t2 b4 mellon letter fdr- entire contents- letter from christopher mellon re intelligence community...

8/14/2019 T2 B4 Mellon Letter Fdr- Entire Contents- Letter From Christopher Mellon Re Intelligence Community Structure 596

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U n i t e d States SenateWASHINGTON, DC20510

November 17, 2003

The Honorable Lee HamiltonVice ChairmanNational Commission on Te rrorist AttacksUpon th e United States301 7th Street, S.W. '" 'Room 5125Washington, D.C. 20407Dear Mr. Vice Cha irman :

This letter respon ds to your request for my views regardin g the recen ttestimony of John Deutch before th e National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the Un ited States. I believe m y thoughts are fully consisten t with those ofmy em ployer, but in this instan ce I nee d to be clear tha t I am only responding as aconcerned citizen.ProcessAt the outset, I believe it is important to acknowledge that substantialprogress can be achieved without fun dame n tal changes in the structure of theIntelligen ce Com mun ity or the authority of its leaders. While the experien ces ofprivate s ector organ ization s are n ot always applicable to government institutions, Ihave n o doubt that tremen dous gain s can be achieved through "business processre-engineering."For example, th e C ommun i ty Ma n a g e me n t Staff does n ot have a mechanism

for independently an d comprehen sively modelin g an d assessing th e numerousmulti-billion dollar platform an d sen sor programs that DoD an d the IntelligenceCommunity purchase every year. Stun n in g, but true. The Se n ate SelectCommittee on Intelligence is pressing th e Secretary of D e f e n se an d the DCI todevelop such a capability through the lan guage contain ed in report Section 335 ofth e Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. It remain s to be seen ,


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The Honorable Lee HamiltonNovember 17, 2003Page Twohowever, whether the bureaucracy can be moved. This is but one of manyopportunities to develop tighter and more effective linkages between DoD and the1C in strategic planning (e.g. via the Quadrennial Defense Review, the DefensePlanning Guidance, and the NFIP and JMIP budget builds).

Further, beyond budget and policy formulation, new processes formanaging, collecting, analyzing and disseminating information can produce a highreturn on investment. Examples in these domains include a more sophisticatedand aggressive use of open source information (there is a fairly stunning classifiedexample at DIA that merits your attention) and more sophisticated leverage of USpersonnel overseas. Finally, developing an independent cadre to staff the DCI,instead of relying on detailees from the agencies he is charged with monitoring, isa simple step that would produce significant benefits. One has only to consider aSecretary of Defense staffed primarily by service personnel to perceive theimportance of this initiative.

Structure and AuthorityWhile significant headway can be made without major changes in the

structure of the Intelligence Community, it is also true that new structures andauthorities, coupled with able and aggressive leadership, can dramatically improveefficiency and effectiveness. In many respects the organizational issuesconfronting the 1C are analogous to those confronting the JCS prior to theGoldwater-Nichols Act. As you know, the fundamental problem confronting theDepartment of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols was excessive Service controlover military operations, policies and budgets. In response, Congress strengthenedthe then flaccid integrating mechanisms in DoD, specifically the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The difference inmilitary performance before Goldwater Nichols (e.g. Desert 1, Lebanon, andGrenada), and after (Panama, Haiti, and Iraq) is stark and clear. In fact, I amconvinced that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did more to enhance national securitythan any weapons systems ever procured by the Department of Defense.


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The Honorable Lee HamiltonNovember 17, 2003Page Three

Although the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization is not a precise template forrestructuring the Intelligence Community,the problems are fundamentally similar:towering vertical structures (NSA, CIA, DIA, NRO, NIMA, the service intelcomponents) and relatively weak integrating mechanisms (the DCI and CMS).Any reorganization proposal needs to address this fundamental problem. In thatregard, I would suggest that the Intelligence Community's lack of responsivenessto the DCI's declaration of war on Al Queda was in part a result of the DCI's weakcommunity management authorities and inability to move the system. Astrengthened DCI could more effectively manage the Intelligence Community,leading to performance improvements comparable to those achieved by themilitary in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

ImplementationA conservative, incremental approach would involve the creation of a

permanent cadre to staff the DCI much as the SecDef has an OSD staff. Thissimple change coupled with aggressive business process reengineering and "yearof execution budget authority" for the DCI over NFIP programs, wouldsignificantly strengthen the DCI's ability to manage the Intelligence Communityand respond to new threats and opportunities.

A more aggressive and far-reaching plan would have to address thefundamental changes that have occurred since the current structure wasestablished by the National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, it would recognizethat the once useful distinction between home and abroad has become not onlyirrelevant, but dysfunctional. This is not to suggest any need to reduce theprotections afforded US persons under the Constitution, merely that globalizationand the development of cyberspace, combined with the rise of apocalypticterrorists groups empowered by lethal new technologies, require a different, moreagile structure that is not impededby outmoded geographic distinctions. In thatregard, Dr. Deutch's suggestion that both foreign and domestic intelligence beconsolidated under the DCI makes a great deal of sense functionally, although itspolitical viability is uncertain. Achievement of a model along these lines - or forthat matter anysubstantial reorganization - will require meticulous research by the


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The Honorable Lee HamiltonNovember 17, 2003Page FourCongressional oversight committee's, a substantial hearing record - and/or arenewed interest on the part of the Administration. At the end of the day,incremental steps will be better than none, and a more aggressive reorganizationwill probably have to wait until a consensus can be built not only on theIntelligence Authorization Committees, but with the Armed Services Committeesas well.

Hopefully your Commission will be able to prompt movement on thesecritical but sorely neglected issues. If nothing else, the conservative, incrementalsteps outlined above should represent a minimum expectation for reform.

I have deliberately kept my remarks brief and at a very high level, but I ammore than happy to further discuss these matters with any member of theCommission or its staff. Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.

Sincere!

Christopher K. MellonMinority Staff Director, SSCI202-518-7060

t2 b4 mellon letter fdr- entire contents- letter from christopher mellon re intelligence community...

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