techniques and processes of administration

Techniques and processes of administration

Abstract. Since the Glassco Commission in the early sixties there has been a ple- thora of administrative changes: Program Planning and Budgeting, Operational Performance Measurement Systems, Management by Objectives, and Cost/Bene- fit Analysis have all been introduced as technical panaceas. In terms of processes, some should probably have been changed but remain the same( such as the personnel selection-promotion process), while others have been circumvented (the regular budgetary process). Still others have been changed (the cabinet committee process) but have produced results of questionable value and perhaps positive harm to majority governments.

It is contended that the Glassco injunction ‘let the manager manage’ and the assumption that private sector practices should be adopted by government, virtually without modification, ignore fundamental differences between the two sectors.

The war between competing interest groups is inevitable and hence perpetual. Governments engage in a rolling set of compromises between factions in an essentially adversarial process under rules, formal and informal, that restrict the field of battle. Frequently, those who advocate administrative changes are in pursuit of their personal interests. They frequently find themselves in alliances with one or more of the contending parties who look upon them as guns for hire to be used or rejected on strategic grounds.

After an impressionistic critique of each of the processes and techniques pre- viously cited, the paper ends on a more positive note. There is a plea that the powers of the auditor general be expanded to encompass reporting upon (as distinct from undertaking) the extent to which a ministry is carrying out ef- ficiency and effectiveness studies, where there is a consensus about the validity of the data and methodology. It is also suggested that the auditor general report upon the disposition of these studies with the aim of breaking down present secrecy barriers. A better informed public would change the incentive structure within which ministers, aided by officials, reach their decisions.

Sommaire. Depuis la Commission Glasscoe, au debut des annCes 60, il y a eu une plbthore de changements administratifs. La Planification et 1’Ctablissement des budgets par programme, les systPmes de mesure des performances opbration- nelles, la gestion en fonction des objectifs, Yanalyse des coiits et avantages, tow ces systPmes ont CtC utilises comme panacbes techniques. Du point de vue des processus, certains, qui auraient dO sans doute &re changes ne l’ont pas Ctb ( comme par exemple la selection du personnel et le processus de Yavancement) alors que d’autres ont btb contournbs (le processus budgbtaire normal). D’autres The author is professor of economics and research associate at the Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto. This paper was presented to the Annual Conference of The Institute of Public Administration of Canada in Ottawa on 4 Sept. 1975.

D.C. HARTLE

encore ont Cte changks (le processus des comitks de cabinet) mais pour produire des rksultats de valeur douteuse et parfois franchement dhfavorables pour les gouvernements niajoritaires.

hisser ghrer les gestionnaires )> et le postulat suivant lequel les pratiques du secteur privi. dev- raient &tre adopthes pratiquement sans modification par les gouvernements ig- norent les diffkrences fondamentales qui existent entre les deux secteurs.

La lutte entre des groupes aux intCr&ts divergents est inkvitable, et donc per- pktuelle. Les gouvernements s’engagent dans tout un jeu de compromis dyna- miques entre les diffhrentes factions dans ce qui essentiellement un processus antagoniste, 8 l’intkrieur de rPgles formelles ou non formelles, qui rbduisent la portke du conflit. Frkquemment, ceux qui rkclament des changements administratifs le font dans leur propre intkr$t et ils se trouvent souvent alliks A un ou plu- sueurs des partis dopposition qui les considhrent comme des mercenaires 8 uti- liser ou rejeter pour des raisons stratbgiques.

AprPs une critique subjective des divers processus et techniques citks prk- ckdemment, I’auteur conclut sur une note plus positive. I1 demande que les pou- voirs de I’Auditeur ghnCral soient ktendus pour qu’il fasse connaitre (et non pas pour qu’il ktudie) la mesure dans laquelle les ministAres effectuent des ktudes sur I’efficience et I’efficaciti., 18 ou il existe un consensus quant B la validiti: des donnCes et de la methodologie. I1 propose aussi que l’Auditeur gknkral fasse rapport sur l’usage qui est fait de ces ktudes, afin de supprimer le secret qui Yen- toure actuellement. Un public mieux inform4 transformerait la structure de la motivation qui entoure actuellement les ministres qui prennent des dbcisions et leurs fonctionnaires.

L’auteur soutient que I’impkratif de la Commission Glasscoe

I want to say at the outset that, generally speaking, I am not enthusiastic about the new techniques and processes of administration. In my view, those who advocate them are inclined to assume that the problem is much easier than it is. There has been a tendency, which can be traced back to the Hoover Commission in the United States, but which had its counter- part in the Glassco Commission in Canada, which reported in the mid- sixties, to suppose that the public sector was, in some sense, mismanaged relative to the private sector. The basic themes were: ‘Let the manager manage’ and ‘Apply the techniques and processes that have proven suc- cessful in the private sector to the public sector.’

Now in my view the idea that public servants are managers is fallacious. In a well-run system, public servants are not managers; they are policy advisers and/or emissaries (negotiators ) and/or administrators. To me, the term ‘manager’ implies n substantial degree of discretion. In a parliamentary system, the bureaucrat should have relatively little decision- making discretion because the minister to whom he reports must take responsibility for the actions of his officials in the House. Any minister who delegates substantial powers to a senior official, who in turn delegates some of these powers to his subordinates, who in turn delegates, ad infini- tum, is a fool if he does not specify the ground rules under which they are to proceed. He is, if he does not set forth such rules, inviting political

22 CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

TECHNIQUES AND PROCESSES

insensitivity at best an old-fashioned corruption at worst. For the public servant who has a great deal of discretion with little or no accountability is vulnerable both to ‘ego trips’ on the one hand, where he bestows or with- holds favours at his own pleasure, or a candidate for a bribe because the potential beneficiary knows that the power to give or withhold a substantial benefit rests in the hands of a non-elected official. I deplore that substantial body of legislation that confers discretionary powers without any clear methods of holding accountable those who make the decisions.

It is true, of course, that the legislation usually requires that the minister ‘decide.’ In fact, as we all know, a minister’s time is limited, and he is required, by and large, to accept the recommendations of his officials 31- most automatically,

The Hoover and Glassco Commissions made a fundamental error in my opinion. They were simple-minded in assuming that the techniques and processes that had proven useful in the private sector could be applied, virtually without modification, to the public sector. They forgot, if they ever understood, that there is a fundamental difference between the two sectors. In the private sector firms that are badly run will ultimately go bankrupt. While no one would claim that the financial statements in the private sector are without their ambiguities, there is a set of accepted accounting conventions that limits the degree of manipulation. For publicly held corporations, if the story told by the profit-and-loss statement is persistently tragic, the shareholders will oust the current corporate managers and replace them with a new set.

In the public sector there is no equivalent to a profit-and-loss statement. The record of assets and liabilities is virtually meaningless. The shareholders - the voters - have only three alternatives if they find the government’s policies are unsatisfadory: they can vote the government out of office (when there is a credible alternative); they can revolt; or they can emigrate. But in reaching their decisions the voters can not simply examine the equivalent of the profit-and-loss statement of the government of the day. No such statement exists or can ever exist. The ‘generally accepted accounting principles’ upon which private sector profit-and-loss statements hinge are disputations; I cannot see the day when the same degree of consensus, limited as it is (e.g inflation adjustments), will exist with respect to the assessment of the policy positions of any government.

The basic conflicts between politicians and bureaucrats, the conflicts among special interest groups; and the conflicts between each of these groups and the political-bureaucratic establishment are inescapable. Those who perceive themselves to be losers are unlikely to acquiesce in their losses: those who perceive themselves to be winners are unlikely to be satisfied with their gains. The losers will fight for redress: the winners will fight to retain what they have, and seek more.

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D.C. HARTLE

The changes in the administrative techniques and processes discussed here should be considered as a continuous battle of the ‘war of all against aX’ While seemingly rather mundane, the battles that go on to change techniques and processes should be looked upon as the way in which society resolves conflict rather than the search for ‘the answer.’ For no such answer - social harmony - will ever be found. Those who advocate changes in techniques and processes are, for the most part, consciously or uncon- sciously, guns for hire; they seek changes in the existing power structure. They are responding, sometimes without awareness, to the incentive systems that apply to themselves and the groups they serve.

In short, I believe that we will understand the behaviour of individuals best by assuming that martyrs are few and far between (e.g. most individuals look out for their personal interests) and that consequently most individuals respond quickly and dramatically to changes in the basic incentive systems within which they operate.

To illustrate, let me give you a few old Ottawa aphorisms: When heads roll, they roll up hill,’ ‘A moving target is harder to hit,’ ‘Better to keep your mouth closed and be thought a fool than open your mouth and prove it,’ ‘A little fat in the soup is a good defence against a reduction in its water level,’ ‘Better to jump on the bandwagon that is playing poorly than to stand on the sidelines playing the perfect solo.’

All of us respond to our perception of the payoff rules, which are often implicit rather than explicit. Proposed changes in techniques and processes pretending that this is not the case are bound to fail. By observation, I would say that many such changes are the result of individuals searching around for some kind of gimmick, to displace the previous gimmick, in order to gain either promotion or greater influence; it is an ill gimmick that does not elevate someone! Let me now turn to a discussion of particular new administrative techniques (gimmicks). I will follow this with a comment on new processes.

Techniques In the past decade or so there have been at least six techniques introduced that purported to improve government decisions: Program Planning and Budgeting, Operational Performance Measurement Systems, Management by Objectives, Cost/Bencfit Analysis, Cost/Effectiveness Studies. I would Iike to comment on each of them in turn. My views are expressed succinctly because the story of each could easily fill a book!

Program planning and budgeting While the coroner’s report is not yet in, at least in Canada, there seems little doubt the PPB is dead. Some useful things were accomplished, as a



comparison of the current Estimates with those of a decade ago clearly demonstrates. There is more data presented in a more useful format than there used to be. The new cross-classification of expenditures by agency, by program, by activity, as well as by object of expenditure, is undoubtedly an improvement over the old classification scheme.

Having said this, however, I do not believe that it is an exaggeration to say that the planning and evaluation purposes of PPB have not been realized and are not likely to be. Spending agencies do not take seriously the requests for estimates of their future expenditures. They simply extrapolate the next year’s requests at a constant rate. Why should they bother to do otherwise when the numbers are not taken seriously by those responsible for putting together the budget for the coming year? At best, these forecasts are aggregated and presented as one slate to ministers to show that, if restraint is not shown, the system will collapse. This ministers already understand.

Secondly, rarely, if ever, does it make strategic sense for a department to reveal its aspirations during the regular cyclical budgetary review. Better to introduce new initiatives by means of special requests to cabinet outside the regular budgetary cycle where the competition for funds is less and where it can be claimed both that special circumstances warrant emergency action and that funds can be found to finance the new or expanded programs for the balance of the year. To the devil with the financial implications for subsequent years!

Thirdly, the analytical component of PPB, as originally conceived, has been largely ignored. Typically, no analytical work has been undertaken to assess program eficiency and effectiveness. Where it has been carried out it has had minimal effects on budgetary decisions, for reasons I will elaborate upon later.

Why has PPB not realized its earlier promise? I believe that there are several interrelated answers. I/ It was nai’ve to assume that agreement could be reached as to the objective of each program. Most programs have multiple objectives, and some of them cannot be admitted. Different ministers and officials assign quite different weights to these several objectives at any point in time. Then these weights change. Witness the problems involved in closing a defence base located in a depressed area. 21 What constitutes a program, an activity, a subactivity, or a sub-subactivity is inherently arbitrary, Should our defence spending be considered as one program or as ten programs? What activities should be combined to constitute a program? Why is an activity not a program in its own right, or a subactivity for that matter? 3/ When is it in the interest of the minister and officials responsible to take a hard look at what they are doing? In- deed, is it not dangerous even to collect the basic data upon which such an assessment could be based? 4/ Given the ambiguities about objec-

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D.G. HARTLE

titles, mentioned above, and the lack of consensus about methods, discussed below, how seriously would an analysis designed to support a PPB submis- sion be taken?

Operational performance measurement systems

When an activity (or should I say subactivity?) results in an output that is sufficiently tangible that it can be measured in both quantitative and qualitative terms, and most of thc costs associated with the output are clearly assignable to it, it is feasible to calculate the changes over time in unit costs or, what is essentially the same thing, changes in labour productivity. For the past five or six years the Planning Branch of the Treasuiy Board has been urging departments with repetitive operations to institute such measurement systems. Using Planning Branch officers as advisers, some progress has been made. While it is certainly a rough estimate, I would suppose that the labour productivity of units accounting for perhaps 30 per cent of government employment is now being estimated. The potential is probably something like 70 per cent of federal employment. It must not be forgotten, however, that the wages and salaries paid to this large proportion of federal employees accounts for only a small proportion of federal expenditures. The cost of the Family Allowance would not be materially affected if the application were processed and the cheques issued without labour, materials, space, and equipment. Most of the costs arise because of the dollar amounts stated on the monthly cheques that are distributed to millions of Canadian mothers.

Nevertheless, while not wishing to claim too much for it in terms of potential budgetary-manpower savings, OPMS seems to me a useful advance. Potentially, at least, it can aid the line officer in monitoring the Performance of his subordinates; it can also serve as a basis for arguing with the Treasury Board for budgetary increases based on increases in work-load but taking into account some productivity improvements.

There are, however, difficulties. One is the difficulty of measuring the extent to which costs per unit are changing as a result of changes in equipment, space, and materials. Theoretically, this problem is soluble, but to the best of my knowledge there is no department that yet measures its total factor productivity. Another problem is that the method cannot deal with overhead costs, Another is Chat OPMS only copes with changes over time and does not take into account the legitimacy of the base from which the changes are calculated. Fat operations can appear to have remarkable reductions in unit costs with little effort, while lean ones have to struggle for improvements.

The last problem I wish to mention may, however, be overriding. Unless the dollar and manpower budgets arrived at for those activities to which



OPMS has been applied in fact reflect the results, the incentive for agencies to maintain, much less extend, OPMS is, to say the least, minimal. There has been a tendency, I am afraid, to have the Planning Branch of the Treasury Board out flogging OPMS to departments while the Program Branch of the Treasury Board has found it expedient to make its recommendations to ministers as though the information were not available.

This is, of course, not illogical if the Program Branch has reason to believe that the required increases in output are likely to be less than the department has forecast, or that the base hid a lot of fat, or that changes in the capital/labour ratio justified a larger reduction in unit costs. It is my impression, however, that if the Program Branch has such views, it does not express them to the agencies. Those officials who have pushed OPMS

to their departments are put in the position of looking foolish. This is not the way to get a new measurement technique instituted in the public service! The Treasury Board Secretariat has the obligation, it seems to me, to explain why its recommendations are inconsistent with the OPMS

numbers.

Management by objectives Except in those operations where it is possible to measure changes in unit costs over time, which means essentially the high volume repetitive operations to which OPMS can be applied, I am highly sceptical about the efficacy of MBO. Too often, in my experience, MBO costs more in time and energy than it produces : endless meetings, haggling over jurisdictional territory, drafts and redrafts of statements of objectives to ensure that they are sufficiently vague, no real monitoring of performance against the stated objectives - sometimes because this is impossible and sometimes because it is uncomfortable for the senior officer.

Who is supposed to monitor the monitors? What is his or her motivation for monitoring? If the subordinate can be neither rewarded nor punished on the basis of the results of the monitoring - at least within extremely wide limits of performance - why bother? We all know of cases where the weak, if not totally incompetent, subordinate is given a glowing letter of recommendation as a way of enticing some unsuspecting agency to take him of€ the hands of the reviewing officer. Good subordinates are often given weak performance appraisals in order to reduce their mobility.

In passing, I might say that I was always impressed by the fine sense of timing displayed by many public servants. They seemed to have an uncanny instinct of when it is time to move. Having initiated some grandiose project in a department, they know exactly when to move along before they can be held accountable for less than promised results. In this way they can, by a series of astute moves, appear to be innovative and energetic while their successors are perceived to be incompetent. Except

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for the grape-vine, which is not to be denigrated as a source of information, ‘the system’ as a whole seems to have little memory with respect to the career performance of individuals, MBO notwithstanding.

Cost/benefit analysis As I said before, one could quite easily write a book on the subject of costfbenefit analysis. Indeed many have been written. The last time I checked, the Treasury Board Secretariat was on the sixth or seventh draft of its manual. There is a tendency for those interested in the subject to press for ever greater refinements: there is also a tendency for those who want to get a particular project approved to use these purists as mercenaries in the perpetual war of all against all for resources. Their studies are wheeled in and out at will and one becomes Exhibit x in the adversarial process when it is thought that this would be helpful to one of the contending parties. Senior officials and ministers essentially look upon those who do costibenefit analysis as experts who can be used or rejected in the adversarial process.

This undonbtedlv puts the issue too extremely, but if you will grant me the validity of the basic thrust of the argument it may be worthwhile to ask whether this is good or bad, inevitable or avoidable.

I have no quarrel with costfbenefit analysis as n technique for ensuring that none of the factors besring on a project decision are neglected. I do not think this is a trivial advantage. On the other hand, I deplore the facility with which some analysts are able to conjure up estimates of some of the inputted costs and benefits to obtain the ratio they want. It is not surprising, it seems to me, that this technique is looked upon by decision- makers as a tool in the adversarial process, because they would be foolish in the cxtreme to take the numbers provided by so-called experts as in some sense sacrosanct. As one of my supervisors once put it: ‘if anyone around here is going to be arbitraw it’s me.’

I cannot recall any instance where a costfbenefit study played a decisive role in the decision to proceed with or reject any proposed major federal project. Probably this is as it should be, because the technique does not adequately handle the distributional question: who will bear the costs and who will reap the benefits. And distributional questions are necessarily at the forefront of the minds of politicians.

Having said this, however, I would not want to suggest that costlbenefit analysis is valueless. In addition to ensuring that the logic, as distinct from the numbers, is straight, I believe it should be used much more extensively as a decision rule when decision-making powers are delegated. This implies, of course, that superiors take the time to develop the criteria and accept responsibility for the results on which they want project decisions to be reached by their subordinates.


TECHNIQUE3 AND PROCESSES

Cost-effectiveness studies I will not belabour this extremely large and important subject for two reasons: first, it is impossible to do justice to it in short compass. Then, a paper of mine on what I thought were the crucial issues was printed in the JOURNAL some years ago. I have not changed my mind about the fundamental theoretical issues. I am, however, more sceptical than ever that we will see, in the near future, the emergence of a larger set of social-economic statistical indicators that are perceived by the decision-makers, the opinion- makers, and the voters, to fairly reflect the changes, both favourable and unfavourable, that are taking place in this country. Consensus on the ‘right’ way to measure the changes in the well-being of Canadians is not going to be easily reached. But until it is reached I am not optimistic that cost-effectiveness studies are going to have much impact. As mentioned at the outset, it is difficult to reach agreement on the multiple objectives (effects) of programs. It is difficult to obtain the data to estimate their effects quantitatively. It is also difficult to obtain release of the results unless they are favourable in every respect. I strongly believe, however, that as slow and painful as it is likely to be, we must push on in this direc- tion. Only in this way are we likely to get a more informed electorate and hence a more responsible government.

Processes There are four processes that I wish to comment upon: the personnel selection-promotion process, the budgetary process, the cabinet committee process, the auditing process. My comments must necessarily be too brief relative to the issues. Here too, each one warrants a book rather than a subsection in a paper. I hope, therefore, that you will forgive my impressionistic approach.

Personnel selection-promotion process Having been out of the federal system for two years, I have received three impressions, a little better than one impression per year! First of all, the whole selection procedure, which was designed to minimize political inter- ference, by and large confers instantaneous tenure on public servants. University tenure is seldom granted until after four or five years and then only after an agonizing appraisal process.

Public servants are inclined to sneer at university faculty members, and sometimes rightly so. But there are more research professorships in Ottawa than there are in all the universities in Canada - men and women with effective instant tenure who have the freedom to pose the question they will research, research it, and then file the answer in their own desks with no accountability.


D.G. HARTLE

The annual salaries paid in Ottawa to some professional groups (not to mention overtime pay and perquisites) is nothing short of outrageous. While I hesitate to name names, the economist-statistician group imme- diately comes to mind. Although I obviously cannot prove it, there seems to be a gross distortion brought about by the fact that those groups with weak bargaining power can opt for arbitration while those who have strong bargaining power (e.g. can inconvenience the public by withholding their services) can opt for the strike route. This is a recipe designed to do in the taxpayer. And do not think that the taxpayer is unaware of what is going on. Tails they lose; heads they lose.

The absence in the past of some kind of career-planning system for individuals is notable, particularly at intermediate and senior levels. How many potentially good men and women retire on the job at painfully early ages? How many progress beyond their level of competence because nobody is keeping track of their level of past performance, or lack of performance?

Budgetary process The thing that impresses one is the inconsequential nature of the regular budgetary process and the overwhelming importance of decisions made outside of it, through special memoranda to cabinet.

I have no reason to attribtue ulterior motives to the Department of Finance. But the fact is that the growth in revenues has been under- estimated year after year. Because the revenue estimates of February form the basis for the Estimates of the following February, which do not apply until the fiscal year beginning two to three months later, it is not surprising in a period of rapid growth and/or inflation that the realized revenues exceed those estimated fourteen to twenty-four months earlier. The fact is, however, that departments have recognized that they are foolish to com- pete for additional funds for new or expanded programs at a time when their requests will be arrayed against so many alternatives. Much better to submit a cabinet memorandum during the fiscal year when the windfall revenue gains are being reluctantly revealed by Finance. Then a quickly prepared memorandum to cabinet showing only that funds are available to finance it for the balance of the current year, with no realistic estimates of the implications for ensuing years, will often do the trick. The real trick is, of course, ultimately played on the taxpayer. For, once having been adopted, it is like practicing dentistry on a shark to achieve modifications in the program in the future. To change the metaphor: the marshmallows of the current fiscal year become the bricks of the next fiscal year - through the A budget. And the bricks of today become the cornerstones of tomorrow as new and expanded programs are erected on this once-quivering foundation.



The problem is, of course, that once launched, new initiatives are more like skyrockets than guided missiles - they follow a course dictated more by the shape of the milk bottle from which they were launched ( I here reveal my age since even I know that milk bottles have vanished from the scene) than by the intentions of the persons who lit the fuse.

It is pathetic how little impact PPB, DPMS, MBO, and such techniques have had on these crucial decisions. In the vital decisions these techniques are, at the present time, like a well-intentioned funeral director who, through the magic of cosmetics, puts a good face on a man who has just died a slow and agonizing death from cancer. The illusion is nearly complete. But the family knows the horrors that have been disguised, and the visitors to the funeral home have their suspicions.

The indexing of the personal income tax was an important step forward, for it will reduce the income elasticity of the personal income tax and thereby force the government of the day to face more squarely the political costs of increased expenditures. I would advocate that two additional statues be erected on Parliament Hill, one on the east side and one on the west. They should be twice the size of the statues erected to Wilfrid Laurier and Robert Borden. One would be of Tom Kent, currently president of DEVCO, who, through his influence - as the father of Medicare, the Canada Pension Plan, Manpower Training, and DREE - increased the federal cash requirements by at least 50 per cent. The other statue should be erected to Simon Reisman, who fought these measures and succeeded in persuading the government to adopt indexing of the personal tax. Worthy opponents!

Cabinet committee process In the past decade or so we have seen the development of a much greater degree of centralization in parliamentary systems. I t is true that some departments have been decentralized, notably DREE and the Post Office at the federal level. But in terms of head office, in the federal government and the government of Ontario - the two with which I am familiar - the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office have much more senior staff, and certainly claim to have much more influence, than they did in the past. Is this an illusion? If not is it good or bad?

I do not think that the centralization of power in a period of majority government is an illusion. A prime minister or a premier with a clear majority has enormous power. He has power that might well be envied by a benevoIent dictator - for who is to say him nay? This power attracts, like a magnet, individuals who wish to influence the exercise of this power, for this confers prestige on them.

Whether it be the effect of television or not, although I am inclined to believe that this is far from unimportant, electorates seem to vote a party leader in or out. Ministers in a majority government are therefore elected


D.C. HARTLE

because of their leader and can be rejected at pleasure. They tend to become, if they were not already, toothless tigers who gum the policy proposals of the senior bureaucracy in general and the cabinet office in particular. Senior ministers may squirm in their chairs, but too often they do not stand up to be counted.

While it is my impression that majority governments confer great powers on the prime minister, and hence on his bureaucratic subordinates, the reverse is also true. Minority governments are highly dependent upon the performance oE particular ministers - whether by virtue of the votes they can deliver as individuals from their own riding or the votes they can deliver by virtue of the policies adopted with respect to their particular portfolio.

Canadians, it seems to me, make a fundamental mistake when they assume that minority governments are indecisive and fraught with conflict. Is there not ample evidence that majority governments are both insensitive and dominated by senior bureaucrats who are playing their own games? Are the games of bureaucrats any more attractive than those played by politicians? Frankly, I prefer the latter to the former.

Any prime minister or premier is making a grave error who, by creating a strong Cabinet Office, isolates himself from his own ministers who, if they have been chosen wisely, reflect the views of an important segment of the electorate. Too often the emperor finds he has no clothes only by freezing to death in the harsh Canadian winter. You can imagine which parts freeze first.

In short, I hold the view that too often strong cabinet secretariats, elaborate cabinet briefings prepared by these secretariats, control over cabinet agendas, and so on isolate prime ministers and premiers from the ultimate reality they must face. This is often done in the name of one of the techniques I have briefly discussed above. To lose an election in the name of PPB, or OPMS, or MBO is no better than to lose it in the name of insensitivity, inactivity, and indecisiveness.

Auditor general Let me end this paper with a plea. Many of the difficulties referred to above arise not because either politicians or bureaucrats are malevolent - indeed the opposite is the case by my observation - but rather because they respond to the implicit incentive systems within which they operate. They are not bad men but good men who cannot face the terribly painful personal costs of doing good.

One way out of this impasse. short of a revolution, is to have much greater public disclosure of information. The public needs the information that will allow it to identify when a good man is doing good - whether it be



politician or bureaucrat. In a state of ignorance, fools and knaves are indistinguishable from wise men and saints.

It is rarely in the interest of a particular minister or official to reveal more than his colleagues: ‘Better to be silent and thought a fool than to speak up and prove it.’ Nevertheless, the conspiracy of silence that prevails in our federal and provincial governments seems to me to put their con- tinued existenec in jeopardy. There is, in short, a crisis of confidence. It is not in the interest of any individual to speak up; but it is of vital importance that the system as a whole reveal in the future more than it has in the past if its legitimacy is to be maintained.

For this reason, while sceptical of some of the techniques discussed in the earlier part of this paper, I am strongly in favour of the auditor general reporting to Parliament on the extent to which they have been applied, the actions taken on the basis of the results, and the availability of the information to the public.

It is a most imperfect and complicated world. But undue secrecy will not make it less imperfect or less complicated. We do not know how to assess effectiveness of many programs in realizing the aspirations of a multitude of groups. One thing is clear to mc, however, I would prefer to trust the partially informed many to the well informed few. This view is reinforced every time I attend a faculty meeting.


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