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TatiDoyleCOMP11612/6/17

TwitterBotsandRussianPlots:PreventingaReoccurrenceoftheRussianInfluenceCampaign

ontheUSElection

AbstractThispaperexaminespotentialmethodstopreventarepeatoftheRussiangovernment’sinterferenceintheUnitedStates’(US)electionontherelationsbetweenthetwonations.

VladimirPutinorderedaninfluencecampaigntoundermineUSdemocracyandharmHillaryClinton’schancesofelection.Thiscampaigncombinedcovertintelligenceoperations,paidsocialmediausers,andstate-fundedmedia.AlthoughitisimpossibletopinpointwhatexactlyledtoDonaldTrump’selection,arecentinvestigationhasshownthatupto150millionAmericanswereexposedtoRussian-createdcontentonFacebookalone,makingupoverhalfofthe

Americanseligibletovote(LeeandKent).Inordertopreventforeigninfluencefromaffectingtheoutcomeofanotherelection,itisimportantthattheUStightenitsrestrictionsonwhocanplacepoliticaladvertisementsandthatboththegovernmentandpoliticalcampaignsupgradetheircybersecuritymeasures.Intheprivatesector,thecompanieswhoseproductswereusedtospreadRussianpropagandashouldpreventfakeaccountsfrombeingcreatedaswellasincrease

transparencyregardingadvertisements.

Introduction

TheadventofsocialmediaandtheInternethasfundamentallychangedpolitical

campaigning.Before,thepubliconlyhadaccesstoTV,radio,andfriendsandfamily.Itwas

difficulttoreachmillionsofpeopleatonce,andTVadswereveryclearlysponsored–theyare

evenrequiredtostatewhopaidfortheadvertisementattheend.Today,theaverageuser

spendsovertwohoursadayonsocialmedia(Mander).Thecontentonsocialmediaoften

comesfromunknownsources,ex.tweetsthathavebeenretweetedorFacebookads.Thismass

exposuretoinformationhascreatedanewplayingfieldforpoliticalcampaignswhere

informationaboutacandidatequicklygoes“viral”–oftenregardlessoftheveracityofthe

information.Thenatureofsocialmediahascreatedaworldinwhichfakenewscanspread

rapidly.TheRussiangovernmenttookadvantageofsocialmediaandusedbothpaidadsand

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fakeuserstospreadfalseinformationaboutcandidatesandcreateafalseimpressionofpeers’

opinions.Beyondsocialmedia,Russiaalsotookadvantageoflackofattentiontocybersecurity

issues,suchasweakpasswordsandlackofawarenessabouttacticssuchasspearphishing.For

example,byexploitingavulnerabilityinanonlinevotingregistrationformfield,nearly90,00

Illinoisvoterrecordswerecompromisedandtherewasatleastonesuccessfulattemptto

modifyvoterinformation(Calabresi).Althoughtheinfluenceofthesestrategiesisnot

completelyquantifiable,itappearstobesignificant–enoughsothattheCIAreleaseda

declassifiedreportdetailingtheknownextentofRussianactions.Inthewakeoftheemergence

ofthisinformation,theUSgovernmentistakingadeep-diveintohowtoregulatetechnology

companiesaswellasitsowncybersecurity.

ToTheCommunity

Althoughcybersecurityisgenerallyassociatedwith“hacking”andahighlevelof

technicalknowledge,socialengineeringisakeypartofmanycyberattacks.AlthoughtheUS’

weakcybersecurityiswellknown,the2016electionrevealedanewvulnerabilitytosocial

engineering(Whittaker).TheRussianinfluencecampaignisanexampleofacombinedstrategy

ofusingbothtechnicalknowledge(ex.gainingaccessvoterrecords)andsocialengineering(ex.

creatinganti-HillaryClintongroupsonFacebook).Influencinganation’spoliticsisoneofthe

highestformsofinfluencethatcanbewielded,andcouldbeusedtounderminethesecurityof

anentirenation.Politicallyweaponizedsocialengineeringisakeycybersecurityissue.Thus,is

imperativethatweaddresssocialengineering,itseffects,andhowtocombat“blackhat”social

engineering.

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Background

AftertheColdWarandthefalloftheBerlinwall,Russiawasextremelyweak.Itwentfrom

beingadominantsuperpowertoscramblingtomakeendsmeet.Duringthattime,theWest

prosperedandexpanded,creatingaperceivedlinkagebetweentheWest’sprosperityand

Russia’sfailure.Afteritsrecoveryandsubsequenteconomicsuccessintheearly2000s,

VladimirPutinemergedasastrongleaderdeterminedtoputRussiabackinitsplaceonthe

globalstagewhereithadonceplayedacentralrole.ThegovernmentnarrativeinRussiaisanti-

American,andtheUSisportrayedascontinuallyattemptingtoundermineRussia’sprosperity

andsecurity.Russiathereforeseesitsactionsascorrectingpastwrongsandcombating

Westernencroachment(Rumer).

Russia’smilitary,whilesignificantlylargerandmoreadvancedthanmanyofitsneighbors,

remainsweakincomparisontoNATO’sforces(Meakins).Sinceitlacksthehardpowerto

directlycompetewithWesternpowers,ithasturnedtoalternativestrategiestoincreaseits

security.Unlikeademocraticsystemofgovernment,therearenochecksonwhatRussia’s

governmentofficialscando.Furthermore,theRussiangovernmentdoesnotseemtobe

concernedwithitsinternationalordomesticreputationandcanthusactextremelyboldly

(Rumer).TheinfluencecampaignontheUSelectionwasanexampleofabrazentacticthatwas

lowincostandhighinimpact–itwasfinanciallycheap,instilleddistrustintheAmerican

politicalsystem,andheightenedexistingdivisionsbetweenAmericans.

TheWorkingsoftheInfluenceCampaign

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Russia’sinfluencecampaignwasamulti-prongedstrategythatmadeuseofspear

phishing,paidads/trollsonsocialmedia,andstate-sponsorednewsoutletRussiaToday,orRT.

Spearphishingis“anemailtargetedataspecificindividualordepartmentwithinan

organizationthatappearstobefromatrustedsource”–91%ofcyberattacksbeginwithaspear

phishingemail(TrendMicoqtd.byKnowBe4).Spearphishingisoneofthemostnotorious

attacksthatemployssocialengineering–peopleoftendon’tthinktwiceaboutclickingonalink

ifitcomesfromwhattheyconsideratrustedsource.Inoneincident,Russianactorssentemails

toemployeesofaUSelectionsoftwarecompanyfromtheemailaddress

noreplyautomaticservice@gmail.comthatincludedaspoofedGoogleAlertemail,whichwould

redirecttheusertoamaliciousdomain.Itislikelythatatleastoneaccountwascompromised.

Inanotherincident,Russianactorsusedtheemailaddressvr.election@gmail.comwiththe

usernamesettobethepreviouslytargetedUScompany.Theythenemailed122people

associatedwithlocalgovernmentorganizationswithaWorddocumentcontainingamalicious

script(Coleetal).Thesendingofadocument/programthatseemsrelevantorusefulwhile

concealinganattackagainsttheenduseriscalleda“Trojanhorse”.Althoughit’sunclearwhat

thescriptdid,theNSAreporttheorizesitallowedtheattackertomaintainpersistentaccessto

thecomputers(Coleetal).

ThistypeofattackwasmostlikelythereasonthatRussianactorswereabletogain

accesstovoterdatabasesandevenattempttoalterthem(Dent).JohnPodesta,HillaryClinton’s

campaignchairman,wasthesubjectofaninfamousspearphishingattack.Thisparticularattack

resultedinhisaccountbeingcompromisedandpotentiallyinthecompromiseofthe

DemocraticNationalConvention(DNC)databasethatledto10yearsofHillaryClinton’semails

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beingpublishedonWikiLeaks,whichhadanextremelyharmfuleffectonhercredibility

(Vaas).Theuseofspearphishingasatacticwasevidentlyhighlysuccessful,giventheamountof

informationRussianactorswereabletoobtainandstrategicallyrelease.Thesuccessofthese

attacksdemonstratedalackofcybersecurityaccountabilityinourgovernmentandpolitical

partyinstitutions.AlthoughspearphishingislikelynottheonlytechniqueusedbyRussian

actorstogainaccesstosystems,itistheonlypubliclydocumentedmethodthusfar.

Beyondtheuseofspearphishing,whichisawell-knowntechnique,Russianactors

utilizedsocialmediatoinfluencepoliticsinanunprecedentedway.Theymadeuseofbothtroll

farms,whichareorganizationsthatemploypeopletooperatenumeroussocialmediaaccounts

tocreateafalseimpressionofawidely-heldopinion,andpaidadstargetedatdifferent

demographics.Belowaretwoexamplesofadsthatwereplaced:

Figure1

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Figure2

Purposelyopposingcontentwasposted,apparentlytoincreasecontroversyoverissues.For

example,thisadcondemnspolicebrutality:

Figure3

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WhilethisoneindicatesthatBlackLivesMatter(acivilgroupagainstpolicebrutality)waskilling

policeofficers:

Figure4

EmployeesoftheRussiantrollfarmcalledthe“InternetResearchAgency”postedsocial

mediacontentsimilartotheaboveadsfocusingondivisivesocialissuesintheUS,suchascivil

rights.Theyevenwentsofarastoorganizebothananti-Islamandpro-Islamprotestinthe

samelocationatthesametime,presumablytoratchetuptensionsbetweenthetwogroups

(Bertrand).Beyondthat,theypostedpoliticalcontentthatappearedtobeauthoredbyother

Americancitizensorlocalnewsoutlets,usingTwitterusernameslike“OaklandOnline”and

“PatriotBlake”(Collinsetal).

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ThepaidadsthatRussiaemployedtargeteddivisivesocialissuesaswell,withcontent

spanningtopicsfromimmigrationtoguncontrol.Theirargumentsfellonbothsides,butwere

largelyaimedatheighteningtensionsonpoliticalissuesandincreasinganationaldivideover

policy.AlthoughstatisticshavenotyetemergedonwhatpercentageofadstargetedHillary

Clinton,theanecdotalevidencethathasemergedthusfarsupportsthehypothesisthatads

referencingHillaryClintonlargelycastherasevilandadsreferencingDonaldTrumplargelycast

himasafixforabrokensystem(Shane).SomeadsevenusedBernieSanders’quotesasa

rallyingcallagainstClinton.Boththetrollfarmsandthepaidadswereapparentlyintendedto

increasenationaldivisionoverhot-buttonissuesaswellasincreasenegativesentimentabout

Clinton.

RussiaalsousedthetraditionalmediaoutletofRussiaToday,rebrandedasRT,topush

theKremlin’sagendaandunderminefaithintheUSpoliticalprocess.RTrepeatedtheideathat

theUSelectionprocesswasundemocraticandcouldnotbetrusted.Theoutletalsoheavily

criticizedHillaryClintonwhilepraisingDonaldTrump.Althoughtheoutletattemptstoframe

itselfasaUSnewsoutlet,itisinfactaKremlin-controlledorganization(IntelligenceCommunity

Assessment).

Betweenthestrategicuseofspearphishingtoobtainkeyinformation,theuseoftrollfarms

andpaidadsonsocialmediatoinfluencepublicopinion,andtheKremlin-backedagenda

posingasaUSnewsoutlet,Russiawasabletoconductahighlysuccessfulinfluencecampaign

onUSpolitics.Thiscampaignincreasednationaldivision,instilledpublicdoubtinAmerican

democracy,andmayhaveswayedtheresultoftheUSelection.Allthreeoftheseconsequences

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aregrave,anditisimperativethattheUStakealonghardlookatbothitsprivateandpublic

sectors.

HowtoPreventAReoccurrence

Inordertoaddressthesecurityrisksthatthisinfluencecampaign–andthethreatofit

happeningagain–posestotheUS,severalactionareasmustbeaddressed.First,theUS

governmentmustcomprehensivelyoverhaulitscybersecurity.Currently,only41%ofuser

accountsat23civilianagenciesrequiresecurecredentialstoaccessagencysystemsandtheUS

hassufferedaseriesofembarrassinghacksbyforeignagents(GAOqtd.byGardnerandCoons).

Thesestatisticsrepresentanembarrassinglylowbarforthesecurityoffederalagencies.For

starters,governmentagenciesshouldatleastrequiresecurecredentialsaswellasimplement

twofactorauthentication,createmandatedstandardsforpasswordsecurity,andask

employeestochangetheirpasswordsregularly.Additionally,allgovernmentemployeesshould

betrainedonsecurityrisksandhowtolookoutforthem–humanerroristhetopcauseof

securitybreaches(Rosenbachetal).Thesetypesofregulationswouldlargelypreventspear

phishingattacksandhelpkeepgovernmentdatasecure.

Thesestepswouldbehighincostandveryslowtoimplement;governmentagenciesare

notoriouslyresistanttochange,especiallywithregardstotechnology.However,theUS

government’sevidentlackofattentiontocybersecurityisarguablyoneofthegreatestsecurity

threatscurrentlyfacingthenation.Therefore,itisimperativethatcybersecurityissuesare

addresseddespitethehighcostintimeandmoney.Beyondcredentialregulations,authority

overcybersecurityissuesshouldbecondensedintoasingularagency.TheUSCyberCommand,

orCYBERCOM,shouldbeseparatedfromtheNationalSecurityAgency(NSA).Itselevationtoa

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unifiedcombatantcommandisthestepintherightdirection,andJamesMattisisalready

consideringseparatingCYBERCOMfromtheNSA(GaramoneandFerdinando).Althoughthis

measureinvolvesmoreredtape,itisnecessaryinordertoaddressarapidlychangingandmore

threateningInternetlandscape.TheUSalsoneedstopassacomprehensivecybersecuritybill

addressingcybercrimeandnew,Internet-basedthreatsthathaveariseninthepastcouple

decades.Althoughthisbillwilllikelytakealongtimetodraftandbevotedintolaw,theprocess

ofcreatingitshouldstartnow.

Besides,itisnotonlythefederalgovernmentthatneedstooverhaulitscybersecurity

practices;HillaryClinton’spoliticalcampaignaswellastheDemocraticNationalConvention

sufferedthemostsignificantdatabreachesoftheelectioncycle.Attheveryleast,campaigns

shouldmovetraintheirstaffonbestpractices,movetheirdatatothecloud,requiretwofactor

authentication,implementpasswordstandards,andplanforsecuritybreaches(Rosenbachet

al).Havinganetworkintrusionsystem,suchasaCanary,isalsoagoodidea(TheGrugq).Hillary

Clinton’sleakedemails,publishedbyWikiLeaks,hadanextremelynegativeeffectonpublic

perceptionofherasacandidatebecausetheyremindedthepublicthatshefailedtousea

secureemailserver.Additionally,mediaoutletswereabletousequotesfromherpersonal

emailstoportrayherhowevertheywanted.Takingstepstomitigatethethreatofcampaign

databreachescanpreventpartiesfromstealing(andpossiblysubsequentlyreleasing)datato

furtherapoliticalobjective.

TheUSalsoneedstocommittopaperballotsandscrapelectronicvotingforthe

moment.TherewasevidencethatvoterdatawasalteredinIllinois–althoughnovoting

recordswereknowntobemodified,futureattackscouldhavesuchconsequences.Current

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electronicvotingsystemsarecurrentlytooinsecure–theyrunonoutdatedtechnologythatis

susceptibletomalware(Barrett).Luckily,mostvotingsystemsstillrunonpaperballots,butthe

commitmenttonottakingvotingdigitalmustbereaffirmedandelectronicvotingshouldbe

phasedout.

TheUSCongressshouldtakethestepofoutlawingforeigners(nonUScitizens)from

givingmoneytosponsorpoliticaladsonsocialmediaplatforms.Thislawisalreadyineffectfor

normaladvertisementsontheradioortelevision(Ingram).Sincesocialmediaisanewformof

media,thesamerulesshouldapplytosocialmedia.However,implementingsuchregulations

willbeextremelychallenging.Itisunclearwhatconstitutesa“politicalad”;isanadvertisement

aboutimmigrationthatimplicitlyreferencesacurrentelectoraldebatepolitical?Whataboutan

advertisementdiscussingfreespeech?Furthermore,ifasocialmediacompanyonlyrequires

officialcampaignorganizationstodiscloseadvertisementfunding,anyactorcouldstillplaceads

thataffecttheoutcomeofacampaignwithoutbeingassociatedwithacampaign.

AsofDecember2017,thereisabillinCongressrequiringdigitalplatformswithover1

millionuserstologelection-relatedcommunicationsbyanyactorspendingover$10,000on

politicalads.However,accordingtoIssieLapowskyofWired,“Settingathresholdof$10,000

alsoallowsanyonetodevelopmultipleFacebookpages,buy$9,999ofadstopromotetheir

cause,andremainunnoticed.”Furthermore,onecouldcreateafakenewssiteandpromotethe

postsofthatsite,havingasimilareffect.Althoughpagesreportedtobepostingfakecontent

aresupposedlybanned,thatdoesn’tpreventthecontentfromspreadinginitially(Lapowsky).

FacebookandTwitterareextremelylarge–Facebookhas1.9billionusersandTwitterhas328

million–makingthemextremelydifficulttoregulate.Despitethesechallenges,itiscertainly

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worthputtingsomesortoflimitonforeignagentsbuyingpoliticalads,ifonlytoslowtheir

spread.Socialmediaplatformsshouldalsoberequiredtodisclosewhopurchaseswhat

advertisementsaswellaswhatadvertisementsarebeingshown,inordertoincrease

transparencyaroundtheissue.

Itisalsotheresponsibilityofsocialmediaplatformstopreventthecreationoffake

accounts.CreationofasocialmediaaccountonTwitterorFacebookshouldrequiresomelevel

ofidentityverificationtostopthespreadoftrollfarmsandtheirapparentlysignificant

influence.

The2016electionisthebiggestwake-upcalltheUShasfacedinregardstocybersecurity.

Despitenumerousembarrassinghacks,theUShasfailedtoreformitscybersecurity.

Additionally,thepotentialimpactofsocialmediaonthepoliticalsystemwasmassively

underestimated.Takingstepstopreventareoccurrenceofwhathappenedin2016isonlythe

beginningofwhatshouldbeacomprehensivelookatnationalsecurityinthecybersphere.

Conclusion

Ultimately,itisclearthattheUShadseveralkeyvulnerabilitiesthatalloweditscitizens

tofallvictimtotheRussianinfluencecampaign,whichwashighlycoordinatedandeffective.

Thehopeofaddressingthesevulnerabilitiesthroughacybersecurityupgradeonthepartof

boththeUSgovernmentandpoliticalcampaigns,regulationofsocialmediaplatforms,anda

commitmenttopapervotingisatleastastepontherightpath.Enactingthesemeasureswill

makethenationmoresecureandsetthestageforfuturereformsofthisnature,wherethe

focusisoncybersecurity.However,it’sunclearwhattheramificationsoftheseproposalsmight

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be.Governmentregulationsonsocialmediaplatformswouldbethefirstoftheirkind,andit’s

unclearwhattheywouldmeanforfreespeechandhowmuchtheywouldblurthelinebetween

thepublicandprivatesector.Regardingidentityverificationforthecreationofsocialmedia

accounts,therearesomewhomightbeadverselyaffectedbythisrequirement.Peoplesuchas

refugeeswhonolongerpossessidentitydocumentsorpeopleoftransgenderidentitieswhose

government-issuedidentitiesmaydifferfromtheiridentitiesmightbeunabletoaccesssocial

networksifsucharequirementwereinstituted.Atthecostofkeepingoursocialnetworks

more“secure”,whodoweunwittinglyexclude?Andevenifallofthesesuggestedmeasures

weretaken,theycannotpossiblybetheend-all-be-allofwaystopreventaforeignbodyfrom

interferingintheUSelectionprocess.JudgingbyRussia’sstrategicuseofalternative

(nonmilitary)methodsofinfluencingtheinternationalsystem,the2016electionissurelynot

theendoftheirattemptstodestabilizeandundermineAmericandemocracy.Althoughwe

can’tknowwhatmightcomenext,it’slikelytobeequallyasunprecedented.

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