tax and grant for sub-national government: realities...

International Journal of Social Sciences. Vol. 12, No.2, April – June, 2018

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Tax and Grant for Sub-National Government: Realities,

Challenges and Policy Options

by

Emmanuel A. Onwioduokit and Gabriel E. Otolorin

Department of Economics,

University of Uyo, Uyo, Nigeria

[email protected]; +2348037968534

Abstract This paper examined the realities and challenges facing the subnational governments with a view of offering policy options that will strengthen them in line with modern realities. It also

examined the management and utilization of federal government allocations -grant and tax revenue - and service delivery in selected states in Niger-Delta within the period of 1999 to

2017. The tax collection and practices of subnational government were also investigated in

order to proffer alternative strategic and efficient best practices. Revisiting the tax assignment to the various tiers of government is of utmost necessity in other to achieve visible and all-

encompassing sustainable development in Nigeria. It was recommended that subnational government should monitor the remittance of subnational taxes in order to curb leakages,

diversion and financial misappropriation. The practice of compensating and assigning the

collection of levies to some microscopic few as election compensation and support to the detriment of both the states and local government respectively should be seriously frowned at

and criminalized. Finally, the 13% derivation fund of the Federation Account Allocation

Committee (FAAC) to states should be geared up as obtainable in the 1960s were the proportion of derived revenue retained by the regions was 50%. This is necessary given the

fact that the livelihoods of the people in oil producing areas have been eroded following the degradation of the environment and in line with the principle of resource control as

obtainable in developed nations.

Key Words: Sub-national Government, Fiscal Decentralization, Derivation Fund, and

Restructuring.

JEL codes: D63, E61, E62, H27, H71, H83

1. Introduction

Decentralized systems act as safeguards against the threat of economic

exploitation and opportunistic behaviour of centralized system but this is not the case in

Nigeria. The over concentration of delectable tax sources at the central needs re-

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Onwioduokit, E. A. and Otolorin, G. E.

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examining and rethinking as economic indices in Nigeria in recent time reveals the

height of youth unemployment, poverty, corruption and poor infrastructural development

compared to other federal states.

Nigeria operates a federal system of government which is faction on; the federal,

state and local governments. The revenue sources of the state and local governments

(subnational governments) needed to embark on programmes, comes majorly from IGR

(levies, tenement rate, fines, PIT and income from investment and commercial activities),

government grants (block grant and special grant which are used to support

infrastructural, education and health project respectively) and FAAC.

The revenue which goes to the federal account comes from crude oil sales,

customs and other form of taxes. While 52.68% of the totally collected revenue goes to

the federal government, the states shares 26.72%, whereas 20.60% is transferred to the

local governments, using the horizontal allocation formula, which consider equality,

population, landmass, social developmental factor (number of hospital beds and most

peculiarly, the amount of rainfall in the state) and IGR in the percentage of 40%, 30%,

10%, 10%, 10% respectively, while 13% of the revenue generated from crude oil goes to

the origin states.

A major problem with subnational government depending on FAAC monthly is

that, the desire to be competitive and the motivation to generate more tax and levies

through proactive and productive means is drastically reduced. This might be attributed

that taxes from their citizens must be accounted for and welfares seen. Hence, their

performance or underperformances are not tied to their IGR but FAAC. More so,

subnational government inability to independently finance their budget is largely tied to

the inconsistent funds received from FAAC, which can be favourable at a point and

unfavourable at another as a result of the volatile nature of crude oil prices which the

FAAC majorly depends on.

The taxes generated internally by the majority of the states in Nigeria are

inadequate to fund their subnational budgets making most of the states in Nigeria to be

unable to consistently pay salaries without FAAC allocations. Albeit, 90% of the states’

budgets are funded from FAAC, and without FAAC revenue, both developmental projects

and administrative expenses might not be met. Nevertheless, the local governments are

bedevilled with a lot of difficulties; inadequate finance, inadequate local government

taxes and tyrannical assertiveness of the state and federal government amongst others.

The inability of subnational to pay salaries and to undertake capital project led to massive

bailout which was visible among states in 2015 and 2016 respectively.

These challenges faced by subnational government and populace show that there

is a need for a more decentralize tax structure and decentralized spending and for

subnational governments not to rely exclusively on grants/FAAC allocation from the

national government. Nonetheless, subnational governments should be more responsible

for over 70% of her revenues rather than depending on federal revenue. Thus, a more

decentralized tax structure will likely spur growth, ensure subnational competitiveness,

and reduced reckless spending.


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2. Aim and Objectives:

There are quite a number of existing literature on the subject matter such as

Olowu (2002), Charbit and Varinia (2009), Bird (2012), Alo (2012). Further reviews of

the work of Salami (2011), and Dilger (2018), focus on explaining the Subnational Tax-

Grants Balance in OECD Countries, while Ekpo (2011) looked at Subnational Tax power

in non OECD Federations: The Nigerian Case. However, this study is targeted at

examining the realities and challenges facing the subnational government which many of

the literatures reviewed did not address with a view to offering policy options that will

strengthen them in line with modern realities. Also, the management and utilization of

federal government allocations -grant and tax revenue- and service delivery in selected

states in Niger-Delta within the period of 1999 to 2017 is examined. Arising from the

above, the objective of the study is to ascertain the tax collection and practices of

subnational government in other to proffer alternative strategic and efficient policy

options.

The study is, therefore, organized technically into seven sections for

comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thus, section one covers the

introduction, section two gives an overview of Grant and Tax in Nigeria, section three

looks critically at the theoretical and conceptual issues, section four x-rays tax revenue

and service delivery in Niger Delta for the period covering 1999 – 2017 while section five

looks at the tax practices and collection: realities and challenges of subnational

government, then section six deals with the policy options for subnational Government

and section seven concludes the paper.

3. Grant and Tax: An overview

According to Adijolola (2009), the 1999 constitution of Nigeria permits the

Federation to make grants to state to complement its revenue but the terms and conditions

are determined by the National Assembly. Subnational government have no discretion to

decide either the tax-base or the tax rate for any own revenue sources (Ekpo, 2011). Since

the power to regulate State taxes are within the ambit of the federal, subnational

government have no control over the size of their revenues except tax enforcement. Ekpo

reiterate that this lack of revenue autonomy constraints the fiscal policy options of State

governments.

Grant to subnational government is dated back to the 18th century. According to

Tax Policy Centre (2016), grants are distributed to state and local governments by the

federal government for numerous reasons. Federal grants are payments to state and local

governments and are usually subject to certain conditions (Maxwell, 1952).” Grants have

been regarded as a technique by which the federal government could recognize a national

interest in certain governmental functions which, for reasons of administration or

tradition, were a state-local responsibility” (Maxwell, 1952).

Broadly speaking, according to Dilger (2018) and Fjeldstad, (2001), there are

three classes of grants.


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i) Unconditional Grants:

These are for any purpose not expressly prohibited by federal or state law and are

not limited to narrowly defined activities. The core of unconditional grant is to

compensate for horizontal fiscal disparities across subnational government arising from

differences in fiscal capacity/expenditure needs. This is done when the necessity of

additional resource transfer to subnational government arises, such as compensate for lack

of adequate revenue.

ii) Conditional Grants:

As the name implies, conditional grants carry special conditions and restrictions

regarding their uses. These grants can be used only for a precisely aided program and

generally are limited to narrowly defined activities. It is usually intended to encourage

greater subnational expenditure and participation in areas that may not be given key

priority by subnational government such as education, poverty reduction, water, and

health.

iii) Equalization Grants: -

According to Fieldstad (2001), equalization grants are used to address horizontal

imbalances between lower level governments. The purpose of horizontal equalization is to

equalize the capacity of local governments to provide a national standard level of public

goods and services. These grants also have the effect of closing the vertical fiscal gap” In

a decentralized system grant are essential as basic intergovernmental transfers to close

fiscal gaps whether horizontal or vertical, to guarantee provision of public service,

pricing, fiscal equalization and to achieve key national objectives and ensue stabilization

Figure 1: State Governments' and Federal Capital Territory Grants (N' Billion)

Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin 2017 & Computed by Author using Excel (October,

2018)

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

80.00

90.00

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Grants (N' Billion)

Grants


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Tax revenue on the other hand in Nigeria are mainly collected from Petroleum

profit tax, CIT, Personal Income Tax, VAT, Stamp Duty, Information Technology Levy,

Tertiary Education Tax. The federal government allows state and local governments to

partake in the collections of certain central government assigned taxes.

The central government controls all the key sources of revenue like import and

excise duties, mining rents and royalties, petroleum sales tax, petroleum profit tax and

companies’ income tax among other revenues sources (see table 1 and table two).

Subnational governments are left with paltry sources which limits their ability to raise

autonomous revenue without relying on FAAC allocation.

Table 1: Types of Taxes VS Tax Authority

Tax Relevant Tax Authority Remarks

1 Personal Income Tax SIRS/FIRS FIRS for FCT, Military,

e.t.c 2 CIT FIRS

3 CGT SIRS/FIRS FIRS for companies

SIRS for transactions b/w

two individuals 4 Stamp Duty SIRS/FIRS

5 VAT FIRS

6 Petroleum profit tax FIRS

7 Tertiary Education Tax FIRS

8 Information Technology

Levy

FIRS

Source: VAIDS 2017

Table 2: Revenue Assignments for Federal, State and Local Governments in Nigeria

SN Federal Taxes State Taxes Local Government

Taxes

1 Company Income Tax (CIT) Personal Income Tax Poll Tax

2 Petroleum Profit Tax (i) Pay As You Earn Tenement Rate

3 Value Added Tax

(ii) Withhold Tax

(Individuals)

Licenses Fines and

Fees

4 Education Tax

Capital Gain Tax

(Individual)

Name of Street Fees

5 Personal Income Tax in respect

of:

-Residential

Markets where State

Finances are involved

Stamp Duties.

Stamp Duties

Pools Betting and

Lotteries

Road Taxes

Business Premises

Registration

Market Fees

Motor Park Fees

Signboard and

Advert Permit Fees

Building Permits

Fess

6 Import Duties Development Levy Radio and Television

Licence

7 Exercise Duties Rent on Govt. Property Rent on Govt. property

8 Other Oil Revenue Naming of Streets Earning on Govt.

property


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Mining parts and royalties

Upstream gas Sales

NLNG gas Sales

(State Capitals)

Fees on C of O

Other Revenue e.g

License, Fines & Fees

Interest and Dividends

on investment

10 Domestic Crude Sales etc

Reimbursement

Miscellaneous

Miscellaneous

Sources: ADIJOLOLA T.M(2009)

4. Theoretical/ Conceptual issues

The theory of taxation as source of government receipts deals with the revenue

side of the budget policy. It analyses the taxes and their micro and macro- economic

effects (Agiobenebo, 2003). To Angahar and Alfred (2012), taxation is a form of charge

imposed on all residents and non-residents doing business within a tax jurisdiction. It is

civic responsibility of all citizens to pay taxes to the government, as their taxes act as

revenue used in the provisions of infrastructures, socio-economic amenities and public

goods. Various theories on taxation have been put forward, but the relevant theories to

this paper are discussed.

The Benefit Theory of taxation

The benefit theory was propounded by Erik Lindahl that tax levels are

automatically determined because tax payers pay proportionately for the government

benefits received by them” (Alao, Sadiq, Moshood and Olayinka, 2015). Explicitly

speaking according to Lindahl, tax should be paid related to the benefit derived from

paying the taxes. Meaning that those who derive more benefit from government services

should be the ones to pay more taxes. The theory stipulates that taxes should be allotted to

individuals according to the benefits they receive from the government expenditure. The

theory in other words advocates for judicious use of government revenue in other for

maximum benefit to be derived by the populace. Critics of this theory opine that benefit

theory will not yield much revenue to the government since individuals will become

selective.

The Socio- political theory of taxation

The socio political theory postulated by Arthur C Pigou posited that taxes should

be based on the ability of tax payers to pay. According to other proponent, tax should be a

medium through which inequality can be reduced. This is the most popular and

commonly acceptable principle of equity and justice in taxation. The Socio- political

theory of taxation believes that taxes should be progressive. As your income increases so

also the tax payment

The Financial theory of taxation

This theory essentially sees tax as a means of obtaining revenue to carry on the

affairs of the state. The exponent of this theory unlike the benefit theory are not so much

concerned with equity but with the acquisition of revenue as expediency as possible.

5. Tax revenue and service delivery: The case of Niger Delta 1999- 2017

It can be argued that subnational governments have the ability to deliver better

service delivery, than the federal government as they are closer to the people, more


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accountable and conscious of their needs but the major setback is non-availability of

revenue and tax autonomy to provide social services such as education, health, water and

sanitation that can help improve service delivery.

The nine Niger Delta states, which comprise Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross

River, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers receive the 13% derivation fund from the FAAC

monthly and these states show increased dependence on federal transfers due to very low

internally generated revenue except for Rivers states, with significant IGR due to the

heavy presence of companies both small and medium.

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria richly endowed with both renewable and non-

renewable natural resources. Despite these huge resources the Niger Delta region is a

paradox (Dafinone, 2003), because it is relatively one of the poorest regions when

compared to the benefit derived. According to Akinbuwa (2008) the oil and gas resources

account for over 85% of Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP), over 95% of the

national budget and over 80% of the nation’s wealth. The fluctuations and low share in

total revenue in IGR in the Niger delta states when compared with Lagos state as shown

in table 3 suggest that the Niger Delta states must be inventive, competitive and

resourceful in finding ways to increase their revenue

Table 3. Nigeria. Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) of Selected States As % of

Total State revenues, 1999- 2010.

Year Akwa Ibom Cross River Lagos Ondo

1999 24.4 14.8 45 22.1

2000 15.5 12.5 50.1 21.4

2001 12.8 10.2 54 21.7

2002 14.6 8.6 51.9 34.1

2003 10.5 6.9 50.7 29.7

2004 7.2 8.6 50.5 29.7

2005 5.4 10.4 48 19.7

2006 5.2 12.2 46 18.6

2007 4.6 14.4 51.2 3.2

2008 4.6 8.5 63.5 16.4

2009 6.8 10.9 62.1 1.1

2010 5.7 15.6 60.7 5.5

Source: Ekpo (2011)

The inability of Niger Delta states and local government to generate internal

revenue for service delivery apart from period allocation FAAC have reflected in huge

debt as noticed in delta state, Akwa Ibom and river. (See table 4 and 5).

Table 4: Local Governments in Niger Delta ' Total Outstanding Debts1 (N’ Million)

State Abia Akwa Ibom Bayelsa Cross River Delta Edo Imo Ondo Rivers

No of LGs 17 31 8 18 25 18 27 18 23

2007 152.13 24.20 149.91 638.30 1,557.72 292.41 281.33 427.20 1,303.88

2008 55.76 12.40 3.30 35.05 80.84 50.45 30.42 23.14 4.78

2009 2,718.43 303.44 103.21 608.34 2,987.53 1,352.24 1,111.14 460.65 542.88


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2010 223.77 106.92 6.00 301.98 615.78 1,093.40 198.27 167.65 34.61

2011 524.98 46.26 58.51 281.49 3,865.65 1,186.58 789.97 265.16 481.45

2012 146.71 45.80 718.39 2,128.96 1,809.59 3,417.66 2,899.19 110.41 1,801.81

2013 na na na 354.2 74.9 21.0 4.2 22.2 7.3

2014 na na na na 516.5 na 3,438.6 na na

2015 na na 679.7 153.6 742.7 115.4 300.0 67.7 66.1

2016 na 69.8 1,982.3 na 1,143.4 1,331.2 na 160.1 30.1

2017 480.9 124.9 4,665.0 2,920.2 5,251.8 1,215.1 305.3 5,069.8 na

Source: CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 2017

Table 5: Domestic Debt of Niger Delta States (N' Million)

State Abia Akwa-Ibom* Bayelsa Cross-River Delta Edo Imo Ondo Rivers

2011 24,202.24 41,253.91 162,822.65 90,750.05 90,843.57 39,044.30 25,419.40 48,369.86 83,978.39

2012 8,663.79 108,889.39 222,401.77 90,872.91 83,684.01 62,274.74 16,700.73 36,518.09 81,459.19

2013 31,736.72 125,037.04 69,513.13 116,061.63 102,100.20 48,190.15 12,633.53 30,883.18 129,549.65

2014 25,126.07 81,756.01 91,681.86 107,342.90 211,953.21 40,050.00 28,946.45 19,267.66 91,757.57

2015 33,530.53 147,575.74 103,374.23 115,522.25 320,605.71 46,289.08 71,743.51 26,647.79 134,966.60

2016 53,525.31 155,431.51 140,177.08 128,142.09 241,231.44 45,091.95 93,267.76 53,159.72 142,424.09

2017 60,648.43 187,277.31 129,469.65 125,648.71 228,328.36 68,514.31 80,785.16 58,550.79 191,156.69

Source: CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 2017

6. Tax practices and collection: realities and challenges of subnational

government The challenges of subnational government tax practices are quite compounded.

Firstly, subnational government specifically local government are left with paltry tax

sources as highlighted in previous section leaving them with low revenue which are

administratively inadequate to meet with their budgetary demands. (Egonmwan, 1984).

Any setback from the external sources of revenue (grants and statutory allocation) would

have adverse effect on the execution of some subnational projects as well as weaken their

internal revenue mobilization capacity. More so as highlighted by Ekpo (2011), the power

to regulate Subnational taxes are within the ambit of the federal, subnational government

have no control over the size of their revenue except tax enforcement. More so,

notwithstanding the constitutional provisions guiding Local governments’ statutory

allocations and IGR, the state governors subordinated and tightly control their finances.

Atakpa, Ocheni; Nwankwo (2012) and Agya, et al. (2015) identified the key causes of

low revenue collection among subnational government:

i) Shortfall of personnel. Shortage of well skilled and trained personnel which

supposed to function as agent for collection of taxes. The available personnel

used specifically at the local government level are sometimes touts and not

efficiently trained on tax and financial management.

ii) Lack of commitment is another key issue as tax collector often sees their work as

government business. These lead to dishonesty and misappropriation, diversion of

revenue as some tax collectors have their own receipt booklet which reduces the

IGR of the subnational government;


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iii) Loopholes and Political factors: tax collections especially at the local

government level are contracted for political reasons and assigned to individuals

as political compensations.

iv) A major challenge with Subnational taxes specifically local government taxes is

that some revenue sources are unpopular and problematic to administer and thus

perceived to be unfair.

v) Delay in the passage of budget and salary payment of tax collectors: These

Invariably cause delay in execution of subnational programmes as well as

payment of the staff salaries, which more than often lead to sharp practices

among tax agents.

vi) Inadequacy coverage of tax revenue which fall under the jurisdiction of local

governments. Giving room for state and federal encroach on the tax heads of local

governments, thus denying them source of revenue. Licenses and fees on

television and wireless radio, market and trading licenses and fees, car park duties

and advertising fees falls within their legal and administration jurisdiction but in

practice, they maximize only market and trading licences.

7. Policy options for subnational Government

The policy options available to subnational governments in Nigeria are essentially

dichotomous (Onwioduokit, 2018). It is either they continue with the status quo or use

austere measures to reduce their overheads or collectively push for a change in the status

quo by advocating for fiscal autonomy or resource control. Onwioduokit (2018) opined

that promoters of austerity policy options urged subnational government to reduce public

spending, and implement programmes that will boost business confidence, investment and

spur entrepreneurship in the citizenry.

According to Ekpo (2011), Subnational governments are constrained as they have

no discretion to determine either the tax-base or the tax rate for any own revenue sources.

These powers fall within the ambit of the central government. Thus, an alternative option

is a push for more fiscal autonomy with the adoption for equalization and conditional

grant framework to address vertical/ horizontal imbalances between lower level

governments. This will ensure competitiveness among states and local government

respectively as these subnational governments cannot continue to be shielded from

national revenue losses and budget deficit.

The broad options available to subnational government includes: partnering with

the private sector in direct investment: transportation services, poultry services, housing

schemes, improving accountability and efficiency of its tax practices. These and several

options will reduce the over reliance on FAAC allocation, act as a safeguard/buffer

against federal revenue fluctuations which is as a result of oil price volatility.

More so, there is need to ensure efficient tax practices and revenue mobilization.

As suggested by Olorungbemi (2015), revenue collectors should be financially or

otherwise motivated to discourage them from tampering with council money or colluding

with the members of the public to defraud the council of its revenue. These can be done

through adequate staffing, training, proper recruitment of well qualified staffs devoid of


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questionable character in SIRS and other local government agencies to enhance internally

generating revenues (Ifeayekwu, 2015).

Joint State/Local Government Accounts should be discouraged constitutionally.

The state governments should concentrate on expanding their tax bases rather than

encroach tax-raising areas of the local governments.

8. Conclusion

This paper examined tax and grant for sub-national governments: realities,

challenges and policy options. In this regard, the paper gave an overview of grant and tax

in Nigeria, x-rayed tax revenue and service delivery for the period covering 1999 – 2017,

Tax practices and collection: realities and challenges of subnational government, and

discussed the policy options for subnational government

Several challenges and problem facing subnational government were identified to

include: Shortfall of trained personnel, Lack of commitment of tax collector, Loopholes

and Political factors, unpopular and problematic tax sources and delay in the passage of

budget and salary payment of tax collectors and these challenges point to the need for

more decentralize tax structure and decentralized spending, for subnational governments

not to rely exclusively on grants and FAAC allocation from the national government.

The revenue assignment to the various tier, reveals that the central government

controls all delectable sources of revenue like import and excise duties, mining rents and

royalties, petroleum sales tax, petroleum profit tax and companies’ income tax among

other revenues living the subnational government with paltry sources which limits their

ability to raise autonomous revenue.

Thus the policy options suggested to subnational government which are

dichotomous, is to either continue with the status quo or use austere measures to reduce

their overheads or collectively push for a change in the status quo by advocating for fiscal

autonomy or resource control.

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https://vaids.gov.ng/website-about.html

https://vaids.gov.ng/website-about.html

tax and grant for sub-national government: realities...

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