability is high then trust is built and a long term relationship is engendered; a tenant of relationship marketing. Reliable prices would enable suppliers to plan their activities and reduce the risk of financial loss when the prices they receive are relatively stable. This is especially the case in fruits and vegetables markets where price hedging is a common practice.

Many retailers attempt to provide more reliable prices to their suppliers by hedging their prices or allowing them to trade in the future markets. Price reliability is also related to reference prices which are based on the past price of the same product at different occasions. Therefore reference prices also affect price fairness as the reference price will also dictate whether the price is fair and acceptable.

INFORMATION SHARING

Supply chain (SC) is defined as a network of connected and interdependent organizations mutually and co-operatively working together to control, manage and improve the flow of materials and information from the suppliers to the retailers(see fig 3). SCM focuses on how firms utilise their suppliers’ processes, technology and capability to enhance competitive advantage. It is a management philosophy that extends traditional intra enterprise activities by bringing trading partners together with the common goal of optimisation and efficiency.

SCM often requires the integration of inter- and intra-organizational relationships and coordination of different types of flows within the entire supply chain structure. In a traditional vision of the SC, demand flows up the chain (from each trading partner to its upstream trading partner) and product flows in the opposite directions. Time delays, distorted demand signals, and poor visibility of exceptional conditions result in critical information gaps and serious challenges for SC managers, including misinformation and ultimately, mistrust. For example, when partners lose faith in the forecast they receive, they typically respond by building up inventory buffers to guard against demand uncertainty. The disruption that results from dramatic, sudden changes in forecasted demand is amplified as it travels up through the SC. This “bullwhip effect” is responsible for much of the inefficiency in SCs.



Information and communication technology (ICT), and in particular the Internet, have played a fundamental role in helping companies to manage retailer supplier relationship. The Internet can change the role and type of relationships between the various players, creating new value networks and developing new business model.The transaction cost theory provides an insight into institutional arrangements for economic relationships between organizations. The focus of transaction cost theory is on the conditions under which a transaction is likely to be carried out internally (hierarchical organization) or externally (in the market). Buyers and sellers need to choose a coordination mechanism in order to economise on transaction costs, which include factors such as asset specificity, uniqueness, uncertainty and complexity of the exchange as well as opportunistic behaviour.

Williamson argues that under high transaction costs, firms tend to choose vertical integration to control the transaction process by closer supervision. In the cases where straightforward, non-repetitive transactions involving no transaction specific investments are concerned, markets coordinated by price mechanism represent the optimal choice. However, organizations may adopt electronic tools to lower transaction costs and improve information flows, thus facilitating improved planning and more coordinated actions to reduce uncertainty

Figure 4: Flows shared in retailer-supplier relationships

Porter (1980) developed the five forces model to consider strategic choices in competitive environments. The basis of this model is that a firm exists within an industry and, in order to succeed, it must effectively deal with the competitive forces which exist within the particular industry.

Buyers or suppliers may be powerful enough to bargain away much of the profitability available to the firm: increasing buyer and supplier switching costs can reduce that power by making a change of relationship expensive.

Porter (1985) also considered the concept of the value chain with primary activities forming a linear flow from the supplier through to the retailer. Each activity must be carried out and linked effectively to achieve optimum overall performance.


SUPPLIER

OR

FARMER

RETAILER

INFORMATION

FRUITS AND VEGETABLES

FINANCIAL

NATURE OF


Within inter-organizational systems, such as information systems used in managing the supply chain, conflicts may arise between organizations that are part of more than one supply chain, with varying strategic directions. These systems must fit within the organizational requirements of the supply chain/network members, or else the overall acceptance may not be adequate for the system’s use. Indeed, without careful planning and agreement across organizations, the potential for inter-organizational conflict also increases.

The factors that have to be managed, maintained and operated internally are: costs, adaptability (internal and external), platform neutrality and interoperability, scalability, security, reliability, ease of use, customer support, and perceived value. From an external point of view, communication systems factors that need to be considered are: communication speeds, type of standard, security, reliability, transaction filtering, additional value-added services, information access, and various costs.In this view, the ICT are a key factor that enables for competitive advantage, by cementing relationships with retailers, enabling integration forward or backwards in the industry value chain, or establishing a technological lead.

The key business benefits that ICT can bring can be identified as:- Improvements to retailer service through simpler processes and reduced lead times;- Lower supply chain costs through simpler integrated processes, lower administrative costs and reduced incidence of failure;- More efficient processes and improved management information;- Improved supplier relationships. Quicker response to end customer demands, lower inventories along the supply chain, and lower costs associated with expediting shipment and/or production.

Companies can be in a position to anticipate demand fluctuations and to respond accordingly. The Internet has given companies even greater tools for tightly orchestrating relationships across the entire supply chain and creating strategic partnerships and operational linkages with a dynamic web of large and small firms spanning all continents.

Internet-enabled shared information helps break down organizational policies and functional fences, helping supply chain alliance members develop a common understanding of the competitive environment. In short, the availability of the Internet and the associated technologies provide the opportunity to make further significant, even radical, improvements to break down functional barriers and enhance the flow of information.

Many researchers agree that ICT reduce cost of coordination. Lack of coordination will result in the supply chain holding inefficiencies in the form of inventory buffers, under-utilised capacity, and obsolescence of products or lost sales.

The degree to which two activities are coordinated is limited by the cost of coordinating the activities. In other words, if the cost of coordination is higher than the cost of inefficiencies, the firm is better off not coordinating. The trade-off between cost of coordination and cost of inefficiencies in the system determines the extent to



which activities in the supply chain are coordinated. Coordination flows support the integration of business activities through information sharing. Therefore, they will tend to expand too many tiers in the supply chain.

FINDINGS

H1: There is much empirical support for a significant positive relationship between relational satisfaction and trust, the availability of alternatives and trust and communication and trust, but relationship between the trader’s willingness to make relational investments and the farmer’s trust in that trader is not so significant. While the majority of the literature anticipates a significant positive relationship between the making of relational investments and trust.

H2: Power has high implication on incentives share by retailer and supplier in F & V category. Power affects the expectations of the two parties over what commercial returns should accrue to them from a relationship. It also affects the willingness of the two parties to invest in collaborative activities. As important, it also affects the willingness of the two parties to share the costs of relationship-specific investments. It also affects the willingness of the two parties to share sensitive information. Thus literature proves that equal power dependence and low transaction costs for both parties lead to better relationship between buyer and supplier.

H3: The above mentioned discussion in literature related to price satisfaction has shown that like in consumer markets, price satisfaction in B2B context can be considered a higher order construct with many dimensions and that each of these dimensions may influence the firms’ relationship performance. The paper also argues that in B2C relationships, price satisfaction is linked to consumer satisfaction and is a result of the price establishment by the supplier, whereas in a B2B context price is invariably established by the buyer as evident in contractual agreements, spot market transactions and exacerbated by market conditions (potentially creation relationship power asymmetry,) which affects the dimensions of price satisfaction. Therefore this paper’s contribution to the literature is the notion that the theory of price satisfaction in the B2C relationships is also applicable in many respects to the F & V suppliers’ satisfaction of price. In a B2B context, price is invariably set by the retailer and subject to market conditions, such as production over/ undersupply (which can result in relational power asymmetries) and is also influenced by the nature of the market structure. Price satisfaction can be posited as a result of economic rewards, imbedded in relationship performance, which can be connected to the dimensions of the price satisfaction concept.

H4: In last, the evaluation of buyer-supplier relationships can be done through the measurement of intensity and effectiveness of information flows occurring between retailer and supplier involved in a supply chain. The gradual increments of the information sharing produce positive increase in the relationship between supplier and buyer in fruit and vegetable category.



CONCLUSION

The fruit and vegetable category is preferred category for retailers. Most of the customers buy fruits and vegetables on daily basis. Retailers can attract customers daily by having good quality and less price’s fruits and vegetables which can influence buying of other products also. Thus, fruit and vegetable category is very important for organized retailers.

Suppliers of fruits and vegetables are either agents or farmers. In today’s environment most of the retailers are buying fruits and vegetables from direct farmers. In past, farmers used to get only 25 % money which consumers pay but now farmers are getting better prices by selling direct to retailers. Thus, managing relationship with all organized retailers is crucial for farmers.

After study of all factors which affect retailer supplier relationship we can say that retailers and suppliers should always follow all these factors if they want to build good relationship. Margins are very low in fruit and vegetable industry for both supplier and retailer and wastage rate is too high. Some retailers operate F & V by getting loss. Thus relationship is very important for getting better financial performance.



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