METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 6, Nos. 3 4 , July-October 1975

SYMPOSIUM : METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION

METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION : AN INTRODUCTION

KENNETH BARBER

The following papers, presented at a conference on Meta- physical Explanation held a t SUNY Buffalo in February, 1974, address the general question: How is metaphysics possible? As might be expected the answers differ, ranging from a positive and fairly traditional account of the metaphysical enterprise to a rejection of that tradition as resting on a mistaken assumption. Perhaps less expectedly, however, the respondents do find an area of agreement, viz., that whether traditional metaphysics is possible depends on the analysis of the connection between thought (or language) and the world. As the papers demonstrate, the various analyses of this connection (or lack thereof) are basic enough to infect all further metaphysical discourse, either by way of providing support for metaphysical claims or, more radically, by preventing certain metaphysical questions from being raised.

The issue is most narrowly joined in the exchange between Allaire and Hochberg concerning the analysis of truth. At stake in the dispute is the claim that “true” designates a relation between a thought (or sentence) and some fact in the world. While the alleged truth relation may itself be partially analyzed in terms of a primitive, intentional connection between a thought and a fact, the crucial point is that the belief in such a relation allows the philosopher to begin his metaphysical quest. If there are facts which make sentences true, then one can legitimately ask for the constituents of those facts, for the categories of those constituents, for the constituents and categories of possible facts correlated with false sentences, etc. To deny, as Allaire does, that there is a primitive connection between thought (or language) and the world is to deny that the metaphysician’s quest is legitimate. If so, most if not all of traditional ontology is not only mistaken but radically mistaken, resting as it does on the belief that one can talk in this way about facts and their constituents. Against this dismal assessment of our philosophical

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heritage Hochberg defends the plausibility of talk about facts, both actual and possible, hence arguing for the very sort of connection between thought and the world which Allaire denies. The possibility of metaphysics is here defended by producing a viable piece of metaphysical analysis and then defending such analysis against all attack.

Rosenberg, like Allaire, argues against there being a primitive connection between thought (or language) and the world. Rather, items in the world causally inform linguistic representers who devise (and revise) theories which are used to explain (or redescribe) the world. If the connection is simply causal, then traditional (positive, in his terms) ontology is mistaken and one is left with negative ontology, which is an attempt to elucidate our categorial vocabulary. The latter, on this view, is not de- scriptive of facts in the non-linguistic world, but instead is to be understood as describing our conceptual framework, i.e., it is to be understood as articulating the general system of descrip- tive concepts in which the various particular scientific theories are embedded. Thus the traditional metaphysician was in error concerning the intended object of his explanation and one is left with the more modest task of explaining not the world but our thought about it.

I shall not venture to assess the merits of the positions here argued. Whatever one’s views on intentionality and the status of metaphysics are, however, the following papers are recom- mended as incisive contributions to current discussion of these issues.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO