t5 b71 misc files re dos visa policy 1 of 3 fdr- responses to 9 questions re 11-21-03 harty...

8/14/2019 T5 B71 Misc Files Re DOS Visa Policy 1 of 3 Fdr- Responses to 9 Questions Re 11-21-03 Harty Interview 576

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S/ES 200331910United St a t e s Department^of Sta t e

W a s h i n g t o n ,D . C . 2 0 5 2 0

December 31, 2003

(SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED When Separated from Attachments) v

MEMORANDUM FOR DANIEL MARCUSNATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the UnitedStates Request fo r Information

Attached is the supplementary information regarding U.S. visapolicy requested by the 9/11 Commission members in a November 21interview with the Assistant Secretary of Consular Affair s, MauraHarty. It consists of classified and "Sensitive but Unclassified"responses to nine questions posed by the Commission.

Under Executive Order 12958, the Department of State may notdisseminate classified information outside the Executive Branchexcept under conditions that ensure that the information will begiven protection equivalent to that afforded to such informationwithin the Executive Branch. We ask that only appropriatelycleared members of staff be granted access to the material and that

it be protected by applying standards at least as stringent as E.O.12958 on the handling of classifie d information.

Please note.that the attached mate ria l contains informationthat is protected from disclosure under Section 222 (f) of theImmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1202(f), and, inaccordance wi th that law, may only be used for the "formulation,amendment, administration, or enforcement of the immigration,nationality, or other laws of the United States."

Further, most of the info rmation is considered "Sensitive butUnclassified." Although this mat eri al is not classified in and ofitself, it s designation as "Sensitive but Unclassifi ed* requiresspecial handling. Therefore, we have also request that theCommission protect this information from unauthorized disclosure.

(SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED When Separated from Attachments)


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- CONEXDENTIAL(SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED When Separated from Attachments)

2

We hope this information is useful to you. As always, pleasedo not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions.

Karl HofmannExecutive Secretary

Attachment:

Supplementary Information.

-CONFIDENT I-AL

(SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED When Separated from Attachments)


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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

FOLLOW-UP TO A/S HARTY'S M E E T I N G ON11/219/11 COMMISSION

Question 1.

Chronology of SAO changes af ter 9/11

Answer:

Chronology of SAO Changes post 9/11:

11/10/01: A 20 calendar-day hold was instituted on all NIVs forapplicants from what became the Condor countries. This was aninterim measure done by the State Department at the request ofDOJ. The data from the pending visa applications was supplied to

the FBI on a disc on a regular basis. The hold applied to allmales between the ages of 16 and 45.

01/26/02: Visas Condor was established pursuant to interagencyagreement. The criteria and the list of.countries areclassified. Posts could issue if they received no response fromthe Department within 30 calendar days. Condor cases wereinitially reviewed by the FBI and the CIA.

07/20/02 The 30-day clock system for Condor cases was endedand posts had to wait for a response from the Department in each

case before proceeding. The CIA, having already provided Statewith all names of suspected terrorists from its databases,dropped out of the Condor program shortly thereafter.

10/18/02 Per agreement with the FBI, the 20 day hold, which hadbeen effectively superseded by the Condor procedure, wasformally terminated.

10/02/03 The Condor criteria were changed and more narrowlyfocused, per interagency agreement.



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Question 2:

Chart on all SAO types, showing how they worked before 9/11 andhow they work now:

Answer:

SAO CategoryBear: Fordiplomatsfrom certaincountries

Donkey: Forapplicantswith a CLASShit or whoare from acountry thathas a specialprocessingrequirementEagle: Forcertaincategories ofapplicants,mostlyimmigrants,from China,Cuba, Iran,Russia andVietnamMantis: Forapplicantswho seek toenter theU.S. toengage inactivitieswhich mayinvolve thetransfer ofsensitivetechnology

Before 09/11/2001FBIYesSpecificreply

Ye s15 dayreviewnospecificreplyrequired

Yes,15 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequired

Ye s15 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequired

CIAYe s10 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequiredYes15 dayreviewnospecificreplyrequired

Yes15 dayreviewnospecificreplyrequired

Yes15 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequired

NPNo

No

No

Ye s15 dayreview,nospecific

replyrequired

After 09/11/2001FBIYesSpecificreply

Ye sspecificreplyrequired

Ye sSpecificreplyrequired

YesSpecificreplyrequired

CIAYes10 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequiredYes15 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequired

YesReviewafterissuance

Yes15 dayreview,nospecificreplyrequired

NPNo

No

No

Yes15 dayreview,nospecific

replyrequired



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Merlin(Did not

exist) : Forrefugees withCLASS hits,Cubanparolees andfamilymembers ofasyleesCondor (Didnot exist) :For certainapplicantsfromparticularcountries

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

YesSpecificreplyrequired

Ye s

Specificreplyrequired

Yes

45 dayreview,no

specificreplyrequired

No

No

No



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Question 3:

What is the current number of people on FBI hold (total, andnumber still pending after more than 90 days)?

Answer:

As of November 24, 2003, the number of cases on hold was 12,914,Also on November 24, 2003, the number of cases on hold for morethan 90 days was 3,080.



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Question 4.

Description of how we are currently using information from thePassport Analysis Project. How do results get into our system?How do Consular Officers learn what CIA knows about bogusentry/exit stamps?

Answer:

See confidential submission as attachment.

The Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud .PreventionPrograms (FPP) receives information from a variety of sourcesincluding post reporting, other agencies and foreigngovernments. FPP sends Intelligence Alerts to all postsinforming them about document fraud and lost or stolenpassports. All FPP alerts, and alerts provided by the

Department of Homeland Security' s Forensic Document Laboratory,are then placed on the CA/FPP intranet web site. In addition,the web site also has copies of cachets, emblems, seals andstamps used by terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and byMiddle Eastern and North African countries.



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Jflff ^TPEJi i ^u

ADDENDUM TO QUESTION NO. A

Question 4: Description of how we are currently usinginformation from the Passport Analysis Project. How doresults get into our system? How do consular officerslearn what CIA knows about bogus entry/exit stamps?

Tttj

9/11 Classif ied Information

Classified by A/S HartyReason: E.O. 12958 Section 1.4

Declassify 12/5/2013


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Question 5:

Please provide copies of our MOU's with the DHS and/or SecretService Forensic Document Labs, and of DS f s MOU with the SecretService:

Answer:

CA does not have MOUs with either forensic document lab butworks closely and cooperatively with both. For example weconsulted on the design of the new Lincoln visa with both labs.DS also has informed us that it has no formal MOU with eitherlab.



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Question 6:

List visa accomplishments since September 11, 2001.

Answer:

The Department of State has made significant changes to thevisa process and entry screening requirements since September11, 2001, to protect the U.S. national security. The stepsoutlined below are some of our more important efforts to improvethe security of U.S. borders, which also include our ongoingparticipation in interagency efforts to implement the provisionsof the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and VisaEntry Reform Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the NationalSecurity Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).

Improvements Made in Visa Processing , 9

Application Processing . + U^y'- "T

Greatly increased the percentage of nonimmigrant applicantsinterviewed worldwide and set a written standard on interviewsto achieve consistency around the world. On August 1, 2003,new regulations were implemented which limit waiver ofpersonal appearance for nonimmigrant visa applicants to only afew categories of exceptions, including diplomats, children,and the elderly.

In coordination with the Departments of Justice and HomelandSecurity, added more interagency security checks for counter-terrorism purposes for certain groups of visa applicants fromcertain countries.

Provided access to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) toDHS inspectors at ports of entry. The CCD provides detailedinformation on all visas issued, including photographs ofnonimmigrant visa applicants. (The CCD had earlier been madeavailable to consular officers worldwide in May 2001.)

Expanded intranet resources for consular adjudicators toassist them in reading and verifying entry/exit cachets inArabic or Persian script.

Coordinated with the Department of Justice in the removal ofArgentina (February 2002) and Uruguay (April 2003) from theVisa Waiver Program and imposition of limitations on Belgium'sparticipation (May 2003).



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In March 2003, centralized the flow of fiancee visa petitionsfrom BCIS to the National Visa Center (NVC) in New Hampshire.NVC compiles FBI and security advisory checks before sendingthe files to overseas posts.

Developed Internet site that allows applicants to complete NIVapplication on-line. Resultant application form includes a 2-D bar code enabling quick scanning of data into the NIVsystem. Forms are available in both English and Spanish, withadditional languages in development.

Namechecks

As of June 2002, incorporated approximately eight millionrecords from the FBI's National Crime Information Center(NCIC) into our Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)

namecheck database. This more than doubled the records onfile. (This was authorized by the USA Patriot Act.)

Eliminated the periodic purge program for lookout records thatfitted a certain predefined profile. As of mid-November, theCLASS database contained approximately 16 million primerecords, and an additional 7.5 million alias records.

Integrated into CLASS a threefold increase in namecheckrecords from the intelligence community (through TIPOFF, aclearinghouse for sensitive intelligence and watchlistentries).

Instituted automated cross-checking of new derogatoryinformation concerning terrorists or suspected terrorists(including TIPOFF entries) against records of previously

issued visas in order to revoke existing valid visas in thehands of those who may be a threat.

In May 2003, implemented the Alternate Processing Center (APC)for the CLASS namecheck system. Located in the KentuckyConsular Center, several hundred miles from Washington, DC,the APC provides additional namecheck production resources andload sharing capability with the primary computer complex inthe Washington area. APC also improves CLASS survivability.

Effective February 2002, discontinued the use of a CD-ROMbased back-up namecheck system. Since then consular officershave been required to conduct a CLASS check which provides

real-time lookout information prior to issuance of any visa.

Implemented the Hispanic algorithm in all Western Hemisphereposts; additional posts are gradually being phased in.

Joined with DOJ and others in establishing a new TerroristScreening Center (TSC) that will integrate watchlists,including TIPOFF. Visa applicants will be checked against TSCdata.



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Enhanced Data Collection

Began worldwide deployment of biometric NIV software, withBrussels, our first pilot post, going live with fingerprintcollection on September 22, 2003. As of November 24, we have28 posts collecting fingerprints in addition to all theMexican posts. All visa posts will have this capability byOctober 26, 2004.

Included 25 additional data elements in the automatednonimmigrant visa processing system beginning in September2002. These fields are viewable worldwide through theConsular Consolidated Database. This data includesinformation on the U.S. sponsors and U.S. destination of thevisa applicant.

Created two new forms for nonimmigrant visa applicants: theDS-157 (November 2001), required of all men aged 16 to 45 fromevery country in the world; and the DS-158 (July 2002),required of all applicants for student visas. The DS-157 isused to identify applicants who require a security advisoryopinion from Washington agencies.

In the spring of 2002, provided all posts with software andscanners to allow scanning of supporting evidence in seriousrefusals. This evidence is thus available in its electronicformat to all consular operations and DHS port of entryinspection offices. This is part of the effort to replacepaper files with image-storage and retrieval and to improvethe access to information by consular officers makingadjudication decisions.

In April 2002, began requiring photo-capture for refusednonimmigrant visa applicants.

Revised photo standards for nonimmigrant applicants to improvethe quality of data for facial recognition and other purposes.

Included several additional data elements in the automatedimmigrant visa processing system to support datasharing withthe Social Security Administration.

Expanded Information Sharing

Created a new staff office, VO/I, in the Visa Office in August2002 to coordinate information management and liaisonactivities. We expect this office to continue to grow and toplay a key role in interagency discussions.

The Border Biometric Program office in the Visa Office hasbeen reorganized as the Office of Border an d InternationalPrograms to allow for expanded efforts at information sharing



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and coordination with like-minded nations and multilateralorganizations.In the fall of 2001, began storing serious refusal files forposts at risk (or with space problems) at the KentuckyConsular Center (KCC). KCC has begun scanning old files,making these files available to all CCD users. This processwill be expanded to include serious refusal files from allposts worldwide, thereby making them available to all postsworldwide and to domestic offices.

Implemented technology support in the visa lookout system tosupport DHS's National Security Entry Exit Registration System(NSEERS).Successfully launched the Interim Student and ExchangeAuthentication System (ISEAS) (September 2002), which providedelectronic verification of the acceptance of foreign studentsand exchange visitors who apply to enter the United States onstudent ( WF," "M") and exchange visitor ( "3" ) visas. ISEASwas created to satisfy the mandates of Section 501(c) of theEnhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 andremained active until February 2003 when DHS's Student andExchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was implemented.Worked with DHS on the implementation of the SEVIS studenttracking system. All student visas are now verified andregistered in SEVIS. Over one million records from SEVIS havebeen downloaded to CA' Consular Consolidated Database wherethe information is available for the electronic verification,adjudication, and reporting of student and exchange visitorvisas.

Internal Controls

Removed direct Foreign Service National access to detailednamecheck information in consular automated systems.

Reviewed the visa referral system and reminded post/consularmanagers of the controls needed. The referral form wasrevised and its use was made mandatory worldwide. The formnow requires written certification by the referring officerthat the visa applicant is personally known to the referring

officer and does not pose a threat to the United States.In July 2002, installed new management tools to monitor useraccounts on consular automated systems.

Mandated a special worldwide review of management controls inSeptember 2002 and again in August 2003. This is now beingmade a required annual report from all consular sections.



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Implemented a system of Consular Management Assistance Teamsto visit posts to review management controls and procedures.The first such visits were made in February 2003.

Began the process of formalizing and disseminating StandardOperating Procedures for visa processing, including thecreation of online processing manuals to better indexoperating instructions.

Fraud Prevention Efforts

In March 2002, pilot tested the new, tamper-resistant Lincolnnonimmigrant visa foil with worldwide deployment completed inSeptember 2003.

Developed a more secure way of canceling machine-readablevisas to deter malefactors from ""washing" the cancellationstamp from the visa. The system was made available to posts inMarch of 2003.

In April 2003, established a Vulnerability Assessment Unit(VAU) staffed by personnel from Consular Affairs and

Diplomatic Security. VAU personnel employ data-mining andother techniques to identify baseline trends and patterns anddetect variations that could indicate possible malfeasance.The unit analyzes data anomalies and makes recommendations foraction. The unit also participates in State Departmenttraining efforts to ensure consular employees are wellinformed about issues related to malfeasance.

In August 2003, established a fraud prevention unit at theNational Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire (NVC). The

unit focuses initially on data validation/fraud screening foremployment-based cases using automated search tools. Afterexperience has been gained at NVC, we will expand the programto the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC).

Based on success with the Diversity Visa lottery (DV) program,anti-fraud efforts using Facial Recognition technology havebeen expanded on a test basis to thirteen NIV applicant pools,with a focus on countering both visa fraud and terrorism.

Created an e-form for easy reporting of lost/stolen/missingvisaed passports, with automatic forwarding to DHS.

Continue to update our database of foreign lost and stolenpassports. We currently have over 680,000 entries of blankand individually issued lost and stolen passports in thedatabase.



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Training

In March 2002, initiated an Advanced Namechecking Techniquescourse at the Foreign Service Institute. Hundreds of consularofficers have now received this training.

Lengthened the Basic Consular Course, also known as ConGen,from 26 to 31 days. This change is the result of the addedemphasis that we are giving to visa security, counter-terrorism awareness and interviewing techniques. Among thenew modules is a two-day interviewing "mini-course" that willfocus students on ways to identify lying/deception byapplicants. The new curriculum also includes a half- dayprogram on counter-terrorism at the CIA Headquarters inLangley. The new, longer ConGen training schedule beganOctober 17, 2003.

Increased training for Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Missionand Principal Officers on their supervisory role in the visafunction.

Incorporated CIA module on terrorist travel patterns into thebasic consular course, which was expanded in October 2003.

Security Improvements

Proposed elimination of crew list visas and establishment of arequirement that seamen obtain individual visas. (Crew listvisas do not allow for the same verification of identity andbona fides as do individual applications.) A proposedregulation was published for public comment in December 2002;the final rule is in the final stages of interagencyclearance.

In February 2003, eliminated the waiver of the visarequirement for permanent residents of Canada and Bermuda.

In March 2002, amended regulations to close a loophole andlimit the ability of persons with expired visas to reenter theU.S. from contiguous territory (i.e. Mexico, Canada, theCaribbean). The change removed from the automaticrevalidation provision those persons who apply for a new visaand are refused in Canada or Mexico and all nationals ofcountries designated as state sponsors of terrorism regardless

of whether they apply for a visa. Supported implementation of the Aviation Security Bill.

Started discussions with Mexico and Canada about greatercooperation on immigration, security, and visa issues.

Approved an Entry-Exit Project Charter (now called VUS- VISIT"(United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator

Technology program), drafted jointly with INS, Customs, and



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DOT, which sets the parameters for an automated system torecord the arrivals, departures, and stay activities ofindividuals coming to and leaving the U.S. Continue to workclosely with DHS on development of US-VISIT.

Deployed on-line electronic registration for the Diversityvisa program. Registration for the DV-2005 "lottery" isconducted exclusively through a dedicated web site. This will

enable us better to identify duplicate entries, including,through extensive use of facial recognition technology, thosesubmitted under fraudulent identities.

FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE VISA PROCESS AND TIMETABLES

The Department continues to implement requirements setforth in the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security andVisa Entry Reform Act, and the Homeland Security Act. Majorinitiatives not outlined above that are currently planned or in

the early stages of implementation include:

Application Processing

Explore possible development of "rules-based process" softwareas a tool to highlight relevant information for consularofficers to facilitate visa adjudication.

Revamp the visa processing sections of the Foreign AffairsManuals, including a complete reexamination of all existingguidance to overseas posts. Existing standard operatingprocedures are being redrafted and reissued, and new standard

operating procedures (SOPs) are being developed. Re-engineering the interagency visa clearance process to allow

stronger accountability and quicker processing.

Namechecks

Improve capacity of CLASS to handle additional informationsuch as Interpol and deportation lookout information, theHispanic algorithm, and lost and stolen passport data.

Develop and implement an algorithm to improve performance onnamechecking of Asian names. This algorithm will be pilotedin FY 2004, with worldwide rollout projected for FY 2005.

Continue to pursue with the FBI additional data pertaining toNCIC lookouts to reduce "false positive" hits.

Upgrade the central namecheck processing facility to increasecomputer power and provide system scalability.



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Enhanced Data Collection

The Border Security Act requires that U.S. visas use biometricidentifiers by October 26, 2004. The Department began phasedimplementation of biometric (fingerprint) collection inSeptember 2003, with the first post Mgoing live" on September22, 2003. We anticipate that all posts will be collectingbiometrics by October 2004.

The Department will work with countries that are eligible forthe Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and with ICAO to meet therequirement that those countries incorporate biometricidentifiers in their passports by October 2004, as required bythe Border Security Act.

Expanded Information Sharing

Continue to expand datashare opportunities with federalagencies, maximizing the value of consular data to the USGwhile developing procedures to ensure proper use of thisinformation.

Make consular data available via the interagency OSIS (OpenSources Information System) network. Work with agenciesconcerned with Border Security (DHS, FBI, etc.) to develop anMOU that will allow this access.

Continue working on a number of programs with Canada andMexico as part of our U.S.-Canada Smart Border Action Plan (30point plan) and U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership (22 point

plan). As concerns the movement of people, we are working onagreements that would allow us to share Advance PassengerInformation/Passenger Name Records for airline passengersentering the U.S., Canada, or Mexico. We are also workingwith both these countries (NEXUS with Canada and SENTRI withMexico) to expand frequent travelers programs to allow fastercrossings for bona fide travelers.

Internal Controls

Restrict further the access of Foreign Service Nationalemployees to namecheck information.

Provide additional guidance to the field on supervisoryofficer review of visa issuances and refusals.

Maintain a robust schedule of visits by consular managementassistance teams to posts to review management controls andprocedures.



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Provide written guidance to chiefs of mission and theirdeputies to assist them in their oversight of consularsections.

Fraud Prevention Programs

Review facial recognition results from initial test deploymentat visa posts to determine how it may benefit screening in theoperational environment.

Introduce new, tamper-resistant and machine-readable immigrantvisa foil. This new machine-readable immigrant visa processwill include digitized photo and fingerprints.

Security Improvements

Deploy worldwide in 2004 the re-engineered interagency visaclearance process, which expands the use of automation and

shared data to facilitate the clearance process.Eliminate crew-list visas and require all seamen to obtainindividual visas.



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Question 8: (Part A - Post Training)

Please provide an explanation of the antifraud program,including fraud prevention managers' responsibilities at post,plus anti-fraud training. (FPP)

Answer:

Mission

CA/FPP performs a vital role in enhancing U.S. border securityand fraud prevention in the application for U.S. traveldocuments. We accomplish this through training, informationsharing and operational support programs for the domesticPassport Agencies and. Consular Sections abroad.

By enhancing the ability of our passport and visa adjudicatorsto make quality decisions, we promote the travel of legitimatevisitors while deterring the entrance of those who would seekour harm. Two teams, the Information Team and the TrainingTeam, share responsibility for building the skills of ourconsular adjudicators and managers.

CA/FPP works very closely with each component of CA, as well aswith DS and, of course, DHS, particularly the Forensic DocumentLab. We also maintain liaison with organizations such asNAPHSIS (National Association for Public Health Statistics and

Information Systems) and AAMVA (American Association of MotorVehicle Administrators).

Information Team

The staff of the information team produces a number ofpublications, including the Intelligence Alerts, which sharedata on missing/lost/stolen blank travel documents with ourconsular sections, DS, DHS and many other government offices.The information team also produces a bi-monthly update, theFraud Digest, which discusses fraud trends and fraud prevention

management strategies. In addition, the staff sends out an e-weekly to the Fraud Prevention Managers (FPMs) at the passportagencies and other interested addressees with reports from themedia on fraud trends. The team maintains a library of traveldocuments, both genuine and fraudulent, for training andforensic purposes. It also has country files in hard copy andcountry summaries on-line. The team maintains FPP's award-



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winning intranet website, which provides extensive managementtools and information to FPMs in consular sections abroad.

Training Team

The training staff conducts the fraud segment of FSI's ConGenRosslyn and Advanced Consular Course. It also conducts two

annual workshops for overseas FPMs, and two to three workshopsfor consular FSNs with fraud prevention duties. When time andresources permit, we conduct fraud detection training at thepassport agencies. The team also assists DS with its new-agent,ARSO and FSNI visa and passport fraud training. The trainingteam has produced five Self-Instructional guides for use byconsular and DS staff with fraud prevention responsibilities.

Document Security

FPP has fielded a secure ink for canceling visas. We have

tested various inks through the Secret Service laboratory, andhave settled on a supplier. We have also designed a self-inkingstamp for posts' convenience.

FPP has been instrumental in the design of the Lincoln visa, amore secure, tamper-resistant nonimmigrant visa foil that hasnow been deployed worldwide. We have also worked to design asimilar foil for use as an immigrant visa. This new machinereadable immigrant visa will be deployed in 2004.

VAU

FPP recently worked with Diplomatic Security to establish aVulnerability Assessment Unit (VAU), which is staffed bypersonnel from Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. VAUpersonnel employ data-mining and other techniques to identifybaseline trends and patterns and detect variations that couldindicate possible malfeasance. The unit analyzes data anomaliesand makes recommendations for action. The unit alsoparticipates in State Department training efforts to ensureconsular employees are well informed about issues related tomalfeasance.

FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS OVERSEAS

The role of Fraud Prevention Units (FPU) overseas is to identifyand prevent fraud within the context of statutory consular



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operations. When absolutely necessary and possible, FraudPrevention Managers (FPMs) and or Fraud Prevention Assistants(FPAs) should use investigations to develop factual information

to aid officers in deciding difficult cases. Priority is givento'citizenship and immigrant visa cases. Non-immigrant visacases involving alien trafficking, terrorism and drug smugglingare also of primary importance.

It is crucial for FPMs and FPAs to establish a dialogue with theRegional Security Office and DHS officers, as well as -otherappropriate offices in the mission. The data that they can bringto such colleagues will often provide a critical piece to anintelligence puzzle or an investigation in progress. U.S. bordersecurity today absolutely depends upon such interagencycooperation. Their feedback, in turn, can enhance line officers'decisions and help them recognize fraud indicators. Liaisonwith other foreign missions and host country authorities mayalso be fruitful, when such contacts are trustworthy and

information is shared discreetly.

The FPU conducts fraud prevention training for new adjudicatorsas well as ongoing training/briefings for consular officers andFSNs on post-specific fraud issues such as frequentlyencountered fakes, the reliability of official documents andregional issues that affect fraud encountered in adjudications.In addition, when appropriate, the FPU providestraining/briefings for foreign government and transportationofficials on subjects such as ""familiarization with the newLincoln Visa" or "changes in USG requirements for visa

issuance."



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Question # 8 (Part B - U.S. Passport Fraud Prevention)

[Note: this question is rephrased to include information on U.S.passport fraud prevention measures.]

With reference to the U.S. passport program, please provide anexplanation of the antifraud program, including fraud prevention

measures and managers' responsibilities at domestic passportagencies, plus anti-fraud training.

Answer:

The Domestic Passport Fraud Prevention Program

Fraud detection is an integral part of maintaining the integrityof the US passport. Every passport agency has an anti-fraudunit that is headed by a GS-13 Fraud Prevention Manager.

Fraud Prevention Managers are constantly training PassportSpecialists, who review every passport application. Possiblefraud cases are referred to the anti-fraud unit for review. Ifthe Fraud Prevention Manager determines that an investigation iswarranted, the case is transferred to Diplomatic Security forappropriate action.

Passport Specialists recently received formal training to helpthem identify possible terrorists who are applying for a U.S.passport. If a passport application contains this type ofinformation, it is referred to Diplomatic Security for

appropriate handling.

In October 1999, Passport Services officially assumed severalfraud functions that were previously performed by. A/FPP.CA/PPT/PAS is responsible for providing day-to-day support toall of the Passport Services Fraud Prevention Managers.However, CA/PPT/PAS continues to work with CA/FPP to assure thatthe Fraud Program runs smoothly and effectively.

CA/PPT/PAS maintains and analyzes the passport agencies' monthlyFraud Prevention Managers reports.



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Summary of Current Anti-Fraud Measures

There are three systems tools that aid us in combating passport

fraud both here and overseas.

Consular Lost and Stolen Passport Program (CLASP)

In January 2002, the Department of State implemented theConsular Lost and Stolen Passport (CLASP) system, which allowsboth domestic and overseas U.S. citizens to report the loss,theft or recovery of their U.S. passport by telephone, letter,Internet or submission of a DS-64 "Statement Regarding Lost orStolen Passport."

The CLASP Unit, located in Washington, B.C., enters datareceived from the public into the CLASP database. The sixteen

domestic passport agencies as well as over 230 overseas postscan also enter data into CLASP. In addition to the passportnumber, the full name and date and place of birth of the ownerof the record is collected and stored in the database and madeavailable on screen, along with comments. This is to allow forreplacement of a U.S. passport to the traveler- and prevent thelegitimate traveler from being detained upon re-entry into theU.S. Travelers receiving replacement passports are instructedthat the old passport book is "invalid" and should not be usedshould it be located or returned to them.

Entries made into CLASP are automatically transmitted tothe Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). Themodified data transmitted to TECS is retrievable by theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal lawenforcement agencies with access to TECS. If DHS has questionsregarding CLASP entries appearing in TECS, they can contact theCLASP Unit for assistance. On a daily basis, we instruct DHSofficers at Points of Entry to confiscate U.S. passport booksthat are reported in CLASP as lost or stolen. These books arereturned to the CLASP Unit for destruction. The DHS officeralso informs the traveler to contact the CLASP Unit in writing

to resolve the issue.

The CLASP database currently has over 232,000 reported lostor stolen passport entries.

Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS)



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Answer

At this time, Passport Services does not have the finalreport from Bearing Point on the potential demand for passportsif a Western Hemisphere travel document requirement wereimposed. We expect the report around mid-December.



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Draft:Question 1,Question 4:Question 5:Question 7:Question 6:

Question 8:Question 8:

2, 3: VO/L/C:Pdoherty x31264CA/VO/I:Msardinas//CA/FPP:Jburt-LynnCA/VO/IrMSardinasVO/F/P: MerzDW/3-1175CA/VO: SAEdson/MRegan (3-1155/3-1160)

CA/FPP: JBLynn xCA/PPT (PPT fraud):Jpenn X32443

okokok

Queston 9: CA/PPT:JPennx32443

Cleared: CA: JJacobsCA/VO: CBarry - okCA/VO/I: MSardinas - okCA/VO/L: JGorsky - okCA/EX/CSD: LTFarrisCA/VO/P: ERamo tows kiCA/EX: LWollemborg

CA/VO:PMurphy - okCA/VO/BIP:PFitzgerald - okCA/P: WStaeben -CA/FPP: FTurley - okFSI: SMaloney - okCA/PPT:Judy Penn -okCA/PPT:Florence FultzL/CA:MMcLeod okL/LM:JBorek ok

Acting - ok


t5 b71 misc files re dos visa policy 1 of 3 fdr- responses to 9 questions re 11-21-03 harty...

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