table of contentssecure site scholar.harvard.edu/files/katienaeve/files/katie... · 2014. 8....
TRANSCRIPT
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Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. 3
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ 4
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 5
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 8
2. Background ....................................................................................................................... 11
The phenomenon of Child Soldiers and Evidence from Reintegration Programs around the Globe . 11
The Colombian Context .................................................................................................................. 12
National Legal Mechanisms ................................................................................................................ 12
International Legal Mechanisms ......................................................................................................... 13
Colombia’s Reintegration Programs ............................................................................................... 14
History of Reintegration Programs in Colombia ................................................................................. 14
Today ................................................................................................................................................... 15
3. Policy Questions and Justification for Evaluation ............................................................... 17
4. Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 19
Set-up and Assumptions ................................................................................................................. 19
Sample Design ................................................................................................................................ 22
Survey Design ................................................................................................................................ 25
5. Data ................................................................................................................................... 27
Description of the Sample .............................................................................................................. 27
Recruitment and Mobilization ............................................................................................................ 27
Participation in Armed Groups ........................................................................................................... 30
Demobilization .................................................................................................................................... 33
Reintegration Program Participation .................................................................................................. 35
Opinions of the Reintegration Programs ............................................................................................ 36
Indicators of Success in the Program .................................................................................................. 38
Employment ........................................................................................................................................ 38
Education ............................................................................................................................................ 39
Psychological Indicators ...................................................................................................................... 40
Relationships ....................................................................................................................................... 41
Gender Dynamics ................................................................................................................................ 42
6. Analysis and Conclusions of the Evaluation ....................................................................... 45
Education ....................................................................................................................................... 46
Employment .................................................................................................................................. 47
Social Indicators ............................................................................................................................. 47
Mental Health ................................................................................................................................ 48
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Safety ............................................................................................................................................. 48
7. Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................... 49
Educational .................................................................................................................................... 49
Economic ....................................................................................................................................... 51
Social ............................................................................................................................................. 53
Psychological ................................................................................................................................. 54
General .......................................................................................................................................... 55
8. Conclusion, Constraints of the Study and Future Research ................................................ 57
Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 58
Appendix 1: Regression Tables ....................................................................................................... 59
Appendix 2: Qualitative Interviews ................................................................................................ 71
Appendix 3: Full Questionnaire – English Version ........................................................................... 72
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 84
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Acknowledgements I would like to thank my advisors at Harvard Kennedy School, Professor Jacqueline Bhabha and Professor Monica Toft for their expertise, guidance and dedication to the success of this project. Several professors at Harvard were also invaluable in the design of and methodology employed in this project; I thank Professors Alberto Abadie, Pinar Dogan, Dan Levy and Julie Boatright Wilson for their generous advice and expertise. I am grateful to the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies for their financial support, without which this research would not have been possible. I thank Marcela Briceño-Donn at the UN for her extraordinary knowledge in this area and enormous support that she has provided me over the last year, and Mario Gonzalez for his graphic assistance. This project would not have been possible without the logistical assistance and access to field locations provided by the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR). Finally, I thank the 112 remarkable former child soldiers around Colombia for sharing with me their time, opinions, stories, injustices and successes—my hope is that the outcomes of this project will in some way positively impact their futures and allow me to repay them for all they have given me.
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List of Abbreviations
ACR High Presidential Counsel for Reintegration (Alta Consejeria Presidencial para la Reintegración), now the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración)
ICBF Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar) CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child DDSP Democratic Defense and Security Policy PRVC Program for Reincorporation into Civilian Life PAE Program for Specialized Attention AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ELN National Liberation Army IHL International Humanitarian Law DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UN OHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
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Executive Summary
The government of Colombia has instituted the world’s most comprehensive reintegration program for demobilized ex-combatants from all armed groups participating in the country’s decades-long internal conflict. Specific programs exist to rehabilitate demobilized child soldiers, who number in the tens of thousands in Colombia, however, these programs determine eligibility using only the age at which a child soldier demobilizes. Subsequently, programs specifically designed to rehabilitate and reintegrate demobilized child soldiers are only available to those who demobilize prior to their 18th birthdays, excluding those demobilized child soldiers who, for reasons beyond their control, demobilize at or after 18 years of age.
For this study, interviews were conducted with 112 demobilized child soldiers in five Colombian regions who are currently young adults participating in reintegration programs with the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR). This sample population contains former child soldiers who demobilized prior to 18 years of age (and received government services for demobilized child soldiers as well as ACR services) and former child soldiers who demobilized just after their 18th birthdays (who did not receive services for demobilized child soldiers, but are receiving ACR services) to identify their common characteristics as well as the differences in their reintegration outcomes. With the information gained from those interviews, this report contributes to the current literature on child soldiers and their reintegration, and provides the ACR with key information about this population and recommends concrete actions to strengthen the ACR services provided to demobilized child soldiers regardless of the age at which they demobilized.
This project achieves four goals:
1) It identifies the characteristics of demobilized child soldiers participating in government reintegration programs as young adults: it identifies their experiences in the conflict, their current wellbeing, their outcomes in key reintegration indicators, and their needs for successful social and economic reintegration.
2) It uses the Colombian government’s strict 18 year-old cutoff for determining eligibility for rehabilitation services for demobilized child soldiers to rigorously evaluate the impact of the cutoff on the reintegration outcomes of demobilized child soldiers using a unique regression discontinuity design.
3) It identifies the shortcomings faced by child soldiers who demobilize after their 18th birthdays due to their ineligibility for services that target former child soldiers.
4) It utilizes the information collected and analyzed to provide concrete recommendations to the Colombian Agency for Reintegration to strengthen, focus and equalize its programs for demobilized child combatants to ensure that all former child soldiers, regardless of the age at which they demobilize, are provided the services necessary for their complete and effective reintegration.
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FINDINGS
Mobilization, While in the Armed Conflict, and Demobilization
70% of the former child soldiers interviewed indicated that they were voluntarily recruited, while around 30% were forced by either their families or armed groups, though these results varied greatly by interview location.
The most-cited reasons for joining the armed group voluntarily were liking the uniforms or weapons characteristic of the armed group (40%), to earn money or other resources (22%) and because friends and family members also joined the armed group (17%).
65% were recruited by FARC, 22% by ELN, and 12% by AUC, and the average age at recruitment was around 14 years—which varied only slightly among armed groups—though participants reported being recruited as young as 8 years and as old as 17 years.
All participants reported carrying weapons, and most participated in direct hostilities.
70% demobilized from the conflict individually, while 19% were captured by Colombian government forces, and 8% participated in collective demobilizations.
The average age at demobilization was 17.5 years.
Participation in ACR Programs
Nearly all participants take part in ACR psychosocial, medical and educational services, though few participate in job training.
Participants cited education as the service that helps their reintegration the most and job training that which helps the least.
Wellbeing and Success in Reintegration
Slightly more than half of participants are unemployed, looking for, but unable to find a job.
Educational programs appear to have helped the least educated and men the most, while not having a significant impact on higher education attainment.
Few participants have completed primary school, and fewer have completed secondary school.
Nearly one-fifth of participants report mental health problems, though they reported very high levels of self-confidence.
Very few indicate having social relationships.
Participants who have children were nearly all teenage parents, and women, on average, had their first child two years younger than their male counterparts.
Impact of the 18-Year-Old Cutoff for Receipt of Services for Former Child Soldiers
Individuals who demobilized before 18 years of age and received services for being recognized as former child soldiers are 17 percentage points more likely to have finished primary school than those who demobilized after their 18th birthdays.
Those who demobilized prior to 18 years of age are 15 to 24 percentage points more likely to be employed.
Participants who received services for demobilized child soldiers appear to be 10 percentage points more likely to report having difficulty with friends, though report, on average, slightly better family relationships.
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There is not enough information to determine the impact of the cutoff on mental health indicators such as substance abuse, self-confidence and difficulty with depression or isolation.
Individuals who received services for demobilized child soldiers were found to be around 30 percentage points more likely to report having difficulty with security.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Educational
1) Improve the availability and flexibility of primary school and high school courses.
2) Provide extra or individualized educational help or tutors for those furthest behind in
academics, which are largely those who did not participate in programs for demobilized
child soldiers.
3) Increase incentives to finish primary school.
Economic
1) Improve ACR collaboration with employers to create jobs for ACR participants.
2) Provide evening or weekend services for those participants who work during normal work
hours.
3) Utilize and build upon the skills that participants already have.
4) Create jobs for ACR participants through ACR-run businesses or organizations.
Social
1) Organize events or activities for young participants to connect with one-another.
2) Facilitate reconnection of participants to their family members.
Psychological
1) Provide individualized psychological treatment for participants and incentivize participants’
take-up by requiring twice weekly psychological therapy as part of the requirement for the
psychosocial stipend.
2) Require an initial psychological examination when a participant first enters the ACR to
identify the participant’s needs with regard to mental health.
General
1) Create individualized treatment plans to meet the unique needs of each participant.
2) Regularly solicit and utilize the opinions of participants to formulate the most appropriate
services.
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1. Introduction Since 2002, the government of Colombia has made significant progress in bringing its decades-long internal conflict to an end by instituting demobilization and reintegration processes for illegal armed combatants. Together, Colombia’s demobilization and reintegration programs have encouraged over 50,000 armed combatants to hand in their weapons in return for a civilian life. Nearly 4,000 of these individuals were children when they demobilized. To ensure the successful return of these children and adults to a productive, peaceful civilian life, the government created what is now known as the Colombian Agency for Reintegration to address the needs of demobilized adults and their communities, and the Program for Specialized Attention to meet the needs of demobilized children. In Colombia, approximately one in four illegal armed combatants is under the age of 18 and nearly half of all combatants enter the conflict as children.1 However, the most important characteristic that the government of Colombia uses to determine an ex-combatant’s path of reintegration is the age at which he or she demobilizes: under 18 years of age and the child is characterized as a child soldier and receives benefits and services accordingly; over 18 years of age the individual is characterized as an illegal ex-combatant and receives benefits and services accordingly. But what should be done about those soldiers who enter the conflict as children but demobilize after their 18th birthdays? They are victims of the armed conflict having been recruited as children, but also adult combatants for the length of time they were in the conflict over the age of 18. The following figure illustrates the difference in reintegration services based upon the child soldier’s age at demobilization. Those that demobilize before their 18th birthdays received specialized (ICBF) services for demobilized child soldiers, then go on to enter the ACR reintegration program, whereas those child soldiers who demobilize on or after their 18th birthdays only receive the ACR program. Figure 1: Illustration of the Difference between the Treatment and Control Groups
1 HRW (2003): 4
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The rehabilitation services provided by the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF) include specialized foster care and physical protection, mandatory education, one-on-one social workers, and specialized mental health services. The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) programs for adult ex-combatants, on the other hand, incentivize optional participation in psychosocial, health, education and job training services with a monthly stipend. Child soldiers who demobilize after their 18th birthdays face a fractured legal and policy response to their demobilization and reintegration. Under Colombian and international law, they were illegally recruited and thus victims of the armed conflict. Their age at demobilization, however, restricts them from receiving reparations and services provided to former child soldiers who demobilized prior to their 18th birthdays. All ex-combatants who legally demobilize in Colombia have the right to government reintegration programs when they are at or above 18 years of age, conditional on there being no warrant for his or her arrest for having committed crimes against humanity. Those who demobilize before 18 years of age, however, receive distinct treatment, reparations and rehabilitation for being child soldiers. Thus, the reintegration path of a demobilized soldier strictly relies on the age at which he or she demobilizes. This project takes a critical look at the Colombian government’s reintegration program for illegal ex-combatants to evaluate its impact on former child soldiers. The contribution of this study to the current literature on child soldiers are three fold: first, it looks at the wellbeing of all demobilized child soldiers participating in the government’s reintegration programs (those that demobilize as minors and those who demobilize after 18 years of age) through in-depth interviews with 112 participants; secondly, it uses a rigorous analytic method to compare child soldiers who demobilized before their 18th birthdays and those who demobilized after to evaluate the incremental benefit the law awards demobilized minors; and lastly, in response to their request, it provides the Colombian government’s Agency for Reintegration with insight into this population and suggests ways to strengthen its services to better address their needs. Because Colombia’s reintegration policy has a strict age cutoff, it provides an unusual amount of analytic traction for studying the program’s effectiveness.2 Although Colombian laws state that demobilized illegal combatants over the age of 18, even those who were recruited as children, may not receive the compensation and rehabilitation services awarded to those who demobilize before their 18th birthdays, the Colombian Agency for Reintegration should provide specific services to all demobilized child soldiers to ensure their unique needs are met so that they may return to society as productive, peaceful and rights-holding citizens. In my analysis, I found that there are no significant baseline differences among young, demobilized ex-combatants participating in reintegration programs in terms of age at mobilization, method of mobilization, educational attainment prior to mobilization, and length of time in ACR programs; the only significant difference other than the age at which they demobilized and length of time with the armed group, is gender (more women in the sample demobilized after 18 years). Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of means of each relevant independent variable and the associated p-value. Each means test (except length in the armed conflict and gender) is significant at at least the 5% level, meaning the means are not significantly different.
2 The natural discontinuity in the policy helps to screen for differences between treatment and control groups, in much the
same way seen in randomized evaluations.
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I use these baseline similarities and the strict 18-year cutoff to compare the impact of reintegration processes for child soldiers who demobilized before 18 years of age to those who demobilized after 18 years of age. Using a quasi-experimental design, I measure the incremental benefit of receiving child soldier benefits as a demobilized minor.
Figure 2: Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups at Baseline
Variable
Control Mean (those who demobilized
≥ 18 years of age) n=19
Treatment Mean (those who demobilized
< 18 years of age) n=91
P-value
Age at mobilization 14.05 13.57 0.39
Method of mobilization 1.37 1.32 0.70
Length of time with armed group (in years)
5.53 3.71 0.00*
Years of education pre-mobilization 4.32 4.38 0.91
Highest education level Pre-mobilization
0.50 0.30 0.20
Method of demobilization 1.95 1.97 0.89
Length of time in ACR program 3.84 3.53 0.54
Percent of females 25% 12% 0.00*
* Differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. Method of mobilization responses are: 1=voluntarily, 2=forced by the armed group, 3=forced by my family, 4=I don’t know, 5=other. Years of education pre-mobilization responses are 1=0 years, 2=1 year, 3=2 years, 4=3 years, 5=4 years, 6=5years, 7=six years, 8=more than 6 years. Highest education level pre-mobilization responses are: 1=primary school, 2=secondary school, 3=high school diploma, 4=job training/certificate, 5=some college, 6=graduated from college, 7=other. Method of demobilization responses are: 1=individually, 2=through a peace accord, 3=captured by armed forces, 4=I don’t know, 5=other.
I find that children who demobilized prior to 18 years of age are more likely to have completed primary school, and less likely to consume drugs, though more likely to report having difficulties with security and with friends than their counterparts who demobilized over 18 years of age. It also appears that those who demobilize as minors feel safer, are more likely to be employed, and report worse family relationships than the control group; however, due to sample size restrictions, these results are not statistically significant at the 10% level, and more data would be needed to show a stronger relationship. These findings, in addition to in-depth interviews with reintegration program participants and staff, allow me to provide the ACR with explicit recommendations on how to better serve all former child soldiers. Although this report does not address the legal mechanisms that distinguish these two groups of demobilized child soldiers, my findings shed light on the practical implications of the failure to recognize all demobilized young combatants who were child soldiers as such and equalize effective treatment among them. This report seeks to illustrate the wellbeing of these now young adults, identify their unmet needs as demobilized child soldiers and recommend ways in which those needs can be addressed by the ACR to benefit both these individuals and Colombian society at large. Colombia cannot continue on its path to a peaceful and economically prosperous future without appropriately addressing its newest members of society.
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2. Background
The phenomenon of Child Soldiers and Evidence from Reintegration Programs around
the Globe
The recruitment and use of child soldiers is a current, worldwide phenomenon. Estimates indicate that between 250,000 and 300,000 children are currently fighting in armed conflicts—either with government or rebel forces.3 Peter Singer (author of the 2005 award-winning book, Children at War) reports that an estimated two-thirds of current or recently ended conflicts saw the use of child soldiers.4 While the largest prevalence of child soldiers is in Africa, since 2001, children have fought and continue to fight in wars and conflicts in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East.5 International law strictly prohibits the involvement of children in armed conflict. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which entered into force in 2002, bans the use of children under age 18 in hostilities, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court made the conscription, enlistment and use of children under the age of 15 in hostilities illegal in July 2002.6 This project does not address the fundamental issue of the recruitment of child soldiers, nor the way in which children fight in wars. It seeks to identify how best to reinsert children into their communities once they have laid down their weapons. This study does, however, look at the recruitment and role of child soldiers in armed conflict as a determinant for their needs post-conflict. As conflicts end and peace agreements are signed, combatants must be reinserted into society. How a country reinserts its warring groups into civilian life is essential for achieving lasting peace. Effective reintegration programs are even more pertinent when seeking to reintegrate demobilized children as often children who fight in wars have less experience in civilian life than their adult counterparts. Additionally, child combatants more often than not are coerced into joining and fighting with groups and are brainwashed or drugged to ease their acceptance of groups’ ideologies or violent tactics. Reintegration programs for demobilized children must be holistic, encompassing their psychological, social, economic, educational, physical, cultural and gender-specific needs. At the same time, they must recognize the uniqueness of each child’s experience, difficulties, and requirements for a successful reintegration. As Wessells (2006) states, “The breadth and scope of their concerns caution against singular approaches that assume that a returnee needs only a single form of support, such as a livelihood.” Successful rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers depends on several factors, namely community acceptance and family support, and access
3 Wessels (2006): 9 4 Singer (2005) 5 Wessels (2006): 10 6 Ibid.
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to education and skills training to help them become self-sufficient, productive members of their communities.7
The Colombian Context
Colombia’s internal conflict began in the mid-1960s, when several left-wing armed groups, namely the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), began attacking both the government and civilians. As guerilla groups gained financial and military strength through kidnappings, extortion and the illegal drug trade, in the early 1980s, right-wing paramilitary groups formed, namely, the United Autodefenses of Colombia (AUC), by large landowners and drug cartels to fight against guerilla groups. These paramilitary groups, believed to be supported by the government, are also responsible for committing atrocities against civilians and government officials.8 Although peace deals and military offensives have contributed to a decline of the conflict, Colombia today still faces a high level of violence at the hands of all armed groups. It is estimated that one in four illegal combatants in Colombia is under the age of 18, and half of all illegal combatants entered the armed conflict under the age of 18.9 Each illegal armed group in Colombia recruits and uses child soldiers. The majority of child soldiers are recruited in the departments (or states) of Antioquia in the central west and Casanare in the central east of the country, though much of central and south-central Colombia also see large numbers of child recruitment.10 Unlike the phenomenon of kidnapping child soldiers in most African conflicts, 84% of child soldiers voluntarily chose to join armed groups, and 15% were forced by either the armed group, or their families.11 Reasons children cite for voluntarily entering the group include receiving threats against themselves or their families, for revenge against an opposing armed group, because their family members or friends also joined, the appeal of weapons or uniforms, family problems, or the lack of educational and economic opportunity. Colombian law aims to protect children from illegal recruitment into armed groups and punishes those who are responsible for their recruitment.
National Legal Mechanisms
Law 418 of 1997 first prohibited the incorporation of minors into military services unless minors joined voluntarily with the authorization of the child’s parents, and it prohibits these children from traveling to combat zones. This law also established benefits for minors who voluntarily demobilize from one of 50 recognized armed groups. In 2002, Congress enacted Law 782, which renewed Law 418, removed the need for the government to recognize the armed group, and broadened the language of what constitutes a child
7 Betancourt et al. (2010) 8 Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Encyclopedia, Colombia. 9 HRW (2003): 4. 10 UNICEF (2006): 76 11 UNICEF (2006): 74. The information in this report was obtained through direct interviews with demobilized children participating in ICBF programs for former child soldiers.
“It was the maltreatment and the
violation of our rights as minors
which has marked me the most for
my entire life and I wish that no one
else will have this experience. It was
really difficult and tough and it left
many holes in my body and my life.”
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victim from “taking part in hostilities” to “victim of political violence.” Law 782 also established the obligation of the ICBF to create and implement “a program of special protection for the assistance of all the cases of minors that have taken part in hostilities or been victims of political violence in the internal armed conflict.”12 Law 782 also removed from Law 418 the requirement that children demobilize voluntarily from the conflict in order to receive the benefits of the law. Building upon Law 782, and with pressure from the ICBF and the government’s Ombudsman’s Office for villages (Defensoria del Pueblo), Decree 128 of 2003 was created and established the guideline that any military, civil or judicial authority of the government involved in the demobilization of a child, must, within 36 hours, turn the child in to the ICBF to receive specialized protection and attention and prohibits the use of demobilized children for methods of intelligence.13 Finally, in 2011, the Law of Victims and Restitution of Land came into effect, which establishes that “boys, girls and adolescents that have demobilized from an illegal armed group while minors” are considered victims of the armed conflict and qualify for financial reparations as such.14 With regard to the prosecution of those responsible for the illegal recruitment of minors, Article 162 of the Colombian Penal Code requires that “he who, as pertaining to the armed conflict, recruits minors under 18 years of age or obliges them to participate directly or indirectly in hostilities or in armed actions will incur a prison sentence of six to ten years.”15 This penalty is awarded to perpetrators who are captured as well as to those who demobilize legally through the government’s DDR process.
International Legal Mechanisms
In addition to its national laws and decrees, under its constitution, Colombia also recognizes as constitutional law the international conventions and treaties to which it is a party. These conventions include the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), which it ratified in 1991, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of children in Armed Conflict, which it ratified in 2005. The CRC institutes a 15-year age minimum for recruitment into an armed group, but states that when recruiting children under the age of 18, priority should be given to those who are oldest.16 The Optional Protocol reestablishes the acceptable age at which irregular armed forces can recruit (compulsory or voluntarily) or use an individual in direct hostilities to be 18 years.17 The Optional Protocol also requires that states party to the convention provide “rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary thereto, including through technical cooperation and financial assistance.”18
12 Law 782 of 2002 13 Decree 128 of 2003 14 The Law of Victims and Restitution of Land of 2011. Title 1, Chapter 1, Article 3 15 UNICEF (2006): 56 16 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 17 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) 18 Ibid.
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Colombia’s Reintegration Programs
History of Reintegration Programs in Colombia
What is today known as the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) began in 2002 as a reintegration program for demobilized illegal adult combatants from all armed groups. This initial reintegration program—the Program for Reincorporation into Civilian Life (PRVC)—was run by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice and formed to address the needs of thousands of illegal combatants that demobilized through the government’s Democratic Defense and Security Policy (DDSP), enacted in August 2002. DDSP’s goal is to “dismantle all illegal armed groups by means of individual or group demobilization”19 and has seen over 51,000 demobilizations to date.20 Any illegal combatant who does not have an outstanding warrant for his or her arrest for crimes against humanity may enter the demobilization process. Those wanted for crimes against humanity, through the Law of Justice and Peace (Law 975 of 2005), can participate in the program in exchange for a confession of his or her crimes and payment of reparations to his or her victims. The PRVC’s goal was to provide individualized care to ex-combatants, with particular attention focused on the psychological, educational and economic needs of the participants. As the rate and scope of demobilizations (both group and individual) began to increase, however, the government of Colombia realized that it needed to provide resources and assistance to the communities into which ex-combatants were re-entering if the reintegration of these individuals was to be successful and sustainable. Between 2003 and 2006, 31,671 combatants turned in their weapons as a result of collective paramilitary peace deals alone.21 Each of the 31,671 demobilized combatants entered the PRVC, with the exception of 2,345 children who entered the Program for Specialized Attention (PAE) administered through the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF), with the option to enter the ACR program once they reach 18 years of age and are no longer eligible for ICBF services. The increased demand for PRVC services created a dangerous backlog and administrative challenges. To address the new demands facing the reintegration of illegal combatants in the wake of mass demobilizations, in September 2006, President Alvaro Uribe instituted the High Presidential Council for Reintegration and appointed Frank Pearl Gonzalez to lead the new initiative. The Council seeks to legally return Colombia’s demobilized population to their communities to contribute to the peace, security, and reconciliation of Colombian society.22 On November 3, 2012, Decree 4138 turned the High Presidential Council for Reintegration into the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, led by Alejandro Eder Garcés. While maintaining the same structure, mission, and services as its predecessor, the new ACR will enjoy greater autonomy in its new form.
19 High Presidential Council for Reintegration, Historical Brief. 20 High Presidential Council for Reintegration, Reintegration in Colombia: Facts and Figures. 21 The paramilitary groups that participated in the 2002-2003 peace deals that led to the demobilization of nearly 32,000 illegal combatants were largely the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and the Central Bolivar Block, though other, smaller groups also participated. 22 High Presidential Council for Reintegration, Historical Brief.
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Today
The ACR, in its 6th year, has over 32,000 active adult participants. Participants in the program receive services and monetary stipends at one of the 29 service centers throughout the country. The participant can choose where he or she resides and receives services from the closest ACR service center. The ACR facilitates the social and economic reintegration of its participants by offering health, psychosocial, employment and educational services, and it incentivizes participants to use the services by providing a monthly stipend for each service in which the participant partakes. The services and professional attention are provided to all participants uniformly, without regard to gender, age, ethnic group, or armed group with which one participated. The services provided, respective financial compensation, and restrictions are outlined in Figure 3. As the figure demonstrates, for the first and second months in the program, participants can receive up to $592 and $482, after which time the maximum compensation is $264 per month. For comparison purposes, the GDP per capita in Colombia is $6225 per year, which is around $519 per month.23 However, due to high level of inequality in Colombia (the 9th most unequal country in the world), it may be more appropriate to compare the stipend to the GDP per capita for the poorest 20% of population. The lowest 20% of the population earns, on average, $934 per year, or $78 per month.24 Therefore, other than the first two months, participants can receive up to around half of the country’s GDP per capita, or around three times the bottom quintile’s GDP per capita each month for participating in all of the services offered.
23 World Bank World DataBank. GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity, for latest recorded
year, 2010. 24 Calculated using World Bank World DataBank data for 2010 GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing
power parity and income quintiles.
16
Figure 3: Services and Benefits Provided to ACR Participants
Service Description Financial
Compensation for Participation
Restrictions & Requirements
Introductory Economic Assistance
For the first two months, participants receive financial assistance for signing a contract and attending monthly meetings with his or her social worker.
$400,000 pesos ($219 USD) per month
Only for the first two months of participation, conditional on attendance at monthly meeting with social worker and signing of reintegration contract.
Introductory Assistance with Household Expenses
One time during the first month of reintegration, a participant can earn financial assistance for household expenses.
$200,000 pesos ($110 USD) per month
One time only.
Health Care
Participants and their families receive the most comprehensive level of Colombian universal health insurance, plus added access to mental health and substance abuse services. This level does not require any out of pocket co-payments for services.
None Participants can only visit public clinics and providers.
Education
Provides participants and their families paid primary education and facilitates enrollment in schools and educational programs.
$160,000 pesos ($88 USD) per month
Participants must attend 90% of class meetings; failure to attend 90% results in no payment. Education services may only last a maximum of 6.5 years.
Psychosocial Attention
Participants receive once or twice monthly group therapy sessions, which aims to build social skills and improve mental health.
$160,000 pesos ($88 USD) per month
Participants must attend 90% of meetings; failure to meet this requirement results in no payment. Psychosocial meetings may only last a duration of 2.5 years.
Job Training
Access to free, national job training program, SENA, and other training programs at institutions approved by the Ministry of Education, and facilitated entrance into courses through reserved spaces for ACR participants only.
$160,000 pesos ($88 USD) per month
Participants receive payment for participation in up to two courses; they may take more, but without payment. Participants must complete primary school (through 5th grade) in order to participate. Participants must attend 90% of class meetings; failure to attend at least 90% of classes results in no payment.
Productive Project/Grant
Grant to start one’s own business, buy a home, or enroll in higher education program (college or university).
Participants must have progressed into fourth stage of reintegration.
TOTAL STIPEND POSSIBLE
$480,000 pesos ($264 USD) per month *$1,080,000 pesos ($592 USD) once, the first month *$880,000 pesos ($482 USD) once, the second month.
17
3. Policy Questions and Justification for
Evaluation
Colombian law and policy clearly aim to prevent children from entering armed groups and seek to protect and rehabilitate those that are victims of both voluntary and forced recruitment into illegal armed groups. The recently passed Law of Victims and Restitution of Lands adds to previous legal code by ensuring that child soldiers who demobilize before their 18th birthdays receive financial reparations for the injustices they have faced. Although viewed nearly universally as a victory for the victims of Colombia’s armed conflict, many children’s rights advocates point to its discrepancies with regard to child soldiers. The law follows Colombia’s reintegration policy for demobilized combatants in restricting victimhood to those child soldiers who demobilize before their 18th birthdays. Although there is clearly a need (politically, legally and economically) to restrict the eligibility for government programs to those whom the program seeks to benefit, many critics wonder if the 18-year cutoff for services and compensation for child soldiers is appropriate. There are several reasons why this cutoff age has come into question. There are legal, normative, economic, and political rationales both for the cutoff and against it. The purpose of this study is to measure what the cutoff impacts in reality. In doing so, this evaluation seeks to answer the following questions: 1) How are all demobilized child soldiers who participate in the ACR faring? Because it is important to first understand who these former child soldiers are who participate in ACR programs and how they are faring generally in terms of social and economic reintegration, I first look at this population in aggregate to describe their general welfare. 2) What are the determinants of a successful reintegration? Children’s rights scholars and activists have identified the needs of demobilized child soldiers. It is key to understand how universally recognized standards for the rehabilitation of these young adults fit into the Colombian context and identify the ways in which the ACR is or is not successfully addressing the specific needs of this population. 3) What is the difference between child soldiers who demobilize before and after 18 years of age in terms of baseline characteristics? To analyze how government reintegration programs have impacted this population, it is key to first identify whether or not these two groups vary on key baseline characteristics, including their lives prior to entering the armed conflict, recruitment into the conflict, and experience with armed groups. 4) Can and do child soldiers choose when to demobilize from a conflict and are they responsible for the age at which they demobilize?
18
As this report will show, the large majority of child soldiers in Colombia do not have the liberty to leave armed groups. This affects the rationale for the 18-year-old cutoff for services, because, even as adults, members of armed groups cannot decide when to leave. This is an important assumption of the evaluation technique used in this analysis. 5) Do we see measureable differences in key reintegration outcomes between former child soldier participants who demobilized under 18 years of age and those who demobilized over 18 years? Due to the differences in services provided to former child soldiers based on the age at which they demobilize, this project will provide concrete evidence of the effect of the 18-year-old cutoff. This evidence serves both to identify the gaps in treatment of these two groups, but it also alludes to general successes and failures of reintegration services for demobilized child soldiers of all ages. 6) What are the potential implications of the 18-year-old cutoff in terms of the recruitment, use and demobilization of child soldiers? In addition to the implications of the distinct service provisions, there are several potential negative externalities of the 18-year-old cutoff. These potential externalities include impunity of armed group leaders, injustices faced by victims of the conflict, and perverse incentives for maintaining children among the ranks in armed groups. 7) If there are measurable differences in outcomes between these two groups, how can the ACR address them through its services? Finally, based upon the evidence gathered and analysis performed in this study, I will propose several recommendations to the ACR for the adjustment and improvement of their services for demobilized child soldiers. The remarkable capacity of this agency to rehabilitate former armed combatants and reintegrate them into their societies speaks to its ability to use the findings of this study to reach its goal of successful reintegration of all demobilized combatants.
19
4. Methodology To address the policy questions outlined above, this study utilizes both basic statistical analysis and a quasi-experimental design to detail the wellbeing of former child soldiers and to evaluate the incremental impact of participating in ICBF programs in addition to ACR programs. This design allows for the comparison of the outcomes of former child soldiers who participated in ICBF and ACR programs to the outcomes of those who only participated in ACR programs in order to find the causal impact of the ICBF program. The evaluation model used for this analysis follows a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, in which it exploits the 18-year age discontinuity that determines eligibility for reintegration services.25 A discontinuity such as that found in this policy is rare in the real world and very beneficial for an evaluation as it affords the researcher an unusually high level of traction for studying policy effectiveness. A discontinuity such as the 18 year old cutoff in this project allows the researcher to mimic a randomized evaluation and the associated high levels of internal validity when measuring causal impact of a program or policy.
Set-up and Assumptions
A regression discontinuity model fits this evaluation well because the treatment (receiving ICBF services) is determined by the assignment (age at demobilization under 18 years) 64% of the time. That is, a child soldier who demobilizes prior to his or her 18th birthday had a 64% chance of receiving ICBF services. In other words, only 4 of the respondents who did not receive ICBF services should have because they demobilized before their 18th birthdays. Similarly, only 5 of the respondents who received ICBF services reported demobilizing at or above 18 years of age.
Figure 4: Probability of Treatment
Likelihood of Treatment Based on Age of Demobilization
Treated Untreated
Demobilized < 18 years of age 94% 6%
Demobilized ≥ 18 years of age 32% 68%
Another key characteristic of the set-up is that respondents could not manipulate the assignment. That is, they could not manipulate the age at which they demobilized. Eighty-eight percent of respondents said that the armed group with which they were involved did not or would not have let them leave. Furthermore, of the five (or 8%) who said the armed group did let them leave, two demobilized as part of a collective demobilization process or peace deal with the government which
25 This evaluation employs a “fuzzy” as opposed to a “sharp” regression discontinuity design meaning that the probability of receiving the treatment does not change from zero to one at the threshold. That is, the likelihood of a child to receive the treatment (here, ICBF services) given that he or she demobilized under 18 years of age is not 100%, and likewise the probability of not being treated given a demobilization after 18 years of age is not 100%. Figure X shows the actual probabilities in this study.
20
requires all members of the block to officially demobilize. Therefore, only three respondents indicated that the armed group they were involved with would have let them leave. Additionally, to receive the treatment, individuals are rigorously evaluated, often medically, to ensure they are indeed under 18 years of age and eligible for services. Mobilized child soldiers are mostly ignorant of reintegration services generally, however, should they attempt to be treated, in addition to not being able to manipulate the actual timing of their demobilization, they are also unable to manipulate their age in order to receive services. These characteristics show that the assignment was completely exogenous as participants could not self-select into the treatment group due to their inability both to choose their demobilization date and misrepresent their age in order to receive the treatment. This aspect of the data is especially important because it is often difficult to control who takes up the treatment and who does not, which impacts the internal validity of the study. Lastly, other variables or characteristics of the participants that affect the treatment do not change discontinuously at the cutoff. That is, characteristics that may impact the treatment the participants receive do not change as participants move from 17 to 18 years of age. Furthermore, as Figure 2 shows, baseline characteristics of the control and treatment are nearly identical (significantly differing only in the average length of time in the armed group and gender composition), and Table 12 in Appendix 1 illustrates the results of placebo tests indicating the success of this discontinuity design. Figure 5 illustrates that the individuals interviewed, on average, were recruited into the armed conflict when they were 14 years old, and were under the control of armed groups between 32 (treatment group) and 54 months (control group). They had received around two years of education prior to joining armed groups, are currently around 21 years old and have spent around three years to date in the ACR program. It is important to note that evaluations using regression discontinuity design most successfully determine the impact of programs when the treatment and control groups fall just below and just above the discontinuity. In the case of this study, that would mean the control group would be over but as close to 18 years of age at demobilization as possible, and the treatment group would be under but as close to 18 years at demobilization as possible. To increase the sample size used for the analysis in this paper, however, I broaden the control and treatment groups. While most of the sample population lies within the ages of 16-19 years, it does include participants who demobilized as young as 12 and as old as 22. Figure 21 in Section 5 illustrates the distribution of ages at demobilization.
21
Figure 5: Comparison of Full Population, Control Group and Treatment Group at Baseline
I. Full Sample II. Control Group:
≥ 18 years III. Treatment Group:
< 18 years
(n=111) (n=19) (n=91)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Age at mobilization (years)
13.65 1.99 8 17 14.05 2.22 10 17 13.57 1.95 8 17
Length of time with armed group (months)
36.00 1.00 <6 >60 54.24 12.12 12 >60 32.40 10.80 <6 >60
Years of education prior to mobilization
3.32 1.00 0 >6 3.32 1.43 0 >6 3.38 0.90 0 >6
Age at demobilization (years)
16.57 1.61 12 22 18.89 1.37 18 22 16.09 1.18 12 17.5
Method of demobilization
Captured by government forces
0.19 0.16 0.20
Individually 0.71 0.74 0.70
Through a peace deal
0.08 0.11 0.08
Other 0.02 0 0.02
Length of time in ACR (years)
2.59 1.00 <.5 >7 2.84 0.92 <.5 >7 2.53 1.01 <.5 >7
Current age 21.31 2.06 18 27 22.00 1.70 19 25 21.16 2.12 18 27
Armed Group
FARC 0.64 0.58 0.65
ELN 0.22 0.21 0.22
AUC 0.12 0.16 0.11
Other 0.01 0.05 0.01
Gender
Females 0.40 0.42 0.36
Males 0.60 0.58 0.64
Figure 5 compares the populations of the former child soldiers studied here, divided into groups according to whether they demobilized before or after 18 years of age. It shows how these populations are similar along most dimensions, with the exceptions of gender and the duration of time in the conflict. The control group has about 6 percentage points more women, and were in the conflict, on average, around 22 months longer than the treatment group, which makes sense given that they entered the conflict around the same age as the treatment group but demobilized at an older age.
22
Sample Design
The sample population used in this study consists of 112 randomly selected individuals, ages 18-27, who are demobilized child soldiers and active participants in the ACR reintegration program. All participants were interviewed at one of six Service centers in five different departments (or states) around Colombia in late 2011. The service centers where interviews took place are:
Bogotá – Engativa, in Cundinamarca department
Bogotá – Rafael Uribe, in Cundinamarca department
Cali, in Valle del Cauca department
Ibagué, in Tolima department
Medellín, in Antioquia department
Villavicencio, in Meta department
Figure 6: Locations of Interviews
23
These locations were selected out of the 29 ACR service centers for several reasons: first, they are among the centers with the largest active participant populations of demobilized child soldiers; second, each of these departments has been impacted profoundly and distinctly by the armed conflict; and third, they were deemed safe for travel and research. Figure 7 below shows the locations of the 29 ACR service centers and the participant population density in each department. As is evident from the map, the departments visited for this study are among the departments with the highest number of participants Figure 7: Locations of ACR Service Centers
Once the service centers were selected, the sample population was chosen by disaggregating the participants at each center by both age (current 18-25 year-olds) and who entered the armed conflict as minors. That population was then separated into two groups, those who demobilized prior to turning 18 years of age and those who demobilized at or older than 18 years of age.
24
The information used for selecting the sample of participants was obtained through the ACR participant database. Using these two lists, each service center called each participant listed to invite him or her to come into the service center for an interview at a particular day and time. Of those who were called and invited to participate, roughly 75% showed up for their scheduled interview. All interviews were conducted in person by the author of this report. Figure 8 below describes the sample population as compared to the actual ACR population.
Figure 8: Comparison of Populations
Comparison of Sample and Total Population in ACR
Sample Population Total Population
Service Center (Department or State)
Cali (Valle de Cauca) 29 552
Ingativa (Cundinamarca) 6 197
Ibagué (Tolima) 8 528
Medellín (Antioquia) 51 543
Rafael Uribe (Cundinamarca) 11 217
Villavicencio (Meta) 7 375
Total 112 4,793
Gender 40% female, 60% male 28% female, 72% male
Age Range 18-27 18-25
The six service centers selected provided a sample with significant heterogeneity. The participants interviewed are from 22 of Colombia’s 32 different departments and fought in 23 departments. Figure 9 illustrates the diverse geography of birthplaces of the participants of this study. Geographic characteristics add to the robustness of the study as each department in Colombia has experienced the armed conflict in distinct ways. Most areas of the country have seen the presence and witnessed the violence of one armed group more than another, for example, and each department has its unique share of economic and social challenges.
25
Figure 9: Participant Birthplaces
Survey Design
Interviews with participants were structured via the use of a survey instrument, which was specifically designed for this project and approved by the Harvard University Human Subjects Review Board. All interviews were conducted in Spanish, which was spoken by all participants, and the native language of most. The instrument contained a series of demographic questions related to the individual’s experience entering, during and demobilizing from the armed group, and asked about services received and the length of time in the reintegration processes, and on outcome indicators in the following categories:
Economic wellbeing
Social integration
Educational attainment
Mental health
Self-esteem and self-confidence
Drug and alcohol use
Criminal activity
26
The instrument also solicited self-reported participation in ACR programs, as well as attitudes toward and recommendations for ACR Programs. Questions on attitudes and recommendations were key for this study given that this population has never been asked to provide feedback or input on the services they receive and feel they would benefit from receiving. Participant attitudes and opinions discovered through interviews largely helped to form several of the recommendations outlined in Section 7 of this report. The full English version of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 3. Enumeration took place individually or in small groups. The small group setting was desirable for both time constraint purposes and to facilitate a focus group-style discussion following the survey. When participants were interviewed in groups, each participant filled out his or her own survey while the enumerator read the questions aloud. This arrangement allowed for confidentiality within the group setting. Further information on participants was provided by the ACR head office in Bogotá. This information included the ACR educational and psychosocial stage of each participant in the reintegration process, the length of time he or she had spent in each stage, and the services the ACR had recorded each participant as having received or is currently receiving. In addition to the structured interviews that utilized the survey, staff members and service center directors were also interviewed for insights on the participants and program generally that were not picked up by the survey.
27
5. Data
Description of the Sample
This study seeks to identify the impact that reintegration programs have on former child soldiers, however, it is first important to understand the general wellbeing and reintegration success of this group. This section will add to previous information collected on child soldiers in Colombia by UNICEF in 2006 and Human Rights Watch in 2003.26 Additionally, it provides key insight into a group of child soldiers not included in these reports: those who demobilized as adults. Each child’s experience of recruitment, participation in and demobilization from an armed group is important in understanding the phenomenon of child soldiers in Colombia and key to implementing reintegration programs that address the unique needs of these young adults and their communities; for this reason, the following descriptive statistics were calculated to identify the characteristics of the young participants in the ACR and to understand both their experiences in the conflict and their general wellbeing post-demobilization.
Recruitment and Mobilization
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the recruitment of child soldiers in Colombia is the high number of children who “voluntarily” choose to join armed groups. Unlike the large number of kidnappings witnessed during the African civil wars of the 1990s and early 2000s, around 28% of children interviewed in this study reported being forced to join armed groups. Figure 10 below illustrates this phenomenon.
26 See “Characterization of Demobilized Boys, Girls and Adolescents from Illegal Armed Groups: Social and Productive Insertion
from a Human Rights Perspective” from UNICEF, and “You’ll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia” from Human Rights Watch, respectively.
70.5%
25.9%
1.8% 0.9% 0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Voluntarily Forced by Armed Group
Forced by Family No Response
Figure 10: Type of Recruitment
28
Scholars and activists who focus on children in armed conflict cite several reasons for this phenomenon, including lack of economic opportunity and lack of alternative livelihoods. Columbia University researcher Mike Wessels purports that children who join armed groups are “actors who have a strong sense of agency and can exercise choice,” who understand the economic and power opportunities that come with joining armed groups.27 He explains that children exercise this choice to join armed groups because adults fail to create for children safe and meaningful lives, and it is often the child’s only prospect for economic security and feeling a sense of honor.
For evidence of the rationale put forth by Wessels, see Figure 11, which describes the reasons children voluntarily joined armed groups. Over 40% of respondents who voluntarily entered the conflict did so because they liked the weapons and uniforms worn by members of the armed group. Although there could be many interpretations of this figure, it is likely a proxy for the feeling of honor or being a part of a recognized, powerful group. Additionally, 22% reported joining the group for money or other resources, and 17% because family or friends also joined an armed group. Discussions with participants showed that in many cases, joining an armed group is simply what a young person does in his or her village, in the absence of schooling and economic opportunity and when faced with difficult family relationships. Interestingly, the type of recruitment experienced by participants varied by service center location. Although at some service centers as few as six participants were interviewed, it is important to note the stark differences in the ways in which the participants joined armed groups. As Figure 12 shows, in Engativa, Rafael Uribe, and Cali, either all or the large majority of participants indicated
27 Wessels (2009)
3.6%
21.7%
4.8%
16.9%
41.0%
2.4% 2.4% 4.8%
14.5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Received threats against
myself or my family
To earn money or
other resources
To protect my family
Friends or family joined group
I liked the weapons
and uniforms
To evade military service
Problems with other
armed groups
I don't know
Other reason
Figure 11: Reason for Voluntarily Joining Armed Group
“Because I didn't have a job or money
to help my family and my family was
and are very poor and I was getting
along really bad and because I was
already involved somehow in this
group, I went or I had to go.”
29
“It is something dark that I don't wish
on anyone because you imagine
something different than what it is
like inside the conflict.”
Role within Armed
Group
% of
Respondents
Bodyguard 40.18%
Surveillance 61.61%
Combat 69.64%
Patrol 83.04%
Communications 34.82%
Radio Operator 26.79%
Cook 72.32%
Medic 17.86%
Other 1.79%
“It is something dark that I don't
wish on anyone because you
imagine something different than
what it is like inside the conflict.”
joining armed groups voluntarily. However, only a small majority and Villavicencio and Medellín reported the same, and in Ibagué, in fact, a significant majority of interviewees reported being forced. One participant in Ibagué described the night he was forced into an armed group. While at a bar with a friend, a pair of FARC members sat down at the table next to them and began to verbally recruit the seventeen year-old boys. The boys replied that they were not interested, and the FARC members responded by buying each of the boys a beer, to indicate their understanding of the boys’ decision, or so the boys thought. The next morning the boys woke up in a FARC guerilla camp.28
Figure 12: Recruitment Type
Type of Recruitment By Service Center Location
Type of Recruitment
Engativa Rafael Uribe
Villavicencio Medellín Ibagué Cali
Voluntary 100% 100% 57% 69% 25% 74%
Forced by Armed Group
0% 0% 43% 25% 75% 26%
Forced by Family
0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0%
Other 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0%
Number of Respondents
6 11 7 51 8 29
All armed groups in Colombia recruit and use children as soldiers. Figure 13 shows the average age at which the former child soldiers reported joining armed groups and the percentage of the sample size pertaining to each group. This data shows that each group recruits children at the same average age—well below the legally defined 18-year minimum. Child soldiers who were recruited by these groups were, on average, around 14 years old at the time of recruitment.
28 All quotes and statements are from demobilized child soldiers interviewed by the author of this report between July and December 2011 at ACR service centers.
Figure 13: Mobilization Age Disaggregated by Armed Group
Age at Mobilization by Armed Group
Armed group
% of Sample
Average age when joined armed group (years)
FARC 64.9% 13.49
ELN 21.6% 14.04
AUC 11.7% 13.73
Other 0.9% 14.00
30
Furthermore, while the mean age at recruitment in the sample is around 14 years, the distribution of ages ranges from as young as 8, with the largest concentration between 12 and 15 years (see Figure 14 below).
Participation in Armed Groups
In addition to the wide distribution in the age at which children mobilized, the length of time the children spend in the armed conflict also varies greatly. Figure 15 shows the distribution of the interviewees’ duration in the armed conflict. There are two main spikes in the data, one at “two years” and one at “more than five.” However, there is no evidence in the data that suggests why these two spikes exist. These same spikes exist, roughly, for each armed group, and for each method of demobilization. The lack of an explanation in the data indicates that the large number of individuals who are with the armed groups for two years and more than five years could either be a general function of the conflict (for example, causing children to be more capable of escaping or being caught by state forces at around two years of participation), or the results could be attributed to some form of sampling error (such as a lack of representation of those child soldiers who were part of armed groups for three to five years).
1 1
6 5
22
14
22
19
12
9
0
5
10
15
20
25
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
# o
f P
arti
cip
ants
Age
Figure 14: Distribution of Age at Mobilization (in years)
9.9%
17.1%
23.4%
9.9% 9.0%
11.7%
18.9%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Less than 6 months
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years More than 5 years
Figure 15: Length of Time Spent with Armed Group
31
“My experience in the armed conflict has
left me handicapped because my role in
the conflict was to plant landmines. It has
been hard for me because at the moment I
am in a wheelchair and have been
handicapped for 6 years and it has not
been easy for my daily life.”
During their time in the armed conflict, most interviewees held very similar roles [see Figure 16], as is expected given their similar ages during mobilization and given that over 60% participated with FARC, a Marxist group in which roles are given to members without discrimination by age or gender. The majority of respondents were involved in surveillance, combat, patrol and cooking.
Figure 16: Roles of Child Soldiers
Role within Armed Group % of Respondents
Bodyguard 40.18%
Surveillance 61.61%
Combat 69.64%
Patrol 83.04%
Communications 34.82%
Radio Operator 26.79%
Cook 72.32%
Medic 17.86%
Other 1.79%
It is important to note that most respondents indicated having roles that could constitute participation in hostilities: 70% indicated that they had participated in combat, 83% in patrol, and each one carried a weapon. Colombia outlaws the recruitment of children under age 18 for any role in armed conflict, and international law states that while children under age 18 may be
recruited voluntarily, they cannot be used in hostilities.29 Therefore, it cannot be argued that these children are being legally used in armed groups. This is not to say, however, that participation in non-hostile acts does not expose child soldiers to extreme violence and long-term mental health consequences. In addition to the traumas faced by participation in hostilities, non-hostility roles were a form of hard
child labor which has lasting impact on former child soldiers. One participant explained that one of her worst memories of the conflict was when she was thirteen years old, and forced to carry extremely heavy equipment while the group traveled. Figure 17 shows the locations in which participants fought in the armed conflict. Most participants reported being involved with the armed group in more than one location. Further proof that these children moved to various locations within the country is that while five departments were visited for data collection, respondents reported fighting in 23 different departments.
29 Article 162 of the Colombian Penal Code, and UN OHCHR (2000).
32
It is important to note that while the areas pointed out on this map are representative of the level of conflict-related violence in those areas, areas in the south and southeast of the country have also been significantly impacted by the conflict, yet no children in this study reported fighting there. This could be attributed to sampling error given the locations where interviews took place (mostly in the central and western parts of the country), or could suggest that children who fight in the south and southeast departments of the country are not able to escape the conflict due to the intensity of fighting in those areas. Further research into this phenomenon is crucial to understanding the recruitment, use and demobilization of children in those departments. Figure 17: Locations Where Participants Fought
33
Demobilization
Although the ACR was originally created to reintegrate ex-combatants who demobilized as part of government peace deals, today the ACR provides services to nearly as many who demobilized individually as it does to those who demobilized collectively with their armed group. To date, the government of Colombia has only achieved peace deals with paramilitary leaders; no guerilla groups have held collective demobilizations, though significant numbers of guerilla group members desert their groups and join the reintegration program individually.
Figure 18: Reported Method of Demobilization
Method of Demobilization
Method n %
Captured by state armed forces 21 18.9%
Escaped Individually 78 70.3%
Through an agreement between my group and the government
9 8.1%
With help from the ICBF 2 1.8%
No response 1 0.9%
The data in this report shows that only 8% of child soldier demobilizations took place through peace deals and collective demobilizations, whereas 78% demobilized by escaping individually, and 19% were captured by state forces. There could be several reasons why we see so few collective demobilizations among this group. First, around half of the interviews for this project took place at the ACR service center in Medellín, which, due to a parallel reintegration program set up by the Mayor of Medellín, only provides services to ex-combatants who did not demobilize as part of a group demobilization. The Mayor of Medellín’s reintegration program aims at incentivizing paramilitary groups in and around Medellín to demobilize and thus offers a slightly different program with distinct monetary compensation packages to those who demobilize collectively through paramilitary-government peace processes. A second hypothesis for why we might not see many children demobilizing through peace accords is that groups may be unwilling to allow minors to demobilize with the rest of their blocks, because the leaders of those groups face the maximum jail penalty if found guilty of illegal child recruitment. If child soldiers are unable to demobilize until after their 18th birthdays, the leaders who recruited those children are not held accountable for their illegal recruitment of those children. Furthermore, leaders are held responsible for the crimes committed by the children in their ranks; if they do not turn in the child soldiers they recruited, it is difficult to hold them accountable for those crimes.
34
Figure 19: Method of Escaping
Method of Escaping
Method n %
Individually 49 59.8%
With help from family or friends 6 7.3%
With other combatants 23 28.0%
The group let me leave 3 3.7%
Other manner 1 1.2%
Of the 70% of interviewees who demobilized by escaping, 60% did so individually, while around 35% had help from family or friends. The ways in which this population escapes from armed groups varies greatly. One participant explained that she was shot in the foot during a combat operation, which rendered her unfit for life in the group’s camp, so she was sent to Bogotá, where she was used for intelligence gathering. While in Bogotá she contacted relatives who helped her escape the group.
Figure 20: Reported Age at Demobilization
Average age at Demobilization by Armed Group
Group n Age
FARC 71 16.49
ELN 24 16.50
AUC 13 16.88
Other 1 15.00
As with the age at which child soldiers are recruited, the age when they demobilize varies little by armed group: it is around 16.5 years. It is important to note, however, that this figure might be slightly skewed downward given that only 18% of interviewees demobilized after turning 18 years of age. Figure 21 shows the distribution of ages at demobilization.
1 3 7
14
21
46
12
4 1 1 2
0
10
20
30
40
50
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
# o
f P
arti
cip
ants
Age
Figure 21: Distribution of Demobilization Age
35
Figure 22 illustrates the reasons participants cited for demobilizing. Most cited the difficulty of life with the group or the violence for their reason for leaving the armed group.
Reintegration Program Participation
As shown in Figure 23, the ACR offers participants four main services: psychosocial therapy, job training, health insurance, and education. Nearly all interviewees are currently participating in psychosocial therapy, which mainly focuses on setting each participant’s life goals and identifying his or her path of reintegration.
Figure 23: Reported Participation in ACR Services
Participation in ACR Services
Service n % Participating
Psychosocial 102 92%
Job Training 30 27%
Health 75 68%
Education 94 85%
Do Not Know or Other 2 2%
Similarly, 85% of participants indicated that they received ACR-provided health care that provides them with the most generous level of Colombia’s universal health insurance program, and requires no out-of-pocket payments for health care. Although all participants are eligible for the ACR’s health program, and there is no benefit for using or not using the benefit, it is reasonable to believe that those who report not receiving the ACR health program simply have not sought health care while participating with the ACR.
44%
9% 6%
3% 6%
19%
13%
1% 0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
I did not like life with the armed group
I did not like how they
treated me in the armed
group
I did not like my role
within th egroup
my friends or family
demobilized
I had to demobilize
with my block
I was tired of the violence
other I don't know
Figure 22: Reason for Demobilizing
36
“The aspect of education here is good
until the 11th grade when one finishes
high school, but after that there are no
more opportunities to chose one's
career or studies. There is also no
information or help with employment.”
“The aspect of education here is good
Most revealing, however, is the low level of participants receiving job training. The ACR job training program enables participants to enjoy the same free job training courses through the government’s National Training Service (SENA) that all Colombian citizens can access. The added benefit the ACR provides is reserved seats within SENA courses for ACR participants. Because SENA is free to all Colombian citizens, reserved seats are advantageous because they ensure that ACR participants do not endure very lengthy waits for entry into courses. One reason why only 30% of those interviewed participate in job training could be because SENA participants must have completed primary school (5th grade) to qualify for SENA courses, which, as I will show, is not a qualification that many young participants possess.
Opinions of the Reintegration Programs
Because this project seeks to identify the ways in which the ACR can modify its services to address most appropriately the reintegration needs of former child soldiers, interviewees were asked their opinions on the services provided by the ACR. Figure 24 reflects the interviewee’s opinions on which ACR service has helped him or her most in reintegration. Most participants indicated that education is the most helpful service. When asked why that particular service was the most helpful, respondents cited education as a necessary condition for their success post-mobilization.
Figure 24: Reported Most Beneficial Service
Service That Has Helped Most
Service n % of Respondents
Psychosocial 45 41%
Job Training 5 5%
Health 12 11%
Education 75 68%
Do Not Know or Other 3 3%
*Note that some respondents listed more than one service as helping the most, and respondents did not need to receive the service to think it is the most useful generally.
Additionally, respondents indicated that psychosocial therapy was helpful both to plan their futures, but also in dealing with their traumas from the conflict. Most participants cited the quality of the psychosocial therapists as the reason they benefited so greatly from this service.
“The training in technical job training
has been the most precious treasure
now that I have learned how to
manufacture furniture and thanks to
that it is my path to work and
sustainability.”
“The training in technical job
formation has been the most
precious treasure now that I have
learned how to manufacture
furniture and thanks to that it is my
path to work and sustainability.”
37
The service that respondents indicated helped them the least in their reintegration is job training. When asked why, the large majority of interviewees indicated that the reason was that they simply do not receive or do not qualify to receive job training services because they have not completed the necessary level of education. Additionally, participants cited the new ACR policy, which restricts compensation for job training to just two SENA courses. Although all ACR participants (as with all Colombian citizens) can participate in as many SENA courses as he or she would like, the ACR will only compensate participants for two. Lastly, the below figure shows the distribution of participants’ duration in the ACR. The figure suggests that participation wanes after five years in the program. Because this study only includes interviews with current ACR participants, it is not possible to ascertain why participation falls off steeply after five years.
It could be that during those five years participants complete their reintegration process; however, because some benefits are provided to participants up to 6.5 years, this is unlikely.30 Another hypothesis might be the age of interviewees: the age range of interview participants is 18-27, most of who joined the ACR around 18 years of age, which would mean that duration past five years is
30 See Figure [X] in Section [X] which outlines the details and duration of each service provided by the ACR.
13%
24%
17% 17%
8%
13%
3% 3% 2%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Less than 1 Year
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 7 Years More than 7 Years
Figure 26: Length of Time in ACR
Figure 25: Reported Least Beneficial Service
Service That Has Helped Least
Service n % of Respondents
Psychosocial 8 7%
Job Training 48 43%
Health 20 18%
Education 5 5%
Do Not Know or Other 28 25%
*Note that some respondents listed more than one service as helping the least, and respondents did not need to receive the service to think it is the most useful generally.
38
simply not feasible for most. It would beneficial for the ACR to identify why, if not due to completion of the program, is participation fading after five years.
Indicators of Success in the Program
Based on the services provided by the ACR, this section shows the outcomes of participants in employment, education, mental health and social indicators.
Employment
Only 43% of respondents indicated having jobs. This figure is quite low as compared to the general population of Colombians aged 15-24, of which, 77% are employed.31 Figure 27 illustrates the number of weekly hours worked by those who are currently employed. It demonstrates that although less than half of participants are employed, most of those that are employed work full-time.
The most common jobs held by participants include clothing or food manufacturing, woodworking or handcrafts, construction and waiting tables, or preparing food at restaurants. Of those who are unemployed, 62% indicated that they were looking for jobs. As Figure 28 shows, the most cited reasons for their unemployment include not being able to find a job (66%), not having time to work (14%), and other reasons (11%), which include being handicapped, pregnant, or attending school. When asked why they believe they have not been able to find a job even though they have been looking, the majority of the population reported an insufficient number of jobs in their city (33%); not being qualified (22%); other reasons (20%), which include being pregnant or handicapped; not having time to work the hours necessary (14%); and lack of interesting jobs (10%).
31 World Bank World databank (accessed March 5, 2012). The employment figure is from 2008, the latest date on record.
6% 10%
15%
65%
2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
less than 10 between 10 and 20 between 20 and 40 more than 40 I don't know
Figure 27: Hours Worked Per Week
39
Figure 28: Reported Reason for Not Working
Reason for Not Working
Reason % of Respondents
Cannot Find a Job 66%
Do Not Want to Work 5%
Recently Lost Job 3%
Do Not Need to Work 0%
Do Not Have Time to Work 14%
Other Reason (including being handicapped, pregnant, or in school)
11%
One of the reasons for the high unemployment in this group as compared to the general Colombian population could be their lack of mobility. Because 33% reported the reason for not having a job being that there are not enough jobs in his or her city, yet the individual continues to live where he or she does, suggests mobility constraints among this population. It would be worthwhile for the ACR to ensure that participants do not feel constrained to live where they do because of the ACR participation requirements, and are aware of their freedom to live where they choose. Because participants can indeed choose where to live and can receive services from the ACR center closest to his or her residence anywhere in the country, there are likely other constraints on their mobility such as cost, security or leaving family members.
Education
As shown in Figure 29, the ACR’s education program has seen a decrease in the number of participants with very little education; 13% of those interviewed had no education prior to joining an armed group, whereas less than 4% report having received no education to date. Figure 29 shows that the distribution of years of education has increased; that is, in addition to there being less participants with no or very little education, there are more participants who have now received two or three years of education, whereas those numbers were small for participants prior to mobilization. There seems to be very few participants, however, who receive four or more years to date as compared to those who received that number of years of education prior to mobilization. This could be because those who had four years of education prior to mobilization now have five or more—which means they have graduated from primary school, a significant achievement for this population.
40
Psychological Indicators
Figure 30 below shows the prevalence of mental health indicators. Sixteen percent of respondents
reported having difficulty with depression, 22% with isolation, and 14% with being in a new
community. While this study gathered self-reported information on mental health problems, a
significant area for future research with this population is further investigation into the post-
traumatic stress disorder symptoms found to be prevalent among former child soldiers in other
areas of the world. Recent studies have identified the increased risk of mental health concerns,
including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other anxiety disorders among
child soldiers.32 These studies found that 55% of former child soldiers in Nepal had diagnosable
PTSD, 53% suffered from depression, and 46% had an anxiety disorder. Additionally, researchers
found that 97% of former child soldiers in Uganda had PTSD symptoms.33
Furthermore, while only around one-fifth of respondents indicated some form of mental health
problem, conversations with interviewees revealed that the level of depression, anxiety and other
psychological conditions are prominent among this population. During these conversations,
participants explained they were afraid to leave their home because they were afraid their former
armed groups would catch them, and having recurring nightmares about the conflict and violence,
and feeling rejection from their communities.
Figure 30: Reported Difficulty with Mental Health
Psychological Indicators
Indicator % of Respondents
Difficulty with Depression 16%
Difficulty with Isolation 22%
Difficulty Being in New Community 14%
32 Betancourt et al. (2010). 33 Ibid.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 More than 6
Figure 29: Number of Years of Education Attained Before Mobilization and To Date
Series1
Series2
Prior to Mobilization
To Date
Prior to Mobilization
To Date
41
Additionally, 88% of respondents reported being very confident in him or herself.34 When asked to explain, one participant stated, “because we should always believe in ourselves and be sure of what we want to do to improve our lives,” and another reported, “because I learned how to survive without needing to use weapons, to work with dignity to have a healthy life goal.” The high level of reported self-confidence could be a function of the psychosocial services provided by the ACR, the resilience of these individuals or a cultural phenomenon. As indicated above, further research into the mental health of these participants would provide useful insight with which the ACR could better craft its psychosocial services and evaluate the impacts it creates.
Relationships Just under half of those interviewed reported being married or in a civil union, half of whom indicated that their partner also was or currently is a member of an armed group. Of those married or in a civil union, 36% reported relations with his or her partner were “very good,” 33% “good,” and 21% “ok.” None of the 33 respondents who are married or in a civil union reported relations as “bad” or “very bad.” Seventy-one percent had been married or in a civil union once, 17% twice, and 12% three or more times.
Figure 31: Reported Marital Status
Marital Status
Status % of Respondents
Married 4%
Single 55%
Divorced 0%
Widowed/Widower 0%
Civil Union 40%
Separated 2%
Just over half of those interviewed reporting having children, 33% having one child, 13% having two, and 4% having three or more. Figure 32 shows the distribution of participants’ ages at the birth of their first child. Evident from this figure, women are having their first children younger than their male counterparts, and 56% had their first child at or below 18 years of age. Furthermore, this data reveals that demobilized child soldiers are over three times more likely to be teenage mothers or fathers (73%) than the general Colombian population aged 15-19 years (20%).35
34 On a scale of one to five, one being very confident, and five being not very confident at all, 88% of respondents gave the
number one. 35 El Espectador (31 January, 2012)
42
It is important to note, however, that these births did not happen while the individuals were in the armed conflict. In fact, harsh measures are taken by armed groups to prevent pregnancy and births among their ranks. These tactics include forced IUD use, sterilization and abortions. One participant explained that when she was thirteen she was held down by a group of soldiers while she was implanted with a contraceptive device (likely an IUD), so that they could “plan” for her, which caused her great physical pain and humiliation. With regard to their families, 25% reported having difficulty with their families, and when asked how much confidence they have in their families, 38% indicated “a lot of confidence,” 34% reported having more or less confidence in their families, and 16% reported having “very little” or “no confidence” in their families. It is important to note that many of those interviewed have not been in contact with their families since they joined the armed conflict, which was explained through discussions with participants, but not directly asked in the survey.
Gender Dynamics
Although the above descriptive statistics represent the aggregate sample population, there are several key characteristics of this population that vary by gender. Generally, women in the sample joined armed groups about three months younger than their male counterparts, though they demobilized, on average, at around the same age (17.5 years). Correspondingly, women reported having participated with armed groups around three months longer than men, on average. As seen in Figure 33 below, girl soldiers had very similar roles to those of boys. Girl soldiers were about half as likely to be bodyguards or on patrol duty, but were equally as likely to be involved in combat, nearly as likely to be involved in surveillance and communications, and more likely to be medics and cooks.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Figure 32: Age at Birth of First Child
Men
Women
43
Figure 33: Reported Role with Armed Group Disaggregated by Gender
Role within Armed Group % of Male Respondents % of Female Respondents
Bodyguard 51% 25%
Surveillance 64% 59%
Combat 70% 70%
Patrol 90% 75%
Communications 37% 32%
Radio Operator 25% 30%
Cook 66% 84%
Medic 10% 30%
Other 1% 2%
In terms of outcome indicators, women were half as likely as their male counterparts to be currently employed. Only 27% of women reported having a job. Many women explained that the reason they are not currently working was because they were pregnant or had children and either they could not work given their need to stay home with their children or their husbands or partners did not want them working. Evidence to this is that women interviewed had, on average, about one more child than the men, and had their first child, on average, at age 17.5 years, whereas their male counterparts’ average age at the birth of their first children was 19.5 years. One might think that female participants are becoming more educated than male participants, given that they are not working and have the possibility of using the education stipend as a means of income. However, there is no evidence that more women than men have reached higher levels of education. In fact, women in the sample were less likely to have finished any level of education at or beyond the completion of primary school. While women and men seem to have attained the same level of education post-demobilization, it is important to note that women entered the conflict with higher levels of education. Women interviewed were nearly twice as likely as men to have reached fifth grade before entering the conflict (46% of women had completed primary school whereas only 25% of men had). Furthermore, women and men, on average, had been in ACR programs nearly exactly the same length of time, meaning that perhaps the education services are not benefiting women as much as they are benefiting men in terms of years of education attained given the same length of time in the program.
44
Finally, Section 6 of this report shows the added effect that ICBF participation has on educational attainment is a 13% increased likelihood of having completed primary school. When disaggregated by gender, we in fact find that there is no effect of ICBF programs on women’s completion of primary school, though there is a significant 19% increase for men. With regard to social and psychological indicators, women were just as likely as men to have confidence in their families and in themselves, though women reported, on average, feeling slightly less safe than men. The average feeling of safety reported by women was 3.2 on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being very safe and 5 being very unsafe, whereas men reported, on average, 2.8.
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 More than 6
Figure 34: Highest Level of Educational Attainment by Gender (in years)
Men
Women
45
6. Analysis and Conclusions of the Evaluation The evaluation performed in this study, as explained in Section 4, utilizes a regression discontinuity (RD) design to compare the outcomes of former child soldiers who demobilized before 18 years of age and thus received ICBF services to the outcomes of child soldiers who demobilized after their 18th birthdays and did not receive those extra services. All individuals are current, active participants of the ACR programs, thus, the difference in outcomes between the two groups can be attributed to the incremental impact of ICBF programs. In light of the characteristics of these demobilized child soldiers outlined in the previous section, this comparison serves to answer three questions:
1. What is the impact of demobilizing prior to 18 years of age and receiving ICBF services? 2. What are the differences in outcomes of the treatment and control groups that can be
attributed to ICBF services in addition to ACR services? 3. How might the ACR use these differences to better target treatment of demobilized child
soldiers who did not receive ICBF services in order to equalize care among all demobilized child soldiers?
The basic regression discontinuity model used in this analysis is as follows:
Yi= β0 + β1(Treati) + β2(Age at Demobilizationi) + β3Xi + εi
In this equation, the variable Y represents the various outcome indicators (educational attainment, employment status, quality of relationships, etc.), and X is a vector of individual characteristics (including mobilization age and method, length in the conflict, educational attainment prior to mobilization, demographic characteristics, etc.). When the outcome indicator is binary, I used a linear probability model. Treat is a binary indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the individual demobilized before 18 years of age, and value 0 if the individual demobilized at or over 18 years of age. The term β2(Age at Demobilization) is the function of the age at which the participant demobilized, which is necessary for an RD design, and ε is the error term, containing unobservable characteristics of the individual. This model was adjusted slightly by varying the vector of individual characteristics and adding fixed effects for the birth location of each individual and the service center where he or she received ACR services. The fixed effects sought to decrease the impact of unobserved characteristics on the outcome of interest. As Section 4 of this report explains in detail, an RD design fits this evaluation effectively because it meets the key assumptions that: 1. Eligibility rules for treatment reflect actual treatment. That is, individuals who demobilized
before 18 years of age were 78 percentage points more likely to have received ICBF services than those who demobilized after 18 years of age.
46
2. Individuals were unable to manipulate the treatment given that they could not choose when to demobilize, nor hide the age at which they demobilized. Furthermore, individuals were not aware of the program, which reduced incentive to attempt to manipulate one’s eligibility for treatment.
3. Other characteristics of the participants are equal at baseline; that is, except for gender, there
is no statistically significant difference between those who demobilized prior to 18 years of age (treatment) and those who demobilized at or older than 18 years of age (control). This assumption was also verified through placebo tests (see Table 12 in Appendix 1] which show that the model used for evaluating the impact of the cutoff do not also predict baseline characteristics.
Overall, the results of the evaluation followed my hypothesis that individuals who did not receive ICBF services appear to be worse off than individuals who did receive the services. However, it is important to note that due to the sample size constraints of this study, many of the findings are not statistically significant at the generally established 90% level. The detailed explanation of findings that follows explains the statistical significance of each finding. A sample size calculation reveals that in order to measure the impact of the program with high statistical significance (at the 95%) level, at least 50 participants in each the control and treatment group were needed; while this data set has 91 individuals in the treatment group, it only has 19 in the control. Therefore, I am confident that the impact ranges found in this study are reflective of the true reality; however, further data collection with a larger control group would be needed to achieve statistical significance. The results of each of the five variations of the model described above are reported in the regression tables in Appendix 1. The main impacts discovered through the evaluation are in educational attainment, mental health and substance abuse, and relationships, though the results for each outcome indicator are explained below:
Education
The most striking finding with regards to educational attainment of this sample population, is that individuals in the treatment group (received ICBF services) are 17 percentage points more likely to have achieved primary school education (through 5th grade in Colombia) than those in the control group (did not receive ICBF services). This result is highly statistical significant, and the magnitude and direction of the impact hold in all five models.36 This finding is especially important both because it demonstrates the disparity in educational attainment of these two groups, and also because of the implications of not finishing primary school. In order to be eligible for job training courses at the ACR, participants must first complete primary school. Therefore, because participants who demobilized at or above 18 years of age are 17% less likely to have completed primary school, they are also less likely to be eligible for job training courses, and, one could infer, less likely to be qualified for employment. It is important to note that when this model is run disaggregating by gender, we find that the result holds for men
36 See Table I in Appendix 1 for all of the results.
47
and is statistically significant, but for women there appears to be no added educational impact of having received ICBF services. All other levels of educational attainment (grades 1-4, 6 and high school attainment) showed no significant difference between the two groups. As Figure 49 demonstrates, this could be due to the small sample size in the lower grade levels and the very small number of individuals who have graduated from high school.
Employment
Because only 48 participants are currently employed (41 of which are in the treatment, and 7 who are in the control group), the impact of the treatment on employment status was not statistically significant. However, it is important to note that in all but one model (that which includes fixed effects), the impact appears large and positive. Specifically, the results suggest that the treatment is associated with a 15 to 24 percentage point increase in employment. That is, treated individuals are 15 to 24 percentage points more likely to have a job. While the results are not statistically significant, the fact that four of the five models show large, positive effects suggest that the treatment has an impact that would likely be statistically significant with a larger sample size. This finding may be attributed the success of the ACR’s job training program, which is utilized by more treated individuals than untreated, because they have met the eligibility requirement by completing primary school.
Social Indicators
Treated individuals appear to be 10 percentage points more likely to report having difficulty with friends (statistically significant at the 10% level), though report, on average, slightly better family relationships.37 While the effect on family relationships is not statistically significant, all five models show similar effects in both magnitude and direction—of having slightly better family relationships. The seemingly negative effect of the treatment on relationships with friends, could simply be evidence that the treated group has friends and the control group does not. During discussions with participants, a common theme discussed when questions on social outcomes were asked was the lack of relationships outside of family. Participants explained that while they have acquaintances, aside from their families and partners they have no personal relationships. This could be due to the stigmatization many feel in their communities for being demobilized or their inability to connect with others given their difficult pasts. As shown in this report, participants on average had their first child at age 18.5 (17.5 for girls and 19.5 for men). Furthermore, treated individuals seems to become mothers or fathers for the first time between 4 months and 2 years later than their untreated counterparts. While this result is not statistically significant, each model shows a positive result, indicating that there may indeed be an
37 Responses were on a scale of 1-6, 1 being getting along very well with family members, 5 being getting along very poorly with family members. On average, treated individuals reported a .5 decrease in response, for example from a 4 to a 3.5, which means slightly better family relations.
48
impact of ICBF programs on teenage pregnancy, though a larger sample size would be required to show this result with certainty.
Mental Health
While the results show that treated individuals are around 12 percentage points more likely to consume drugs, it is important to note that only five individuals reported using drugs, thus making this result questionable. Similarly, the treatment seems to increase alcohol use by 19-30 percentage points, which is positive in each model, but not statistically significant in any of them. Furthermore, treated individuals appear to be between 5 and 20 percentage points more likely to report feeling depressed. Although each model showed positive results, none were statistically significant. Through qualitative interviews, it became apparent that there was considerable social stigmatization associated with mental health issues such as anxiety and depression. In several cases individuals reported not being depressed or suffering from any traumas from the conflict, only to tell me later that they have had the same recurring nightmares for the last five years, or are afraid to go into the street sometimes because they think the armed group is looking for them. This indicates that there may be some reporting error causing an inaccurate measure of the mental health effects of the treatment.
Safety
The treatment appears to increase participants’ feeling of safety, shown to be positive and large in each model, though not statistically significant. However, treated individuals were found to be around 30 percentage points more likely to report having difficulty with security (statistically significant). During interviews with ACR psychosocial therapists, it was revealed that many of the young participants that come to the ACR directly from the ICBF show worse success in social and psychological indicators than their counterparts who did not receive ICBF services, likely because while with the ICBF, participants are very heavily protected and looked after. Therapists at the service centers explained to me that because the ICBF so tightly controls the lives of these children and does not appropriately teach the children the life skills they will need when they leave the ICBF, often when they turn 18 they are not fully capable of caring for themselves or ensuring their own safety and wellbeing.
49
Recommendation #1:
Improve the availability and flexibility of primary school and high school courses.
Recommendation #1:
Improve the availability and flexibility of primary school and high school courses.
7. Policy Recommendations The populations studied in this report are extremely similar at baseline. However, one is getting treated and one is not due to their ages at demobilization. As shown in Section 6 above, the evaluation employed in this study suggests that some aspects of the treatment are quite effective, while others are not. Because these populations are so similar in baseline characteristics, we should expect the treatment to have similar effects on the control group. This section aims to interpret the results found in the previous sections of this paper to formulate concrete recommendations to improve the service s provided to both groups of demobilized child soldiers. Because there are observable impacts of the treatment, it is pertinent that services are equalized among the two groups to ensure that both receive the rehabilitation necessary for former child soldiers and have the same chance at a successful social and economic reintegration. The recommendations that follow speak to the differences in outcomes of these two groups based upon the differences in services received, but also to the aggregate needs and opinions of all those interviewed.
Educational
Under the current ACR program, most participants attend school during the work day. Many participants reported facing a tradeoff between working and going to school, because the two overlapped during the day. Furthermore, participants felt that since they were receiving a stipend to attend school, they could forgo working because they were receiving enough financial compensation to crowd-out a possible salary. Schooling should not be a tradeoff for work, or a constraint, but a complement to employment. Offering evening or weekend courses, for example, for those that work during the hours of the day would reduce participants need to choose school over work or vice versa. Because educational services with the ACR are currently provided through the Ministry of Education, implementation of this recommendation will require additional human and financial resources from both the ACR and Ministry of Education.
50
Recommendation #3:
Increase incentives to finish primary school.
Recommendation #3:
Increase incentives to finish primary school.
Although the ACR’s psychosocial services help participants identify their appropriate grade level and ensure that participants have a school to join, little is support is provided educationally to ensure that participants succeed in reaching their academic goals. There is more involved in the educational success of these young participants than simply providing them a seat in a classroom. While a seat in an appropriate-level classroom is an important first step, once the participants are in the classroom, it is important to recognize the diverse academic needs of each student and provide adequate services to ensure their success, including out of the classroom tutoring and success monitoring. Other than the six and a half year maximum for receiving the education stipend, there are no concrete mechanisms in place to ensure that participants’ individual academic needs are met and that they are indeed succeeding through school rather than just sitting in a classroom. This improvement in educational quality to ensure outcomes is especially crucial to those participants who did not receive ICBF care and subsequently seem to be less likely to have completed higher levels of education to date.
Due to the minimum standard of primary school completion in the Colombian job market, and the constraint that ACR participants must complete primary school (5th grade) in order to participate in job training courses, it is pertinent that the ACR facilitate attainment of this level of education. To do this, the ACR should increase financial assistance for those receiving primary school to incentivize them to graduate. Then, when participants finish 5th grade, they should receive decreasing financial assistance for attending high school. Once a participant completes primary school he or she is eligible to receive compensation for attending SENA courses, which, together with attending high school courses, will equal the payment received up until 5th grade. This will both incentivize completion of primary school, but also wean participants off ACR stipends and onto a more economically sustainable future of employment. Due to the current stipend cap of six and a half years of education and two SENA courses, participants will witness a slow decline in financial benefits as they reach the completion of their education and job training courses, which will further nudge them into the workforce. It is important to note, however, that this change in financial compensation for education must be delivered to active participants in a transparent manner so that they do not feel that their benefits are being restricted unfairly. Furthermore, actions should be taken to ensure the new
Recommendation #2:
Provide extra or individualized educational help or tutors for those furthest behind in
academics, which are largely those who did not participate in ICBF programs.
Recommendation #2:
Provide extra or individualized educational help or tutors for those furthest behind in
academics, which are largely those who did not participate in ICBF programs.
51
Recommendation #1:
Improve ACR collaboration with employers to create jobs for ACR participants.
Recommendation #1:
Improve ACR collaboration with employers to create jobs for ACR participants.
Recommendation #2:
Provide evening or weekend services at the ACR for those participants who work during
normal work hours.
Recommendation #2:
Provide evening services at the ACR for those participants who work during normal work
hours.
compensation schedule does not disincentivize participants to attain post-primary education. It should not, however, require increased financial resources because the declining compensation for those who continue their studies past primary school may offset the added cost of the increased compensation for primary school students.
Economic
As noted in the descriptive statistics in Section 6, only 43% of participants interviewed were currently employed, slightly under half of which do not work full-time. Furthermore, of those unemployed, 62% report currently looking for but unable to secure employment. While the ACR is consistently working with employers to find positions for ACR participants, this significant effort has been largely unfruitful, often resulting in only one or two ACR jobs per employer38. The ACR should look to multinational corporations—particularly American firms—and solicit positions for ACR participants as part of the plan for Colombia’s future economic growth. Because significant amounts of Colombian defense ministry funds come from the U.S., the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the ACR should collaborate to involve American economic actors, such as businesses, in the fight to bring peace to the country. As a resource, the ACR could look to U.S. organizations like YearUp that work to provide meaningful job experiences to at-risk young adults to learn best practices for employing young adults in adversity. In addition to providing employment opportunities and relevant experience for the populations they serve, job placement services for young, at-risk adults can also reduce stereotypes, misperceptions and discrimination often faced by these groups by giving them presence in their communities. Clearly there are risks involved with revealing the identity of these former child soldiers, and subsequently intense measure will need to be taken both to protect their identities from former groups and civilians with anti-demobilized sentiment, but also to create an environment that facilitates their re-entry into society, rather than stigmatizes them.
One major complaint revealed by interviewees was their inability to hold jobs because they consistently must leave work to receive ACR services—namely, psychosocial services. Participants
38 Presentation by Frank Pearl, former High Commissioner for Peace and Reintegration (Spring 2011)
52
Recommendation #3:
Utilize and build upon skills participants already have.
Recommendation #3:
Utilize and build upon skills participants already have.
Recommendation #4:
Create jobs for ACR participants through ACR run businesses or organizations.
Recommendation #4: Create jobs for ACR participants through ACR run businesses or
organizations.
reported the difficult both taking time off work and the stigmatization faced by employers when they realize why the employee is taking the time off. They explained it is difficult to hide the reason for leaving work for hours at a time, and 63% of respondents said that they believed they would be fired if their employer knew they were demobilized. As with educational services, often participants face a tradeoff between working and receiving psychosocial services for which they are compensated. Participants should not need to choose between working and receiving important services, nor should they be disincentivized to work due to the compensation they receive for other services. To address this issue, the ACR should offer evening or weekend services to participants who have constraints during work hours due to employment. This would require increased staffing and could potentially presents a security threat to ACR staff if they are required to be at the office after dark due to the security situation in some of the areas in which ACR offices are located. Increased security personnel would be required to ensure the safety of ACR staff. The security constraint faced by personnel leaving ACR offices at night, however, could be overcome by offering very early morning or weekend hours.
When asked, 90% of participants stated they gained a useful skill while in the armed group (such as cooking, sewing, security or nursing) and of those, 80% stated they would be interested in using a skill they gained for a job. Therefore, it would be useful for the ACR to use participant’s current skill-set to help them find employment, or build upon those skills in job training courses. As factory and restaurant jobs are currently the most common form of employment for those interviewed, the cooking and sewing skills learned specifically could be worthwhile to utilize when looking for employment. The potential constraints of this recommendation are the difficulty in explaining to employers that do not have a strategic relationship with the ACR where these skills were learned, and not all skills that participants feel are useful could actually be transferred to a civilian job. For example, one participant explained that he became very skilled at dismantling bombs.
The ACR already promotes entrepreneurialism through their Proyecto Productivo grant for participants to start their own business, but most of those receiving the grant only create jobs for themselves, and furthermore, only seven of the 112 participants interviewed had received a grant.
53
Most recipients who use the grant for entrepreneurial activities purchase carts from which to sell food or handcrafts, or open their own small shop or bakery. Extra incentives should be provided to ACR participants receiving the grant for hiring other ACR participants. This not only further enhances the ACR’s support of entrepreneurship and economic sustainability, it promotes appropriate collaboration among participants.
Social
Nearly all those interviewed stated that they did not have personal relationships with individuals other than their family members or partner. Because the ACR seeks to reintegrate individuals economically and socially, in addition to psychosocial services, opportunities for relationship building should be added to participants’ path to reintegration. During group interviews, participants openly shared their experiences with one-another, asked each other questions, and listened attentively when each participant was sharing their opinions or experiences. Furthermore, few participants knew the others in the room. This experience led me to believe that participants would benefit from social activities, both to connect with others who have and are experiencing similar difficulties and successes, and also to re-learn how to manage social relationships. Because these individuals, especially those who did not receive ICBF services, have had no civilian social relationships since they were young children before they entered the conflict, and, in many cases, their relationships before they entered the armed conflict were wrought with violence, distrust, and manipulation. Therefore, to ensure the successful social reintegration of these young participants, it is important to offer social services and activities. This could be group job training, specialized educational services provided in groups, community activities or projects such as building infrastructure, planting gardens, or merely social activities such as short trips to beaches or restaurants. The ACR could work with local governments to facilitate community projects and could facilitate social activities by simply promoting them to the participants with whom they work. While it will be difficult to incentivize participants to participate in the activities without providing monetary compensation, the ACR could provide transportation, childcare or a meal so as not to have the activity place a burden on the participant.
Recommendation #1:
Organize events or activities for young participants to connect with one another.
Recommendation #1: Organize events or activities for young participants to participate in
and get to know one another.
54
“I have problems with my dreams - I
dream of being in the conflict and seeing
violence and that they're going to kill me.
I have had these dreams of the conflict
for the last 5 years.”
Recommendation #1:
Provide individualized psychological treatment for participants and incentivize participants’
take-up by requiring weekly psychological therapy as part of requirement for psychosocial
stipend.
Recommendation #1: Provide individualized psychological treatment for participants and
incentivize participants to do so by requiring twice weekly
psychological therapy as part of requirement for psychosocial stipend.
One significant setback to the social reintegration of ACR participants is their inability to reconnect with their families. Studies have shown that discrimination of former child soldiers is inversely associated with family and community acceptance, and that family acceptance is associated with decreased levels of hostility.39 While often families live in areas still controlled by armed groups, thus making it unsafe for participants and their families to be in contact, this is not the case for all demobilized child soldiers. The ICBF program for demobilized child soldiers as well as several NGOs attempt to connect children to their families when possible. Thus, the ACR could utilize the same tactics used by the ICBF to safely reunite these young participants with their families. Both social recommendations could lead to a greater sense of personal safety for the ACR participants, as they would create a network of support and solidarity.
Psychological
The psychosocial services provided to participants assists them in setting future goals and ensuring they receive the necessary services to achieve those goals. As such, psychosocial services are more focused on social planning than on psychological treatment. Due to the traumas faced by demobilized child soldiers during the conflict, and the post-traumatic symptoms they face, it is pertinent that the ACR provides mental health services. Furthermore, because the post-war experiences differ so greatly among former child soldiers, and these differences shape their psychosocial adjustment, it is important that the psychological treatment provided is focused on the individual and his or her unique needs.40 Including focused psychological services to participants will have a financial cost for hiring mental health workers and developing treatment plans for participants, however several of the
39 Betancourt et al. (2010) 40 Ibid.
Recommendation #2:
Facilitate connection of participants to their family members.
ii. Recommendation #2: Facilitate connection of participants to their family members.
55
Recommendation #2:
Require initial psychological examination when a participant first enters the program to
identify the participant’s needs with regards to mental health.
.
Recommendation #2:
Require initial psychological examination when participant first enters program to identify
the participants’ needs with regards to mental health
.
Recommendation #1:
Create an individualized treatment plan to meet the needs of each participant.
Recommendation #1:
Individualize treatment plan to meet the needs of each participant.
psychosocial professionals currently working with the participants are licensed psychologists, which may help offset some personnel costs.
When participants officially enter the ACR, they participate in lengthy interviews that provide the ACR with information on their participation in the armed conflict, previous education and employment experience, family details, and identifiable needs. However, no initial psychological examination is provided to evaluate the mental health of the participant. In order to successfully reintegrate demobilized combatants—especially those that were child soldiers—it is important to recognize and understand their mental health status and needs. This evaluation should occur at the start of a participant’s involvement in the ACR so that his or her services can be best targeted to his or her mental health needs. Again, this will require financial costs due to personnel needs, the formulation of an appropriate psychological examination, and a mechanism for using the results of the exam to target the services needed by each participant.
General
While the ACR seeks to place participants in services that meet their educational, employment and psychosocial needs, the services offered are mostly one-size-fits-all. In order to meet the needs of each unique demobilized child soldier, the ACR should take into account each participant’s background, including:
experience in the conflict gender education level employment goals mental health status family relationships number of children native language whether or not the individual pertains to an indigenous group
Each of these and other identifying characteristics of demobilized child soldiers impact their ability to successfully reintegrate and the issues they face in their path to economic and social reintegration. Identifying and understanding the uniqueness of each participant’s background and
56
Recommendation #2:
Solicit and utilize the opinions of participants.
experiences will allow the ACR to better target their needs and ensure their success in the program and in their post-conflict lives. For example, a 20 year-old woman participating in the program who has two young children, who mobilized at age 10, demobilized at age 18 and who is illiterate has a specific set of needs. First, it is pertinent that she attends classes and learns to read. This would require her to obtain childcare, and find a basic educational program near her home. Due to the specifics of her involvement in the conflict, she is likely not in contact with her family and subsequently has very little social or familial support. Therefore, she would likely benefit greatly from ACR social programs where she can form relationships with other young ACR participants, and would benefit from a service that helps her locate and reconnect with her family. A specialized treatment plan is a significant adjustment to the ACR’s current standardized approach to services. It will likely require significant investment in training staff members and identifying ways in which each individual’s characteristics may impact the services he or she requires for a successful reintegration.
This project was the first time this population of ACR participants had ever been asked to provide feedback to the ACR on their needs and the services they feel would benefit them in their reintegration. Asking participants what they wanted from the ACR gave them a sense of empowerment and forced them to think critically about their needs as demobilized child soldiers. The two needs that the large majority of participants articulated were: 1) Increased financial support: they felt they should be able to, but could not live off of the stipend provided by the ACR. More specifically, participants explained they would like financial help for paying rent. 2) Greater transparency: they felt uninformed of ACR policy changes and wished they were included in decisions about changes in the services they are provided. Participants explained that they were usually made aware of new policy changes at the time they received a reduced stipend. 3) Improved access to job training courses and improved job placement services: participants who were not eligible for SENA job training courses felt underserved and most unemployed individuals indicated the service they would most like to receive is help finding a job. These three points as well as other information the ACR could collect on a regular basis through short questionnaires or small focus groups would help ensure the ACR hears the needs of the participants and it will give the participants a sense of agency in their path to reintegration. It is important, however, that the ACR also uses the feedback gained from participants to formulate its programs. Without clearly implementing the suggestions or needs articulated by participants, they will feel their voices are unheard and may become reluctant to provide their opinions.
57
8. Conclusion, Constraints of the Study and Future
Research This project has contributed to the literature on child soldiers in Colombia and their social and economic reintegration and provides concrete policy recommendations to the Colombian Agency for Reintegration. Through interviews with 112 former child soldiers who are active ACR participants, I identified key characteristics of their involvement in the conflict, their current wellbeing, and their reintegration needs and wants. Furthermore, these interviews and the unique characteristics of Colombia’s reintegration programs provided the perfect platform for a rigorous evaluation of the outcomes attributed to Colombia’s reintegration policy that determines a demobilized child soldier’s path to reintegration based on the age at which he or she demobilized. By conducting this evaluation, I was able to identify the impacts of this policy on key reintegration outcomes for demobilized child soldiers and synthesize those impacts, as well as the general characteristics of this population, to provide recommendations to the ACR so that they can strengthen their services and ensure the successful social and economic reintegration of all demobilized child soldiers in Colombia. Due to the sample size constraints of this study, many of the findings of the impact evaluation, while informative, were not shown to be statistically significant. Although I am confident that the results are robust, further data collection is necessary to prove the explicit causality of Colombia’s reintegration policy and 18 year-old cutoff on the key reintegration outcomes of this population. It is my hope that I or another researcher can continue this study to strengthen and broaden the conclusions identified in this report. As indicated earlier in this report, another 30 interviews with former child soldiers who demobilized at or after 18 years of age would likely be sufficient to achieve this goal. To further enhance the internal validity of this study, however, a larger sample of ACR participants who demobilized at age 17 and 18 would be ideal, as this study included both older and younger demobilization ages which reduces the explanatory power of a regression discontinuity design evaluation.
58
Appendices 1. Regression Tables 2. List of Qualitative Interviews 3. Full Questionnaire – English Version
59
Appendix 1: Regression Tables
The models shown were selected because they are those which provided the most statistically
significant outcomes and were used in the analysis of this report.
TABLE I
Completion of Primary School
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.0931 0.0969 0.170** 0.153** 0.127
(0.0772) (0.0789) (0.0782) (0.0761) (0.109)
Age at demobilization 0.0171 0.0151 0.0269 0.0132 0.00639
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0192) (0.0206) (0.0296)
Current age 0.0111 0.0344 0.0307
(0.0152) (0.0279) (0.0292)
Gender -0.0612 -0.0495 -0.0231
(0.0561) (0.0604) (0.0883)
Current marital status -0.0145 -0.0203 -0.0114
(0.0236) (0.0252) (0.0273)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.00141 -0.0232 -0.0312
(0.0169) (0.0233) (0.0230)
Method of demobilization -0.0169 -0.0242 0.00380
(0.0327) (0.0332) (0.0433)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.0986 0.107 0.106
(0.0807) (0.0798) (0.135)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.0327 -0.0309 -0.0286
(0.0213) (0.0198) (0.0201)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant -0.270 -0.477 0.0235 -0.380 -0.570
(0.278) (0.400) (0.376) (0.450) (0.487)
Number of observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 -0.010 -0.013 -0.009 0.007 0.047
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in probability of having completed primary school with different levels of
covariates included. Model 5 reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location
where the participant received ACR services, and the location of their birth.
60
TABLE II
Feeling of Safety
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.204 0.189 0.454 0.551 0.978
(0.489) (0.485) (0.602) (0.595) (0.805)
Age at demobilization -0.127 -0.115 -0.199 -0.129 -0.0111
(0.131) (0.129) (0.149) (0.157) (0.204)
Current age -0.0569 -0.160 -0.142
(0.0715) (0.120) (0.162)
Gender 0.393 0.335 0.415
(0.370) (0.372) (0.576)
Current marital status 0.0422 0.0745 0.118
(0.125) (0.118) (0.171)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.0123 0.125 0.140
(0.0850) (0.120) (0.152)
Method of demobilization 0.356 0.385* 0.275
(0.241) (0.228) (0.294)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.0443 -0.0166 -0.160
(0.348) (0.349) (0.452)
Age at mobilization/recruitment 0.0824 0.0745 0.0334
(0.0972) (0.0968) (0.132)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant 4.872* 5.905** 3.637 5.391* 2.705
(2.485) (2.698) (2.898) (3.128) (4.720)
Observations 109 109 89 89 88
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.009 0.031 0.043 0.022
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in reported feeling of safety (scale of 1-5, 1=feeling very unsafe; 5=feeling very
safe), with different levels of covariates included. Model 5 reports the same difference including covariates and
fixed effects for the location where the participant received ACR services, and the location of their birth.
61
TABLE III
Measures of Self Confidence
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment -0.0340 -0.0449 0.0170 0.0397 0.351
(0.226) (0.225) (0.266) (0.270) (0.398)
Age at demobilization 0.00418 0.00975 0.0159 0.0339 0.109
(0.0490) (0.0518) (0.0541) (0.0625) (0.0799)
Current age -0.0316 -0.0452 -0.0484
(0.0283) (0.0363) (0.0608)
Gender 0.0234 0.00800 0.268
(0.150) (0.155) (0.255)
Current marital status -0.0378 -0.0301 -0.0850
(0.0451) (0.0432) (0.0785)
Length of time in ACR Programs 0.00219 0.0345 0.0135
(0.0439) (0.0414) (0.0609)
Method of demobilization -0.0771 -0.0675 -0.0501
(0.0956) (0.0984) (0.103)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.201 0.189 0.340
(0.225) (0.227) (0.333)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.0269 -0.0293 -0.0555
(0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0521)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant 1.184 1.773** 1.537 2.066* 0.965
(0.956) (0.884) (1.136) (1.102) (1.623)
Observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 -0.018 -0.017 -0.067 -0.071 -0.112
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in reported feeling of self confidence (scale of 1-5, 1=being no confidence in
oneself; 5=being fully confident in oneself), with different levels of covariates included. Model 5 reports the same
difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location where the participant received ACR services, and
the location of their birth.
62
TABLE IV
Drug Use
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.118** 0.120** 0.0887 0.0964* 0.191
(0.0542) (0.0548) (0.0567) (0.0573) (0.116)
Age at demobilization 0.0228* 0.0188** 0.0183 0.0264* 0.0496*
(0.0118) (0.00925) (0.0121) (0.0139) (0.0285)
Current age 0.0127 -0.0205* -0.0262
(0.0124) (0.0105) (0.0191)
Gender -0.0403 -0.0465 -0.0490
(0.0349) (0.0370) (0.0610)
Current marital status 0.00396 0.00688 0.00103
(0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0229)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.0149 0.0299 0.0448*
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0252)
Method of demobilization 0.0977 0.102 0.114*
(0.0646) (0.0638) (0.0621)
Education level prior to mobilization -0.0489 -0.0531 -0.00828
(0.0407) (0.0412) (0.0830)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.00835 -0.00935 -0.0164
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0241)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant -0.430* -0.637 -0.435 -0.191 -0.760
(0.223) (0.397) (0.316) (0.343) (0.535)
Observations 108 108 89 89 87
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.012 0.114 0.124 -0.031
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in use of drugs, with different levels of covariates included. Model 5 reports the
same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location where the participant received ACR services,
and the location of their birth.
63
TABLE V
Alcohol Use
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.191 0.199 0.285 0.297 0.185
(0.164) (0.163) (0.208) (0.211) (0.268)
Age at demobilization 0.0541 0.0505 0.0376 0.0475 0.0296
(0.0393) (0.0409) (0.0476) (0.0508) (0.0654)
Current Age 0.0217 -0.0249 -0.0183
(0.0219) (0.0367) (0.0568)
Gender -0.219* -0.228* -0.297*
(0.127) (0.127) (0.176)
Current marital status 0.0298 0.0340 0.0399
(0.0379) (0.0381) (0.0531)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.0174 0.0352 0.0575
(0.0273) (0.0374) (0.0573)
Method of demobilization 0.105 0.111 0.115
(0.0669) (0.0670) (0.0694)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.178 0.172 -0.102
(0.107) (0.109) (0.156)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.0229 -0.0242 0.0171
(0.0280) (0.0288) (0.0417)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant -0.391 -0.800 -0.228 0.0639 -0.0525
(0.751) (0.853) (0.960) (1.053) (1.574)
Observations 110 110 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.001 0.039 0.033 -0.001
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in use of alcohol, with different levels of covariates included. Model 5 reports
the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location where the participant received ACR
services, and the location of their birth.
64
TABLE VI
Employment Status
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.223 0.241 0.179 0.146 -0.0872
(0.161) (0.152) (0.186) (0.188) (0.247)
Age at demobilization 0.0521 0.0428 0.0343 0.00823 -0.0180
(0.0365) (0.0380) (0.0438) (0.0455) (0.0540)
Current Age 0.0523** 0.0655* 0.0679
(0.0223) (0.0350) (0.0474)
Gender -0.367*** -0.344** -0.339**
(0.132) (0.134) (0.163)
Current marital status 0.0118 0.000698 0.0321
(0.0390) (0.0374) (0.0503)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.00925 -0.0376 -0.0753
(0.0263) (0.0363) (0.0463)
Method of demobilization -0.0358 -0.0496 -0.0129
(0.0744) (0.0691) (0.0879)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.159 0.176 0.00201
(0.123) (0.128) (0.136)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.0478 -0.0444 -0.0491
(0.0305) (0.0321) (0.0420)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant -0.615 -1.592** 0.432 -0.335 0.753
(0.700) (0.793) (0.900) (0.953) (1.320)
Observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.039 0.067 0.093 0.142
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in probability of being employed (any number of hours) with different levels of
covariates included. Model 5 reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location
where the participant received ACR services, and the location of their birth.
65
TABLE VII
Age at Birth of First Child
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 1.427 1.542 0.728 0.266 1.910
(1.223) (1.147) (1.062) (1.096) (1.278)
Age at demobilization 0.525* 0.425* 0.268 0.0513 0.110
(0.264) (0.231) (0.247) (0.259) (0.303)
Current age 0.450*** 0.429* 0.603**
(0.149) (0.231) (0.245)
Gender -1.807** -1.756** -2.253
(0.767) (0.739) (1.461)
Current marital status 0.327 0.273 0.300
(0.232) (0.217) (0.313)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.139 -0.166 -0.845***
(0.214) (0.230) (0.264)
Method of demobilization 0.250 0.0336 1.209
(0.695) (0.766) (0.703)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.207 0.396 3.697**
(0.581) (0.571) (1.520)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.0771 -0.0489 -0.581**
(0.194) (0.203) (0.231)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant 8.657* 0.439 13.28** 9.271 4.944
(5.072) (5.584) (5.772) (6.207) (6.637)
Observations 56 56 43 43 43
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.181 0.117 0.180 0.565
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in age at birth of first child with different levels of covariates included. Model 5
reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location where the participant received
ACR services, and the location of their birth.
66
TABLE VIII
Quality of Family Relationships
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment -0.482 -0.446 -0.356 -0.412 -0.486
(0.522) (0.536) (0.639) (0.646) (0.782)
Age at demobilization -0.166* -0.185* -0.0801 -0.124 -0.104
(0.0937) (0.0989) (0.124) (0.136) (0.141)
Current age 0.105 0.111 0.0495
(0.0681) (0.121) (0.115)
Gender 0.0992 0.137 0.465
(0.365) (0.358) (0.434)
Current marital status 0.0852 0.0664 0.0517
(0.127) (0.125) (0.122)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.0213 -0.0582 0.0783
(0.0919) (0.123) (0.117)
Method of demobilization 0.101 0.0770 0.225
(0.185) (0.191) (0.187)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.559* 0.587* 0.0386
(0.323) (0.326) (0.477)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.293*** -0.287*** -0.106
(0.107) (0.106) (0.122)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant 5.610*** 3.647 7.348*** 6.045** 3.768
(1.886) (2.309) (2.489) (2.818) (3.195)
Observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.013 0.095 0.096 0.182
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between treated
and nontreated participants in reported quality of family relationships (scale of 0-5, 0=not in contact with family,
5=great family relationships/full confidence in family members), with different levels of covariates included. Model 5
reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location where the participant received ACR
services, and the location of their birth.
67
TABLE IX
Feeling of Depression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.116 0.111 0.191 0.200 0.0510
(0.110) (0.110) (0.133) (0.133) (0.147)
Age at demobilization 0.0168 0.0192 0.00961 0.0166 -0.0203
(0.0206) (0.0212) (0.0263) (0.0285) (0.0291)
Current age -0.0134 -0.0177 0.00211
(0.0174) (0.0274) (0.0224)
Gender 0.0355 0.0295 -0.0877
(0.109) (0.111) (0.114)
Current marital status 0.00873 0.0117 0.0304
(0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0285)
Length of time in ACR programs 0.00465 0.0173 0.0182
(0.0256) (0.0315) (0.0297)
Method of demobilization 0.0422 0.0459 0.0339
(0.0612) (0.0624) (0.0494)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.133 0.128 -0.0272
(0.107) (0.108) (0.0982)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.00298 -0.00391 0.0114
(0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0211)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant -0.213 0.0367 -0.285 -0.0779 0.427
(0.404) (0.495) (0.537) (0.608) (0.753)
Observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 -0.010 -0.014 -0.038 -0.047 0.429
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in probability of feeling depressed with different levels of covariates included.
Model 5 reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location where the participant
received ACR services, and the location of their birth.
68
TABLE X
Difficulty with Friends
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment -0.0380 -0.0387 0.0967* 0.102* 0.148
(0.0936) (0.0920) (0.0570) (0.0601) (0.0973)
Age at demobilization 0.00461 0.00498 0.0205 0.0251 0.0336
(0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0131) (0.0153) (0.0205)
Current age -0.00208 -0.0115 -0.0132
(0.0148) (0.00846) (0.00981)
Gender 0.00355 -0.000367 0.0478
(0.0485) (0.0503) (0.0706)
Current marital status -0.0105 -0.00855 -0.000685
(0.00791) (0.00776) (0.0168)
Length of time in ACR programs -0.0204* -0.0122 -0.00853
(0.0118) (0.00824) (0.0105)
Method of demobilization -0.0158 -0.0134 0.00268
(0.0228) (0.0213) (0.0155)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.0554 0.0524 0.0693
(0.0443) (0.0429) (0.0657)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.00293 -0.00353 -0.00734
(0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0120)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant 0.0181 0.0569 -0.237 -0.103 -0.504
(0.278) (0.220) (0.226) (0.245) (0.525)
Observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 -0.012 -0.021 0.019 0.016 0.158
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in probability of having reported difficulty with friends with different levels of
covariates included. Model 5 reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the location
where the participant received ACR services, and the location of their birth.
69
TABLE XI
Difficulty with Security
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment 0.214* 0.201* 0.288** 0.300** 0.146
(0.115) (0.109) (0.142) (0.140) (0.152)
Age at demobilization 0.0325 0.0392* 0.0472 0.0569* 0.0430
(0.0215) (0.0222) (0.0314) (0.0332) (0.0321)
Current age -
0.0381**
-0.0242 0.0114
(0.0192) (0.0298) (0.0289)
Gender 0.0170 0.00879 -0.0745
(0.110) (0.113) (0.109)
Current marital status -0.0347 -0.0306 -0.0225
(0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0313)
Length of time in ACR programs -0.0243 -0.00700 -0.0203
(0.0251) (0.0299) (0.0299)
Method of demobilization -0.0601 -0.0550 -0.0362
(0.0563) (0.0561) (0.0430)
Education level prior to mobilization 0.0283 0.0221 -0.122
(0.106) (0.108) (0.110)
Age at mobilization/recruitment -0.0272 -0.0285 -0.0275
(0.0253) (0.0249) (0.0250)
Birth location fixed effects Yes
ACR Service center fixed effects Yes
Constant -0.508 0.203 -0.132 0.151 -0.0923
(0.418) (0.502) (0.622) (0.706) (0.699)
Observations 111 111 91 91 89
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.032 -0.011 -0.016 0.349
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Models 1-4 report the difference between
treated and nontreated participants in probability of reported difficulties with physical security with different
levels of covariates included. Model 5 reports the same difference including covariates and fixed effects for the
location where the participant received ACR services, and the location of their birth.
70
TABLE XII
Placebo Tests with Baseline Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Number of baseline variables with
statistically significant coefficients at
p<0.01
1* 1*
Number of baseline variables with
statistically significant coefficients at
p<0.05
1*
Number of baseline variables with
statistically significant coefficients at
p<0.10
1* 1
*The baseline variable indicated is gender due to the fact that there are more women in the control group than
treatment group.
71
Appendix 2: Qualitative Interviews
Frank Pearl, Former High Commissioner for Reintegration, Government of Colombia, Cambridge,
Massachusettes (February, 2011)
Esneyder Cortes Salinas, Director, Division of Research and Planning, Colombian Agency for
Reintegration, Bogota, Colombia (May, 2011)
Nelson Sarria Muños, Division of Research and Planning, Colombian Agency for Reintegration,
Bogota, Colombia (May, 2011)
Professor Ana Maria Ibañez Lodoño, Economics Department, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota,
Colombia (May, 2011)
Mariana Diaz, Researcher, Fundación Ideas Para La Paz, Bogota, Colombia (June, 2011)
Antonio Menendez de Zubilaga, Director, Fight Against Impunity Division, UN OHCHR, Bogtoa,
Colombia (June, 2011)
Marcela Briceño-Donn, Legal Officer, Fight Against Impunity Division, UN OHCHR, Bogota, Colombia
(June, 2011)
Carlos Martinez, Coordinator, Colombian Coalition Against the Involvement of Boys, Girls and
Adolescents in the Colombian Armed Conflict, Bogota, Colombia (June, 2011)
Ana Maria Jimenez, Legal Officer, Colombian Coalition Against the Involvement of Boys, Girls and
Adolescents in the Colombian Armed Conflict, Bogota, Colombia (June, 2011)
Daniel Campo, Benposta International, Bogota, Colombia (July, 2011)
Ursula Chaves, Colombian Agency for Reintegration, Medellin, Colombia (July, 2011)
Professor Theresa Betancourt, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts (October,
2011)
Paula Garcia, Psychosocial Therapist, Colombian Agency for Reintegration, Rafael Uribe, Colombia
(December, 2011)
72
Appendix 3: Full Questionnaire – English Version
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
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