Systems Thinking – A Post-Structuralist Critique James Juniper

Lecturer in International Business University of South Australia

1 Introduction: ____________________________________________________1 1.1 The Fundamental Constituents of a System:______________________________ 2

2 Systems Engineering and Cognitive Processes _______________________3 2.1 Multilayer Perceptrons _______________________________________________ 3 2.2 Multilayer Perceptrons, Self-Organizing Maps, and Real Neurons _____________ 7

3 Soft Systems Methodologies (SSMs) _______________________________10 3.1 Critical Systems Heuristics __________________________________________ 12 3.2 Total Systems Intervention __________________________________________ 13

4 The Basis for a Critique of Systems Methodologies __________________14 4.1 Habermas on Luhmann’s Systems Thinking _____________________________ 15 4.2 Foucault’s Interrogation of Power Relations _____________________________ 16

5 So What Would Foucault have Thought about Soft Systems Thinking? __22

6 Conclusion ____________________________________________________25

Bibliography _______________________________________________________26

1 Introduction: Systems thinking, understood in a broad sense, encompasses so-called ‘hard systems’ techniques that include the dynamic simulation of linear and non-linear systems (of differential and difference equations), and stochastic optimal control and filtering theory. The latter provides the quantitative and theoretical core of finance theory (asset and option pricing, portfolio management, risk management), operations research (logistics, PERT, CPM, production scheduling), and modeling and simulation in economics, management accounting, actuarial studies and marketing. However, in this paper I primarily address Soft Systems Methodologies (SSMs), which their advocates view as encompassing hard systems, while extending their concerns for design, planning and control into the uncertain and ambiguous domains of problem-oriented human systems. By their nature, social systems are susceptible to a variety of interpretations due to the differing values, beliefs and world views espoused by various social and organizational roups. In this paper I present a post-structuralist critique of systems thinking, questioning the soundness of its contribution to an understanding of organizational processes. To this end, I first review ‘hard’ systems approaches to the cognitive and linguistic dimensions of human behaviour. The inadequacies of these quantitative approaches propel me to review so-called SSMs that draw loosely on themes developed within the critical strand of post-war Continental philosophy, especially those set out in the works of Edmund Husserl and Jürgen Habermas. However, my critique of this material is motivated by an awareness that, from the late 1940s onwards, many scholars working in the Continental tradition, including Habermas, have distanced themselves

from Husserlian phenomenology. In questioning the philosophical underpinnings of SSM I initially examine a critique of systems thinking outlined in one of Habermas’ recent works (1987). However, this leads me to question certain aspects of his own philosophy that relate to the teleological notion of the ideal speech condition. This condition—one guaranteeing informed consensus—can only be realized after both the internal (the unconscious) and external (the class struggle) barriers have been removed to transparent communication. In this interrogation I have been guided by Foucault’s early analysis of the 19th Century episteme and his more mature reading of power relations and political technology. To set the overall context, in the next section of the paper I provide a brief overview of Systems thinking, before examining recent applications of quantitative methods of systems analysis to human cognition and language. 1.1 The Fundamental Constituents of a System: The components of a system—boundaries between the system and its environment, system elements, inputs, outputs, and feedback loops—are illustrated in the diagram below (Flood and Jackson, 1991, p. 6).

Input

Output

Boundary

Environment

Feedback Loop

“The System”

An element

A Relationship

This kind of model is sufficiently abstract and generic to represent a variety of different kinds of systems. For example, relationships between elements could be formalized in mathematic terms as a system of linear differential equations. In this case, positive and negative feedback loops, and more complex, cross-linked combinations of positive and negative feedback loops can be represented in the form of transfer functions, enabling the given system of equations to be translated into a polynomial matrix equation that, in principal, can be solved using linear algebra. While breakthroughs in operations research, applied finance theory and macroeconomics have drawn upon what might be called Hard Systems Theory—involving techniques of simulation, modeling, and optimal stochastic control and filtering—these developments have attracted increasing criticism from within the discipline of management. One of the early defectors from the fold was Herbert Simon, recognized for his principles of Bounded Rationality and satisficing behaviour (Simon, 1960). Simon emphasized the notion of the human being as a symbolic processor: (a) putting symbols in; (b) pulling symbols out; (c) storing symbols and relational structures of symbols; (d) constructing, modifying and erasing such symbol structures; (e) comparing two symbol structures; and (e) following one course of action or another, depending on the outcome of such a comparison. In all these cognitive activities Simon chose to emphasize both the internal, cognitive constraints and the external, social constraints. As a result, not all alternative strategies could be contemplated, not all the consequences of each strategy could be determined, and not all sets of

consequences could be evaluated. Cognitive limits applied not only to capabilities of information gathering, storage, and retrieval, but also over analysis, due to the adequacy of scientific theories. To deal with these constraints, Simon suggested that human agents resorted to the use of heuristics and rules of thumb, seeking to attain merely satisfactory rather than fully optimal outcomes. (Sent, 1997; Simon, 1960). Simon’s views had enormous influence over strategic management and the fledgling theories of Neuro-Cybernetics such as Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems Theory, and the Soft Systems Thinking of Checkland and Churchman, and Ackoff’s Interactive Planning framework (Ackoff, 1978; Beer, 1985; Checkland, 1990, 1993, 2000a,b; Churchman, 1971). Common to all these strands of management thinking was an emphasis on the ill-defined nature of most human, problem-orientated situations. Objectives were acknowledged to be ambiguous, and susceptible to a multiplicity of interpretations. Orientations towards a given problem situation were typically characterized by a marked divergence in actor interests, values, beliefs, priorities, and goals. Nevertheless, in recent times, certain branches of what might be termed hard systems theory have been applied to an understanding of human cognitive processes, including pattern recognition and language itself. In the next section I review a variety of hard systems techniques—artificial neural networks—that have not only been applied to pattern recognition, clustering, statistical estimation and non-linear regression tasks, but also to linguistic analysis: the latter task largely accomplished by a class of neural networks called self-organizing maps.

2 Systems Engineering and Cognitive Processes Recent developments in non-linear estimation, pattern recognition, and image processing have modeled themselves on neurophysiological activities, benefiting from biological, statistical and mathematical research into artificial neural networks (ANN). At the same time, this systems-based research has furthered our understanding of certain features of human and animal perception and cognition. The most common form of ANN is the multilayer perceptron (MLP), which I examine in more detail below. This is followed by a discussion about the differences between MLPs and human neuronal systems. I then consider the properties of self-organizing maps, a class of ANNs that seems to be more congruent with certain features of actual neuronal behaviour. This review serves as a convenient entry point, in the succeeding section of the paper, for an examination of different approaches to soft systems thinking that may better be able to accommodate concerns about the nature of human cognition and communicative practice. 2.1 Multilayer Perceptrons The single layer perceptron is the simplest form of neural network. It consists of a single neuron with adjustable synaptic weights and bias, the latter operating like an intercept term within a multiple regression. The single neuron forms the basis for an adaptive filter, the basic building block in signal processing. Adaptive filtering has evolved from the early work of pioneers such as Widrow and Hoff, who in 1960 constructed the least mean square algorithm. The single layer perceptron represents an unknown dynamical system, which produces a scalar output in response to the application of an m-dimensional stimulus at discrete units of time and at a constant rate. Each of the m elements can either be conceived as representing an input originating at different points in space or at different but uniformly spread moments in time. The following is a block-diagram for the single layer perceptron (Haykin, 1999, p. 119):

Single Layer Perceptron

x0 = +1

x1

x2

xm

Σ

ω 0

ω 1

ω 2

ω m

vϕ(v)

yInputs

Output

Activation Function

-1 Σe(n)

e(n) = d(n) - y(n)

d(n)

Backward Propagation(change ω’s to min error sum of squares)

Error term

… ……

Bias

This diagram depicts the vector of input signals xj, each of which is associated with its own synapse or connecting link to the neuron. As the signal passes through its respective synapse into the neuron, it is weighted by a unique synaptic weight ωj. Within the neuron an adder sums each of the weighted input signals before feeding them summed signal into an activation function. This function limits the permissible amplitude range of the output signal to some finite value, typically within the closed interval [0,1] or [-1,1]. Also shown is the process of back-propagation or feedback, which is associated with a signal traveling in an opposite direction to the input-output sequence of the neuron. This process of feedback, to be described in more detail below, adjusts each of the synaptic weights in accordance with a cost or penalty function which is sensitive to any discrepancies between the output from the neuron and some target or desired output sequence. A range of commonly adopted activation functions is portrayed in the following diagram (Haykin, 1999, pp. 12-15).

Activation Functions: ϕ(v)

( )

( ) ( )

( ) ( )( )

( ) ( )TVvp

vpvp

v

avv

vv

v

−+=

−−+

=

−=

<≥

=

exp11

1 prob with1 prob with1

exp1

0 if 0 0 if1

ϕ

ϕ

ϕ

Heaviside

Sigmoid

McCulloch-Pitts

0 +1-10

1

v

+1

-1

v

A multilayer perceptron can be constructed by combining together a parallel train of single layer perceptrons and then stringing together a number of layers in sequence. Typically, the input vector is fed into each of the neurons within any given layer, although this may not always be the case. The actual pattern of connections between the input layer and the first “hidden” layer of neurons determines the so-called receptive field of each neuron. In a multilayer perceptron, the outputs from each preceding layer then become the inputs into the neurons with the next layer, as shown in the following block diagram (Haykin, 1999, p. 159):

Multilayer Perceptron

… …

Inputs

…

InputLayer First

HiddenLayer

SecondHiddenLayer

OutputLayer

Outputs

This diagram depicts a three-layered neural network, which commences with an input layer feeding into the first “hidden” layer of neurons, which then feeds into the second before feeding into the final output layer. The architecture of a neural network depends on the receptive field of the first hidden layer of neurons, the pattern of interconnections between each layer, the activation functions that are deployed, and the weight-sharing process that governs the choice of synaptic weights. Multilayer Perceptrons are usually tuned using the back-propagation algorithm, a form of error-correction learning whereby an adjustment is made to the synaptic weight of a neuron in proportion to the product of the error signal and the input signal of the synapse in question (p. 163). Applying the so-called delta rule or Widrow-Hoff rule, a penalty or cost-function is minimized to indicate the direction in which the error surface is decreasing, hopefully towards the most minimal point on the surface (although sometimes, the iterative process can become trapped in a local rather than a global minimum). Alternative learning rules have been derived including Hebbian learning, which conforms to a two-part process: (1) If two neurons on either side of a synapse are activated simultaneously the strength of that

synapse is selectively increased. (2) If two neurons on either side of a synapse are activated asynchronously then that synapse is

selectively weakened or eliminated. Another form of learning is competitive learning under which each neuron within a group competes to be active at any particular time, as in self-organizing maps (treated in more detail below). Many learning algorithms are based on the method of minimizing the difference between two vectors1. Minimizing the Euclidean distance is equivalent to maximizing the similarity between two vectors, as measured by the projection of one vector on another. 1 Consider the Euclidean distance between the two m × 1 vectors xi and xj (Haykin, 1999, pp. 26-27):

Yet another form of learning is based on a branch of thermodynamics called statistical mechanics. For example, Boltzmann machines consist of what are called stochastic neurons, which reside in one of two states: the “on” state represented by +1, and the “off” state given by –1. The Boltzmann machine has two layers of neurons. One of these is a visible layer while the other is a hidden layer. From an analogy with thermodynamics, using Bayes rule, the probability of a realization can be determined at any level, conditional on the state attained by every other neuron2 (p. 564-5). Typically, this conditional probability has a sigmoid form. To determine the optimal choice of neuronal weights, a learning rule can be derived by maximizing the relevant log-likelihood function3.

( ) ( )21

1

,

−=−= ∑=

m

kjkik xxd jiji xxxx ,

where each vector has been normalized to possess unit length. In this case, d(xI, xj)2 will equal . ( ) ( ) jijiji xxxxxx TT 22−=−−

2 the energy of a Boltzmann machine is given by (p. 564):

( ) ∑ ∑≠

=i j jiji

jixxE ω

21x

In a physical system with many degrees of freedom, that can reside in one of a large number states, let the probability of occurrence of state i be given by pi with ∑ =∀≥

iiii ppp 1,0 . A fundamental result from

statistical mechanics tells us that when the system is in equilibrium with its surrounding environment then state i occurs with probability (p. 546):

−=

TkE

Zp

B

ii exp1 .

Here T is the absolute temperature in kelvin, kB is Boltzmann’s constant, the distribution is called the Gibbs distribution, and Z is a constant called the partition function whose value is given by (p. 547):

∑

=

i B

i

TkEZ exp .

This expression can be derived from the requirement that all probabilities sum to unity. 3 A mathematical justification for much of what goes on in the estimation of neural networks is provided by regularization theory, a technically demanding branch of optimization theory that draws upon differential geometry. This method is designed to find a solution to so-called ill-posed problems of multivariate interpolation (ie., hyper-surface reconstructions that are required for the estimation of non-linear functions, often within a space of reduced dimensionality) (Haykin, 1999, p. 267). Assume that the input signal is a sequence of vectors xi ∈ℜm, i = 1,2,…,N, with the desired response being a sequence of scalars di ∈ℜm, i = 1,2,…,N. Regularization theory sets up a Lagrange multiplier expression, which is a function of two terms to determine the approximating function yi = F(x). The first of these terms is the usual standard error term:

( ) ( )∑=

−=N

iiiS ydF

1

2

21ξ .

The second term ξC(F) is the so-called regularizing term which depends on the geometrical properties of the approximating function F(x). Specifically:

( ) 2

21 FFC D=ξ ,

where D is the linear differential operator, which acts as a stabilizer, making the solution smooth and continuous. Using some fairly technical mathematics, including Fréchet differentiation of functionals, the Riesz representation theorem, Green’s identity and the relationship between linear differential operators and Green’s function, Haykin (1999, pp. 267-273) derives the following expression for the optimal value of the Euler-Legrange function:

( ) ( )[ ] ( )∑=

−=N

ii GFdF

1

,1ixxxx

λλ.

Here, λ, the Lagrange multiplier, is called the regularization parameter and the G(x, xi) are symmetric Green’s functions with centers of expansion at xi. The term to the left of this expression can be thought of as

2.2 Multilayer Perceptrons, Self-Organizing Maps, and Real Neurons Unfortunately, Haykin observes that in many respects MLP’s seem to operate differently from real neurons. For one thing, synaptic connections in MLPs can switch from being excitatory to inhibitory in contrast to synaptic connections in real neurons. For another, global forms of communication (e.g. hormonal, intentional) are ignored in MLP construction. And in MLPs, weights are modified by pre-synaptic activity and by an error signal that is independent of post-synaptic activity, in contrast to neurobiological findings. Apparently, the rapid transmission of information backward along a neuron’s axon does not occur in real neurons, as it must with back propagation. Finally, back propagation requires a “teacher” whereas many aspects of neurobiological learning do not. Nevertheless, one type of neural network that appears to be closely related to actual brain processes is the self organizing map (SOM) (Haykin, 1999, Chapter 9). This form of neural net is optimized through a competitive learning algorithm and seems to mirror certain aspects of perceptual function in monkeys (Haykin, 1999, p. 476). Under competitive learning, output neurons compete amongst themselves to be activated (fired), usually through in-built lateral inhibition (a form of negative feedback). As a result, only one neuron within a group can be on at any one time. Each neuron is placed at the node of a one or two-dimensional lattice, with the spatial locations of the neurons being indicative of certain statistical features of the input pattern. It can be thought in mathematical terms as a non-linear generalization of principal component analysis. A schematic example of an SOM is provided in the following diagram.

Layerof sourcenodes

Two-dimensional Lattice of Neurons

The SOM algorithm proceeds by initializing the synaptic weights (via small numbers selected from a random number generator). Within each group, the neuron with the largest value

GwF =λ

a set of weights ωi, whose values can be found by solving for w in the vector version of the optimality condition (Haykin, 1999, pp. 273-274; Poggio and Gerosi, 1990a):

,

where . ( )λλFdw −=

1

( )Thus w . dIG 1−+= λRegularization theory provides insight into the tradeoffs between the reliability of training data and the goodness of fit of the model and can be deployed in the optimal tuning of MLP neurons. Regularization theory also provides a deeply grounded rationale for the distinction between free and relative entropy: a distinction that underpins large deviations theory and statistical mechanics. Large deviation theory is drawn upon in the literature on the risk-sensitive control of stochastic systems under relative entropy constraints.

according to a discriminant function is declared the winner in a competitive process. Other neurons within the topological neighbourhood of the winning neurons are cooperatively excited. This enables individual neurons to increase their respective discriminant function values through adjustments applied to their synaptic weights. It is understandable that SOMs have been employed in artificial intelligence systems for semantic or conceptual mapping. The Hebbian postulate of learning - that a synaptic weight is increased with a simultaneous occurrence of presynaptic and postsynaptic activities - while suitable for associative learning, is not suited for SOMs. This is because the change in connectivity only occurs in one direction, driving all synaptic weights to saturation. This is accomplished through the introduction of a forgetting term. The SOM algorithm stores a large number of input vectors x ∈ Χ by finding a smaller set of prototypes wj∈ Α, so as to provide a good approximation to the input space Χ. A theoretical rationale for what goes on is provided by vector quantization theory, which views the process of constructing a “feature map” as one involving an encoding and a decoding component, as shown schematically in the following diagram (Luttrell, 1989):

Inputvectorx

Encoderc(x)

Decoderx′(c)

Reconstructionvectorx ′(c)

Code c(x)

For largely illustrative purposes, the following diagram of an SOM that has been applied to the conceptual mapping of different animals identified by their respective names and attributes, has been reproduced from Haykin’s text.

Dov

e

Hen

Duc

k

Goo

se

Ow

l

Haw

k

Eagl

e

Fox

Dog

Wol

f

Cat

Tige

r

Lion

Hor

se

Zebr

a

Cow

Small 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0Medium 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0Big 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 12 legs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 04 legs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Hair 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Hooves 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1Mane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0Feathers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0Hunts 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0Runs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0Flies 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Swims 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Animal Names and Their Attributes

xa = attribute code (13 × 1)xs = symbol code (16 × 1)

+

=

=

a

s

s

a

x0

0x

xx

xEach data vector is normalized to unit length for training a 10 × 10lattice of neurons.

The resulting semantic map, also shown below, has been obtained through the use of a particular technique called simulated electrode penetration mapping (neurons with strongest responses to their respective inputs shown in bold font, and boundaries identify similarly related groups of animals: that is, the map is divided into regions representing birds, peaceful species and hunters):

dog dog fox fox fox cat cat cat eagle eagledog dog fox fox fox cat cat cat eagle eaglewolf wolf wolf fox cat tiger tiger tiger owl owlwolf wolf lion lion lion tiger tiger tiger hawk hawkwolf wolf lion lion lion tiger tiger tiger hawk hawkwolf wolf lion lion lion owl dove hawk dove dovehorse horse lion lion lion dove hen hen dove dovehorse horse zebra cow cow cow hen hen dove dovezebra zebra zebra cow cow cow hen hen duck goosezebra zebra zebra cow cow cow duck duck duck goose

Despite their applicability to models of perception and language recognition, it should be obvious that artificial neural networks, in their current form, do not support linguistic activity that could be called conscious or intentional4. It is this inadequacy of systems engineering approaches that has lead to their replacement by more comprehensive socio-philosophical approaches, which will be described in the next section of this paper. In an effort to encompass the social domains of language, interpretation, and argumentation, those theorists wanting to apply systems methodologies to social and business organizations have embraced disciplines such as 4 The forms of learning reviewed so far can be thought of as locally rather than globally based. The field of Neurodynamics is concerned with the latter form of learning, which, in broad terms, can take two forms: those reliant on associative or content-addressable memory; and those grounded in input-output mapping models. Examples of the former include the Hopfield Model, which is constructed around an electronic circuit model of neuronal activity (see Haykin, 1999, pp. 685, 702, 706, and 718). Examples of the latter include the Nonlinear Autoregressive Model (NARX) and those that apply Extended Kalman Filtering theory to the estimation of non-linear models (see Haykin, 1999, pp. 770 and 770, respectively). However, it can readily be appreciated that similar limitations would apply to these global versions.

sociology, and political science—to find satisfying frameworks for thinking about the socio-political and cultural aspects of complex systems. I review some of these frameworks in the next section of the paper.

3 Soft Systems Methodologies (SSMs) One influential methodology that openly confronts many of the issues pertaining to researchers in mnanagement and organizational studies is Soft Systems Methodology (SSM). As there is a variety of SSMs, here, I shall focus on the approach promoted by members of the Lancaster University action research programme that has been further developed by Peter Checkland and his associates at the University of Lancashire (Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Checkland and Holwell, 1993; Wilson, 1984). SSMs evolved out of the mathematical general systems theory research and the systems engineering thinking of the 50s and 60s. In its departure from “hard systems” approaches SSM has been philosophically influenced by the Husserlian phenomenological perspectives of Alfred Schutz (1967) and Berger and Luckman’s synthesis of phenomenology and Sartrian theory, which places emphasis on the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman, 1966). In addition to action learning, other influences include Herbert Simon’s work on information systems, business organizations, and the nature of artificial intelligence and human reasoning (Simon, 1960) and, more recently, the notions of complexity and autopoesis, as expounded in Maturana and Varela (1980). SSMs can be distinguished from their hard systems counterparts in two main ways: first, their advocates attack the often unquestioned assumption that the world contains systems and sub-systems in the form of externally subsisting objects; second, they question whether such systems and sub-systems can, on the one hand, be characterized by naming their objectives and then, on the other hand, engineered to achieve these taken-for-granted ends (Checkland, 2000a, p. S13). In moving away from these assumptions, SSM views human beings as undertaking purposeful action that is meaningful for them, but without necessarily being grounded in well defined objectives. Instead, purposefulness is regarded as an “emergent” activity (p. S14). As such, multiple interpretations of any declared purpose are possible, and before systems can be understood, a series of relevant human activity systems models must be chosen, reflecting the range of world views or Weltanschauung upon which they are based (pp. S14-15). Each world-view is seen to determine both relevance of the model and its content. Moreover, rather than working with a clearly defined “problem” emphasis is placed on problematical situations. Therefore, any approach to the resolution of these problem situations is itself regarded as an emerging, organized learning system (S15). As such, the models are not so much representations of a certain set of external relationships in the world outside the researcher but rather, accounts of concepts about purposeful activity, based on declared world-views, which can be used to stimulate debate around what is perceived to be problematic and what can be done to change things (p. S26). To clarify this point, Checkland distinguishes between primary task models that map existing organization structures, and issue-based models that focus on the problem situation and may well cut across organizational boundaries (p. S27). As illustrated in the following diagram, SSM is predicated on four activities (Checkland, Fig. A1, p. S16; p. S21): 1) finding out about the problem situation, including both culturally and philosophically; 2) formulating some relevant purposeful activity models; 3) debating the situation, using the models, seeking from that debate both

(a) changes that would improve the situation and are regarded as both desirable and (culturally) feasible, and

(b) the accomodation between conflicting interests that will enable action-to-improve to be taken;

4) Taking action in the situation to bring about improvement.

Perceived Real-World Problem Situation

Leads toselection

of

Models of relevantpurposeful activity

systems, each basedon a declared

world-view

A structured debate aboutdesirable and

feasible change

Comparison(using models)

Findaccommodations

which enable

Actionto

improve

OBSERVE

ACT

REFLECT

PLAN Effectively, Checkland has taken the Kolb action learning cycle defined by the familiar steps—observe, reflect, plan, act—and has transformed it into a social constructed process of intervention. The first part of his analysis is supported by Rich Picture Building to identify core processes and combined structures. Root statements define the purposeful activity to be modeled by identifying the relevant inputs into the transformative process, the resulting outputs of the process, and any requisite resources that may be utilised. This transformative process is characterised by the: “Do P (the what to do) by Q (the how to do it) to achieve R (the why to do it)” (S28). Identification of the transformative process establishes the level of the system. One level above this is the wider system, at which a decision can be made to stop the system operating. One level below this is the sub-system comprising the individual activities that achieve the defined transformation. Each activity can then be further decomposed into detailed component activities. Three additional modes of analysis assist in grasping the richness of the problem situation. Analysis 1, 2 and 3 deal, respectively, with tracing problem ownership to individual players, and identifying relevant problem solvers; the identification of the roles, norms and values framework pertaining to the problem situation; and an analysis of the distribution of power in the social situation (pp. S23-S26). The latter focuses on what must be possessed by the would-be actors so that they can significantly influence other people and cause things to happen or stop other possible, but undesirable courses of action. Sense-making plays an important part in each of these three modes of analysis. Performance measures for each activity are based on the familiar distinction between efficacy (E1), efficiency (E2), and effectiveness (E3). Activity analysis based on relations of inter-dependency and causal succession between activities is performed, with the requisite monitoring and control actions consciously incorporated into the activity model. Checkland argues that this process should be accomplished iteratively to ensure that the activities are justified by the defining characteristics of the problem situation (p. S31). To guide thinking about factors that enable desirable and feasible change to occur Checkland commonsensically urges researchers to identify the combination of structures, processes and attitudes that is required, why the action should be taken, who is responsible for the action, when it should be taken, and which criteria should be deployed to judge the success of the action (p. S34). In a major review of contract relationships between purchaser sand providers that was conducted for the UK National Health Service (NHS), Checkland and his co-workers produced a model of activities, which was used to structure interviews with 60 NHS professionals. Discourse

analysis was then employed to fashion a new model of activities that was more congruent with the world-view of the NHS practitioners (Flynn and Williams, 1997). In discussing methodology as the principles of method, Checkland introduces the LUMAS model, pictured below (Figure A10, Checkland, 2000a, p. S37):

New ‘improved’problem situation

LearningL

User ofmethodology

U

Real-worldsituation

S

Actualapproachadopted

A

Methodologyformally described

(source of A)M

Modifies,enriches

appreciationof

yields

Perceives,has a

concern forbecomes

TailorsM to S

Uses toguide

action in becomes

appreciates

changes

From this perspective, methodology itself is an emergent and user-dependent process that occurs whenever SSM procedures are applied in real-world situations. However, in all applications there are family resemblances that are determined by the constitutive and strategic rules imposed through the adoption of SSM (p. S38). In responding to the question of how to judge the scientific veracity of research based on the application of SSM, which cannot be replicated in any other situation, Checkland argues the need to go beyond weak claims of plausible belief in stipulating that action research should be recoverable for anyone interested in critically scrutinizing the research. To this end, he suggests that, from the outset, researchers should explicitly declare the intellectual frameworks and processes of application (p. S42). Arguably, much of the vitality and profundity of Checkland’s on-going research agenda can be traced to his ability to somehow rise above his own chosen theoretical and philosophical foundations. This is most obvious in his recent contributions. For example, in a valedictory piece on Universities Checkland identifies his core concern as being one focusing on “the abiding mystery of the nature of human and social phenomena” where we are always “tiptoeing near that hazardous frontier between what can be rationalized in scholarship and that which lies beyond rationalization and, indeed, is beyond scholarship—but is more important” (Checkland, 2000b, p. S72). At this point he rhapsodises lyrically, and in true romantic form, about the ineffable mysteries of life, love, the darkness, music and song, moving in turn from the poetry of Louis McNiece, to Nelson Mandela’s political wisdom, to Stravinsky’s love for his wife, and the jazz poetry of Langston Hughes. Perhaps this poetic interpretation of the ineffable is the very domain within which both philosophical critiques of phenomenology and SSMs can be shown to occupy a common ground. 3.1 Critical Systems Heuristics More recent development’s of soft systems thinking such as Walter Ulrich’s Critical Systems Heuristics and Flood and Jackson’s Total Systems Intervention, place increasing emphasis on the complexity of systems: distinguished from simple systems by the presence of a large rather than a small versus number of elements, well-defined rather than poorly defined laws and structures, full rather than partial interactions between sub-systems, evolution rather than

homeostatic stability, sub-system purposefulness and independence, and self emergent properties (Ulrich, 1983; Flood and Jackson, 1991). Ulrich adopts Jürgen Habermas’s notion of knowledge-constituting interests, emphasizing the importance of emancipatory and communicative rather than merely technical forms of rationality. However, while Habermas points to the need to eliminate internal (i.e. unconscious repression) and external (i.e. class relations) limitations over reason so that a universal and unconstrained consensus can be achieved, Ulrich views this goal of “ideal speech” as utopian and infeasible (Habermas, 1972). To find a more practical philosophical ground, Ulrich turns to Kant’s lecture on the Enlightenment, where the philosopher introduces the three truth-seeking questions: “what can I know?” (the systems idea); “what might I do?” (the moral idea); and “what may I hope?” (the guarantor idea). Ulrich uses these three questions as the basis for his critical inquiries, with the intention of making the normative content of system designs transparent, considering the totality of conditions bearing on any relevant judgement about the system, and bringing critical reflection to bear on the presuppositions, partiality and the boundary constraints imposed over the judgement of involved participants and design experts. 3.2 Total Systems Intervention Flood and Jackson acknowledge the realist distinction between systems metaphors and the real world, which implies the need for systematically ordered conceptions of organization. As such, they favour the disciplined, systematic use of metaphors to match organizational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Flood and Jackson draw on Morgan’s discursive approach, distinguishing between mechanistic (closed), organic (open), neurocybernetic (viable), cultural, and political metaphors of organization (Flood and Jackson, 1991, Chapter 1; Morgan, 1986). In mechanistic (closed) systems, humans follow the machine, conforming to its stable, repetitive, and straightforward rhythms. However, Flood and Jackson warn that this mechanistic model is rigid and dehumanizing if followed too dogmatically, preventing necessary adaptation of organizations to changed circumstances. Organic (open) systems are viewed as self-regulating and responsive to change, a feature that is entirely appropriate for operating within complex environments. However, they note that the organic model ignores the fact that reality is socially constructed, and while organizations are potentially imbued with conflict, they are also capable of supporting proactive change. This leads to the neurocybernetic (viable system dynamics or VSD) model, which emphasizes active learning and control, and creativity in response to environmental uncertainty. However, it ignores the fact that the specific purpose of a given part may not be congruent with the whole, it also elides the reality of political resistance, and once again, the social construction of reality. As such, another model must be introduced—that of the cultural system—emphasizing the mutual sense of belonging that members of an organization possess along with a shared construction of social reality. However, Flood and Jackson observe that even this metaphor ignores the ever-present danger of ideological control, and skates over the possibility that a cultural system can take a long time to transform, a brute fact that is not helpful to those who have to manage complex organizations under short time-horizons. This forces the adoption of another metaphorical model of the political system—one which explicitly recognises the role of power, coercion, and conflict within organizations, and the ubiquitous presence of interest-based rationality. However, this very recognition, they suggest, may politicize a given situation, breeding mistrust. In departing from a unitary conception of the organization as one characterized by common interests, values and beliefs, agreed objectives, means, and ends, and the participation of all,

INTEREST

CONFLICT

POWER

UNITARY PLURALISTIC COERCIVE

TEAMS

COALITIONS

PRISONS

Flood and Jackson acknowledge a divergence in actor interests, values, beliefs, priorities, and goals. They follow Morgan in further differentiating between pluralist and coercive organizations: while coalitions based on compatible interests and some degree of compromise over means and ends are achievable in the pluralist case they are precluded in the latter case, to be replaced by power relations and coercion. These ideal type categories are depicted below (Flood and Jackson, 1991, pp.13, 42). Flood and Jackson argue that organizations are too complex for the application of a single model. Instead, they require a range of different systems metaphors that, in turn, must be linked closely to methodologies. However, they emphasize the complementarity between different methodologies suggesting that researchers and practitioners must attend to respective strengths and weaknesses and opportunities and threats opened up by each respective approach. They argue the need for interaction between 3 phases of intervention. In the first phase—creativity—the systems practitioner must introduce all the alternatives, considering each of the five metaphors identifying, in addition, the presence of unitary, pluralist or coercive political factors. The second stage—choice—involves the selection of both dominant and dependent methods and associated tools. The third stage—implementation—involves the integration of tasks with tools to achieve a highly interactive and coordinated outcome. All relevant parties—facilitators, clients and others must be engaged at all stages. This “horses for courses” approach is summarized in the diagram below, which shows Flood and Jackson’s mapping of each major model into its respective cell as defined by the simplicity or complexity of the system and the nature of the political structure.

C-C

?

C-PIntPlan’gSSM

C-UVSDGSTheorySocTechConting’y

Complex

S-C

CSH S-P

SSDSAST

S-UORSAnalysisSEngin’gS.Dyn’s

Simple

Coercive Pluralist Unitary

4 The Basis for a Critique of Systems Methodologies Flood and Jackson partially acknowledge that the system metaphor begins to loose cohesion as principles of complexity and analysis of power relations are introduced (by leaving the last square in their diagram blank). Nevertheless, despite their use of Morgan’s metaphor of the psychic prison, borrowed in turn from the work of Foucault, I argue below that their reading of power is fairly conventional in that it effectively ignores much of what Foucault was trying to achieve in his rethinking of the political: especially his questioning of traditional concepts such as those of “sovereignty” “interest” and “ideology”. In their place, Foucault (1980) sought to introduce concepts of domination through discursive and non-discursive apparatuses, emphasizing the material constitution of power through effective practices. Foucault was especially concerned with understanding how techniques of power activate and coordinate apparatuses of knowledge that are both much more and much less than ideology; and in identifying the way that global and general mechanisms of power, within an ascending hierarchy, operate to colonize and transform

the infinitesimal mechanisms of power that are applied at more localized and specific sites, each possessing their own tactics and history. Furthermore, the uncritical reliance on social constructivism in the writings of Checkland and Flood and Jackson, prevents further interrogation of its grounding in Husserlian phenomenology: a philosophy that has become the target of every variety of contemporary post-structuralist thought from Derrida through to Foucault, Deluze and Lacan. As such, there is no recognition of the internal critiques of rationality that begin with Kant’s identification of the antinomies and paralogisms of reason and have carried through to Hegel, Weber, and current strands of Post-Structuralist thought5. At the same time, I would argue that the politically attenuated notion of emancipation that systems thinking promotes largely elides or weakens the critical focus on removal of (external) political constraints and (internal) unconscious obstacles, that is so much a part of Habermas’ writing. Although Flood and Jackson openly criticize CSH for its idealism, immaturity of methodology, (ie. its lack of integration with actual interventions) and its refusal to examine the material preconditions for specific ideologies and/or possible agents of transformation, they provide no theoretical instruments for dealing with these issues. To highlight these observations, I next examine a critique of systems theory outlined in one of Habermas’ more recent works (Habermas, 1987). This is followed by a review of Foucault’s thinking about power, which is designed to show how his thinking goes well beyond the simplistic carceral metaphors embraced in Flood and Jackson’s work. To this end, I identify a key motif in Foucault’s later thinking about power relations: the notion of pastoral power. 4.1 Habermas on Luhmann’s Systems Thinking In the last of his twelve lectures on The Philosphical Discourse of Modernity Jürgen Habermas (1987) takes aim at one of the most eloquent of the philosophical readings of systems theory: to be found in the works of Niklas Luhmann (1984). Luhmann offers a general theory of society that is, itself, grounded in a critique of the Enlightenment notion of knowledge. He aims to replace the duality between the knowing subject and the knowable object, instituted by modernist thought, with the metabiological duality holding between the system and its environment6. 5 Of course, Kant is better known for his Schemata of Understanding. The transcendental categories concern number or Quantity (and universal judgements about unity, particular judgements about plurality and singular judgements about totality), degree or Quality (and affirmative judgements about reality, negative judgements and infinite judgements about limitation and absence of limitation, respectively), the permanence of the real in time, succession of the manifold of perception, and the simultaneity of determinations that come under Relation (and categorical judgements about subsistence, hypothetical judgements about causality and disjunctive judgements about reciprocal action, respectively), and agreement between the synthesis of representations, existence in determinate time and in all times or Modality (and problematic judgements about possibility or impossibility, assertive judgements about existence or non-existence, and apodictic judgements about necessity or contingency, respectively). Although we cannot know things-in-themselves, we can interpret them through the transcendental schemas of understanding, which both condition and enable our knowledge of the real. This notion of the “writing” of the world is taken up and elaborated on in Husserl’s analysis of eidetic intuition. While Habermas, in his critique of Husserlian Phenomenology (Habermas, 1986), deploys the Fichtean notion of knowledge-constituting interests against attempts by Kant, Hegel, and Husserl to purify reason of the contaminations of ‘interest’, Derrida deconstructs Husserl’s distinction between indicative and expressive statements (Derrida, 1978). In a similar fashion, Lacan has drawn on Hegel’s writings on language and signification to question both Husserlian Phenomenology and Ego Psychology (see Zizek, 1994a). The Lacanians, in particular, have discussed the antinomies of reason: those aspects of Kant’s thinking that impose limits over what we can know (Copjec, 1995). 6 A similar notion is at work in ideological interpretations of “the invisible hand” that figure prominently in the works of neo-Hayekian scholars (Butos and Koppl, 1977). It is important to realize that the notion of rationality at play in the rational-expectations literature does not have to be conscious or codifiable rationality. From Hayek, to Milton Freidman and beyond, we have been told that certain things happen the way they do for complex reasons that may escape the full comprehension of individuals. However, despite this, economic outcomes and decisions can be described as though they were the products of fully conscious rational calculation.

Habermas (1987, p 369) argues that the meaning processing systems that Luhmann bestows upon philosophy as a replacement for the knowing subjects of modernist discourse, are conceived on the basis of a very narrow and constrained interpretation of meaning-as-code. Luhmann turns to Husserlian Phenomenology to arrive at his idea of meaning as equivalent to the phenomenological intention: a pre-linguistic intuition of such notions as connectivity, limit, boundary, pulse and duration. Because language is seen to be derivative of pre-linguistic meaning connections, Habermas observes that “communication carried on by linguistic means cannot be explained in terms of specifically linguistic conditions of possibility” (Habermas, 1987, p. 380). In such a world, there can be no basis for establishing validity or consensus, enabling effective communication, or achieving emancipation from internal or external constraints7. As such, there can be no real prospect of achieving pre-harmonisation between the existent plurality of system cum environments; or distinguishing between psychic and social attributes of consciousness (Luhmann is forced by his logic to regard society as merely an aggregate of all existing system/environments). In summary, Habermas accuses Luhmann of rejecting epistemology (thinking), metaphysics (being), and linguistic theory (communication), thereby denying any chance for communicative participation in a common life-world based on shared meanings8. 4.2 Foucault’s Interrogation of Power Relations Foucault came to the works of Habermas and other members of the Frankfurt School quite late in his career. On being asked by an interviewer, Trombadori, to describe what set him apart from his academic training in the phenomenological tradition, Foucault responds by defining the latter as,

…a certain way of bringing a reflective gaze to bear on some object of ‘lived experience,’ on the everyday in its transitory form, in order to grasp its meanings. For Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, on the other hand, experience is trying to reach a certain point in life that is as close as possible to the ‘unlivable,’ to that which can’t be lived through. What is required is the maximum of intensity and the maximum of impossibility at the same time. (Foucault, 2001a, p. 241)

In The Order of Things, his early work on the history of the human sciences, Foucault views phenomenology as a discourse whose possibility was established by the same 19th Century epistemic space that gave birth both to Marxist eschatology and to positivism. In becoming detached from representation, Foucault argues that the grids deployed in the Classical analysis of life, labour and language, the various tableaus or taxonomies, have now been eliminated, especially those belonging to the analysis of discourse itself. This cutting free, he suggests,

7 The ideal of undistorted communication not only provides the basis for the Habermasian notion of ideal speech—a speech extricated from distortions due to economic interests of class or the unconscious barriers of neurotic anxiety, delusion, and disavowal, but also for the concept of legitimation. For Habermas, legitimation performs the ideological function of disguising the actual presence of such distortions as a barrier to achieving social consensus (Owen, 1996, pp. 122-123; Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 213). 8 The same telling criticism can be directed at recent applications of systems theory in macroeconomics and finance (Andersen et al, 1998; Hansen et al, 2001; Maenhout, 1999; Tornell, 2000; Trojani and Vanini, 2001; Veronesi, 2001). In these representative agent approaches, cognitive processes are erroneously divorced from those relating to prediction and decision-making (through the assumption that rates of economic growth or returns on different financial assets can be represented by an exogenous stochastic process) and techniques of action-oriented (risk-sensitive) feedback control are deployed. In these approaches assumptions that are often justified on the basis of mathematical convenience, effectively undermine any role for government interventions intended to alleviate the detrimental effects of financial instability, such as involuntary unemployment and large-scale corporate failure. Equally, there is no role for civic society in transforming institutional structures to promote prudent behaviour, integrity, and a more socially responsible corporate ethos. And yet it can be shown that the underlying assumptions justifying the adoption of these techniques are fraught with contradictions that are severe enough to preclude their feasibility (Juniper, 2002).

imposes on language a “singular destiny”, yet one realized through a multiplicity of modes of being (Foucault, 1970, pp. 303-304). Whereas in Classical thought, the person for whom representation exists is the ever absent King, in 19th Century thought, man comes into existence in the place of the King, as the sovereign subject of all knowledge. No longer does he appear as a mere species or a genus, no longer as the mere locus of memory and imagination, or need and desire, but as someone to whom is ascribed a limited, specific domain, the regional nature of one whose destiny it is to know nature and itself as a natural being. At the same time, language no longer functions as Discourse—as the translucent necessity through which representation and being must pass. Instead, and in its place, the mode of being of the cogito can and must be described (pp. 307-312). Under the heading of The Analytic of Finitude, Foucault argues that things now stand in an external relation to the human being who arises in the space hollowed out by living beings, objects of exchange, and words: each of these withdraws into its own space. Man becomes governed by them as a living being, an instrument of production, and a vehicle for words which exist before him, marked by them in his finitude. Thus finitude becomes the identity and the difference of each of these positivities as they are manifest in death, desire and the succession of discursive instances (Foucault, 1970, pp. 312-318). In the next section of his chapter on 19th Century thought, Man as the Empirical-Transcendental Doublet, Foucault once again contends that knowledge will be attained in Man, that he renders all knowledge possible, not through representation (reminiscence, imagination, self-consciousness) but rather in his very finitude as determined by both his anatomo-physiology and by historico-social conditions. This implies a change in the notion of truth to one predicated on its expression through the body and perception, as historical illusion overcome, and as true discourse. However, this notion of truth is condemned to oscillate, in regard to in its very foundation, not only between the empirical truth of the object (positivism), and the eschatological anticipation of truth proceeding from our own discourse (Marxism), but also within the phenomenological analysis of actual experience—in the form of a tension or mediation between dialectical promise and aesthetic reduction. Foucault argues that each of these models of truth is determined by the same archaological configuration—and opposed to each is the Nietzschean question “Does Man really exist?” (pp. 318-322). Foucault examines yet another dimension of 19th Century under the heading The Cogito and the Unthought: the unthought is broadly conceived as comprising both ground, shadow and stain. The mode of being of man now extends from the cogito to that which is not reflected in the cogito—the not known (as well as from pure apprehension to what he calls the ‘empirical clutter’). Man effectively inhabits something that eludes him, something which results in a four-fold displacement from truth to being, nature to man, the possibility of understanding to the possibility of misunderstanding; and finally, from the previous Classical opposition between philosophy and science to that holding between philosophy and the ‘unaccounted for experience’. At the zenith of this displacement Foucault suggests that it can no longer be claimed that the “I think” of the Classical cogito implies the “I am”, and that during the Classical epoch the reflection of ratio upon itself only became possible because man could conceive of himself. However, in the 19th Century, thought now eludes itself within the tangles and ontological vicissitudes of life, language, and labour. The privilege of reflection has been displaced by faceless, shadowy mechanisms, by what we call the Unconscious (pp. 322-328). It could be argued that at this juncture in Foucault’s thinking about the human sciences, we once again traverse certain of the themes and insights that Checkland attempted to evoke through the media of poetry and jazz. However, unlike Checkland, Foucault is attempting to describe something that has occurred entirely within the epistemic field of the human sciences. Finally, Foucault considers The Retreat and Return of the Origin. Where Classical thought viewed the Origin as the representational site of transparent equivalence of (e.g. likeness in nature, identity in exchange and language, reminiscence in knowledge), for 19th Century thinking this operation of equivalence, he argues, is been replaced by an anthropology predicated on a

preconditioning historicity: of life, labour and language as already-begun, as other than, yet as activated by man. Man, as such, is constituted in correlation with, as bound to, and as articulated upon these historicities as a living, labouring, and speaking being (pp. 328-335). Foucault then goes on to distinguish this approach to philosophy from that represented by the writings of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot: a provocative tradition that he regards as one informed by extreme or “limit-experiences”—experiences that somehow wrench the subject away from itself and, likewise, from the phenomenological effort to ground meaning and experience in the transcendental functions of subjectivity9. He goes on to suggest that something of this sort is responsible for the transformative effects of his writing, insofar as it prevents him “from being the same”10. At a certain point in his interview with Trombadori, Foucault is asked to explain the relationship between this critique of subjectivity via the ‘limit-experience’ and his concern with problems of epistemology and the philosophy of science. Initially, Foucault responds by highlighting the concern of phenomenology with both ‘lived experience’ and the history and rationality of science, and the fact that Marxism professed to be a science, a history of society, and thus, a social history of scientific practices. Through Nietzsche, Foucault notes that he moved beyond the concerns of Althusser and Desanti with a history of rationality and irrationality in the sciences, towards a history of truth to the extent that truth “consists in a certain relationship with that discourse that knowledge maintains with itself”, in and through history, to the extent that truth “forms part of the history of discourse and is like an effect internal to a discourse or a practice” (Foucault, 2001a, p. 253). From such a perspective, Foucault notes that science can be analyzed as an experience in which the subject is modified by that experience. Within the new, unformalized sciences, such as the science of madness in the eighteenth century, both the object, madness, was taking form and, at the same time, so was the subject as the being capable of understanding madness (p. 254). However, Foucault emphasizes the fact that this experience could not properly be understood unless it was related to “certain well-known historical processes: the birth of a certain normalizing society, connected with practices of confinement, with a specific economic and social context corresponding to the period of urbanization, the birth of capitalism, with the existence of a floating, scattered population, which the new requirements of the economy and the state were unable to tolerate” (p. 255). Although Bachelard’s notions of discontinuity were undoubtedly important, Foucault cites Canguilhem as the principle influence in the development of his conception of the history of the sciences (p. 256). For Foucault, the kinship of Canguilhem with the Nietzsche and limit-experience is most obvious in the former’s historical analyses of the life-sciences, through which the human being acquired the power to act on itself and alter itself as a living being through “changing its living conditions and its own life” (p. 256). 9 In another interview Foucault (1985) expresses this point more succinctly: the main target of this critical reassessment was the very idea that the “…phenomenological, trans-historical subject [was] able to provide an account of the historicity of reason”. 10 Ironically in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas makes this aspect of Foucault’s approach to philosophy the major target of’ his critique, despite his own attack on the common basis of phenomenology and positivism (a critique effected through the transcendental determination of communicative and emancipatory knowledge-constituting interests). For Habermas, this critique is justified on the basis that Foucault’s Nietzschean philosophy amounts to a complete renunciation of what ought to be accomplished through an inter-subjective notion of science as the product of social inquiry: one grounded in a transcendental conception of truth as warranted assertibility and ethically guaranteed by the emancipatory possibility of free and undistorted communication. As such, Habermas accuses Foucault of a foundationless moral relativism. Unfortunately, a more detailed rebuttal of this argument would take me too far away from my main purpose, that of presenting a critique of systems theory that is positioned within a historically grounded Foucaldian analysis of power-knowledge relations. A more detailed evaluation of the on-going debate between advocates of Foucault and those of Habermas is provided in Flyvbjerg (1998), Owen (1996), Visker (1995), and Kelly (1994).

Later on in the interview, Trombadori asks Foucault to describe the relation of his thoughts to the Frankfurt School. Foucault comments on the remarkable fact that the works of this School were largely unknown for a long time in France, despite the emigration of many of its representatives to France during the war (273). Despite harboring some initial concerns, Foucault acknowledges that once he had began to read more of the relevant works, he “then understood that the representatives of the Frankfurt School had tried, earlier than I, to say things I had also been trying to say for years”, especially about the “effects of power in relation to a rationality that was defined historically and geographically, in the West, from the sixteenth century onward” (p. 273). Nevertheless, although acknowledging this shared struggle against domination by a reason that flies in the face of the Enlightenment promise that freedom could be attained through the exercise of reason, Foucault still detects the survival of a fairly traditional conception of the subject. He sees this conception as one “permeated with Marxist humanism” especially in its “connection with certain Freudian concepts, such as the relation between alienation and repression, between liberation and an end to alienation and exploitation (p. 275). In contrast, Foucault interprets Marx’s phrase “man creates man” to imply the death of man through the creation of something completely new and unknown, something unrelated to any conception of essence, nature, goal, or pre-given rule of production, something governed by a historico-genealogical rather than a metaphysical origin. This, he suggests, is because in constituting objects men continually displace themselves, continually reconstruct themselves as subjects (pp. 275-6). Foucault argues that members of the Frankfurt School largely take their history as ‘already written’, that is, as pre-prepared by others, and this professional, and typically Marxist history is then utilized by them as a “sort of material foundation” to explain phenomena of a sociological kind. Foucault complains that this establishes an improper separation between the orders of philosophy (which occurs in people’s minds) and history (as a material series of economic mutations). In another interview given around the same time in his life, Foucault accepts the doubts raised by his interviewer, Raulet, about the validity of the Frankfurt School notion that at a certain stage in the dialectical unfolding of reason, some kind of perversion is engendered that once and for all, and completely, transforms reason reducing it to an objectifying form of instrumental knowledge. Instead, Foucault speaks of an “…endless, multiple bifurcation—a kind of abundant ramification (Foucault, 1985, p. 442). Rather than thinking that a rational critique of rationality or a contingent history of reason was impossible, Foucault whole-heartedly embraced this possibility:

I think that since Weber, in the Frankfurt school and anyhow for many historians of science such as Canguilhem, it was a question of isolating the form of rationality presented as dominant and endowed with the status of the one-and-only reason, in order to show that it is only one possible form among others (Foucault, 1985, p. 441).

As Foucault’s work evolves, he increasingly becomes concerned about the nature of power relations and the State. For example, in the second of his Two Lectures on power Foucault identifies two points of reference in his research into psychiatric power, infantile sexuality, and political systems: rules of right that provide a formal delimitation of power, and the effects of truth that this power produces and transmits (Foucault, 1977, p. 93). Foucault invokes and then questions the traditional question of political philosophy: how is the discourse of truth able to fix limits to the rights of power? He contrasts this question with his own, more concrete approach: in a society such as ours, what rules of right are implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses of truth? Or alternatively, what type of power is susceptible of producing discourses of truth that in a society such as ours are endowed with such potent effects? In simple terms, power cannot be exercised except through the production of truth and to produce the truth of power that our society demands we are constrained to speak and are often rewarded for speaking the truth (Foucault, 1977, p. 93). He outlines five methodological principles that have conditioned his research into power.

In as much as the juridical edifice of our own society in historical terms concerned the demands and requisites of royal power it is still focused on determining the prerogatives of, obligations towards, and the legitimate rights of sovereignty. Foucault first argues that this very focus on the discourse of right has served to obscure the brutal facts and consequences of domination in the exercise of this sovereign or even democratic right (Foucault, 1977, p. 95). Thus, he attends not only to the machinery of law, but also to the apparatuses, the techniques, the institutions, and their regulatory supports that put this domination into motion. This necessarily implies that any analysis must go beyond questions of legitimation, rules of right, and descriptions of the globally constituted exercise of power. Instead, it must try to locate power in the multiple and often less than legal forms of subjugation that are materially instigated at the regional, extremities of the social organism (Foucault, 1977, pp. 96-97). Second, Foucault warns that the analysis of power must not succumb to the temptation, in the spirit of Hobbes’ Leviathan, to concern itself with the subjectivity of power, whether in terms of the central animating force, conscious intentionality, aim, or decision making sensibility. Rather, it must examine the real and effective practices that, on one hand, make up the immediate field of application of power and, on the other hand, progressively and materially constitute the subjects of power. Third, Foucault cautions that individuals are not merely the targets or points of application of power, they are the vehicles of power, simultaneously undergoing and exercising it. One of the prime effects of power is that certain gestures, certain discourses and certain desires are constituted as individuals. Thus, individuals are both constituted by power and function as elements in its articulation. Fourth, Foucault warns that one should not start at the center of power and then analyze how sovereign interest is enacted in a descending fashion, permeating the social network through to its very base:

One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and see how these mechanisms of power have been-—and continue to be—invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination (Foucault, 1977, p. 99)

Fifth, although Foucault concedes that ideologies of education, of the monarchy, of partliamentary democracy have no doubt accompanied the major mechanisms of power, the exercise of power is both much more and, much less than ideology. Because the exercise of power occurs through a range of subtle techniques and instruments of observation, registration, and control it necessarily coordinates and puts into play specific apparatuses of knowledge which are not merely ideological constructs (Foucault, 1977, p. 102). We can now appreciated how these more subtle aspects of Foucault’s analysis of power are largely obscured in Flood and Jackson’s analysis of coercive systems, which is based on the unquestioned behavioural notions of interest and conflict. This ‘psychologistic’ analysis gives rise to a simplistic dichotomy between ‘coercion’ and ‘participation’—one that carries over to the organizational distinction between ‘teams’, strategic ‘coalitions’, and ‘prisons’. As his concern with the political technologies of power develops in his later writings, Foucault observes that the role of philosophy has moved from a critique of reason predicated on the limits of what is given in experience to one concerned with the necessary limits over political rationality

(Foucault, 2001b). However, he cautions that reason should not be put on trial, suggesting that research must go beyond the dichotomies of guilt or innocence, rationalist or irrationalist, and pre- or post-Enlightenment (p. 328). He argues that we should attend to specific rationalities rather than analyze the rationalization of ‘society as a whole’. The starting point for such research must be a focus on resistance to the differing forms of power in regard to its position, its point of application, the methods used, and the antagonism of strategies—those of men over women, parents over children, psychiatry over the mentally ill, medicine over populations, and administration over the way people live (Foucault, 2001b, p. 329). These later inquiries into political technology identify a special form of power—pastoral power—initially constructed within the confines of the Christian church. In its original context, pastoral power issued commands but it was also willing to sacrifice itself in the interests of the flock. Although it was initially defined by its concern for salvation in next world, in looking after both the community and the individual, as such, it could not have been exercised without a knowledge of peoples’ ‘souls’. Therefore, it was intrinsically linked with the truth of individual and was co-extensive with the life of individuals and the life of the community as a whole (Foucault, 2001b, p. 333). Foucault observes that over the 18th century, a new organization of this power came into existence. This form was concerned with ensuring ‘salvation’ in this world (i.e., the health, well-being, and wealth of the state). Police became the new officials of power who worked alongside the family and private philanthropic movements. At the time, policing was viewed in broad terms as an activity embracing the judiciary, the army and the exchequer. It dealt with men’s co-existence, their relations to property, production and exchange, and how they live. As such, it embraced religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, highways and buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, manservants and factory workers, and the poor (Foucault, 2001b, pp. 334-5). A similar transformation took place in conceptions of leadership. Where Plato argued that the leader of Republic should be a philosopher, Aquinas envisaged the king to be virtuous, or in Augustine’s terms, one who must imitate God in combining natural, human and divine systems of law to ensure just government and the attainment of Honestum or Heavenly Bliss, and where Machiavelli assisted the Prince in the strategic art of holding a people or a territory against both internal and external rivals, so the ideal of the modern politician was expressed in terms of both knowledge and competence. It was in this environment of competent administration that Political Arithmetic and statistics was established (Foucault, 2001c, p. 408). With the change in both the agents and the aims of pastoral power, therefore, came a change in the knowledge of man, which operated along two axis: one globalizing and quantitative, the other individualizing and analytical. The police “see to everything pertaining to men’s happiness” to “relations between men”, to “regulating society” and to “living”. However, in being concerned with both the moral quality of life, the conveniences of life, the preservation of life, and the pleasures of life, a new correlation arises between the utility of individuals and that of the State. The new political technology deals not just with men but with society as an object: happiness is not conceived as a mere effect but as a veritable condition of the state’s survival and expansion (Foucault, 2001c, pp. 412-3). Moreover, insofar as the State wields power over living beings as living beings Foucault argues that politics becomes biopolitics:

Since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics (Foucault, 2001c, p. 416).

Foucault contends that this reinvented pastoral power is enacted in a manifold number of forms: it can incite, seduce, facilitate, obstruct, release, constrain, or forbid. In its exercise it is not

embodied within a unity but within a multitude of institutions and tactics, replacing an atemporal Cartesian universality with a complex and contingent present. In defining the target of this power as conduct, however, he notes that it is exercised over the conduct of others only insofar as they are ‘free’ to refuse. Irrespective of whether they are viewed as means to an end, moves in a complex game, or attempts to win some kind of military victory, the strategies of power and the character of every power relation imply the possibility of resistance, escape or flight (Foucault, 2001c, pp. 341-345)11.

5 So What Would Foucault have Thought about Soft Systems Thinking? In The Order of Things, Foucault characterises the nineteenth century episteme governing the human sciences as one inscribed by three faces: the mathematical and physical sciences, philosophy as an analytic of finitude, and the three positivities of labour, life and language. Foucault argues that from the nineteenth century onwards—conditioned by a breakthrough in the structuring of scientific knowledge in the natural sciences, politicial economy, and general grammar—the latter positivities are conceived as folded back upon themselves, possessed by their own densities, and by their own historical laws and temporalities. Contemporaneous with the birth of the new sciences of economics, linguistics and economics Man, as an anthropological concept, comes into being governed by them as a living being, an instrument of production, and a vehicle for words which exist before him, marked by them in his finitude. And knowledge will be attained in him, he renders all knowledge possible, not through representation but in his finitude understood both in terms of his anatomo-physiology and the particular historico-social conditions that determine him. However, the mode of being of man now extends from the cogito to that which is not reflected in the cogito - the not known. In nineteenth century thought, Man is now conceived as inhabiting something that perpetually eludes him: the “I think” of Classical representation no longer coincides with the “I am” because representation always operates elsewhere, in another domain. The origin as the transparent equivalence of representation—manifest during the Classical age as likeness in nature, identity in exchange and language, or reminiscence in knowledge—is now replaced by a preconditioning historicity of life, labour and language, an already-begun, that is both other than, and yet activated by man. Man is subject to the pure events these histories contain: what lives, works, consumes, and speaks is man himself. There is now a historicity proper to man through which he evolves and adapts as a living being, manipulating economic laws, and transforming language. And Man is constituted in correlation with, as bound to, articulated upon these historicities—the already begun of life, labour and language—as a living, labouring, and speaking being (pp. 367-70). When the sciences of life are intertwined with philosophy what arises are the respective philosophies of life, of alienated labour, and of symbolic forms. When, instead, they are related to mathesis, the outcome is that which can be rendered into mathematical form in the empirical sciences. Whereas, when philosophy is wedded to mathesis the outcome is all that is formalizable in thought. No doubt, Foucault would see general systems theory as a representative of the second of these combinations. However, he notes that a relation to mathesis, as such, can never constitute human sciences because they share with other sciences the use of mathematics as a tool. He argues that there is no new advance within mathematics that would justify such a reductionist approach, but rather a common retreat of mathesis, a disruption of the unitary field that mathesis possessed in the Classical period, which effectively made it possible for man to constitute himself as an object of knowledge, in relation to the convolutions of labour, life, and language upon themselves (p. 349). 11 In this light, we can explain the new regard for human rights in Foucault’s mature work. Political technology is defined by an antinomy between law and order. To this extent, on the basis that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, legal rights can be established and drawn on in resisting administrative decree (see Colin Gordon’s introduction to Volume 3 of the Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, p. xxxvii).

Foucault further notes that in determining the form of positivity of the human sciences, two different types of models have been adopted. The first of these involves concepts introduced from another domain as images (Foucault cites the role of energetics in Janet and dynamics in Lewin). General systems theory would obviously fall into this category of models. A second approach entails the fabrication of constituent models that extend beyond their initial zone of appearance (pp. 356-57). Foucault instances three series of constituting models drawn, respectively, from biology that are associated with functions (homeostasis, adaptation, evolution) and norms of adjustment; those drawn from economics where interest and needs lead to situation of conflict, which is later resolved into a resulting body of rules; and those drawn from language, which conceive of customs and rites as systems of signs, and a field of meaning and signification. He further notes that all three can be superimposed as secondary models on analyses conducted using other models as their fundamental choice (p. 358). The application of models drawn from the mathematics of complex systems to the social sciences —often accompanied by, or superimposed over those of biological evolution, or economic exchange—are the hallmark of much modern systems thinking. And as Habermas observes, in systems thinking labour is conceived as a process managed through technical feedback control, life is reduced to a process of homeostatic adaptation, language to a dual flow of encoding and decoding (whether digital or analogical), and culture to an expression of cybernetics. However, Foucault warns that whenever this kind of borrowing occurs it always operates in such a way as to bypass the epistemic complexity discussed above, which, instead, is replaced by mere opposition between various models. In his analysis of the relation between history and the human sciences, Foucault casts his critical gaze onto the variety of historicisms, each of which always implies a certain philosophy—either a philosophy of living comprehension (i.e. as expressed in the notion of a Lebenswelt), one of inter-human communication (within social structures), and of hermeneutics (differentiating between manifest and latent meanings of discourse). It could be argued that for Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, through his Peircian conception of history as a progressive unfolding of scientific truth and undistorted consensus—accomplished through a process of social inquiry—could here be seen to fall into the trap of what he considers to be a form of historicism constituted around an inter-subjective hermeneutics of communication. As we have seen, Peter Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology is grounded in a phenomenology of the “lived experience”. I have argued that Foucault situates phenomenology within the same nineteenth century epistemic opening as Marxism (the eschatological anticipation of truth as something proceeding from our own discourse), and positivism (as a discourse predicated on the empirical truth of the object). Within positivism the tension between dialectical promise as a writing of the world and aesthetic reduction as reading of the world is mediated through the analysis of actual experience. To each of these nineteenth-century forms of thinking Foucault opposes the vision of Nietzsche, and the poetic cries of an Artaud or a Roussel. However, in returning from the poetic to the more prosaic concern with understanding the human sciences, Foucault identifies the prospect for the construction of an entirely new ‘third science’—so called because it would be situated at the intersection between psychoanalysis (which articulates the relationship between the historicity of culture and the unconscious of individuals), and an ethnology (which articulates the effect of the history of individuals on unconscious of culture). For Foucault, psychoanalysis approaches each of the three positivities in terms of the relation holding between the cogito and the unthought. For the positivity of life, Death is seen to govern the transformation from function to norm; for the positivity of labour, Desire is seen to dictate the passage from conflict into rules; and, for the positivity of language, the Law is seen to constitute the movement from signification into system. Ethnology, on the other hand, despite its apparent concern for peoples ‘without history’, introduces a certain kind of history into the respective domains of the three positivities: namely, the historicity of culture. It is not unreasonable to suggest that it is largely within this third science—one that interrogates the

historical a priori—that Foucault would situate his own analysis of the human sciences. This third science, he argues, would enable the researcher to interrogate both the influence of individual experience over possible systems of society and that of social structures in determining the characteristics of possible individuals. A question that naturally arises at this juncture is how different Foucault’s third science is from the later concerns of Habermas for validity claims in regard to the truth (constatives), the cooperative sincerity (representatives), the redemption or understandability (communicatives) and the appropriateness (regulatives) of our utterances or speech acts. On one hand, Habermas refuses to confine his analysis to an empirical pragmatics that would attend to what is merely contingent, limited, and concrete, following Peirce in his efforts to describe the general structures that appear in every possible speech situation. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Habermas’s critique of Chomsky’s distinction between linguistic competence and performance is based on the argument that semantic universals are not only innate but they are also part of an inter- subjectively produced cultural system. Surely this latter conception is very close to what Foucault means by the historical a priori. And of course, both authors address the unconscious. However, it at this very site that the philosophical differences between each author become most apparent. Whereas the unconscious, for Habermas, operates as a temporary barrier to cooperative and sincere argument, for Foucault, it is seen to be constitutive of our nature as living, labouring and speaking beings12. Presumably, it would be within the framework of such a ‘third science’ that Foucault would apply himself to the sorts of questions and interventions, raised and applied in soft systems thinking. Nevertheless, things are not so straightforward. In his later works Foucault distances himself from psychoanalysis as a social practice, describing it as a form of pastoral power with analogies to the confessional. In a cautionary vein Foucault warns that the assertion that sex is not repressed is certainly not new. He notes that Psychoanalysis itself has always challenged the simplistic metaphor of a higher order opposing the up-welling of primitive, natural, living energy by positing the Law as something which constitutes both desire and the very lack that motivates it (p. 81). But here, Foucault rejects what he sees as yet another version of the ‘juridico-discursive’ model of power that governs both the thematics of repression (along with the promise of ‘liberation) and also the more sophisticated theory of law as constitutive of desire (which coincides with the idea that we are always-already trapped) (p. 82) 13. Foucault argues that five principal features characterize this monotonous, repetitive, and impoverished juridico-discursive model of power relations: the negative relation, the insistence of the rule, the cycle of prohibition, the logic of censorship, and the uniformity of the apparatus (pp. 83-4). The first feature views power solely in negative terms as a blockage, exclusion, concealment, or mask. All it can produce are gaps, discontinuities, and absences. The second feature proscribes an intelligible order for sexuality based on a series of dichotomies between the licit and the illicit, the permitted and the forbidden, a rule of law that operates discursively. The third feature views power as enforcing renunciation through the threat of nullification, the prohibition of sex “plays on the alternative between two non-existences” (p. 84). The fourth describes power as conforming to a paradoxical logic that takes three forms expressed through the injunction of non-existence or denial, non-manifestation or refusal and ultimately, the silence of the non-expressible. Each one of these is the principle and effect of the others. The final feature expresses the supposed homogeneity of power mechanisms that apply equivocally to

12 Zizek (1994b) has articulated a psychoanalytic critique of Habermas. In Zizek’s eyes, Habermas errs in combining psychoanalysis with a language-based critique of ideology: the Id is conceived as a pseudo-natural cause that distorts public language. Habermas contends that self-reflection can dissolve the symptom and overcome the unconscious distortion so that true motivation can coincide (in a very Kantian way) with expressed meaning. Zizek contrasts this perspective with the Freudian/Lacanian view, which conceives of the primordial repressed as an infantile, pre-linguistic, traumatic stumbling block or lack that, in turn, constitutes Symbolic meaning through its very disavowal of this repressed kernel. 13 See Derrida (1998), for a subtle and nuanced analysis of Foucault’s engagement with psychoanalysis.

kingship, parental authority, the claims of master over disciple, or of the state over the citizen; in each case, defining the subject purely in terms of obedience to constraint (p. 85)14. This rejection of the proscriptive, juridico-discursive underpinnings of psychoanalysis, raises the question of where this leaves Foucault’s earlier project of a third science. What mode of inquiry can replace a linguistic and psychoanalytic reading of the cultural unconscious in tracing the discontinuities of the historical a priori? Some insight into Foucault’s response to these questions is provided within subsequent chapters of The History of Sexuality that desribe features of the power-knowledge relations, which pertain especially to sexuality. Once again, Foucault refuses to adopt a legalistic interpretation based on subjugation through rules or, in a more terminal form, through violence. Typically, he also rejects an institutional approach turning, instead, to a Nietzschean conception of power as the expression of a multiplicity of force relations, as the product of a complex strategic situation, where no unique source of sovereignty or central point can be determined and no simple relation between ruler and ruled can be defined. Power is not something acquired, seized, held, or shared but rather something exercised from innumerable points. It is not something exterior to the other economic, sexual, and knowing social relations. Instead, as evidenced by techniques of surveillance, the confessional, and self-examination, it is their immanent effect and condition. Its apparent unity is an effect of a kind of nominalism, which operates by attributing a name to what is merely a concatenation of force relations, inscribed by cleavages and general lines of force that traverse, link, bring about various distributions, alignments, homogenizations, and convergences, that in turn sustain whatever hegemonic effects arise there. And these distributions of power and appropriations of knowledge are not static, rather they are matrices of dynamic transformations and shifts. Although possessed of intentionality and intelligibility, and imbued with calculative, strategic, and tactical characteristics, power-knowledge relations are effectively non-subjective. Those who are the subjects and objects of power relations are neither accepted nor excluded, neither dominant not subjugated, instead, they are the vehicles of a complex strategic deployment based on person, position, and institutional context. Family, society and state are not representatives of power, but supports for, envelopes of, and sites for investment by power relations. Moreover, where these effects of power arise there is always a multiplicity of points of resistance, irreducible opposites, that are, likewise, mobile and transitory, but which can sometimes be strategically codified or can coalesce. Once more, we find ourselves thrown back into the chaotic vortex of the will to power, conditioned by a Nietzschean battle ground of opposing or temporarily aligned, sometimes positive and sometimes negative forces.

6 Conclusion We have come a long way from our beginnings in a review of systems thinking. By questioning the nature of critical systems theory’s understanding of the political we have initially viewed the world through a Habermasian lens. Finally we examined Foucault’s efforts to rethink theories of power. It is now time to draw these various strands together. As we have seen, Habermas 14 An important question is how accurately this conception of negativity, exclusion and prohibition reflects the Lacanian analysis of Law and Desire. For example, in the Four Discourses Lacan arrives at a Peircean ‘Pragmaticism’ of universal paradox and impossibility. Charles Sanders Peirce attempted to suspend the infinite regress of intepretations of intepretations of interpretations by grounding the meaning of propositions in the conditional expectations, actions and behaviours which they elicit (as the non-intepreted effects of a process of ampliative inference). However, Lacan turns to the internalized limit: the master signifier that motivates the signifying chain is the signifier of signification—a signifier without a signified. The other side of the coin is the lost object conditioning desire, itself constituted retrospectively as what eludes the grasp of symbolic—the signified without a signifier. In each of the four discourses, the specific (manifest) form of communication between the sender and the receiver of the message always yields a (latent) product and always veils a latent truth. Although communication is always productive, whatever is produced is always situated elsewhere, in a zone cut off from subjective interpretation.

criticizes the application of biological models of systems and sub-systems to the social on the basis of both a communicative and an emancipatory model of rationality, one grounded in the notion of truth as “warranted assertability”. Material and psychological emancipation is deemed to be essential to the attainment of undistorted communication and consensus. Certain elements of this Habermasian critique have no doubt been incorporated into some versions of soft systems methodology, but in a significantly attenuated form. And as we have seen, Foucault questions the “once-and-for-all” notion of a bifurcation in reason he detects within the works of certain members of the Frankfurt School. Through Foucault’s work political technology, I would argue that critical analysis can be firmly grounded in a detailed historical analysis of power relations and forms of resistance to power. Rather than taking the various Weltanschauung as given frames of reference for which some kind of accommodation must be found, Foucault places emphasis on power effects that are localized, anarchistic, and immediate rather than deferred and global in scale. He attends to those techniques of power that make individuals subjects, rather than attacking specific groups, classes, elites, or institutions. In opposition to the privileges of particular modes of knowledge and in opposition to the mystifications, secrecy and deformations to which they give rise, he refuses abstraction, violence, and the administrative determination of “who we are”. Inevitably, those who apply Soft Systems Methodologies in a consulting role are condemned to work within existing frameworks of power, unintentionally adding further weight to the various modes in which they operate within any given organization or institutional frame. Foucault’s work serves as a timely reminder of the dangers attending action research programmes of this kind: despite an openly acknowledged awareness of the carceral or coercive dimensions of organization, the would-be critic can always fall into the trap of becoming yet another seducer, especially when so much goodwill is at stake! Time and time again, some kind of bowdlerized notion of pragmatism has been drawn upon to justify co-optation and submission to the necessities of the market or to what is deemed to be politically feasible given the constraints of technology and existing knowledge. And many forms of resistance have attracted condemnation on the grounds of their impracticality and utopian otherworldliness. Yet each one of these antagonistic discursive tactics can be interpreted as a ‘worldview’ that can be woven together with others to achieve some kind of accommodation. But at this point, we must always ask ourselves the Foucaldian question, “what is the price we must to pay for accommodations of this kind”.

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