t7 b4 meetings w team leaders-staff-families fdr- 10-29-03 team 7 meeting w lee hamilton- mfr by ben...

8/14/2019 T7 B4 Meetings w Team Leaders-Staff-Families Fdr- 10-29-03 Team 7 Meeting w Lee Hamilton- MFR by Ben Rhodes

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Meeting of Team 7: Sam Brinkley, Bill Johnstone, and John Raidt with Vice-Chairman Hamilton and Chris Kojm

Lunch at Wilson CenterWednesday, October 29,2003

Notes Taken by Ben RhodesDeadline: Lee began by asking the team if they were on schedule to meet theCommission's deadline. Sam Brinkley said they were, but did not yet understand howthey would interface with Commissioners. If the report goes in a philosophical directionthat they are unaware of, they might need more time.Subpoenas: Lee asked if the team had the documents that they need. Sam Brinkley saidthey were still waiting for some documents from local authorities - for instance Massport- and were particularly troubled by the airlines, which had clearly held back informationout of concern over pending lawsuits. He said that if another subpoena is used it willlikely be on the airlines, and that United was the worst offender.Work of Team: Lee asked if the team had a narrative in place. Sam Brinkley said theywere working on three sets of documents:

1) the state of aviation security on September 10, 2001- 2) thenarrative of September 11, 2001 and 3) the current state of aviation and recommendations for the future.

Recommendations: Sam Brinkley said they probably had around 65 recommendations,bu t they were already working that down to 4-6, which could be given priority - theothers could be issued as "sub-recommendations." They are working through a vettingprocess to isolate the most effective recommendations, which would have a chance atimplementation. He cited the question of interaction with Commissioners as a necessarypart of this vetting process.CAPPSII: Lee asked about CAPPS II - when will it be ready. The team said they didnot think CAPPS II would be ready for 18 months to 2 year - if that. The rules are notbeing expedited, and OMB is taking interest in the project. Testing has begun, though,and the "no-fly list"is being implemented. John Raidt said CAPPS II is essentiallyCAPPS I with more dynamism introduced into the system so that terrorists have less of achance to beat it. Sam Brinkley raised questions about the cost-benefit analysis of thesystem - even the no-fly list could be vast when accounting for all terrorists and theiraliases. He also suggested that there is no foolproof technological solution to securingaviation - terrorists can find ways to beat these systems (eg. some hijackers werecarrying "legal" blades).Cargo: Lee raised the issue of cargo security. The team said that they are working on this- almost all cargo on planes is not screened and it is tough to find a technologicalsolution to this problem.


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MANPADS: Leeasked about thethreat from shoulder-fired missiles - MANPADS. Theteam said they were looking at this issue, and were waiting for some findings from GAO.Lee asked what the perimeter is for the weapons. SamBrinklev said when airlines are9/11 Classified Information-./He suggested that equipping planes with anti-missiles devices (flares, etc) is too expensive. He has worked on this issue for ten yearsand favors other, less expensive methods - for example, working with air traffic to

change flight patterns and establish randomness.Privacy: Lee asked if the team was looking carefully at the issue of privacy in light ofnew security measures. What is the trade offbetween security and liberty? Security andefficiency? Lee feels that the issue of privacy needs to be addressed in the report. Hefeels the American people will ultimately have to sacrifice some liberty for security. TheCommission needs to educate the American people on this issue and get them thinkingabout it. The team said they would look more closely at the privacy issue, and felt that theissue of efficiency might bejust as - if notmore important.Principles of System: SamBrinkley said the government has not figured out theprinciples of its aviation security system. Is aviation a matter of national security or is it aregulatory issue (as it largely was pre-9/11)? He said that security has not beenengineered into the airlines' system ofefficiency (as safety has). Instead, they have metminimum guidelinesand written off security - including non-compliancefines - as anexpense. Since 9/11, they have shifted costs and liability for security to the USG.Brinkley said our aviation security has been reactive - always fighting the last war andnever looking several years into the future. The Team wants to address that. That said,there will always be a gap between the ideal and what you can detect. With humanscreeners you aim to minimize these limitations. Ultimately, it is a human issue becausethere can be no 100% technological fix.Wou ld 9/11 happen? Lee asked if 9/11 could happen today. The team had conflictinganswers - no, because cockpits hadbeen reinforced and/or people would not toleratesomeone trying to take over a plane with boxcutters. Before9/11, the procedure for ahijacking was for the crew to not resist and dissuade anyone from being a hero. That said,it is clear that certain things are still getting through checkpoints and there are other, newthreats - cargo andMANPADS. Airlines have still not integrated security into theirsystems - they focus on producing compliance, not minimizing risk. Terrorists find waysaround security systems.Priorities: Lee raised the issue of priorities in aviation security and transportationsecurity in general. The team said they were addressing this issue - which they refer to asrisk-management. Lee stressed that priorities should be part of the vetting system forrecommendations, and the team said it was. They said that in their next hearing they weregoing to try and getSecretary Ridge to speak to this, but did not think he would answer.Lee asked what other areas we had to focus on since there areunlimited targets -policymakers never want to choose because if you get burned you look bad, but you must


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choose because you have limited resources. Sam Brinkley said he though ports were aparticular vulnerability.Local Guidance: Leesuggested the Commission - in a broad sense - needs to educatepeople about what they can do in their community.He knows a town in Indiana with achemical plant - if it gets blown up the whole town will blow up. People want to knowhow to protect the vulnerabilities in their communities and nobody is telling them. For alot of communities, the vulnerability is in the transportations sector. He sees it as aresponsibility of the Commission to give people some guidance across the country. JohnRaidt said this was a very good idea and would be incorporated into the team's work.General Commission: Lee asked if there was any general comment. Bill Johnstoneraised the issue of Congress. He said that theTeam - and Commission - could not focussolely on the Executive Branch, that the Congress bore some of the responsibility forfailings. Members - or key staff- need to be interviewed. He acknowledged that becausethe Commission wants to get recommendations implemented, it has to work with theCongress, but said people like Rep. Sensennbrenner had a lot to offer by way ofinformation. Lee agreed that Congress had to be talked to, and Chris said that he wouldtake requests and try to arrange interviews.Implementation: Lee returned to the issue of implementation.He said that ultimately theCommission would have to get a feel for the Congress. The Team needed to evaluatewhat the chances were for implementing these recommendations. If its only a 5% chancefor a particular recommendation, he won't spend the capital on it unless it is absolutelyvital and worth fighting for. The Team reiterated that it was including probability ofimplementation in its vetting strategy for recommendations.

t7 b4 meetings w team leaders-staff-families fdr- 10-29-03 team 7 meeting w lee hamilton- mfr by ben...

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