syria 2011 public opinion survey

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S u r v e y F i n d i n g S :

Syria 2011 Public Opinion Survey

Angela Hawken, PhD

Jonathan Kulick, PhD

Matthew Leighty, MPP

Jillian Kissee, MPP

Sptmb 20, 2011

Report Prepared for The Democracy Council of California


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Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 2

2. Introduction...........................................................................................................................................3

3. Background...........................................................................................................................................3

3.1. Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 3

3.2. Recent History .............................................................................................................................. 4

3.3. 2011 Unrest................................................................................................................................... 4

3.4. Assessment....................................................................................................................................6

4. Methodology......................................................................................................................................... 6

4.1. Survey Methods ............................................................................................................................ 6

4.2. Analytic Methods.......................................................................................................................... 7

5. Survey Results ...................................................................................................................................... 8

5.1. Personal Situation ......................................................................................................................... 8

5.2. Political and Economic Situation................................................................................................ 11

5.2.1. Background......................................................................................................................... 11

5.2.2. Key Findings from 2011 Survey......................................................................................... 13

5.2.3. Political Situation................................................................................................................ 13

5.2.4. Economic Situation............................................................................................................. 19

5.3. Capability of Government........................................................................................................... 21

5.4. Bashar al-Assad and Anti-Government Protests......................................................................... 255.4.1. President Assad and Protestors ........................................................................................... 25

5.4.2. Reforms...............................................................................................................................29

5.4.3. Foreign Relations ................................................................................................................ 32

5.5. Access to Communications and Media....................................................................................... 34

5.5.1. Background......................................................................................................................... 34

5.5.2. Key Findings from 2011 Survey......................................................................................... 37

6. Conclusions.........................................................................................................................................40

7. Appendix.............................................................................................................................................42

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1. Executive Summary

In 2011 the Democracy Council conducted a second wave of in- person surveys to determine Syrians

views on governance, the economy, politics, and their personal situations, and to assess their use of

media. The first wave was collected from January 16 to February 6, 2010 and provides data from 1,046

adults. The second wave was collected from August 24 to September 2, 2011 from 551 respondents, and

includes perceptions of the Syrian protestors and preferences for alternative governance. (Women were

underrepresented in the survey sample due to their greater reluctance to participate, from several possible

concerns; the data analysis compensates for the imbalance in survey respondents.)

2011 has seen unprecedented unrest and social ferment in Syria. Influenced by ongoing protests and

changes of government elsewhere in the Arab world, and reflecting decades of disaffection with the ruling

regime and a stagnant economy, thousands of Syrians have engaged in demonstrations against the Assad

government. Participation continues to grow and the governments response, from the military, police,

and allied paramilitary groups, has become increasingly violent, with at least 2,000 civilians and a smaller

number of security forces killed; tens of thousands more have been beaten or imprisoned.

Anti-government protestors appear to have a variety of motivations and demands, including greater

political freedoms and an end to the security state. They do not appear to be centrally organized, and

social media play a critical day-to-day role in organizing the protests and in networking communities. The

self-defined leadership of the opposition is disparate, comprising mostly exiled human-rights activists,

youth-led coordinating committees, traditional opposition parties, and sectarian or religious groups. The

results of a renewed effort to unite the opposition under a single national council in September 2011 have

yet to be seen.

Comparatively, little is known about how ordinary Syrians understand the protest movement and how or

why they decide whether to participate in anti-government activity. The government contends that the

protests are being driven by religious radicals and foreign agitators. Less frequent pro-government

demonstrations appear to be organized by the government, but many participants join voluntarily. As

world opinion, including in Syrias neighboring states, hardens against the Assad regime, the regime has

stiffened its resolve to put down the demonstrations. It has announced and implemented some substantial

changes, but not enough to satisfy its opponents or critics inside or outside the country.

This report presents an analysis of the Democracy Councils 2011 survey results, with five key findings

on popular sentiments and perceptions of current events.

The public has very little confidence in the Assad regime and the government in general. 86.1% of

respondents judge President Assads performance negatively, and 88.2% do not think the current

government is capable of solving the countrys problems (up from 62.5% in early 2010).

The anti-government protestors are popular, and most people perceive them as popular. 71.1% have

positive views of the protestors and 5.5% have negative views, while 88.0% think that the majority of

the population shares the protestors concerns.

Reforms will not placate. 11.5% prefer the regime to remain power and make reforms, while 81.7%

want regime change; and 87.9% think that reforms will not satisfy the protestors.

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Despite thoroughly negative views of the current circumstances (or perhaps reflecting a sense that

things could not get any worse), optimism prevails. 92% expect that the political situation will

improve, 91.0% expect the economy to improve, and 78.3% feel more hopeful about the prospect for

reforms in Syria in light of popular movements elsewhere in the Arab world.

Men and women had substantially different views on many issues, with women generally more

optimistic and less critical of the government, and women are less well-informed.

2. Introduction

Very little is known about how Syrians perceive their government institutions and their political and

economic situations. In 2010, the Democracy Council set out to capture Syrians views by conducting a

first-of-its-kind survey, since only government-approved surveys are allowed under Syrian law. A cadre

of specifically trained field staff was able to collect in-person surveys from 1,046 Syrian adults over a

three-week period (January 16 to February 6, 2010). Attempts were made to ensure proportional

representation by province, age group, sex, education level, and religion. Pepperdine University

conducted an independent analysis of the survey responses and prepared a report on the results.

The final report, published in August 2010, had four major findings. First, a majority of Syrians believed

that the political and economic condition of Syria is poor, and worse than it was five years prior. Second,

a majority had little faith in the governments ability to confront the countrys problems. Third, a

substantial majority believed that corruption is widespread. And fourth, a substantial majority believed

that the State of Emergency should be lifted.

A subgroup analysis of survey results found differences by age and sex. Women were significantly more

optimistic about their personal circumstances and less critical of the performance of the government.

Those over 40 were significantly more pessimistic about their personal circumstances and more critical of

the performance of the government.

Given the initial success at performing a survey of this nature and the ongoing unrest, the Democracy

Council set out to conduct a second-round of in-person interviews. As before, attempts were made to

ensure proportional representation by province, age group, sex, education level, and religion. In-person

surveys were collected from 551 Syrian adults over a 10-day period (August 24 to September 2, 2011).

Pepperdine University was asked to conduct an independent analysis of the survey responses and prepare

a report on the 2011 results. This report summarizes the methods used for collecting and analyzing the

survey data and presents findings.

3. Background

3.1. Summary

2011 has seen unprecedented unrest and social ferment in Syria. Influenced by ongoing protests and

changes of government elsewhere in the Arab world, and reflecting decades of disaffection with the ruling

regime and a stagnant economy, thousands of Syrians have engaged in demonstrations against the Assad

government. Participation continues to grow and the governments response, from the military, police,

and allied paramilitary groups, has become increasingly violent, with at least 2,000 civilians and a smaller

number of security forces killed; tens of thousands more have been beaten or imprisoned.

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Anti-government protestors appear to have a variety of motivations and demands, including greater

political freedoms and an end to the security state. They do not appear to be centrally organized, and

social media plays a critical day-to-day role in organizing the protests and in networking communities.

The self-defined leadership of the opposition is disparate, comprising mostly exiled human-rights

activists, youth-led coordinating committees, traditional opposition parties, and sectarian or religious

groups.

Comparatively, little is known about how ordinary Syrians understand the protest movement or why they

decide whether to participate in anti-government activity. The government contends that the protests are

being driven by religious radicals and foreign agitators. Less frequent pro-government demonstrations

appear to be organized by the government, but many participants join voluntarily.

As world opinion, including in Syrias neighboring states, hardens against the Assad regime, it has

stiffened its resolve to put down the demonstrations. It has announced and implemented some substantial

changes, but not enough to satisfy its opponents or critics inside or outside the country.

3.2. Recent History

The Baath Party has been the sole locus of power in Syria since 1963. The Party was led by Hafez al-

Assad from 1970 until 2000, when his son, Bashar, assumed power. The Assad family and most senior

members of the government and military are from the Alawite minority; a majority of Syrians are Sunni

Arabs, Christians and other minority groups have historically been seen as favoring the ruling regime.

Syria was under an Emergency Law from 1962 until earlier this year.

Security forces acting under the Emergency Law have maintained calm, for the most part. A low-level

Sunni-led insurgency began in the mid-1970s, and culminated in a Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama

in 1982; the government put down the revolt, killing some tens of thousands of civilians. In 1999, a

dispute over succession between Bashar al-Assad and his brother Rifaat led to clashes between security

forces and Rifaats supporters in Latakia. In 2004, clashes between Kurdish activists and security forcesin al-Qamishli killed dozens of people.

3.3. 2011 Unrest

The protest movement in Syria began quietly in January, with individual actions in solidarity with

activists in Tunisia and Egypt. A campaign for a day of rage on February 5 emerged on social-media

sites, including the Facebook group Syrian Revolution 2011; several hundred people demonstrated in

al-Hasakah, calling for Assads departure, and dozens were arrested. On February 22, several hundred

people demonstrated outside the Libyan Embassy in Damascus, in solidarity with rebels in Libya.

On March 12, thousands of Kurds demonstrated on the anniversary of the al-Qamishli uprising. March 15

saw larger crowds of demonstrators, in cities across Syria, which grew further on March 18, answering an

online call for a Friday of dignity. The most common protest chant was God, Syria, freedom. Online,

organizers demanded the release of political prisoners, prosecution of security forces who attacked

protestors, lifting of the Emergency Law, and an end to pervasive corruption. The government variously

denied that any demonstrations were taking place and blamed them on outside provocateurs. Daraa saw

the most acute conflict between protestors and security forces, which continued for more than a week,

with dozens of protestors killed.

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The government made some efforts to respond to protestors demands, while continuing to crack down on

the protests. On March 24, the Presidents spokesperson said that the Emergency Law would be lifted (but

did not specify when), and pledged to reduce corruption and limits on press freedom. On March 26,

President Assad ordered the release of more than a hundred political prisoners. On March 29 the first

large-scale pro-regime demonstrations were staged across the country, and the cabinet resigned. The

President gave a televised speech on March 30, blaming the protests on foreign conspirators, includingIsrael and Sunni clerics, and saying only that lifting the Emergency Law would be given further

consideration. On March 31, the government announced a committee to address protestors concerns and

investigate reprisals. On April 6, the government offered concessions to Sunni religious activists, lifting

the ban on schoolteachers wearing the niqab and closing the countrys only casino, and announced that

tens of thousands of Kurds would receive Syrian citizenship.

These actions did little to mollify demonstrators, and protests continued and grew every Friday, with a

mounting death toll among protestors and security forces. Frequent telephone and internet outages were

seen as attempts to frustrate organizers, and foreign reporters were expelled from the country.

On April 16, President Assad gave two speeches, in which he acknowledged that the state had failed tomeet all of the citizens aspirations, called for dialogue and cooperation, and announced some specific

reforms. On April 19, the Emergency Law was lifted, but security forces have only escalated their

crackdown on protestors since.

In May and June, protests spread to other cities and suburbs of Damascus, with some besieged as

protestors established control over districts. On June 20, President Assad delivered another address

promising a national dialogue; he also offered amnesty to protestors who had fled to Turkey, blaming

the uprising on vandals. International pressure on the Syrian government increased in June, as the UK

and France prepared a UN Security Council resolution condemning the crackdown, with similar

expressions from the Prime Minister of Turkey. Several weeks later US Secretary of State Clinton said

that President Assad had lost legitimacy and that the United States had nothing invested in himremaining in power, but did not go so far as calling for his resignation. And on June 19 opposition

activists in Turkey announced the formation of a National Council to coordinate the effort against the

Assad government; after two months of meetings it announced its launching on August 22. A renewed

effort to further unite and legitimize the National Council took place in mid-September, and is ongoing at

the time of this writing.

Demonstrations and violent responses have continued through the summer. The bloodiest episode to date

was in Hama at the end of July and beginning of August, with more than one hundred killed as tanks and

artillery came into use. In mid-August the Syrian Navy bombarded the coastal city of Latakia. These

events have brought broader condemnation of the Syrian government, with several Gulf Cooperation

Council member states withdrawing their ambassadors, and the United States and EU member statescalling on President Assad to step down. On August 21 he gave an interview in which he warned against

foreign military intervention, said that the unrest had become more militant but the government had it

under control, and spoke about political reforms and holding parliamentary elections in February 2012.

President Assads efforts have not appeased his critics. On September 2 the EU adopted a ban on the

importation of Syrian oil. On September 9, as the weekly Friday protests turned towards a call for

international intervention, President Ahmadinejad of Iran, Syrias closest ally, offered to host a summit

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for the government and protestors to talk, and cautioned that a military solution is untenable. And on

September 12, the Secretary General of the Arab League visited Damascus and presented President Assad

with a plan to implement reforms and end the civil unrest, while President Medvedev of Russia pledged

to block any further UN Security Council sanctions.

3.4. AssessmentAt the time of this writing the eventual outcome of the unrest in Syria is unclear, as indeed are many of

the particulars of current events. The country is locked in a weekly spiral of demonstrations and reprisals,

followed by demonstrations elsewhere in solidarity with the victims, and so another round of reprisals

(two dozen protestors were killed on September 11, mostly in Homs). The international response seems to

reinforce President Assads determination not to face the same fate as President Mubarak of Egypt, who

gave in to popular pressures, and to embolden Syrian activists who expect that the perception that the

Assad regime is doomed will sway more Syrians to actively oppose it. And after the collapse of the

Qaddafi regime in Libya in late August, Syrian opposition activists are hotly debating whether to move to

an armed rebellion and seek foreign intervention.

While the regime is increasingly isolated, there has been only one high-level defection from the

government (the Attorney General of Hama resigned in early September) and none from the military. The

opposition has no clear leaders or succession plan; ad hoc local coordination committees have formed

to document protests and disseminate anti-government messages. The makeup of the protestors remains

uncertain, as is the extent of armed militants among them. As international news media have been banned

from Syria, reporting is largely limited to official sources, opposition media, and to amateur Syrian

journalists using social media. None allows for a systematic assessment of the perceptions and sentiments

of the Syrian public.

4. Methodology

4.1. Survey Methods

All respondents are Syrians over the age of 18. Results described in this report reflect the responses of

551 Syrian nationals who were residing in Syria at the time of data collection.

In-person surveys were conducted in Arabic by trained data collectors. For the 2010 survey, sixty data

collectors were hired, organized by province (governorate) according to population. In 2011,

circumstances complicated training and recruitment and forced the field coordinators to identify, vet, and

train a new group of Syrian data collectors. Two trainers were trained outside the country on the data-

collection manual, developed by the Democracy Council and outside expert pollsters for the 2010 survey.

These trainers then trained eight additional data collectors inside Syria by secure VOIP communications

and in person. Due to sensitivities surrounding data collection in Syria, field staff were required to strictlyadhere to an oral script.

This survey was not approved by the Syrian government. Any data collected outside the auspices of the

Syrian government is prohibited under Syrian law. Concerns for the safety of data collectors and survey

respondents meant that a truly nationally representative sample based on random selection was not

possible. Data collectors were trained in how to select respondents with the aim of collecting data

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representative of the Syrian population (with respect to region, rural/urban, sex, age, religion, and

education).

The deteriorating security situation in Syria created a number of significant logistical problems. The

intermittency of broadband internet in protest areas drastically slowed down the initial set-up process (the

survey was originally planned for June 2011). In some cases, training and follow-on communications

with data collectors in those areas were restricted to in-person conversations only. The sample size (n =

551) was smaller than originally intended (n = 1000). Finally, we recognize that those agreeing to

participate in such an exercise, without host government approval, would be inherently more likely to

express anti-government sentiments.

Women were underrepresented in the survey sample (only 11% of respondents). To address this

imbalance, womens responses were up-weighted (i.e., given greater influence on statistics) to ensure

that they have an equal voice. Women might have been less inclined to participate for several possible

reasons: 1. Our analysis finds that women tended to be less well informed (less likely to consume news

and less likely to be familiar with key political events), and so may be less interested in participating in a

survey focused on political issues. 2. Women may be warier about participating in a secret survey inviolation of Syrian law. 3. There was only one female field worker, and women may be less inclined to

respond to a male survey taker. 4. In the ongoing civil unrest, fewer women might be out and about, and

so they are less accessible to survey takers.

Each survey was completed in-person between August 24 and September 2, 2011. Survey forms were

scanned and delivered to a transfer location in Turkey, from which the data were sent to the Democracy

Council in Los Angeles. The Council inputted the raw data in the Los Angeles office.

4.2. Analytic Methods

Post-fact statistical adjustments to the collected data use a series of constructed survey weights. The

primary purpose of the weights is to improve the generalizability of the survey findings. This entails upweighting cases that, for whatever reason, are underrepresented in the sample, and down-weighting

cases that are overrepresented in the sample. Table 1 describes the survey sample.

Table 1. Characteristics of the Survey Sample (unweighted).

Gender Percent

Male 89Female 11

Age

1824 42

2534 49

35+ 9ReligionMuslim-Sunni 57Muslim-Alawi 6

Muslim-Druze 6Muslim-Other 18

Christian 5

Other 8

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Education

No education 9

First or secondary 8

High school 30Some university 33

Bachelors degree 16

Masters degree 3Doctoral, law, or medical degree 1

Governorate (province) of Birthplace

al-Hasakah 13

Aleppo 2

ar-Raqqah 12

as-Suwayda 2

Damascus 26

Daraa 1

Deir ez Zor 1Hama 7

Homs 9Idlib 11Latakia 2

Quneitra 1Rif Damascus 16

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Figure 1. How do you appraise, in general, your personal and your familys situation today? Is it

good or bad?

1.8%

9.1%

27.5%

43.9%

17.7%

9.4%

29.8%

35.7%

18.6%

6.6%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Very good Good Neither good Bad Very bad

nor bad

2011 2010

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 547. 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question. For the

2010 survey, n = 1036. 99.0% of participants responded to this question.

Figure 2. Do you feel that your personal and familys situation is better or worse than it was five

years ago?

0.0%3.1%

19.0%

58.2%

19.8%

5.5%

27.9%

34.1%

25.8%

6.7%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Much better Better The same/No Worse Much worse

change

2011 2010



While Syrians expressed despondence over their current situation, they were overwhelmingly optimistic

about the prospects for their future (see Figure 3). 92.8% responded that they expected their personal and

family situation to improve in the future (compared with 44.7% in 2010), 6.9% thought it would remain

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the same, and less than 1% thought their personal and family situation was likely to deteriorate in the

future (down from 29.1% in 2010).

Figure 3. What about your future? Would you expect any improvement in your personal and

familys situation, or is it going to deteriorate?

100%92.8%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50% 44.7%

40%29.1%

26.2%30%

20%

6.9%10%

0.3%0%

Will improve Will remain the same Will deteriorate

2011 2010



There are significant differences by sex and age. 1 Men are significantly more pessimistic about their

personal situation than women (p = 0.06). Respondents over 25 are significantly more pessimistic about

their personal situations than those under 25 (p = 0.05). Similar differences by sex and age were found in

2010.

One measure of confidence in personal circumstances is interest in emigration (see Figure 4). 45.8% feel

inclined to leave Syria, down slightly from 51.9% in 2010. This is consistent with the other questions

about personal circumstances: although assessments of the current situation have worsened, expectations

for the future have improved. Women have considerably less interest in emigrating than men do; 25.7%

feel inclined compared with 61.1% for men (p = 0.000).

Among those who feel inclined to emigrate, Europe is the favored destination (see Figure 5); the

preferences for destination country are similar to those from the 2010 survey.

1 Cross-group demographic comparisons use a Pearson (Rao-Scott correction F-statistic) chi-square test.

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Figure 4. Do life, work, or other circumstances encourage you to emigrate?

54.2%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

60%

45.8%

Yes No

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question.

Figure 5. If yes, to which country do you most wish to emigrate?

50%

43.6%45%

19.0%

4.0%

20.5%

4.3%

8.6%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%40%

Saudi Arabia Lebanon USA or A Latin A European An Asian

or another Canada American country countryGulf country country


5.2. Political and Economic Situation

5.2.1. Background

Although Syria is formally a multiparty republic, continuous one-party control of the government has

been justified for nearly half a century by the State of Emergency declared shortly after the Ba athist

seizure of power in 1963. The State of Emergency granted the government extensive powers; it was lifted

in April 2011, although the government continues to exercise similar powers and security forces have

faced few constraints in putting down the uprising.

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An evaluation of political freedom in Syria is provided by the Polity IV Project,2 which classifies

countries governmental characteristics. On a scale of10 to 10, countries that score between10 and6

are classified as autocracies, 5 to 0 as closed anocracies, 1 to 5 as open anocracies, and 6 to 10 as

democracies. 3 The most recent data from the Polity IV Project give a polity score of 7 (highly

authoritarian) for Syria in 2010, which has remained the same since 2001.4

Freedom House, a non-profit organization that advocates for democracy and human rights, publishes the

Freedom in the Worldsurvey, which rates political and civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being

most free and 7 being least. In 2009, Syria was rated 7 for political liberties and 6 for civil liberties; its

status remains not free for 2010.5

The World Bank calculated unemployment at 8.4% in 2007, down from 10.2% in 2003 (20042006 data

were unavailable). However, one in two jobs in the country is of poor quality and youth unemployment

exceeds 30%.6 While GDP per capita has steadily increased since 1994 (see Table 2), these gains accrued

mostly to the top income bracket and wealth inequality has been on the rise.7 Since the uprising began, the

Syrian government has faced economic sanctions from the United Nations, European Union, and the

United States that have likely impacted GDP.

Table 2. GDP Per Capita, 20002010 (2010 USD).

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20101171 1244 1238 1248 1351 1509 1701 2012 2555 2557 2734

Source: World Bank, 2011.

A survey conducted in Damascus and published in 2008 found that 70 percent of respondents believed

that their financial situation had deteriorated seriously in the previous two years.8 Changes in poverty

differ strongly by region,9 but some estimate that one in three Syrians lives below the poverty line.10

In the 2010 survey, respondents were asked about the political and economic situation of the country as

one combined category; the 2011 survey distinguishes between political and economic issues, so it is notpossible to compare the 2011 and 2010 survey responses on these items.

2 Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2009. Authority trends, 1946-2009. Polity IV Project: Political regimecharacteristics and transitions, 18002009. Fairfax, VA: Center for Systemic Peace.systemicpeace.org/polity/syr2.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).3 Marshall, Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. Global Report 2009: Conflict, governance, and state stability.Fairfax, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf (accessed April 20,2010).4

Marshall and Jaggers, op. cit.5Freedom House. 2011. Freedom in the World (2011). Washington: Freedom House.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2011&country=8143 (accessed July 28, 2011).6 Achy, Lachen. 2011. Syria: Economic hardship feeds social unrest. Washington: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace. carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=43355 (accessed March 11, 2011).7 No author. 2008. Syria: Wealth gap widening as inflation hits poor. Teheran: IRIN. February 7.8 No author, op. cit.9 El Laithy, Heba and Khalid Abu-Ismail. 2005. Poverty in Syria: 19962004: Diagnosis and pro-poor policyconsiderations. New York: United Nations Development Programme.10 Achy, op. cit.

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5.2.2. Key Findings from 2011 Survey

A broad range of issues preoccupies Syrians (see Figure 6). 96.3% are concerned or very concerned about

the (general) poor quality of life; of the more specific contributors to quality of life, 88.1% are concerned

or very concerned about the absence of political freedom, 82.4% about the prevalence of corruption, and

71.4% about the cost of living. The only issue about which a majority is relatively unconcerned is Iraqi

refugees (23.9%).

This question was posed differently in 2010, when respondents were asked to identify the one issue of

greatest concern. The top three responses were political freedom (22.9%), corruption (20.3%), and quality

of life (15.7%). While a direct comparison between the two surveys is not possible, the rank ordering in

2010 corresponds fairly closely with the ordering of very concerned responses in 2010, so relative

concerns do not appear to have shifted much in the last year.

Figure 6. How concerned are you about the following issues?

Absence of political freedom

Poor quality of life

Prevalence of corruption

Possibility of war with a neighbor

Rise in cost of living

Lack of employment opportunities

Poor education

Poor health services

Iraqi refugees1.3%

10.0%

10.0%

15.4%

28.0%

46.9%

47.0%

49.2%

58.7%

22.6%

50.5%

49.1%

43.3%

43.4%

22.7%

35.4%

47.3%

29.4%

47.6%

38.3%

39.3%

29.6%

24.5%

27.1%

17.5%

2.2%

9.6%

28.5%

1.3%

1.7%

11.6%

4.2%

3.3%

0.0%

1.3%

2.3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Very concerned Concerned Neither concerned nor unconcerned Unconcerned

Note: Response rates for these items ranged from 93% to 99%.

5.2.3. Political Situation

Respondents hold a dim view of the political situation (see Figure 7). 80.2% regard it as bad or very bad,

and only 2.5% as good (zero respondents regard it as very good). These responses correspond fairlyclosely with those to a question about changes from five years ago (see Figure 8); 87.7% regard it as

worse or much worse, and only 2.8% as better.

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Figure 7. How would you rate the political situation in the country today?

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%0.0%

2.5%

17.3%

61.7%

18.5%


nor bad

Note: n = 547. 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question.

Figure 8. How is the countrys political situation compared to five years ago?

0.0%2.8%

9.6%

72.5%

15.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse


But Syrians remain optimistic (or dont see how things could get any worse) (see Figure 9). Anoverwhelming 92.0% expect the political situation to improve, and none expect it to worsen.

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Figure 9. How do you expect the countrys political situation will be in the future?

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

34.1%

57.9%

7.8%

0.0% 0.0%



Political situation is a deliberately vague formulation, to allow respondents to interpret how they wish.

A key element of the political situation is the state of democracy (which term also allows for various

interpretations, especially in a citizenry with little direct experience of it) (see Figure 10); however

interpreted, respondents hold a dim view, with 81.8% saying that it is bad or very bad, only 3.2% good,

and zero saying very good.

Figure 10. How do you judge democracy in Syria?

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%0.0%

3.2%

15.0%

63.0%

18.8%


nor bad


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To help interpret this judgment, respondents were asked about their views of democracy in principle (see

Figure 11). A majority (67.4%) favor democracy over any other form of government, and a sizeable

minority (22.4%) are unsure or indifferent.

Figure 11. Which of the following best describes your views of democracy?

80%70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Democracy is In some I don't think it I don't knowpreferable to any circumstances a matters what type

other form of non-democratic of government we

government government can be have

preferable

67.4%

10.2%5.7%

16.7%


On a related measure (see Figure 12), 85.3% consider the human-rights situation to be bad or very bad,

and only 2.9% good. The 2010 survey asked one question combining democracy and human rights;

60.5% responded bad or very bad, so it appears that views on both have deteriorated in the last year.

Figure 12. How do you judge human rights in Syria?

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


nor bad

0.0%2.9%

11.9%

59.9%

25.4%


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Awareness of and support for principles of democracy appear to be increasing. The 2005 Damascus

Declaration called for greater freedom of speech and an end to the state of emergency in place since

1962. Under this law, the constitution can be superseded by the President at any time. 274 activists,

intellectuals, and reformers signed the Declaration and soon thereafter created the National Council of the

Damascus Declaration; many of the people involved were arrested between 2006 and 2008. 11 70% of

respondents are familiar with the Declaration (see Figure 13), up slightly from 62.5% in 2010. Of those(see Figure 14), 64.1% view it positively (compared with 54.1% in 2010) and only 3.6% negatively

(10.6% in 2010). Women are less well informed than men; 56.8% are familiar with the Declaration,

compared with 80.2% of men (p = 0.000).

Figure 13. Have you read the Damascus Declaration or heard about it?

80%70.0%

70%62.5%

60%

50%

37.5%40%

30.0%30%

20%

10%

0%

Yes No

2011 2010

Note: For the 2010 survey, n = 1028. 98.3% of survey participants responded to this question. For the2011 survey, n = 543. 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question.

11 Sharp, Jeremy. 2009. Syria: Background and U.S. relations. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

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Figure 14. If yes, what is your opinion concerning the Damascus Declaration?

70% 64.1%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

32.3%

3.6%

54.1%

35.3%

10.6%

Positive Neutral Negative

2011 2010

Note: This calculation was limited to those respondents who reported having knowledge of the Damascus

Declaration.

The decades-long state of hostilities with Israel is a central feature of Syrian politics and public life, and

June 2011 saw the deadliest clashes in years on the Golan Heights border. 12 Respondents were about

evenly split on the prospects for a renewed war with Israel in the near future (see Figure 15), with 52.5%

considering it likely or very likely (this question was not asked in 2010); men (58.7%) are more likely

than women (42.9%) to expect a war (p = 0.07)

12 Rabinovitch, Ari. 2011. Israel sees Syrian hand in Golan clashes, 23 dead . reuters.com/article/2011/06/06/uspalestinians-israel-idUSTRE7541PF20110606 (accessed September 11, 2011).

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Figure 15. How likely is a war with Israel in the near future?

40%

33.5%35%

Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely


5.2.4. Economic Situation

Perceptions of the economic situation mirror those of the political (see Figure 16). 81.5% of respondents

regard it as bad or very bad, 3.9% as good, andagainzero as very good. Similarly, 93.4% consider it

worse or much worse than five years ago, and only 3.2% think it is better (see Figure 17). Women are less

pessimistic than men; 75.2% rate the economic situation bad or very bad compared with 85.2% for men

(p = 0.09).

Figure 16. How would you rate the economic situation in the country today?

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%0.0%

0%


nor bad

19.0%

24.1% 23.4%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

3.9%

14.6%

68.6%

12.9%


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Figure 17. How is the countrys economic situation compared with five years ago?

0.0%3.2%

13.2%

68.1%

15.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%



Optimism prevails concerning the economic future (see Figure 18), with 89.5% expecting it to be better or

much better, and a scant 1.2% expecting it to be worse.

Figure 18. How do you expect the countrys economic situation to be in the future?

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

32.0%

57.5%

9.3%

1.2% 0.0%



While, as noted previously, we cannot directly compare these responses with the aggregated questions in

the 2010 survey, we can note that in 2010 60.5% thought the political/economic situation was bad or very

bad and 9.4% thought it good, so perceptions have worsened markedly in the past year. On the other

hand, in 2010 47.4% expected the political/economic situation to be worse or much worse in the

(unspecified) future, so their expectations were met.

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5.3. Capability of Government

Respondents have little confidence in the government (see Figure 19). 88.2% do not think the government

is capable of solving the problems that the country is confronting, up from 59.4% in 2010. It is not clear

to what extent they think that the problems have worsened or the governments capabilities have declined,

but Figure 20 shows that 84.2% think that government institutions perform poorly, compared with 52.7%

in 2010. Women are less pessimistic than men; 80.1% rate the government as incapable compared with

94.4% for men (p = 0.000).

Figure 19. Do you believe that the current government is capable of solving the countrys

problems?

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

1.9%

10.0%

39.7%

48.5%

8.8%

28.6%

35.6%

26.9%

Strongly yes Yes No Strongly no

2011 2010


2010 survey, n = 1015. 97% of participants responded to this question. In 2010 4.9% responded with no

comment to this question. In the 2011 survey, no comment was not a response option. For

comparability with 2011, the 2010 percentages reported here exclude respondents who responded with

no comment.

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Figure 20. How would you rate the performance of the governments institutions?

0.0%

9.0%6.8%

59.1%

25.1%

1.0%

6.3%

40.2%

31.3%

21.4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%


nor bad

2011 2010


2010 survey, n = 984. 94.1% of survey participants responded to this question.

In 2010, Syria scored 2.5 (on a 010 worstbest scale) on the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by

Transparency International, which ranked it at 127 out of 178 countries.13 Respondents share the tenor of

this assessment (see Figure 21), with 91.3% judging the government at least moderately corrupt. This

question was posed slightly differently in 2010, when 86.9% thought that public-sector corruption is

widespread. Of those who think that there is at least some corruption, 86.1% think that it is worse than

five years ago, whereas in 2010 56.9% thought that it was worse than in the (unspecified) past (see Figure

22). As with other shortcomings, the public is confident that matters will improve, with 92.2% expecting

less corruption in the future (see Figure 23).

13 Transparency International 2011. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results. Berlin: TransparencyInternational. transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed July 28, 2011)

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Figure 21. How corrupt are the government ministries and public administrations?

45% 42.0%

Extremely Very corrupt Moderately Neither Not corrupt

corrupt corrupt corrupt not not

corrupt


Figure 22. If you believe that corruption exists, how does it compare with five years ago?

70%64.5%

35.4%

13.9%

4.2% 4.5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%



1.2% 1.3%

11.4%

21.6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

23


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Figure 23. If you believe that corruption exists, how do you think it will be in the future, compared

to today?

24.8%

67.4%

7.5%

0.3% 0.0%0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%



On a more specific aspect of corruption, nepotism or cronyism (see Figure 24), respondents are similarly

negative, with 85.6% saying that a common citizen needs an inside connection to get a government job; in

2010 74.8% held the same view.

Figure 24. Can a simple citizen get a government job without an intermediary (connection)?

2.1%

12.3%

30.5%

55.1%

1.4%

20.9%

45.8%

31.9%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Strongly yes Yes No Strongly no

2011 2010


2010 survey, n = 1018, and 3.8% responded with no comment to this question. In the 2011 survey, no

comment was not a response option. For comparability with 2011, the 2010 percentages reported here

exclude respondents who responded with no comment.

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5.4. Bashar al-Assad and Anti-Government Protests

5.4.1. President Assad and Protestors

Turning more specifically to views about President Assad and demonstrations directed against him and

the ruling regime, we find that the President is held in low regard (see Figure 25); 82.6% consider his job

performance poor or very poor, and only 8.7% good. (These questions were not asked in 2010.)

Figure 25. How would you rate President Assads job performance?

50%45.6%

Very good Good Fair Poor Very poor


In its simplest formulation (see Figure 26), the survey finds that 82.0% of respondents support the anti

government demonstrations and 9.6% oppose them.

Figure 26. Do you support the peaceful revolution that began on March 15, 2011 in Syria?

100%82.0%

Yes No I don't know


The anti-government demonstrators (see Figure 27), are viewed positively or very positively by 71.1%,

with 23.4% holding neutral views and only 5.5% negative. Men have a higher opinion (77.8% positive) of

the anti-government demonstrators than women do (59.7% positive) (p = 0.02).

0.2%

8.7% 8.5%

37.0%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

9.6% 8.4%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

25


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Figure 27. How do you regard the anti-government demonstrators in Syria?

45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

41.1%

30.0%

23.4%

2.9% 2.6%

Very positively Positively Neither Negatively Very negatively

positively nor

negatively


Choosing whether to actively support or engage in anti-government demonstrations depends not only on

an individuals attitudes about the demonstrators, but also on perceptions of how other citizens view

themthat is, people are likelier to participate if they see the movement as popular. (It is not so clear that

anyone who opposes the demonstrators would join simply because they appear to be popular.) In this

instance, respondents have a fairly accurate assessment of popular sentiments (see Figure 28), with 84.4%

thinking that the majority view is positive and only 4.8% thinking that it is negative.14

14 Questions of the sort, What do you think most other people think? can be difficult for some people to considerand answer. As a check on this question, the survey posed a more concrete hypothetical situation: Imagine that thetotal number of adult people living in Syria today is 100 and you have to give your opinion of how many of these100 people share the concerns of the anti-government protestors. How many would you say? (Please give an answerbetween 0 and 100.) 88% gave an answer larger than 50 (i.e., these respondents thought that a majority supports thedemonstrators), which is consistent with the responses to the first question.

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Figure 28. How do you think most Syrians regard the anti-government demonstrators?

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

32.2%

52.2%

10.8%

3.3%1.5%


positively nor

negatively


Respondents assessments of their neighbors views mirror their assessments of the general population

(see Figure 29); 90.2% think that most of their neighbors view the demonstrators positively. Men (95.7%)

are more likely to think so than women (82.8%) are (p = 0.000).

Figure 29. Do most of your neighbors support the anti-government demonstrators?

90.2%100%

80%

60%

40%

20% 9.8%

0%

Yes No


Spokesmen for the anti-government demonstrators and most international observers have sharply

divergent views from those of the Assad regime on the demonstrators motivations. Survey respondents

mostly share the former perceptions, but may give some credence to the governments position (see

Figure 30). 92.5% think that lack of political freedom is an important issue to the demonstrators, 91.3%that freedom of information is, and 92.0% think that poor quality of life is. However, 74.3% also think

that religion and 39.0% that outside agitators play important rolesrecall that the Assad regime

contends that the unrest is led by (mainly foreign) religious extremists; it is not clear whether respondents

regard these outside agitators as the same parties that the regime cites, nor is it evident how respondents

think that religion is important to the demonstrators.

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Of the foreign-policy issues, Syrias relationship with Iran and Hezbollahits closest alliesis held to be

the most important to the demonstrators. Overall, we see that all of the eleven issues proffered are thought

to be important to the demonstrators; this might reflect some uncertainty about the demonstrators

motivations, or perhaps a sense that it is a broad-based movement concerned with the full range of issues

confronting the country.

Figure 30. How important are the following issues to the anti-government demonstrators?

Syria's relationship with Iran and Hezbollah 59.0%

Freedom of information

Lack of political freedom

51.5% 39.8% 6.6%

50.7%

The Emergency Law 44.5%

Syria's relationship with Israel

Government corruption

43.5% 29.4% 21.2%

39.6%

Religion

Syria's relationship with the United States

35.5% 38.8% 21.0%

21.6%

Economic issues 19.1%

Quality of life

International relations

14.4% 54.1% 29.4%

9.2% 43.1%

34.7% 6.3%

41.8% 5.8%

14.1% 32.4%

41.9% 15.7%

53.0% 20.7%

51.5% 27.1%

39.5%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Very important Important Neither important nor unimportant

Note: response rates for these items ranged from 87% to 99%.

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The Muslim Brotherhood is a significant force in Syrian public life, and their role in the protest

movement is disputed. Respondents views (in general) of the Muslim Brotherhood are mixed (see Figure

31); 34.9% are positive, 23.7% neutral, 36.1% negative, and 5.3% do not know what the Muslim

Brotherhood is. Women (46.0%) have a more positive view than men (30.0%) do (p = 0.05).

Figure 31. What is your view of the Muslim Brotherhood?

23.7%25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

12.0%

22.9%

15.6%

20.5%

5.3%

Very positive Positive Neither Negative Very Do not know

positive nor negative what the

negative Muslim

Brotherhood

is


5.4.2. Reforms

When the survey was designed, the state of emergency had not yet been lifted; survey implementation

was delayed, and in the meantime the state of emergency was lifted (but with little attendant change in the

practices of the security forces). What was to have been a prospective question then became a question

about the current situation (see Figure 32); 58.7% are positive about lifting the state of emergency and

41.0% are neutral, likely reflecting the sentiment that it is a positive development in principle but has

made no practical difference (only 0.2% disapprove). Men (63.9%) are more positive than women

(50.6%) are (p = 0.10). In 2010 (when the prospect was not openly discussed by the government), 79.7%

supported lifting the state of emergency, with 5.5% opposed.

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13.0%

41.0%

0.0% 0.2%0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Figure 32. How do you feel about the lifting of the state of emergency?

50% 45.7%


positively nor

negatively


In aggregate, respondents assess their neighbors preferences for reform or regime change (see Figure 34)

as slightly more extreme than their own (see Figure 33); 81.7% want the Assad regime to leave power and

6.8% want to maintain the status quo, compared with a perception that 88.3% of their neighbors want

regime change and 9.4% the status quo. Women (70.3%) are much less likely than men (90.3%) are to

want regime change (p = 0.001).

Figure 33. What would you like the current regime to do?

90% 81.7%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Maintain the current Remain in power but Leave power

situation make some reforms

6.8%11.5%


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Figure 34. What do you think your neighbors would you like the current regime to do?

9.4%2.4%

88.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Maintain the current Remain in power Leave power

situation but make some

reforms


In the event of regime change, two-thirds of respondents think that (unspecified) democratically elected

leaders would be most qualified to assume power (see Figure 35) as against 13.6% for the Muslim

Brotherhood or religious leaders (of course, nothing precludes religious figures coming to power by

democratic means). While respondents overwhelmingly support the protestors aims, few (7.3%) think

theyre best positioned to assume power. Women (58.4%) are less impressed than men (72.5%) are with

the capability of democratically elected leaders (p = 0.08). On the different matter ofpreferences for

future leadership (see Figure 36), 77.3% think that their neighbors would most prefer democratically

elected leaders versus only 4.1% for religious figures.

Figure 35. If the current regime leaves power, who do you think is the most qualified to assume

power?

66.4%

9.7%12.8%

3.9%7.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Democratically Muslim Military Religious Protest leaders

elected leaders Brotherhood leaders leaders


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Figure 36. If the current regime leaves power, whom do you think your neighbors would like to

assume power?

Democratically Muslim Military Religious Protest leaders

elected leaders Brotherhood leaders leaders


In any event, few (12.1%) think that even (unspecified) reforms, along with lifting the state of emergency,

will mollify the demonstrators (see Figure 37). Women (17.2%) are much more likely than men (7.7%)

are to think so (p = 0.03).

Figure 37. Do you think that the reforms by the state and the lifting of the Emergency Law will

satisfy the protesters?

77.3%

2.9%

9.9%

1.2%

8.6%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

12.1%

87.9%

Yes No


5.4.3. Foreign Relations

All parties to the unrest in Syria are closely watching developments elsewhere in the Arab world.

Respondents are encouraged by protests elsewhere (see Figure 38); 78.3% feel more hopeful in their light,

and only 5.9% feel less hopeful.

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Figure 38. How do the protests in other Arab countries make you feel about reforms in Syria?70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Much more More hopeful Neither more Less hopeful Much less

hopeful nor less hopeful hopeful

58.6%

19.7%15.7%

1.1%4.8%


And a clear majority (see Figure 39) thinks that Tunisia and Egypt are better off after their revolutions.

(The survey was conducted before Septembers unrest in Cairo.)

Figure 39. After revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, how is their situation?

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Better Neither better Worse

nor worse

81.1%

10.3% 8.6%


Syrias neighbors and the international community have taken active positions on the ongoing unrest, and

Syrias relations with many stakeholders have suffered. To gauge popular views on Syrias relations with

four influential parties, the survey asked respondents about their neighbors perceptions (see Figure 40).

(This question is asking the respondent to describe or assess the regime's current conduct, not for the

respondent to suggest what his or her neighbors prefer.) Respondents think that their neighbors expect

the government to reinforce its relations with its most reliable partners of recent years, Hezbollah (88.0%

for strengthening relations) and Iran (78.7%). At the same time, respondents think that most (68.8%) of

their neighbors expect the government to maintain its (very poor) relations with the United States.

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Mens and womens views differ on popular expectations for ties with the United States and with the

Muslim Brotherhood. 19.1% of women and 7.5% of men perceive an expectation to strengthen ties with

the United States (p = 0.02), while 19.0% of women and 31.5% of men see the same with respect to the

Muslim Brotherhood.

Figure 40. In facing ongoing developments in the Middle East, how do most of your neighbors see

the current regime treating ties with the following?

Muslim Brotherhood

Iran

United States

Hezbollah 88.0%

12.5%

78.7%

26.2%

11.9%

68.8%

21.1%

0.1%

31.9%

18.7%

0.2%

41.8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Strengthen Maintain Weaken

Note: Response rates for these items ranged from 97% to 99%.

5.5. Access to Communications and Media

5.5.1. Background

Press Freedom

Since the uprising began, the Syrian government has expelled almost all foreign journalists; press access

was not assured even prior to these events. Syria has consistently performed poorly on Reporters Without

Borders Press Freedom Survey, which measures the degree of freedom experienced by journalists and

the countrys commitment to protecting and ensuring this freedom.15

Indicators include violations directly

affecting journalists and news media such as murder, threats, censorship, or searches and harassment;

ability of media to investigate and criticize; financial pressure put on media; the country s legal

framework; and the free flow of information on the internet.16

According to the 2010 survey (which

covered September 2009 to September 2010), Syria has joined Burma and North Korea in the group of

15 Reporters Without Borders. 2010. Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2010: How the index was compiled. Paris:Reporters Without Borders. en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/methodology.pdf (accessed April 26, 2011).16 Ibid.

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the worlds most repressive countries towards journalists.17

As shown in Table 3, Syria fell from 165th

out of 175 countries in 2009 to 173rd out of 178 countries in 2010.

Table 3. Syria in Press Freedom Index, 20022010.

Year Rank Rank from the Bottom

2002 126 132003 155 11

2004 155 12

2005 145 22

2006 153 15

2007 154 15

2008 159 14

2009 165 10

2010 173 5Source: Reporters Without Borders, 2011.

Global rankings of the degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information

provided by Freedom House shows Syrias performance declining from 2009 to 2010. Freedom House

scores press freedom on 23 methodology questions in three categories: legal environment, political

environment, and economic environment.18

They investigate print, broadcast, and internet freedom as

well as analyzing the events of each calendar year.

In 2009, Syria ranked 178th out of 196 countries and in 2010 Syria dropped to 181st out of 196 countries

(see Table 4). With consistently high scores (0 is best, 100 is worst), Syria s press sector has been

considered not free since at least 2002.19

Freedom House cites Syria as among the countries oflong-

standing concern where journalists and bloggers face harsh punishments such as banishment from the20,21country, large fines, arrest, detention, and torture for expressing divisive views. In the Middle East

th 22

and North Africa, Syria places 16 out of 19 countries.

Syrian officials continue to incarcerate cyber-dissidents and block such networking sites as Blogger,

Twitter, and Facebook.23

As of the March 2011 Reporters Without Borders report ofInternet Enemies,

17 Reporters Without Borders. 2010. Press Freedom Index 2010. Paris: Reporters Without Borders.en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html (accessed April 14, 2011).18 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press 2010 Methodology. Washington: Freedom House.

freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop10/Global_Table_2010.pdf (accessed June 6, 2011).19 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press 2010 table of global press freedom rankings. Washington:Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop10/Global_Table_2010.pdf (accessed April 14, 2011).20 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press Syria (2010). Washington: Freedom House.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7928&year=2010 (accessed June 6, 2011).21 Karlekar, Karin Deutsch. 2010. Press Freedom in 2010: Signs of change amid repression. Washington: FreedomHouse, p. 9.22 Freedom House. 2011. Freedom of the Press Syria (2011). Washington: Freedom House.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2011/FOTP2011GlobalRegionalTables.pdf (accessed July 28, 2011)23 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press Syria (2010). op. cit.

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at least three dissidents are behind bars, one of whom is the youngest female blogger in custody in the24

world.

Table 4. Syria in Survey of Press Freedom, 20012010.

Year Score Rank from the Bottom

2001 78

b

2002 80b

2003 80 16

2004 83 13

2005 84 13

2006 83 16

2007 83 15

2008 83 17

2009 83 16

2010 84 13Source: Freedom House, 2011a

Scores of 61100 are considered not free.b No rank available.

Internet Access

Reporters Without Borders included Syria with nine other countries on the 2011 list of enemies of the

internet.25

The Syrian Information Organization monitors discussions on the internet and targets26

banned words.

Police raids on internet cafes are common and those who are caught doing excessive surfing are

strongly encouraged to make themselves available for questioning by Syrian officials. Website managers

must also keep track of the personal data produced by internet users and maintain a list of visited websites

and inform authorities of any illegal activities.

27

As of March 2011, 240 websites were blocked that wererelated to issues such as political criticism, religion, obscenity, and the Kurdish minority, as well as

certain Lebanese newspapers and sites based in Israel.28

Internet censorship has tightened since the

uprising began.

Syria has experienced significant growth in internet access in the last decade but with little improvement

in infrastructure, causing connection slowdowns and frequent outages. The best estimates show massive29,30growth from 30,000 internet users in 2000 to 3.4 million in 2010, about 18% of the population. The

24

Karlekar, Karin Deutsch. 2009. Press Freedom in 2009: Broad setbacks to global media freedom. Washington:Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2010/OverviewEssayFOTP2010finallaid-out.pdf (accessedApril 17, 2011).25 Reporters Without Borders. 2011. Internet enemies. Paris: Reporters Without Borders.march12.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf (accessed April 17, 2011).26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Internet World Stats. 2010. Middle East internet usage and population statistics. Miniwatts Marketing Group.www.internetworldstats.com (accessed April 19, 2011).

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average cost for one hour of internet connection at an internet caf is one to two U.S. dollars whereas the

average monthly salary in Syria is US$200.31

The internet in Syria is essentially controlled by one source, the state-owned Syrian Telecommunications

Establishment, and concerns remain that the government can block all internet access. On June 3, nearly

two-thirds of the Syrian network went down for a few hours, leading to speculation that it was agovernment action.

32

Satellite Television

In contrast to the internet, satellite television is relatively easy to access, with many channels available.33

Syria Satellite TV is operated by the Ministry of Information; its programming is varied and includes

sports, scripted shows, news, and music. Those with access to satellite dishes can view programming

from around the Arab world. In the 2010 Democracy Council survey, respondents were asked to name

their favorite television programs and actors in a free-response question. More than 200 TV programs

were named, illustrating the diversity of programming available to Syrians, with both Syrian and pan-

Arabic programs in the top ranks.

5.5.2. Key Findings from 2011 Survey

Newspapers remain the principal source of news information for half the respondents (see Figure 41),

with 27.9% receiving most of their news from the internet. 72.9% read a newspaper at least weekly (see

Figure 42), up considerably from 42.1% in 2010, likely reflecting an increased interest in current events.

Women consume less news than men across all media, with 37.3% (vs. 51.9%) reading a newspaper

almost daily (p = 0.07).

30 The data produced by Internet World Stats are compiled from sources including the Nielsen Company,International Telecommunications Union, GfK Group, Computer Industry Almanac, and CIA Fact Book, amongother agencies.31 Reporters Without Borders. 2011. op. cit.32

Cowie, James. 2011. Syria internet shutdown. renesys.com/blog/2011/06/syrian-internet-shutdown.shtml.33 It is common for Syrian households to share a satellite dish.

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Figure 41. Where do you receive most of your news?

60%

49.9%

Newspapers Radio Television Internet All of these None of

these


Figure 42. Do you read a daily paper?

50% 46.0%

Almost every day Once or more Rarely I do not read a

weekly daily newspaper


The internet is, however, the most trusted news source (see Figure 43), with 87.1% finding it at leastmostly trustworthy; state-run television is trusted by only 10.%. Women are more trusting than men of all

news sources except for the internet; 17.2% of women and 4.5% of men find state-run television at least

mostly trustworthy (p = 0.000), versus 80.8% of women and 89.8% of men trusting the internet (p = 0.08)

2.2%

17.6%

27.9%

2.1%0.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

26.9%

21.1%

5.9%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

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Figure 43. How trustworthy do you find your news outlets?

Internet 1%

Satellite television

Syrian State-run television

Radio 1%

Newspapers 16%

5%

7%

22%

55%

56%

48%

3%

58%

32%

28%

45%

11%

20%

0%

9%

1%

25%

2%

0%

53%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Trustworthy Mostly trustworthy

Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy Mostly untrustworthy

Untrustworthy

Note: Response rates for this question ranged from 98.0% and 98.9%.

Those who watch news on satellite TV (see Figure 44) most prefer Al-Jazeera (58.7% as first or second

favorite), Al-Arabia (44.7%), and Barada (36.2%).34

34 The figure shows preferences for networks named in the survey question. Respondents were allowed to namenetworks other than those offered in the survey question; 15.2% named another network, with Roj and Al-Wesa thetop picks.

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Figure 44. If you watch the news on satellite television, which are your favorite networks? Please

list your top two, in order. Mark only one network as your first choice. Mark only one network as

your second choice.

Al-Manar

CNN

Orient TV

Barada TV Network

BBC

Al-Souria

Al-Arabia

Al-Jazeera

1.6%

1.6%

8

6.1

4.6%

3.0%

0.0%

15.

14.0%

9.0%

.0%

9.9%

9.0%

%

20.2%

8%

30.1%

28.9%

38.5%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0%

First choice Second choice

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 535 (97.1%) specified their first choice of network, and 523 (94.9%)

specified their second choice.

6. Conclusions

The 2011 Syria Public Opinion poll reveals a Syrian public that has very little confidence in the capacity,

performance, and legitimacy of the Assad regime. The majority rate President Assads performancenegatively (88%), support the anti-government demonstrations that began on March 15, 2011 (82%), and

regard the anti-government demonstrators positively (71%). And people perceive that this support is

widespread: 84% respond that most Syrians regard the demonstrators positively. Respondents hold mixed

views on the Muslim Brotherhood. Women are less critical of the Assad regime than men, and somewhat

less supportive of the anti-government demonstrators, they are also more likely to express positive views

of the Muslim Brotherhood. But women, in general, are less well informed and less likely to closely

follow political events. Womens underrepresentation in the survey sample may be due to bothor

otherconsiderations.

There is growing pessimism about the ability of the government to solve the countrys problems: 88.2%

believe it is incapable of doing so (up from 62.5% in 2010). When presented with a list of issues facingthe country, absence of political freedom is the dominant concern, and a vast majority (85%) feels that the

human-rights situation is poor. Syrians hold a dim view of the political situation, with 80.2% regarding it

as bad or very bad, and 87% report that it has gotten worse in the past five years. Syrians express general

discontent with the countrys economic situation, with 82% reporting that the economic situation is bad

and 83% that it has deteriorated over the last five years. However, they express surprising optimism about

the future (or perhaps a sense that matters cannot get worse), reporting that they expect the political

situation (92%) and economic situation (90%) will improve.

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The opinions expressed in this survey suggest that reforms by the Assad government would not placate

the Syrian people: 82% want regime change irrespective of plans for reform. The majority (66%) would

prefer democratically elected leaders to assume power and a majority (78%) report that the protests in

other Arab countries make them feel more hopeful about reforms in Syria. And just as they oppose the

government and demand domestic reforms, Syrians expect little change in the current regimes security-

relations posture: a majority thinks their neighbors expect the government to strengthen ties withHezbollah (88%) and Iran (79%), with many fewer perceiving an expectation of strengthening ties with

the Muslim Brotherhood (26%) or the United States (13%).

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7. Appendix

Table 5. Do you participate in unions, clubs, charitable organizations, or cultural activities?

Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent)

Do you participate in Often 16.8 13.3unions, clubs, charitable Sometimes 17.0 17.5

organizations, or Rarely 24.0 25.9cultural activities? Never 42.2 43.3

Note: 99.6% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 549).

Table 6. Do you have a landline phone?


Do you have a landline? Yes 63.0 74.0

No 37.0 26.0


Table 7. Do you have a mobile phone?


Do you have a mobile Yes 89.8 92.1phone? No 10.2 7.9


Table 8. Do you have a television?


Do you have a Yes 68.4 64.5television? No 31.6 35.5


Table 9. Do you have a satellite dish at home?


Do you have a satellite Yes 88.5 90.1dish at home? No 11.5 9.9Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544).

Table 10. How often do you watch the news on the satellite channels?


How often do you watch Almost every day 46.0 53.7the news on the satellite Once or more weekly 32.4 28.7channels? Rarely 19.7 16.6

I do not watch the newson satellite channels

1.9 1.1


Table 11. Do you have Internet access at home or at work?


Do you have Internet Yes 76.8 83.5access at home or atwork?

No 23.2 16.5


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Table 12. Do you use the Internet for news?


Do you use the Internet Yes 76.9 83.4for news? No 23.1 16.6


Table 13. Do you use the Internet for social networking sites?Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent)

Do you use the Internet Yes 65.1 68.9for social networkingsites?

No 34.9 31.1


Table 14. From where do you receive most of your news?


From where do you Newspapers 49.9 59.3receive most of your Radio 2.2 1.5news? Television 17.6 10.4

Internet 27.9 27.2All of these 2.1 1.3

None of these 0.5 0.4

Note: 97.8% of survey participants responded to this question (n=539).

Table 15. Do you read a daily paper?


Do you read a daily Almost every day 46.0 51.0paper? Once or more weekly 26.9 29.2

Rarely 21.1 16.5

I do not read a daily

newspaper

5.9 3.3


Table 16. How trustworthy do you find the newspapers?


How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 15.6 15.3find the newspapers? Mostly trustworthy 56.3 53.1

Neither trustworthy noruntrustworthy

27.7 30.2

Mostly untrustworthy 0.2 0.4Untrustworthy 0.3 1.1


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Table 17. How trustworthy do you find the radio?


How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 5.0 4.0find the radio? Mostly trustworthy 48.3 43.6


44.7 49.5

Mostly untrustworthy 0.8 1.8Untrustworthy 1.2 1.1


Table 18. How trustworthy do you find Syrian state-run TV?


How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 7.0 5.9find Syrian state-run Mostly trustworthy 3.0 1.3TV? Neither trustworthy nor

untrustworthy11.5 10.3

Mostly untrustworthy 25.1 27.9

Untrustworthy 53.4 54.7Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

Table 19. How trustworthy do you find satellite television?


How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 21.8 23.7find satellite television? Mostly trustworthy 58.5 56.6


19.7 19.5


Untrustworthy 0.0 0.0


Table 20. How trustworthy do you find the Internet?


How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 55.4 59.1find the Internet? Mostly trustworthy 31.7 31.3


9.4 7.4


Untrustworthy 1.4 0.6Note: 98.0% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 540).

Table 21. How would you rate the quality of the public education system in our country?

Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent)How would you rate the Very good 0.7 0.6quality of the public Good 13.1 8.1education system in our Neither good nor bad 32.1 26.7country? Bad 36.9 44.5

Very bad 17.3 20.2


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Table 22. How do you rate, in general, your personal situation today?


How do you rate, in Very good 1.8 1.5general, your personal Good 9.1 9.7situation today? Neither good nor bad 27.5 25.4

Bad 43.9 44.6

Very bad 17.7 18.8

Note: 99.3% of survey partici

syria 2011 public opinion survey

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