tardy report

Geneva Centre for Security Pol icyCentre de Politique de Scurit,GenveGenfer Zentrum fr Sicherheitspolitik

T H I E R R Y T A R D Y G C S P FA C U LT Y M E M B E R

20-21 June 2004

T H E B R A H I M I R E P O R T : F O U R Y E A R S O N

PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY

In 2002, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) initiated a series of seminars on the broad range ofpeacekeeping activities. Every year, these seminars bring together around 30 academics, experts, policy-makers and military to look into a particular aspect of peacekeeping.

The 2002 seminar addressed the issue of peace operations in a post-911 context, and led to a book (ThierryTardy, ed., Peace Operations after 11 September 2001, Frank Cass, London, 2004).

The 2003 seminar dealt with the European Union and peace operations (proceedings available atwww.gcsp.ch).

In 2004, the conference was dedicated to the implementation of the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations,four years after its release.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

The GCSP and myself are grateful to Nicole Pinter-Krainer (Research Officer), who was in charge of theadministrative aspects of the seminar, and to Jonathan Hepburn and Bethany Webster (Faculty Assis-tants), who contributed to the elaboration of the proceedings.

Thierry Tardy

Design by Damla Sar, Geneva, [email protected]

Geneva Centre for Secur ity Pol icyCentre de Politique de Scurit,GenveGenfer Zentrum fr Sicherheitspolitik

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Box: The Brahimi Report on Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51. The Political Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62. States Policies and the Brahimi Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73. The Reform of the UN Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94. Peace Operations in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115. Key Challenges for Future Peace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: Programme of the Workshop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16ANNEX II: List of Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations has reached, in 2003/04, a level of commitment in peace operations that has notbeen seen since the mid-1990s with, as of June 2004, 16 operations and over 55,000 military person-nel and civilian police being deployed in operations which include a wide variety of activities. In thiscontext, the implementation of the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations is examined on four levelsof analysis.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 2004, the international environment is no doubt slightly different from the 2000 environment,when the Brahimi Report was released. The current situation combines grounds for optimism andworrying trends for the United Nations.

The events of 11 September 2001 have fundamentally altered threat perceptions at least in theWest which in turn further weakened Western countries eagerness to support the United Nationsas the main peacekeeping implementer. Besides, the Iraq crisis and then war once again raised thequestion of the relevance of the United Nations as the organisation in charge of internationalpeace. Those events have indeed further weakened the centrality of the United Nations, both as anormative and as an operational actor.

Yet, in this critical environment, the United Nations displays an astonishing ability to continually risefrom its ashes. Besides its key role as a legitimizing body, the United Nations has remained extreme-ly active on the peacekeeping front, with the creation and conduct of four major operations sincethe spring 2003 relevance crisis (Liberia, Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Burundi). At the same time, the dra-matic growth in UN operations pushes the Organisation to the limits of its capacities. Besides, UN op-erations continue to suffer from a lack of support from Western states, which persistently refuse toplace their military under UN command. The commitment gap between developing and devel-oped states is a matter of great concern, as it questions the ability of the United Nations to conductrobust peacekeeping, one of the key objectives of the Brahimi Report.

THE UN REFORM

The reform of the UN structure mainly concerns its rapid deployment capacity and its planning andsupport structure. Progress has been observed on both levels.

As for rapid deployment capacities, the authorization given to the Secretary-General to commitfunds prior to the creation of a mission (Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority), the creation of theStrategic Deployment Stocks, aimed at facilitating the rapid deployment of materials to the field,and the establishment of groups of pre-identified personnel which are supposed to support an op-eration in its first 90 days (Rapid Deployment Teams) have all been valuable implementations of theBrahimi Report, despite the remaining difficulties to deploy a complex operation within 90 days.

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Concerning headquarters resources, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has beensignificantly strengthened, while communication between headquarters and the field has been im-proved. Yet persistent difficulties remain for the United Nations to plan and conduct peace opera-tions in a strategic and integrated way. More generally, the question centered around whether a re-inforced DPKO is in a better position to plan and run peace operations today than it was four yearsago. Some participants expressed some doubts about the link between structure and performance.While it was acknowledged that the improvements observed are valuable, they may not be suffi-cient to enable the United Nations to perform at the upper-level of the peacekeeping spectrum (ro-bust peacekeeping).

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

Seven out of sixteen UN operations take place in Africa, with 85.3% of UN personnel in peace oper-ations being deployed on that continent.

As far as the implementation of the Brahimi Report is concerned, two levels of analysis can be dis-tinguished: a strategic level, dealing with the UN role in Africa and the place of the Brahimi Reportin this context; and a more practical level, dealing with the implementation, specifically within op-erations deployed in Africa, of the technical recommendations of the Report.

Insofar as the practical level is concerned, most of the recommendations of the Brahimi panel thathave been implemented have found applications in Africa. The already mentioned Rapid Deploy-ment Teams mechanism, Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority, Strategic Deployment Stocks, and In-tegrated Mission Task Force were all somehow implemented in the case of the UN Mission in Liberia(UNMIL), which was the first major UN operation since the release of the Brahimi Report.

Concerning the strategic level, the Brahimi Report was criticised for not being sufficiently focusedon the security needs of Africa in general and for having neglected the relations between the Unit-ed Nations and regional/sub-regional organisations in particular.

The linkage between the implementation of the Brahimi Report (in particular its technical aspects)and an increased ability of the United Nations to do peacekeeping in Africa was also questioned, asthe politics of peacekeeping in Africa often seem to be more important than technical and lo-gistical constraints.

Furthermore, the already discussed commitment gap is particularly acute in Africa, where theWestern reluctance to intervene creates some resentment. At the same time, Western military in-volvement in Africa, especially on the part of France or the UK, is often suspected of resulting fromself-interest. It was however stressed in the workshop that what was feared in Africa was Westernindifference rather than Western self-interest. This ambivalence is also reflected in the debate onthe extent to which African conflicts should be handled by Africans rather than by external actors.This, in turn, leads to the issue of the role of regional powers (Nigeria and South Africa) in conflictmanagement. While their involvement conditions the strength of regional organisations, it also im-plies regional power politics that may have counter-productive effects.

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KEY CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

The demand for peacekeeping will continue. The persisting existence of UN peace operations asa way to deal with conflicts was widely acknowledged. This was however challenged by two kindsof arguments. First, it was contended that through peace operations, the international communitywas spending too much energy on the management of the consequences of the conflict, while over-looking the politics of it. Second, one might witness a decrease in the number of peacekeeping op-erations in the near future, as the number of conflicts is also decreasing.

UN reform is a limited reality. It was clear during the seminar that the reform of the United Na-tions had become a reality, and that the United Nations is today better able to conduct peacekeep-ing operations. However, the ability of the United Nations to manage robust peacekeeping is stillquestioned, and will remain so. Furthermore, the reform process is only one element of a coherentUN peacekeeping policy. State support is another determining factor that is unlikely to be muchstronger in the near future. The position of the United States was particularly stressed here.

Strategies / Integration of operations. The need for the United Nations to look at peacekeepingin a strategic way was presented as a generally overlooked topic, but one of key importance. In par-ticular, the need for an integrated approach to peace operations at the UN level was stressed. Thevery nature of contemporary peace operations that combine a wide range of interrelated civilianand military activities makes an integrated and coordinated approach a condition of coherence andsuccess.

Division of labour and regional cooperation. The question concerning the function of the UnitedNations in peace operations raises the issue of the role of other actors involved in peacekeeping. InAfrica in particular, the issue of the division of labour between the United Nations and regional or-ganisations needs to be clarified. This clarification has to deal with legal issues (mandates, use ofChapter VIII of the UN Charter), operational issues (which organisation is in charge of which activi-ties?), as well as sequencing (which organisation should go first?).

Simultaneously, the fact that a regional approach to conflicts should be favoured whenever possiblewas widely accepted. Two issues are to be distinguished here: one is the need to empower regionalorganisations so as to enable them to deal by themselves with the conflicts of their region; the otheris to adopt a regional approach to conflicts that are closely inter-related, and the resolution of whichcannot be completed individually (case of West African conflicts).

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4INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) initiated a series of seminars on the broadrange of peacekeeping activities. Every year, these seminars bring together around 30 academics, ex-perts, policy-makers and military to look into a particular aspect of peacekeeping.

The 2002 seminar addressed the issue of peace operations in a post-911 context, and led to a book(Thierry Tardy, ed., Peace Operations after 11 September 2001, Frank Cass, London, 2004).

The 2003 seminar dealt with the European Union and peace operations (proceedings available atwww.gcsp.ch).

In 2004, the conference was dedicated to the implementation of the Report of the Panel on Unit-ed Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations),1 four years afterits release in August 2000.

The United Nations has reached, in 2003/04, a level of commitment in peace operations that had notbeen seen since the mid-1990s with, as of June 2004, 16 operations and over 55,000 military per-sonnel and civilian police being deployed in operations including a wide variety of activities. Such acommitment leads to a series of questions, as the United Nations is, once again, confronted with asituation that puts it at the very limits of its own capacities. It is in this context that the implemen-tation of the Brahimi Report on Peace Operations is looked at, with four levels of analysis.

The political context. The international environment has always had a direct impact on the propen-sity and ability of the United Nations to conduct peace operations. Many important events havetaken place since the summer 2000, therefore it was indispensable to look at the UN performance inlight of the new environment. In particular, the issue of state policies vis--vis the United Nations re-mains at the centre of any process of reform, as well as it heavily impacts on success or failure of UNoperations.

The UN reform. The UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is in charge of planningand conducting operations, and was, as such, the main administrative target of the Brahimi Report.To what extent has it been reformed, and to what extent is it today structured to deploy over 55,000troops in 16 multidimensional and often complex operations?

Peacekeeping in Africa. Seven out of sixteen UN operations take place in Africa, with 85.3% of UNpersonnel in peace operations being deployed on that continent (in addition, roughly one third ofpeacekeepers come from Africa); How has the Brahimi Report been implemented in Africa?

The way forward: key challenges for future peacekeeping. The examination of the above-men-tioned questions leads to a few queries as to the main challenges to which UN peacekeeping will beconfronted in the coming years: What are the likely trends? How is UN peacekeeping likely toevolve?

This report summarizes the key issues discussed at the seminar. It is organised around several broadthemes that emerged in the discussions.

1 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305, S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

5T H E B R A H I M I R E P O R T: F O U R Y E A R S O N - G C S P - 2 0 0 4

THE BRAHIMI REPORT ON PEACE OPERATIONS AUGUST 2000

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was written in 2000 (A/55/305,21 August 2000) at the request of Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The panel was chaired by theformer Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi.

The primary objective of the panel was to undertake a thorough review of the peace and se-curity activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendationsto assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.

The initiative and the process that followed came as a response to the political, military, andorganisational difficulties encountered by the United Nations in conducting peace operationsin the 1990s, especially in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

The Report focused on peacekeeping issues (rather than on conflict prevention or peace-building), and identified four areas of analysis:

Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations; UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively; Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping

operations; and Peace operations and the information age.

Each section led to practical recommendations (57 in total), that were later to be approved or rejected at different levels of the UN structure (Security Council, General Assembly, Spe-cial Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Bud-getary Questions, etc.). The Report was also followed by implementation reports, issued bythe Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

One of the key recommendations of the Brahimi Report was the absolute necessity to getclear and achievable mandates for UN operations. Simultaneously, the United Nationsshould be able to conduct robust peacekeeping; the United Nations does not wage war,but once deployed, UN forces should be in a position to confront the lingering forces of warand violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. Most importantly, UN op-erations have to be backed by the states. The issue of political support of states is central tothe Report, as it fundamentally affects the chances of success of an operation. The Report alsoadvocates for a restructuring and strengthening of the UN secretariat, in particular the De-partment for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The Brahimi Report was described as being frank yet fair by the UN Secretary-General, andwas rather well received by states, despite some reserves from developing states. Four yearsafter its release, many recommendations have been or are being implemented. However,the ability of the United Nations to deploy rapidly and efficiently in complex operations re-mains uncertain, while the willingness of many states developed states in particular to sup-port the implementation of the Report as well as UN operations is still being questioned.

61. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

The international context of the implementation of the Brahimi Report is, in 2004, no doubt slight-ly different from the 2000 context. The current situation combines grounds for optimism and wor-rying trends for the United Nations, a combination that has always characterised the environment inwhich the United Nations operates.

The events of 11 September 2001 have fundamentally altered threat perceptions at least in theWest which in turn further weakened Western countries eagerness to support the United Nationsas the main peacekeeping implementer. The Iraq crisis and subsequent war did, once again, raise thequestion of the relevance of the United Nations as the organisation in charge of internationalpeace and security. As a matter of fact, the question of the UN relevance, as posed by the Bush ad-ministration in the spring 2003, was about the relevance of its Security Council, and in this case itspropensity to legalise/legitimise a US decision to go to war against Iraq.

Those events have indeed largely weakened (or confirmed the weakening of) the centrality of theUnited Nations, both as a normative and as an operational actor. At the normative level, UN Charterregulations proscribing the use of force have been regularly circumvented, while the ones definingthe right of self-defence are questioned by the unilaterally-defined concept of pre-emptive action,which assumes that, in a post-11 September world, states can no longer wait for an attack to occurto invoke their right of self-defence.2 In the same vein, while the UN Charter made sovereignty oneof its sacrosanct principles, the Charter does not appear to remain an efficient guarantee against theattacks on sovereignty. Beyond the highly controversial cases where states invoke humanitariangrounds to interfere in internal affairs of third states, it is the multi-centric and globalised world it-self that constitutes, per nature, a threat to sovereignty.

At the operational level, if a multilateral approach to transnational threats seems to be the only waythat allows states to combine legitimacy and efficiency in their response, the United Nations is yetrarely seen as the most appropriate tool to tackle such threats. In brief, in the post-11 September andpost-Iraq world, the inadequacy of the United Nations as a tool in the current environment seems tobe increasingly visible. It is this inadequacy that led to the creation in November 2003, by the UN Sec-retary-General, of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.

Yet in this critical environment, the United Nations displays an astonishing ability to rise again fromits ashes. Indeed, a few months after the end of the Iraq war, the persistence of the utility of theUnited Nations is as striking as the questioning of its raison dtre was during spring 2003.

In Iraq itself, where the United Nations had been violently set aside during the 2003 war, it progres-sively appeared as a key element of the transition between the US authority and a sovereign Iraqistate. And indeed the United Nations played an increasingly important political role during the US-UK occupation period, and was seen by the United States in the spring 2004 in a fundamentally dif-ferent way from the approach one year before. As an indication of this change, for one participantof the workshop, the UN Special Adviser for Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, was even seen as having eclipsedPaul Bremer in importance in the preparation of the hand over of authority on 1 July 2004. It is herethat the political role of the United Nations in war-torn societies is acknowledged.

2 As stated in article 51 of the UN Charter.

By extension, despite all grievances expressed about the United Nations, the organisation is still per-ceived as playing a custodial role3 to defend the UN Charters key principles. In this respect, theUnited Nations remains the only universal source of legitimacy; the UN Security Council continues toembody internationally recognised rules that are regularly challenged, but never fully invalidated.One participant noted that going through the Security Council remains the norm and that by-pass-ing it remains the exception. In the same vein, the United Nations appears to be of evident useful-ness4 to states, the permanent members of the Security Council in particular, partly because theUnited Nations serves to legitimise various processes.5

Insofar as peace operations are concerned, the United Nations has remained extremely active, withthe creation and conduct of four major operations since the spring 2003 relevance crisis and de-spite tensions among some of the key permanent members of the Security Council: the UN Missionin Liberia (UNMIL) created in September 2003; the UN Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) created inApril 2004;6 the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), created in June 2004; and the UN Op-eration in Burundi (ONUB) created in June 2004.

Those operations, combined with already demanding ones, such as the UN Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL), the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and the UN InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), demonstrate the remaining central role of the UnitedNations in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, despite tensions at the political level and cri-tiques about the UN performance on the ground. A parallel was made with the European Unionwhich created two military operations (in Macedonia and in the DRC) in 2003, at a time when theEuropean Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was largely shaken by the Iraq episode.

At the same time, the dramatic growth in UN operations puts the Organisation at a level of deploy-ment that has not been seen since the mid-1990s, and that pushes the United Nations at the limitsof its capacities. This is particularly the case of UN missions in Africa that require large-scale logisti-cal and political support for mandates that are complex and ambitious. Such a situation, largely seenas being of great concern, has made the question of the implementation of the Brahimi Report evenmore acute.

2. STATES POLICIES AND THE BRAHIMI REPORT

The issue of states policies was largely debated throughout the seminar. One of the key aspects ofthe Brahimi Report was the close connection established between UN peacekeeping activities andthe political support of states. The Report states at its very beginning that Without renewed com-mitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial sup-port, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peacebuild-ing tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years.7

The role of the state in enabling the United Nations to fulfil its role of guarantor of internationalpeace and security is part of the intrinsic nature of the Organisation. As an inter-governmental or-ganisation, the United Nations is heavily dependent on states ability and willingness to empower

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3 Expression of a participant.4 Expression of a participant.5 Expression of a participant.6 The creation of UNOCI was delayed due to Franco-American tensions following the Iraq war.7 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, Executive Summary, first paragraph; and first paragraph of the Report itself.

the Organisation. And what is true for the UN performance in peacekeeping is also true for the im-plementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. Given the nature of the current US ad-ministration and the Iraq context, the US policy and its evolution in the coming years were present-ed as particularly important for the United Nations.

Insofar as states policies vis--vis peace operations are concerned, the Brahimi Report deplored theweak presence of developed states in UN operations,8 and UN officials have since then regularlyasked for an increased involvement of Western states in UN-led operations. Despite this request, UNoperations are still largely composed of developing states four years later. As of 31 May 2004, thefirst ten troop contributors are Pakistan (7,997), Bangladesh (6,753), Nigeria (3,424), Ghana (3,259),India (2,925), Nepal (2,301), Uruguay (1,910), Jordan (1,829), Kenya (1,824), and Ethiopia (1,820),which together represent 61.4% of UN troops.9 As of the same date, the contribution of Organisa-tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to UN operations was 12.5%(6,941 out of 55,470),10 a percentage that is even lower in African operations (1.61% in the MONUCin the DRC; 0.74% in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone; 5.25% in UNMIL in Liberia). Furthermore, there is nosign that developed countries would reconsider their no troops under UN flag policies.

To the degree that one associates political support with troop contribution, which is indeed a tangi-ble way to support UN operations, one can observe that the support of developed states has notbeen modified since the release of the Brahimi Report.

This commitment gap between developed and developing countries is particularly interesting inthe analysis of the implementation of the Brahimi Report because it raises the question of the feasi-bility of such an implementation in the absence of a sustained backing from a significant part of thecommunity of states. As one participant noted, assessing the implementation of the Brahimi Reportby looking at the current UN performance in peace operations (in Africa for example) is partially mis-leading, since one of the key conditions of the implementation of the Report the support of states is often lacking.

Another interesting aspect is illustrated in the fact that the link between the reform of the UnitedNations and the propensity of developed states to go through the United Nations in order to con-duct peacekeeping is weak. One key element of states eagerness to go through the United Nationsis the trust that they have vis--vis the institution. Such a trust had been severely damaged with theoperations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda, and one objective of the Brahimi Reportwas to restore lost trust by inciting the United Nations to have clearer strategies (achievable man-dates) and by strengthening political-military capacities (reform of the DPKO mainly). One under-lying idea was that a more rational and better-equipped tool would lead to a higher confidence,and therefore to a higher disposition to use the tool. Yet the on-going reform of the Secretariat hashad no tangible impact on the trust that states put in the United Nations, which clearly poses a limitto the implementation of the Brahimi Report.

The commitment gap leads to two other issues. First, it poses the question of the ability of theUnited Nations to do robust peacekeeping as defined in the Brahimi Report11 without the sup-port and capacities of developed countries. One participant defined robust peacekeeping as theability to defeat spoilers, the ability to implement the mandate when the local consent is broken,and the ability to protect civilians whenever it is in the mandate of an operation. Yet, those activi-

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8 It noted ( 103) that In contrast to the long tradition of developed countries providing the bulk of the troops for United Nations peace-keeping operations during the Organisations first 50 years, in the last few years 77 per cent of the troops in formed military units de-ployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as of end-June 2000, were contributed by developing countries.

9 Monthly Summary of Contributions (Military Observers, Civilian Police and Troops) as of 31 May 2004, UN Website.10 Ibid.11 The Report says ( 55) that once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and

successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the missions mandate, with robust rules of en-gagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.

ties require means (specialised units and a rapid reaction capacity) that are mostly available in de-veloped countries. Without such capacities, the ability of the United Nations to do robust peace-keeping will remain questionable. It is partly with those issues in mind that the United Nations andthe European Union have conducted discussions on possibilities for the United Nations to take ad-vantage of the newly-created and allegedly-operational EU capacities. Drawing on what it did in op-eration Artemis in the DRC in the summer 2003, the European Union has developed the concept ofthe battle group (with a clear reference to Africa), consisting of highly trained and robust units thatwould deploy rapidly (within 15 days) and for a short period of time (up to 120 days) under a UNmandate, to prepare the ground before UN forces take over. While the concept was welcomed, suchan option was presented in the seminar as being insufficient to remedy UN deficiencies in Africa.

Second, Western resistance to commit troops to UN operations creates a lot of frustrations withinnon-Western/developing countries where the commitment gap is seen as an extremely negative de-velopment. Those grievances are reinforced when comparing the attention given by the West to theBalkans and to African conflicts; when comparing means made available to the United Nations andto NATO or budgets of UN-led operations with budgets of NATO-led or coalition-of-the-willing op-erations.

Finally, states policies have a direct impact on the implementation of the doctrine/strategy di-mension of the Brahimi Report, a field where progress has been very limited. The recommendationthat said that a Security Council resolution be left in draft form until troops are actually committedhas not been implemented.12 Most importantly, in contradiction with the expressed necessity to de-fine realistic and achievable mandates, mandates continue to suffer from a lack of clarity and co-herence. This is especially the case when mandates imply robust peacekeeping. The whole approachto a robust impartiality, which is what the United Nations aspires to be able to do, is yet to be im-plemented. Drawing on these weaknesses, one participant expressed doubts as to the ability of theUnited Nations, as it is (re-)structured today, to prevent events such as the fall of Srebrenica or theRwanda genocide, in case a UN presence were to face similar situations in the future. As far as con-flict prevention is concerned, the situation in Darfur (Sudan) was interpreted differently by partici-pants: while some argued that the United Nations played well its role of whistle-blower (through theUN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the Secretary-General), others contended that onceagain, the United Nations was unable to prevent an on-going slaughter.

3. THE REFORM OF THE UN SECRETARIAT

The UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively and the Headquarters resourcesand structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations are the two areas where theimplementation of the Brahimi Report is the most apparent. As far as rapid deployment capacitiesare concerned, tangible progress has been observed. As one participant put it, the United Nations isnow better able to move money, things, and people rapidly.

Firstly, the authorisation given to the Secretary-General to commit funds13 prior to the SecurityCouncil resolution establishing a mission (Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority PMCA) was used

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12 The Report says ( 60) that the Security Council should leave in draft form a resolution that contemplated sizeable force levels fora new peace keeping operation until such time as the Secretary-General could confirm that the necessary troop commitments hadbeen received from Member States.

13 Up to $50 million.

in the two cases of the MINUCI in Ivory Coast and UNMIL in Liberia and proved to be valuable, de-spite identified shortcomings.14

Secondly, the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, has been upgraded with the creation of the Strate-gic Deployment Stocks (SDS), aimed at facilitating the rapid deployment of materials to the field.The SDS seems to have helped, though the simultaneous conduct of major operations in Africa hasled to a rapid depletion of the stocks.

Thirdly, the rapid deployment of civilian personnel has been improved by the establishment of theRapid Deployment Teams (RDTs), groups of pre-identified personnel which are supposed to supportan operation in its first 90 days. That mechanism was used for the first time in Liberia with relative-ly good results.

Yet, the objective set in the Brahimi Report of being able to deploy a traditional operation within30 days and a complex operation within 90 days is generally unlikely to be met in the latter case. InLiberia for example, 180 days were necessary for the operation to be fully deployed.15 In the nearfuture, it was said that around 120 days would be required to deploy a force of 15,000. In this con-text, the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) continues to suffer from state negligence. Thecall for states to create brigade-size forces within the UNSAS framework did not get any answer.Similarly, the constitution of on-call lists of military officers for rapid deployment was not met withthe most enthusiastic response from member states who have promised some assistance rather thanidentified persons.

Concerning headquarters resources, the DPKO has been significantly strengthened. Its overall sizewas increased from approximately 400 to 600 persons. This growth initially led to an increasedfield/headquarters ratio,16 which was strongly recommended by the Brahimi panel. However, the si-multaneous increase in UN personnel being deployed in 2003 and 2004 put back the ratio roughlyat the same level as in 2000.

Communication between headquarters and the field has been improved. The concept of the Inte-grated Mission Task Force (IMTF), recommended by the Brahimi Report to facilitate joint planningand decision-making across UN departments, is also a mechanism that has found some implementa-tion (for UNAMA in Afghanistan; UNMIL in Liberia; in addition an IMTF has also been created forSudan). However, the assessment is uneven. While IMTFs have improved communication betweenUN departments and agencies, they have not operated as true decision-making bodies, due partlyto structural and cultural reasons17 and partly to the number of people represented in each IMTF.18

Those difficulties illustrate the persistent obstacles for the United Nations to plan and conduct peaceoperations in a strategic and integrated way, a point that was underlined by several participants.The conflicting relations between DPA and DPKO were also discussed. By extension, it is the lack ofstrategic direction of the United Nations itself that was stigmatised.

On issues that were not implemented, the case of a strategic analysis capacity was discussed duringthe seminar. For some participants, the absence of such a capacity following the rejection of theproposal for an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat continues to be problematic but hassomehow been partly compensated by the joint work of the Department of Political Affairs, the Sit-uation Centre (DPKO), and the Best Practices Unit (DPKO), as well as by a greater openness towards

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14 See MINUCI : Use of Pre-mandate Commitment Authority for Rapid Deployment, After Action Report, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit,UNDPKO, 5 June 2003.

15 See Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the UN Mission in Liberia, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO, April 2004, p.6.16 The Report on the implementation of the Brahimi Report written by William Durch says that the field/headquarters ratios for military

personnel and for civilian police were respectively 0.1 and 0.1% in mid-2000 (32 persons for 27,365 military personnel ; 9 for 8,641 forcivilian police), but 0.2 and 0.4% in September 2003. William Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle, Moira Shanahan, The Brahimi Reportand the Future of UN Peace Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 2003, p.55.

17 See on this William Durch, op.cit., pp. xix-xxii, and pp. 47-50.18 Initially, the IMTF constituted for Liberia counted more than 50 people.

the policy community. As for information issues, several points were discussed. One was the need todistinguish, when talking about information at the United Nations, between what would be a gen-uine intelligence capacity which is hardly conceivable and a structure that would work mainly onopen sources which may draw less suspicion. A second point was the distinction between informa-tion gathering at the strategic level (Secretariat) and at the tactical level (in the field); the two lev-els require different means and respond to different needs. The third item was the linkage estab-lished between guaranteeing a certain level of security for UN personnel, which is a growing concernfollowing the August 2003 Baghdad attack, and having access to some sort of information. One par-ticipant said that the resistance expressed on those different issues by developed countries four yearsago was not as strong today.

In brief, the fact that DPKO is now better-equipped and structured than it was in 2000 was largelyacknowledged. Yet, the question to know whether a reinforced DPKO was in a better position toplan and run peace operations than it was four years ago was also raised, with some participants ex-pressing certain doubts as to the link between structure and performance.

Here again, the assessment of UN potential varies depending upon the level of complexity of the op-erations. If the improvements observed are undoubtedly valuable, they may not be sufficient to en-able the United Nations to perform at the upper-level of the peacekeeping spectrum (robust peace-keeping), or to run as many as 16 operations involving more than 55,000 personnel. By the sametoken, if the ability of the United Nations to deploy troops rapidly depends on the existence and ef-fectiveness of mechanisms, such an ability will remain conditional upon the readiness of states tomake assets and troops available rapidly. Again, the inability or unwillingness of states to committroops (illustrated by the difficulties to improve the UN Stand-by Arrangement System UNSAS)poses the limits to the implementation of the Brahimi Report, regardless of the degree to whichmechanisms have been improved.

4. PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

The Brahimi Report came about partly as a response to the failure of the United Nations in Somaliaand in Rwanda. It was also released at a time when the United Nations was becoming increasinglyinvolved in operations on the African continent (with UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, MONUC in the DRCand UNMEE19 in Ethiopia/Eritrea being created in 1999/2000) and when it was becoming apparentthat Africa would become the main theatre for different kinds of peace support activities (not onlyUN-led).

Indeed, the many conflicts that have touched Africa since the end of the Cold War have led to an im-portant UN involvement at different levels of the crisis management spectrum and by different UNbodies. In recent years, the Security Council spent between 35% and 42% of its meetings discussingAfrican issues.20 In 2001, 20 out of 52 (38%) Security Council resolutions dealt with Africa, in 2002,26 out of 68 (38%), and in 2003, 35 out of 67 (52%). On the ground, besides the significant and long-standing implication of UN agencies, the United Nations has been involved in Africa through the cre-ation of three operations (In Liberia, Ivory Coast and Burundi) out of five operations created in total

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19 UNMEE : UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.20 In 2001, 81 of 191 Security Council meetings were on African issues (42%); in 2002, 84 out of 237 (35%); in 2003, 75 out of 207 (36%).

Figures given by Jane Boulden in The Role of the Security Council and Regional Organisations in Peace Consolidation, Working paperof the Consolidation of Peace in Africa Project, Oxford: Centre for International Studies, 2004.

since the release of the Brahimi Report. As of June 2004, seven out of the 16 UN-led operations arein Africa,21 with 47,315 out of the 55,457 military personnel and civilian police deployed22 being sta-tioned on the continent, yielding a percentage of 85.3%.

However, such an activity does not inform about the quality of the UN involvement and about theimplementation, specifically in Africa, of the Brahimi Report.

Two levels of analysis can be distinguished here: a strategic level, dealing with the UN role in Africa andthe place of the Brahimi Report in this context; and a more practical level, dealing with the imple-mentation, within operations deployed in Africa, of the technical recommendations of the Report.

As far as the practical level is concerned, given the importance of Africa for UN operations, most ofthe recommendations of the Brahimi panel that have been implemented have found applications inAfrica. The already mentioned Rapid Deployment Teams (RDT) mechanism, Pre-Mandate Commit-ment Authority (PMCA), Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), and Integrated Mission Task Force(IMTF)23 were all somehow implemented in the case of UNMIL in Liberia, which was the first majorUN operation since the release of the Brahimi Report.24 The MINUCI and then the UNOCI in IvoryCoast have also resorted to those newly-created mechanisms.

Concerning the strategic level, the Brahimi Report was criticised during the seminar for not beingsufficiently focused on the security needs of Africa in general and for having neglected the relationsbetween the United Nations and regional/sub-regional organisations in particular,25 which stands incontrast to the mandate of the High-Level Panel. Most importantly, the insistence of the Report re-garding the fact that the United Nations should perhaps not launch missions where the chances ofsuccess are too low instead of undertaking missions doomed to fail was sometimes perceived inAfrica as further evidence of a UN reluctance to get involved in African conflicts.

The linkage between the implementation of the Brahimi Report (in particular its technical aspects)and an increased ability of the United Nations to do peacekeeping in Africa was also questioned, asthe politics of peacekeeping in Africa often seem to be more important than technical and lo-gistical constraints.26 As an example, the need to deploy more troops in the DRC, advocated bysome participants, was challenged by others who, given the size of the country, stressed instead thenecessity to address the problem at the political level.

Six factors were identified as having contributed to success in UN operations in Africa: the willing-ness of local parties to cooperate; the existence of strategies to deal with spoilers; the absence ofconflict-fuelling economic resources; the cooperation of regional players; the cessation of supportto local parties by external actors; and the good quality leadership of UN missions.27

In West Africa, the pre-eminent role of ECOWAS28 since the early 1990s but noticeably in settingup operations before the United Nations took over in the three cases of Sierra Leone, Liberia andIvory Coast, was presented as an illustration of the division of labour between the United Nationsand a regional organisation as much as evidence of a failure of the United Nations to intervenein the first place.

Furthermore, the already discussed commitment gap is particularly acute in Africa, where the West-ern reluctance to commit troops under a UN command is reinforced by the mere idea to be military in-

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21 There are also plans for an operation in Sudan.22 UN Website, June 2004.23 In Liberia, after an IMTF was created and proved to be of little added-value, a Liberia Working Group was created by DPKO.24 On Liberia, see Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the UN Mission in Liberia, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO,

April 2004.25 The word Africa appears only twice in the Brahimi Report.26 Argument developed by Adekeye Adebajo in a paper distributed for the conference.27 Argument developed by Adekeye Adebajo in a paper distributed for the conference.28 Economic Community of West African States.

volved in Africa. At best, Western states are ready to commit troops for short periods of time and undera national or quasi-national command (UK in Sierra Leone in 2000; France and the EU in the DRC in thesummer 2003), an approach that is easily associated with some sort of neo-colonial policy.

This situation reveals a certain ambivalence in some African positions. On the one hand, the com-mitment gap is severely deplored, i.e. Western indifference to African conflicts is stigmatised. On theother hand, Western military involvement in Africa, especially on the part of France or the UK, is veryoften suspected of resulting from self-interest. It was however stressed in the workshop that whatwas feared in Africa was Western indifference rather than Western self-interest. This ambivalence isalso reflected in the debate on the extent to which African conflicts should be handled by Africansrather than by external powers or institutions. This, in turn, leads to the issue of the role of regionalhegemons,29 mainly Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa, in conflict man-agement. While their involvement conditions the strength of regional organisations (respectivelyECOWAS and SADC30), it also implies regional power politics that may have counter-productive ef-fects. By and large, a UN presence guarantees a certain degree of impartiality that is harder to getwith regional actors. In any case, the issue of how intervening states or institutions are perceived wassaid to be of paramount importance. As it is unrealistic to rule out self-interested interventions, onekey aspect is to ensure the highest degree of legitimacy.

5. KEY CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE PEACE OPERATIONS

The issue of the role of peace operations in the management of security in future missions was large-ly discussed during the seminar. The following points were given particular attention.

T h e d e m a n d f o r p e a c e k e e p i n g w i l l c o n t i n u e . The persisting existence of peaceoperations as a way to deal with conflicts was widely acknowledged, as was the role of the UnitedNations in this respect. One participant said that UN peace operations are enduring features of in-ternational order. This was however challenged by two kinds of arguments. First, one participantdeplored that, through peace operations, the international community was spending too much timeand energy on the management of the consequences of the conflict, while overlooking the politicsof the conflict. The case of the DRC was taken as an illuminating example where, given the size ofthe country, the international community would be better off dealing with the countries that pullthe strings in Eastern Congo rather than increasing the UN military presence. Second, one participantnoticed that one might witness a decrease in the number of peacekeeping operations in the near fu-ture, as the number of conflicts is also decreasing.

U N r e f o r m i s a l i m i t e d r e a l i t y . It was clear during the seminar that the reform of theUnited Nations had become a reality in the sense that many of the Brahimi Report recommendationshave been or are being implemented and that this process has had a valuable impact on the abilityof the United Nations to plan and conduct peace operations.

However, the United Nations is still very much constrained by two sets of realities, one conjunctural,one structural: the conjunctural one is the current level of deployment of troops, which places theUnited Nations in a situation of overstretch and sheds new light on the implementation of the Brahi-

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29 Expression of a participant.30 Southern African Development Community.

mi Report; the structural one is the level of state support, which is a sine qua non to effective UNpeacekeeping while remaining too weak in the developed world. Linked with these two constraintsis the fact that the reform process is only one element of a coherent UN peacekeeping policy. Oneparticipant noted that the intrinsic nature of the Organisation and of the activity of peacekeepingimplied that one has to accept that some operations will fail. Such an assumption should lead to thegreatest caution, not to retrenchment.

In any event, one key challenge for the United Nations will remain to be able to conduct robustpeacekeeping, i.e. to use force in some circumstances; it is largely on this ability that the United Na-tions will be judged.

S t a t e s u p p o r t a n d n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . The implementation of the Brahimi Reportwill remain limited by the extent to which states are disposed to support the process. In addition tothe key role of Western states in supporting UN operations politically, financially, logistically, andmilitarily, the Security Council remains at the centre of the process. The implication of the SecurityCouncil in actually dealing with a conflict at the political level before it decides to create an opera-tion remains instrumental. The role of the United States was particularly stressed here. By the sametoken, once an operation is established, sustained attention by the Security Council is crucial, thoughrarely observed. However, looking at a UN operation as the result of a compromise within the Secu-rity Council and looking at it as an answer to a particular conflict are two different issues. In otherwords, the politics of the Security Council may be different from the peacekeeping needs of a givencountry. No doubt that this has an impact on the implementation of the Brahimi Report.

More generally, while it is assumed that peace operations are being launched out of self-interests,and that power politics will remain a key feature of international relations, the very notion of inter-est is to be reviewed as a dynamic concept that integrates many different elements, of an objectiveand subjective, rational and irrational nature. Consequently, it is the concept of intervention that isslowly evolving, along with the evolution of the concept of interest. This evolution makes for exam-ple that the protection of civilians in peace operations will be increasingly difficult to exclude frommandates. In this context, the question of how one can enhance the political attention of key statesfor conflict situations is of paramount importance.

S t r a t e g i e s / I n t e g r a t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n s . The need for the United Nations to look atpeacekeeping in a strategic way, integrating short-term and long-term parameters and involving thewide range of actors of peace support activities, was presented as generally missing but of key im-portance. In addition to troop contributing countries and the other actors involved, the SecurityCouncil has an important role to play in this respect. Concurrently, the need for an integrated ap-proach to peace operations at the UN level was stressed. The very nature of contemporary peace op-erations, that combine a wide range of interrelated civilian and military activities (interposition; dis-armament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); rule of law; institution building; humanitarianaid; economic reconstruction; etc.), makes an integrated and coordinated approach a condition ofcoherence and success. Nevertheless, the meaning of integrated was not always clear, while theimplied definition may not be acceptable for all actors participating in a peace operation. One par-ticipant warned against the risk of a humanitarian rebellion from some humanitarian actors incase the confusion about their role and their politicisation further developed. At the UN Secretariat,inter-departmental coordination remains problematic, as tensions between DPKO and DPA attest.

14

In the same vein, the clarity of the mandate, which is one of the key objectives of the Brahimi Re-port, is to be combined with the definition of an exit strategy, based on an identification of the el-ements that constitute a sustainable peace, and therefore permit the process of hand over to localauthorities. It also requires a sustained effort from the interveners, after public attention has start-ed to fade away.

At these different levels, the necessity to get good quality leadership was mentioned on several oc-casions. In particular, it is important that Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs)and other high-ranking personnel be appointed as early as possible in the process of establishing anoperation.

Finally, following the Baghdad bomb attacks on the UN mission in August 2003, while it was large-ly recognised that security of UN personnel has to be addressed with the utmost rigour, some voic-es also expressed the concern that too much of an emphasis on security would hamper the ability ofthe United Nations to fulfil its mandate. One participant said that the United Nations should avoidthe bunker approach. This could also lead to increased tensions between humanitarian actors andpersonnel in charge of security issues.

Divis ion of labour and regional cooperation. The question of the role of the UnitedNations in peace operations raises that of the role of other actors involved in peacekeeping. In Africain particular, the issue of the division of labour between the United Nations and regional/sub-regionalorganisations was raised as necessitating further clarification. This is needed because regional andsub-regional organisations (the African Union and ECOWAS in particular) have acquired some capac-ities in peace support, and are likely to play an even more important role in the future. Such a clari-fication must deal with legal issues (mandates, use of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), operational is-sues (which organisation is in charge of which activities?), as well as sequencing (which organisationshould go first?). Among other things, the involvement of the peace-implementer as early as pos-sible in the peace-making process is indispensable in the event the phases involve different actors.Furthermore, looking at the division of labour implies that an analysis of the capacities and mandatesof regional/sub-regional organisations is conducted. In the case of African organisations, mandatesare often unclear, while capacities remain extremely weak, despite recent improvements.

Coincidently, the fact that a regional approach to conflicts should be favoured whenever possiblewas widely accepted. Two issues are to be distinguished here: one is the need to empower regionaland sub-regional organisations so as to enable them to deal by themselves with the conflicts of theirregion; the other is to adopt a regional approach to conflicts that are closely inter-related and theresolution of which cannot be completed individually (in this case, the regional approach is not nec-essarily conducted by a regional organisation). This is what is advocated in West Africa with the syn-ergies sought among the three UN operations (UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMIL in Liberia, UNOCIin Ivory Coast).

Beyond Africa, the division of labour between the United Nations on the one side, NATO and the EUon the other side, is also to be clarified. Especially as those regional institutions do not considerthemselves as Chapter VIII regional arrangements and as they no longer intervene only in their ownregions, as the NATO operation in Afghanistan and the EU operation in the DRC have demonstrated.

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PROGRAMME OF THE SEMINAR

SUNDAY 20 JUNE 2004

Opening DinnerKeynote Speaker: Hans DAHLGREN, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

MONDAY 21 JUNE 2004

Welcome and IntroductionGrard STOUDMANN, Director, GCSPThierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSP

Opening Address: David MALONE, President, International Peace Academy, New York

FIRST SESSION WHERE ARE WE? POLITICAL CONTEXT FOUR YEARS AFTER

Chair: Fred TANNER, Deputy Director, Head of Academic Affairs, GCSPSpeaker: Mats BERDAL, Professor of Security and Development, Kings College LondonDiscussants: Eric SCHWARTZ, Chief, Executive Office of the UN High Commissioner for

Human Rights, GenevaThierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSP

SECOND SESSION WHAT HAS BEEN DONE? THE UN REFORM FROM THE INSIDE

Chair: Anne DEIGHTON, Faculty Member, GCSPSpeaker: David HARLAND, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UN, New YorkDiscussants: William DURCH, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.

Joan LINK, Head, Conflict Prevention Unit, UN Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

THIRD SESSION WHAT IS BEING DONE ON THE GROUND?

PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA IN LIGHT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRAHIMI REPORT

Chair: Jacques BAUD, Centre for International Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bern

Speaker: Adekeye ADEBAJO, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape TownDiscussants: Adedeji EBO, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Patricia LEWIS, Director, UNIDIR, Geneva

FOURTH SESSION WHAT DO WE DO NEXT?

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE REFORM OF THE UN: THE WAY AHEAD

Chair: Thierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSPSpeaker: Neil MACFARLANE, Professor of International Relations, Oxford University, and

Faculty Member, GCSPDiscussants: Piper CAMPBELL, Counsellor (Refugees and Migration), Permanent Mission of the

US to the UN, GenevaPascal TEIXEIRA, Deputy Director, Department of United Nations and International Organisations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

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ANNEX I

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Adekeye ADEBAJO, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape TownJean-Pierre BADET, MG, Swiss Armed ForcesMaciej BARTKOWSKI, HEI Visiting ResearcherJacques BAUD, Centre for International Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BernMats BERDAL, Professor of Security and Development, Kings College LondonPiper CAMPBELL, Counsellor (Refugees and Migration), Permanent Mission of the US to the UN, GenevaHans DAHLGREN, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, SwedenVincent DE KYTSPOTTER, French Ministry of Defence, Course Participant, GCSPAnne DEIGHTON, Faculty Member, GCSPWilliam DURCH, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.Adedeji EBO, Senior Fellow/Coordinator, Africa Working Group, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), GenevaAndrew HALE-BYRNE, British Ministry of Defence, Course Participant, GCSPHeiner HNGGI, DCAF, GenevaFredrik HANSSON, Swedish Armed Forces, Course Participant, GCSPDavid HARLAND, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, United Nations, New YorkJonathan HEPBURN, Faculty Assistant, GCSPNicolas KACZOROWSKI, Deputy to the Director of Special Programmes, GCSPUlrich LEHNER, Director, Political Division III, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BernAnnette LEGUTKE, Researcher, Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of HamburgPatricia LEWIS, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), GenevaJoan LINK, Head, Conflict Prevention Unit, UN Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, LondonNeil MACFARLANE, Professor of International Relations, Oxford University, and Faculty Member, GCSPDavid MALONE, President, International Peace Academy, New YorkVictor MAUER, Senior Researcher, Centre for Research in Security Policy, ZurichSergey MURSANKOV, Military Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, GenevaNicole PINTER-KRAINER, Research Officer, GCSPKarl-Heinz RAMBKE, Faculty Member, GCSPJean-Marc RICKLI, PhD Candidate, Oxford and President, Geneva University Strategic Studies GroupEric SCHWARTZ, Chief, Executive Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, GenevaSergiusz SIDOROWICZ, Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Course Participant, GCSPGrard STOUDMANN, Director, GCSPFred TANNER, Deputy Director, Head of Academic Affairs, GCSPThierry TARDY, Faculty Member, GCSPPascal TEIXEIRA, Deputy Director, Department of UN and International Organisations, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, FranceSandra TYLER-HAYWOOD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, LondonErik WINDMAR, Faculty Member, GCSP

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ANNEX II

RESEARCH AND SEMINAR ACTIVITIES

To complement and reinforce its training, the GCSP is involved in research and seminar activities re-lated to international security issues. Research is conducted by individual faculty members as well ascollectively with experts from other institutions. In addition, and on demand, the GCSP provides ex-pertise to the Swiss authorities, including to the Federal Parliament.

GCSP research and seminar activities, conducted in close co-operation with institutions active in se-curity areas, include round tables and meetings with the participation of experts from the GCSP andaffiliated institutions, and eminent leaders presenting their views and insights. Most notably, thesejoint activities, with such institutions as the RAND Corporation and the International Security Stud-ies at Yale University, are regular events that generate widely circulated discussion papers.

The outcome of these topical research and seminar activities are published in GCSP Occasional Pa-pers and in relevant journals.

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Geneva Centre for Secur ity Pol icyCentre de Politique de Scurit,GenveGenfer Zentrum fr Sicherheitspolitik

Avenue de la Paix 7bis (WMO/OMM Building)P.O. Box 1295 . CH-1211 Geneva 1Tel. +41 22 906 16 00 . Fax +41 22 906 16 49

www.gcsp.ch [email protected]

THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) IS ENGAGED IN 4 AREAS OF ACTIVITIES:

TRAINING diplomats, military officers and other civil servants in international security policy

RESEARCH and seminars to support the training activities

CONFERENCES and OUTREACHto promote dialogue on various security-related issues

NETWORKING in the security field

tardy report

Documents