t7 b14 final report chp 1 drafts version 061304 fdr- chp 1 draft

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CHAPTER ONE

"A NE W TYPE OF WAR"

1.1 Inside th e Four Flights

Tuesday, September 11,2001, dawned with exceptionally fine weather across thecountry.1 In Florida, President Bush went for an early morning run. Tens of thousandsof employees at the World Trade Center were waking up and heading to work.Thousands more were headed to work at the Pentagon, in Arlington, Virginia, or werealready there.

Boarding th e Flights

Boston: American 11 and United 175. In Portland, Maine, Mohammed Atta andAbdul Aziz al Omari got a very early start, boarding a flight that left at 6:00 a.m. fromPortland, Maine, for Boston's Logan International Airport. 2 3

The Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS) selected Atta forspecial security procedures when he went through screening in Portland 4 Under theCAPPS system in use by the airline on 9/11, American's ticket agents were to mark as"selectees" those passengers who did not provide correct responses to the requiredsecurity questions, were identified by certain triggers developed by the FAA, withpossible further triggers added by the airline.! "T

].or were chosen at randbhibv me airline's computerized CAPPS system.

The only consequence of selection was that Atta's checked bags were held off the planeuntil it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft.6 This was no hindrance to Atta'splans.

Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later, at 6:52, Atta apparentlytook a call from a longtime colleague who was at another terminal at Logan airport,Marwan al Shehhi. They talked for ^hree minutes. 7 *..Whatevertheysaid, it was their

final conversation. They decided to proceed with their long-planned operation.

Between 6:45 9 and 7:40, 10 Atta, Omari, Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, andTWaleed alShehri checked in for and boarded their flight that morning from Boston to Los Angeleson American Airlines Flight 11. The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45. u

In another terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed alGham di, andHamza al Ghamdi checked in at Logan Airport's United Airlines ticketcounter for United's Flight 175, also headed to Los Angeles. 12 A couple of Shehhi'scolleagues were obviously unused to travel; the United ticket agent remembered that theyhad trouble understanding the standard security questions and she had to go over them

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slowly until they gavethe routine, reassuringanswers .1314 l5 Their flight was scheduledto depart at8:00.

There, was only on e checkpoint through whichpassengers could have gainedaccess tothe American 11 gate, through which Atta and his colleagues would have passed. GlobeSecurityoperated^]! under a contract with AmericanAirlines/'""

In a different terminal of Logan airport, United 175 passengers had to go through onecheckpointto reach theirgate. This checkpointwas controlled by United Airlines, w hichhad contracted w ith Huntleigh USA to perform thescreening.17

In passing through these checkpoints eachof the hijackers would have been screenedby awalk-through m etal detector c alibratedto detect items witha metal contentof a 22-caliber handgu n or more. Any of the hijackers who may have alarmed the w alk-throughmagnetometer would have been screened with a hand wand metal detectora procedurerequiring the screener toidentify the item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, anx-ray mach ine would have screened the hijack ers' carry-on belongings in order toidentify prohibited or restricted items. Restricted or prohibited items discovered duringth e wa lk through metal detector, hand wa nd, or x-ray screening w ould have beenconfiscated.18

Neither the supervisors on duty at the checkpoints nor any of the screeners reportedobserving a nything suspicious that morning . No records w ere kept to log individualswho may have alarmedthe magnetometer, or from whom restricted or prohibited itemswere confiscatedat the checkpoints, unlessthe individual possessedan "illegal" itemsuch as anunlicensedfirearm.19

CAPP S selected three more of the passengers headed for American11. Atta had alreadybeen selected in Portland. Suqami, W ailal Shehri, an dTWaleed al Shehri were selectedinBoston. 20 But, as explained earlier, their selection onlyaffected the handling of theirchecked bags. It would havehad no effect on the waythey were screenedat thecheckpoint. All five men made their way to thegate for American11. Atta, Omari, andSuqami took their seatsin business class, rows 8 and 10(seats 8D, 8G and10Brespectively). The Shehri brothers had adjacentseats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in

2B), in the First Class cabin. They boarded Am erican11 between 7:31 and7:40. Theaircraft pushed backfrom the gate at7:40, right after the last of the men boarded theplane.21

Shehhi and his team, none of wh om had been selected byCAPPS,22 boarded United 175between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammadin 2A, al Shehri in 2B, al Shehhi in 6C, Hamza alGhamdi in 9C andAhmed al Ghamdi in 9D). 23 Their aircraft pushed backfrom the gatejust before8:00.

Washington-Dulles: American77 . Hundreds of miles southwestof Boston, at DullesAirport in the Virginia suburbsof Washington, D.C., five more men were checkingin fortheir early morn ingflight. At 7:15, a pair of them, Khalid al Mihdhar andMajed M oqed,

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checked in at theAmerican Airlines ticket counterfor Flight 77 , bound for Los Angeles.Within the next twentyminutes.Jhey wouldbe followed by Hani Hanjour and two -(Deleted;Tbrothers, Naw afal Hazmi and Salemal Hazmi. 21

Hani Hanjour, Khalid alMihdharan d Majed Moqed met the CAPPS criteria. The Hazmibrothers were both selected either because they provided inadequate identificationinformationto the airline or because they triggered som e other criterion, perhaps credit,addedby the airline.25 26

All five of the hijackers passed through the Main Terminal's West security screeningcheckpoint forwhich Un ited Airline s was the responsible air carrier and had contractedout the work to Argenbright security.27 At 7:18,Mihdhar and Moqed entered the securitycheckpoint.

Mihdhar an d Moqed placedtheir carry-on bags on the x-ray m achinebelt an d proceededthrough the first magn etometer. Both set off the alarm. They were directed to a secondmagn etometer. Mihdhar did not alarm the second magnetom eter and was permittedthrough the checkpoint. Moqed set it off. A screener wanded him . He passed thisinspection.28

Abouttwen ty minu tes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Han iHanjour,placed two carry-on bags on the x-ray belt in the Main Terminal West Checkpoint, andproceeded, without alarm, through the magne tometer. A short time later, Naw af andSalem al Hazm i entered the same checkpoin t. Salem al Hazm isuccessfullycleared themagnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint.

Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second magnetometers and wasthen hand-wanded beforebeing passed. In addition, his shoulder-strap carry-on bag w asswiped by an explosive trace detector an d then passed. The video footage indicates thatNawaf al Hazmi was carrying an item in his back pocket that was clipped to the rim ofth e pocket.29

The FAA's localcivil aviation securityoffice later investigated these security screeningoperations. The screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary. They could not recall that

an y of the passengers they screened were C APPSselectees.30 We asked a screeningexpert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding. Our expertfound the screener'swork to have been "marginal atbest." The screener should have"resolved" what set offthe alarm, and it was c lear that he didnot .3 1

At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and wereseated in 12Aand 12B in Coach.Hani Hanjour,assigned to seat IB (First Class), soon followed. TheHazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the First Class cabin a fewminutesafter him.32

New ark: Un ited 93. Between 7:03 and 7:39, Ziad Jarrah, Saeed alGhamdi,Ahmed alNami, andAhmadal Haznaw i checkedin at theUnited Airlines ticket counterfor Flight

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93, going to Los Angeles. Two checked bags; two did not. 33 34 .35 .36 Jarrah was the last tocheck in. Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened forexplosives andthen loaded on the plane. 37

The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by United Airlines an doperated under contract by Argenbright Security. 38 As was the case with the Bostonflights, the checkpoint did not feature closed circuit television surveillance so there is nodocumentary evidence to determine what time the hijackers passed through thecheckpoint or what alarms may have been indicated or security procedures wereadministered. The FAA interviewed the screeners later; none recalled anything unusualor suspicious. 39

Th e four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the FirstClass cabin. Their plane did not have a business class section. Jarrah was in seat IB,closest to the cockpit, al Nami was 3C, al Ghamdi in 3D and al Haznawi in 6B. 41

The nineteen men were aboard four transatlantic flights. They were planning to hijackthese planes and turn them into large guided missiles, fully loaded with up to 20 j)00 ... {Deleted;24 .gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 a.m. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11 , 2001,they _,...-{ Deleted; o r m o r e g a l lo n sha d defeated all of the security layers that America's civil aviation security system thenhad in place to prevent a hijacking.

The Hijacking of American 11

American Airlines Flight #11 provided daily, non-stop service from Boston to LosAngeles.4 2 Th e aircraft used for the flight on September 11, 2001 was a Boeing 767-200. 43 Captain John Ogonowski an d First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the plane.It carried its full capacity of nine Flight Attendants. 44 Eighty-one passengers boarded theflight with them (including the five terrorists). 45 46

Th e plane took off at 7:59. 47 By 8:13, it hadclimbed to 26,000 feet, and had not quitereached its assigned cruising altitude of 28,900 feet.4 8 All communications and flightprofile data were normal.4 9 About this time the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign would usually beturned off and the flightattendants would have begun preparing fo r cabin service 50

Just before 8:14,American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground .5 ISixteen seconds after that transmission, Air Traffic Control (ATC) instructed theaircraft's pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent attempts byATC to contact the flight were never acknowledged. 52 From this fact an d other evidence,we believe the hijacking began at 8:14. 53

Reports from two flight attendants in the Coach cabin, Betty Ong and Madeline "Amy"Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. Initiallysome of the hijackers most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who wereseated in row 2 in First Class stabbed the two unarmed flight attendants wh o would



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have been prepa ring for cabin service in that cabin. Neither stabbing was fatal, thoughone of them was wo unded very seriously.54

At the time of the hijacking, American Airlinesflight attendants all carried cockpit keyson theirperson.55 We do not know exactly how the hijackers gainedaccess to thecockpit. Ong speculatedat one point that theyha d "jamm ed their way" in.56 Th e terroristsmight have stabbed theflight attendants to get their co ckpit key, toforce one of them toopen the cockpitdoor, or to lure the C aptain or FirstOfficer out of the cockpit. Or theflight attendants m ay jus t have been in their way.

At the same time,or shortly thereafter, Atta- the only terroriston board trainedto fly ajet - would have movedto the cockpit from his Business Class seat, possiblyaccompanied by Omari. Asthis was happening, passenger Daniel Lewin, who was in seat9B, in the row just beh ind Atta and al Om ari, had his throat slashed by one o f thehijackers (probably Satam al Suqami, who was in the rowjust behind Lewin).57 Asreported in press accounts, Lew in,31, had served four years as anofficer in the Israelimilitary. He mayhave madean attempt to stop the hijackers,no t realizing thatone ofthem was sitting behind him .

We do notknow what happenedat the front of the aircraft except thatthe hijackersquicklygained control of the aircraft and sprayed peppe r spray or mace, or some thing

like it, in the First Class cabin, in order toforce the passengers and Flight Attendants tovacate thefront part of the plane.58 Somehow they claimed they had a bom b.59

About five minutesafter th e hijacking began,flight attendant BettyOng contactedtheAmerican Airlines Southeastern ReservationsOffice in Gary,North Carolinavia GTEairfone to report an emergency aboardthe flight.60 This was to be the first ofseveraloccasions on9/11 when Flight Attendants on the hijackedaircraft had to improvise andgo beyond their "Comm onStrategy" training, which emphasized that they were tocommunicate their reports to the cockpit crew in the event of ahijacking.61 Th eemergency call lasted approximately25 minutes,as Ong calmly, professionally relayedinformationabout events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the gro und.62

At 8:19 Ong reported that "The cockp it is not answe ring, som ebo dy's stabbed in business

class...and I think there'smace.. . thatw e can't brea the...I don't kno w, I thinkwe'regetting hijacked." She then reported on the stabbings of the twoflight attendants.63

At 8:21 the transponder on AA# 11 was shut off, while theaircraft was at 29,000 feet.64One o f the Am erican employees receivingOng's call in North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez,alerted the AmericanAirlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Ft. Worth, Texas,reaching the manager on duty, Craig Marquis.65 Marquis soon realized this was ahijackingan d initiated various emergency proceduresat Am erican Airlines, includingcontacting the airline's dispatcher responsible for the flight.66 She tried unsucc essfully tocontact the aircraft.67 The air traffic control specialist in Am erican SO C passed thealarm to the FAA' s Boston air traffic control center^whichwas already awareof the { Deleted:,B o s t o n C e n t e rproblem,, 68 (Deleted:

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At 8:25 the hijackers attemptedto communicate withthe passengers. The microphonewas keyed, and one of thehijackers stated: "Nobody move! Everything willbe okay. Ifyou try to make an y moves yo u'll en danger yourself and the airplane. Just stayquiet." 69Air traffic controllers heard the transm ission. Betty Ong did not. The hijackers probablydid not know how to operate the system correctly, sothey broadcast their messageinstead of talking to the cabin. Also at 8:25,flight attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeneygot through to the Am erican F light ServicesOffice in Boston. Sweeney also beganrelaying updates to the em ployees in Boston, first to Evy Nunez a nd then to M ichaelWoodward.70

At 8:26 On g reported that the plane w as "flyingerratically."71 A m inute later Am erican11 turned south.72 Americanalso began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ongpassed in some of the seat numbers ofpassengerswho had gained unauthorized access tothe cockpit.73 74

Sweeneycalmly reported on herline that the plane had beenhijacked; a man in first classhad his throat slashed; two flight attendants had beenstabbedonewas seriously hurtan d was on oxygen w hile the o ther's w ounds we re not as serious and she seemed to beokay. A doctor had been paged. The flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit.There was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney told Woo dward that she and Ong were trying

to relay as much informationas they couldto people on the ground.75

At 8:38 Ong told Gonzalezthe plane was flyingerraticallyagain.76 Sweeney toldWoodward that the hijacke rs were M iddle Easterners, nam ing three of their seat num bers.One spoke very little English and one spoke exce llent English. The hijackers had gainedentry to the cockpit. She did not know how. Theaircraft was in a rapid descent.

At 8:41 Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression thatthere was a routine medica l emergency in First Class. Flight attendants were busy atduties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were reporting theevents.77

At 8:41, in the Am erican Airlines SOC in Ft. Wo rth, M arquis confirmed that others

understood this was ahijacking. A colleague told him that the airtraffic controllers"thinkhe's (American11) headed toward Kennedy[airport in New YorkCity] ...they'removingeverybody out of the w ay...They seem to have him on a primary radar. Theyseem to think that he isdescending."78

At 8:44. Gonzalez reported losing phone contact w ithOng.79 Abo ut this same timeSweeney reported to Woodward, "Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descen t...weare all over theplace." Woo dward asked Sweeney to look out the w indow to see if shecould determine wh ere they were. Sweeney: "We are flying low. We are flying very,very low.We are flying way toolow." Seconds latershe said "Oh m y God we are waytoo low." The phonecall ended.80



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At 8:46:40, American11 crashed into the North Tow er of the W orld Trade C enter inNew York City. 81 All 92 individ uals on board were killed instantly, along with anunknown num ber of people in the building they had struck.

The Hijacking of United 175

United Airlines Flight #175 was scheduled to depart daily for Los Angeles at 8:00 a.m.On 9/11, the aircraft was a Boeing 767-200. Captain Victor Saracini and First OfficerMichael Horrocks pilotedthe plane. Five flight attendants wereonboard. 82 Fifty-sixpassengers boarded the flight. Fayez Banihamm ad and Mo handal Shehri sat together inFirst Class. M arwan al Shehhi was in Business Class, along with Hamza and Ahm ed alGhamdi.83 84

United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58, and departed L ogan A irport at8:14. 85 By8:33 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175 had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000.86 The flight attendants w ould have begun their cabinservice.87

Th e flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked,and at 8:42 the United175 flight crew comp leted their reporton a "suspicious transmission"from another plane(which turned out to have been Flight11) 88 they had overheardjust after take-off. Thisrepresented j^ight 175's last routine communication withthe ground. 89 . ^Deleted: the

what he had heard. 98

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The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46. They used knives (as reportedby two passengers and aflight attendant), 90 mace (reported by one passenger) and thethreat of a bomb (reported by the samepassenger). 91 They stabbed m embers of the flightcrew (as reported by aflight attendant and onepassenger). 92 All of the eyew itnessaccounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, even though both of thepassengerswho made calls were originally seated m uchfurther forward in the cabin, thusindicatingthat passengers and perhaps crew had been m oved to the back of theaircraft.93Given the similaritiesto Flight 11 in hijacker seatingand in the eyew itness reportsoftactics and weap ons, as well as the close contact between p resumed team leaders Atta andShehhi, we presume the tactics were similaron both flights.

The first operational evidence that something abn ormal was o ccurring on United175

came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice w ithin a one-minuteperiod. 94 At 8:51 the flight deviated from its assigned altitude95 and a m inute later NewYork air traffic controllers began repeatedly and un successfully trying to contact theflight.96

At 8:52, 97 in Easton, Conn ecticut, a man nam ed Lee H anson received a phon e call fromhis son Peter, a passenger on United 175. As he heard what his son had to say, he beganquickly taking notes. Acco rding to the notes, his son stated: "I think they've taken overthe cockpit...An attendant has beenstabbed...and someone else upfront may have beenkilled. The plane is making strange moves. Call UnitedAirlines...Tell them it's Flight175, Boston to LA." Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and relayed

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Also at8:52, a male flight attendant (possiblyRobertFangm an) called a Unitedoffice inSan Francisco, reaching MarcPolicastro." ' 101 The flight attendant reported thatth eflighthad been hijacked. Both pilots had been killed. A flight attendant had beenstabbed, and thehijackers were probablyflying theplane. The call lasted approximatelytw o minutes,after which Policastroand a colleague tried unsuccessfullyto contacttheflight. 102

One m inute later the flight took a heading tow ard New York City and resumed itsdescent.10 3

At 8:59104 Flight 17 5passenger Brian David Sweeney triedto call his wife, Julie. He lefta message on their home answering machine that the plane had beenhijacked.10 5 Hethen10 6 called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, andadded that the passengers were thinking about storming the co ckpit to take control of theplane awayfrom th e hijackers. Immediatelyafter th e call from her son, Louise Sweeneyturned on the TV and saw thesecond aircraft hit the World Trade Center.10 7

At 9:00,108 Lee Hanson receiveda second call from his son Peter, which,hp reconstructed (Deleted:.

It's getting bad, Dad. . .A stewardesswas stabbed...Theyseem to haveknives an d mace.. .Theysaid they havea bomb. . . I t ' sgetting verybad onth e plane...Passengersare throwing up and gettingsick...The plane ismaking jerkymovements.. .!don' t think th e pilot is flying theplane...Ithink we are goingdown. . . Ithink they intend to go to Chicago orsomeplace and flyinto a building...Don't worry, Dad...If ithappens,it'llbe very fast . . .My God, my God.

The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson h ad heard a woman scream justbefore it cut off.He turned on his TV. From her home, Louise Sweeney was turning on her TVtoo. Boththen saw the footage from New York.109

At 9:02:40, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the Wo rld Trade

Center.11 0 All 65 individuals on board were killed instantly, along with hun dreds ofpeople in the Tower.

The Hijacking of American 77

American Airlines Flight #77 was scheduled to departfrom Washington Dulles for LosAngeles at 8:10. Theaircraft was a Boeing757. The pilot was Captain Charles F.Burlingame;th e First Officer David Charlesbois.There werefour flight attendants.11 1 112On September11, the flight carried 58 passengers, for atotal of 64 persons on board.113There is no eviden ce that any passenger was allowe d to sit in the jum p seat near thecockpit.114 Each of the flight attendants had a key to the cockpit. The a irline's FlightStandards Manual instructed the crew to guard their keyscarefully.11 5

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repliedthat the aircraft was then flying over houses. Ano ther passenger told her theywere traveling northeast. The Solicitor General then informed hiswife of the twoprevious hijacking s and crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicateany awareness of an impend ing crash. At that point, the second call was cutoff .1 3 4

Between 9:25 and 9:30 controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control"observeda primary radartarget tracking eastboundat a high rateof speed." This waslater determined to have been Flight 77.35 At 9:29 the autopilot on American 77 wasdisengaged, with the aircraft at 7,000feet and approximately 35 miles w est of thePentagon.13 6

At 9:33, Dulles advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in thedirectionof the WhiteHouse.13 7 At 9:34 Am erican 77 was 3.5 miles W est/Southwest ofthe Pentagon and began a330-degreeright turn, essentially a circle, lining up the aircraftgoing towards the Pentagon and downtown Washington, at 2,000feet and four milessouthwestof the Pentagon.13 8

At 9:37:50, A merican Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon Building in Arlington,Virginia. At the mom ent of impact the aircraft was traveling at approximately 530 milespe r hour.13 9 All 64 individualson board were killed instantly,as were many civilianan dmilitary personnel in thePentagon.14 0

The Battlefo r United 93

At 8:41, United Airlines Flight 93 took offfrom Newark (New Jersey) LibertyInternational Airport bound for SanFrancisco.14 1 Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00a.m.,14 2 the Boeing757's take-off was delayed becauseof the airport'stypically heavymorning traffic.14 3

The hijackers had planned on taking flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (American11),8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and8:10 (American 77). Three of the flights hadactuallytaken off within10 to 15 minutes of their schedu led departure times. Am erican11 had taken off at 7:59; Uni ted 175 at8:14;Am erican 77 at 8:20. United 93 wou ldordinarilyhave taken of f about 15 minutesafter pulling awayfrom the gate. Whenit

took off at 8:41 theflight was running about 25 minutes late.

On the three other hijackings, FAA controllers had become aware that something waswrong within about five minutes of the time the hijackers begantheir assault. Offices ofAmericanand United Airlines learned that something was wrong soon afterward. Thehijacking of anaircraft was a well known phenomenon, althoughit had nothappenedinth e United States for more than a decade.

But no one onduty thatday had ever dealt with mu ltiple, connected hijackings.It hadneverhappened before in the UnitedStates. It had not hap pened anywhere in the worldin more than thirty years.14 4 As news of the hijackingof American11 filtered through

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the FAA and American Airlines systemsafter 8:20, it does not seem to have o ccurred toanyone that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too m ight be hijacked.

United 175 washijacked between8:42 and 8:46, and the system beganto realize it after8:51. Am erican 77 was hijacked between 8:51 and8:56. By 9:00, FAA and airlineofficials began to compreh end that attackers w ere goingafter mu ltiple aircraft. Hearingof the United 175 problem, A m erican 's Arpey ordered a ground stop of all the airline'splanes in the northeast. Hearing a few minutes later of the American 7 7, he extended, theground stop to the wh ole country. FAA controllers at the alert Boston Center, which hadtracked thefirst two hijackings, immediately began speculating about other aircraft thatmightbe in danger, leading themto worry abouta transcontinental-bound aircraft- Delta1989 -that in fact was nothijacked. A warningwas sent to that aircraftat 9:19.

As United 93left Newark at8:41, the flight's two pilots and five flight attendants w ereunaware of the hijacking of Am erican11 . 1 4 5 Around 9:00, the FAA, Am erican andUnited Airlines were facing thestaggeringrealization of apparent multiple hijackingsy146At 9:03 they could see another aircraft strike the Wo rld Trade Center. Crisis managers atFA A and the airlines d id not yet act to warn other aircraft.

Several FAAofficials told us it was the air carriers' responsibility tonotify their planesof security problems. One senior FAA AirTraffic Control manag er said that it wassimply not the FAA's placeto order the airlines w hatto tell theirpilots.14 7 W e believesuch statements do not reflect an adequate appreciation of the FA A' s responsibility forthe safety and security of civil aviation.

United Airlines naturallyhad responsibilitytoo. United (andfor that matter American)was facing an escalating num ber of conf licting and in most cases w hat turned out to beerroneous reports abou t otherflights, as we ll as a continuing lack of vital informationfrom the FAA about communicationsit had received from both American11 an d United175. By about8:40 the FAA's Boston Center realized that a message overheardfrom thehijackerpilot of American11 jnay havejncluded the phrase, "Wehave planes...."

United's first decisive action tonotify its airborneaircraft to take defensive action cameat 9:19,when a U nitedflight dispatcher, Ed B allinger, took the initiative to be gin

transmittingwarnings to his 16 transcontinental flights:"Bewareany cockpit intrusion...Two a/c [aircraft] hit World TradeCenter." One of these flights was United 93. BecauseBallingerwas still responsible fo r his other flights (unlike the Ame rican system which"isolated" hijacked flights), his warning message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until9:24.""

48

By all accounts, the first 47 minutes of Flight93's cross-country trip proceeded routinely.Radio comm unicationsfrom the plane were normal. Heading, speed and altitude ranaccording to plan.14 9 At 9:24, Ballinger senthis warningto United93. Twominuteslater, at 9:26, the pilot, JasonDahl,responded with anote of puzzlement:"Ed, confirmlatest mssg ... Jason." 1 51 5 1 Dahl did not have much tim e to reflect upon the warning, orwhat he could do about it .

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The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000feet above eastern Ohio, United93 sudde nly and precipitously began to lose altitude.15 2 Eleven seconds into the descentthe FAA's airtraffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radiotransmissionsfrom the aircraft. During the first broadcast the pilot or firstofficer couldbe heard declaring"mayday"amid the sounds of a physical struggle taking placein thecockpit.Th e second radio transmission, thirtyfive seconds later, indicated thatthe fightwas continuing. The pilot or firstofficer could be heard shouting: "Hey get out ofhere...get out ofhere.. .get out ofhere." 153

On the morningof 9/11, there were only37 passengers on United 93 - 33 in addition tothe four hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of2001.154 But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels orpurchased ad ditional seats in order to keep the numb ers dow n or facilitate theiroperation.15 5

The terrorists who hijacked three other com mercialflights on 9/11, operated in five-manteams. They initiated their cockpit takeover operations within thirty minutes oftakeoff,most likelyafter the seatbelt signha d been turnedoff and theflight attendants werebeginning cabin service. On Flight 93, however, there were onlyfour hijackers. Theoperative likely destined to round ou t the team forthis flight had beenrefused entry by a

suspiciousimm igration inspector at Orlando airport, in Florida, more than a monthearlier.

The hijackers waited an unusually long time to begin their takeover of the flight. We donot know why. Of thefour pilots, Jarrah had been the mo st reluctant, the one most tied tofamily and a girlfriend. That mo rning, he had been the last to get on the plane.

Since several passengers on Un ited 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four,some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit"jumpseat" from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by docu mented andapproved individua ls, usually air carrier personnel such as other pilots oroperators.15 6We have reviewed the issue andfound no evidence that one of the hijackers, or anyoneelse, used the cockpit jum p seat on this flight. All of the hijackers had assigned seats in

First Class.'"

158159 They seemto have usedthem.16 0 W e believe it is more likely thatJarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuousuntil after seizure of the cockpit, and then w ould not have been visible to the passengers.

United 93's cockpit voice recorder preserved soundsfrom the cockpit via microphonesimbedded in theheadsetsof both the pilot and firstofficer, and in theroof of the flightdeck.16 1 It is the only cockpit voice recorder that couldbe recovered from one of theaircraft.16 2 Pursuant to FAA regulations, it recorded in 30 minute loops. This tapeactuallypreserved cockpit soun ds during the last31 minutes of the flight. We haveanalyzed its contentswith care, obtaining the help of our own A rabic-language interpreterto verify the work done by the governm ent's translators.

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Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed a nd that two people w ere lying on thefloor of the cabin, injuredor dead, possiblythe Captain an d First Officer.1 7 6' 7 Onecaller reported thata flightattendantha d been killed.17 8

One of the callersfrom United 93 also reported that he thought the hijackers mightpossess a gun.17 9 But none of the other reportsfrom callers who noted the hijacker 'sweaponryreported thepresenceof a firearm. According to the recipient of a separate callfrom the aircraft, she specifically asked her caller w hether the hijackers had guns. T hepassenger replied that he did not seeone. 180 No firearms or identifiable remains offirearms werefound in evidence at the crash site of theaircraft.18 1 There is no indicationfrom the cockpit voice recorder of a gun being fired or me ntioned at any time.18 2 In thelast minutes of the flight we believ e that, if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they wou ldhave usedit .

Passengers on three flights reported the hijacker claim that they had abomb. The FBItold us theyfound no trace of explosives at the crash sites of United 93 or Am erican77. 183 One of the passengers who called to report the bom b expressed his belief that itwas not real.18 4 Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegalitemspast the security screening checkpoints, we believe any bombs were probablyfakes.

Amongthe passengers'phone calls, there w ere at least fivecontactsduring whichinformationwas shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier in the morning at theWorld Trade Center.18 5 The passengersan d surviving crew m em bers preparedto revoltagainst the hijackers.The callerstalked about duty, resolve, determinationan d teamwork.18 6 During on e of these calls inform ation was received indicating that thepassengersan d crew votedon whetherto rush the terrorists in an attemptto retake thep l a n e s .7

The passengers could not be sure what the hijackers intended. They certainly could nothave counted on surviving such an attack. We ighing uncertainties of every kind, theyfollowed the habit of our nation, andtook a vote. They then acted.

We m ake no comm ent on this. Their conduct made a statement, as Lincoln once said,"far above our poor power to add ordetract."

The passengers rushed toward the cockpit. Two passengers, w ho were on the phone withloved ones as the struggle began term inated their calls in order tojoin.18 8 One of thecallers endedher messageas follows: ".Everyone's runningup to First Class. I'vegot to --{ Deleted:rve g o tto go,go . Bye."18 9 "" " " " "" " ""

The assau lt appears to have begun at 9:57. T he CVR captures the noise,muffledby theintervening cockpit door, moving toward the cockpit. Somefamily members who listenedto the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the d in. Wecannot identify individual voices. But the assault was sustained.



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At 9:58, Jarrah became desperate. He began to shout orders and maneuv er the aircraft ina desperate attempt to knock the passengers off theirfeet.19 0 For the next two minutes herolled the plane onto one side and then the other, jerking the yoke hardleft then hard right42 times.1 1 He then yanked the nose of the plane violently up and down over 14 times,followed by another seriesof twists. Experts tellus that no one would havebeen able toremain standing through these maneuvers.

Before the counterattack of the passengers began at9:57,,the aircraft was traveling at8,400 feet heading directly toward the Washington area at an air speed of 335 m iles perhour,.192 Jarrah was firmlyin control. Onlyafter the counterattack began did Jarrahinitiate his defensive maneuvers.

iJ

Deleted: 292 knots (Note:we willconvert to MPH)

During the violent turning and lurching of theaircraft, the recorder captured the soundsof dishes and glasses sm ashing. A loud noise beganafter 10:00, as if a windo w hadbroken in the cabin and the roar of air rushing by can be heard. The aircraft's wildswings tossed anything and anyone not lashed dow n, yet thepassengers must haveendured thebuffeting, and kept getting up to try and break in. The sounds of strugglenever abated.

Jarrah remained at thecontrols, 193 but apparently judged that the passengers were go ing

to succeed in overcoming him and hisfellow hijackers. At 10:00 one of the hijackers, inresponse to the counterattack, states"When they all come, wefinish it off." 194 He musthave believedhe had only seconds left before the passengers prevailed. Shortlythereafter, with the aircraft still descending and traveling at a high rate of speed, Jarrahturned the control yoke hard to the right. The airplane began to roll o nto its back beforeplowing into an empty field inShanksville,Pennsylvania at 540 miles per hour, no morethan 20 minutes flying tim e from Washington, D.C. 195

Jarrah's objective was tocrash his jet airliner, with itsthousands of gallons jet fuel, intothe domed Capitol of the United States or into the White House. Wewill discuss thoseplans in Part S ix of thisreport. Mo re than any other targets, Jarrah's chief, Usama BinLadin, had dearly hopedto strike one of those symbolsof the American republic. He wasstopped by the alerted, unarm ed passengers of United93.

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1.3 National Crisis Management

[INSERT FROM FOOTNOTED STAFF STATEMENT#17]

The terrorist attacks on September11, 2001 w ere the firstmajor attack upon thecontinentalUn ited States since 1814. They killed 2,963 people, in addition to the 19hijackers.

Of this number, excluding the hijackers, 2,749 were killed in New York City:141passengersan d crew on the twoplanes; 2,205 civilians,343 firefighters, 23 NewYorkCity policeofficers and 37 Port Authority policeofficers. At the Pentagon, 125 peoplewere killedin the building along withthe 64passengersan d crew m emberson theaircraft. 40 more c ivilians died in thecrash of United93 .

These casualties represent the largest loss oflife on Am erican soilfrom a single enemyattack in the history of the U nitedStates. Th e 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, forexample, k illed 2,403 civilians and militaryservicemen.19 7

The im pact of the attacks reverberated far beyond the death toll, in theform ofconsequences which, in themselves, would be remarkable tragedies, but which have beensubsumed by the imm ensity of the event. Some grievingfamily members have takentheir ow n lives. Thousands moresuffer physical, emotional,an d psychological trauma,the effects of which endure today.

The economic impact XXXXXXXXX XX

At 10:02, a busy Mission Crew Com mander at NO RA D's Northeast Air Defense Sectorin Rome, New York, was working with his colleagues on thefloor of a command centerthat was trying to improv ise a defense of the UnitedStates. In a brief mom ent ofreflection,he w as recorded rem arking that:"This is a new type ofwar." 198

That conflict did not begin on 9/11. It had been publicly declared years earlier, mostnotably in a d eclarationfaxed early in 1998 to an Arabic-language newspaper in London.Fe w Americanshad noticed it. The fax hadbeen sentfrom thousandsof miles awaybythe followers of a Saudiexile gathered in one of the most remote and primitive countrieson earth.



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1 Interviewof Craig Marquis,CraigParfitt,Joe BertapelleandMikeMulcahy, November19,2003; andBriefingon the UAL System Operations Control Center and C risis Center, Novem ber20,2003.2 As was the case with the other two airports used for the 9/11 hijacked flights (Newark LibertyInternational Airportan dWashington-Dulles International Airport), Boston's Logan International Airportwas designatedas a"CategoryX" airportby theFAA. This categoryrepresented thelargestan d mostpotentiallythreatened facilities generally subject to greater security requirements. (Source:Civil AviationSecurityReferenceHandbook,M ay 1999,pp. 117-118.[SSI])Though Logan was selected for two of thehijackings(a s were both Americanan dUnited Airlines),the Commissionha s foundno evidence thattheterrorists targeted particularairportsor airlines.Basedon all of theperformance resultsit hasexamined,nothingstands ou t aboutany ofthem with respectto theonly security layer thatwas relevantto theactualhijackings:checkpoint screening. (Source: Federal Aviation Administration,Office of Civil AviationSecurity Operations,"Assessmentand Testing Data for BOS, EWR, and IAD."[SSI]) Therewas localreporting of security problems atLogan,including two F ox 25 television investigative reports that aired inFebruaryand April of 2001 which demonstrated the ease with which checkpoints could be breftchedusing c) / ~ \ _knives.A formerFA AspecialapgntI 1 wrntgtheaeeficvTs leadershinregarding hisconcernsaboutlax securityat theairport.Withinth e worldof civil aviation security United Airlineshad abetter rersonaj.reputationfo rsecurity consciousness thandidAmerican (Sources: Interviewof AndyStuddert,November Privacy20,2003;Interviewof BruceButterworth,September29,2003;Interviewof Cathal"Irish"Flynn,September9, 2003; Interview of Steve Jenkins, February24,2004),but there is no evidence to suggest thatsuch issuesentered intothe terrorists'targetingof East-to-Westtranscontinentalflights, whichnecessarilyinvolvedheavy fuel loads. They simply bookedsuch flightsthat tookoff (orwere scheduledto take off)nearlysimultaneously.3 No physical, docum entaryor analytical evidence derived eitherby theCommissionor lawenforcementprovidesa clear or convincingreasonwhyAttaand alOman droveto Portland,Mainefrom Bostonon the

morningof September10, only to returnto LoganInternationalAirporton Flight #5930on themorningofSeptember11. The Commissionwas briefedby Portland Police Chief Michael Chitwoodwho indicatedthat the Portland police pursued over60 leads regardingthe presenceof Attaand alOman in Portlandbu tthatnoneof theleads shedan y lighton thequestionof theirtravel to and fromPortland,Maine. Onetheory about Atta and al Omari's travel to Portland is that the hijackers chose to fly into Boston to avoidsuspicion thatmay have been arousedif theyha d arrivedvia car atLoganat approximatelythe same timeas eight other young Middle Eastern malesto check-infor Am erican Airlines Flight#11 an dUnitedAirlinesFlight #175.A related possibilityis that Attaand alOmanmay have tested whetherthe hijackers'operational security had been compromised by U.S. intelligence or law enforcement, or by the U.S.aviation security system. Beingapprehendedduring their check-inat thePortland airport would have beenpreferable tobeing stoppedat Logan Airport where three additional Flight11 hijackersand theentireterrorist team intending to hijac k United Flight 175 would be assembling. As the operational leader it islikely that MohamedAtta would have been particularly subjectto such concerns. Whatever the reasonforthe flight,the Portlan d Jetport was the nearest airport to Boston with a 9/11 flight thatwouldhave arrivedat Logan in t imefor thepassengersto transferto American A irlines Flight #11, whichhad ascheduleddeparture time of 7:45a.m. (Sources: Com mission Interview of TomKinton,Boston,MA, November 6,2003; FBI265A-NY-280350-302-46874[LES])4 The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS).was an FAA-designed automatedsystem run by theairlinesthat was designedto identifyindividualswho mayposea threatto civil aviation.The fact of Atta's C APP S selection, which cameto theCom mission's attentionafter its January27, 2004hearing, means thatten out of the 19hijackers (in cluding nineout often on the twoAmerican flights) wereidentifiedvia theCAPPS system.5 FAA AirCarrier Standard Security Program,5/31/2000, pg. 75-76 ; FA AInterviewof DonnaThompson,September23,2001.[SSI]6 FAA Air Carrier Standard Security Program,5/31/2000;CommissioninterviewwithU.S. AirwaysStationManagerat Portland Jetport..[SSI]' Thecall w asplacedfrom a payphonein TerminalC (betweenth escreening checkpointand UAFlight175'sboarding gate).W epresumeShehhimadethe call;we cannotbe sure. Logan SiteVisit an d Briefing,August15,2003.' FBI,DocumentsIn ResponseTo and InLieuof BriefingRequest#6 , Topic II . [LES]

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9 A l Suqaraiand the al Shehris parkedtheircar atLogan 's Central Parking Facilityat 6:45. FBI Interviewwith ThomasO'Hear, 265A-NY-280350-302-22079[LES]10 Flight11 pushed backfrom Gate 32 in Terminal B at 7:40. FB I 302 19106 (LES]11 Commission QFRresponsefrom Am erican Airlines, March15,2004.12 United Airlines, "Flight175-1 ISepOlPassengerA CICheck-in History," July 11,2002.13 Customer service representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter w ith theAl-Ghamdi ' soccurredat "shortlybefore 7 a.m. and when shown photos of the hijackers she indicated that MohandAl-Shehriresembledone of the two shecheckedin. Thus,her experiencem ayhaveactuallybeenwith FayezBanihammadand Mohan d A l-Shehri, who checked in at 6:53 a.m. However, Jawahir recalled that the twoindividuals shespoke withhad thesame last nameand hadassigned seatson Row 9,both of whichf it theAl-Ghamdisand therefo re that account has been adopted here. In either case, it is almo st certain that shewa sdealing withone set of theFlight 11 hijackers.(Source: FB IInterviewof Gail Jawahir, September16 ,2001. [LES])14 United A irlines, "Flight175 - 11SepOlPassengerA CICheck-in History," Ju ly11,2002.15 One of the two indicated to Jawahir that he needed aticket,but she observed that he already had a UAenvelope with itineraryin hishand. Therefore,she told him thathe didn'tneed a ticketbu t couldgodirectlyto check-in. She recalled th at each m an had "problems" in responding to the standard securityquestions, and that she had to go over the questions again "very slowly" before receiving theresponsesthatallowed them to clear the check-in process.Th e two individuals then d eparted the counter area for thesecurity ch eckpoint gateas directedby Ms.Jawahir. (Source:FB IInterviewof Gail Jawahir,September16 ,2001.[LES])

>;>..-....n^n r,.r ITI^.In i l n.ac .-..rwln.-t,-^ nt Ihi- Nnrth ( f i r Mnitri fhrrk-miiTil ( H S I in Terminal H

I Wilh respectto FY2001 nationalaverages.B5 screenersmet orexceededthe averagefo roverall .physicalsearchan d x-raydetection, whil efallingbelow the norm for metaldetection.No FAA SpecialAssessmentsl'"RedTeam'")were doneat Logansecuritycheckpoints overthe twoyears priorto 9/11/01.F A AOffice of Civil AviationSecurityOperations. "Assessmentan d Testing Datafor BOS.EWR. an dIAD."I SSII17 Screeningfo r Flight 175 wasdoneat CheckpointClin TerminalC. ForLoganCheckpointC3 .

With resnect to FVOOIlationalaverages.C3 screenersmet orexceededthe averagefor overall, physicalsearchan d x-ray

detection,while f a l l i n gbelowthe norm fo r metaldetection.No FAASpecialAssessments ("Red Team'")were doneat Logansecuritycheckpointsover the two yearspriorto 9/11/01. FAA Office of C i v i lAviationSecurityOperations. "Assessmentan d TestingData forBOS. EWR.an d IAD."fSSIl

""' United Airlines,"Flight175- YiSepbT Passenger AC ICheck-inH~istory",'vJuly" fi,'2662';"an d FB I302- "51589. [LES]" Comm ission InterviewofMary CarolTurano,Washington, DC, March11,2004.20 Transportation Security Administration,"SelecteeStatusof the9/11 Hijackers." [SSI]21 "Am erican Airlines SABRE response for Flight11, September 1 1,2001. NOTE: These boarding timesfrom the American system are approximateonly;for Flight11 they indicated that some passengers had"boarded"after the aircraftha d pushed backfrom the gate.22 Transportation S ecurity Administration,"SelecteeStatu s of the 9/11 Hijackers." [SSI]23 United A irlines, "Flight175-11 SepO1 PassengerA CICheck-in History," July11,2002.' 4 The al Hazm i's checked-in at7:29. bu t the airlineha sno t ye tbeen ableto confirmIhe l imeof Haniour'scheck-in. However,the checkpointvideotapeplacesthe latterat the checkpoint at7:35. thus hischeck-in

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had tohave takenplaceh y that lime.American A irl inesS A B R Eresponsefo r Flight77 . September11 .2001 [SSI]:an d MetropolitanWashington AirportsAuthor i ty,videotapeof MainTerminalcheckpoints.September11 . 2 0 0 1TSSI]" Transportation Security Administration,"Selectee Statusof September11 Hijackers."[SSI]26 FA A ,Civil A viation S ecurity,"Selectee List - AA LA #77."[SSI]

\ Whilethe nationalaverage,both th e metaldetectoran d x-ray results w ere belowaverageT FA AOfjice of CivilAviationSecurityO perations. "Assessmentand Testing Datafo rB O S -E W R .and IAD" [SSI],21 Metropolitan Washington Airports A uthority, videotapeof Main T erminalcheckpoints, September 11 ,2001[SSI]29 Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, videotape of Main Terminalcheckpoints,September11 ,2001[SSI]30 Immediately afterthe event,the FAA's Washington Civil Aviation Security Field O ffice begananinvestigationinto the screening operations at Dulles on9/11. After interviewing 43 of the 44screencrs(theother individualwas in thehospital)identifiedby Arganbrightas beingon dutyon September11,2001, theoffice reported that:"Overall, the responses provided by the screeners were consistent. They reportednothingout ofordinaryno r suspicious activityon themorningof September11,2001 None of thescreeners o ndutyat the East and West checkpoints recalled handling any passengersidentifiedasselectees."51 Commission Interviewof TimJackson, Washington,DC , Apri l12, 2004.33 American A irlines SAB RE responsefo r Flight 77 , September11,2001.33 F B I265A-NY-280350-302-104078;UAL Document 00000552;UASSI1-0000005534 F B I265A -NY-280350-302-104078; UAS SI1-00000055; UAS SII-0000001535 F BI265A-NY-280350-302-104078;UA SSI 1-0000005536 UASSI1-0000005537 Transpo rtation S ecurity Ad ministration, "Selectee S tatus of September11 Hijackers."[SSI]

r J A I Iofthese detectionratesmet or exceededthe nationalaveragesfo rthis time period.J-lo F A ASpecialAssessments ("RedTeam") were doneat Newark securitycheckpoints overth e two yearspriorto 9/11/01.FA A Office of Civil Aviation SecurityOperations.' 'Assessmentan d TestingData fo r B O S . E W R .an dIAD." ISS1L _ _ _ _39 United Airlines Flight 93, September11,2001,Execu tive Report; New YorkCiviiAviationSecurity

Field Office."' UnitedAirlines."Flight 93 - 1 1 S e p O lPassengerAC1 Check-inHistory."Ju ly 11 . 200 2. [SSI141 FB I"The Final24 Hours" 12/08/200342 QFR responsefrom Am erican Airlines: March15,2004.43 A merican Airlines, "Dispatch Environmental Con trol/Weekly Flight Su mmary- Flight11," September11 ,2001 .44 American Airlines, "Flight Attendant Ju mp Seat Locations During Takeoff and Flight Attendant TypicalCabin Positions During Start of Cabin Service for F lights11 an d 77."45 A A Ldocument bate stamped00343446 The percentage of seats o ccupied on the aircraft(also known as "loadfactor")on September11, 2001wa s 51.26percent, comparedto anaverageload factorof 3 8.6 percent (forA A # 11 flightsthat operatedonTuesday's over the three monthspreceding 9/11/2001). These facts show thatload factorson this fligh twere somewhat aboveth e norm.The evidence doesnot sugg est that passenger levels were man ipulatedby

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the hijackers in order to reduce the num ber of passengers they would be require d to control. (Source: AAKean Commission document006390)47 FBI 30219106. [LES]48 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight11 - Flight Profile."49 Interviewof Bill Halleckan d Peggy Houck, January8,2004.50 The initial service assignments for Flight Attendants on AA Fligh t#11 would have had Karen Martinworking in the First Class cabin, with BobbiAresteguiin the First Class Galley . Sara Low and Jean Rogerwould hav e been serving Business Class passengers, with Dianne Snyder in the Mid-Galley. Betty Ong

and Amy Sweeney would have be en working in the Coach section, with Karen Nicosia in the aft galley.Jeffrey Collmanwould have been assignedto work in Coach,but to assist in First Classif needed.50 Giventhe higher"load factor" in First Class compa red to Coach on 9/11, it is possible he w ould have started inFirst Class. American Airlines,"FlightAttendant Jump Seat Locations D uring Takeoffan d FlightAttendant Typical Cabin Positions D uring Start of Cabin Service for Flights11 an d 77;" and Comm issionbriefingby BobJordan, United Airlines, Chicago,IL, November20 , 2003.51 NTSB, "AA11Radio Com munications."52 NTSB, "UAL175 Radio C ommunications."53 Giventhe fact that the American#11 cockpit crewha d been acknowledgingal l previous instructionsfrom ATC that m orning within a matter ofseconds,and that when thefirst reporting of the hijacking wasreceived a short time later (the 8:18:47 Betty Ong call) a number of actions had alread y been taken by thehijackers,it is most l ikely thatthe hijackingof Flight11 occurredat 8:14 a.m.54 American Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11Telephone Calls,"BettyOng toNydiaGonzalez;"American Airlines, Tapesand Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls, "Nydia Gonzalezto CraigMarquis;"American A irlines, Tapesand Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls, "Nancy Wyattto RayRowland;"Interviewof Michael Woodward, January25 , 2004.55 Interviewof Craig M arquis, Novem ber19, 2003.56 American Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11Telephone C alls, "BettyOng toNydia Gonzalez."57 American Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls, "Nydia Gonzalezto CraigMarquis."58 American Airlines, Tapesand Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls, "BettyOng toNydiaGonzalez;"American A irlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls, "Nydia Gonzalezto Craig Marquis."59 Interview of Michael Woodward, January 25, 2004.60 American'sflight attendants were well acquainted with the Reservations Office's 800-phone numberbecause they call itfrequentlyto help passengers with reservations q uestions. Calls to the num ber arerouted to the first openline at one of several reservations facilities, includ ing the reservations center inGary. Source: Interview of Ny dia Gonzalez, Novem ber 19, 2003.61 Air Carrier Standard Security Program,Section XIII.J; Commissionbriefingby DonDillman,AmericanAirlines, Ft. Worth, TX, November18, 2003; and Commissionbriefingby Bob Jordan, Unite d Airlines,Chicago, IL,November20 , 2003.62 Th e call from Ms. Ong wasreceived initiallyat theReservationsOffice by American A irlines employeeVanessa Minter, and then taken over by her colleague W inston Sadler. Realizing the urgency of thesituation M r. Sadler pushed an emerge ncy button that simu ltaneou sly initiated a tape recording of the call

and sent an alarmnotifyingNy dia Go nzalez, the reservationsoffice supervisor, to pick up on the line.Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the firstfourminutesof the phone call between Ong and the reservations center (M inter, Sadler and Gonzalez) was taperecorded because the recently installed recording system in thatoffice was designed with suc h a recordingtime limiton its tapes.(Sources:Interview ofNydiaGonzalez,November19 ,2003; and Testimony ofNydia G onzalez to National Com mission on Terrorist Attacks Up on the United States, January 27, 2004.)63 Am erican Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls,"Betty Ong toNydia Gonzalez."64 Since the transponder broadcaststhe aircraft's altitudeto AirTraffic Control, preciseinformationonFlight 11 s altitudew as lost from this point. Source: NTSB, "American Airlines Flight11 - Flight Profile."65 Interviewof Nyd ia Gonzalez, November19,2003.66 Interviewof Craig Marquis, Novem ber19 ,2003; and Interviewof Craig Marquis, April26,2004.67 American Airlines, "Dispatch Environmental Control/Weekly Flight Summary: Flight11, September 11,2001.68 American Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls,"BillHalleck to BOS ATC."

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69 Tape position 46R at ZBW (FAA Boston Air RouteTraffic Control Center); and NTSB,"AA 11 FlightCommunications."70 Flight Attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeney aboardAA Flight #11 attemptedto contactthe AmericanAirlines flight servicesoffice at Logan International Airport by GTEairphone,starting at 8:22 a.m. Theoffice Ms. Sweeney was attempting to call managed the scheduling and operation of flight attendants andthe phone numberwas well knownto theAmericanflightattendants operatingout ofBoston.M s.Sween ey's first attempt to get through to theoffice failed,as did a second attem pt at 8:24 a.m . When shegot through to Ms. Nunez, the latter thought she had reported her flight as #12. Michael W oodward,

supervisor at the Bostonoffice, hearing that a problem had been reported aboard an American airplanewent to Ame rican's gate area at Logan with his colleague Beth Williams. Woodward noted that themorning bank of flights hadall departed Boston and the gate area was qu iet. Hefurther realized that Flight12 was a flight to Bostonfrom the W est Coast that had not even departed yet, so he and William s returnedto theoffice to try toclarifythe situation. (Sources: FBI, "American Airlines AirphoneUsage," September20,2001;[LES]an d Interviewof Michael W oodward, January25 , 2004.)71 American Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls,"NydiaGonzalezto Craig Marquis."72 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight11 - Flight Profile."73 Am erican Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11 Telephone Calls, "Nydia Gonzalezto Craig Marquis."74 The phone call between Ms. Sweeney and Mr. Woodward lasted approximately twelve minutes (8:32a.m. - 8:44 a.m.). This phone callwas nottaped. Inform ation aboutits contentw as derivedf rom aSeptember2001 emailfrom M r. Woodwardto American security;M r. Woodward's contemporaneousnotes;interviews with Mr. Woodward conducted by the FBI, American Airlines security, and theCommission; and the tape and transcript of the Nancy Wyatt phone call to the AA SOC described below.75 Interviewof Michael W oodward, January25,2004.76 Am erican Airlines, Tapesan d Transcriptsof 9/11Telephone Calls, "Nydia Gonzalezto Craig Marquis."77 American Airlines, Tape and Transcript of9/11 Telephone Calls, "Nancy Wyatt to RayRowland,"an dInterviewof Michael Woodward, January25 , 2004.78 AmericanAirlines,Tape andTranscript of 9/11 Telephone Calls, "NydiaGonzalezto CraigMarquis."79 Am erican Airlines, Tapean d Transcriptof 9/11Telephone Calls, "Nydia Gonzalezto Craig Marquis."80 Interview of Michael Woodward, January 25, 2004.81 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight11 - Flight Profile."82 United Airlines, "Flight 175: Flight AttendantPositions/Jumpseats."(SSI)83 FAA, "Executive Summ ary Chronologyof a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September11,2001," September17,2001; United A irlines, Flight175 ACARS Report;an d United Airlines Flight 175, Flight Data Rec ap.84 The 56passengers representeda load factorof 33.33 percentof theplane's passenger capacityof 168.This figure is considerab ly below the49.22percent average loadfactor for Flight 175 for Tuesdays in thethree-month period priorto September11 (June 11 through September4, 2001),and infact representsthethird lowest loadfactor among all the 93 scheduled flights in that time period. UA175 was cancelled onMonday,July 16, 2001 and c ontained a load factor of only 28.57 percent on W ednesday, Au gust 29, 2001.(Source: United Airlines, "Flight 175 BOS-LAX LoadFactors")However, the September 11, 2001passenger load was sim ilar to the loads on comparable T uesday dates in 1999 (37.2 percent on9/14/99) and2000 (36.6 percenton 9/12/00).(Source: UAL, "Explanationof Load Factors.")85 FAA, "Executive Sum mary Chronologyof a Multiple Hijacking Crisis, September11,2001,"September17,2001;and NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175- Flight Profile."86 NTSB, "UAL175Radio Com munications."87 At or around this time, Flight Attendants KathrynLaboriean d Alfred Marchand would have begun cabinservice in First Class, while Flight Attendants Amy King and Robert Fangman would have done the samein Business Class, and MichaelTarrou,Amy Jarret and Alicia Titus would be doing so in Econom y Class.Unlikeat American, United Flight Attendants wereno t given cockpit keysas of9/11. Instead, such keyswere stowedin thecabin. On Flight 175,a cockpitkey was locatedin the overheadbin above Seats1A andIB in FirstClass. (Sources: Briefingon United757/767 Aircraft,November11 ,2003; and U nited A irlines,"Flight 175: Flight Attend ant Positions/Jump seats." (SSI)88 Flight 175 had been asked by airtraffic controllers to look for an Am erican Airlines 767 (Flight11 )backat 8:37, and had reported spotting theaircraft at 8:38. At 8:41, the #175 flight crew reported havin g"hearda suspicious transmission"from anotheraircraft shortlyafter takeoff,"like someone keyedthemikean dsaid everyone stay in yourseats."NTSB, "UAL Radio Com munications."

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89NTSB,"UAL 175 Radio C omm unications."90 FB I Interviewof LeeHanson, September11, 2001 [LES]; Interviewof MarcPolicastro,November21 ,2003;FB I Interviewof Marc Policastro, September11,2001 [LES];and FBIInterviewof Louise Sweeney,September28,2001 [LES].91 FB I Interviewof LeeHanson, September 11, 2001[LES].92 FB I Interviewof LeeHanson, September11, 2001 [LES]; Interviewof Marc Policastro, November21 ,2003; FBI Interview of Marc Policastro, September11, 2001 [LES].93 Peter Hansonwas assigned to seat 19E,bu t called from ro w 30CDE. Garnet Baileywas seated in 6F, but

called from row 32CDE, and Brian Sweeney was origina lly in ISA, but calledfrom 31 AB. The FlightAttendant calls tostar-fixwere made from row31 . (Department of Justice briefing for Commission on"Phone Calls from UA Flights 175 and93," Washington,DC, May 13,2004.) [LES]94 NTSB, "United Airlines Flight175 - Flight Profile."95 NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175- Flight Profile."96 NTSB, "UAL175 Radio Communications."97 Department of Justice briefing for Commission,"PhoneCalls from UA Flights 175 and93,"Washington,DC, May 13,2004. [LES]98 FB I Interviewof LeeHanson, September11, 2001. [LES]99 The time of 8:52 a.m.is based onGTE-Airfonerecords, whichindicate twocompletedcalls to theSAMC Star-fix location from Flight 175, the first of 75 seconds duration beginn ing at 8:52:01 EasternTime, and the second of 31 seconds beginning at8:56:19Eastern Time. The recipient of the Star-fix call(s)from Flight 175, Marc Policastro, recalled only one such comm unication. United investigators determinedthat therewas only on e call. (Letterfrom Jeff Plantz,United Senior Staff Investigator,to Assistant UnitedStates A ttorney DavidJ. Novak, July31,2002)(SSI) Whetheror notthere weretw o calls or only one,thelonger first comm unication is more consistent w ithPolicastro'srecollection of the duration and inform ation

imparted duringthe call. (Interviewof Marc Policastro, November21 , 2003)100 Flightcrew onboard United aircraft could contact thisoffice by sim ply dialing *349 on anairphone.FB IInterviewof DavidPrice,January24 , 2002. [LES]101 Though he believed the Fligh t Attendant had iden tified himself at the time of the call, Policastro w as notsure of theidentityafterward. How ever, when read the name of the three ma le flight attendants he wascertain that the caller was not eitherAlfred Marchand or M ichaelTarrou,and thus he thought itmust havebeen Robert Fangman.102 Interview of Marc Policastro, N ovemb er 21, 2003; and FBI Interview of Marc Policastro, September11,2001. [LES]103 NTSB, "United Airlines Flight 175- Flight Profile."104 Department of Justice briefing for Comm ission, "Phone Calls from UA Flights 175 and 93,"Washing ton, DC, May 13, 2004. [LES]105 At 9:00. FBI Interview of Julie Sweeney, O ctober 10, 2001. [LES]106 Department of Justice briefing for Comm ission, "Phone Callsfrom UA Flights 175 and 93,"Washington,DC, May13,2004. [LES]107 FBI Interview of Louise Sweeney, September 28,2001. [LES]108 Departm ent of Justice briefing for Comm ission, "Phone Callsfrom UA Flights 175 and 93,"Washington,DC, May 13,2004.[LES]109 FB I Interviewof LeeHanson, September11,2001. [LES]110 NTSB, "United Airlines Flight175 - Flight Profile."1 '' American Airlines,"FlightAttendant Jump Seat Locations During TakeoffAndFlight AttendantTypical Cabin Positions D uring Startof Cabin Servicefor Flights 11 and 77."1 American Airlines crew manifestfo r Flight77 , September11,2001.113 The 58passengers representeda load factorof 32.95 percentof theplane's passenger capacityof 176.This figure is almost identical to the 32.8 percent average loadfactor for Flight 77 for Tuesdays in thethree-month period priorto September11 (June 11 through September4, 2001). In this three-monthperiod, Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 77, with Wednesd ay's next lowest at 40.3 percent.American Airlines, "Average Load Factor by Day-of-Week for Flights11 an d 77;" and Email fromChristopher R. Christensen, January20,2004.114 Letterfrom DesmondT. Barry, Jr., March15,2004,Responseto Question 77.12.115 Interview of Craig Marquis, CraigParfitt,Joe Bertapelleand Mike Mulcahy , Novem ber 19, 2003.

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116 FAA, Washington, DC Civil Aviation Security FieldOffice, "Chronology of the September11, 2001Attacksan d Subsequent Events Through October24 , 2001."117 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile."118 Flight Attendant Rene May w ould likely have started working in the First Class Galley between thecockpit and First Class, Mich ele Heidenberger w ould have been in the Aft Galley at the rear of the plane,JenniferLew is would have been circulating in FirstClass,and Kenneth Lewis would havebeein circulatingin the Main C abin. Am erican Airlines, "Flight Attendant Jum p Seat Locations Du ring Takeoff An d FlightAttendant Typical Cabin Positions Du ring Start of Cabin Service for Flights11 and 77."119 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile;"and ZDC - ARTCC- 212, HNNR,at 3,December3, 2001.120 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile."121 FA A Summaryof Air Traffic HijackEvents:September1 1 . 2001.AAT-20.9/17/01.;CommissionInterview of Richard Byard; Commission Interview of LindaPovinelli,122 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile;"an dNTSB,"AA 77Radio Communications."123 American Airlines, "Dispatch EnvironmentalControl/WeeklyFlight Summary: Flight77 , September11,2001.124 Commission MFR: Larry W ansley; Comm ission MFR: GerardArpey125 Commission MFR: G erard Arpey126 American Airlines, "Systems Operation Command Center (SOCC) Chronology for September11,2001."127 FBI, "American Airlines AirphoneUsage,"September20 , 2001 [LES];an d Departmentof JusticeBriefingfor Commission on"PhoneCallsfrom AA Flights11 and 77," Was hington, DC, May 20, 2004.

' FBI Interviewof Ronaldan d Nancy M ay, September12,2001.[LES]129 The records available for the phone callsfrom American Airlines Flight 77 do not allow for adeterminationof whichof four "connected callsto unknown numbers" representthe two connectionsbetween Barbara and Ted Olson, although it is believed by the FBI and the Department of Justice that allfour of these calls represent comm unications between B arbara Olson and her husband'soffice (based onthe fact that allfamily mem bers of the Flight 77 passengers andcrew were canvassed to see if they hadreceived any phone calls from the hijacked flight, and only ReneMay'sparents and Ted Olson indicatedthat they had received such calls). Thefour calls wereat 9:15:34for one minute, 42 seconds; 9 :20:15 forfour minutes,34 seconds; 9:25:48for twominutes,34 seconds; an d 9:30:56fo r four minutes,20 seconds.Department of Justice Briefing for Commission on "Phone Callsfrom AA Flights11 and 77," Washington,DC, May 20,2004. [LES]132 FBI Interview of Theodore Olson, September11,2001;[LES] and FBI Interview of Helen Voss,September14, 2001. [LES]133 Department of Justice Briefing for Commission on"PhoneCalls from AA F lights11 and 77,"Washington,DC, May20,2004.[LES]134 FBI Interview of Theodore Olson, September11,2001;[LES] and FBI Interview of Allen Ferber,September14,2001.135 FAA Summaryof AirTraffic HijackEvents:September11 .2001 .AAT-20.9/17/01,136 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile."137 FAA Summaryof AirTraffic Hijack Events:September11.2001.AAT-20 .9/17/01T138 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile."139 NTSB, "American Airlines Flight77 - Flight Profile."140 Federal Aviation Adm inistration,Criminal Acts Against C ivil Aviation 2001,p. 41 .141 Air Traffic Control Records (PENDING DOCUMENT NUMBER)142 UASSI1-00000859-00000873143 Com mission interview with New ark Tower personnel inclu ding supervisor BobVarcadipane144 On September 6, 1970, m emb ers of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked a PanAm erican Boeing 747, a TW A Boeing 707 , and a Swissair DC-8. On September 9, a British VC-10 washijacked as well. An attempt tohijack an Israeli airliner was thwarted. The Pan American plane landed inCairo. Its passengers were released and the aircraft was blown up. The other threeaircraftwere flown toDawson Field, near Amman, Jordan. Thepassengerswere held captive; the planes were destroyed. Thehijackingcrisis turned into acivilwar in Jordan and an international crisis, as the Jordanian governm ent

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used forceto restore its control of the c ountry.See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston:Little,Brown, 1979), pp.600-31.145 Accordingto phone records,a tape recordingof thephone calland FBI and9/11 Commission interviewswith witness acc ounts, at8:19 a.m. Flight Attendant Betty Ong aboard Am erican Airlines Flight11contacted the American Airlines Southeast Reservations Center in Gary, North Carolina to report a securityemergency aboard theaircraftstating"The coc kpit is not answering,somebody'sstabbed in businessclass...I don't know, ithink we're getting hijacked."146 American Airlines, Tapesand Transcriptsof 9/11Telephone Calls,"Nydia Gonzalezto CraigMarquis;"

Interviewof Craig Marquis, November 19,2003;y^meric an Airlines, Systems Operation Com mand Center(SOCC)Chronologyfo r September11, 2001:Briefingon UALSystemOperat ions ControlCenteran dCrisisCenter.No vem b er20 . 2003;CommissionInterviewof Rich ''Doc" Miles. Chicago .1L. November21 , 2003;and UALTimel inefo r Dispatch/SMFDOActivit ies-Terrorist Crisis.September1 1 .2001T147 Com mission Interview with FAA A TCofficialEllen King; FAA AirTraffic Control tapes indicate thatat 9:19 a.m.the FAA AirTraffic Control System Com mand Centerin Herndon,Virginia orderedcontrollersto send a cockpit warningto Delta Flight1989because, like American Airlines Flight11 andUnitedAirlines Flight 175 was a transcontinentalflight departingBoston'sLogan International Airport.148 Commission Interviewwith,EdBallinger,AjjrjLM^gOCM,Acompany-wide order for dispatchers towarn cockpitswas notissued until9:21T'UAL Timelinefo rpispatch/SMFpOActivit ies- TerroristCrisis.September 11. 2001. We co uldfind no evidence that American Airlines sent any cockpit warnings to theiraircrafton 9/11 whatsoever. C om mission Interview with American Airlines System Operations Co ntrolmanagement,April 26th, 2004.149 National TransportationSafety Board Readout of theFlight Data Recorderof United Airlines Flight93recovered at the crash site in Shan ksville, Pennsylv ania150 Evidence derivedfrom copies of ACARS messages produced for the C omm ission by United Airlines

and, providedto theCom mission separatelyby UALFlight DispatcherEd Ballinger. (GET GUIDANCEON HOW TOFOOTNOTE ACA RSAND DOCUMENT STAMPS).151 The ACARS message sentfrom the coc kpit of Flight 93 in reply to the dispatcher's c ockpit wa rningstated: "Ed Confirm latest mssgpl z Jason." NEEDTO CONFIRM WITHED WHY HE DIDN'TF U RT H E RCONFIRMOR RE SPON D ; Aircraft Com munication and Reporting System documentsindicatetimeof message transmissionand receipt (CONFIRM THISRE: ED SOLIDAY ONDELTA OFTIME INDICATORSAND ACTUAL RECEIPT)152 Evidence derivedfrom NTSB A nimat ion ofFlightData Recorder readout of UAL 93 presented to theComm ission 4/22/2004 at NTSB headquarters.153 Evidence derivedfrom audio read-out of Cockpit Voice Recorderfrom Flight93 . A transcript of CVRwas prepared by the N ational TransportationSafety Board and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation.154 The 37passengersrepresented aload factoroF20.33% ofthe plane'spassengercapacity of182. Thisfigure is considerably belowthe average loadfactor fo r F l i g h t93 forTuesdaysin the three-monthperiodprior to September1 1 (June 1 1 through September4. 2001).and in fact representsth e lowest loadfactoramongall the 93 scheduled flights in that timeperiod,exceptfor five whichwerecancelled(6/11/01.6/19/01.6/25/01.7/3/01.an d 8/22/01).UnitedAirlines."BOS-LAXLoad Factors."155 FAA and FBI records indicate that there were no more thanfour "no shows" for the flight. Each of the"n o shows" were investigatedan d clearedby theFBI.156 FB I Interviews with recipientsof communicationsfrom passengers B eamer, Bingham,Glick,Lyles157 14 CFR, Chapter1, Section 121.547158 CHECK TO SEE IFUASSI-00000859-00000873REFLECTS THE GATEREADER BECAUSETHEY ARE TICKET PULLS(RE: ED SOLIDAY)159 GET NUMBERAND NAMEOF FORM AND WHEREIT WOULDBE FILED.(RE EDSOLIDAY)160 One passenger reported that10 firstclass passengerswereaboard the flight. If that num ber is accurate, itwould inc lude thefour hijackers.UA SSIl-0000085 9-00000873; FBI Interview with LisaJefferson (265A-NY-280350-302-95682) United Airlines m anifest recordsfo r Flight93 show that passengers Thom asBurnett , Mark Bingham, Joseph DeLuc a, Edward Felt , LindaGrondlund,and Mark Rothenberg were thesix passengers holdingfirst class cabin seats. All but Rothenberg co mmunicated with the ground duringthe flight. None mentioned anyone from their cabin having gone into the co ckpitbefore the hijacking.Moreover,the pilotan d co-pilotof Flight93 were experienced, well-regarded professionals,who wouldbequiteunlikely to allow an observer into the cockpit pre or post take-off who had not obtained the proper

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permissionfo r such privileges priorto the flight. Comm ission DocumentRUAL#030044450A[Employeerecords].161 PENDING INPUT OF FAACV R REG. (RE: CHARLEY)162 The cockpit voice recorder for Flight 77 wasfound, but the impact had broken it rendering theinformationit contained unrecoverable.163 Evidence derivedfrom tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA AirTraffic Control radiofrequencies,and by the Flight 93CockpitVoice Recorder data.164 The airphone system was capable oftransmittingonly eight calls at any one time.165 Evidence derivedfrom tape recordings of radio transmissions over FAA AirTraffic Control radiofrequencies,and by the Fligh t 93 Cockpit Voice Recorder d ata.166 Comm ission Document RFBI#04019063--Interviewswith recipients of communicationsfrompassenger Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95682& 265A-NY-280350-302-95630); CommissionDocumentRFBI#04019066~Bradshaw(265A-NY-280350-302-95686)167 Text messages w arning the cockpit of Flight 93 were sent to theaircraft by United A irlines FlightDispatcherEd Ballingerat 9:24 a.m., (GET OTHERTIMES;SE E WHETHER THEY WERE PRINTEDOR SCREEN MESSAGESAS PER EDSOLIDAY).168 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passengers Comm ission Document RFBI#04019063-Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682),CommissionDocumentRFBI#04019065Bingham (265A-NY-280350-302-4069;265A-NY-280350-302-63761),CommissionDocumentRFBI#04019067--Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306),Commission DocumentRFBW 04019062 Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Com mission Docu me ntRFBI#04019070-DeLuca(265A-NY-280350-NK-444),Com mission Docum ent RFBI#04019072--Felt (265A-NY-280350-302-17823), Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Glick(265A-NY-280350-302-11722);CommissionDocumentRFBI#04019077Grandcolas;Commission DocumentRFBI#04019079~Gronlund(265A-NY-

280350-302-4080;265A-NY-280350-302-1123);Comm ission Docum ent RFBW04019087-- Wainio(265A-NY-280350-302-14895)169 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passengers:Comm ission DocumentRFBI#04019066-Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Lyles(265A-NY-280350-302-53207; 265A-NY-280350-302-TP419)170 We have relied mainly on the record of FBI interviews with the people who received calls. The FBIinterviews were conducted while memories were stillfresh, an d less likely to have beenaffected by readingthe accountsof othersor hearingstoriesin the media. In some caseswe have conductedour owninterviewsto supplementor verify the record.171 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passengers Com mission Document RFBI#04019063-Todd Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630; 265A-NY-280350-302-95682), Bingham(265A-NY-280350-302-4069;265A-NY-280350-302-63761),Comm ission DocumentRFBI#04019066~--Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), C om missio n Docum entRFBI#04019067-Britton(265A-NY-280350-302-25306), Commission DocumentRFBI#04019062~Burnett(265A-NY-280350-302-535),Commission DocumentRFBI#04019070--DeLuca (265A-NY-280350-NK-444)Comm ission DocumentRFBW04019072Felt (265A-NY-280350-302-17823),Glick -(265A-NY-280350-302-11722),Grandcolas(265A-NY-280350-302-638); Com mission Docum ent RFB I#04019079--Gronlund(265A-NY-280350-302-4080;265A-NY-280350-302-1123),Commission DocumentRFBI#04019082~Lyles(265A-NY-280350-302-53207;265A-NY-280350-302-TP419)Wainio (265A-NY-280350-302-14895)

172 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passengers Com mission Document RFBI#04019063 Beamer(265A -NY-280350-302-95630; 265A -NY-280350-302-95682); Comm ission Docu men tRFBI#04019066 Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Com missio n Docum entRFBI#04019062~Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission Document RFBI#04019073-Glick-(265A-NY-280350-302-11722)173 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passengers Comm ission Docum ent RFBI#04019063-Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682),CommissionDocumentRFBI#04019065-Bingham(265A-NY-280350-302-4069;265A-NY-280350-302-63761);CommissionDocumentRFBI#04019062~Burnett(265A-NY-280350-302-535), Commission DocumentRFBI#04019073 Glick-(265A-NY-280350-302-l 1722); Commission DocumentRFBI#04019079-Gronlund-(265A-NY-280350-302-4080);

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174 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passengers Comm ission DocumentRFBI#04019066--Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686); Com mission Docum entRFBI#04019073Click (265A-NY-280350-302-11722)175 FBI Interviews w ith recipients of communicationsfrom passengers Comm ission DocumentRFBI#04019066-Bradshaw(265A-NY-280350-302-95686), C om miss ion Docum ent RFBI#04 019073Click (265A-NY-280350-302-11722)17 6FB I Interviews with recipientsof communicationsfrom passengers Com mission DocumentRFBI#04019062--Burnett(265A-NY-280350-302-535); Com mission Docum entRFBI#04019067~Britton

(265A-NY-280350-302-25306); Com missio n interview with LisaJefferson.177 Summaryof PenttbomInvestigation, Departmentof Justice,FBI, January31 , 2003, pg. 64.178 Commission Interview with Richard Belme. (CONFIRM WITH TAPE OF IV AND HIS NOT ES)179 Jere Longm an,Amongthe HeroesUnited Flight93 & thePassengers& Crew WhoFought Back,(New York Harper-Collins P ublishers, 2002),pg 107; Commission interview with Deena Burnett180 FBI Interviews withrecipientsof communications frompassengers Call of Jeremy G lick to hiswifeLyzbeth-(265A-NY-280350-302-l1722);Commission Memoto File on call with Lyzbeth Glick.181 FIND OUT HOW TOREFERENCE QFR;GET THE IDNUMBEROF THEEVIDENCE LISTASPE R TA M M ; ALSO GET RUNDOWN OF HOW LIKELY IT IS FIREARM W OULD SURVIVE ASPE R RICK KEL LY.182 Federal Air Marshals con sulted by the Com mission indicate that the sound of a gunshot aboard anaircraftwould be unm istakable and would most likely be reported by passengers con tacting the ground andcaptured on the CVR. CONFIRM AS PERTSA Q U I N N AND/OR FA A PERIERA183 FIND OUT HOW TOREFERENCE QFR;GET THE IDNUMBEROF THEEVIDENCE LISTASPE R TA M M ; ALSO GET RUNDOW N OF HOW LIKELY IT IS EXPLOSIVES WOULD HAVE BEENDETECTED HAD THEY BEEN PRESENT AS PERRICK KELLY184 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from passengers Glick(265A-NY-280350-302-11722)(CONFIRM)185 FBI Interviews with recipients of comm unicationsfrom passengers Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686),Britton (265A-NY-280350-302-25306), Burnett (265A-NY-280350-302-535), Glick (265A-NY-280350-302-11722),Gronlund (265A-NY-280350-302-4080;265A-NY-280350-302-1123);Lyles (265A-NY-280350-TP-13363)18 6FB I Interviews with recipients of comm unications from passengers. C ommission D ocumentRFBI#04019063~Beamer(265A-NY-280350-302-95630;265A-NY-280350-302-95682); Bradshaw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686), Burn ett (265A-NY-280350-302-535); Glick(265A-NY-280350-302-11722),Wainio ,CHECK ON BINGHAMAND OTHERS187 FBI Interviews with recipient of communications from passenger Glick(265A-NY-280350-302-11722)188 FBI Interviews with recipients of communicationsfrom passenger Wainio (265A-NY-280350-302-14895) and Bradsh aw (265A-NY-280350-302-95686) (CO NFIRM )189 FB I Interviews with recipientsof communicationsfrom FlightAttendant Sandy.Bradshaw;(265A-NY-280350-302-95686):Com mission Interview withPhilipBradshaw. (CALL PHILIPTO CONFIRM)190 Evidence derivedfrom readout prod uced by the National Transportation Safety Board of the Flight Data

Recorderrecoveredfrom Flight93 .191 Evidence derivedfrom readoutan d animation producedby theNational T ransportationSafety Board ofthe Flight Data Recorder recovered from Flig ht 93.192 Evidence derivedfrom readout produced by the National TransportationSafety Board of the Flight DataRecorder recovered from Flight 93 based on a converstion of 292 knotsinto Miles Per HourT193 Th ecockpit voice recorder clearly capturesthe words of a hijacker including wordsin Arabic from themicrophonelodged in the pilot headset up to the end of theflight. The hijackers statem ents, the clarity ofthe recording, the position of the microp hone in the pilot headset and the correspo nding manip ulation offlight controls provide the evidence.194 CONSULT FRONT OFFICE ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS.195 Calculated according to distancefrom crash site to Washington DC given the aircraft's airspeed. (ASPE R CHARLEY)196 Flight93 was loadedwith 75.549Ibs. of Jet Fuel.19 71.C.B. Dearan d M.R.D. Foot,eds., Th e Oxford Companionto World War II (Oxford:Oxford U niversityPress, 1995),p. 872.

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