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BOOK 1 (ARTICLES 1-99, RPC)

PADILLA v. DIZON

(158 SCRA 127)

The respondent-judge has shown gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

February 1, 2012 G.R. No. 151258

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system. No act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment). The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).

INTOD ET. AL. v. CA

(215 SCRA 52) G.R. No. 103119

Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was not present in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar presents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts

even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

PEOPLE v. DOMASIAN (219

SCRA 245)

The accused illegally detained a child and sent a ransom note to the latter's parents, but the child was rescued even before the ransom note was received. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means, and the delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when the accused deprived the child of his liberty.

STAGES OF EXECUTION

PEOPLE v. LAMAHANG

(91 Phil 703)

The accused was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store, and succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall. The crime committed was not attempted robbery but only attempted trespass to dwelling, since based on the facts established, his intention was to enter by means of force into the said store against the will of its owner.

PEOPLE v. PANCHO (416 SCRA 506) November 27, 2003

G.R. 136592-93

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. There is no attempted rape in this case because the accused just dragged the victim and held her feet, which are not indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.

PEOPLE v. ORANDE

(415 SCRA 699) November 12,

2003 G.R. No. 141724

The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape due to the fact that the latter did not succeed in inserting his penis in the victim’s vagina. There is no such crime as frustrated rape. Instead, the accused is guilty of consummated rape since perfect penetration is not essential for the consummation of rape.

VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE (525 SCRA

306)

The accused argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft for taking cartons of detergent from the supermarket since he was immediately apprehended by the security guard. Thus, was not able to freely dispose of the said stolen articles. Theft cannot have a frustrated stage and the accused is guilty of consummated theft since he has obtained possession over the stolen item and the presumed

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENACT PENAL LAWS

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

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inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a

constitutive element of the crime of theft.

PEOPLE v. RECONES, ET. AL. (310 SCRA 809)

July 20, 1999

G. R. No. 129535

Three (3) accused were charged with murder. The first one hit the victim repeatedly with a stone marker, the second one pummeled the victim with his fists while the third only watched and acted as lookout in case others will try to intervene. All of them, including the lookout, are guilty of murder and are accountable for the death of the victim on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.

Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not necessary to establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the acts of the accused, before, during, and after the commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNEL VILLALBA

AND RANDY VILLALBA October 22, 2014 G.R. No. 207629

Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The events swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands;

but neither of these witnesses was able to describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or that accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.

ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

February 11, 2015 GR. No. 204644

Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court of its existence beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, when the co-accused stated in open court that her fellow co-accused had no participation in the crime of estafa, such statement was an admission against her interest. The statement negated the alleged “common design or purpose”of conspiracy between her and Benito. It alsomeans that she admitted that her companion’s acts can never be attributed to her.

PEOPLE v. CANTUBA (183 SCRA 289) G. R. No. 79811

The accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator. His knowledge of the plot to assassinate the victim, the fact that he had been ordered to scout for a man who could do the job and his knowledge of the place, date and time of the assault are sufficient to show unity of purpose. At the very least, therefore, he had to know the plot and decided to join the execution. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.

The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in conspiracy.

CONTINUING CRIMES

PEOPLE v. TUMLOS (67 PHIL 320) April 13, 1939 G.R. No. 46248

The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed by the

defendant took place at the same time and in the same place. Consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight (8) of the said cows belong to one owner and five (5) to another does not make him criminally liable for two (2) distinct offenses for the reason that to be liable for two (2) distinct offenses, the act must be divided into two (2). In this case, the act is not susceptible of division. The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen (13) cows which he found grazing in the same place.

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

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PEOPLE v. JARANILLA (55

SCRA 563) February 22, 1974 G.R. No. L-28547

The taking of the six fighting cocks from their coop should be characterized as a single offense of theft as the assumption is that the accused were animated by a

single criminal impulse. The taking of the fighting cocks in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to separate crimes of theft.

SANTIAGO v. GARCHITORENA (228 SCRA

214) G.R. No. 109266

Public prosecutors filed thirty-two (32) Amended Informations against Santiago for violation

of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by giving "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. The thirty-two (32) Amended Informations charged the accused with what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against Santiago. The concept of delito continuado is applicable to crime penalized under special laws.

ILAGAN v. COURT OF APPEALS

(239 SCRA 575) G.R. No. 110617

The series of acts committed against the seven (7) lot buyers were not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different dates and in separate places, hence, they originated from separate criminal intents and consequently resulted in separate felonies. COMPOUND CRIMES

PEOPLE v. CASTROMERO (280 SCRA 421) G.R. No. 118992

The rape victim jumped from a window of her house to escape from the accused; as a result, she suffered

serious physical injuries specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. Here, the rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with the settled principle that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the other person may consequently suffer.

PEOPLE v. COMADRE

(431 SCRA 366) June 8, 2004

G.R. No. 153559

The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a

house, killing one and causing 4 others to suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies. The accused was found guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48, and the penalty for the most serious crime (murder) shall be imposed.

PEOPLE v. MELECIO ROBINOS (382 SCRA 581)

May 29, 2002 G.R. No. 138453

The accused stabbed his pregnant wife with a knife, causing the instantaneous death of the latter and the fetus inside her womb. He was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, and the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed.

PEOPLE v. BALOTOL (84 Phil 289)

The accused stabbed the victim at the back with the use of a bolo. The bolo pierced through the victim's

abdominal region which also wounded another person, resulting to the death of both victims. The crime committed was double murder, defined and penalized in Article 248, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code.

COMPLEX CRIME PROPER

PEOPLE v. TALO October 25, 2000 G.R. No. 125542

The accused forcibly took the victim from her parents' house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The accused was found guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as the crime of forcible abduction was a necessary means for committing the crime of rape.

PEOPLE v. SABREDO (331

SCRA 663) May 11, 2000 G.R. 126114

The accused, using a blade, forcibly took away the victim from Cebu to Masbate, and eventually raped her. The crime committed is simple rape only since the information failed to allege that the forcible taking of the victim was done with lewd designs (an element of forcible abduction). Hence, the crime of rape may absorb forcible abduction.

PEOPLE v. BARBAS

(60 PHIL 241)

The defendant, a public officer, altered the duplicates of the cedulas by erasing the names originally written on them and replacing the same with new names for the purpose of selling them to other people and

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misappropriating the money. The falsification of public documents was, therefore, the means which the

defendant availed himself of in committing the crime of malversation.

PEOPLE v. ABRAZALDO (397

SCRA 137)

While the accused admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that the victim accidentally stabbed himself while they were grappling for the knife. The justifying circumstance of self- defense cannot be appreciated considering the accused- appellant’s flight from the crime scene, his failure to inform the authorities of the incident and his failure to surrender the knife to the authorities. The aforesaid circumstances are inconsistent with having a clean conscience and, instead, indicate his culpability to the crime charged.

PEOPLE v. TAC-AN

(182 SCRA 601) G.R. Nos. 76338-39

The accused killed the victim but claimed self-defense. The victim previously uttered some threatening words against him. Assuming that the victim uttered those words, such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most fundamental requirement of self-defense, and such statements could not reasonably inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm."

PEOPLE v. PATOTOY

(261 SCRA 37) G.R. No. 102058

The accused admitted to having killed the victim but claims to have done so in self-defense. The victim

appeared to draw something from his waist during their confrontation. The victim's alleged act of drawing

"something" from his waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression" meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike at him and no veritable physical force on the part of the latter has been shown that could have really endangered the life of the accused. Hence, self-defense cannot exist in this case.

Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot exist nor be an extenuating circumstance.

PEOPLE v. GENEBLAZO

(361 SCRA 572) July 20, 2001

G.R. No. 133580

Assuming that the version of the accused of the incidents is true, that unlawful aggression emanated from the victim and his companion by throwing stones at him, the aggression ceased to exist when the victim and his companion ran away. There was no longer any

real danger to the life or personal safety of the accused. When the perpetrator does not persist in his purpose or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril, an act of aggression is not unlawful aggression warranting self- defense.

PEOPLE v. BAUTISTA

(424 SCRA 63) February 27, 2004

G.R. No. 139530

There is no self-defense in this case because even if the accused believed that the victim did try to kill him when he saw him raise his bolo, such aggression ceased when accused succeeded in grabbing the bolo and he was not hit by the stone hurled at him by the victim; hence, the accused no longer faced any danger to his life and limb. When an unlawful aggression no longer exists, the one making a defense has no right to kill or even injure the former aggressor.

PEOPLE v. ESCARLOS (410

SCRA 463) September 10, 2003

G.R. No. 148912

Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment the accused disarmed the victim by seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the victim. Hence, the accused became the unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.

PEOPLE v. APOLINAR C.A., 38 O.G. 2870

The accused, while looking over his land and believing that the victim had stolen his palay, shouted for the latter to stop, fired his gun in the air and then at the victim, causing the latter’s death. Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life and it can be invoked only as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled with an attack on the person of the one entrusted with the said property.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION, EDWIN RAMIREZ, and

RICKY LITADA April 21, 2014

G.R. No. 196753

To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it must be proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also doubtful. Thus, the claim of an accused that he stabbed the victim at the back portion of the latter’s body (Lumbar area) while the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is improbable and contrary to the physical evidence

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITYJUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

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especially when the vicitm was lying on the ground while the accused was on top and at the same time choking him, making the plea of self-defense dubious

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, et al. November 19, 2014

G.R. No. 189405 The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Other than Dela Cruz’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to Dela Cruz’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused Dela Cruz to fear for his life. Even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed .A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNALDO BOSITO

Y CHAVENIA January 12, 2015 G.R. No. 209346

Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. Bosito failed to present adequate evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot stand. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN CASAS

Y VINTULAN February 25, 2015 G.R. No. 212565

The accused failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case. However, the Court disagrees that the accused should

be convicted of the crime of Murder with respect to the death of Joel, considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the existence of treachery. In order to appreciate treachery, the victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated. In this case, Joel knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the assailant’s careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel’s obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

PEOPLE v. GENOSA September 8, 2010

G.R. No. 135981

Marivic Genosa, charged with parricide for the killing of her husband, anchored her defense on the theory of battered woman syndrome (BWS), which constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. The Court convicted Genosa as the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from BWS: (1) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; (3) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v. DOMINGO (580 SCRA 436)

The accused asserted that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the crimes and presented the results of a medical examination showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. The medical examination was taken four years after the crimes were committed. The alleged insanity of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed, not at any time thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder referring to a period after

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the time the crime was committed will not exempt him from criminal liability.

LLAVE v.

PEOPLE (488 SCRA 376)

April 26, 2006 G.R. No. 166040

The accused (a minor), with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind a pile of hollow blocks to ensure that passersby would not discover his acts. When he was discovered, he hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. The Court ruled that he acted with discernment when he had carnal knowledge with the victim. Based on the circumstances, the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstances

included the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

U.S. v. TANEDO

(15 PHIL 196)

The accused, while hunting fired a shot at wild chickens; however, the slug recoiled and fatally hit another man. A person who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it, is not criminally liable.

PEOPLE v. FALLORINA (428

SCRA _) May 4, 2004

G.R. No. 137347

The accused claims that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off. The Court convicted him for the victim's death due to his failure to prove with clear and convincing evidence his defense of accident. The following proved otherwise that the accused accidentally shot the victim: (1) his refusal to answer clarificatory questions of the prosecutor, which casted doubt on his defense; (2) his refusal to surrender himself and his firearm after the shooting; and (3) other pieces of evidence which belie his claim that the death of the victim was accidental and that he was not negligent.

PEOPLE v. AYAYA (52 PHIL

354)

The accused, in order to prevent the door from crushing

her son's head, jabbed her husband with her umbrella

which later led to her husband's death. The Court concluded that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, the accused did so to free her son

from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled and if she consequently caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any

fault or intention to cause it.

PEOPLE v. GENITA

(425 SCRA 343) March 11, 2004

G.R. No. 126171

The appellant's claim that he "accidentally shot" the two victims is incredible. In this case, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance were not proven: (1) appellant's manner of carrying his rifle negates his claim of due care in the performance of an act since he should have seen to it that its safety lock was intact; (2) the fact that both victims sustained more than one wound shows that the shooting was not merely accidental; (3) appellant manifested an unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them.

PEOPLE v. CASTILLO

(526 SCRA 215) June 29, 2007

G.R. No. 172695

Appellant contends that assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. However, the Court does not agree. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident.

PEOPLE v.

BANDIAN (63 PHL 530)

September 30, 1936 G.R. No. 45186

The mother who went to the thicket to respond to the call of nature but, instead, gave birth therein is not criminally

liable for infanticide for leaving the child behind. She

should not be blamed for the act of abandonment because it all happened by mere accident, she was

overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility (also

considered as an insuperable cause). Any person who

acts and behaves under such circumstances is exempted

from liability.

PEOPLE v. MORENO (77 PHIL

548)

The accused admitted to having killed the victim but claimed that he should be exempted from liability

because he did so in obedience to an order given him by

Japanese officers of the navy. The latter informed him

that the victim was one of those who were encountered

by the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanese

soldier. The accused was held guilty because the law

provides that to be exempted from criminal liability, it is

not enough to prove that the act was committed in

obedience to an order, it must also be established that the order being followed is lawful.

VALCESAR ESTIOCA v.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006(R.A. NO. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH

WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED)

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PEOPLE (556 SCRA 300) June 27, 2008

G.R. No. 173876

The accused was 14 years old at the time he committed

the robbery which occurred in 2001. Although R.A. 9344

or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took

effect only on May 20, 2006, the said law should be given

retroactive effect in favor of the accused who was not shown to be a habitual criminal (penal laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal).Hence, the

accused was exempt from criminal liability.

JOEMAR ORTEGA v. PEOPLE (562 SCRA 450)

August 20, 2008 G.R. No. 151085

The accused was only 13 years old at the time of the

commission of the rape and under R.A. No. 9344 (which

was applied retroactively), he is exempted from criminal liability. Section 64 of the law further provides that cases

of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the

commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed

and the child shall be referred to the appropriate Local Social Welfare and Development Officer (LSWDO).

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE E

PEOPLE v. JAURIGUE (C.A.

NO. 384)

The deceased placed his hand on the upper portion of the woman's thigh without her consent, which led to the woman stabbing the neck of the deceased to defend her honor. The means employed in the defense of her honor was excessive and she cannot be declared completely exempt from criminal liability. However, the fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be

considered as mitigating circumstance in her favor.

U.S. v. AMPAR (37 Phil 201)

The accused, a 70-year old man, killed the deceased for telling him, "Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The offense which the defendant was trying to vindicate would be considered a mere trifle to the average person but it was evidently a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke for the old man. Hence, he was given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE v. IGNAS (412 SCRA 311)

September 30, 2003

G.R. No. 140514

The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after he

discovered his wife's extramarital dalliance, but the court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation because for the same to

be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. The period of two weeks between the discovery of his wife’s extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.

PEOPLE v. BENITO (74 SCRA 271)

December 17, 1976 G.R. No. L-38091

The accused (who had a pending case with the Civil Service) contended that the victim insulted him when he (the victim) remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service Commission and further argued that that remark "was tantamount to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his

officemates. Assuming that the remark was directed at the accused, the Court did not apply the mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense for the killing of the victim because the accused had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it.

U.S. v. HICKS (14 PHIL 217)

The accused and the victim illicitly lived together for 5

years. After they separated, the accused killed the victim

for living with another man. No mitigating circumstance

was considered in his favor, not even the loss of reason

and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the

defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the

criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are those

which originate from legitimate feelings and not those

which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

U.S. v. DELA CRUZ March 29, 1912

G.R. No. L-7094

The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his former lover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accused

was entitled to the mitigating circumstance because in

this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and

which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was

not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with

him but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.

PEOPLE v. RABAO

(67 PHIL 255) April 10, 1939

G.R. No. L-46530

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The accused and his wife had a heated argument because the wife wanted to give their sick child a bath

which was against the wishes of the accused. The Court considered mitigating circumstance in his favor since, although he transgressed the law by an unjust attack on

his wife, the accused did not really have the intention of committing so grave a crime as parricide, and the quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the accused, as a father, to

prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a

bath.

PEOPLE v. DAWATON

(389 SCRA 277) September 17, 2002

G.R. No. 146247

In trying to avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the accused argues that he was not arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the

policemen when they came for him. That he did not try to

escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by

the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender and

it is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be

appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the accused.

PEOPLE v. VIERNES

(372 SCRA 231) December 13, 2001

G.R. No. 136733

Going to the police station “to clear his name” does not show any intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an

acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the

authorities the trouble and the expense that search and

capture would require.

PEOPLE v. ABOLIDOR (423 SCRA 260) February 18,2004

G.R . No. 147231

The accused surrendered to the authorities more than one year after the incident in order to disclaim

responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because: (1) the facts of the case do not show repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture; and (2) at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him.

PEOPLE v. CALISO (58 PHIL

283) July 1, 1933

G.R. No. L-37271

In the commission of the crime, the aggravating

circumstance of grave abuse of confidence was present since the appellant was the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's "amah". The circumstance that the crime had been

committed in the dwelling of the offended party which was considered by the lower court as another aggravating circumstance should be disregarded as both the victim and the appellant were living in the same house.

PEOPLE v. LORA

(113 SCRA 366) March 30, 1982 G.R. No. L-49430

The accused was charged for the crime of serious illegal detention with murder for illegally detaining a 3-year old child, and attacking the same, which resulted to the child's death. There are three aggravating circumstances in this case, namely: (1) lack of respect due to the tender age of the victim; (2) cruelty, for gagging the victim's mouth with stockings thereby causing slow suffocation; and (3) abuse of confidence since the main duty of the accused in the household was to take care of the minor child.

PEOPLE v.

LAGUARDIA (148 SCRA 133)

February 27, 1987 G.R. No. L-63243

The following aggravating circumstances were present in this case of robbery with homicide: (1) despoblado or uninhabited place since evidence shows that the accused lay in wait for the truck being driven by the victim at an isolated portion of the highway, choosing that particular spot where they could commit the crime without disturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity for escape; and (2) use of motor vehicles because the conspirators took the vehicle of the victim to facilitate their escape and to prevent the other passengers from reporting the offense to the authorities. The following aggravating circumstances were rejected: (1) nighttime because it was not especially sought, as the victim's trip schedule and not the discretion of the culprits determined the time of its commission; (2) evident premeditation because it is inherent in the crime of robbery and was not proved in the commission of the killing; and (3) treachery, as there is no evidence of its employment since none of the witnesses actually saw the shooting.

PEOPLE v. ZETA

(549 SCRA 541) March 27, 2008 G.R. No. 178541

The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from the time

the accused showed their determination to kill the victim

(2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time

the accused shot to death the victim (2:15-2:30 in the

morning of 28 October 1995) could not have afforded

them full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the

consequences of the crime they committed. The Court held that the lapse of thirty minutes between the

determination to commit a crime and the execution

thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the

consequences of the act. Hence, the aggravating

circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be

appreciated in this case.

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PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES v. FLORO BUBAN BARCELA

April 23, 2014 G.R. No. 208760

The special qualifying circumstance such as the minority of the victim and relationship with the offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common law spouse or live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege such relationship as aqualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. The relationship alleged in the information is different from that actually proven.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MATIMANAY WATAMAMA a.k.a. AKMAD SALIPADA, TENG

MIDTIMBANG

June 2, 2014 G.R. No. 188710

Without any evidence to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing of Calim, respondent can only be held liable as principal for the crime of homicide. For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be presumed. Furthermore, Watamama’s theory of mistaken identity is not persuasive; witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latter’s faces.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNY LIKIRAN alias “Loloy”

June 4, 2014 G.R. No. 201858

Jenny stabbed the victim out of the blue during town festivities. A sudden attack which is not preconceived by the accused belies the holding of treachery. When the victim is merely a bystander in an altercation, when suddenly the accused stabs him, absent any other qualifying circumstance, the accused is only liable for homicide.

MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

July 14, 2014 G.R. No. 181843

Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental. A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. In this case, no

evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VIRGILIO AMORA y

VISCARRA

November 26, 2014 G.R. No. 190322

The accused who was charged and convicted with the crime of murder contends that the trial court and the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The SC ruled that the appellant’s sudden attack on the victim amply demonstrates that treachery was employed in the commission of the crime. It further held that It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of the victim when he thrust the knife to his torso for even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.

GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA v.

ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. AND PEOPLE OF THE

January 12, 2015 G.R. No. 190912

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANIEL VILLA

MATIBAG y DE @ "DANI" "DANILO," March 25, 2015 G.R. No. 206381

In convicted the accused of the crime of murder, the RTC appreciated the use of firearm as an special aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court affirmed such ruling by citing Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, which treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE v. ORTIZ AND ZAUSA

(55 PHIL 993) August 27, 1986 G.R. No. L-3507

Ortiz and Zausa were charged with conspiracy to kill the

victim but Ortiz contends that he should be acquitted

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ACCESSORIES

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because he did not take part in the attack. The Court ruled that Ortiz cannot be convicted either as principal or as accessory, for it has been shown that there was

neither plan nor agreement between him and Zausa to

commit the crime, and that he took no part in the latter's

attack with the spear.

VINO v. PEOPLE (178

SCRA 626) October 19, 1989 G.R. No. 84163

The information was correct. An accused can be validly

convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an

information charging him as a principal. Also, the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal for the

corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice

and accessory are distinct from each other.

PEOPLE v. FERNANDEZ (183

SCRA 511) March 22, 1990

G.R. No. L-62116

The accused entered the bathroom together with

accused Fernandez. In the bathroom, the latter tied a

piece of cloth around the victim’s neck while accused Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body. Thereafter, they raped the victim one after the other. Hence ,the Court was correct in imposing on each of the

accused of the penalty corresponding to two crimes of rape because each of them (accused) cooperated in the

commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts

without which it would not have been accomplished.

PEOPLE v. CASTILLO (17

SCRA 721) July 26, 1966

G.R. No. L-19238

After his son had fatally hacked the victim with a bolo and was about to strike the victim a second time, the accused shouted: "You kill him." The accused is not guilty as principal by inducement because in determining whether the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result.

PEOPLE v. DUMANCAS (320

SCRA 584) December 13,

1999 G.R. No. 133527–

28

The accused cannot be held guilty as principal by

inducement when she told the policemen to "take care of the two" victims, who were later killed by the said

policemen. There are 2 ways of directly inducing

another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command and in this case, there is no evidence that the accused offered any price or reward should they kill the victims, nor can the remark of the accused be deemed as a command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement.

CARINO v. PEOPLE (7 SCRA 900) April 30, 1963

G.R. No. L-14752

The accused cannot be held guilty as an accomplice in the crime of rebellion through his acts of sending or furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk, as well as changing $6,000 to Philippine money or in helping Huks to open accounts (which were said to be part of his functions as an employee of a bank). These acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove any criminal intent of helping the Huks in committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion and they cannot be said to constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the act of overthrowing the government.

PEOPLE v. DELA CERNA (21 SCRA 569)

October 30, 1967 G.R. No. L-20911

The accused furnished the gun that was used to kill the victim Casiano, however, he cannot be held liable as an accomplice because he merely conspired with the principal to kill another victim, Rafael. The accused here was not aware that the principal would use the gun to kill Casiano. Hence, for other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequences of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable.

REYNALDO S. MARIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

July 7, 2014

G.R. No. 178145

The CA modified the felony committed by Mariano from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The court ruled that CA incorrectly considered the Mariano's act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the accused's act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.

MANOLITO GIL ZAFRA v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES July 23, 2014

G.R. No. 176317

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At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO BARAGA y ARCILLA

G.R. No. 208781

June 4, 2014

Baraga allegedly raped his own daughter 2 times and committed acts of lasciviousness twice. He was convicted by both the RTC and the CA. The decisions differ as to the penalty imposable. The Court reconciled the different impositions by stating that in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the crime as alleged in the criminal complaint must be followed. The Court cannot interchange the law applicable just on the basis of the victim’s age. The fact that the victim is beyond 12 years old when the act of lasciviousness occurred, such fact does not exclude it from the application of the Anti-Child Abuse Law.

ROSAL HUBILLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

November 26, 2014 G.R. No. 176102

Hubilla insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under P.D. No. 968. This argument is bereft of legal basis. Neither the RPC, nor R.A. No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law. Thus, when he was convicted at age 23, the suspension of his sentence is not available.

DURATION OF PENALTIES

PEOPLE v. ALVARADO (275 SCRA 727)

July 21, 1997 G.R. No. 117402

The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Lucas, January 9, 1995, where it was clarified that “Although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as

an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua, therefore, retains its nature as having no minimum, medium and maximum periods and is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE v. MANTALABA

(654 SCRA 188) July 20, 2011

G.R. No. 186227

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority was

appreciated in fixing the penalty necessarily reducing the penalty from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal, which is one degree lower. The ISLAW is also applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Hence, the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty

next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the

maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal.

PEOPLE v. ESCARES (102 PHIL

677) December 23, 1957

G.R. Nos. L-11128-33

It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of the six cases where appellant pleaded guilty in

accordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which should be applied in its minimum period in view of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, or from 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. In applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and the maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of prision mayor. The trial court; however, committed an error in applying the proper penalty by using the three- fold rule. Hence, the penalty imposed upon appellant by

the trial court should be modified in the sense that he should suffer in each of the six cases an indeterminate penalty of not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto

mayor and not more than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, plus the corresponding accessory penalties provided for by law.

MEJORADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (151 SCRA

399) June 30, 1987

G.R. Nos. L-51065-72

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The Sandiganbayan imposed eight penalties for the eight informations (for violating Section 3E of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) filed against the accused. The penalties totaled to fifty-six years and eight days of imprisonment which the accused impugns as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years. The accused is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code since this article is to be taken into account not in the

imposition of the penalty but in connection with the

service of the sentence imposed. It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.

PEOPLE v. ALFREDO BON (506 SCRA 168)

October 30, 2006 G.R. No. 166401

In view of the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346, "death," as provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. In the case of the accused, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Therefore, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal but prision mayor.

PROBATION LAW

FRANCISCO v. CA (243 SCRA 384)

April 6, 1995 G.R. No. 108747

The accused who was found guilty by the MeTC of grave oral defamation in 4 of the 5 cases filed against him and sentenced to a prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional in each crime committed appealed his case before the RTC but eventually applied for probation. The Court, in ruling that the accused is no longer eligible for probation, listed the following reasons: (1) Sec. 4 of the Probation Law clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction;" (2) the penalties

imposed by the MeTC were already probationable, hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period (multiple prison terms should not be added up); (3) the accused appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence; (4) the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law, in this case was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" of the RTC.

SORIANO v. CA

(304 SCRA 231) March 4, 1999

G.R. No. 123936

Petitioner, whose probation was revoked since he was

not able to comply with one of the conditions of probation

which is to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P98,560.00, asserts that his non-compliance was due

to his poor financial condition and that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on the

satisfaction of his civil liability. The Supreme Court, in

ruling that the revocation of probation was lawful and

proper, held that his continued refusal to submit a

program of payment creates the impression that he wants

to completely avoid paying his civil liability and that the

conditions of probation must be satisfied in order that the

purposes of probation be fulfilled, which include

promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and

providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve

a prison sentence.

TOLENTINO v. JUDGE ALCONCEL

(121 SCRA 92)

Petitioner Tolentino, who pleaded not guilty to the charge

of violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, changed his plea of not guilty to the lesser offense of illegal possession of marijuana, which Judge Alconcel allowed, sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of 6

months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months plus fines. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of Judge

Alconcel to deny Tolentino's subsequent application for probation on the ground that "probation will depreciate

the seriousness of the offense committed", held that the

potentiality of the offender to reform is not the sole or primordial factor that should be considered and that the

demands of justice and public interest must be observed

in the grant or denial of an application for probation.

CABATINGAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN

(102 SCRA 187) January 22, 1981 G.R. No. L-55333

Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for probation

by the petitioner, merely relied on a report of the

probation officer which in itself, was mostly hearsay, and

did not give the petitioner a chance to be heard before it issued its resolution denying the application for probation. The Supreme Court held that respondent court appears

to have wholly relied on the probation report and did not make its own determination as to whether or not probation would serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the applicant. It was not enough

for the respondent court to deny petitioner's application

solely on the report that she was involved in "maisiao" and that she was facing another preliminary investigation

for the "additional shortage" of the funds of which she

had already pleaded guilty.

BALA v. JUDGE MARTINEZ (181 SCRA 459) January 29, 1990 G.R. No. L-67301

Petitioner violated the terms and conditions of his

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probation but contends that there was no valid reason for its revocation since his probation period had already

terminated on August 10, 1983 (although no order of final discharge was issued as the probation officer had not yet submitted his final report). The Supreme Court, in holding that the probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court, held that: (1) the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation; (2) nowhere in the provisions of the probation law can be found the ipso facto termination of probation; (3) probation is not coterminous with its period; (4) there must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer and only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

NEIL E. SUYAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND THE CHIEF PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER, DAGUPAN CITY

July 02, 2014 G.R. No. 189644

Suyan has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The court held that as probation is a mere discretionary grant, Suyan was bound to observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.

PEOPLE v. SARCIA (599

SCRA 20) September 10, 2009

G.R. No. 169641

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and

restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. In this case, since the accused- appellant is about 31 years of age, the suspension of sentence has become moot and academic but he is still entitled to confinement in agricultural camps and other training facilities under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.

PEOPLE v. HERMIE

JACINTO (645 SCRA 590) March 16, 2011 G.R. No. 182239

The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant who is now 25 years old since the suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. However, the offender shall be entitled to the right of restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she will have the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

ADUA v. PEOPLE (559 SCRA 519) July 23, 2008

G.R. No. 168546

The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit as Section 38 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense

charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with

the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once the child reaches 18

years of age, the court shall determine whether to

discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified

period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21

years. However, since petitioner has already reached 21

years of age or over, he could no longer be considered a

child for purposes of applying Rep. Act No. 9344.

REMIENDO v. PEOPLE

(603 SCRA 274) October 9, 2009 G.R. No. 184874

The accused, being above 15 and under 18 years of age

at the time of the rape, and having acted with

discernment, claimed for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 in

view of Section 40, which provides that "if the child in

conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance

with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend

the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the

child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years." However, the application of Section 40 is

rendered moot and academic since the accused was

already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a

child for the purposes of applying R.A. No. 9344.

DAMASCO v. LAQUI (166 SCRA 214)

September 30, 1988 G.R. No. 81381

The petitioner was charged with the crime of grave

threats (the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the

information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days), but was only found guilty by the

court of light threats (with a prescriptive period of 2

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months or 60 days). The Supreme Court, in agreeing with

petitioner's contention that he cannot be convicted of light threats since it had already prescribed, held that where

an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible with the graver offense charged, he

cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already

prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction a

circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple

expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

YAPDIANGCO v. BUENCAMINO (122 SCRA 713) June 24, 1983

G.R. No. L-28841

On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed an information for slight physical injuries (with a prescriptive period of 60 days) allegedly committed by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information having been filed on the sixty first day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed. The Supreme Court (in disagreeing with the lower court's denial of the motion to quash due to the fact that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding business day) held that "where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day for prescription has

automatically set in”.

PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS (236

SCRA 239) September 2,

1994 G.R. No. 102007

The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. The Court ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; and (4) the

private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action for in such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case.

SERMONIA v. CA (233 SCRA

155) June 14, 1994 G.R. NO. 109454

Petitioner, in contending that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription, insists that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and constitutes notice to the whole world. Hence, the offended party is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975 and that prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. The Supreme Court held that unlike in the case of real property, the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage and that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.

CABRAL v. PUNO (70 SCRA

606) April 30, 1976

G.R. No. L-41692

Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification (with a prescriptive period of 10 years) for allegedly forging a document that was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. The complaint of respondent, filed on September 24, 1974, was dismissed on the ground of prescription since the respondent had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery upon its registration in the Register of Deeds.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO

November 26, 2014 G.R. No. 194068

The criminal and civil liability ex delicto of a person convicted for murder who moved for reconsideration of his conviction and died pending resolution, will be extinguished.

Act No. 3326, As Amended

ZALDIVIA v. REYES (211 SCRA 277)

July 3, 1992 G.R. No. 102342

The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the

petitioner (quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal) commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326 and it was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial

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proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

PCGG v. DESIERTO

(527 SCRA 61) July 9, 2007

G.R. No. 140231

The respondents were charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019 (amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 increased the prescriptive period from 10 to 15 years), and the applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which provides that "prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment". Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992 and the complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995, or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the

prescriptive period of 15 years.

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG v. TERESITA D. RIVERA

June 4, 2014 G.R. No. 200148

Rivera was resigned from work. However, her separation pay and other benefits were withheld. She sent several text messages to the account manager of her former company. The President of the said company instituted a criminal action for libel due to the contents of the text messages. Rivera alleged that libel can no longer prosper due to prescription. "Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare.

PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES

DEL CASTILLO v. TORRECAMPO (394 SCRA

221) December 18, 2002

G.R. No. 139033

10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating the Election Code (whereby he was never apprehended and remained at large), he filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He based his claims on

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The petition must be denied since under Article 93, prescription shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the case at bar since the petitioner was never brought to prison

and cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

PANGAN v. GATBALITE (449

SCRA 144) January 21, 2005

G.R. No. 141718

Petitioner, who failed to appear during the promulgation of the decision in the MTC on August 9, 1991, questioned his arrest on January 24, 2000 on the ground that the same was illegal since the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code. In ruling against the petitioner, the Court held that the

prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty. Hence, the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

PEOPLE v. TADULAN (271

SCRA 233) April 15, 1997 G.R. No. 117407

The supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly

granted only by the mother (BBB) without the

concurrence of the offended minor, AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself.

PEOPLE v. LIM (206

SCRA 176) February 13, 1992

G.R. No. 95753

The accused, who was charged with the crime of rape, insists that he was pardoned by the offended party when she executed an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that the rape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding. The Supreme Court did not agree and held that to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or pardon should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action. Hence, the alleged pardon could not be considered in his favor since the Affidavit was executed after the present case was filed.

PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES

PARDON BY OFFENDED PARTY

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PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

PEOPLE v. SALLE (250 SCRA 581)

December 4, 1995 G.R. No. 103567

The accused was granted conditional pardon, but for the said pardon to take effect, he must first withdraw his appeal. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal and in case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said accused, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.

PEOPLE v. BACANG

(260 SCRA 44) July 30, 1996

G.R. NO. 116512

The conditional pardons were granted to accused- appellants during the pendency of their appeal. The Court held that such conditional pardons are void since the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court and any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO,

MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO June 25, 2014

G.R. No. 195668

Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid. The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. As a co-conspirator, then, Inovero’s civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law

CIVIL LIABILITY