tactical solutions magazine
TRANSCRIPT
SUMMER 2015
A
actical SolutionsT
Cunningham on
KNIFE ATTACK
William Gage on
METL
Robert Graziano on
REACTIONARY GAP
Harry Kirk on
ACTIVESHOOTER
NDEXTactical Solutions
Tactical Solutions – SUMMER 2015
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
DEPARTMENTSFrom The Editorp.5
Offender Contact: Safety Within the Reactionary Gapp.07
by R. Martinelli
by R. Graziano
The “21 Foot Rule”—Forensic Fact or Fantasy?p.46
Leadership
by A. CunninghamKnife Attack Primer.p.25
by H. KirkThe Active Shooter Threat: Workplace Violence or Terroristic Acts?p.10
by W. GageMETL Model for Law Enforcement Tactical Teamsp.32
by J. KoesterWays to Succeed During Joint, Combined Missions in the Pacificp.38
Intelligence
by L. LujanDuty Belts—CO Shooters and Proctor Covert B.E.L.Tp.29
Equipment
by L. LujanSummer PTp.22
PT Time
by L. LujanPatrol Rifle Practicep.20
Range Time
3
CONTENTS
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
I
Tactical Solutions
This journal is provided to members of the InternationalTactical Training Association-ITTA. The information pre-sented is from various sources from which there can be nowarranty or responsibility by the ITTA Corporation, or thepublisher as to the legality, completeness and accuracy. Theinformation described and portrayed in this journal is basedupon the personal experience of the author. The author’sentire experience may not be reported or otherwise verified.Nothing in this journal should be construed as a substitutefor a manufacturer’s manual or for professional training.
The ITTA does not, by the presentation of any advertise-ment, product evaluation, article or editorial, create anywarranty, either expressed or implied. The opinionsexpressed in the editorial and articles are those of theauthors, and do not necessarily express the opinions orpositions of the Board of Directors of the ITTA or employ-ees. The individual author represents tactics discussed inTACTICAL SOLUTIONS. This publication should in noway be considered an endorsement or recommendation bythe ITTA Corporation.
All rights reserved. No portion of TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
may be reproduced without prior written permission fromthe ITTA Corporation.
Firearms SafetyAlways adhere to and obey firearms safety rules:
1. Treat every gun as if it were loaded.
2. Always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction and do not muzzle anything that you arenot willing to destroy.
3. Keep your finger off of the trigger and out of thetrigger guard until ready to fire.
4. Be aware of your target and what is beyond it.
The individual manufacturer and retailer set the prices anddetails for items featured in TACTICAL SOLUTIONS. Theyare subject to change without notice.
Certain products featured in this journal may be subject toprohibitions, restrictions or special licensing for sale, posses-sion or interstate transport. Check with local and federalauthorities regarding the legality of purchase, possessionand transport.
Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to International Tactical Training AssociationITTA, P.O. Box 59833, Chicago, Illinois 60659, United States of America
DISCLAI
MERS
4
SUMMER 2015 T
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
FOLLOW US ONLINE
E D I T O R - I N - C H I E FLAWRENCE LUJAN • [email protected]
P R E S I D E N TAARON CUNNINGHAM •[email protected]
S E C R E T A R Y – A C C O U N T A N TSUNG JOO LEE • [email protected]
G R A P H I C A R T I S TVANESSA M.
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINE is the digital Journal of the International Tactical
Training Association. Written by and for specialoperators, police operators, and intelligence
officers and for all those in the mission againstcrime and terror worldwide.
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINEis published in Winter-December,
Spring-March, Summer-June, and Fall-September
For inquiries regarding advertising inTACTICAL SOLUTIONS, please email
For inquiries regarding existingTSM editions, please email
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINE [email protected]
Or Contact Us At:
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINEP.O. BOX 59833, CHICAGO, IL 60659 USA
Tel: 872-221-ITTA Fax: 872-221-5882
CONTRIBUTING PHOTOGRAPHERS
AS1 &2- Heide Couch, USAF, DVIDS; Group PT- Cpl. Sarah Dietz,USMC, DVIDS; METL-Lance Cpl. Adwin Esters, USMC, DVIDS;Reactionary Gap- Petty Officer 2nd Class Lauren Jorgensen, US CoastGuard, DVIDS; Ways to Succeed-Jonathan (Jay) Koester; 21 ft. Rule-
Ron Martinelli; Rifle-Pfc. Steven Young, U.S. Army, DVIDS
ON THE COVER
7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) soldiers move toward a doorway to conduct a breech…
Photographer: U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Steven Young, DVIDS
CONTRIBUTING WRITERS
Aaron Cunningham, Robert Graziano, William Gage, Harry Kirk,Jonathan (Jay) Koester, Lawrence Lujan, Ron Martinelli
SUMMER 2015
Well all, summer is here. I hope that all is well and that you are keeping safe and tactically
proficient. Many will be travelling but that is no reason to let your edge down and not get in
some quality training time. Take a look at our Summer PT for a great workout that you can
accomplish while travelling. We bring you an excellent Rifle course that can be run as practice or as a
qualification course. In addition, we bring you some great articles that address the “21-ft rule,” active
shooting incidents, the “reactionary gap,” Mission Essential Task Lists, Ways to Succeed in During Joint,
Combined Missions in the Pacific and the review of two excellent duty belts.
Have a great summer, and as always…stay alert, stay ready and stay alive!
Lawrence Lujan
Editor-in-ChiefTactical Solutions Magazine
Tactical SolutionsLETTER
EDITOR
fromthe
RAPID ASSAULT SHIRT™
© 2013 5.11 TACTICAL, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
BUILT FOR THE MOSTDEMANDING MISSIONS
The 5.11 Rapid Assault Shirt offers maximum breathability and comfort underneath your plate carrier or nylon gear while maintaining a tactical uniform exterior.
VISIT 511TACTICAL .COM OR CALL 866.451.1726 TO FIND A FULL LINE DEALER NEAR YOU
actics Techniques and ProceduresT
7TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Safety Within theReactionary Gap
Offender Contact:
One of the most important thingsyou will learn when making contactwith people is the concept of rela-tive positioning. Relative position-ing is how far you are from the con-tact person, and it is made up of thereactionary gap, the danger zone,and reaction time. I have spoken many times duringclasses and explained and demon-strated how action beats reaction
almost every time and on occasion,results in a tie between the two. Thereactionary gap is the distance youmust keep between you and theoffender in order for you to respondto any sudden threat. That distancetends to be six to nine feet if youcan see the suspect's hands, and 25feet if you can't. The danger zone isanywhere inside the reactionarygap. Your reaction time to any
threat is the final part of the equa-tion.When we consider our reactiontime, we must consider how muchtraining and preparation we havedone to prepare for such reaction.We must also consider our mindsetand willingness to respond with thecorrect reaction.I have observed and trained manyofficers, and including my own per-
Written by Robert Graziano
Photographer U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Lauren Jorgensen, DVIDS
U.S. Coast Guard Petty Officer 3rd Class Joshua Welsh demonstrates properhandcuffing techniques on Petty Officer 3rd Class Lawrence Benson
sonal experience, I have realizedthat our mindset preparation is asimportant as scenario-based train-ing. What I mean by this is thatyour mind will not develop the sur-vival instinct needed to react in thefight mode unless you train it. Youcould very well react in flight mode.As police officers a reaction of flighthas negative conse-quences on thebehalf of societyand the well beingof the officer.Worse than flight,would be no reac-tion at all. This iswhen you have noresponse or a lagin response to theevent. The result iscatastrophic asmilliseconds sepa-rate life and death.How can we pre-pare? How can weknow what is inour fate?We need to men-tally play scenar-ios of situations inour head wherewe are victorious.The scenarioshould be of per-sonal capabilityand just as realisticas our hands ontraining. Further, thisis how we create the index card inour heads without the life experi-ence. Of course hands on trainingshould be hand in hand with mindpreparation but we all know howoften we get to train in academyenvironments. This is NOT anexcuse to not prepare mentally asthis training is a personal commit-ment.As a young soldier in the Army Ilearned early on, that during com-bat, mindset is the difference
between going home or not. If youdon’t believe in yourself and believeyou are the best, then you havealready been defeated. I don’t sug-gest that one be cocky or conceited.A warrior needs not impress any-one to be victorious; there is a dif-ference between cocky and confi-dence.
• What I have learned:o Most police officers react
to the situation, when they should be controlling the situation. The officer has not thought about the call before arriving to it. The officer has not gathered information about thehistory or the details ofthe call. The officer has not mentally prepared for the worst outcome. Further the
complacency of submissive calls beforehand; cloud the judgment of preparedness on the officer’s part.
• We haven’t left the reactionary gap:
o We need to think like an offender would think. Watch for clues, indicators
of what their inten-tions are. Compliant peopleare just that…com-pliant! As officers we have a greatability to see anddetect lies, becauseeveryone lies to us.In saying that ifeveryone ran orresisted or tried tokill us we would beprepared, right? Sowhy is it that whena person runs,resists or fights withus we play catchup? • What happenswhen the offender or we close the gapand how do wemaintain control?
o Beaware of your sur-roundings. Is yourback to traffic; isthere a ditch or
fence behind you?What options of control do youhave? What is available on yourbelt? If the officer closes the gapand the decision is made to arrestthen understand that control of theoffender is the first priority.Here are some things to take intoaccount when closing the gap andgoing hands-on: Always remember,the process could begin sooner thanyou think. This is where the rubbermeets the road. Once the decisionhas been made to make a physical
actics Techniques and ProceduresT
When we considerour reaction time,we must considerhow much training
and preparationwe have done to prepare for such
reaction. We mustalso consider our
mindset and willing-ness to respond withthe correct reaction.
8 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
9TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
arrest, the suspect only has onechoice: comply. If he or she doesn'tcomply, your options are to disen-gage or escalate.The single most important factor inclosing the gap is obtaining controlof the offender before you handcuff.Too many officers try to handcuffsomeone while he or she is stillfighting. I recently was involved ina foot pursuit that escalated into aresisting and assault on a public ser-vant. As I arrived to assist the offi-cers I observed a rookie officerstruggling to keep control over aloose handcuff that had been placedon the offender before he was con-trolled. You can't fight and handcuffat the same time. What usually hap-pens when you do so is you onlyget one handcuff on and you haveunwittingly armed the offenderwith a deadly weapon. Luckily forthe officers this time help arrived!Will help arrive the next time?
Resistance to a physical arrest isgoing to happen, and we must beprepared to deal with it. One of ouroptions includes hands on tech-niques. In saying this, we cannotrely on one piece of magical equip-ment to solve all our problems, wemust be able to adapt and use ourresources as needed. Too many offi-cers never want to move in. Weplace too much weight on thingslike Conducted Electrical Weapons(CEW) such as TASERs. CEWs arenot the end all. They have beenknown to fail, they have beendefeated, and have sometimes justhad a minimal effect on the suspect.Remember, we will never fullyreplace hands-on techniques withtechnology. You still need to knowhow to move and obtain control.Combatives are a diminishing skill.If you don't train, you lose yourproficiency and are well on yourway to becoming a statistic or a
name on a wall. I have found that by dealing withevery suspect firmly but withrespect, that I have prevented manyphysical confrontations throughoutmy career. Any seasoned officer willtell you that's sound advice, and itgets you to where you want to bemore times than not. However,regardless of the level of coopera-tion, you must be prepared to movein and gain control quickly in orderto make your arrest. Your situationcan change in an instant.We must be prepared mentally andphysically to answer the call whenthe reactionary gap is closed. Youmust use your relative positioningto your advantage and feel comfort-able working in the danger area.You need to feel very comfortabledealing with offenders up close andhave the mindset that you will pre-vail. T
Sergeant Robert Graziano is a 14-year veteran with the El Paso, Texas Sheriff's Office. He
spent 8 years on the El Paso County Sheriff's S.W.A.T team and assignments include: Task force
officer with the FBI violent crimes unit, Metro narcotics and Senior Instructor at the El Paso
County Sheriffs Training academy. He was responsible for firearms, tactical training, defensive
tactics and basic peace officer training. Sergeant Graziano also served 13 years in the United
States Army. Sergeant Graziano's certifications include; US ARMY Instructor, US ARMY master
Physical fitness Instructor, TCLEOSE Instructor, TCLEOSE Firearms Instructor, Federal Firearms
Instructor, Advanced Carbine/Rifle Instructor, Lowlight CQB Instructor, OC Instructor, Specialty
Impact munitions Instructor, Distraction device and chemical munitions Instructor, PPCT Defensive
tactics Instructor, Taser Instructor, Basic Active shooter Instructor, Enhanced Active shooter resolu-
tion Instructor, Shoot house Instructor.
About the Author
ntelligenceI
Workplace Violence or Terroristic Acts
The ActiveShooter Threat:
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS10
The ChangingLandscape of ViolenceThere have been two significantshifts in the national threat matrixspecific to the types and frequencyof violent acts that can affect boththe private and public sector work-place. The nature of workplace vio-lence is changing at the same timethe nature of terrorism is changing.In light of these changes, it may benecessary to take a fresh look at theproblem of workplace violence andmake adjustments to policies, plansand exercises to reflect the evolvingthreat.
While recent mass shooting eventsin New Mexico and Connecticutwould seem to suggest otherwise,the number of people killed inworkplace shootings has beendeclining for more than a decade,according to statistics released inApril by the U.S. Department ofLabor. Those statistics show that thenumber of workplace homicides hasfallen from a high of 1,080 in 1994 to526 in 2008, a decline of 52 percent.
That is a significant reduction inworkplace violence and a statisticthat should be known to any indi-vidual or group charged with work-place violence prevention within theorganization.
It is believed that the wide spreadimplementation of workplace vio-lence prevention efforts and policieshas resulted in this decline in thenumber of workplace homicides.Still about 2 million U.S. workers arethe victims of some kind of work-place assault each year, according toOccupational Safety and HealthAdministration reports. Workplaceviolence is still a major problem, but the nature of this problem ischanging.
As the overall workplace violencepicture has changed, so has theglobal picture of terrorism. The U.S.State Department’s “CountryReports on Terrorism” released onAugust 5th, reports that 2009, terror-ist attacks worldwide and theirdeath toll were at their lowest levelsin some four years. According to the
report, terrorists carried out 10,999attacks worldwide in 2009, the low-est number in five years and downfrom a recent high of 14,443 in 2006.In 2009, 14,971 people died in terror-ist attacks, down from recent high of22,736 in 2006. Globally, terroristsconducted fewer attacks, but withinthe U.S., there has been a significantincrease in attempted attacks andnear misses.
The mature workplace violence pre-vention programs currently in placein many organizations often utilize amultidisciplinary team approach,incorporating representatives fromseveral areas including HR, RiskManagement, Safety and Health,Wellness/EAPs and of course,Security. There is substantial evi-dence that the multidisciplinaryapproach is sound and effective inworkplace violence prevention. Butwhen the topic an “active shooter”or “terrorism” is raised, these issuesare often relegated exclusively to theSecurity Department.
Workplace violence, in its most pub-
Written by Harry Kirk
60th Security Forces Squadron airmen sharpen their skills by participatingin ongoing active shooter training, Travis Air Force Base, Calif.
U.S. Air Force Photo By Heide Couch, DVIDS
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS12
licized form involves the disgrun-tled current or former employee,while terrorism scenarios typicallyinvolve outsiders unknown to theorganization who seem to strikewithout warning.
Classic workplace violence and ter-rorism scenarios are becomingincreasingly similar. The conver-gences of motives and methods forextreme violence in the workplacecalls for a new look at preparedness,response and recovery. The teamapproach may be more importantthan ever in confronting this evolv-ing threat, but it may be time torevisit roles and responsibilities onthese teams.
Who is the “New Terrorist?”Terrorism is changing in ways thatsuggest that the acts and actors arebecoming more like those seen inincidents of workplace and/orschool violence and less like thoseassociated with spectacular, highlycoordinated or symphonic (i.e.,blended operations such as theMumbai attack) acts of terrorismhistorically associated withAl-Qaeda. Terrorist organizations,especially in the wake of the U.S.response to the 9/11 attacks, havebecome increasingly decentralized.While the name "Al-Qaeda" literallytranslates to "the base", there is nolonger a single, identifiable "base",but rather over time, greater num-bers single operators and small cellsof "Al-Qaeda-inspired" terrorists.These “new terrorists”, are part of adecentralized, global effort, blendinginto the community and becomingthe average "Joe" and " Jane", theguy or gal next door or in the next
cubicle.FBI Director Robert Mueller warnedU.S. lawmakers that “homegrown”,“lone wolf” terrorists pose a securitythreat equal to that of Al-Qaedaproper. A recent report developedby Mitch Silber, the NYPD’s top ter-rorism analyst indicates that 90 per-cent of the core conspirators ofjihadist plots against America andthe West throughout the worldbetween 2004 and 2009 were radical-ized in the West. Many of these indi-viduals were born or raised in theUnited States, came from middleclass backgrounds, were well edu-cated and had no discernableAl-Qaeda connection. For the mostpart, these individuals lived andworked amongst the general popu-lation. Would-be terrorists bornand/or raised in the U.S. may bemore difficult to detect and deter.Due to their familiarity with the cul-ture and everyday life in the commu-nity and workplace, they understandvulnerabilities in security and thenuances of potential targets in waysforeign terrorists often may not.
The motive of the single terrorist orsmall cell is also different. Ratherthan conducting sophisticated,strategic attacks purely for ideologi-cal or religious reasons, intelligenceofficials have learned that severalrecent attempts were motivated, atleast in part, by a sense ofvengeance. These violent acts andattempts are often referred to inintelligence circles as “blow back”(i.e., unintended consequences)associated with the ongoingunmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or“drone” attacks employed inPakistan, Afghanistan and else-where. Local populations claim thatsuch strikes are responsible not only
for the targeted elimination ofknown terrorists and insurgents, butalso for the indiscriminant killing ofinnocents. It seems that the attempt-ed bombing of New York’s TimeSquare, the disrupted plot targetingtransit hubs in and around New York,and others recent incidents, havebeen fueled by revenge, anger and asense of injustice related to these mili-tary actions, rather than a larger spiri-tual or philosophical purpose.
It is thought that lone terrorists orsmall cells are likely to select “softtargets” such as businesses andschools, retail, sporting and enter-tainment venues, and other loca-tions that allow for rapid acquisitionof multiple targets.
The active shooter scenario usuallyinvolves an individual or smallnumber of individuals activelyengaged in killing or attempting tokill people in a confined and highlypopulated area. Acts of conventionalterrorism typically involve bombing,shooting and kidnapping. However,in most documented active shootercases, the actor use firearms with nopattern or method to their selectionof victims. In the workplace thismay be different. The classic work-place shooter is motivated by asense of personal rather than collec-tive injustice and may target specificsupervisors or employees he or shebelieves has wronged them. Thustargeting tends to be more selectiveand calculated.
Terrorism in theWorkplace ViolenceContextThe National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health
ntelligenceI
13TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
(NIOSH) and Occupational Healthand Safety Administration (OSHA)has historically categorized work-place violence in four types. Thesetypes are defined by the relationshipbetween the perpetrator and the vic-tim(s) or targeted organization, aswell as the motive, but not themethod of violence. Strategies forthe prevention of the four recog-nized types of workplace violenceare well documented and manyorganizations have established, mul-tidisciplinary workplace violenceprevention programs in place incor-porate the perspectives of Security, Health and Safety, Risk Management, Legal and other departments focused on this problem.
While not usually classified as such,given recent trends in terrorism, itmay be useful to view the terror-ist-active shooter risk as a potentialfifth type of workplace violence. Assuch, many facets of existing work-place violence prevention programsmay be useful in addressing therisks of the “new” or “homegrown”terrorism, but may require anexpansion of current practices,including revisiting the “ownership”of terrorism-related violence pre-vention as primarily a Security func-tion. The evolution of this risk maynecessitate a movement toward acomprehensive violence preventionprogram inclusive of the establishedfour types of workplace violenceand a new, fifth type,Terrorism/Hate Crimes. Doing somay help avoid confusion in plan-ning and incident response, and inthe current economic climate canreduce the need to create new mech-anisms for detecting and respondingto this emerging threat. At present,
the most widely accepted types ofworkplace violence are:
Type I: Criminal IntentType I workplace violence existsacross all industries but is mostprevalent in certain types of workcharacterized by interaction with thepublic, and the handling of cash,where employees often work aloneor remote areas and/or late at night.Convenience store workers, taxidrivers and others with these jobcharacteristics are likely targets ofType I violence. The list of commonelements in Type I violence includes:• Perpetrators who do not have
any legitimate business relationship with the establishment or organization.
• A primary motive of theft.• A deadly weapon is often used,
increasing the risk of fatal injury.• Crimes that often begin as
robberies, shoplifting and trespassing incidents but become violent while in progress.
Type II: Customer/ClientType II workplace violence is direct-ed at an organization’s employees orleaders by current or former clientsor customers, but is not typicallymotivated by monetary gain. Ratherit is precipitated by anger, frustra-tion and the perception of unfair-ness that somehow has moved theactor to resolve a real or imaginedconflict or injustice through the useof violence.Type II workplace violence involves:• Perpetrators who are known
as customers or clients of the organization.
• Violence that occurs in conjunction with an
employee’s normal duties.• A constant or routine risk in
service delivery such as those faced by mental health workers and police.
Type III: Worker-on-WorkerType III workplace violence involvesthe sort of co-worker-to-co-workeror worker-to-supervisor violencethat most often makes the eveningnews and is typically the kind of sit-uation that comes to mind for mostpeople when the term “workplaceviolence’ is mentioned. It accountsfor about 7% of all workplace homi-cides and is often considered one ofthe most preventable types of work-place violence.. Many of the estab-lished pre-incident indicators of vio-lence are often present and if recog-nized, may create an opportunity forearly intervention and prevention ofa violent act. Mental illness ratherthan criminal intent is frequently themain catalyst for such acts.
Type III workplace violence involves:• The perpetrator is a current or
former employee of the organization.
• The motivating factor is often one or a series of real or perceived interpersonal or work-related conflicts, losses or traumas.
• The violence is a byproduct of a “smoldering” rather than “sudden” crisis or conflict with an employee.
Type IV: Domestic
Violence/Personal RelationshipsType IV workplace violence is per-
60th Security Forces Squadron airmen sharpen their skills by participatingin ongoing active shooter training, Travis Air Force Base, Calif.
ntelligenceI
14TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
petrated by an individual who typical-ly doesn’t work for the organization,but rather has a personal relationshipwith a current employee. Type IVworkplace violence involves:• A spillover of domestic
violence into the workplace.• A perpetrator who is not usually
an employee or former employee of the affected workplace.
Women are more likely the targets ofthis type of on-the-job violence. Fromthe perpetrator’s standpoint, the work-place offers an ideal setting to strike,since they may be able predict exactlywhere their victims will be at certaintimes of the day.
Type V: Terrorism/Hate CrimesIt may be useful to characterize vio-lence directed at an organization, itspeople and/or property for ideological,religious/political reasons or asvengeance deaths and destructionassociated with governmental/militaryactions, as Type V workplace violence.Target selection in this instance is notbased on sense of personal or profes-sional injustice in the workplace, butrather rage against what the targetedorganization does or represents.
Violence perpetrated by extremist envi-ronmental, animal rights, anti-abortionand other value-driven groups mayalso fall within this category. The rela-tionship between the actor and the tar-get is often tenuous and target selec-tion is based on the nature the targetorganization’s products and services,as well as the symbolic value and theopportunity for publicity.
A review of workplace violence litera-ture yields few if any references to ter-
U.S. Air Force Photo By Heide Couch, DVIDS
rorism as a form of workplace vio-lence. One exception is the KansasBureau of Investigation’s brochure,“Violence in the Workplace: DeadlyConsequences,” which describes ter-rorism and hate crimes as fifth cate-gory of violence on the job.
The Active ShooterIn all four, as well as the proposedfifth type of workplace violence, therisk of an active shooter scenario isvery real and case examples areplentiful. It is understood that of thefour recognized types of workplaceviolence, the first type, perpetratedin the commission of another crime,is the most common. It is estimatedthat 85% of all workplace homicidesfall into this category.
It would seem counterproductivefor organizations to address theactive shooter risk differently due tothe motive. Exactly why someonehas entered a facility and openedfire is irrelevant to the immediateresponse.
Detection and DeterrenceAt the core of most workplace vio-lence prevention training programsare “warning signs”, “red flags” andother behavioral indicators that mayhelp supervisors and/or co-workersrecognize an employee who may bemoving along a trajectory towardviolence. Some of the well-knownred flags for potential violence are:• Recent traumas or losses, real
or perceived.• Externalized blame for personal
mistakes and difficulties.• Use of physical/verbal
intimidation and/or threats.• A strong sense of entitlement.• Social withdrawal or isolation.
• Romantic obsession/stalking of former or current worker(s).
• Verbal expression of paranoid/suspicious thoughts.
• Bringing/displaying weapons at the workplace.
In broadening the workplace vio-lence typology to include the possi-bility that an employee harbors thepotential for Type V violence, it isnecessary to add to this list:• Sudden religious or spiritual
conversion or dramatic intensification of religious convictions and/or activities.
• Voicing religious or political beliefs concerning ideologies of a generally perceived extremist nature.
• Testing the limits of supervisors’ authority and control, and/or security personnel and systems.
Individuals at risk for Type III andType V workplace violence shareseveral behaviors and psychologicalcharacteristic. In both instances, theviolence is more “predatory” than“affective” and both have similar“attack cycles” that can be useful inthe prediction and prevention ofviolent events.
Affective violence is often the dra-matic response to an immediatethreat, real or perceived. Predatoryviolence is not reactive to an imme-diate threat, but rather to a sense ofinjustice or a compulsion to right awrong or fulfill a deeper psychologi-cal need or purpose. Such violenceappears to be “cold” and calculated,it is planned and purposeful. Whileaffective violence is sudden, preda-tory violence is smoldering. Suchacts are carefully mapped out, oftenrehearsed, and in many instances
preceded by some type of ritual oractivity to document the perpetra-tor’s final act.
Shared Warning SignsThe need for an awareness of the“attack cycle” shared in Type III andV violence is consistent with therecent adoption of the New YorkCity Counterterrorism slogan by theU.S. Department of HomelandSecurity. The mantra for public par-ticipation is, “if you see something,say something,” but as with theoften criticized Terror Alert ColorCodes, people need specific guid-ance about what to look for andwhat to do if they notice somethingunusual.
In addition to the changes in com-munications or behaviors that typi-cally populate the list of workplaceviolence warning signs, there arespecific pre-attack activities thatmay expose an incubating plot ofviolence. Security experts oftendescribe this aspect of violence pre-vention as “counter surveillance”(CS) or hostile surveillance detection(SD). These pre-attack behaviors areoften referred to as the “Seven Signsof Terrorism,” and include:
1. Surveillance: Would be attackerswatch individuals, groups and/orfacilities to determine vulnerabilitiesor weaknesses and to identifypotential attack methods and time-frames. In Type III violence, this isoften reported as stalking.2. Elicitation: Potential perpetratorsseek information about and from oth-ers or through open sources such associal media sites and public records.3. Testing Security: Probes of securi-ty can be simple or sophisticated
ntelligenceI
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS16
such as specifically pushing the lim-its to see how far one can go beforebeing detected.4. Acquiring Supplies: Acquiring thetools and materials (ranging fromfirearms and ammunition tobomb-making materials).Interruption of their plan prior togathering weapons and materials ispreferable in most instances.5. Suspicious Behavior: Furtivemovements that appear sneaky orevasive are part of the spectrum ofsuspicious behavior. Governmentintelligence agencies use theacronym TEDD to highlight thesebehaviors:a) Time: A person who seems to beseen repeatedly over a period oftime.b) Environment: A person whoseems to be popping up in manydifferent settings or environments.c) Distance: A person who is alsospotted in varying geographic dis-tances from the home or workplace.d) Demeanor: Someone who blatant-ly appears to be watching, followingor stalking, and seems to act unnat-urally or does not seem to fit the sit-uation or environment.6. Trial Runs: Rehearsals and “dryruns” are common in instances ofboth Type III (Co-worker) and TypeV (Terrorist) violence. 7. Getting into Position: The finalstep is moving into position to exe-cute the attack.
Recognition and Responseto Type V ViolenceIn Homeland Security terms, theactive shooter is defined by theiractions and not by their motives.The fact that a perpetrator hasentered a facility or space and hasbegun shooting is the most urgent
matter. Whether the shooter is a for-mer employee angry about his ter-mination or a stranger avenging theloss of loved ones abroad due toAmerican military actions is irrele-vant in the moment.
Surviving and stopping the attackare clearly the overarching priori-ties. Both employees and organiza-tions can benefit from expandingnot only the definitions and cate-gories of workplace violence but byrecalibrating training in awareness,recognition and response to inci-dents of workplace violence. Doingso can create a “force multiplier”effect, transforming front lineemployees to the first line of detec-tion and deterrence.
Most employers seldom engage theworkforce in unconventional emer-gency drills. Fire drills and evacua-tions are most common. For lockdown or shelter-in-place actions tobe viable, they must also be realisticand rehearsed.
It is recommended that workplaceviolence prevention andsecurity-based antiterrorism strate-gies be integrated so that violence pre-vention in general, regardless of itssource becomes part everybody’s job.
To do so, the behavioral indicators ofpotential terrorist activity, such as the“Seven Signs of Terrorism” or theTEDD approach previously dis-cussed, should be added to thewell-worn list of behavioral indica-tors of a potentially violent coworker.
Basic counterintelligence or countersurveillance concepts, such as“watching out for watchers,” can beshared so that the organization sim-
ply has more eyes on a potentialproblem. Bringing employees intothe loop of prevention of the estab-lished types of workplace violencehas proven useful.
Bringing them into the loop of ter-rorism prevention may be equally asuseful and increasingly importantgiven the changes in the nature ofthis threat.
The U.S. Department of HomelandSecurity has recently developed con-cise guidelines for employers andemployees in responding to anactive shooter incident and furtherdistilled the key points down to apocket card.
Steps toward anIntegrative ModelIn light of the evolving threats ofworkplace violence and terrorism, arecommendation of a series of actionsteps toward a more fully integratedapproach to mitigating these risks.These steps include:
1. Broadening the definitions ofworkplace violence in policy toinclude those acts driven by politi-cal, ideological and religiousmotives (i.e., Type V workplace vio-lence).
2. Tightly integrating Security/LawEnforcement, HR, RiskManagement, Safety and other func-tions related to workplace violenceprevention by creating a sharedfocus on preventing all types of vio-lence, including acts of terrorismdirected at the organization and/orits people.
3. Including definitions, descrip-
17TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
tions, warning signs and recom-mended responses to incidents ofType V violence, such as hostile sur-veillance awareness and how torespond to a shooting event and thearrival of police, appropriately intoemployee and supervisor levelawareness training programs.
4. Coordinating with the appropri-ate law enforcement and other localfirst response agencies in develop-ing comprehensive plans and realis-tic exercises.
5. Adding active shooter responsedrills to the list of other emer-gency/business continuity pre-paredness exercises to the list ofother drills employees routinely par-
ticipate in.
6. Advising internal or external cri-sis counseling providers, such asEmployee Assistance Programs(EAPs) that violence related to ter-rorism will be considered a type ofworkplace violence so that it can beaddressed appropriately with wit-nesses, victims and survivors.
7. Continuing to monitor trends inboth workplace violence and terror-ism and adjust organizationalapproaches to detection and deter-rence accordingly.
ConclusionIt seems the problems of workplace
violence and terrorism will remainsignificant threats to employers andemployees for many years to come.All those involved in the preventionand response to violence must takecare that these issues do not simplybecome “ambient” risks that requirelittle day-to-day attention. Therisks and responses to all types ofviolence continually change and theviolence prevention program devel-oped a decade ago may simply notbe adequate to address today’s chal-lenges. The key impact of this paperis the extent to which people andthe organization can visualize andinitiate the efforts and partnershipsneeded to understand and reducethe risks of workplace place violencewithin their spheres of influence.
Harry Kirk is a retired police lieutenant with 27 years of service to the El Paso Police
Department. Supervised field operations, tactical gang unit, special operations, and
police academy training. Went on become chief of police for the U.S. Federal Reserve
law enforcement El Paso branch, and the training director. Now retired, utilizing vast
experiences instructs criminal justice part time at a local college in El Paso, Texas.
About the Author
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS18
ntelligenceI
T
1. Domestic Violence in the Work Place–the Worst Mass Murder Suicide in New Mexico History.http://www.nextdoor.org/domestic-violence-work-placethe-worst-mass-murder-suicide-mexico-history/
2. Reasons for mass shooting in Connecticut remain unknown to investigators. http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/08/reasons_for_mass_shooting_in_c.html
3. U.S. Department of Labor. Occupational homicides by selected characteristics, 1997-2008. April 22, 2010. http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/work hom.pdf
4. U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” August 5, 2010. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm
5. Mueller: Home-Grown Terror Threat Top al-Qaida, NEWSMAX. April 10, 2010http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/fbi-homegrown-terrorists-alqaida/2010/04/16/id/355908
6. Violence in the Workplace: Deadly Consequences brochure. http//www.accesskasass.org/kbi/info/docs/pdf/Violence%20the%20Workplace%20Brochure.pdf
7. Crimando, S. & Wainschel, M., “Perfect Practice makes Perfect: Accurate Behavioral Assumptions are an Essential Element of Exercise.”Disaster recovery Journal. January 2010.
The Honor Network is a 501.C.3 non-profit organization dedicated to memorializing those heroes who made theultimate sacrifice for their family, community and country. It also serves to foster education of the American publicregarding all heroes, past and present, and their organizations, including police, fire, and our nationʼs military. The Honor Network was founded on the conviction that every person who is committed in service to our communities and country deserves the support of every single American, and that an increase in American patriotism is vital in keeping our great nation united.
The Honor Network
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, a flag was gifted to Chris Heisler (President and CEO of the HonorNetwork) by the Texas House of Representatives. Like many Americans, Heisler felt compelled to take action during a horrific time for the United States, and with this flag in tow; he set out for Ground Zero. Along the way,Heisler helped to organize one of the longest police motorcades in the history of the United States, bound forGround Zero bringing many tokens of support to our nationʼs heroes. Since September 2001, the United StatesHonor Flag has paid tribute to those who have lost their lives in the line of duty protecting our lives, our homesand our country, and also those who currently serve our communities and our nation.
The United States Honor Flag
To learn more about The Honor Network, visit www.ushonorflag.org.
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS20
ANGE TIMER
Patrol Rifle
7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) GreenBeret engages target with a M4 assault rifle
U.S. Army Photo by Pfc. Steven Young, DVIDS
PRACTICEA simple 50-round course that cov-ers the skills that you need; movingand shooting, aimed fire, reloads,and close contact drills. The goal isthe application of proper shootingfundamentals (sighting, stance,
breathing, and trigger press) leadingto improved skill, performance,accuracy and speed. You can runthis course with out times focusingon technique or you can run thecourse with the times as a Q course.
21TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
50-yard line: Distance; 08 rounds;start behind the barricade; 05 sec-onds per string
• 2 rounds Standing Right Side Barricade, take cover
• 2 rounds kneeling Right Side Barricade, take cover
• 2 rounds squatting Right Side Barricade, take cover
• 2 rounds prone, make your rifle safe
25-yard line: Barricade Shooting(Shoot and take Cover); 08 rounds;05 seconds per string
• 2 rounds Right Side Barricade (Standing) take cover
• 2 rounds Right Side Barricade (Kneeling) take cover
• 2 rounds Left Side Barricade (Standing), take cover
• 2 rounds Left Side Barricade (Kneeling), take cover
15-yard line: Reloads; 08 rounds; 05seconds per reload
• Load one magazine w/01 round and have one magazine w/01 round.
• 1 round standing, rifle goes empty, execute reload (smooth and by the numbers) repeat
15-yard line: Turning Drills; 08rounds; 05 seconds per string
• Facing right, turn towards threat, fire two rounds, scan and breathe, repeat
• Facing left, turn towards threat, fire two rounds, scan and breathe, repeat
10-3 yard line: Shooting on theMove; 12 rounds; 04 seconds; 2 com-mands (move and fire)
• On the move, fire a controlled pair (2 rounds of aimed fire) before reaching the 3 yard line; repeat for a total of 12 rounds
03-yard line: Weapon Retention/CloseContact Drill (Transition fromShoulder to High Underarm
Assault (HUA)-06 rounds• From the shoulder mount,
transition to the High Underarm Assault and fire two rounds. Reload two rounds and repeat for a total of 06 rounds.
Target: IPSC Scoring: 5 pts A-zone; 4 pts C-zone,3 pts D-zoneMax Score: 250, 90%-225, 80%-200T
Written by Lawrence Lujan
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS22
T TIMEP
Warm-up: 5 minutes @ 6.0 speed on treadmill10 3-count Mountain Climbers
10 Sit-ups
10 Pushups
10 Jump Squats holding a dumbbell 25, 35, 45, 25, 25
10 Pull-ups
23TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Summer is here and the weather is great and the sunis out. Family vacations, visits to the beach or tothe amusement parks will try to interfere with your
workout time. Here is a routine that you can knockoutwhile on vacation or on (business travel) without takingtoo much time away from your family. PT
20-yard Farmers Carry
Repeat 5x’s
10 Sit-ups
10 Military Press
Cool down: 5 minutes @ 3.0 on treadmill
Written by Lawrence Lujan
Group PT: Marines with Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd MarineRegiment, utilize their down time off of training to exercise
U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Sarah Dietz, DVIDS
GET A GREAT DEAL, JUST CONTACT US @ [email protected]
ntelligenceI
The vast majority of assaults
against police officers are unarmed
attacks of which many result in
injury. But the unarmed assault is
rarely lethal. While infrequent by
comparison, the Lethality of pene-
trating injuries inflicted during
knife assaults is a real concern.
Knives follow firearms as the sec-
ond leading cause of death for vio-
lence-related injury in the US.
Penetrating knife injuries are the
leading cause of trauma casualty
globally (Eldar Soreide.Prehospital
Trama Care: Soreide:403). Knives
inflict a low velocity crushing
force on tissue determined by fac-
tors from tool shape, length,
sharpness, and force used. The
resulting penetrating trauma of
stab/slash injuries can impact any
of regions, cavities, or structures in
the human body.
Officers are injured more often in
Written by Aaron Cunningham
Photo, QuirkyChina/Barcroft (2010)
25TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
A man brandishes a knife while riot policetry to subdue him in Zhongshan, China.
A Primer on Knife Attackfor Law Enforcement
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS26
knife assault than by firearms: 12.7
% were injured after knife assaults
compared to 9% injury rate follow-
ing firearm related assault from
2004-2013 (FBI). Those attacks
directed to the head, neck, chest,
and pelvis are especially challeng-
ing for medical responders. The
problem is compounded by a lack
of body armor to guard the neck
and other points of articulation on
the body. Armor manufacturers
are working hard to cre-
ate adequate ‘multi-
threat’ protection. The
future may provide
solutions with ballistic
as well as stab and
slash protection.
Edged weapons are a
known part of the ter-
rorist repertoire. One
percent of all terror
attacks from 1980-2005
involved knives.
Knives were used to
injure, kill, kidnap,
hijack vehicles, and
force entry or gain
control over buildings
(Brian Jackson. Rifling
through the Terrorists Arsenal:
2007). The use of the knife by ter-
rorist organizations is on the rise
and that the primarily intended
targets are members of law
enforcement and military person-
nel. The Asia Pacific region, Africa,
and the Middle East have experi-
enced the brunt of this problem.
Terrorists use knives to injure, kill,
kidnap, hijack vehicles, and force
entry or gain control over build-
ings (Brian Jackson. Rifling
through the Terrorists Arsenal:
2007). The use of the knife by ter-
rorist organizations is rising, and
the primary intended targets are
members of law enforcement and
military personnel.
The threat posed by knives makes
a requirement of edged weapon
training and education. It is a key
element of situational awareness
and promotes overall officer sur-
vival. In general, edged weapon
instruction is missing for many
recruit training academies and in-
service training programs. The
knife is a significant part of the
threat matrix faced by law enforce-
ment officers. But it has largely
escaped our national and global
attention. This gap in capabilities
is a matter of life and death.
Edged weapon training must be
threat focused and studied in view
of law enforcement use-of-force
and agency policy. All serious
threats require our tactical focus,
careful study, detailed understand-
ing, and definition. Officers must
train for the prospect of sponta-
neous and fast emerging threats in
close quarters and confined space.
Bus aisles, vehicle extractions,
room entry, clearing, searching,
and riot response are
situations that
demand rigorous close
quarter’s skills and
quick reactions.
Sgt. Dennis Tueller of
the Utah PD spotted
the time criticality
nature of the knife
threat 32 years ago in
1983. In fact, our cur-
rent recognition of this
lethal force issue is
largely due to his
efforts. The ’21 Foot
Rule’ has become part
of our vocabulary. But
training has not
caught up, the dilemma
remains for most officers and
agencies. What techniques, train-
ing, and procedures, and tactical
consideration has your agency
given this threat? As a dedicated
professional, are you allotting time
and energy to develop a trained
response?
Through its
, The
ntelligenceI
Officers areinjured moreoften in knifeassault thanby firearms
27TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
is on task for this training
mission with an integrated pro-
gram of tools and platform based
training and direct instruction
aimed at instilling the right skills,
mindset, and knowledge. We aim
to advance situation awareness,
improve observation and recogni-
tion and condition fast and effec-
tive response to the immediate and
time critical threat posed by knives.
Our training approach is oriented
to provide instruction for the justi-
fiable use of this tool for in
extremis situations by law enforce-
ment officers. Instruction is espe-
cially crucial for that time when
the use of your prescribed firearm
for lethal force is not available to
maintain control in a life and
death situation. Disarm, loss of
control, time constraint, and other
factors bear down heavily on our
standard use of force models.
Effective training programs satisfy
priority-training requirements and
address the real needs of officers.
Examine readiness levels, baseline
knowledge, and existing skill-sets
to determine what direction your
training may go. Determine
whether your current best prac-
tices and standards accommodate
this special threat and liability.
Most importantly, ensure the train-
ing program answers the mission
and saves officers from unneces-
sary injury and preventable death.
Be prepared, remain aware, and
stay vigilant to asymmetric threats
least of all the knife.
Aaron Cunningham is the acting President of ITTA
About the Author
Manufacturers of Ballistic Armor11220 Rojas Dr. B9 www.SarkarTactical.com El Paso, Texas 79935 915-603-1360 [email protected]
SARKAR TACTICALWE PROTECT · YOU SERVE
QUIPMENTE
BELTREVIEW
29TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Written by Lawrence Lujan
√
TSM has field tested
two duty belts for you.
Both belts have earned
our approval and we
know that they will
earn yours too.
Over our Spring break, TSM testedtwo belts that you will find of greatvalue. The Covert B.E.L.T. by FrankProctor at Way of the Gun and theCO Shooters Belt from Elite SurvivalSystems. Both belts serve their pur-pose well, and can be used for bothon and off-duty roles.
The Proctor Covert B.E.L.T. (Bring
Everything Light Tactical) is a mini-malist belt that can fulfill its role asboth a duty belt (especially if you arein a plain-clothes duty assignment)and also as an off-duty belt. The bestway to describe this belt is to think ofit as your old-faithful riggers belt, butone that has a minimalist buckle andthat is cable of carrying magazines, aflashlight and even cash. You can
wear it covertly through the airportwithout letting everyone know whatit’s for and you can also wear it on aduty assignment in TAC gear, plain-clothed and even dressed up on asecurity detail. This is my new go-toand everyday belt.
• 1.5" wide made from lightweight, flat black nylon webbing
30 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS30
31TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
• Belt sides have an inner core stiffener prevents bunching/twisting and provides stability for holsters and accessories
• Elastic mag pouches (2 pistol mag pouches up front and a pistol and rifle mag pouch on both sides behind the hip) are built into the belt for covert/concealed carry
• Designed for right or left-handed
shooters • Heavy duty 4 way stretch elastic• The inside of the mag pouches
have a backing on the nylon side that prevents the magazines from sliding out while moving around
• Small Velcro pouch in the rear/small of the back area for whatever small items or cash you might need to keep concealed
The Elite Survival Systems COShooter's Belt incorporates Mil-Specnylon webbing, a structured innercore, reinforced stitching, and fea-tures a COBRA® quick-release buck-le by AustriAlpin. COBRA® buckle.The CO Shooter's Belt can serve asthe inner belt to a padded belt systemor individually as a carry belt. Havingused a traditional riggers belt for over15 years, this was my first experiencewith a belt that uses the Cobra®buckle. I am very pleased with thisbelt and feel that it excels as an innerbelt on a padded system or as anindividual carry belt. For plainclothes/casual use, it looks nice, but ittakes getting used to, as you have toremove the male side of the buckle inorder to thread it each time. It is defi-nitely not covert. The belt performedas advertised on the range and wasfound to be very comfortable. Thesize of the buckle is in proportion tothe size of the belt and is not uncom-fortable.
• Ultra-tough, double layered 1.5" Mil-Spec nylon webbing construction• Inner core prevents bunching/twist-ing and provides stability for holstersand accessories• Velcro adjustable• AustriAlpin COBRA® quick-releasebuckle exceeds Mil Spec guidelines • Made in the USA
Tactical Solutions Magazine reallyenjoyed both belts and finds the COShooter’s Belt to serve the narrowrole of a duty rig. We truly like thedual-purpose role of the ProctorCovert B.E.L.T. They will both serveyou well and we give both a rating of05-excellent (mission ready, aboveand beyond specs and expectations).The fit, quality, function and design isexcellent and we feel that you willagree. We are pleased to give boththe CO Shooter’s Belt and the ProctorCovert B.E.L.T. the TSM status ofmember tested and recommended. T
QUIPMENTE
eadershipL
Model for Law Enforcement Tactical TeamsMETL
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS32
33TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
The nature of lawenforcement tacticaloperations has
changed. Originally, policetactical teams were conceived for dealing withbarricaded and or heavilyarmed violent individualsthat exceeding the capabili-
ties of the patrol division
Written by William Gage
Maj. Dismas Bigirindavyi, Commander, 1st Sapper Company, Burundi National Defense Force, addresses his troops on the order of movement to take place during a combined arms breaching exercise
U.S.M.C. Photo by Lance Cpl. Adwin Esters, DVIDS
eadershipL
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS34
of a police department. Now,police tactical teams areexpected and tasked to dealwith any number of crises,including active shooters,compromised environments,and dignitary protection.Additionally, there has been adesire for tactical teams toconduct non-traditional lowvisibility operations.
Unfortunately, policedepartments havenot adjusted to the
new requirements placed ontactical teams. Preceding oper-ations have dictated trainingand tactics for future ones.Tactical training and solutionshave been oriented to the pastand good fortune and luckhas been incorrectly mistakenfor tactical acumen. There hasbeen no emphasis placed onclearly defining the tacticalmission, success or failure ofeach mission, and there alsohas been no emphasis on pro-viding clear and unmistakablesupervisory guidance or“command intent” of thesemissions. Additionally, therehas been no effort placed on aperformance based trainingplan, with individual and col-lective tasks, for each mission.
Police tactical operationsoccupy a very smallpercentage of the over-
all efforts of a police depart-ment. A perception exists thatsince these operations take upso little of a police depart-ment’s overall operation thatthe total time and effort allo-cated for tactical training andpreparation should also beminimal. Nothing could befurther from the truth. Truesophistication and mastery oftactical skills and principlesrequire an organized and con-centrated effort. Additionally,even though police tacticaloperations consists of a rela-tively small percentage ofoverall agency operations,police tactical operations arethe most high profile, oftenhave the most potential formassive loss of or preserva-tion of human life and presentthe highest risk of negativeliability to a police depart-ment.
Without a clear mis-sion definition, nostatement of spe-
cific command intent, no defi-nition of success or failure,and no performance basedtraining plan, officers areplaced in a difficult and often
no win situation that canresult in catastrophic missionfailure. Using a
, or ,model can prevent catastroph-ic mission failure by tacticalteams providing a clear defi-nition of the mission, by pro-viding a commanders intentor guidance, by clearly defin-ing success or failure, and byproviding a performancebased training plan that prepares a unit for missionsby clearly outlining distinct individual and unit responsibilities.
AMETL is a concisestatement of the pos-sible doctrinal or
directed missions that a unitcan receive, and the tasks thata unit MUST perform in orderto successfully complete thosemissions. Contained withinthe each mission, is the fol-lowing: (1) a clear and concisestatement of the mission, (2) aclear and conciseCommander’s Intent of themission, (3) a definition ofsuccess or failure of the mis-sion, (4) and a list of the col-lective and individual tasksrequired of the mission.Community related functions,ceremonies and any formal or
35TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
mandatedtrainingrequirementsor otheractivitiesshould not bepart of aMETL. Onlythose mis-sions thatplace the tac-tical team inharms way orinvolve activ-ities thatexceed thecapabilities ofpatrol shouldbe includedin the METL.
The listofmis-
sions in a METLshould be as short as possible.This short list of missions isthen broken down into sepa-rate types of subtasks for thatparticular overall mission. Forexample, “High Risk Searchand Secure” will be brokendown into sub-tasks such as“Warrant Service,” “ActiveShooter,” “Area Searches.”Each of these sub-tasks willcontain collective tasks andindividual tasks. Collective
tasks are those that the unitMUST accomplish as a whole,while individual tasks arethose that single membersMUST accomplish for missionsuccess. All collective andindividual tasks are equallyimportant. The METL is alsoelastic. The number of mis-sions can be expanded orreduced, based on the missionprofiles and demands placedon the tactical unit.
AMETL isan endstate and
it is not uncon-strained byresources. It doesnot acknowledgelimited trainingresources. TheaccompanyingMETL trainingplan willacknowledge lim-ited trainingresources (bud-getary, access tofacilities etc.).
AMETL isnot aregurgi-
tation of trainingstandards or
departmental poli-cy. Departmental
General Orders, federal, stateand local laws, and lawenforcement governing bodies(DCJS/IACP policies etc..)established training curricu-lums will inherently be con-tained in the “CommandIntent” portion.
AMETL defines specif-ic missions and tasks,and does not list or
define generic capabilities. A
Without a clear missiondefinition, no statement ofspecific command intent, no
definition of success orfailure, and no performance
based training plan, officers are placed in a
difficult and often no winsituation that can result incatastrophic mission failure
generic platform, environ-ment, condition, or equipmentmay apply to a specific task orsub-task, but these in and ofthemselves are not a specifictask. “Operate in a comprised(Nuclear, Chemical, Biologicaletc.) environment,” “ConductCQB,” are examples that mayapply to a specific task, butare not standalone tasks.
Additionally, a METLwill have a perform-ance based training
plan that has the goal ofeveryone on the team achiev-ing a predetermined standard.This training plan will bebased on the following train-ing principles: (1) supervisorsare responsible for training,(2) first line leaders areresponsible for the technicaland tactical proficiency oftheir team, (3) train for excel-lence, (4) train to a standardusing appropriate tactical doc-trine, (4) train to adapt, (5)train to maintain and sustain,(6) train using multi-echelontechniques, and (7) train todevelop leaders. A perform-ance based training plan willallow for documentation ofunit training accomplishmentsand allow a unit to achievelevels of proficiency for all of
the tasks that are deemed mis-sion essential. This trainingplan will include the Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures(TTPs), necessary for missionsuccess.
AMETL performancebased training planwill stress the follow-
ing descending list of priori-ties: (1) the mission, (2) teamneeds, and (3) individualneeds. The first priority thatwill be stressed in training ismission success. Everythingelse is subservient and sec-ondary. The second prioritythat will be stressed is teamneeds. Maintenance of teamgear, ensuring team vehiclesare full of gas and operatingproperly, equipment accounta-bility and other miscellaneousduties or logistical responsibil-ities come before individualneeds. Additionally, the needsof other individual teammembers come before individ-ual needs. The final prioritythat will be stressed is indi-vidual needs. Individualneeds are important but aresubservient to mission successand team needs. Individualdiscomforts, opinions, jeal-ousies, rumors, gossip, per-sonality differences or con-
flicts do not contribute to mis-sion success, are not a teamneed, and therefore shouldnot be considered during amission tasking or training.
AMETL performancebased training planwill also serve as a
training log that will allowsupervisors, team leaders andindividual members to have arecord of which mission spe-cific training has been con-ducted, and to fill in anytraining gaps that exist.
Law enforcement tacti-cal teams should adopta Mission Essential
Task List, or METL, model toachieve a verified and meas-urable Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA)Level I capability, according tothe guidelines set forth in theFEMA Typed ResourceDefinitions Initiative(7/30/2007). The followingmissions and sub-missionsshould be stated in the METL:
1). High Risk Search andSecure
a). Warrant Service
b). Active Shooter
eadershipL
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS36
c). Area Searches
2). Barricade
a). Emotionally Disturbed Person (EDP)
b). Criminal
3). Hostage Rescue
a). Barricaded hostage
b). Hijacking hostage
4). Protective Service Detail
a). Dignitary
b). Prisoner
c). Venue
5). High Risk Apprehension
a). Vehicle
b). Building
The METL model forLaw EnforcementTactical Teams, might
not in its entirety, work forevery tactical team as eachindividual team will have
unique circumstances andmission requirements.However, every tactical teamshould have a clearly definedmission on EVERY operation,with clearly defined comman-der's intent, and clear andconcise individual and collec-tive tasks. Adopting a METLmodel can assist every tacticalteam, regardless of budgets,geography or circumstances,in doing the three mostimportant things: saving lives,keeping the public safe, andhaving every member of theteam come home after EVERYoperation.
37TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
William Gage is a dynamic, self-motivated, innovative and results-oriented
Law Enforcement and Security professional with a variety skills and experience.
He has Extensive global investigative and tactical protective experience protecting
the Nation's critical infrastructure and elected leaders and has has demonstrated
administrative, organizational, and Law Enforcement and Security expertise. A Decision-maker,
resourceful leader and problem-solver with exceptional research and analytical skills and ability to
coordinate between Federal, State and local Law Enforcement agencies in security preparations and
emergency response for large scale public events.
About the Author
T
eadershipL
Ways to Succeed During Combined Missions in
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS38
Former Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth O. Preston, right, listens to the senior enlisted panel. Pictured inthe panel are, from left, Command Sgt. Maj. James Norman, command sergeant major of U.S. Army 1stCorps; Command Sgt. Maj. John Troxell, command sergeant major of U.S. Forces Korea; Sgt. Maj.William Stables, sergeant major of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific; and Lead Sgt. Daribish Oyunbold,senior enlisted advisor of the Mongolian Armed Forces. (Photo by Jonathan (Jay) Koester)
Joint, the Pacific
39TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
A standing-room-only audience of more than 100officers and noncommissioned officers, includingformer Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth O. Preston,was on hand for the first senior enlisted panel atthe Association of the United States Army Instituteof Land Warfare LANPAC Symposium andExposition.Command Sgt. Maj. Bryant Lambert, command ser-geant major for U.S. Army Pacific, organized and
Written by JONATHAN (JAY) KOESTER
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS40
eadershipL
41TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
led the panel. Lambert said hethought it was pivotal, duringthis third year of the Land Powerin the Pacific symposium, toinclude the noncommissioned-officer point of view.“I thought it was important thatwe have a senior enlisted advisorperspective on some of the con-cerns and barriers that we arehaving out there in the Pacificwhen we are executing interop-erabilities,” Lambert said. “We’llbe looking at the relationshipsthat we are building, not justmultinational, but also with ourother services.”With so much to talk about, thepanel took place over an entireday, with 90 minutes of discus-sion in the morning and another90 minutes of discussion in theafternoon.Command Sgt. Maj. John Troxell,command sergeant major forU.S. Forces Korea, kicked off themorning session, talking abouthow he works in a combined,joint environment, striving everyday to cement the U.S. partner-ship with the Republic of Korea.“When we talk about interoper-ability, my definition is the abili-ty, confidence and comfort for anoncommissioned officer tooperate in any environment,whether it’s their service envi-ronment or working aroundpartner security forces or work-ing with other services,” Troxellsaid. “The way I think we get
A standing-room-only crowd listenedto the first seniorenlisted panel of theAssociation of theUnited States ArmyInstitute of LandWarfare LANPACSymposium andExposition. (Photoby Jonathan (Jay)Koester)
after that is through horizontalcommunication. We do a greatjob at vertical communication. …What we have to get better at ishorizontal communication in thejoint and combined perspective.“What we want is the ability tohave that service identity andunderstand that as an Armythere are things we have to standalone on, but also, that we arenever going to face another fightalone,” Troxell said. “It’s going tobe in a joint capacity, and also amultinational capacity.”After more than a decade of war,Soldiers in the U.S. Army areexperienced in conflict, Troxellsaid. The challenge now is tomake those Soldiers realize that,as the Army focuses on thePacific region, their role changesto that of ambassadors.“What we’ve got to continue toget better at is shaping anddeterring conflict,” Troxell said.“As we look at rebalance in thePacific and regionally alignedforces, we are going to be in aphase 0 or phase 1 type of envi-ronment, more than we are goingto be in a combat environment.So we have to shape our non-commissioned officers so thatthey understand that they areambassadors for our country outthere. Their ability to influencewhoever they’re partnering with,whether it’s a joint force or acombined force, is imperative.”“We have to set the example as
senior noncommissioned officersof stepping out of our comfortzone to make progress in a com-bined and joint environment,”Troxell said later during thepanel. “All it takes is one seniorenlisted leader to not respect thatculture, that refuses to eat thatnation’s food or something likethat, it sends a huge messageacross this entire Pacific that wehave some U.S. Soldiers outthere doing things they should-n’t.”Sgt. Maj. William Stables, ser-geant major of U.S. MarineCorps Forces Pacific, spoke ofthe need to let junior leaders takecharge, despite the risk thatsometimes entails.“Regarding the NCO, what Iwanted to do is pull a phrasefrom our commandant’s plan-ning guidance,” Stables said.“The staffers wrote it perfectly.… ‘Errors by junior leaders stem-ming from overboldness are anecessary part of learning. Weshould deal with such errorsleniently. There must be no zero-defects mentality. Abolishingzero defects means that we donot stifle boldness or initiativethrough the threat of punish-ment. It does not mean the com-mander does not counsel subor-dinates on mistakes. Instructivecriticism is an important elementin learning, nor does it give sub-ordinates free license to act stu-pidly or recklessly.’”
Lead Sgt. Daribish Oyunbold,senior enlisted advisor of theMongolian Armed Forces, spokeof the increased demands on hisarmy’s NCOs, and how thosedemands forced them to spendmore time training NCOs beforea deployment. Working withother nations’ militaries hashelped his NCOs see problemsand solutions in a more matureway, Oyunbold said.“Mongolia was closed off fromthe rest of the world until 20years ago,” Oyunbold said.“And as Mongolian citizens aretraveling around the world andbringing back a lot of differentperspectives, knowledge, ideasand participating in the multina-tional environment, our NCOsare seeing things in a differentway. They’ve grown moremature and analyze things in dif-ferent ways. It’s really valuableto every single NCO. It’s broughta lot of value to our nation.”After Oyunbold talked about theways in which his NCOs arenow required to make decisionson their own, Lambert tied thediscussion together.“Regardless of the Army thatyou are a part of, noncommis-sioned officers are the ones onthe ground, making those deci-sions, because the officers can’tbe everywhere at every time ofday,” Lambert said. “That’s whythe noncommissioned officer isthere — to instill discipline and
eadershipL
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS42
ensure the commander’s intent isgetting accomplished.”Warrant Officer Mark Motriboy,the sergeant major of the NewZealandArmy,talked aboutthe need toinvest timein learningabout part-ner nations.“You know,we studythe enemy,”Motriboysaid. “Wespend agrossamount oftime study-ing a threatgroup. Weneed toinvest a cer-tain amountof timelearningabout ourpartners.You’regoing tohave tohavepatience tocultivateand expand the relationship. Ittakes time, and you do have toput some energy into it.”Stables added, that in addition tothe up-front effort to build part-
nerships, NCOs need to remem-ber the importance of how themission wraps up, as well.“We’re all guilty of this, but on
the back end of that mission, wedon’t take enough time to cele-brate the accomplishments ofthat unit,” Stables said. “That’spart of building a relationship.
You will work with a lot of thosepeople again, so if the missionhas been successful, it’s incum-bent on the sergeant major of the
unit to tell thecommander,‘We have got todo somethingfor everybodyto remember.’”Command Sgt.Maj. JeffreySweezer, com-mand sergeantmajor of the2nd StrykerBrigadeCombat Team,25th InfantryDivision, waspart of theaudience forthe panel, andstood to tell thepanel membersthat he learneda lot from theirdiscussion. Headded that heonly wished hehad heard someof it before hetraveled toThailand, Koreaand thePhilippines
recently as part of the PacificPathways initiative.“I lived it and experienced itwith our team,” Sweezer told thepanel. “In Thailand, we had the
43TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
We have to shape
our noncommissioned
officers so that they
understand that they
are ambassadors for
our country out there.
Their ability to influence
whoever they’re partnering
with, whether it’s a joint
force or a combined
force, is imperative-
Command Sgt. Maj. John Troxell
language barrier. But, Soldiersare Soldiers. They figure it out.The technology, whether it beapps, iPads or phones, no matterwhat country we partner with,they will figure out how to com-municate, whether it’s actions,words or technology helpingthem.”Warrant Officer David Galloway,senior enlisted advisor for theAustralian Army, told Sweezerand other NCOs who work withpartner nations through PacificPathways to remember to cherishand keep active the connectionsand relationships they make, sothat they don’t fade away.“When you finished your
Pathways, and you moved out ofthose areas of the Pacific, whathave you left behind?” Gallowaysaid. “That’s what you need toask your NCOs. What connec-tions have you left behind?”Command Sgt. Maj. JamesNorman, command sergeantmajor for U.S. Army 1st Corps,closed the afternoon session witha reminder of what the discus-sion means as the U.S. Army andpartner nations move forward.“I think we’ve all come to theconclusion that we will never dosomething as a single country ora single service,” Norman said.“These joint task forces don’t
occur by happenstance. So, it isparamount that we train togeth-er, train to build interoperability,train to build relationships, trainto foster our ability to movethrough the Pacific.”Also participating in the panelwere Chief Warrant Officer NGSiak Ping, senior enlisted leaderfor the Singapore Armed Forces;Command Sgt. Maj. CharlesTobin, the command sergeantmajor of the 8th TheaterSustainment Command; andCommand Sgt. Maj. WilliamBruns, the command sergeantmajor for CommunicationsElectronics Command.
TACTICAL SOLUTIONS44
Jonathan (Jay) Koester is the Team Lead Writer/Editor for the NCO Journal, the official U. S.
Army magazine of noncommissioned officer professional development. Read more at ncojournal.
Dodlive.mil. Originally published in and used with permission of the NCO Journal.
About the Author
T
eadershipL
Dual Bone Conduction Transducers
No Audio Bleed on Receive
RATED
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN AVAILABLE
CONFORMS TO:BUY AMERICAN ACT
GOVERNMENT CERTIFIE
D
MAD
E IN CANADA
RATED
AVAILABLE W/ PICATINY
MOUNTABLE WIRELESS PTT
NEUTRALIZEHEAR .... ....LOCATE
NO OBLIGATION
TEST & EVALUATION
facebook.com/Threat4Tacticaltwitter.com/Threat4linkedin.com/company/threat4
A
BUY AMERICAN AC
ADDAAAD
NNNA
AAE CCANIEDDDE
AAAD
MMMA
R
DEED IIE FFI TIIIF TTIF RRT MEER CCE TNE M
E
NNMRRN
EER
BUY AMERICAN ACT
VVEOG
CONFORMS TO:NFORMS
EBLBLAALLIIAAAVVININOF GIROF O
EETTCE AATCIFITRCE
actics Techniques and ProceduresT
Photo by Ron Martinelli
46 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
THE
RULE”FOOT“21
ForensicFact or
Fantasy?
Officers throughout the UnitedStates and perhaps internationallyhave heard use of force instructorsdiscuss the “21 Foot Rule” duringtheir officer safety, firearms anddeadly force training. As both a useof force instructor and practicingforensic police practices expert, Ihave also trained and testified tothis concept myself.However, I don’t think that the con-cept’s founder, police Lt. JohnTueller (Ret.) would have everimagined when he designed thissimple firearms training drill in theearly 1980’s that it would eventual-
Written by Ron Martinelli,Ph.D., BCFT, CFA, CLS
Officer with his gun holsteredfacing a suspect with a knife
47TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
ly become a set in stone police doc-trine that is taught and testified tohundreds of times a year. The ques-tion I pose to you is, “Is the ’21 FootRule’ a forensic fact or a policemyth?” My answer is, “Well thatdepends.” But depends upon what?Well, there’s the rub.In my practice I dealwith forensic factswhether I am con-sulting on a caseor training officersto protect them-selves and others. Iendeavor to offerforensic solutions,not speculation incases; especiallythose involvingdeadly force,which is my spe-cialty. If we aredealing with criti-cal issues of officersafety and deadlyforce, it is impor-tant to peel backthe layers of theonion to get to thefactual basis ofany tactic, which ispresented as “doc-trine” to see if itcan be forensicallydefended duringtraining and incourt. It is important tokeep in mind thatfirearms instructor JohnTueller designed his “21 Foot Rule,”simply as a training device to assisthis officer students to better under-stand the concept of “TheReactionary Gap.” The reactionarygap is a human factors formula thatcompares action versus reaction.Given the fact that action is alwaysfaster than reaction, the closer an
assailant is to an officer, the lesstime the officer has to defensivelyreact to any aggressive action theassailant makes.Tueller set up a drill where heplaced a “suspect” armed with anedged weapon twenty or so feetaway from an officer with a hol-
stered sidearm. He then directed thearmed suspect to run towards theofficer in attack mode. The trainingobjective was to determine whetherthe officer could draw and accurate-ly fire upon the assailant before thesuspect stabbed them. After repeat-ing the drill numerous times, thenSgt. Tueller wrote an article wherein
he opined that it was entirely possi-ble for a suspect armed with anedged weapon to successfully andfatally engage an officer armed witha handgun within a distance oftwenty-one feet. Hence, the “21Foot Rule” concept was born andsoon spread throughout the law
enforcementcommunityalmost like avirus.It is alsoimportant tokeep in mindthat by allaccounts Ihaveresearched,Tueller’s 21foot was onlya drill and wasneverdesigned norproduced asan organized,outlined andimplementedresearch proj-ect involvingthe appliedsciences ofpsychophysi-ology, physics,and relatedhuman factors.No forensictesting, exami-nation, recon-
ciliation of data,or scientific over-
sight of a research model was everconducted. Further, to my knowl-edge, the drill and the articles lead-ing to the development of the “21Foot Rule” concept was never peerreviewed by certified, credentialedand/or court qualified experts inhuman factors applied science.During the past thirty years since
actics Techniques and ProceduresT
The truth is thatthe “21 Foot Rule”
should not beconsidered to bean absolute ruleat all because
they are too manyvariables involved
at this point tocall it a “rule.”
48 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
49TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
the “21 Foot Rule” has becomeinformal doctrine within the lawenforcement community, I haveheard it misrepresented and bas-tardized by self-appointed use offorce, firearms and police practices“experts” from all sides. I actuallyreviewed the fact pattern of an offi-cer-involved shooting (OIS) casewhere an officer with a carbinefatally shot/killed a suspect armedwith a knife from a distance of over150 feet, who attempted to use the“Tueller Drill” as his defense. Instructors and “experts” also seemto have forgotten that the originalpremise of Tueller’s drill was thathis designed circumstance involvedan officer with a holstered sidearmdrawing and accurately firing hisweapon. In most OIS’s I review, theofficer already has his gun not onlyout of its holster but in either the“low ready” position, or directlyaimed at the suspect armed with aknife, or who is furtively reachinginto their waistband.So what are the real forensic factsthat might assist officers with theirofficer safety and deadly forcedeterminations? Actually, there areno forensically proven facts that Iam aware of that specifically verifyor conclusively establish that a sus-pect armed with an edged weaponwill more likely than not be able toseriously injure or kill an officerarmed with a sidearm on all occa-sions and circumstances. The truthis that the “21 Foot Rule” shouldnot be considered to be an absoluterule at all because they are toomany variables involved at thispoint to call it a “rule.” Let’s discussthem.
– Is the mergingof the sciences of psychology andphysiology. Let’s keep this simple.Peer reviewed research and science
tells us that humans possess both aforebrain and a midbrain. The fore-brain is where cognitive processingand decision making takes place.The midbrain is where subcon-scious and ingrained memories takeplace. It is important to understandthat absolutely no cognitive pro-cessing takes place in the midbrain. When a human (officer) experiencesa phobic scale response(threat/fear), on average it takesabout .58 second to experience thethreat and determine if it is real. Itthen takes about .56 – 1.0 seconds tomake a response decision. In ani-mals there are only two: fight orflight; but in humans we have five:defend (fight), disengage (retreat),posture (yell, point a finger, actaggressive), become hypervigilant(panic, confusion, freezing, usingforce excessively), and submit (sur-render). When a human is threatened, thebrain automatically infuses thebody with “survival chemicals”such as adrenalin (stimulant),endorphins (pain blockers) anddopamine (euphoric pain blocker).While the body designed thesechemicals to help us survive bymaking us faster, stronger and morepain tolerant, they can also signifi-cantly diminish our human per-formance under intense stress. Thisultimately affects our survival. Under the intense stress normallyassociated with deadly force threatscenarios and while under the influ-ence of survival chemicals, thebody’s basal metabolic rate (BMR)measured by heart rate, blood pres-sure and respiration, climbs signifi-cantly in milliseconds. This circum-stance causes officers to classicallypresent with perceptual narrowing(“tunnel vision”), loss of near sightvision, and auditory occlusion(diminished or total loss of hear-
ing.) Since 66% of all OIS occur indiminished, low or no light condi-tions, an officer’s vision can be fur-ther impaired.
– The safety equip-ment an officer is attired with andthe environment the deadly forceconfrontation takes place in are allcritical factors that can impact anofficer’s survival against a suspectarmed and attacking with an edgedweapon. For instance, an officer ordetective whose sidearm is securedin a Threat Level III holster will cer-tainly have a slower draw to targetacquisition time than an officerdrawing from a Threat Level I hol-ster. An officer’s experience andcompetency with their holster sys-tem and combat shooting style arealso critical human factors in anofficer’s ability to draw, move offthe line of attack and direct accuratefire upon an armed assailant. Mynon-scientific studies have shownthat depending upon the holstersystem used and the competency ofthe officer, it can take anywherefrom 1.5 to 3.5 seconds for an officerto access, draw, move and acquire amoving target. And, they have noteven fired yet! A colleague of minelost his life during a bank robberyin part because he had not practicedwith the shoulder holster he hadrecently purchased and was tooslow to draw and engage the armedrobber. Practice and proficiencymatter in any high-risk encounter.
-Firearms training studies haveshown that while the average offi-cer in static firearms qualifications(non-timed standing and shootingwithout moving) can hit the 9-10rings 95% of the time. However,research of actual OIS incidents hasshown that officers can only accu-rately hit their moving assailants
only 14% of the time in life or deathsituations from distances of onlytwo to ten feet! So the psychophysi-ological components of actual gunfighting play a critical role in anofficer’s survivability within rela-tively close distances.
“Perception lag time” – Once theaverage officer gets on target, ittakes them approximately .56 sec-onds to make a decision to com-mence shooting. However, it thentakes that same officer about .33 sec-onds per trigger pull to fire. As thedeadly force scenario rapidlyevolves, it takes that same officer onaverage approximately .55 - .58 sec-onds to realize that the threat haspassed and to stop shooting. This isbecause of a psychophysiologicaldynamic referred to as “perceptionaction - reaction lag time.” This is amain reason why action is alwaysfaster than reaction. The subject ofwhy suspects are found to haveentry wounds in their sides and
backs when an officer has assertedthat the suspect was facing themwhen they fired is a bi-product ofperception action - reaction lag time.
- The fields of contemporarypolice practices and applied sci-ences are rapidly changing environ-ments. Applied science by its natureis an environment that constantlyquestions hypothesis and theoriesand is resolved to reconcile scientif-ic statements, facts and evidence toestablish the forensic facts of a mat-ter. However, law enforcement ismore inclined to be archaic andmarried to non-forensic, speculativedogma that is unchallenged butwidely accepted as “fact.”In the immediate case of my initialanalysis of the “21 Foot Rule,” Iwould opine that Lt. John Tuellerdid us all a tremendous service in atleast starting a discussion and edu-cating us in the concepts of actionversus reaction and perception –reaction lag time. This has certainly
saved many lives within our ranks.However, it is certainly time tomove forward with a far more sci-entific analysis that actually seeks toconfirm this hypothesis that is farfrom “doctrine.”The truth be told, whether or notthe “21 Foot Rule” is an applicabledefense in an officer-involvedshooting actually depends upon thefacts and evidence of every uniqueand rapidly evolving deadly forceencounter. It is certainly debatable.In some circumstances, shooting atsimilar distances with far moreexperienced, competent and betterequipped officers, within an envi-ronment with physical obstructionssuch as a police vehicle, might beinappropriate. Whereas, with inex-perienced officers, wearing a diffi-cult holster system and no obstruc-tions within distances greater thantwenty-one feet might be justified.Just some “forensic food” for thought.Be safe out there!
50 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS
Ron Martinelli, Ph.D., is a nationally renowned forensic criminologist specializing in police
death cases, use of force, human factors and psychophysiology. Dr. Martinelli is a retired law
enforcement officer who directs the nation’s only multidisciplinary civilian Forensic Death
Investigation Team at Martinelli & Associates, Inc. He can be reached at (951) 719-1450 and
www.martinelliandassoc.com. His firm is presently engaged in a major forensic scientific project
reanalyzing the “21 Foot Rule.” If you are interested in volunteering for this important project,
please contact his office.
Note: Special thanks to forensic expert team members Homicide Lt. Bob Prevot (Ret.), M.A., ballistic scien-
tist/firearms expert Lance Martini, M.S., firearms expert Larry Nichols, and NSW operational psychologist
and psychiatry professor Douglas Johnson, Ph.D. for peer reviewing this article.
About the Author
T
actics Techniques and ProceduresT