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The top documents tagged [revelation principle]

Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, and Moshe Tennenholtz Stanford University
Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, and Moshe Tennenholtz Stanford University
225 views
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry Authors: C. Corbett, C. S. Tang Presenter: T.J. Hu
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry Authors: C. Corbett, C. S. Tang Presenter: T.J. Hu
214 views
Decentralization and Collusion
Decentralization and Collusion
243 views
Sep. 8, 2014 Lirong Xia Introduction to MD (mooncake design or mechanism design)
Sep. 8, 2014 Lirong Xia Introduction to MD (mooncake design or mechanism design)
223 views
Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Differential Privacy (and you). Aaron Roth DIMACS Workshop on Differential Privacy October 24
Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Differential Privacy (and you). Aaron Roth DIMACS Workshop on Differential Privacy October 24
219 views
Online Mechanisms Seminar on game theory, David C Parkes. Presentation by Alon Baram
Online Mechanisms Seminar on game theory, David C Parkes. Presentation by Alon Baram
215 views
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions Written by: Presented by: Ron Holzman Rica Gonen Noa Kfir-Dahav Dov Monderer Moshe Tennenholtz
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions Written by: Presented by: Ron Holzman Rica Gonen Noa Kfir-Dahav Dov Monderer Moshe Tennenholtz
216 views
Chapter 16 Negotiation 1.Costly Agreements 2.Ultimatum game with Incomplete Information 3.Counteroffers with Incomplete Information 4.The revelation principle
Chapter 16 Negotiation 1.Costly Agreements 2.Ultimatum game with Incomplete Information 3.Counteroffers with Incomplete Information 4.The revelation principle
226 views
Agent Technology for e-Commerce Chapter 10: Mechanism Design Maria Fasli
Agent Technology for e-Commerce Chapter 10: Mechanism Design Maria Fasli
216 views
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie
230 views
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Michael Schapira Joint work with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan Hebrew University
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Michael Schapira Joint work with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan Hebrew University
218 views
1 Secure Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment Vinayak Deshpande Krannert School of Management Purdue University Collaborators: Mikhail
1 Secure Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment Vinayak Deshpande Krannert School of Management Purdue University Collaborators: Mikhail
218 views