swimming in murky waters: challenges in developing the eu ... · murky waters piotr maciej...

SWIMMING IN MURKY WATERS

Piotr Maciej Kaczyński FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 88 • September 2011

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

88

CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING THE

EU’S EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION

• Onlydaydreamerscouldhave imagined thatconstructinga foreignministry fora supranationalentitywithunified external representationwouldbe easy.TheEuropeanUnionhas once againenteredunchartedwaters.

• The EU external representation is complex due to two overlapping developments. First is theconfusionoverwhotorepresent:theUnionortheUnionandthememberstates.ThesecondboneofcontentionrelatestothequestionofwhentheEUissupposedtobeincharge,sincethecompetencesoftheEUandthememberstatesarescatteredacrosstheboardandinternationalnegotiationsalmostalwaystouchuponvarioustypesofcompetences.

• Theearlycompromisesonexternalrepresentationremainfragileandcertainissuesarestillpendingandwaitingtobeaddressed.Thisprocessiscompoundedinatimeofeconomiccrisisandpoliticalinstabilitiesinthememberstates.

• ThestrongestmotivatingfactorinfavouroftheEU’smoreunifiedexternalrepresentationisthefearofexternalinsignificance.Thelatestexamplesshowingthatsuchconcernsarewell-foundedincludetheCopenhagen2009climatenegotiationsandtheIMFreform,whereEUmemberstateshadtoyieldtothecoalitionoftheUSandChina.

SWIMMING IN MURKY WATERS

FIIA Briefing Paper 88

September 2011

CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING THE EU'S EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION

The European Union research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Piotr Maciej Kaczyński

Research Fellow

The Centre for European Policy Studies

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

Intheareaofexternalaffairs,theTreatyofLisbonhas introduced a number of innovations into thefunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion.Theinitialphaseoftheseinnovationswasin2010whentwoparallelprocessestookplace.First,theset-upoftheEuro-peanExternalActionService(EEAS)wasnegotiatedandsubsequentlyimplemented.Second,anumberofdevelopmentshavetakenplaceinthesphereoftheEU’sexternalrepresentation.SoonafterDecember2009, when the new treaty entered into force, itbecameclearthatitwaswideopentointerpretation.Sincemostactorscontinuedtointerpretthetreatyprovisionsintheirfavour,theEUhadtoengageindifficult negotiations on several occasions. In fact,thenewtreatyimpactsnotonlyEUrelationswiththirdstatesandwithininternationalorganizations,italsohasasignificantimpactonthemember states’relationswiththirdstatesaswellasontheirrepre-sentationwithininternationalorganizations.

The experience of theUN climate negotiations inCopenhagen in December 2009 (coinciding withthe new treaty’s entry into force) provided freshimpetusforgreatercooperationandharmonizationamongEuropeansindealingwithglobalissues.Theissue thatpushesEuropeanscloser together is thefear of globalmarginalization.AsPresident of theEuropeanCouncilHermanVanRompuysaidaboutCopenhagen’09:“[Itwas]adisasterinwhichEuropewasexcludedandmistreated.”1

1 The Guardian,quotingaWikileakssource,3December2010.

The problem, however, is rather complex, as thispaperwill attempt to illustrate.There are also nodefinitive answers at this stage as tohow the sys-temwillultimatelybeorganizedatalllevels,andifthe new system is going to enhance the effective-nessofEUdiplomacy.Theprincipalsourceof thiscomplexity couldbenarroweddown to twoques-tions: representing whom and when? There is adegreeofambiguitybetweentherepresentationof(1)theEU,(2)theEUand theEUmemberstates,and(3)thememberstatescollectively.Thesecondques-tionofwhenandhowtherepresentationisprovideddependsonthenatureofcompetences.WhiletheEUrepresentationintheareaofexclusivecompetencesis relatively clearly determined, at the same timethereisanadditionalneedtorepresentthememberstatescollectivelyintheareasofsharedcompetencesbetweentheEUandmemberstates.

Theissueofcompetencescallsforsomeclarification.TherearethreemainblocksofUnioncompetences:exclusive,shared,andsupportive.TheLisbonTreatyhascreatedacatalogueofthese.2WhentheUnionexercises its exclusive competences on trade, forexample, the issue of representation is clear-cut,aswill be argued in the secondpart of thispaper.However, the Lisbon rules apply only to externalrepresentationonissuestheUnionhascompetencesin.TheEUdoesnothavecompetencesinallissues,

2 Articles2-6oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropean

Union.

The two Presidents: Herman Van Rompuy and José Manuel Barroso. Photo: European Commission Audiovisual Services.


andwheneveragivencompetenceissharedbetweentheEUanditsmemberstates,theexternalrepresen-tationisdecidedonacasebycasebasis.

The reform of the EU external representationincludes a wide range of challenges from thirdcountriesrecognizingthenewactor’sprerogativestointernalEUactors’engagementinandcontribu-tiontodiscoveringthenewuncharted,oftenmurkywaters of EU foreign policy. This paper focusesmainly on the internal dynamics in the EuropeanUnionanditsmainstakeholders.First,theactorsintheEUexternalrepresentationareexamined.Thenthepoint of departure for theEU and itsmemberstates ispresented in relation toestablishing theirpresence in internationalorganizations.Afterthat,thefocuswillswitchtotheissueofhowthesitua-tionhasbeendevelopingduring thefirsteighteenmonths since the Lisbon Treaty came into force.Lastly,theissuesthatarestillpendingatthisstagewillbeenumerated.

Actors in the EU external representation

Onpaperatleast,theTreatyofLisbonisratherclearonwhoprovidestheexternalrepresentationoftheUnion in different contexts.Those actors are: theEuropeanCommission, theHighRepresentativeofthe Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy(and,underher leadership,theEuropeanExternalActionService),andthePresidentoftheEuropeanCouncil.Asageneralrule, therotatingpresidencyoftheCouncilofMinistersnolongerrepresentstheUnion.However,therehavebeennumerousexcep-tions,especiallywhenitcomestoprovidingexter-nalrepresentationonissuesfallingintothesharedcompetencescategory.Thisdebateisbrieflyoutlinedbelow.

Article17oftheTreatyoftheEuropeanUnionbluntlystates that “[w]ith the exception of the commonforeignandsecuritypolicy,andothercasesprovidedforintheTreaties,it[theCommission]shallensuretheUnion’s external representation”. Inprinciple,therefore,itistheCommissionservices’responsibil-itytoprovideexternalrepresentationonallexternalissuesrelatedtotheUnionpolicies:trade,develop-ment, environment, climate, energy, transport,immigration,financialcooperation,andsoforth.Atthepoliticallevel,thecorrespondingCommissionerprovides theEU’s external representation. By the

same token, the President of the European Com-missionprovidestheexternalrepresentationoftheUnionatthelevelofheadsofstateandgovernment.

TheonlylimitationtotheCommissionprerogativesonrepresentationistheCommonForeignandSecu-rityPolicy(CFSP).Onallmattersrelatedto“foreign”and“security”issuestherepresentationisprovidedbytheHigh Representativeand,underherleader-ship,theEuropean External Action Service(EEAS).Article27(2)TEU reads:“TheHighRepresentativeshallrepresenttheUnionformattersrelatingtothecommon foreign and security policy…” Since thenewtreatyhassignificantlystrengthenedtheHighRepresentative’s position (who is simultaneouslyHigh Representative, the Foreign Affairs CouncilChairandtheVicePresidentoftheEuropeanCom-mission3),anewissuecameupofpossiblydelegat-ingsomeoftheworkoftheHighRepresentativetootheractors.Thereare, inprinciple, four“Ashtondeputies”.ThethreeCommissionersintheEuropeanCommission,whowereelectedtotheCollegeinFeb-ruary2010,aresupposedtowork“inclosecoopera-tionwiththeHighRepresentative/Vice-Presidentinaccordancewiththetreaties”asPresidentBarrosohasindicated.4Thefourth“deputy”isthenationalforeignminister of themember state holding therotatingCouncilpresidency.5

Should theproblemfallwithinboth theCFSP andotherUnionpolicies(namelyclimateissueswithintheUN Conference on Climate Change, or globalcooperation within the G20 on financial marketssupervision, or in the area of development), therepresentationof theUnion is provided jointly bytheHighRepresentative and the respective policyCommissioner.The fact thatMrs Ashton is at thesametimeamemberoftheCollegeofCommissionersshould,intheory,significantlyeasethiscooperation.Infact,thisisoneofthemostimportantindicatorsfor the increasedeffectivenessof themergedposi-tionsoftheformerCommissionerforExternalRela-tionsandtheformerHighRepresentative.However,thesituationbecomesblurredbelowtheCollegeof

3 Seee.g.PiotrMaciejKaczyński,PeadaróBroin,Twonewlead-

ersinsearchofajobdescription,CEPSPolicyBriefNo.200,25No-

vember2009.

4 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=

IP/09/1837.

5 Art.2(5)oftheCouncil’sRulesofProcedure,30Nov2009.


Commissioners,as theEEASdoesnot formpartoftheCommissionandislargelyperceivedasanentityexternaltotheCommissionservices.

However,theHighRepresentativehasthenewEEASatherdisposal.Thisserviceisasui generis bodythatshouldcooperatesimultaneouslywiththeEuropeanCommission,theCouncilGeneralSecretariatandthememberstates’diplomacies.It isalsocomposedofstafforiginatingfromtheabove-mentionedbodies.Therearealreadyover4,000diplomatsworkingintheEEAS,alargemajorityofwhomworkinthe136EU Delegations. The Union delegations representtheEUvis-à-visthirdcountriesandinternationalorganizations. Previously, the EU representationwasprovidedbytherotatingCouncilpresidency.

ThepermanentPresident of the European Council alsoprovidesrepresentationoftheEU.AsArticle15(6)stipulates,thePresident“shall,athislevelandinthatcapacity,ensuretheexternalrepresentationoftheUniononissuesconcerningitscommonforeignandsecuritypolicy,withoutprejudicetothepowersoftheHighRepresentative”.ThereforeMrVanRom-puydoesnot enjoy any exclusive representationalpowers, but shares them verticallywith theHighRepresentativeonCFSPissuesandhorizontallywiththe President of the European Commission on allnon-CFSPissues.

TheexternalrepresentationoftheUnionisprovidedindividually or collectivelybynumerous actors. ItcouldbepresentedasshowninTable1.

In situationswhere the competences for externalrepresentationgobeyond thegiven actor (namelywhenthetopicofaninternationalmeeting,orpolicyareaofaparticularinternationalorganizationwheretheEU isactive,concernsbothaCFSP issueandaUnionpolicy),theexternalrepresentationshouldbeprovidedjointly.Hence,bothPresidentsBarrosoandVanRompuyattendtheG20summitsonbehalfoftheEU,andbotharepresentat summitswithAfrican,AsianorLatinAmericanleaders.Bythesametoken,

both the EEAS and the Commission staffers arepresentintheUnionDelegationsinordertojointlyaddressthecross-sectoralissues.

In the pre-Lisbon system there was yet anotheractorproviding the external representationof theEuropeanUnion: the rotating Council presidency.Thepresidencies,as theycameandwenteverysixmonths,representedtheEUanditsmemberstateson numerous occasions, including within theUNsystemaswellasinbilateralrelationsbetweentheUnionanda thirdstate.TheLisbonTreaty inprin-ciple eradicates the rotatingpresidencypowers inexternal relations; they no longer coordinate theworksoftheForeignAffairsCouncil(thisisnowper-formedbytheHighRepresentative)andmostofitsworkingparties(theseservicesarenowprovidedbytheEEAS).Whatismore,theynolongercoordinatememberstates’actioninthirdcountriesnorintheinternationalorganizations(theUnionDelegationsnowprovidethiscoordinationfunction).

In short, the role of the rotating presidency inproviding external representation has been eradi-cated,exceptforspecificnumeroussituations.Thisis sometimes due to the simple fact that Uniondelegationsarenotineverycorneroftheworld(forexample, the Hungarian presidency representedtheEUinTripoliinspring2011;andtheEUdoesnothavedelegationsinplaceslikeTehranorPyongyang).Moreimportantly,andmorefrequently,inareasofsharedcompetences thecorrespondingEU institu-tionandtheCouncilpresidency(asarepresentativeofthememberstates)togetherproviderepresenta-tionoftheEUanditsmemberstates.Ontopofthat,thereare situationswhere, inorder tobe success-ful,theEUanditsmemberstateshavetoengageincoordinatedaction6atalllevelswithaunifiedformofrepresentation,includingtheEU’scompetences

6 Ontheneed forcoordinatedactionatall levels, seeAngela

Merkel’sspeechattheCollegeofEuropeinBrugeson2November

2010,http://www.coleurope.eu/news/2186.

Level / Issue CFSP Issues Non-CFSP Issues

Level of Head of States

or Government

President of the European Council President of the European

Commission

Ministerial Level High Representative Any Commissioner responsible

for a given dossier

Table 1. Actors in the External Representation of the EU (within the EU competences).


(exclusiveorshared)andthememberstates’exclu-sivecompetences (seeDiagram1).TheUN climatetalksareanobviousexampleofsuchasituation.

Reforming the EU external representation

in international organizations

TheEUand itsmemberstates’presence invariousinternational organizations is organized accordingtofivedifferentmodels:7

• Allmemberstatesasfullmembers,theEUasobserver.Thisisthemostcommonmodelinglobalmultilateralorganizations.However,theobserverstatusdoesnotstoptheEUinstitutionsfrombeingactivelyengagedwiththeircounterpartsfrominternationalorganisations(forexampleinthecasesoftheCouncilofEuropeandinternationalfinancialinstitutions).

• AllmemberstatesandtheEUasfullmembers.WhereEUcompetencesareparticularlyimportant,suchasfortrade(WTO)andagriculture(FAO),theUnionenjoysfullstatusalongsidememberstates.

• SomememberstatesandtheEUasfullparticipants.Thisismostcommoninlessformalizedprocesses,suchastheG8/G20wherethelargerEUmemberstatesarepresenttogetherwiththeEU.AtG8andG20meetingsthetwoPresidentsoftheEuropeanCouncilandoftheEuropeanCommissiontakepartinthemeetingsrepresentingtheEUhorizontally.

• TheEUasafullmember/contractingparty,withnomemberstates.Thisismostlyseeninthecaseofhighlyspecializedinternationalagreements,suchasthoseforindividualagriculturalcommoditiesormetals.

• Somememberstatesasfullmembers,theEUwithnostatus.TheUNSecurityCouncilisaspecialcasewithtwomemberstates(FranceandtheUK)aspermanentmembers,otherstakingonlyoccasionalplacesinrotation,andthe

7 Formoreonthis,seeMichaelEmersonetal,Upgrading the

EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructur-

ing of European Diplomacy,Brussels2011.

EUnotevenpresentasanobserver.However,theLisbonTreatyprovidesanarrangementallowingtheEUtobeinvitedtoexpresscommonpositions.

The first eighteen months

Themost salient difficultywith the establishmentof the institutional foreign policy set-up and the(re-)definingofthenewactors’powersisprobablyrelatedtotheinterplaybetweenthreefactors:

• TheblurreddelimitationofEUandnationalcompetencesintheareasofsharedcompetences.

• OnmanyoccasionsastrongneedfortherepresentationtobeprovidedbytheEUandtheEUmemberstatestogetherasvariouselementsoftheissueathandareanEUandanon-EUcompetence(seeDiagram1above).

• LimitedtrustamongEUactors,especiallybetweenmanyEUgovernmentsandtheEuropeanCommission;thesituationdeepenedwhenthefinancialcrisiscoincidedwiththeLisbonTreatyimplementation.

Amidtheatmosphereofuncertaintycausedbytheeconomiccrisis,thepracticeoftheEuropeanUnionexternalrepresentationundertheLisbonruleshasbroughtaboutsomeinterestingdevelopmentsdur-ing thepast 18months.Member states, theCoun-cil’s Legal Service and the European Commissionstruggledformonthsoverthedefinitionsofsharedcompetences, the precise delimitation of compe-tencesandtheirapplicationtoreal-lifeissues,whilesearching for practical arrangements that wouldhavesavedtheEU’sface(orEuropeanfaces)vis-à-vis multipliedthirdcounterparts.

Institutionally,therehavealsobeennumerouspowerstruggles, especially when the decisions on theestablishmentoftheEEASwereundernegotiation.Also, thenewpowers of theHighRepresentativesproved tobemoredifficult inpractice thanprevi-ouslyanticipated.Forexample,MrsAshtonchairstheForeignAffairsCouncil,butattimesherleader-shiphasbeenpubliclychallenged.Thetimingofherproposalsand thequalityof thediscussionpapershavealsobeencriticized.Allinall,thefirstmonthswerenottheeasiestfortheHighRepresentative,not


leastbecausefortwelvemonthstherewasnoEEAS,and the firstmonths of 2011 saw the new Serviceintheearlystagesofbeingsetup. Itwillstill takesometimebeforetheEU’sdiplomaticcorpsisfullyoperational.

There have been relevant developments related tothe external representation in fourmain types ofactivities. First, there was the representation inthe (global) processes leading up to internation-ally binding agreements.Thesenegotiationsoftentouchuponvarious typesofEU competences.The“mercury case” came to symbolize all the relatedproblems.ByJune2010,theEUwasfacinganinter-institutionaldeadlock(betweenthememberstatesandtheCommission)andriskedadiplomaticlossoffaceduringtheUNEP-ledinternationalnegotiationsleadinguptoalegallybindingglobalagreementonmercury.8 The first meeting of the global confer-encewasscheduledforJune2010inStockholm.Forsome sixmonths prior to that, variousEU actorscouldnotagreeontheformthattheEUnegotiatingteamshouldtake.Ontheday,theEUwaswithoutanymandatetonegotiateandalltheEUstakehold-erswerestronglylimitingeachother’sactions.TheCommissionarguedthatvastelementsof themer-cury negotiations fell under the exclusive compe-tencesoftheUnion,whiletheCouncilLegalService

8 Formoreinformation,seetheUnitedNationsEnvironmental

Programme(UNEP)websitehttp://www.unep.org/hazardous-

substances/Mercury/tabid/434/language/en-US/Default.aspx.

andmanymemberstatesthoughtdifferently.Atonepoint prior to the Stockholmmeeting, one of theCouncilLegal Serviceopinions recommended thatthe Council should take the Commission to courtwhentheCommissionwithdrewitsdraftmandaterecommendation after theCouncil had previouslyapproveditattheCOREPER9level.

ThemercurycaseandtheStockholmmeetinghaveproved how difficult it can be to work out anyarrangement among the EU institutions. At thesame time, Stockholmwas a stark reminder thatarguablythemost importantmotivator foranyEUagreementonhow toorganizeitselfwasthefearoflosingfaceintheeyesofcounterpartners. Follow-ingStockholm’s“cold shower for theEuropeans”,asoneparticipantputit,theEUleadersworkedoutthepracticalarrangements–inasimilarfashiontothe largeUN climatenegotiations inwhichtheEUrepresentationfollowsaparticularpattern.Subjecttofurtherchanges,theprocessallowingformovingforwardconsistsofabroadnegotiatingmandateandtheso-callednegotiatingdirectives laiddownina

9 Theprocessofadoptingamandateisasfollows:theCommis-

sionissuesadraftrecommendation,whichisthenprocessedbot-

tom-upintheCouncil,intheWorkingParty,theCommitteeof

PermanentRepresentatives(COREPER)and,finally,theCouncil

ofMinisters.Itisunclear,however,whethertheCommissioncan

withdrawitsdraftrecommendation.

EU & MS external representation

No or vague EU competence

Member states external representation

EU external representation

Shared competences

Exclusive EU competences

Diagram 1: Areas in EU and member states external representation.


Councildirective,10aswellastheadoptionofpracti-cal arrangements,whereby the roles for theCom-mission,therotatingpresidencyandothermemberstatesweredefined.Thelimitationofthesearrange-mentswas their adhocnature.Even thoughboththeBelgianandtheHungarianrotatingpresidencieshave tried to use the practical “mercury compro-mise” as amodel for arranging other negotiationpractices,theyhaveconstantlymetwithoppositionfromtheEuropeanCommissionaswellasfromsomememberstates.11

The second type of problemwas related to repre-sentationinpoliticalactivitiesnotleadinguptoanylegallybindingdocument.TheEUrepresentationatinternational events and conferences refers heremainly to a wide range of events frommajorUNconferencestoothergatheringssuchastheG8/G20or theUnion for theMediterranean. In thecaseofsucheventsandconferences,practicalarrangementsarenotincludedintheCouncildecision,butintheCouncilconclusions,sincethere isno law-makinginvolved.The various speaking roles of the Com-mission and the presidency, the order of internalcoordination,andsoon,arestillbeingenumerated,while burden-sharingwith fellowmember states(other than the presidency) by delegating certaintopics/interventionsduringmorecomplexnegotia-tionshasbecomeacommonpractice.

TheCouncilLegalServicehasaddressedtheissueofexternal representation in this context on severaloccasions.Intheseopinions,onceagaintheprinciplehasbeenconfirmedthatthememberstatesdisposeofwideautonomyindecidingwhotheirrepresenta-tiveshouldbe.Inprinciple,theCommissionsharesthisview.However,asalreadydiscussedabove,thisdivisionoflabourbetweentheCommissionandtheCouncil in all international activities is still beingquestioned.

Thethird issueconcerningexternalrepresentationrelates to presence in international organiza-tions.Theestablishmentof theEuropeanExternalAction Service (EEAS),which also controls theEUDelegations, includingdelegationsto international

10 ImplementationoftheLisbonTreatywithregardtotheEx-

ternalRepresentationoftheEUinmattersofSharedCompetenc-

esduringtheHungarianpresidency.StateofPlay,30June2011.

11 Ibid.

organizations,meansthat it isuptotheEEASandtheEUDelegationstoprovidetheEU’sfullexternalpresence.However,inissuesofsharedcompetencesthis canbecomemore complex.Furthermore, thetransitionofEU representationhas takenplace in2010and2011,duringwhichtimetheEEAShasstillbeenintheprocessofbecomingoperational.

This transformation included,amongother things,theneedtochangetheEU’spositionintheUNGen-eralAssembly.Until2009,theEUwasrepresentedby a rotating presidency. Now it is representedby the Union’s common actors: the EU Delega-tioninNewYork,theHighRepresentativeandtheEuropeanCouncilPresident.After the initialblowto Union diplomacy (the issue was delayed fromautumn2010andfinallyadoptedinMay2011),theEUfinallymanagedtoconvincethirdstatestorec-ognizetheseactorsaslegitimaterepresentativesoftheUnion.12Notwithstandingtheexternalapproval,theUnionisstillinternallyinclinedtodecideontherepresentationinlinewiththeso-calledtransitionalarrangements,whichincludearolenotonlyfortheEUDelegations,butusuallyfortherotatingCouncilpresidencyaswell.AnimportantelementofthenewsystemisthattheHeadsofMissions(HoMs)coordi-natedbytheEUDelegationtakethemostimportantdecisions.However,therelationsbetweenHoMsandthecorrespondingCouncilworkingpartieshavenotyetbeenfullydefined.

Therearemanyotherinternationalorganizationsorbodieswhere theEU positionhas changed follow-ingtheLisbonTreaty’sentry into force. IntheUNSecurityCouncil,theHighRepresentativecannowbe invited to speak for the EU if the EU memberstateshaveacommonposition.However,theHighRepresentative cannot, of course, speak on behalfofpermanentor electedmember states that sit intheCouncil.Moreover, theLisbonTreatyprovidesa theoreticalpossibility for theEurozone states tohaveunifiedrepresentationininternationalfinancialinstitutions,most importantlyintheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBank.

It is alsoworthmentioning that the Lisbon Treatyprovides fortheEU toaccedetotheEuropeanCon-ventiononHumanRights.Theaccessionhasnotyet

12 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution A/

res/65/276.


takenplace,althoughtheprocessismovingforward.TheCouncilofEuropehasalreadyamendedthedocu-mentallowingtheEUtobecomelegallyboundbytheConvention(previouslyonlystatescouldbepartiestotheConvention).Oncethishappens,theEUpresenceintheCouncilofEuropesystemwillmean,forexam-ple,thattherewillbeEUdelegationstotheCouncilofEurope’sCouncilofMinisters(mostlikelyaCom-missionerresponsibleforfundamentalrights),anditsParliamentaryAssembly(mostlikelyaEuropeanPar-liamentdelegation),aswellasajudgeintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsnominatedbytheEU.

Fourthly,thebilateral representation oftheEUwiththirdstateshadtobecompletelyre-organized.Dur-ing theweekend following the newTreaty’s entryintoforce,theCommissionDelegationswereturnedintoEUDelegations.Apart from thename change,theyweregivenacoordinationfunction:theEUDel-egationshavenowtakenoverthecoordinationofEUmemberstateembassies.Yetthereweresignificanttransitoryprovisions,anditwasnotuntiltheendof2010thatallEUDelegationscoordinatedtheworkofnationaldiplomatspresentontheground.Moreover,thedelegationswerestillnotfullyequippedtoplaythenewrole,astheirobjectiveshadchangedover-nighton1December2009.Therehadbeenhardlyanypoliticalreportingpreviously,butitdulybecameanimportantactivityofallthedelegationsandacrucialelementintheconstructionoftheEEASandtheEEASinputintotheactivitiesoftheHighRepresentative.

Whatmade the transition evenmoredifficultwasthattheEUdelegations’coordinationfunctionwasnot welcomed everywhere; a new incentive forcoordinatingnationaldiplomatshadtobedeveloped.There are over 3,000 EU member state embassiesaround theworldand tensof thousandsofpeopleinvolved.Aseachofthetransition-in-coordinationbattleshad tobewon separately, therewere (andinsomecasesstillare)some136micro-warsontheground.13Insomecasesthetransferofthecoordina-tion functionwasnoteasy.Forexample, inWash-ingtonsomenationalambassadorsdidnotshowupforlocalcoordinationmeetingsformonths.

Anotherchallengeinthedelegationscamewiththearrival of EEAS diplomats. Previously, the entire

13 Thereare136EUDelegationsintheworld(bilateralandto

internationalorganizations).

Commission Delegations personnel belonged totheCommissionandweresubjecttothesamestaffregulations.Inthenewregime,therearetwotypesofstaffintheEUDelegations:theCommissionstaff-erssubjecttooneregulationandtheEEASdiplomats,who are subject to different rules. This createdadditionaltensioninmanyplaces,notleastbecausemanyoftheincomingEEASdiplomatswerepreviousnationaldiplomats.AllsuchproblemsaresymbolicofagreaterandurgentneedtodevelopaEuropeandiplomatic and administrative culture.This, how-ever,willonlybepossibleoverthelongerterm.

TherepresentationduringbilateralsummitsbetweentheEUandathirdstatewasmucheasiertoorganize.Thenewruleisthatwheneverbilateralsummitstakeplace intheEU, theyshouldbeheld inBrussels.AclearexceptiontotherulewastheEU-USsummitinLisbonin2010,butallothermeetingsrespectedthenewrule(theexceptionwasgrantedattherequestofthepartnerstocoincidewiththeNATOsummit).TheEUisrepresentedatthesesummitsbythePresi-dentoftheEuropeanCouncil,VanRompuy,andthePresidentoftheEuropeanCommission,Barroso.

At themultilateral summits (namely Asia-Europemeetings,EasternPartnershipsummitsormeetingswith theACP states or the LatinAmerican states),representationisstillprovidedbythesameEUlead-ers(VanRompuyandBarroso),butnationalEUlead-ersarealsooftenpresent(oratleastsomeofthemare).Moreover,wheneverthesesummitstakeplaceintheEU,theycaneitherbeorganizedinBrusselsorinthecountryholdingtherotatingCouncilPresi-dency.TheEU-LAC (LatinAmericaandCaribbean)summittookplaceinMadridinMay2010;theASEMsummittookplaceinBrusselsinOctober2010dur-ingtheBelgianCouncilpresidency;andtheEasternPartnership summit is scheduled to take place inWarsawinSeptember2011.

In lieu of a conclusion: Problems at hand

Only daydreamers could have imagined that con-structingaforeignministry(EEAS)fortheEuropeanUnionwithitsownnetworkofembassies, itsownagendaanditsowncompetenceswouldbeeasy.Thequestionsonthesuccessoreffectivenessofthisnewsystemare still impossible to answerconclusively.The EU has once again entered unchartedwaters.Foreignpolicyisthecentral featureofastate,and


forthefirsttimeincontemporaryhistoryasuprana-tionalentity(whichisnotastate!)issettoconductaforeignpolicywithunifiedexternalrepresentationasoneofitsfeatures.

Furthermore, the process of reforming theUnionrepresentation is still far fromcompletion.That iswhy formulating major conclusions at this stagewouldbepremature.A recentpaperpublishedbythe Hungarian Council presidency has outlinedongoing contentious issues when it comes to theEUexternalrepresentationinthecontextofsharedcompetences.14Theseissuesincludethedefinitionofrepresentation,therelationshipbetweentheCouncilandtheEUDelegations,andthelocalcoordination.

Theterm“representationoftheUnion”hasnotbeendefinedintheTreatiesandtherearevariousdefini-tions in other documents.The following practicalissuesaretheresultofthislackofadefinition:

• Unityofrepresentation:EUDelegationsandtheCommissionappeartoarguethatatanyparticulareventorwithininternationalorganizationsitisonlytheDelegationortheCommissionthatshouldassumethewidestpossiblerepresentationalroles.Thisincludesallmannerofactivities,formalandinformal,atagiveneventorinaninternationalorganization.ThemajorityofmemberstatesareoftheopinionthatrepresentationmustbedividedonanadhocandindividualbasisinaccordancewiththedivisionofcompetencesbetweentheEUanditsmemberstates.Asageneralrule,itistheCouncilpresidencywhoshouldactasthejointrepresentativeofmemberstateswhenitcomestomemberstates’(non-EU)competences.

• Theextentofrepresentation:amajorpointofdisagreementiswhethertherepresentationoftheEUalsocoversitsmemberstates.ThisissueisparticularlypertinentinthecontextofsharedcompetenceswheresomememberstatesdonotwanttheCommissionortheEUDelegationstostarttheirstatementswith“onbehalfoftheEUanditsmemberstates”.

14 ImplementationoftheLisbonTreatywithregardtothe

ExternalRepresentation,ibid.

Secondly, a practical interpretation seems to beemerging that the universal representative role oftheDelegationsimpliesthattheycannegotiateandexpresspositionswithout the involvementand, inparticular,thepriorauthorizationofCouncilbodies.Eveniftosomeextentthismaybejustifiedbypoliti-cal necessity, such stepswould not bewelcomedamongthememberstates.

Thirdistheissueoflocalcoordination.Atthehead-quarters of international organizations (especiallyin theUN context) theEUDelegationshave takenovertheroleoftheCouncilpresidency.Inpractice,however,theinternalEUcoordinationisgovernedbytransitionalarrangementsusingtheformatof“EUTeams”,whichusuallyconsistoftheCouncilpresi-dencyteamandthelocalEUDelegationpersonnel.Theuncleardivisionoflabouraswellasthefluctuat-inglevelofexpertiseattheEUDelegationsexplainwhythesystem’sinternalcoordinationhasremainedvolatile.Therearecaseswherethesystemisalmostcompletelydominatedby theEUDelegation, leav-inghardlyanyspaceforthepresidency.Indeed,thedelegationswillbeprivilegedinthelonger-term,astheircompositiondoesnotrotateeverysixmonthslikethatofthepresidency.

TheimpactoftheLisbonTreatyonthelocalcoordi-nation is stronglymarkedbytheregularmeetingsof theHeadsofmemberstateMissionsandtheEUDelegation (HoMs).HoMsmeetings are gaining inimportance when it comes to defining EU policypositions.ThereisariskthatinsomecasestheHoMsdecisionswould, in fact, substantially amend theCOREPERpositions.

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