G.R. No. L-77194 March 15, 1988

VIRGILIO GASTON, HORTENCIA STARKE, ROMEO GUANZON, OSCAR VILLANUEVA, JOSE ABELLO, REMO RAMOS, CAROLINA LOPEZ, JESUS ISASI, MANUEL LACSON, JAVIER LACSON, TITO TAGARAO, EDUARDO SUATENGCO, AUGUSTO LLAMAS, RODOLFO SIASON, PACIFICO MAGHARI, JR., JOSE JAMANDRE, AURELIO GAMBOA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, PHILIPPINE SUGAR COMMISSION, and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, respondents, ANGEL H. SEVERINO, JR., GLICERIO JAVELLANA, GLORIA P. DE LA PAZ, JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS, intervenors.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners are sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers, who have come to this Court in their individual capacities and in representation of other sugar producers, planters and millers, said to be so numerous that it is

impracticable to bring them all before the Court although the subject matter of the present controversy is of common interest to all sugar producers, whether parties in this action or not.

Respondent Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM, for short) was formerly the government office tasked with the function of regulating and supervising the sugar industry until it was superseded by its co-respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA, for brevity) under Executive Order No. 18 on May 28, 1986. Although said Executive Order abolished the PHILSUCOM, its existence as a juridical entity was mandated to continue for three (3) more years

"for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enables it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets."

Respondent Republic Planters Bank (briefly, the Bank) is a commercial banking corporation.

Angel H. Severino, Jr., et al., who are sugarcane planters planting and milling their sugarcane in different mill districts of Negros Occidental, were allowed to intervene by the Court, since they have common cause with petitioners and respondents having interposed no objection to their intervention. Subsequently, on January 14,1988, the National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP) also moved to intervene, which the Court allowed on February 16,1988.

Petitioners and Intervenors have come to this Court praying for a Writ of mandamus commanding respondents:

TO IMPLEMENT AND ACCOMPLISH THE PRIVATIZATION OF REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK BY THE TRANSFER AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE SHARES OF STOCK IN THE SAID BANK; NOW HELD BY AND STILL CARRIED IN THE NAME OF THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR COMMISSION, TO THE SUGAR PRODUCERS, PLANTERS AND MILLERS, WHO ARE THE TRUE BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF THE 761,416 COMMON

SHARES VALUED AT P36,548.000.00, AND 53,005,045 PREFERRED SHARES (A, B & C) WITH A TOTAL PAR VALUE OF P254,424,224.72, OR A TOTAL INVESTMENT OF P290,972,224.72, THE SAID

INVESTMENT HAVING BEEN FUNDED BY THE DEDUCTION OF Pl.00 PER PICUL FROM SUGAR PROCEEDS OF THE SUGAR PRODUCERS COMMENCING THE YEAR 1978-79 UNTIL THE PRESENT AS STABILIZATION FUND PURSUANT TO P.D. # 388.

Respondent Bank does not take issue with either petitioners or its correspondents as it has no beneficial or equitable interest that may be affected by the ruling in this Petition, but welcomes the filing of the Petition since it will settle finally the issue of legal ownership of the questioned shares of stock.

Respondents PHILSUCOM and SRA, for their part, squarely traverse the petition arguing that no trust results from Section 7 of P.D. No. 388; that the stabilization fees collected are considered government funds under the Government Auditing Code; that the transfer of shares of stock from PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers would be irregular, if not illegal; and that this suit is barred by laches.

The Solicitor General aptly summarizes the basic issues thus: (1) whether the stabilization fees collected from sugar

planters and millers pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 are funds in trust for them, or public funds; and (2) whether shares of stock in respondent Bank paid for with said stabilization fees belong to the PHILSUCOM or to the different sugar planters and millers from whom the fees were collected or levied.

P. D. No. 388, promulgated on February 2,1974, which created the PHILSUCOM, provided for the collection of a Stabilization Fund as follows:

SEC. 7. Capitalization, Special Fund of the Commission, Development and Stabilization Fund. — There is hereby established a fund for the commission for the purpose of financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market to be administered in trust by the Commission and deposited in the Philippine National Bank derived in the manner herein below cited from the following sources:

a. Stabilization fund shall be collected as provided for in the various provisions of this Decree.

b. Stabilization fees shall be collected from planters and millers in the amount of Two (P2.00) Pesos for every picul produced and milled for a period of five years from the approval of this Decree and One (Pl.00) Peso for every picul produced and milled every year thereafter.

Provided: That fifty (P0.50) centavos per picul of the amount levied on planters, millers and traders under Section 4(c) of this Decree will be used for the payment of salaries and wages of personnel, fringe benefits and allowances of officers and employees for the purpose of accomplishing and employees for the purpose of accomplishing the efficient performance of the duties of the Commission.

Provided, further: That said amount shall constitute a lien on the sugar quedan and/or warehouse

receipts and shall be paid immediately by the planters and mill companies, sugar centrals and refineries to the Commission. (paragraphing and bold supplied).

Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 does provide that the stabilization fees collected "shall be administered in trust by the

Commission." However, while the element of an intent to create a trust is present, a resulting trust in favor of the sugar producers, millers and planters cannot be said to have ensued because the presumptive intention of the parties is not reasonably ascertainable from the language of the statute itself.

The doctrine of resulting trusts is founded on the presumed intention of the parties; and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established (89 C.J.S. 947).

No implied trust in favor of the sugar producers either can be deduced from the imposition of the levy. "The essential Idea of an implied trust involves a certain antagonism between the cestui que trust and the trustee even when the trust has not arisen out of fraud nor out of any transaction of a fraudulent or immoral character (65 CJ 222). It is not clearly shown from the statute itself that the PHILSUCOM imposed on itself the obligation of holding the stabilization

fund for the benefit of the sugar producers. It must be categorically demonstrated that the very administrative agency

which is the source of such regulation would place a burden on itself (Batchelder v. Central Bank of the Philippines, L-25071, July 29,1972,46 SCRA 102, citing People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 [1954]).

Neither can petitioners place reliance on the history of respondents Bank. They recite that at the beginning, the Bank was owned by the Roman-Rojas Group. Because it underwent difficulties early in the year 1978, Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto, then Chairman of the PHILSUCOM, submitted a proposal to the Central Bank for the rehabilitation of the Bank. The Central Bank acted favorably on the proposal at the meeting of the Monetary Board on March 31, 1978 subject to the infusion of fresh capital by the Benedicto Group. Petitioners maintain that this infusion of fresh capital was accomplished, not by any capital investment by Mr. Benedicto, but by PHILSUCOM, which set aside the proceeds

of the P1.00 per picul stabilization fund to pay for its subscription in shares of stock of respondent Bank. It is petitioners' submission that all shares were placed in PHILSUCOM's name only out of convenience and necessity and that they are the true and beneficial owners thereof.

In point of fact, we cannot see our way clear to upholding petitioners' position that the investment of the proceeds from the stabilization fund in subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank were being made for and on their behalf. That could have been clarified by the Trust Agreement, dated May 28, 1986, entered into between PHILSUCOM, as "Trustor" acting through Mr. Fred J. Elizalde as Officer-in-Charge, and respondent RPB- Trust Department' as "Trustee," acknowledging that PHILSUCOM holds said shares for and in behalf of the sugar producers," the latter "being the true and beneficial owners thereof." The Agreement, however, did not get off the ground because it failed

to receive the approval of the PHILSUCOM Board of Commissioners as required in the Agreement itself.

The SRA, which succeeded PHILSUCOM, neither approved the Agreement because of the adverse opinion of the SRA,

Resident Auditor, dated June 25,1986, which was aimed by the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, on January 26,1987.

On February 19, 1987, the SRA, resolved to revoke the Trust Agreement "in the light of the ruling of the Commission on Audit that the aforementioned Agreement is of doubtful validity."

From the legal standpoint, we find basis for the opinion of the Commission on Audit reading:

That the government, PHILSUCOM or its successor-in-interest, Sugar Regulatory Administration, in particular, owns and stocks. While it is true that the collected stabilization fees were set aside by

PHILSUCOM to pay its subscription to RPB, it did not collect said fees for the account of the sugar producers. That stabilization fees are charges/levies on sugar produced and milled which accrued to PHILSUCOM under PD 338, as amended. ...

The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the State to impose for the

promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). They constitute sugar liens (Sec. 7[b], P.D. No. 388). The collections made accrue to a "Special Fund," a "Development and Stabilization Fund," almost Identical to the "Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund" created under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 567. 1 The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State (Lutz vs. Araneta, supra.).

The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State

is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power of the sovereign. (Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, 128 So. 857, cited in Lutz vs. Araneta, supra).

The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and producers for a special purpose — that of "financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market the fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to

law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence vs. American Surety Co., 263 Mich 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am. Jur. Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if

any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (See 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(l]). 2

The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29[1],1973 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 18[l]).

That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and millers, and that the funds were channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fired for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The investment in shares of respondent Bank is not alien to the purpose intended because of the Bank's character as a commodity bank for sugar conceived for the industry's growth and development. Furthermore, of note is the fact that one-half, (1/2) or PO.50

per picul, of the amount levied under P.D. No. 388 is to be utilized for the "payment of salaries and wages of personnel, fringe benefits and allowances of officers and employees of PHILSUCOM" thereby immediately negating the claim that the entire amount levied is in trust for sugar, producers, planters and millers.

To rule in petitioners' favor would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, "and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market," including the foreign market the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to national interest.

WHEREFORE, the Writ of mandamus is denied and the Petition hereby dismissed. No costs.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernan, J., took no part.

HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila; ROMAN G. GARGANTIEL, as Secretary to the Mayor; THE MARKET ADMINISTRATOR; and THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXX and the FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET VENDORS, INC., respondents.

The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the

ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.

On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE

OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June 15, 1974.

On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and

(d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.

Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge issued an

order on March 11, 1975, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.

After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Respondent Judge ruled:

There is, therefore, no question that the ordinance in question was not published at all in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published in the same manner after approval, although it was posted in the legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public libraries. There being no compliance with the mandatory requirement of publication before and after approval, the ordinance in question is invalid and, therefore, null and void.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court.

On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion.

Forthwith, petitioners brought the matter to Us through the present petition for review on certiorari.

We find the petition impressed with merits.

1. The nexus of the present controversy is the apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Tax Code on the manner of publishing a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. For, while Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides:

Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, and shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. * * * Each approved ordinance * * * shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, within ten days after its approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance.

Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs:

Within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrioordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges shall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places

within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a local government for dissemination.

In other words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the

ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners' compliance with the Local Tax Code rather than with the Revised Charter of the City spawned this litigation.

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone

defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular

persons or things of a class. 1 And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 2 However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof,whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or

other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. 3 Special provision governs. 4 This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The

law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility. 5

The case of City of Manila v. Teotico 6 is opposite. In that case, Teotico sued the City of Manila for damages arising from the injuries he suffered when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. The City of Manila denied liability on the basis of the City Charter (R.A. 409) exempting the City of Manila from any liability for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of the city officers to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or

other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code makes cities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any persons by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code controlling. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of the two laws, the Revised City Charter establishes a general rule of liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas the Civil Code constitutes a particularprescription for liability due to defective streets in

particular. In the same manner, the Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of "ordinance" in general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of "ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges in particular.

In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one. 7 A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. 8 A subsequent general

law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. 9 A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the

constitution and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of such character. 10

2. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. This is because Section 47 of the Local Tax Code provides that any question or issue raised against the legality of any tax ordinance, or portion thereof, shall be referred for opinion to the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. The opinion of the city fiscal is appealable to the Secretary of Justice, whose decision shall be final and executory unless contested before a competent court within thirty (30) days. But, the petition below plainly shows that the controversy between the parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of

law: whether it is the Revised Charter of the City of Manila or the Local Tax Code that should govern the publication of the tax ordinance. In other words, the dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code on the point at issue, and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax. Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the question litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply. 11 The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and

irreparable damage. 12

3. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the

procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense bears its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law." 13 And one of those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in particular: "Local governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and premises * * *." 14 They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale,

lease or occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges. 15

It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violates Presidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30, 1972, insofar as it affects livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the collection of other fees and charges thereon "with the exception of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection fees, as well as the delivery, stockyard and slaughter fees as may be authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." 16Clearly,

even the exception clause of the decree itself permits the collection of the proper fees for livestock. And the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231, July 1, 1973) authorizes in its Section 31: "Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter of animals and the use of corrals * * * "

4. The non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in accordance with Republic Act No. 6039, an amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that "the market committee shall formulate, recommend and adopt, subject to the ratification of the municipal board, and approval of the mayor, policies and rules or regulation repealing or maneding existing provisions of the market code" does not infect the ordinance with any germ of invalidity. 17 The function of the committee is purely recommendatory as the underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is without binding effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior

acquiescence of an intended or proposed city ordinance is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could enact such ordinance. The native power of the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest degree. It can move in its own initiative and the Market Committee cannot demur. At most, the Market Committee may serve as a legislative aide of the Municipal Board in the enactment of city ordinances affecting the city markets or, in plain words, in the gathering of the necessary data, studies and the collection of consensus for the proposal of ordinances regarding city markets. Much less could it be said that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate

to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the city markets. Potestas delegata non delegare potest.

5. Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the

exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of

Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to

tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation. 18

Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance will necessarily inure to the unwarranted benefit and advantage of the corporation. 19 We are concerned only with the issue whether the ordinance in question is intra vires. Once determined in the affirmative, the measure may not be invalidated because of consequences that may arise from its enforcement. 20

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No. costs.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.

Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners. Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J.:

A TV ad proudly announces:

"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —

A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;

B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;

C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1,

1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy —

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of

chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National

Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund

and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by

the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the —

. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law

may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of

Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)

Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the

1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the

constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,

provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.

What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869).

As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR,

was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under

this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).

Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior

having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the

power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:

Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.

Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-

alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .

Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:

Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission

over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments

of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.

Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may

perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).

The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.

(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:

Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,

fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under

the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)

As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)

Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who

may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary

(Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same

name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).

Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies

and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be.1âwphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)

It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If

the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by

petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 —

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed

legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of

the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the Congress.

Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean

that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

MANILA RACE HORSE TRAINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and JUAN T. SORDAN vs. MANUEL DE LA FUENTE G.R. No. L-2947 January 11, 1951

This action was instituted for a declaratory relief by the Manila Race Horses Trainers Association, Inc., a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, who allege that they are owners of boarding stables for race horses and that their rights as such are affected by Ordinance No. 3065 of the City

of Manila approved on July 1, 1947.1 They made the Mayor of Manila defendant and prayed that said ordinance be declared invalid as violative of the Philippine Constitution.

The case was submitted on the pleadings, and the decision was that the ordinance in question "is constitutional and

valid and has been enacted in accordance with the powers of the Municipal Board granted by the Charter of the City of Manila."

On appeal, the plaintiffs as appellants make three assignments of error, the first two of which are discussed jointly in their brief under two separate topics.

First, it is maintained that the ordinance under consideration is a tax on race horses as distinct from boarding stables.

It is argued that by section 2 the basis of the license fees "is the number of race horses kept or maintained in the boarding stables to be paid by the maintainers at the rate of P10.00 a year for each race horse;" that "the fee is increased correspondingly P10 for each additional race horse maintained or fed in the stable;" and that "by the same token, an empty stable for race horse pays no license fee at all."

The spirit, rather than the letter, of an ordinance determines the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its words and more to the context, subject matter, consequence and effect. Accordingly, what is within the spirit is within

the ordinance although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is in the letter, although not within the spirit, is not within the ordinance. (62 C. J. S., 845.) From the context of Ordinance No. 3065, the intent to tax or license stables and not horses is clearly manifest. The tax is assessed not on the owners of the horses but on the

owners of the stables, as counsel admit in their brief, although there is nothing, of course, to stop stable owners from shifting the tax to the horse owners in the form of increased rents or fees, which is generally the case.

It is also plain from the text of the whole ordinance that the number of horses is used in the assessment purely as a method of fixing an equitable and practical distribution of the burden imposed by the measure. Far from being obnoxious, the method is fair and just. It is but fair and just that for a boarding stable where only one horse is maintained proportionately less amount should be exacted than for a stable where more horses are kept and from which greater income is derived.

We do not share plaintiff's opinion, apropos the second proposition, that the ordinance in question is discriminatory and savors of class legislation. In taxing only boarding stables for race horses, we do not believe that the ordinance, makes arbitrary classification. In the case of Eastern Theatrical Co. Inc., vs. Alfonso, 46 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 11, p. 303,* it was said there is equality and uniformity in taxation if all articles or kinds of property of the same class are

taxed at the same rate. Thus, it was held in that case, that "the fact that some places of amusement are not taxed while others, such as cinematographs, theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows, and boxing exhibitions and other kinds of amusements or places of amusement are taxed, is not argument at all against the equality and

uniformity of tax imposition." Applying this criterion to the present case, there would be discrimination if some boarding stables of the same class used for the same number of horses were not taxed or were made to pay less or more than others.

From the viewpoint of economics and public policy the taxing of boarding stables for race horses to the exclusion of boarding stables for horses dedicated to other purposes is not indefensible. The owners of boarding stables for race horses and, for that matter, the race horse owners themselves, who in the scheme of shifting may carry the taxation

burden, are a class by themselves and appropriately taxed where owners of other kinds of horses are taxed less or not at all, considering that equity in taxation is generally conceived in terms of ability to pay in relation to the benefits received by the taxpayer and by the public from the business or property taxed. Race horses are devoted to gambling if legalized, their owners derive fat income and the public hardly any profit from horse racing, and this business demands relatively heavy police supervision. Taking everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discrimatory within the meaning of the Constitution.

One ground of attack in the court below on the constitutionality of the ordinance — variance between the title and the subject matter — apparently has been abandoned. In its place a new question is brought up on the appeal in the third

and last assignment of error. It is now contended, for the first time, that "the Municipal Board of Manila (is) without power to enact ordinance taxing private stables for race horses," and that the lower court erred in not so declaring. This assignment of error has reference to Class B or the second sub-paragraph of section 1 of the ordinance.

Not having been raised in the pleading, this question was properly ignored, not to say that even it had been raised it would not have been available as basis for a declaration of nullity of the ordinance. The clause of the ordinance taxing or licensing boarding stables for race horses does not prejudice the plaintiffs in any material way, and it is well settled that a person who is not adversely affected by a licensing ordinance may not attack its validity. Stated differently, he may not complain that a licensing ordinance is invalid as against a class other than that to which he belongs. (62 C. J.

S.830, 831.) By analogy, where a municipal ordinance is valid in some of its parts and invalid as to others and the valid parts are separable from the invalid ones — in which latter case the valid provisions stand as operative — the plaintiff may contest the validity of the provisions that injure his interest but not those that do not.

We are of the opinion that the trial court committed no error and the judgment is affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellants.

CREBA vs COMMISSIONER

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?

B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?

C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?

1. §1

2. § 4

3. § 5

4. § 10

B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1. Art. VI, § 28(1)

2. Art. VI, § 28(3)

These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills

of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate

enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.

It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND

ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED

The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees."

The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING

ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.

First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of

Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of

the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative

power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power

to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an

amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the

House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by

the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second

requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of

an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. 11

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of

printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent. 12

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.

It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country.

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has

been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under

Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the pending in the House.

Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days of its

session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often mark the proceedings of conference committees.

Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.

In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive sessions with only

the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close the meetings. 14

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any

material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have

already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . . . 15

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills. 16

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to

the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18

Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules

the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:

Rules of the Senate

Rule XII:

§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.

The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.

(Emphasis added)

Rules of the House of Representatives

Rule XIV:

§ 85. Conference Committee Reports. — In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.

The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the

Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient

that three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.

(Emphasis added)

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the

precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them. . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these

cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the

preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings

in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference

committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.

Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the

Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the

requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case 23 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and

that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND

ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

. . . .

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or

in the near future," in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.

As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

. . . .

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of

the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of

pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:

AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed. 24

It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by special law, in view of § 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:

This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified, amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is a contract which can be

altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended by a general law.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and

other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their rights under § § 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.

The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press under § 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested in Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's duty is to execute the law.

§ 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously granted exemption were:

(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.

Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject to the VAT

with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The exemption of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on the gross

receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication. Even

on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.

To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It has been held:

The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . 27

The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving

broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is

now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was clear either

from the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the volume of

advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature

of Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted,

the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." 29 The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to destroy.

In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents' incentive to get goods from outside states where the

sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because the legislature, by again

amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general interest

magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."

These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to

tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not prohibit all

regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 35

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of printing,

publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 36 the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.

This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, 37 although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The case ofAmerican Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles

and other religious literature. This Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 39 in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason, it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 40

But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of

the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the free speech,

press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education, science and technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.

B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment of Contracts

There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and

the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.

There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation must be

progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause." 41

Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact

is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.

Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." 42Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who

are in the higher-income bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities, which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.

Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This,

according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.

Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in society harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against

the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation.44

Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.

Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to

do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran 45 should have laid to rest the questions now raised against the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be "hearsay and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate

the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal

order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 46

In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" 48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a "special function" of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual

record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases — to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.

We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 is cited in support of this view:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 50

Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the

legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to

determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 51

This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several cases 52 of this Court following Angara.

It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.

In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

Basco vs. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991

FACTS: On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize

all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given

territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders,

rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

But petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal

fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to

Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or

form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the city of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees to

PAGCOR.

RULING:

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or

statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it". Its "power to tax"

therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which

has the "inherent power to tax". The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress.

GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992

Feliciano, J.:

FACTS:

The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional

duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for

consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of

P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

ISSUE:

Whether of not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-

generating measures.

RULING:

The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the

Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are

prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987

Constitution provides:

―The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…‖

The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sections 104 and 401, the

pertinent provisions thereof.

ERNESTO M. MACEDA vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., et al…

G.R. No. No. 88291 May 31, 1991 and G.R. No. No. 88291 June 8, 1993

FACTS:

Commonwealth Act No. 120 created the NPC as a public corporation to undertake the development of hydraulic power

and the production of power from other sources. Several laws were enacted granting NPC tax and duty exemption

privileges such as taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges and restrictions of the Republic of the Philippines, its

provinces, cities and municipalities "directly or indirectly," on all petroleum products used by NPC in its operation.

However P.D. No. 1931 withdrew all tax exemption privileges granted in favour of government-owned or controlled

corporations including their subsidiaries but empowered the President and/or the then Minister of Finance, upon

recommendation of the FIRB to restore, partially or totally, the exemption withdrawn. BIR ruled that the exemption

privilege enjoyed by NPC under said section covers only taxes for which it is directly liable and not on taxes which are

only shifted to it.

In 1986, BIR Commissioner Tan, Jr. states that all deliveries of petroleum products to NPC are tax exempt, regardless

of the period of delivery. Thereafter, the FIRB issued several Resolutions in different occasions restoring the tax and

duty exemption privileges of NPC indefinite period due to the restoration of the tax exemption privileges of NPC, NPC

applied with the BIR for a "refund of Specific Taxes paid on petroleum products. On August 6, 1987, the Secretary of

Justice, Opinion opined that "the power conferred upon Fiscal Incentives Review Board constitute undue delegation of

legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional. However, respondents Finance Secretary and the Executive

Secretary declared that "NPC under the provisions of its Revised Charter retains its exemption from duties and taxes

imposed on the petroleum products purchased locally and used for the generation of electricity. Thereafter

investigations were made for the refund of the tax payments of the NPC which includes Millions of pesos Tax refund.

Petitioner, as member of the Philippine Senate introduced as Resolution Directing the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,

In Aid of Legislation, to conduct a Formal and Extensive Inquiry into the Reported Massive Tax Manipulations and

Evasions by Oil Companies, particularly Caltex (Phils.) Inc., Pilipinas Shell and Petrophil, Which Were Made Possible By

Their Availing of the Non-Existing Exemption of National Power Corporation (NPC) from Indirect Taxes, Resulting

Recently in Their Obtaining A Tax Refund Totalling P1.55 Billion From the Department of Finance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent NPC is legally entitled to the questioned tax and duty refunds.

RULING:

Yes. In G.R. No. No. 88291 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of exempting NPC to the said taxes. Also in G.R. No.

No. 88291 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of respondents. NPC under the provisions of its Revised Charter retains

its exemption from duties and taxes imposed on the petroleum products purchased locally and used for the generation

of electricity. Presidential Decree No. 938 amended the tax exemption of NPC by simplifying the same law in general

terms. It succinctly exempts NPC from "all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts, as well as costs and service fees

including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings." the NPC electric

power rates did not carry the taxes and duties paid on the fuel oil it used. The point is that while these levies were in

fact paid to the government, no part thereof was recovered from the sale of electricity produced. As a consequence,

as of our most recent information, some P1.55 B in claims represent amounts for which the oil suppliers and NPC are

"out-of-pocket. There would have to be specific order to the Bureaus concerned for the resumption of the processing

of these claims.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996

FACTS:

Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. The

Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark registration over "Champion,"

"Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The initial position of the CIR was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign

brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune

Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said

brands from the foreign brand category.

RA No. 7654, was enacted and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC. About a

month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No.

37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax, was issued by the BIR. Fortune Tobacco

requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The

following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,

598, 334. 00.

On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA upheld the position of Fortune

Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law.

RULING:

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that

the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC,

as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and

"Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have

them covered by RA 7654.

In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due

observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court

is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.

Reyes v. Almonzor

G.R. Nos. L-49839 – 46. April 26, 1991

FACTS: The National legislature enacted R.A. 6359 which prohibits an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling unit or

land on which another’s dwelling is located, where the rental does not exceed Php300.00. The act also suspended

article 1673 of the Civil Code thereby disallowing ejectment of lessees. These prohibitions were made absolute by the

filing of Presidential Decree 20. Consequently, petitioners herein are precluded from increasing monthly rentals and in

ejecting the lessees.The respondent city assessor of Manila reassessed the value of the petitioners’ properties based

on the scheduled market value thereof. This entailed an increase in the tax rates prompting petitioners to file a

Memorandum of Disagreement with the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals averring that the reassessment was

excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional considering that the tax imposed upon them is

greater than the annual income derived from the property. They also argued that the income approach should have

been used in determining the land values instead of the comparable sales approach. The Board of tax Assessment

Appeals considered the assessment valid and the same was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment appeals,

hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Did the board err in adopting the comparable sales approach in fixing the assessed value of the properties?

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is unquestionable that both the Comparable Sales Approach and the Income Approach are generally acceptable

methods of appraisal for taxation purposes. However, it is conceded that the proprietary of one, as against the other

would depend on several factors. Hence, as early as 1923, it has been stressed that the assessors , in finding the

value of the property, have to consider all the circumstances and elements of value and must exercise a prudent

discretion in reaching conclusions.

Sison vs. Ancheta

GR L- 59431 June 25, 1984

Facts:

BP 135 was enacted. Sison, as a taxpayer alleged that Sison is thereof unduly discriminated against him by the

imposition of higher rate upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to class legislation, and that it

transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution as well as the rule

requiring the uniformity in taxation.

Issue: is the contention meritorious?

Ruling:

No. it is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much wider scope. The reason was clearly set forth by

justice Makalintal, thus: the areas which need to be left with private enterprise and initiative and which the

government was called upon to enter optionally, and only because it was better equipped to administer for the public

welfare than any individual or groups and individual continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed

within the activities that the government must undertake in the sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social

challenges of the times. Hence, there is a need for more revenues. The power to tax, on inherent prerogative, has to

be reconciled to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of public funds. Taxes, being the

lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence.

VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS: On February 22, 1968, the Municipal Board of Manila passed City Ordinance No. 6537. The said city ordinance

was also signed by then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas (Villegas).

Section 1 of the said city ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or

occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an

employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the

diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine

Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious

orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (Tsai Pao Ho) who was employed in Manila filed a petition with the CFI of Manila to declare

City Ordinance No. 6537 as null and void for being discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in

taxation. The trial court declared City Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. Villegas filed the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not City Ordinance No. 6537 is a tax or revenue measure.

RULING:

Yes. The contention that City Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal

purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall

secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and

approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second

part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no

logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the

purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.