Syria’s Uprising: Ethnic Conflict and National Unity

Christopher Haynes

15/12/11

The popular uprisings that have swept the Middle East and North Africa have had similar causes in each country: economic stagnation, corruption, decades of dictatorship. Not all of them have occurred in ethnically-divided societies. Egyptians widely held nationalist sentiments and united across the Muslim-Christian divide in opposition to Hosni Mubarak. Syrians, however, a majority-Sunni population ruled by an ethnic minority supported by other minorities, are varied in their attitudes toward the ruling party.

Protests against the regime of President Bashar al Assad began on January 26, but did not turn violent until March 15, when security forces attacked protesters in the southern city of Deraa and Damascus held demonstrations in a “day of rage”.1 Youths had written “the people want the fall of the regime”, the slogan of the other Arab Spring movements, on walls in Deraa, and were tortured and killed as a result.2 Since March, protests have taken place around Syria, and most have been brutally crushed. The UN estimates that 5000 people have been killed since then.3 Tens of thousands have been arrested, including some 14,000 reporters.4 Some observers of Syria are speculating that we are seeing the beginnings of a civil war. The bolder among them believe that it will be an ethnic civil war, with the Sunni majority pitted against the ruling Alawi sect.

This essay will not look at the situation of all ethno-cultural groups of Syria. Syria has some nine such groups5 (including Palestinian and Iraqi refugees) with populations over 100,000. It considers only relations between the Sunnis and the Alawis, as the commentators and experts see them as the two key parties. If any two groups will fall down the hole of ethnic conflict, it will be them.

Is Syria in civil war? British prime minister David Cameron warned it was heading toward civil war in late November.6 President Abdullah Gul of Turkey said Turkey is preparing for the worst.7 Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, predicted in April that Syria would descend into a civil war between Sunnis and Alawis.8 There is evidence of an inchoate civil war, but it is truly an ethnic conflict? If we can find clear evidence of major, sustained clashes between sects, or systematic violence against one sect by the army, we will have reason to say an ethnic conflict is occurring in Syria.

1 Unknown author (March 16, 2011). Middle East unrest: Syria arrests Damascus protesters. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-127573942 Unknown author (November 22, 2011). Syria protests: What you need to know. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-158446313 Unknown author (December 12, 2011). Syria: 5000 dead in violence, says UN human rights chief. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/12/syria-5000-dead-violence-un4 Nasseri, Ladane (December 11, 2011). Syrian protesters urge general strike, pressure on Assad grows. Business Week. Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-11/syrian-protesters-urge-general-strike-pressure-on-assad-grows.html5 World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Syria overview. Minority Rights Group International. Retrieved from http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=52666 Unknown author (November 22, 2011). David Cameron: ‘Civil war a real possibility’ in Syria. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-158444707 Unknown author (November 21, 2011). Turkish president, Gul, ‘prepared for worst’ in Syria. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-158291598 Bakshi, Amar C. (April 26, 2011). Why Syria is descending into civil war. CNN. Retrieved from http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/26/why-syria-is-descending-into-civil-war/

There is a certain difficulty in gathering information about an ongoing conflict, particularly one taking place in a country from which journalists are banned. This essay attempts to paint an accurate picture of what some are calling (and others are hesitant to call) an ethnic civil war based on the obtainable evidence. Its contention is that there is no clear answer at present, and that the evidence points both ways: certain ethnic cleavages are coming to the fore while unity in opposition to the ruling elite is nationalist and has brought people together.

This paper first sketches the history of ethnic relations in Syria, with emphasis on the Baath Party and Alawi dominance of it. Second, it considers other sources of division and examines the possibility of horizontal inequalities, the sources of ethnic division. Third, it looks at the forces that unite most of the population of Syria, the common grievances, from economic stagnation to lack of democracy. Finally, it outlines the protests that have taken place and the violence with which they have been met. These factors all display the forces dividing and uniting Syria during this uprising.

Sunni Muslims make up approximately three quarters of the population of Syria, the remainder split among Christians, Alawis, Druze and Ismailis. As a secular state, official censuses do not cover religion or ethnicity, so accuracy is difficult. Alawis represent between 8 and 15% of Syrians. Though they populate the upper echelons of the military, as a community, Alawis are not in an advantaged position.9 Alawis are concentrated in the northwest of Syria.

The land now known as Syria has historically been a refuge for the persecuted. Religious, tribal and linguistic differences are strong, as are local loyalties, especially in the Latakia region (Alawi majority) and the Jabal al Duruz (Druze majority), the only two regions that are not majority Sunni. (Van Dam, 1979, 16) Sunnis traditionally enjoyed the privilege of being on the top. (Ibid., 17) Syrian “sects” have separate histories and religious beliefs, and as such can be considered ethnic, religious and cultural groups. The distinction among the three terms, in Syria at least, is nugatory.

When the European powers interfered in the Ottoman Empire, ostensibly to protect religious minorities, the Ottoman government and the Sunni majority looked on the minorities as “potential traitors, sources of weakness and instruments of European policy; in general as dangers to the Empire and to the Islamic community.” (Ibid., 18) Relations soured.

During the mandate period, the French deliberately incited sectarian tensions and fostered the separateness of each community. (Ibid., 18) They favoured members of the armed forces from minority groups and did not encourage Sunnis to enlist. The minorities were often from poorer backgrounds and had more economic incentive to join the military. (Ibid., 39) Moreover, wealthy Sunnis led the nationalist revolt against the French, and refused to send their sons into the imperial military, thus giving minorities a better chance at advancement. (Ibid., 40) As result, there is less loyalty to the nation as to the community or the pan-Arab cause, and local political struggles dominate national politics. (Ibid., 19) However, this manipulation by foreign powers does not seem to have left any very powerful, smouldering ethnic tensions. At the very least, not many of the Syrians who have taken to the streets seem to blame one group (the Alawis) so much as Bashar al Assad and his government. Sectarian, tribal and regional loyalties overlap in Syria.

9 Unknown author (December 9, 2011). Guide: Syria’s diverse minorities. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16108755

Moreover, socioeconomic classes cut across sectarian and other ties, with people in different religious communities suffering the same poverty and exploitation. (Ibid., 26) Conflict is not necessarily sectarian. It could just as easily arise due to ideology, inter-generational conflict, personal ambition and opportunism, or other factors. (Ibid., 25)

The Baath Party took power in Syria in 1963. 700 officers were dismissed in the 1963 coup, about half of whom were replaced by Alawis. (Ibid., 43) A radical wing of the party, led largely by Alawis and other minorities, took over in 1966. In 1970, another coup led to the presidency of Hafez al Assad, which lasted 30 years. (Perthes, 1995, 2) Nikolaos van Dam details the struggles among ethnic groups in the Baath Party, and the Alawi-dominated officer corps’s internal struggle. When Hafez al Assad took over, he was worried about other Alawis and surrounded himself not with people because they were coreligionists but because they were from his family and friends. (Van Dam, 44) The resulting new ruling elite consisted mainly of military officers of rural backgrounds. “Practically all the military officers playing a role in the regime originated from the middle class peasantry, that is from families whose income allowed them to send some of their sons to high school, but not to university.” (Perthes, 37) Hafez al Assad was typical of this group. Many of the officers were from minority religious backgrounds, particularly Alawi and Druze. Baathism is a secular nationalist ideology. The party used state education and the media to indoctrinate everyone in Arab and Syrian nationalism, socialism, secularism, anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. (Maoz, 1999, 85) Everyone knows the country is ruled by Alawis; but that fact might not disadvantage other ethnic groups as much as other cases of minority rule.

The coup by the Alawi section of the Baath Party opened up the channels for upward mobility in Syria. The government appropriated large tracts of land from big landowners, giving them to landless peasants and cooperatives. It improved workers’ conditions significantly. With the emergence of a new elite, “the way was opened to upward sociopolitical mobility of the middle and lower classes of the population—workers, peasants and intelligentsia—Sunnis and non-Sunnis alike.” (Ibid., 84)

The traditional middle and upper-middle classes, mostly Sunnis, strongly opposed the Baathist reforms, particularly socialism and secularism, and deeply resented the domination of Syria’s military by Alawis. But Assad came to consider Islam central to Arab nationalism, and in 1971 reinstated the presidential Islamic oath and encouraged mosques and Muslim institutions. (Ibid., 86) After the 1982 massacre in Hama (see below), Hafez al Assad reversed some of the secular policies to appeal to Sunnis once again. (Ibid., 88) When he died in 2000, Assad left behind “an alliance of sorts” between Alawis and the Sunni business elite. But the Alawis were unwilling to relinquish any of the political, social or economic benefits they had accrued, and would not let go of the reins of the government, party, military and intelligence. (Lesch, 76) Today, many Syrians, Sunnis among them, approve of Baathist rule because of the economic growth and political mobility it affords. “Many of them respect Assad’s leadership and some of them do not consider the Alawis as usurpers of power, but as an integral component of the Syrian national community. A growing number of Sunnis have indeed established political and economic ties, as well as social and marital links with Alawis”. (Maoz, 90) Ethnic tensions may exist, but racism is insufficiently strong to have been unleashed by the current chaos.

The country experienced a period of economic growth in the early years of Assad’s reign; coupled with the political victory of the October 1973 war, the regime was reasonably popular.

Political opposition existed, however, both from the left and from conservative Islamists. Periodic violent protests took place, particularly in Hama, traditionally conservative and whose nobles were hard hit by Baathist reforms. In 1973, Islamists called for strikes and demonstrations against the un-Islamic regime. Following a series of clashes, the government modified the draft constitution to stipulate that the religion of the president is Islam. (Perthes, 136)

In 1976, tensions rose and violence occurred around the country. Inflation, corruption, the Syrian intervention into Lebanon and the unchecked power of the security forces were the culprits. (Ibid., 136) Nepotism, that close colleague of corruption, meant a “comparative advantage” for Hafez al Assad’s family and clan, but confession was not the criterion for favours; loyalty to the president was. Many of his ministers were Sunnis. (Ibid., 182) The opposition was prohibited from organising and thus turned to violence. 1979 to 1982 approximated civil war in Syria. “The anti-regime opposition was led by, though not solely composed of, Islamist forces, particularly the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, who tried and partly succeeded in giving the conflict a sectarian or confessionalist (Sunni-majority against Alawi-minority) character.” Some of the opposition murdered Alawi intellectuals, whether or not they were close to the regime. The regime was losing the allegiance of large parts of society that had once formed its base, such as public-sector workers, members of the liberal professions and parts of the urban middle class. Its answer was more oppression. The violence culminated in the spring of 1982 with the massacre of Hama, which killed between ten and thirty thousand people. (Ibid., 137)

One can draw parallels between the violence of then and that of today, as there is a new uprising against the regime. Like today, Sunnis were pitted against the rulling Alawis, and Islamists have been involved. People who have something to gain will always attempt to paint the conflict as ethnic, and some people will believe them. But not all. Grievances in the 1976 to 82 conflict were not clearly ethnic. To say that the Sunnis revolted against the Alawis would imply that Sunnis were united as Islamists, which they were not, and that their grievances were against an ethnic group, as distinct from the ruling class. One reason for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is the secular nature of the Baath ideology that rules Syria, along with the fact that the rulers are Alawis, considered heretics by many Sunnis. But they also rose because of the economic stagnation and corruption through the 1970s, the inspiring example of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the regime’s support for the Maronite Christians in the Lebanese Civil War. (Lesch, 44) Violence committed by Sunnis in the name of Islam is not violence directed at ethnic enemies but at a regime considered heretical.

Alawis were underrepresented in the upper echelons of power before the 1966 coup. Now, however, while they are certainly overrepresented in the officer corps, the same is not true of the civilian government. Alawis and other underprivileged minorities were enabled to rise through the ranks and, Perthes estimates, “achieve a roughly proportionate representation of regions and sects.” And the Alawis are by no means a homogeneous group with endless privileges. “A group of Alawis is in power, not the Alawis.” Many Alawis are opposed to the regime. (Perthes, 183) (Nir Rosen suggests that attitude is changing in the very sectarian climate in Syria and the Middle East, however.10) Manipulating sectarian ties may be politically useful, but the divisions are a means, not an end. The regime’s policies have not showered benefits on Alawis in general or the coastal region most of them are from. (Perthes, 184)10 Youtube (September 23, 2011). Al Jazeera’s Nir Rosen on the Syrian uprising. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Pe1wDvE1Os

None of this is to say that there has never been conflict among ethnic groups in Syria until now. Class consciousness is difficult to foster due to the strong ties to one’s sect, but

sectarian loyalties can have a catalysing influence on the take-off of a class struggle if sectarian contrasts coincide with socioeconomic differences. In such a case, the class struggle can be directed through sectarian channels. Thus, sectarian, regional, tribal and socioeconomic loyalties, if they overlap, may complement and reinforce one another. (Van Dam, 27)

There is also an urban-rural divide. Sunnis are largely the urbanites and minorities are rural workers. The urban-rural divide thus strengthens the confessional divide. Thus, sectarian, regional and tribal categories can overlap with class, and the urban-rural divide coincides with sectarian divisions. (Ibid., 27) The point is that the current violence is influenced far more by other grievances. Before we get to them, let us delve deeper into sectarian inequalities to see if there is clear evidence of systematic bias.

Ethnic cleavages can enhance group cohesion among the relatively deprived (Ostby, 2005, 8) (in our case, Sunnis). Is there group cohesion among Sunnis? If so, the available evidence is scant. Sunnis may seem relatively deprived when looking at who holds the levers of power (the Alawis); however, Sunnis form the majority of the Syrian business elite, and play a key role in keeping the Baath regime in power.11 Meanwhile, most Alawis gain no benefits from the vaunted position of their coreligionists. Most Sunnis and most Alawis are deprived relative to the elite of their sects, meaning there is considerable vertical inequality. Systematic inequalities of power may seem obvious prima facie, but unless most Alawis benefit from them, they are not horizontal inequalities.

Loyalties are divided in Syria among nation, tribe, region, family and sect. It is possible there are horizontal inequalities among regions, sects or other groups that will fuel an emerging ethnic conflict. Horizontal inequalities are biases of which distinguishable cultural or other groups can take advantage. If ethnic group A has far more economic opportunities than ethnic group B, it increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Group B might want to displace the elites (or at least use violence to even the score), or group A might fear an uprising and initiate violence against group B. (Ostby, 9) The opposite of horizontal inequalities are vertical inequalities, meaning unequal distribution of resources and opportunities between the rich and poor that make up a single ethnic group. Ostby (2005) examines Demographic and Health Surveys and finds that countries with highest social horizontal inequalities, that is, educational and occupational opportunities for individual ethnic groups, contribute to the likelihood of ethnic conflict (whereas economic and health inequalities do not). Is there evidence of systematic horizontal inequalities between Alawis and Sunnis?

According to the 2006 multiple indicator cluster survey of Syria, one does find certain social horizontal inequalities. The levels of pre-school and secondary school attendance in Latakia, Tartous (majority Alawi) and Sweida (majority Druze) are higher than in Homs, Hama and Idlib.12 However, it is not clear from the data that these disparities are systematic, nor do they demonstrate enormous regional inequalities. Most other indicators, such as child mortality, show 11 Yacoubian, Mona (October 5, 2011). Saving Syria from civil war. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/05/saving_syria_from_civil_war12 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006, Syrian Arab Republic, pp. 101, 104. Central Bureau of Statistics, UNICEF, League of Arab States. Retrieved from http://www.childinfo.org/files/MICS3_Syria_FinalReport_2006_Eng.pdf

no significant biases among regions. (The only exception is in poverty-stricken Raqqa, an isolated city on the Euphrates river, where child nourishment, sanitation and some educational indicators are relatively low.)13

But economic grievances have been cited as factors in all of the Arab Spring uprisings. Stagnant economies and rampant corruption imply that vertical inequalities are the problem. What are the nature of Syria’s economic problems? Syria’s economy is based on agriculture, oil, industry and tourism. Oil production has declined. Droughts in the south, around Deraa, have harmed agriculture and driven people off the land and into the city. Deraa was, in fact, the first place to see major protests, which quickly spread to nearby towns.14 Droughts are so severe they threaten as many as one million agricultural workers, and Syria has moved from being a net exporter of wheat to a net importer.15 A somewhat misdirected campaign of liberalisation has led to a fourfold increase in the price of fertilisers, a 357% increase in the price of diesel and a 50% rise in the price of fuel oil. (Ibid.) Syrian banks have made very few loans, at the expense of economic growth and possibly as a way to stifle an independent class that is not dependent on the regime. Shana Marshall points out that “authoritarian regimes are loath to cede any dominance of the economy when their very survival depends on the control of the principal sources of patronage”. (Marshall, 2009, 4) Access to resources is obtained by access to the patronage of the regime. The networks of patronage function as a means of control, binding powerful groups like the military and the business elite to the regime. (Perthes, 181) There are few small and medium enterprises as a result. Corruption deters would-be entrepreneurs. Consider Rami Makhlouf. Makhlouf is the brother-in-law of Bashar al Assad. He is widely known as “Mr. Ten Percent”, because he controls business interests that amount to some 10% of Syria’s GDP. Marshall says Makhlouf “has become a lightening rod for criticism of the regime’s nepotism and corruption.” (Marshall, 6) On March 20, crowds in Deraa set fire to a courthouse, the local headquarters of the ruling Baath party and a branch of Syriatel, owned by Makhlouf. “They burned the symbols of oppression and corruption," an activist said. "The banks nearby were not touched."16 32% of Syrians live on two dollars a day or less.17 Unemployment is “massive”, says Joshua Landis. Some free-market reforms were meant to soak up some of the idle labour, but have not kept up with the youth bulge.18 Inflation, rising budget deficits and increasing pressure on water supplies19 all constitute legitimate grievances, and resemble the causes of the other Arab revolts. Finally, Syria has been subject to international sanctions and an influx of Iraqi refugees. And when economic stagnation has a face (the Assad regime), those suffering or sympathising have a target.

13 Ibid.14 Unknown author (April 27, 2011). Syrian troops’ bloody assault. The Australian. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/syrian-troops-bloody-assault/story-e6frg6so-122604527688115 Background note: Syria (March 18, 2011). US Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm16 Unknown author (March 20, 2011). Syria protesters torch buildings. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320113138901721.html17 Bakshi, Amar C. (April 26, 2011). Why Syria is descending into civil war. CNN. Retrieved from http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/26/why-syria-is-descending-into-civil-war/18 Ibid.19 Background note: Syria (March 18, 2011). US Department of State. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm

What do the protesters say they want? Are they divided along ethnic lines? Middle East expert Juan Cole says the Arab Spring protest movements are essentially about popular sovereignty, or democracy, what he calls a “Rousseauian impulse”.20 Joshua Landis agrees, arguing that Syria’s young organisers are principally demanding democracy and freedom.21

Protesters in Syria are chanting “God, Syria, freedom”22, appealing to nationalism as opposed to sectarianism23. Most of the opposition to the regime is peaceful demonstrations organised by young people demanding freedom. Most of these young people seem to be nationalists, as distinct from confessionalists, not interested in what sectarian label the regime wears but its legitimacy as rulers. The government has tried everything to stop the challenges to its rule, from tanks, airplanes, thugs, stoking ethnic tensions and calling protesters terrorists to ending the state of emergency, ending one-party rule, investigations into killings, pardoning political prisoners and granting Kurds citizenship. Opponents of the regime apparently consider all these actions an inch; they want a mile. Blaming all kinds of enemies is a popular refuge of a scoundrel. One day into the siege of Deraa, on April 26, the Syrian government claimed Islamists were behind the uprising.24 On September 26, Syrian authorities claimed to have found Israeli weapons and uniforms in Homs and near Deraa.25 But the opposition does not want to be divided.

Esteban and Ray (2006) say that the identification of ethnic differences is “presumably by an elite”, and the masses accept such cleavages. (Esteban and Ray, 2006, 2) Ethnically, Syrians (aside from Kurds) are Arabs. If they were divided into cultural or religious groups by an elite, this division must have taken place long ago. Syrians (and Lebanese) came to their current homelands because they were persecuted for their religions. The shared experiences may well have strengthened group identity but those identities were not forced on them by Syrian elites.

The authors go on to explain that the elite will attempt to gain or hold onto power “by the vested use of history, legend or myth, or by the framing of incidents (such as murder or rape) in explicitly ethnic terms.” (Ibid., 2) We see some evidence for this in the activities of the shabiha, or mostly-Alawi, pro-regime thugs murdering the opposition. One activist told the Sunday Telegraph that shabiha “kill Sunnis and blame it on the Alawis. Then they stage reprisals.” 26 Con Coughlin of the Telegraph draws parallels with the civil war in Lebanon as 60 bodies were dumped last week on the streets of the city of Homs. It is likely they were abducted, tortured and killed by the shabiha for nothing more than opposing the Assad regime.27 The Lebanese Civil War did indeed begin along ethnic lines, but as ethnic groups fractured and split, ethnic divisions

20 Cole, Juan (March 23, 2011). It’s the Popular Sovereignty, Stupid. Informed Comment. Retrieved from http://www.juancole.com/2011/03/its-the-popular-sovereignty-stupid.html21 Bakshi, Amar C. (April 26, 2011). Why Syria is descending into civil war. CNN. Retrieved from http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/26/why-syria-is-descending-into-civil-war/22 Unknown author (March 18, 2011). Middle East unrest: Three killed at protest in Syria. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-1279173823 Youtube (April 28, 2011). Syrian soldiers ‘switching allegiances’. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIeEY2topAU24 Neild, Barry (April 26, 2011). Syrian regime’s attacks on protesters escalate. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/26/syrian-attacks-on-protesters-escalate25 Unknown author (September 27, 2011). Security forces storm Syrian city of Aleppo, activist group says. CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/27/world/meast/syria-unrest/26 Sherlock, Ruth (December 11, 2011). Defecting Syrian soldier tells of his ethnic conflict. ICJS Research. Retrieved from http://www.icjs-online.org/index.php?article=3479

faded into senseless violence. Residents and activists in Homs have said that the regime is arming Alawis to kill protesters. After three regime supporters, one Shia, one Sunni and one Alawi, were killed, the shabiha smashed and torched shops that belonged to Sunnis in those areas in response. Some in the neighbourhoods express anti-Alawi sentiment. But the Local Coordination Committees of Syria, a group supporting the demonstrators, denied the violence is of a sectarian nature. Rather, they said, the government is stirring up tensions among groups as part of its strategy for holding onto power.28 This story shows us that the forces trying to tear Syria apart are countered by forces uniting it against the regime of Bashar al Assad. More anecdotes and hearsay are available on the actions of the shabiha, particularly in Homs. But Homs is more easily divided, given that it is the most ethnically-mixed city in Syria and is having violence imposed on it. It is thus a clear target for the regime to scare Syrians into accepting its protection, much as the Mubarak regime attempted by letting pro-regime thugs roam violently during Egypt’s revolt. Homs has also been the stronghold of those who have defected from the army.29 Resistance will grow in Homs, and sectarian violence will escalate.

Does Homs represent Syria? The shabiha seem to be everywhere, as activists claim they recently surrounded mosques in suburbs of Damascus, Banias and Latakia.30 Journalist Robert Fisk believes that, though the violence began against demonstrators in Deraa and Homs and some other cities, “the struggle in Syria now cuts through the centre of the country and that many armed men now oppose the army…. A sectarian war may well be in the cynical interests of any regime fighting for its life. But unless everyone I've met is lying (which I don't believe), this is now a growing reality in central Syria.”31

The anecdotes paint a vivid picture. Journalist Nir Rosen describes a situation similar to the one he witnessed in Iraq in 2004 and 5. Sunni and Alawi militias defend their villages and people are getting killed for going to the wrong village. The regime’s opposition is mostly Sunni, and its supporters are mostly Alawi and Christian. One would expect poor Alawites to oppose the regime, but it skillfully manipulates them into supporting it to prevent Sunni Islamists taking over. One reason the opposition has not been very successful at reaching across sectarian lines is that many of the loudest opponents of the regime are Sunni clerics. Many demonstrations come out of mosques and shout “Allahu akbar”, making it hard for non-Muslims to join. Sunnis are wary and resentful of Alawites given the disproportionate influence the latter have on the regime. “Social relations are just destroyed. Sunnis and Alawites in particular don’t trust each other. There is a lot of hatred.”32 But again, this evidence is anecdotal. Can it be applied systematically over more of Syria? It is too difficult to generalise without substantiation. Whether or not these

27 Coughlin, Con (December 8, 2011). Grisly reminders signal Syria’s descent into civil war. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8943824/Grisly-reminders-signal-Syrias-descent-into-civil-war.html28 Ali, Nour (July 18, 2011). Syrian protesters killed in apparent sectarian violence. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/18/syrian-protesters-killed-sectarian-violence29 Coughlin, Con (December 8, 2011). Grisly reminders signal Syria’s descent into civil war. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8943824/Grisly-reminders-signal-Syrias-descent-into-civil-war.html30 Unknown author (October 7, 2011). Gunmen kill Kurdish opposition figure; death toll rises during anti-Assad protests. Al Arabiya. Retrieved from http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/07/170661.html31 Fisk, Robert (October 27, 2011). Syria slips toward sectarian war. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-syria-slips-towards-sectarian-war-2376408.html

stories are meaningful, most opponents of the regime do not seem to be falling for it. Demonstrators are calling for the removal of Bashar al Assad; they are appealing to “God, Syria, freedom”; they are protesting in all areas of Syria, not just Sunni ones. The real conflict in Syria is between the people and the state.

The army is the core of the state. The Syrian army has 220,000 active troops, 11 armoured divisions and about 5,000 tanks. The 4th armoured division, headed by Bashar al Assad’s brother Maher, is the all-Alawi unit that lay siege to Deraa.33 One estimate is that 70% of Syria’s full-time soldiers and 80% of its officers are Alawis.34 But soldiers are deserting. In mid-November, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) announced that 15,000 troops had defected from the army35 (though of course that number is unverifiable). Civilians now appear to be joining the defectors, taking up arms rather than engaging in the frustrating practice of non-violent demonstration.36 Reuters reports that hundreds fought against the army’s 12th division on December 11 when the latter stormed Busra al Harir.37 More reports claim the FSA is defending neighbourhoods in Homs that are under attack by the army.38 The defectors’ relationship to the peaceful protest movements, as well as what weapons they have, is unclear. It is estimated that nearly all defectors are Sunni.39 If it is true that 70% of the army is Alawi, the FSA may only ever represent a small resistance force, though one capable of protracted guerrilla war. All these developments do imply a civil war along ethnic lines. But to regard Homs, the shabiha and the FSA as representing the situation of Syria at the moment is to lose sight of the countless demonstrations that have taken place on top of them.

Independent reporting tells of mostly (but not entirely) Sunni and Kurdish protesters, particularly at the beginning of the conflict. But protests and crackdowns have taken place in all major cities and many smaller ones in Syria, from ethnically-mixed cities like Homs to Alawi-majority ones like Latakia. The young activists who launched the revolt on March 15 are the decentralised organisers and leaders of the peaceful side of the resistance. They come from various classes and professions and are non-ideological in the sense that they eschew ethnic and political divisions.40 Syrian intelligence only knows the older types, not the young generation. When the young generation turned political in March 2011, they didn’t know who the troublemakers would be.

32 Youtube (September 23, 2011). Al Jazeera’s Nir Rosen on the Syrian uprising. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Pe1wDvE1Os33 Cole, Juan (April 25, 2011). The tyrants strike back. Informed Comment. Retrieved from http://www.juancole.com/2011/04/the-tyrants-strike-back.html34 Coughlin, Con (December 8, 2011). Grisly reminders signal Syria’s descent into civil war. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8943824/Grisly-reminders-signal-Syrias-descent-into-civil-war.html35 Unknown author (November 16, 2011). Up to 15,000 Syrian soldiers defect, says opposition. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-1576803836 Vela, Justin (December 8, 2011). ‘Every Syrian has lost someone. Now we are ready to fight back’. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/every-syrian-has-lost-someone-now-we-are-ready-to-fight-back-6273728.html37 Yacoub Oweis, Khaled (December 11, 2011). Major battle in Syria; shops shut by strike. Reuters. Retrieved from http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE7B90FP2011121138 Slim, Randa (November 1, 2011). Meet Syria’s Opposition. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/meet_syrias_opposition39 Ibid.40 Ibid.

Since then, the whole generation has been mobilised. “[T]he Syrian younger generation has turned from being a rather apathetic crowd that were materialistic, uninterested in politics and atomized, to being deeply mobilized and galvanized around this movement.”41 They do not divide Syria but unite it. Protests have taken place all over Syria, not merely in the fiercely anti-Assad quarters. In late July, they held a protest for national unity, deploring recent sectarian violence in Homs.42 Even Aleppo, considered a stronghold of the regime, has seen demonstrations with as many as 1000 people, and violent crackdowns in response.43 And not all Alawis support the regime. As early as April, prominent Alawi intellectuals came out to protest the shooting of unarmed demonstrators. The town of Jableh, largely Alawi in composition, has held protests as well.44 Banias and Latakia, in the majority-Alawi region, were among the first places to experience protests in March.45

Do ethnic differences and long-standing sectarian grievances truly fuel this conflict? Battles between different religious groups have taken place and may be escalating, but most of the violence since mid-March has come from the army’s ruthless crushing of demonstrations. A number of experts, such as Joshua Landis and Robert Fisk, believe that the pieces of the puzzle point to a looming, ethnically-based civil war. This paper has shown that the evidence is mixed. Syria has a history of ethnic divisions and has been ruled by a minority group for four decades, but the Baath Party opened up channels of mobility and at any rate is ruled not by an ethnic group but a clique. Not all Alawis agree with their coreligionists in power, though that may change if ethnic conflict deepens. There is more evidence for vertical than horizontal inequalities, which means lower likelihood of ethnic conflict. Economic and political grievances are the forces bringing demonstrators to the streets over and over, not ethnic divides. Nonetheless, ethnic conflict appears to be on the rise, especially in Homs, and it may be spreading to the rest of the country.

Without a clearer picture of what is happening in Syria, it is too early to say Syria is in the grip of ethnic or sectarian conflict. Until now, the majority of violence has been conducted against peaceful protesters. What we are seeing is a strong state whose legitimacy is rapidly unraveling slaughtering thousands while provoking a weakly-united nation to go to war with itself. In sum, though sectarian warfare may be the next phase of the Syrian uprising, we cannot be sure it is what we are witnessing at present.

41 Bakshi, Amar C. (April 26, 2011). Why Syria is descending into civil war. CNN. Retrieved from http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/26/why-syria-is-descending-into-civil-war/42 Cole, Juan (July 22, 2011). Syrian gov’t besieges Homs ahead of Friday demonstrations. Informed Comment. Retrieved from http://www.juancole.com/2011/07/syrian-govt-besieges-homs-ahead-of-friday-demonstrations.html43 Chulov, Martin, and Nour Ali (August 12, 2011). Syria violence spreads to commercial capital Aleppo. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/12/syria-violence-spreads-aleppo44 Cole, Juan (April 25, 2011). The tyrants strike back. Informed Comment. Retrieved from http://www.juancole.com/2011/04/the-tyrants-strike-back.html45 Cole, Juan (April 2, 2011). 7 dead in Syria unrest. Informed Comment. Retrieved from http://www.juancole.com/2011/04/7-dead-in-syria-unrest.html

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