tan 6 applications of network identifiers v3 31jan2012

7/27/2019 Tan 6 Applications of Network Identifiers v3 31jan2012

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700TAG Technical Advisory Note #6

Impact of Network Ident i f iers on the Governance of a

Nat ion -Wide Publ ic Safety Mobi le Broadband Netwo rk

700 MHz Mobi le Broadb and for Publ ic Safety - Technolo gy Ad visor y Group

Public Security Science and Technology V.3 Jan. 31, 2012

September 27, 2011

Partners: The Technology Advisory Group for700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum (700TAG) iscomposed of a collaborative group of technicalexperts led by Centre for Security Science andincludes scientific authorities from theCommunications Research Centre and technicalexperts from Federal, Provincial, Territorial, andMunicipal agencies.

Objectives

Network identifiers comprise a set of unique

characters used in identifying and referencingeach network resource in a mobile radio accessnetwork, the core network, and the gatewaysbetween mobile and other networks. In the eventthat Canada allocates spectrum for a 700 MHzpublic safety mobile broadband network, aschema of network identifiers will need to bedeveloped. The objective of this Technical

Advisory Note (TAN) is to inform the Canadianpublic safety community on how networkidentifiers can be applied to the mobile broadbandnetwork and the implications of the identifierschemes on governance of the network at thenational and regional levels. Two approaches are

reviewed and compared: (i) a single numberingbase for the entire nation-wide network, and (ii)multiple numbering bases - one for each regionalpublic safety network.

Purpose of Network Identifiers

Network identifiers in a mobile cellular networkare used to uniquely identify each and everymobile subscriber on a publicly accessiblenetwork, as well as every device that processesinformation that is carried on the network orcontrols users access to the network. A tieredstructure of network identifiers allows for locatingmobile users rapidly and to hand-off sessions

from one cell to another with minimal impact onthe delivered service. They are used for thefollowing purposes [1]:

a) determination of the home network of a visitingmobile terminal or mobile user;

b) determination of the visited network in which avisiting mobile terminal or mobile user isregistered;

c) identification of mobile terminal or mobile userwhen information about a specific mobileterminal or mobile user is to be exchangedbetween networks offering mobility services;

d) identification of mobile terminal for registeringa mobile terminal in a visited network;

e) identification of mobile terminal for signaling;

f) identification of mobile terminal or mobile userfor charging and billing purposes;

g) identification of subscribers and managementof subscriptions, e.g. for retrieving, providing,

changing and updating of subscription data fora specific mobile terminal or mobile user; and

h) identification of a mobile user during the userauthentication procedure to identify a roaminguser.

Network identifiers can also be used to delineatethe logical boundaries between different

jurisdictional entities belonging to the samenetwork as well as delineating domains forapplication data ownership. In the case wheremultiple operators share the same radio accessnetwork, they can be used to distinguish whichusers belong to which operator.

Structure of Network Identifiers

Network identifiers adhere to internationalconventions [1,2]. This TAN provides a high leveloverview of some of the network identifiers for the3

rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP)

*

networks, specifically Long Term Evolution (LTE).A complete list of LTE network identifiers can befound in reference [8]. The following networkidentifiers are examined from the viewpoint ofhow they impact the architecture and thegovernance of the network.

a) Public Land Mobile Network Identifier (PLMNID),

b) International Mobile Subscriber Identifier(IMSI),

c) E-UTRAN Cell Global Identifier (ECGI),

d) Mobility Management Identifiers (MMEI,MMEC, MMEGI),

*www.3gpp.org
http://www.3gpp.org/http://www.3gpp.org/http://www.3gpp.org/http://www.3gpp.org/


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Imp act of Network Ident i f iers on the Governance of a

Nation-Wide Publ ic Safety Mobi le Broadband Network

e) Tracking Area Identifiers (TAI, TAC).

The Network Identifier (PLMN ID)

The PLMN ID is the basic identifier used todistinguish one public mobile network from allothers in the world. The structure of the PLMN IDis shown in Figure 1 and a partial list of PLMN IDsassigned to Canadian wireless operators is givenin Table 1. The PLMN ID comprises a 3-digit(decimal) Mobile Country Code (MCC) and a 3-digit Mobile Network Code (MNC). TheTelecommunications Standardization Bureau ofthe International Telecommunication Unionassigns MCCs for public networks. Canada isassigned MCC = 302 [3]. In Canada, the MNC isadministered by the Canadian Numbering

Administrator

by authority of the CanadianRadio-television and Telecommunications

Commission (CRTC).

Figure 1: Structure of the PLMN ID and IMSI forLTE networks.

3 0 2 6 1 0

3 0 2 6 4 0

3 0 2 2 2 0

3 0 2 2 2 1

3 0 2 8 6 0

3 0 2 3 6 0

3 0 2 7 2 0

3 0 2 4 9 0

3 0 2 6 6 0

3 0 2 7 8 0

PLMN ID

Telus Mobility

Telus Mobility

Bell Mobility

Telus Mobility

Name of OperatorMCC MNC

SaskTel Mobility

MTS Mobility

Bell Mobility

Telus Mobility

Rogers Wireless

Globalive Wireless

Table 1: Partial list of PLMN IDs assigned toCanadian wireless operators.

Subscriber Identifiers (IMSI)

The 15-digit (decimal) IMSI is programmed intothe Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM)resident on User Equipment (UE). The 9-digitMSIN is assigned by the wireless operator whichmeans that an operator can support up to one

www.cnac.ca

billion unique devices on its network. For publicsafety applications MSIN numbers would beassigned to USIMs used by first responders aswell as sensors and other machine-to-machine

devices such as automatic vehicle locationtrackers.

Figure 2 shows an example of a USIM. The USIMcontains the Home PLMN ID to which the UEbelongs as well as permitted PLMN IDs andprohibited PLMN IDs. The permitted PLMN IDsrepresent the operators with whom the homenetwork operator has established roamingagreements. The forbidden PLMN IDs areprogrammed into the USIM by the home networkoperator. There is also the possibility to identifywhich operators are preferred among thepermitted operators.

Figure 2: Example of a USIM.

Base Station Identifiers (ECGI)

The LTE base stations, also known as eNB, areuniquely identified down to their individual sectors(also referred to as cells) by the ECGI. The

structure of the ECGI is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Structure of the ECGI for the LTE cell.

Note that the PLMN ID is part of the ECGI, thusthe ECGI is globally unique. The eNB ID is a 5-

digit (hexadecimal) number and is assigned bythe wireless operator. There are 1,048,576possibilities. The 2-digit (hexadecimal) Cell ID has256 combinations and identifies the specificsector within the eNB. The ECGI is programmedinto the eNB as part of configuring the equipment.

PLMN ID

International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI)

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

MCC MNC Mobile Station Identity Number (MSIN)
http://www.cnac.ca/http://www.cnac.ca/http://www.cnac.ca/http://www.cnac.ca/http://www.cnac.ca/


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Mobility Management (MMEI, MMEC, MMEGI)

The Mobility Management Entity (MME) is the key

control-node for the LTE access-network. It isresponsible for idle mode UE tracking and pagingprocedure. It is involved in the radio resourceassignment for applications (session activationand deactivation). The MME checks theauthorization of the UE to register onto theservice providers mobile network and enforcesUE roaming restrictions. Lawful interception ofsignaling is also supported by the MME. Itprovides the control plane function for mobilitybetween LTE and non-LTE access networks. TheMME is identified by a globally unique identifier,GUMMEI, whose structure is shown in Figure 4.There can be a maximum of 16,777,216 MMEs inan operators network (MMEGI+MMEC = 6

hexadecimal digits). Typically, an MME couldsupport up to 3,000 eNBs or 250,000 subscribers,whichever is more constraining for any particulardeployment. So the public safety communities ofmany Canadian metropolitan areas would likelybe fully served by one MME for each metropolitanarea.

Figure 4: Structure of the GUMMEI.

Tracking Area Codes (TAI, TAC)

Tracking Area Codes (TAC) are assigned togroups of eNBs and used for idle-state mobilitymanagement. This level of partitioning is useful tominimize the frequency of the UE updating itslocation to the Mobility Management Entity (MME)and thereby conserves idle-state battery power inthe UE as it migrates from cell to cell. The notionof Tracking Area also minimizes the amount ofsignaling traffic sent across the network to UEs by

directing paging requests specifically to theTracking Area where the UE has registered itslocation. Groups of Tracking Areas can be usedto delineate jurisdictional boundaries within thefootprint of a larger network. Figure 5 is anillustration of eNBs assigned to an MME andgrouped into Tracking Areas. Figure 6 shows thenumbering structure for the Tracking AreaIdentifier (TAI), starting with the PLMN ID which

indicates that the TAI is also globally unique. TACis a 4-digit (hexadecimal) number with 65,536possibilities.

Figure 5: Illustration of grouping eNBs intoTracking Areas [4].

Figure 6: Structure of the globally unique TAI.

One PLMN ID versus multiplePLMN IDs

The 700 MHz mobile broadband network forCanadas public safety community can beimplemented with one PLMN ID for the entirenation-wide network, or it could potentially beimplemented with each region having its ownPLMN ID. Both options are examined from theviewpoint of technical implementation andimplications for governance. Ultimately, it will beup to Industry Canada to determine which optionwill be adopted.

Multiple PLMN IDs

If each region were to have its own PLMN ID thenthey would essentially be independent networkoperators, just like any of the wireless operatorsin Table 1. Federal users with no specificgeographically distinguishable regionalboundaries (e.g. RCMP) could also be assignedtheir own PLMN ID and still be able to attach ontoany regional network. They could share theinfrastructure, to varying degrees, with theregional operators. The 3GPP has specified two

Globally Unique Mobility Management Entity Identifier

(GUMMEI)

1 2 3 1 2 3 0:F 0:F 0:F 0:F 0:F 0:F

MME Code

MME IdentifierPLMN IDMCC MNC MME Group Identifier

Tracking Area Identifier (TAI)

1 2 3 1 2 3 0: F 0:F 0:F 0:F

PLMN IDMCC MNC Tracking Area Code


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ways for independent operators to share physicalnetwork elements in order to facilitate the hostingof virtual operators [5]. Operators who choose toshare only the Radio Access Networks (eNB) are

deemed to operate under the Multi-Operator CoreNetwork (MOCN) configuration. Operators whochoose to share eNB and MME are deemed tooperate under the Gateway Core Network(GWCN) configuration. In both cases the UEs willbe able to attach to any shared eNB. Figure 7illustrates the MOCN configuration where,regardless of which operator owns the UE, it canattach to the Radio Access Network (RAN) ofoperator-A while they are in region-A. Figure 8illustrates the GWCN configuration.Notwithstanding the sharing of infrastructurebetween the two operators, in order for the users

to be able to register onto each others networks,the two operators will need to establish roamingagreements between them.

The logical construct of the network identifiers for

a regional operator could be as shown in Figure9. Each region would operate its own HomeSubscriber Server (HSS) and Evolved PacketCore (EPC) LTE network. The latter could be ahosted service. With roaming agreementsbetween all regional operators, all users would beable to attach to any public safety network nation-wide. An operator representing federal userscould share the infrastructure with regionaloperators as a Mobile Virtual Network Operator(MVNO), having its own PLMN ID. Alternatively,federal users could be covered under a logicalnetwork and roam across all regional networks.

Figure 7: Multi-Operator Core Network (MOCN) Figure 8: Gateway Core Network (GWCN).

Figure 9: Possible logical construct of a regional network and hierarchy of network identifiers.


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One PLMN ID for a nation-wide public safetynetwork

Another approach to implement a nation-wide

public safety network is with only one PLMN ID.With reference to Figure 9, the case of a singlePLMN ID would mean that the HSS is hosted atthe national level rather than having one HSS perregion, province, or territory. Each region couldhave access to an HSS portal in order tomanage the subscribers associated with thatregion. Federal users could also be managedthrough the same HSS portal under the control ofan agency responsible for federal users. In casethere are multiple independent federal agencies,each agency could access the HSS portal tomanage the users under its authority. It is alsopossible to implement an HSS per region evenunder one PLMN ID. This would increase

resiliency and reduce transport costs and latencyat the expense of having multiple HSS.

With one PLMN ID, the notion of public safetyusers roaming between regions does not applysince roaming is only relevant betweenindependent operators. All users are, therefore,considered to be in their home network. Roamingagreements would not be required between publicsafety jurisdictions. However, inter-jurisdictionalagreements would be required in order toharmonize policies and the management ofnetwork IDs.

One PLMN ID can support 1 billion individualusers (human, machine-to-machine, andsensors). Verizon Wireless and AT&T Wireless inthe USA have one PLMN ID each for their nation-wide LTE networks covering 200 million and 100million potential users, respectively. Based on 5%of the general population in 20 years time,roughly 2 million public safety users could accessthe mobile broadband network. Another 8 millionsensors and machine-to-machine devices couldalso access the network. Therefore, one PLMN IDwould be more than sufficient to cover all potentialsubscribers on the Canadian public safety mobilebroadband network for the long-term future.

Impact on GovernanceNetwork identifiers impact the networkarchitecture which has implications for thegovernance of the network. Technically, bothapproaches could support one national networkarchitecture or an architecture composed offederated regional networks [7]. The maindifferences lie in the governance and delineation

of responsibilities between regional level andnational level authorities. This section examinessome ways in which fundamental governanceissues could be addressed by either approach.

Inter-carrier roaming agreements

Roaming agreements allow public safety users toattach to commercial networks while they areoutside the footprint of a public safety network.Roaming agreements would also allowcommercial users to attach to public safetynetwork(s), subject to negotiated rules andregulatory restrictions. In the case of multiplePLMN IDs for public safety, inter-jurisdictionalroaming agreements would be required betweenall the public safety jurisdictions. Roamingbetween carriers is a complex process thatrequires the following minimum conditions:

a) There is a physical interconnection betweenthe partners networks such that user andsignaling information can be passed from onenetwork to the other.

b) Roaming agreements are in place as well asthe mechanisms to implement the agreements.

c) The RAN technology deployed by each carrieris supported in the UE devices.

Figure 10 is an illustration of a UE from network-Broaming onto network-A and the two types ofrouting that pertain to its sessions. UE(B) canaccess the Internet locally from the hosting

network (A), whereas specific informationcontained only in the home network (B) isaccessed via secure tunnels through to the home-based databases. The latter session typicallyincurs greater latency.

Figure 10: Home-routed access and localbreakout access for a roaming UE.


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With reference to Figure 10, one of the roles ofthe Clearinghouse is to help establish andmanage the roaming agreements between thevarious parties. In the case that there is only one

PLMN ID for the public safety network, then thepublic safety roaming agreements will likely bewith Canadian commercial carriers, UScommercial carriers, US public safety networkoperator(s), and possibly other internationalcarriers. Alternatively, if each region in Canadawere to have its own PLMN ID, then the numberof agreements to be managed would be muchhigher. Table 2 shows an example of the numberof roaming agreements that would be requiredbetween 6 independent Canadian regional publicsafety networks and 2 Canadian commercialoperators, 2 US commercial operators, and 1 USpublic safety operator. In this example 45agreements need to be established andmaintained compared to only 5 agreements in thecase of one national Canadian public safetyoperator.

Table 2: Hypothetical illustration of the numberof roaming agreements that would berequired between multiple public safetyoperators and other partners.

It is evident that having more independentoperators imposes a greater burden to administerthe agreements which entails greater cost.

Inter-carrier billing settlement

One of the functions of the Clearinghouse is totrack the charges incurred by roaming users,reconcile the balance of how much is owed towhich operator, and issue the bills or pass alongthe payments. The allocation of charges istypically done at the level of the PLMN ID. But afiner level of granularity can be achieved down toa range of IMSI numbers. In the case of a singlenation-wide public safety network, any responderthat roams onto a commercial network will incur acharge that can be billed to the jurisdiction of thatroaming responder.

Commercial partnerships

There can be several different types ofcommercial partners, such as funding partners,service delivery partners, and roaming partners.Funding partners would finance theimplementation and/or operation of the networks.Service delivery partners could be commercialcarriers. Roaming partners would be othercommercial and public safety operators. A partnercan fulfill one or more of these roles. Whether thepublic safety network is composed of multiplePLMN IDs or a single PLMN ID any regional

jurisdiction could enter into partnershipagreements independently of other jurisdictions.

However, in the case of a single PLMN ID theroaming partnerships would likely be managed atthe national level, but could also be managed atthe regional level through a Clearinghouse usingIMSI ranges.

Interoperability assurance

Interoperability is a fundamental requirement forthe 700 MHz broadband public safety network,underpinned by all 5 lanes of the InteroperabilityContinuum [6]

. Whether there is one national

network operator or multiple regional operators,achieving and maintaining interoperability across

multiple jurisdictions presents numerouschallenges. Some of the technical challenges canbe met by ensuring that all jurisdictions adhere tocommon technology and configuration standards.For example, a national entity could be the

The 5 lanes of the Interoperability Continuum are:Governance; Standard Operating Procedures;Technology; Training and Exercises; Usage


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licensee of the public safety spectrum and sub-license the spectrum to those jurisdictions thatdemonstrate continued compliance to a minimumset of national interoperability standards. The

national licensee would then be the internationallyrecognized public mobile network operator andgrantee of the PLMN ID, but would be anoperator in a titular sense only.

In anticipation of disagreements betweenjurisdictions that could impact interoperability, amechanism would be required to resolve them, aswell as resolving matters that fall in betweenregional jurisdictional responsibilities. Forexample, when the networks of two adjoining

jurisdictions grow into each other geographicallyhow will the issue of potential interference at theboundary between the two regions be mitigatedand how will the cost be shared? A national

licensee can facilitate the establishment ofguidelines and dispute-resolution processeswhich could be co-owned by all jurisdictions.

Network Administration

An area that needs attention is the long-termcontinual management of network identifiers, IPaddressing scheme, updating of Domain NameSystem (DNS) servers and Access Point NetworkIDs as networks grow. In the case of a singlenational PLMN ID, the identifiers would bemanaged at the national level. For multiple PLMNIDs, each regional operator would manage itsidentifiers, thus repeating this function among all

the regions.

In addition to managing identifiers and addressingschemes, an operator would need to manage thenetwork in the broader sense (performance,access controls, maintenance, etc.). It would bepossible for any regional jurisdiction to have thisability either under one national PLMN ID orunder its own PLMN ID.

Network resiliency

One of the ways to increase the resilience of thepublic safety network is to provide redundancy forthe critical elements of the network, whose failure

would result in catastrophic loss of service.Redundancy could be provided by fail-over to aneighboring network rather than duplicating thenetwork elements which would remain in an idlestand-by mode for the vast majority of the time.For example, if a region had only one MME in itsnetwork and it failed, it is conceivable that aneighboring jurisdictions MME could act as aback-up for the failed MME. This approach could

be implemented more easily if both jurisdictionsuse the same PLMN ID than if each jurisdictionuses different PLMN IDs. This assumes thesame vendor is used by both jurisdictions and that

the network elements are maintained at the samerevision levels. Cooperating jurisdictions couldenter into agreements for mutual fail-over.

If two public safety regional network operatorsshare the core and radio infrastructure with twodifferent commercial operators, the ability to relyon neighboring network elements for fail-over maybe more difficult since it is unlikely that acommercial network operator would interface itsMME with another commercial operator. In thiscase each public safety network operator wouldneed to rely on its partner to have a sufficientlyrobust back-up strategy to meet the reliabilityrequirements of the public safety operator. If the

resiliency requirements for public safety are morestringent than what the commercial operatorwould normally do for its commercial services,then the cost to increase robustness would likelybe borne by the requesting entity.

Despite best efforts and precautions to avoid lossof service, network-wide outages do occur. Ifeach region were to have its own PLMN ID theextent of the service disruption would likely belimited to the affected jurisdictions network andwould not impact other jurisdictions, with thepossible exception of MVNO operators sharingthe same infrastructure. Since even a locallycontained outage is unacceptable it is desirable

for first responders to have alternative ways toaccess critical information. In the case of VerizonWireless events of LTE service outages

, their

users were still able to access data servicesthrough Verizons 3G network. Their UE devicesare multi-mode and can access both 3G and LTEnetworks with preference given to LTE.

Interaction with Canadian regulatory agencies

The decision to assign one PLMN ID or multiplePLMN IDs to the Canadian public safetycommunity will likely be made by an authorityoutside of the public safety community. If eachregion is granted a license to operate a mobile

broadband network, then one PLMN ID wouldprobably be assigned to each regional operator.The regulatory authority would have theresponsibility to ensure that each regionalnetwork operator adheres to the regulatoryframework associated with operating a wireless

Verizon Wireless LTE nation-wide service disruptionsreported Apr.26, Dec.7, Dec.21, 2011.


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broadband communications network. However,one of the fundamental drivers for the nation-widepublic safety broadband network iscommunications interoperability of public safety

users across agencies, jurisdictions, and acrossCanada. In 2010 a similar situation arose in theUSA. The Federal Communications Commission(FCC) imposed a number of conditions regardinginteroperability on the 21 public safety waiverrecipients. It also mandated the EmergencyResponse Interoperability Center (ERIC) to verifythat the waiver recipients complied with thoseconditions [10]. It is reasonable to assume that inthe case of independent regional public safetynetwork operators, each Canadian regionaloperator would probably be required todemonstrate that it complies to some minimumconditions concerning interoperability and that thismay also need to be done when upgrading thenetworks to ensure they remain interoperable witheach other.

On the other hand, if one PLMN ID is assigned forall public safety networks in Canada, as the FCCrequested be done [9] for the 21 waiverrecipients, the Canadian regulatory agency couldrely on the national public safety licensee to self-regulate the sub-licensing of broadband spectrumto regional jurisdictions. Furthermore, the nationalpublic safety licensee would need to demonstratethat it can ensure compliance by each

jurisdictional level to the regulatory frameworkthat may be imposed, which may includepartnering or sharing to some degree with

commercial operators. In this model, theregulatory authority would essentially delegatesome of its compliance enforcement functions tothe national public safety licensee, providing thelatter can carry out that duty.

Summary

This section summarizes the advantageousgovernance aspects of having one PLMN ID forthe nation-wide public safety mobile broadbandnetwork, as well as the advantages forgovernance of having one PLMN ID per regional

public safety network.Advantages of having one PLMN ID for thenation-wide network:

Managing roaming agreementswould besimpler and less costly to administer at thenational level, especially with US-basedcarriers. The task could be facilitated through

the services of a Clearinghouse provider at thenational level.

Assuring interoperabilityover the

operational life the network requires dedicatedand verifiable adherence to nationally acceptedguidelines. A national broadband spectrumlicensee could self-regulate compliance atregional levels.

Federal usersfrom independent agencies aremore easily accommodated by adding HSSportals rather than requesting additional PLMNIDs.

Advantages of having multiple PLMN IDs:

Allocating bi-lateral billing credits anddebitsto the responsible jurisdiction would besimpler, but can be done by IMSI rangesunder one national PLMN ID.

Isolating network outagestothe affectedregion could be more easily achieved than byexposing the national network to the risk of anation-wide outage.

Governance aspects which are unaffected by thechoice of one versus multiple PLMN IDs:

Contracting authority and autonomy forentering into agreements with commercialpartners is retained at the regional andnational jurisdictional levels.

Controlling access to the networkis withinthe purview of each jurisdiction, includingfederal agencies.

Monitoring and administeringthe networkcan be done by each jurisdiction such assubscriptions and user priorities.

Conclusion

An internationally supported convention fornetwork Identifiers has been established thatpertains to LTE networks. The Canadian publicsafety mobile broadband network operator(s) willapply the network identifiers according to the

construct that will satisfy whatever regulationsaccompany an anticipated pronouncement on theallocation of 700MHz spectrum for public safety.The assignment of network identifiers to thevarious elements of the broadband network mustbe done with care and attention to (i) avoidduplication, (ii) respect regional autonomy, (iii)have an efficient and resilient network, and (iv)allow for growth over time. If identifiers need to be


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changed at a future point in time, this could leadto network-wide outages, thus further reinforcingthe need to plan the assignment of identifierscarefully at the outset.

The role of a Canadian regulatory agency, andthe manner in which public safety jurisdictionswould interact with it, will be strongly affected bywhether only one PLMN ID will be assigned ormultiple PLMN IDs. Having one PLMN IDassumes that a national public safety networklicensee will be established to ensure that anyregional jurisdiction, desirous to implement apublic safety broadband network in its province orterritory, will meet federal regulations andrequirements for interoperability. This includesfederal public safety operators that are likely tooperate as MVNOs or operate logical networks.They could be treated as regional jurisdictions,

where their regions span multiple provinces orterritories.

Governance and choice of network architectureare closely linked to whether Canadas publicsafety broadband network will be establishedunder one PLMN ID or under multiple PLMN IDs.Each approach has advantages with respect tothe governance of the public safety mobilebroadband network, ie, setting policies, achievingagreements with commercial and other partners,and administering the network. Based on thefactors examined in this TAN, having one PLMNID for the nation-wide network appears to be thebetter choice. While each regional jurisdiction

could retain its autonomy to manage its users anddirect its investments in the network, a nationallevel entity would be required to hold the PLMNID and provide necessary support to the regionsto coordinate and provide guidance on theimplementation of their networks.

References

1. The international identification plan formobile terminals and mobile users,International Telecommunications Union(ITU) Recommendation E.212, Oct.16, 2008.

http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.212-200805-I

2. Digital cellular telecommunications systems(Phase 2+); UMTS; Numbering,Addressing, and Identification, 3GPP TS23.003 v8.14.0, Release 8, October 2011.

http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123003/08.14.00_60/ts_123003v081400p.pdf

3. Mobile Network Codes (MNC) for theinternational identification plan for publicnetworks and subscriptions (According toRecommendation ITU-T E.212), ITU TSB,

updated periodically.

http://www.itu.int/pub/T-SP-E.212B-2011

4. Harri Holma and Antti Toskala, LTE forUMTS OFDMA and SC-FDMA BasedRadio Access, 2009, John Wiley & Sons.

5. 3GPP; Technical Specifications GroupServices and System Aspects; NetworkSharing; Architecture and functionaldescription (Release 8) 3GPP TS 23.251v8.3.0, March 2011.

http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123200_123299/123251/08.03.00_60/ts_123251v080300p.pdf

6. Communications Interoperability Strategy forCanada, Government of Canada, January2011.

http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/cisc-eng.pdf

7. C.Lucente, 700TAG - Technical AdvisoryNote #4: A comparison of communicationsNetwork Architectures for a Public SafetyMobile Broadband Network, Centre forSecurity Science, Government of Canada,Oct. 7, 2011.

8. Public Safety Communications Research,Public Safety 700 MHz DemonstrationNetwork: Network Identifier Guidelines,Version 1.0, January 2012.

http://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdf

9. FCC Order, guidance to 700 MHz publicsafety broadband waiver recipients on theirimplementation of a public land mobilenetwork identifier and related networkidentification numbering scheme to supportthe interoperability of the networkdeployments, PS Docket No. 06-229,

January 9, 2012.http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0109/DA-12-25A1.pdf

10. FCC OrderFCC Grants Conditional Approvalof 21 Petitions by Cities, Counties and Statesto Build Interoperable Broadband Networksfor America's First Responders. May 2010.
http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.212-200805-Ihttp://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.212-200805-Ihttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123003/08.14.00_60/ts_123003v081400p.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123003/08.14.00_60/ts_123003v081400p.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123003/08.14.00_60/ts_123003v081400p.pdfhttp://www.itu.int/pub/T-SP-E.212B-2011http://www.itu.int/pub/T-SP-E.212B-2011http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123200_123299/123251/08.03.00_60/ts_123251v080300p.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123200_123299/123251/08.03.00_60/ts_123251v080300p.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123200_123299/123251/08.03.00_60/ts_123251v080300p.pdfhttp://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/cisc-eng.pdfhttp://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/cisc-eng.pdfhttp://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/cisc-eng.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0109/DA-12-25A1.pdfhttp://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0109/DA-12-25A1.pdfhttp://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0109/DA-12-25A1.pdfhttp://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0109/DA-12-25A1.pdfhttp://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0109/DA-12-25A1.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://www.pscr.gov/projects/broadband/700mhz_demo_net/testing/PSCR_Network_Identifiers_Demonstration_Network_Guidelines.pdfhttp://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/cisc-eng.pdfhttp://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/cisc-eng.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123200_123299/123251/08.03.00_60/ts_123251v080300p.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123200_123299/123251/08.03.00_60/ts_123251v080300p.pdfhttp://www.itu.int/pub/T-SP-E.212B-2011http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123003/08.14.00_60/ts_123003v081400p.pdfhttp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/123000_123099/123003/08.14.00_60/ts_123003v081400p.pdfhttp://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.212-200805-I


10/10



http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-79A1.pdf

NOTE:DRDC Centre for Security Science warrantsthat this advisory note was prepared in a professionalmanner conforming to generally accepted practices forscientific research and analysis. This advisory note

provides technical advice and therefore is not astatement of endorsement of Defence ResearchDevelopment Canada, Department of National Defence,or the Government of Canada

Author: Claudio Lucente, P.Eng

Scientific Authorities:

Jack Pagotto, Head/ESEC S&T [EmergencyMgmt Systems & Interoperability,Surveillance/Intel, E-security, CriticalInfrastructure Protection]

Claude Belisle, Vice-President, SatelliteCommunications and Radio PropagationResearch Branch, Communications ResearchCentre.

Joe Fournier, Research Program Manager,

Communications Research Centre.

Eric Lafond, Senior Research Engineer,Communications Research Centre.

Approval for Release: Dr. A. Vallerand
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-79A1.pdfhttp://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-79A1.pdfhttp://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-79A1.pdfhttp://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-79A1.pdfhttp://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-79A1.pdf

tan 6 applications of network identifiers v3 31jan2012

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