techniques of repression: the control of popular protest in mid-nineteenth century france

Techniques of Repression: The Control of Popular Protest in Mid-Nineteenth Century FranceAuthor(s): Roger PriceSource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), pp. 859-887Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638635 .

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The Historical Journal, 25, 4 (I982), pp. 859-887. Printed in Great Britain

TECHNIQUES OF REPRESSION: THE CONTROL OF POPULAR PROTEST IN

MID-NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE*

ROGER PRICE University of East Anglia

The purpose of the article is to examine the official response to the widespread series of disorders occurring in France following poor harvests in the i 840s and I 85os. A large number of studies of popular protest have been written in recent years. Most have failed to consider the forms of repression employed, and yet this is an essential means of understanding both the scale and the characteristics of protest. Our essential concern is thus with the techniques of repression employed in this period prior to the development of modern police and bureaucratic systems.

Popular anxiety about food supplies and the disorder this caused obviously created major problems for the authorities. The way in which these problems were solved depended upon the structure and the effectiveness of the responsible civil administrations, the nature of their relationships with the police and military authorities, and the efficiency of all these agencies.

In a society in which the bureaucracy remained numerically small, the efficiency of administration depended a great deal on the willingness of unpaid local officials to co-operate. These (mayors andjustices of the peace) constituted a weak link in the administrative hierarchy. Their effectiveness was to some degree determined by the character of their relationship with the communities they sought to administer. Often, particularly in the more isolated regions, traditional hostility towards outside interference in the affairs of the community remained strong. Resident local officials were aware of this feeling, and indeed often shared it. This inevitably inhibited their behaviour. On occasion they acted less as representatives of the government than as members of the communities they inhabited. There was thus a constant risk of breakdown within the administrative hierarchy. Senior officials frequently complained that their own effectiveness was greatly reduced by the lack of co-operation they received from subordinates.'

Non-cooperation could take various forms. Lack of understanding of the law

* I would like to express my gratitude to the British Academy, to the Leverhulme Trust and to the Wolfson Foundation for awards which made the research for this article possible, and to David Barrass of the University of East Anglia, Colin Heywood of the University of Loughborough and John Merriman of Yale University for their comments on an earlier draft.

' See e.g. Procureur-gentfral (PG) Bordeaux, I 3 April I 847, in Archives nationales (hereafter AN) BB19 37; PG Orleans, 3 Feb. i853 in AN BB30 382.

859



86o ROGER PRICE

was one common excuse. The legislation protecting freedom of trade was difficult enough for senior law officials to interpret, and its ambiguities could be used to justify action or inaction by local officials in the interests of consumers. This, and even more their simple ignorance of the law, frequently caused them to lend 'moral' support to those who caused disorders.2 Some of the worst problems in I846 and I847 appear to have occurred in the Cholet area of Maine-et-Loire, where mayors and justices were only too aware of the misery of thousands of rural weavers. Their unwillingness to support the repression of popular protest led to complaints by the procureur-ge'ne'ral at Angers. He had found it necessary to threaten the mayors of La Tessouailles and St-Quentin-en-Mauges with prosecution before they would agree to assist in judicial investigations, and the justices of the peace shared the same outlook. The mayor of St-Macaire had actually gone so far as to respond to magistrates requesting his co-operation with the assertion that, 'natural law permits people to take what they need to eat when they are hungry'. He furthermore demanded that the government reduce the price of grain and increase the wages of the weavers unless it wanted to see carters killed and farms burnt. In reply to the procureur-ge'ne'ral's complaints the prefect of Maine-et-Loire, whilst deploring the failures of these officials, could only observe that it was impossible to find better mayors.3 This the minister of the interior was forced to accept in September i846, observing that many rural mayors lacked both the intelligence and firmness to carry out their duties effectively and that most of them could only be replaced by even less suitable candidates, so that higher authority could do little save tolerate mistakes.4

Such behaviour by local officials is easy to understand. They often sympathized with their neighbours and in the poorer regions might experience the same problems. Where they tried to enforce the law they were likely to be isolated within the community. Placards and graffiti expressed the most horrific threats against them, and sometimes popular discontent was more forceful. At Haussy (Nord) in January I847, after a cart had been stopped on the Valenciennes-Le Cateau road the mayor, as was his duty, reported the names of those involved to the gendarmerie. On 30 January a crowd of around 300 went to his house and demanded to know if it was he who had called the gendarmerie into the commune. If it was, they were determined, they said, to pull up the paving stones in the courtyard of his house and smash all his windows. Fortunately he was in Cambrai for the day and his family lied their way out of the situation. In the small town of Quimperle (Finistere) on 7 May an irate mob carried out their threats by beating up the commissaire-de-police and smashing every window in the mayor's house.5 The weakness of the

2 PG Bordeaux, 3 Feb. I854 in AN BB30 374. 3 PG Angers, i i Sept. I846 in Archives historiques de la Guerre (hereafter AHG) E5 I57. 4 Minister of interior to minister of agriculture, i8 Sept. I846 in AN F11 2758. 5 General officer commanding (hereafter GOC) i6th Division militaire (hereafter DM), 3 Feb.

I847 in AHG E5 158; Officer commanding (hereafter OC) gendarmerie Finistere, report on May I847 in AN F7 4002.



TECHNIQUES OF REPRESSION 86i

mayor's position vis-'a-vis the local population was intensified by the inadequate police support he could expect. Senior officials touring their areas of responsibility were struck by the concern of village mayors for their personal safety. From Angers, the procureur-gene'ral complained about 'the exaggerated fears' of the mayors of communes in close proximity to the city.6 Heaven help those in more isolated places! The general commanding in the Loiret in March I847 complained that some mayors had admitted to him that they could not co-operate with the military because it was too dangerous. They risked pillage, arson and even death for their pains.7 Local officials often failed to report disorders as well as refusing to point out participants. Resistance to the departure of carts from the hamlet of Argentieres (Deux-Sevres) on 21

November i 846 only came to the notice of the gendarmerie at nearby Melle on i December I846. 'The absolute silence of all the inhabitants of the village ... situated in a poor area, deprived of roads and isolated from all centres of population', and fear of 'attracting the vengeance' of disorderly elements had inhibited the mayor and the 'few honest people' who lived there from reporting the incident.8 Very many villages were just as isolated.

In effect it seems likely that the administration of the law was most effective in and around large settlements where mayors and justices could expect support from gendarmerie brigades or military garrisons, and where they were more closely supervised by the permanent officials of the prefectoral and judicial administration. Elsewhere mayors and justices of the peace were often likely to ignore incidents, or make concessions which served to further encourage those who had demanded them.

The correct procedure for both mayors and justices of the peace was to go to the place at which a disturbance was occurring or seemed likely to occur, immediately they received information of this fact, and there attempt to persuade the crowd to disperse, warning participants of the legal penalties they faced, and if necessary requisitioning gendarmes or even troops to disperse the recalcitrants. They were furthermore asked to make detailed reports to their administrative superiors and give every possible help in subsequent investigations and repression.9 The frequent reiteration by higher authorities of the duties of mayors in respect of the protection of the freedom of trade lends weight to the impression that quite commonly the law was not properly enforced.

This is not to deny, however, that in many cases, even in the most backward and socially primitive regions, mayors and other local officials did act conscientiously even in the face of angry crowds, particularly where they were supported and their authority as government representatives was reinforced by the presence of one or two gendarmes.10 The influence of a mayor would in part depend upon his status as a local notable, and on the respect which

6 PG Angers, 26 Aug. I846 in AN BB19 37. 7 GOC Ist DM, 24 Mar. I847 in AHG E5 I54. 8 Lieutenant gendarmerie Melle, I Dec. I846; GOC I2th DM, 4 Dec. I846 in AHG E5 I57. 9 See e.g. PG Angers circular, 2I Jan. I847 in AN BB19 37. 'o See e.g. OC gendarmerie Creuse, report on Nov. I846 in AN F7 3978.



862 ROGER PRICE

the community felt was due to him. This, as much as his official function, might determine his effectiveness.

In conditions of crisis the influence of a whole range of local notables would be deployed in an effort to prevent disorder, which must have appeared especially threatening to them as property owners. The occurrence of disturbances could then be seen as a sign of the limits to upper-class dominance over the poor and/or of the desperation of the latter. Frequently protest about food prices represented the emergence of pre-existing social tensions, normally suppressed by the dominant position of notables within the local economy and administration. In the majority of communities the established social and administrative authorities were unchallenged and exercised themselves, through the distribution of work, aid and advice, to maintain this position. The procureur-gene'ral at Rennes clearly expressed the official view of the proper situation which should prevail in the host of small communities in which most Frenchmen still lived, in observing that, 'what is most suitable, given the present disposition of spirits, are good preventative measures, sound advice given to the population by influential men... so that it will understand on the one hand, the satisfactory state of our cereal resources and on the other, the necessity, in its own interest, of freedom of trade'." It was where such advice was rejected or not proffered, where mayors were either identified with the minority of profiteers and consequently ignored, or on the contrary too obviously sympathized with the poorer citizens, that the effectiveness of the local administration as a means of social control was greatly diminished.

The degree to which police support was available to local officials was obviously of considerable importance in determining the vigour and rapidity of their response when disorder threatened. At the cantonal level policing was the responsibility of cantonal commissaires-de-police, acting under the orders of the mayor of the chef-lieux and thejustice of the peace, but even the major cities, which made special arrangements, were clearly underpoliced. In Paris at the end of the July Monarchy there were less than I,OOO municipal police, in Marseille 213, in Lille 46. Throughout the whole of France there were only 630 cantonal commissaires. The situation improved from the beginning of the Second Empire - most dramatically in Paris, where the number of municipal policemen increased to 3,600, but also in the smaller centres with the establishment of 738 new commissaires, and the extension of their jurisdiction from their place of residence, normally the chef-lieux of a canton, to the entire canton. This extended police coverage of rural areas, but even in i854 there were only 1,745 commissaires covering the 2,850 cantons not included in major cities. If this statistic is considered in relation to the number of communes into which France was divided - 36,826 in i 858 - it is evident that few, especially of those with small populations, had a resident commissaire. In them, the mayor remained the sole representative of the administration and of its police functions. 12

" PG Rennes, circular to Procureurs-du-Roi (hereafter PRs), 29 Nov. I845 in AN BB18 I436. 12 H. C. Payne, The police state of Louis Napolkon Bonaparte I85I-60 (Seattle, I966) pp. 83, I IO,

II3, I3I-



TECHNIQUES OF REPRESSION 863

Although expansion of the network of commissaires was welcomed, complaints were often voiced about the poor quality of recruits. Poor pay was not likely to attract the best men into a demanding profession. The effectiveness of commissaires as upholders of the law was likely to be further reduced by their dependence upon mayors and subjection to local influences.13 Even so the towns and larger market villages were well policed in comparison with most rural communes. In these, according to the procureur-ge'ne'ral at Orleans in February i 853, much police legislation would remain a 'dead letter' for as long as the 'negligence of the mayor was allowed to paralyse the good results one would expect'.14

In most villages the mayor enjoyed the support of the gardes-champetres or of gardes-forestiers who shared the duties of rural police with the gendarmerie but were far less efficient. They were appointed by the mayor, although from I852 prefectoral consent was required, and served under his immediate command. At the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, they were paid an average salary as low as 211 fr. per annum in I856 - not enough to make this a full-time occupation - and even then many communes refused to make appointments because of the cost. It has been estimated that in i856 about three-quarters of French communes employed a garde-champe'tre. Regular proposals for reform, usually by means of their organization in brigades under an officer hierarchy, were rejected on financial grounds.'5

So the system, in spite of its gross and evident shortcomings, survived. Many of the shortcomings were due to the guards' dependence on the mayor and local notables and their fear of enforcing the law against these or their friends and relatives. Complaints on this score were frequent. Gardes depended on the municipal council for their wages, and often on other citizens for their part-time employment - most of them found it essential to supplement their inadequate salaries. They were, according to the gendarmerie commander in Haute-Loire in I857, merely the mayor's 'domestics'; whilst his colleague in the Meuse maintained that the gardes, 'are continually obstructed when they wish to perform their duties vigorously '.16

The conseil-gene'ral of the Doubs in its i85I session reported that the ineffectiveness of the gardes was essentially due to their isolation and to the lack of control and direction over them by experienced policemen. Other reasons included the over-large area most were required to control, particularly in mountainous areas like the Pyrenees, and the excessive age of too many of them, combined with frequent drunkenness and a lack of zeal due in part to their preoccupation with earning a living.17 The departmental gendarmerie commanders, who were required to make frequent reports on their efficiency, complained above all about the failure of the gardes to supply them with

13 PG Bordeaux, 3 Feb. 1854 in AN BB30 374. 14 PG Orleans, 3 Feb. I853 in AN BB30 382. 15 Payne, Police state, pp. 244-5. 16 Reports on Jan. I857 in AN F7 4050, and AN F7 409I respectively. 17 Proces-verbal Besancon I851; OC gendarmerie Pyrenees-Orientales on Feb. I856 in AN F7

4I32.



864 ROGER PRICE

information. In general, they reported to their mayors and to the nearest cantonal commissaire, and only subsequently, if at all, to the nearest brigadier of gendarmerie, who was thus often ignorant of police matters in his area of responsibility. Not infrequently, as after a subsistence riot at Champeux (Puy-de-Dome) in December I846, the local gardes, obviously under all kinds of pressure from the local population, refused to give the names of those involved to the gendarmerie.18 In the early years of the Second Empire, and in relatively well-policed regions like that around Paris, legal officials continued to complain about the lack of authority of police agents in rural areas. According to the procureur-general at Paris, 'the countryside escapes all surveillance. Enemies of the government, just as ordinary wrongdoers, are able to hide themselves with impunity. "19 Occasional patrols by the gendarmerie were not sufficient to establish a sense of respect for the authorities.

The gendarmerie provided the most effective form of policing available. They were military trained, organized under an N.C.O. and officer hierarchy and relatively independent of local pressures, being responsible to the ministry of war. Their main weakness was numerical. The i852 budget provided for expansion to a strength of 788 officers, I3,798 mounted gendarmes and I0,073 on foot. This was an increase of around 4,000 on the I 847 establishment, when furthermore budgetary controls had kept many units below their proper strength.

Although over 2,400 of the new men were retained in Paris this reform permitted the establishment of 46I new brigades - the basic unit, composed of 5-6 men commanded by an N.C.O., and itself subordinate to a lieutenant or captain commanding an arrondissement. Even so the gendarmerie clearly remained very thin on the ground.20

A report from the gendarmerie commander in the Haute-Saone covering the month of August I846 gives some idea of the normal duties performed by a gendarmerie brigade. According to this, each day two gendarmes were required to maintain good order in the town in which the brigade was stationed, by means of the surveillance of travellers and beggars, visiting inns where brawls with drunks were not uncommon, examining the passports of strangers when coaches arrived, making certain that the postmaster provided relay horses only to authorized people, and generally ensuring that the mass of police regulations were observed; two or more went on patrol in the brigade's area of responsibility outside its town of residence, so that each commune was visited twice a month. There always had to be a sufficient number of gendarmes at all fairs and markets in case of trouble, and regular patrols had to be mounted by night as well as day along major roads. In addition to these regular daily

18 Lieutenant gendarmerie Issoire, I6 Dec. I846 in AHG E5 I59. 19 PG Paris, I8 Feb. I854 in AN BB30 383. 20 Minister of war to minister of interior, 2 Feb. I847 in AN BB19 37; Payne, Police state, pp.

22, I3I, 235; W. Zaniewicki, 'L'armee francaise en I848', doctorat de 30 cycle, Univ. de Paris, I966, p. 28.




duties, extraordinary responsibilities were frequent - such as escorts for tax collectors, and military deserters, or the suppression of poaching.2'

In times of subsistence crisis duties multiplied, especially due to the civil authorities' awareness of the unreliability of rural police and National Guards. A succession of reports from the Doubs in I846-7 list night-patrols to curb begging, and because of popular fear of arsonists; responsibility for the investigation of increased numbers of thefts as popular misery grew more intense, and the attempts to discover the authors of various threatening placards.22 More frequent patrols were essential in order to reassure rural populations liable to panic, prevent the spread of rumours and admonish those likely to riot, to control access roads to markets, protect traffic on major roads, and to reinforce brigades at neighbouring market centres at which trouble might be expected. This almost continual activity was reported to be 'excessively tiring' for the gendarmes involved - even in relatively quiet departments like Haute-Loire in I846-7. In the Creuse, even in the middle of the winter, three brigades of gendarmes were required for each market. As a preventive measure this appears to have been effective, but the departmental commander complained that the exertions called for by this and frequent patrols in harsh weather conditions were causing illness amongst his men, and expenses which reduced their families to misery.23

In spite of this the procureur-ge'ne'ral at Angers, concerned about the growing numbers and increasingly threatening attitude of beggars, complained in November i 846 that 'the rare and periodic patrols of gendarmes whose residence is distant does not allow them to get to know the population. They are unable to correct the predatory habits of idlers, who without adequate surveillance become used to living at the expense of others. ' The sous-prefet at Montlucon (Allier) complained about the difficulty of maintaining order at the grain markets held in that town and on the approach roads. By reinforcing the brigade at Montlucon with that from Huriel he had ten men available. Further reinforcement depended on the brigade at Marcillat, which was however on foot and 20 kilometres away, and on that on Montmarault, which was mounted but 30 kilometres away, which meant a round trip of 6o kilometres each market day if it was to be used. This was not very practical. The other brigades in his arrondissement - at Herisson and Cerilly - were regularly used at the market at Aingy, held on the same day of the week as that of Montlucon.24

Due to the accumulation of duties, and often also the failure of mayors and gardes-champ'etres to inform them of potential trouble, gendarmerie commanders recognized that they were often unable to act rapidly enough in a preventive

21 OC gendarmerie Haute-Saone on August I846 in AN F7 4I50. 22 OC gendarmerie Doubs on May i846, Jan. and Feb. I847 in AN F7 3985. 23 Prefect Haute-Loire to GOC I gth DM, I Mar. I 847 in AHG E5 I 59; OC gendarmerie Creuse,

report on Dec. I846 in AN F7 3978. 24 PG Angers, i8 Nov. I846 in AN BB19 37; Sous-prefet Montlucon, 26 Nov. I846 in AHG

E5 I59.



866 ROGER PRICE

capacity, instead arriving only after disorders had commenced or even ended, and thus being forced to act in an essentially repressive role. They faced the obvious problem of not being able to be in two places at once. Two separate incidents on I 3 January I847 illustrate this. In the first, two carts were pillaged in the centre of the town of Pouance (Maine-et-Loire) whilst the brigade stationed there was restoring order at nearby Combree. In the second, farmers at the market of Quelaines (Mayenne) were forced to reduce their price for wheat from the prevailing 40 fr. per hectolitre to 20 fr. in the absence of the local gendarmes, who had been ordered to the fair held at Craon.25 Careful deployment oflimited resources was essential. Thus in February the gendarmerie commander in Correze felt obliged to reprimand the lieutenant commanding in the arrondissement of Ussel for requisitioning four men from Egletons, three from Bugeat, two from Meymec, two from Neuvic, exposing all these points to disorder, simply because threatening placards had been found on the streets of Ussel.26

Like any other institution the gendarmerie had its individual incompetents. Errors ofjudgement were most likely to be due to excessive zeal. In the interest of maintaining order and perhaps also from sympathy with local populations, gendarmes on occasion interfered with transactions in the market place. At Bourges (Cher) on I7 January I847, for example, they asked the mayor to impose a system of rationing on consumers and forced one seller whose prices they regarded as excessive at 8 fr. per double hectolitre for wheat to reduce this to 4-50 fr. After a more serious incident at Ry (Seine-Inf6rieure) in March, when gendarmes actually cut open the sacks of sellers who were reluctant to accept the prices they were being offered at an agitated market, the minister of the interior was led to complain to his colleague at the ministry of war about what he saw as protection of disorderly elements by the gendarmerie.27

Far more often the gendarmerie could be relied upon for firm and effective action in agitated situations. At Angers in August i846, for example, when mayors and justices in impoverished areas like that around Beaupreau (Maine-et-Loire) were proving to be completely unreliable, the procureur-ge'ne'ral felt convinced that at least the gendarmerie could be depended upon to do their duty.28

On occasion a small number of gendarmes on duty at a particular place might simply be overwhelmed by a large crowd. At Lencloitre (Vienne) in January I847 five gendarmes were unable to control a crowd estimated at around 2,000 and determined to get its hands on the grain displayed for sale. The local brigadier and mayor were able to escape the fury of the crowd only due to the efforts of a gendarme standing on a pile of sacks and swinging his

25 OC gendarmerie Maine-et-Loire, on Jan. i847 in AN F7 407I; GOC 4th DM, i6Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I55.

26 OC gendarmerie Correze, i i Feb. i847 in AHG E5 I59. 27 OC gendarmerie Cher, i 6 Jan. I 847 in AHG E5 I minister of interior to minister of war,

I9 Mar. I847. 28 PG Angers, 26 Aug. i846 in AN F11 2758.




sabre at the heads of the members of the crowd in order to clear a space. At Cluny (Saone-et-Loire) in the same month gendarmes and the small number of national guards who reported for duty were unable to control a large crowd compressed into the enclosed area of the former monastery which served as the grain market. At Bellac (Haute-Vienne) on 30 January the brigade was forced to lock itself into its barracks as bands of hungry peasants poured into the town from all sides. At Chateau-Chinon (Nievre) in August I846, as at Bayac and Montignac (Dordogne) in February I847, local mayors judged the number of gendarmes to be insufficient, and refused to sanction the departure of loaded carts in the presence of hostile crowds, until reinforcements arrived.29

In most threatening situations, however, gendarmes were able to retain control. Regarded by most people with a mixture of fear and respect, their mere presence must frequently have been enough to deter would-be rioters. Agitated market-place crowds, when admonished by the local mayor and notables, supported by even one or two gendarmes (figures representing in the eyes of the populace the principle of authority and repression), were likely to think twice before ignoring these warnings.30

By the time the crisis of the I 85os developed, the authority of the gendarmerie over the population had been reinforced, not through any extension of their powers, but by their association with a stronger central government.31 This was one factor making the outbreak of civil disorder less likely and also increasing the likelihood of the gendarmerie being able to cope with local disturbances. It did not entirely compensate for the continuing numerical weakness of the gendarmerie and other police organizations, and was partly offset by the suppression of the national guard. This had been dissolved in I85I, not just for political reasons, but because it had repeatedly shown itself to be unreliable during civil disorders. In practice in I 846, in many towns the national guard had only existed on paper, and where reliable middle-class elements formed only a relatively small part of the population - particularly in the industrial centres - the authorities had not been in the least bit anxious to reorganize guard units which might have included members of the poorer classes. These were too likely, in case of disorder, to sympathize with the rioters, or at least to be unwilling to give offence to their friends and neighbours. Even in places where guards were equipped they were usually badly trained and not particularly effective at crowd control.32

To compensate for all these deficiencies in local policing there were urgent efforts during times of social crisis to organize reliable civil forces which might

29 Brigadier gendarmerie Lencloitre (Vienne), 4Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I55; OC gendarmerie Saone-et-Loire report onJan. I 847 in AN F7 4 I 54; Lieutenant gendarmerie Bellac (Haute-Vienne) 3I Jan. i847 in AHG E5 i58; A. Thuillier, 'La crise des subsistances dans la Nievre en i846-7', Actes du goe Congres des socite's savantes 1965, iII ( I 966).

30 See e.g. Lieutenant gendarmerie Provins (Oise), 20 Feb. i847 in AHG E5 I54, describing events at Bray-sur-Seine on the igth.

31 See e.g. PG Metz, 23 Jan. i854 in AN BB30 380. 32 See e.g. Sous-prefet Montlucon, 26 Nov. i846 in AHG E5 I59; GOC Charente, I3 Feb.

I847 in AHG E5 i 6.



868 ROGER PRICE

be used against those elements of the community thought to be likely to cause disorder. At Ch'ateauroux (Indre) on I s January I847, after the garrison had marched to Villedieu and Buzancais, abandoning the town - which had plenty of experience of riots - largely to its own resources, 'the good citizens' rapidly proceeded to form a civic guard in readiness for the market due to be held on the following day, which would bring an influx of poor peasants from the surrounding countryside. At the same time the national guard at Bourges and in many small towns and villages was also hurriedly reorganized, in response to the serious disorders which had occurred at Buzancais and throughout the Indre.33 In other areas rural national guards were placed on an active footing by prefectoral arret, in order to help troops and gendarmes safeguard transport of foodstuffs and to protect their own communities and isolated farms against bands of beggars.34

National guards continued however to prove their unreliability in various ways. At Mulhouse on 5 June I847 when the call 'To arms!' went out, most guardsmen simply stayed at home. According to the military commander they looked good on parade, but were useless in dangerous situations.35 Guards could expect to have stones thrown at them and to be subject to physical violence. At Lisieux (Calvados) on 3 I July I 847 over i ,ooo rioters had attacked 30 national guards; at Lencloitre (Vienne) early in January when the mayor had called the Guard to the market place, only a dozen men responded and they were immediately disarmed and their guns broken.36 Even more frightening was the prospect of reprisals by rioters against individual guards after the event. The guardsmen of Cluny were told by the prefect that they should not fear being reproached as 'enemies of the People'. The true friends of the People were those who protected the grain trade.37 This cannot have been much comfort.

There was also the prospect that guardsmen might intervene on the side of the rioters, as at Ardentes (Indre) on 25 January i 847, where guards joined with the rest of the population to prevent a farmer taking his grain to market.38 Several units were disarmed to avoid this.39 In the Buzancais area when pillaging finally ceased, due in part to the intervention of national guards, these only offered their protection to proprietors providing they agreed to sell their grain at the price previously stipulated by the demonstrators.40

National guard units were supposed to supplement, or act in place of,

33 PG Bourges, I7 Jan. i847 in AN BB"9 37; Prefect Cher, 19 Jan. i847 in AN F11 2758. For an analysis of these disorders see R. Price, The modernisation of rural France: communications networks and agricultural market structures in the nineteenth century (forthcoming).

34 See e.g. OC gendarmerie Eure-et-Loir, report on Dec. i846 in AN F7 3996. 35 GOC 5th DM, 5 July i847 in AHG E5 I56. 36 OC gendarmerie Calvados, on July i847 in AN F7 3946; Brigadier gendarmerie Lencloitre

(Vienne) 5 Jan. I 847 in AHG E5 I 55. 37 OC gendarmerie Saone-et-Loire, I Feb. i847 in AHG E5 I59. 38 OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, I7 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I58. 39 See e.g. PG Rennes, 26 Jan. i847 re national guards at Loudeac in AN BB19 4I. 40 PG Bourges, 19 Jan. i847 in AN BB19 37.




whatever professional police force was employed. Their reliability depended on particular circumstances - in large part on the number of middle-class citizens with property to protect who might be mobilized, and upon firm leadership. It was greatest in the larger centres, where the presence of professional police agents was likely to increase the willingness of middle-class guardsmen to disperse demonstrators. These could be gendarmerie or, in the cases in which the gendarmerie was insufficient, it might become necessary to reinforce gendarmes with regular troops.

Use of the army in urban centres or villages ocurred in two forms. Troops might be kept in an obvious state of readiness in order to overawe potential troublemakers. Or troops might be used to disperse crowds when disorder occurred which it was beyond the capacity of the civil authorities and even gendarmerie to control. In any situation the deployment of troops was the last resort for the authorities, and took place only after carefully specified legal formalities, designed to limit the occasions for conflict between troops and civilians, had been complied with. A representative of the civil power - mayor, deputy mayor, justice of the peace or commissaire-de-police - was required to deliver three sommations to a disorderly crowd, i.e. a combined request for dispersal and warning of the consequences of failure to comply. Only after these had been delivered - and this was a stage in the proceedings which itself normally followed the use of persuasion - could troops legally be used.41

Both civil and military authorities were extremely reluctant to commit troops, although the absence of any alternative often required them to do so. Their intervention was fraught with uncertainty. They might disperse a crowd rapidly, but if their numbers were inadequate, or the crowd particularly enraged, conflict might escalate and lead to casualties. Once committed, commanders of detachments were normally required to use whatever means might be necessary to secure the objective of restoring order. There was particular concern that troops should not be overwhelmed by a crowd or forced to withdraw - results which would only have encouraged the spread of disorder.42

The employment of troops had evident disadvantages. One of the most obvious was their lack of training in crowd control, and the absence of special equipment. Troops confronting demonstrators were forced to use their conventional weapons - musket and bayonet in the case of infantry, and pistol and sabre for cavalry. Although the order to fire was rarely given, deployment of men dependent on bayonet or sabre in itself raised the level of violence and however effective it might normally be as a means of crowd dispersal, neither civil nor military authorities welcomed the necessity.

The scale of agitation together with the numerical strength and degree of reliability of alternative police agencies determined whether troops would be used or not. A military presence, if not necessarily direct intervention, was

41 See e.g. OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 28 Nov. i846 in AHG E5 I57. 42 See e.g. GOC 4th DM, I3 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I55, report on discussion between himself,

GOC Vienne and Prefect Vienne; GOC Is5th DM, 25 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 i58.



870 ROGER PRICE

clearly advisable in areas in which disorders seemed likely and these alternative agencies were insufficient. Direct intervention became a necessity in such situations as that at Pont-l'Abbe (Finistere) where on 22January i847 a crowd pillaged two cartloads of potatoes, in spite of the efforts of the mayor and several gendarmes. The alarm bell was sounding to call in the population from the surrounding countryside to join the rioters and there was every possibility that disorders would become more widespread unless determined repressive action occurred. Three companies of infantry were immediately dispatched and that same day arrested twenty-four presumed ringleaders. This measure of intimidation appears to have been successful, as no further disorder was reported. Retention of troops in the village for some days after the incident would serve to reinforce the warning that the authorities would repress disorder wherever it occurred, using whatever means became necessary.43

Due to the limited manpower available, military action outside large centres of population often took place after disorders happened and took a punitive form, with deterrence as its main objective. After carts had been prevented from leaving Nieuvil (Vienne) on 23 January i847, troops were sent. They arrived on the 27th and protected the loading and departure of these carts. There is no record of arrests in this particular instance, but clearly it was a response to crowd action rather than a preventive measure.44

Besides a host of minor incidents which nevertheless required military intervention, if not the use of violent force, there were more serious affairs. At Nancy on 20, 2 I and 22 June i846 disorders occurred due to the high price of bread, and on the 22nd stones were thrown and, according to the report, pistol shots fired at a patrol. Surrounded by a large crowd the troops felt obliged to use their weapons to defend themselves and fired, killing one man and wounding others. Following this preventive measures were intensified - cavalry and infantry reinforcements were sent from Luneville, guard posts and patrols were doubled in strength and the whole garrison kept on the alert in its barracks.45

Although not using firearms, large bodies of troops were engaged in fairly violent conflict with rioting crowds at Laval (Mayenne), Chateauroux (Indre) and Rennes (Ille-et-Vilaine) in January i847, at Lille in May and at Troyes (Aube) on 7-8 August.46 At Mulhouse in June troops again opened fire, this time after crowds looting food and wine shops had failed to disperse. Four individuals died immediately and four later of their wounds; 200 arrests were made. Typically there had been too few troops on duty initially to control crowds and they had fired to avoid being overwhelmed.47 It was to avoid

4 OC gendarmerie Finistere on Jan. i847 in AN FP 4002. " OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 28 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 i58. 45 OC gendarmerie, Meurthe, on June i846 in AN F7 4088. 46 GOC 4th DM, i iJan. i847 in AHG E5 I55; GOC I5th DM, i6Jan. i847; GOC Indre

to GOC 4th DM, n.d., in AHG E5 i58; OC gendarmerie Ille-et-Villaine ioJan. i847 in AHG E5 I57; OC gendarmerie Nord on May i847 in AN FP 4o6; GOC i8th DM, io Aug. i847 in AHG E5 i59.

47 GOC Haut-Rhin, 27 June i847; GOC 5th DM, 27 June i847 in AHG E5 I57.




placing himself in this kind of situation that on I3 January i847 the prefect of the Indre, accompanied by only 20 dragoons, delayed his entry into Buzanc,ais, waiting until the rioting there had already declined in intensity of its own accord. The constant fear was that crowds faced by small numbers of police or troops, and enraged by their inability to buy sufficient food, would be irritated rather than overawed by the military presence.48

On all these occasions military commanders were only able to intervene to maintain order after requisition by the civil authorities. Only when a state of siege was in force was this unnecessary. Detachments helping to maintain order were normally accompanied by a civilian official responsible for making the sommations which were a necessary prelude to military action. A ministry of war circular in January i847 insisted that, 'No troops should be employed, even in the town in which they are garrisoned, except after written requisition, indicating clearly the goal to be attained'. It furthermore stressed that the civil authorities should leave 'to the military commander the choice of means by which to achieve this end '.4

Effective action depended on close collaboration between the civil and military authorities, and disagreement over responsibilities was frequent. In spite of this, in most cases the degree of collaboration was adequate to the situation. Only rarely were the relationships between civil and military officials so troubled as to drastically influence the course of military action. At Sucy-aux-Bois (Loiret) on I7 March I847 a barge loaded with flour was pillaged by a crowd estimated at around I,200 in spite of its escort of thirty infantry and twenty-five cavalry. The refusal of the responsible civil authorities to make the sommations seems to have inhibited the defensive measures of the escort - in particular their use of weapons. The officer commanding the detachment subsequently observed that many mayors of rural communities would act in similar fashion, and that some had admitted to him that were they to act openly in concert with the military they would expose themselves to the pillaging or burning of their properties or even to murder.50

The basic concerns of the government in times of subsistance crises are easily identified. They were determined to safeguard the freedom of circulation and trade in food-stuffs, and to protect the persons and property of those who might become the object of the hostility of riotous mobs, aggressive beggars or thieves. Instructions to this effect from the ministers of the interior, justice and war to their principal subordinates were repeated in numerous circulars sent by the latter to every community and gendarmerie or military unit.51 In practical terms, the prevention and repression of disorder was likely to lead to requests for military aid from the civilian authorities. Thus after the outbreak of serious disturbances in the Indre in January I 847 the prefect expressed his belief that

48 Prefect Indre, 27 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 i58. 49 28 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I53 (emphasis in the original). 50 GOC ist DM, I9 and 24 Mar. i847 in AHG E5 I54. 51 Minister of agriculture to minister of war, i9 Nov i846 in AHG E5 I59, and confidential

circular from minister of interior, i8 Jan. i847, quoted by A. Thuillier, 'La crise', pp. 258-9.



872 ROGER PRICE

unless dramatic measures were rapidly implemented to restore security on the roads his department would experience famine within a month. At the beginning of February I847 the sous-prefel at Moissac (Tarn-et-Garonne) asked for a garrison to safeguard large stocks of grain held by merchants in this marketing centre. On i8 March the minister of the interior and on the 29th the prefect of Loiret expressed their concern about the security of barges en route for Paris and thus about the provisioning of the capital - always an effective manner of overcoming the reluctance of the military to provide more troops.

Requests for military help were also stimulated by vague fears generated by an awareness of growing social unrest. Already in November i 846 local authorities and notables in the Indre were expressing their anxiety and d-emanding troops; in January I847 the minister of the interior asked his colleague at the war ministry for reinforcements for garrisons in Creuse, Haute-Vienne and Correze, where it was feared that returning seasonal migrants might be one cause of disorder; at the same time the prefect of the Rhone wanted to reassure frightened proprietors in the mountains of the arrondissement of Tarare, where popular misery was intense.53 Again in I853 the procureur-general at Angers recognized so many symptoms of trouble, similar to those of I846, that he began to press the military to deploy forces in readiness.54 Both administrators and army officers inevitably used their experience of past events as a basis for planning measures to deal with present events.

Frequently police and civil officials at all levels seem to have been obsessed by fears of political conspiracy. Every murmur of discontent was likely to be blamed on politically motivated agitators. Even shouts in the night of 'Vive Henry V!' or 'Vive la Republique!' probably proffered by drunks on their way home after the bars had closed, were reported in all seriousness as demonstrations by hostile political groups.55 In regions in which legitimist landowners had managed to preserve their influence over the masses, there was always official concern that they might manipulate popular discontent as the basis for a political and perhaps insurrectionary movement. Better-informed observers, however, realized that although influential legitimists might agitate in their salons and in the press, they were not prepared to risk unleashing the anarchical passions of the hungry. They were as interested in preserving social order as their political opponents and were thus unwilling to commit themselves wholeheartedly to their political cause. Far greater reason for concern was republican agitation and the revolutionary symbolism which was frequently

52 GOC 4th DM, I9Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I58; GOC ioth DM, 2 Feb. i847 in AHG E5 I56; minister of interior to minister of war, i8 Mar. i847 in AHG E5 I57; GOC ist DM, 31 Mar. i847 in AHG E5 I54.

53 OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 22 Nov. i846 in AHG E5 I55; minister of interior to minister of war, 23 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 i58; Prefect Rhone, 25 Feb. i847 in AHG E5 I59.

54 PG Angers, 4 and i6 Oct. i853 in AN BB30 432. 55 E.g. OC gendarmerie Sarthe, 7 Jan. i848 in AN F7 4158; Paris pr6fect of police, 22 Sept.

5867 in Papiers et correspondance de lafamille imperiale, iI (Paris, I870), 267.




a part of popular protest.5' The general commanding the i 8th military division reported from Dijon early in 1847 that, 'all the disorders which have taken place appear to have been the work of a movement of communists... 'He based this view on the presence of more people than usual at market places where incidents had occurred, and on shouts of 'down with the bourgeoisie!'. A national guard officer who had asked an agitator what he wanted had been told, 'We want your country house'. All ofwhich added up - for the general - to clear proof of a communist plot.57 Few government representatives were prepared to adopt the dismissive attitude of the gendarmerie commander in Finistere in 1846-7. He reasoned that the local population was geographically and culturally isolated from political militancy and that shouts or placards which contained messages which appeared political in inspiration were at worst only the work of isolated and probably drunken agitators. The gendarmerie commander in Doubs even maintained in January I847 that, 'the question of grain dominates all others, the spirit of party restrains itself in the face of such a calamity'.58

The actual outbreak of disturbances, particularly where they were as serious as those in the Indre, lent credence to every fear and stimulated further demands for troops, and not only from areas in close proximity to places at which disorders occurred. After BuzanZais the editors of the Siecle expressed their fear that whereas 'formerly the poor class looked for support to the bourgeoisie: today it is the bourgeoisie which it attacks. They no longer say " War on the chateaux! " They say " Kill the bourgeois! "59 This kind of anxiety was stimulated by reports on the affair which stressed its more violent aspects and drew general conclusions. Such exaggerated fears meant that military reluctance to comply with requests for troops inevitably led to complaints from all levels of the administrative hierarchy, from village mayors to departmental prefects and ministers about the 'unreasonable' reluctance of both gendarmerie and regular troop commanders to comply with what seemed to them to be reasonable and urgent requests. The minister of the interior complained bitterly to the war minister on 26 January I847 that military policy was in 'frequent contradiction with the instructions given by the government to all those magistrates charged with the maintenance of order'. He insisted that, 'the civil authorities can only act on the basis of information received; they are not always able to know with exactitude, to what extent public order will be compromised; they cannot know in advance if gatherings will limit themselves to making complaints or if they will engage in acts of aggression and violence. In asking for the despatch of detachments of troops to given points, they thus often obey the councils of prudence rather than the demands

56 See e.g. GOC 4th DM, 2 Apr. 1847 in AHG E5 155 contrasting Legitimists and Republicans in Sarthe.

57 I Feb. 1847 in AHG E5 I59. 58 OC gendarmerie Finistere, i5 Nov. I846 in AHG Es 157; OC gendarmerie Doubs, report

on January i847 in AN F7 3985. 59 Le Siecle, 7 Mar. I847.



874 ROGER PRICE

of absolute necessity. . . ' It was precisely this sort of attitude which gave such grave cause for concern to the minister of war. In his reply dated 28 January he recognized the army's obligation to lend aid to the civil authorities, but insisted that with limited resources it simply could not meet all the requests that were made, and that to attempt to do so would only exhaust the troops. He concluded with the suggestion - which could not have been well received - that civilian officials were simply trying to pass on to the military their difficult responsibility for the maintenance of order.60 An internal ministry of war minute written early in I847 suggested caustically that it was a rule at the ministry of the interior to demand an increase in the garrison of every town which experienced the slightest disorder, and at the same time to refuse always to consent to a reduction in the garrisons of other places. An even more irritated note for the minister written in February observed that, 'the terror of the prefects is so great that they are no longer content to address themselves to the minister of the interior to obtain troops; now they invoke the support of the minister of commerce, and the minister of justice on behalf of the procureurs-ge'neraux and the procureurs-de-roi, so that the same request comes from three ministers... .61 In effect, the ministry ofwar wanted a more discriminating attitude on the part of the civil administration and was prepared to resist what appeared to be unreasonable requests for aid. In a circular to the generals commanding military divisions and their departmental sub-divisions, the minister warned them against responding too eagerly to requests from frightened civil administrators. To limit the possible troop movements the provisions of a regulation laid down on IOJuly I 79 I were recalled. No troops should leave one military division for another without the explicit orders of the minister, nor one department for another without the order of the commander of the military division; and no troops should leave their garrison town without the order of the departmental military commander. Troop movements and the responses to popular agitation were to be as closely controlled as possible, and should only follow full consultation between the civil and military authorities. In a previous letter to the ministry of the interior in September I 846 the minister of war had recognized the right of civilian officials to requisition troops, but stressed that it was for the military authorities alone to determine the size and composition of the forces to be used and the form of their deployment. They alone should give the orders.62

Disputes continued. In March I847, when the prefect of Loiret pressed for the maintenance of escorts for barges passing through his department on the Loire and the Orleans Canal, the military divisional commander responded by expressing his belief that the prefect exaggerated.63 In this case, and again following measures taken for the repression of the widespread disorders around Buzancais in January, the responsible army commander was anxious to end

60 Minister of interior to minister of war, 26 Jan. I847 and latter's reply in AHG E5 I54. 61 In AHG E5 I59 and E5 I57 respectively. 62 In AHG E5 158. 63 GOC ist DM, 3I Mar. I847 in AHG E5 I54




his commitments to the civil power and the dispersal of his force at the earliest possible moment, whilst the civil authorities, anxious that a renewed outbreak of violence might find them without military support, wanted to preserve this for as long as possible, and were led to magnify the dangers inherent in the existing situation.

The explanations of the war ministry were certainly not enough to calm the fears of the minister of the interior. He returned to the attack in a letter of 9 March I847, using the specific case of the Seine-Inferieure, with its large concentrations of impoverished workers. He rejected the war ministry's claim that in the case of disorder Rouen could easily be reinforced from Paris by use of the railway. He stressed his belief that delays in deploying adequate force would only result in the rapid spread of disturbances. Later in that same month it was the insufficient number of troops being used to guard traffic along the canals from Dunkirk to Lille, where grain prices were rising, which was the cause of altercation between the two ministers.64

Given the nature of their responsibilities both ministers were acting quite correctly. The war minister, however, was all too aware of the limited resources at his disposal and all too frequently reminded of the need to conserve them by the mass of requests from civilian authorities which made conflicting demands on these resources. Thus when particular civilian authorities asked that apparently threatened points receive military reinforcements, others, responsible for order in those places which were likely to have their garrisons reduced to provide these reinforcements, were always bitterly opposed to reductions. When these had occurred, they wanted their troops returned as quickly as possible.65 At the same time those places to which extra troops had been sent wanted to keep them for as long as there was the slightest possibility of further disorder. The prefect of the Indre, requesting more and more troops throughout January and February I847, was still trying to hang on to them in July, on the grounds that food prices were not falling as rapidly as in other areas.66

Save for relatively large concentrations around Paris and along the frontiers, the number of troops in most departments was not large. At the end of 1847 there were around 29,000 men in the department of the Seine, and over I o,ooo in each of the Rhone, Nord and Moselle; seven departments had between 5,000 and g,ooo. In the troubled areas in the centre, nine departments had less than goo men each, including gendarmes. These were not large numbers, especially when it is remembered that aid to the civil power was in addition to normal duties, and that each year large numbers of conscripts had to be trained and absorbed. It is hardly surprising that frequent complaints were made both by military commanders and civilian officials about the difficulties caused by lack

64 Minister of interior to minister of war, 9 and 26 Mar. I847 in AHG E5 I57 and E5 I58 respectively.

65 See e.g. Mayor of Bar-le-Duc, to minister of interior, I Mar. I847 in AHG E5 I54; GOC I5 DM, 28 Nov. I846 in AHG E5 I58.

66 GOC I2th DM, 28 Nov. I846 in AHG E5 I58.

30 HIS 25



876 ROGER PRICE

of personnel. Civilian authorities wanted troops everywhere, but clearly this was impossible. The basic military doctrine on the stationing and deployment of forces was clearly restated in a ministerial circular of 28 January 1847. A commanding officer should 'conserve available resources in the major centres of population, send detachments rapidly, strong enough to energetically repress disorders [elsewhere] ... and secure the return of these detachments as soon as the disorders have been repressed, in order to always have them at his disposition '.67

Their primary responsibility was the maintenance of order in these 'major centres of population', providing reinforcements for police and national guards on market days, patrolling the streets at night and placing guards over granaries and bakers' shops if need be, as well as ensuring the security of traffic passing through what were generally nodal points in the regional or inter- regional systems of communications.

Patrols were not normally sent outside the garrison towns. In general troops moved in to surrounding areas, at the request of the civil authorities, only after disorders had actually occurred. It was due to this that outside their garrison towns they were generally employed in a repressive rather than a preventive role, which incurred frequent criticism from civilians. Even the gendarmerie commander in Finistere demanded to know how farms were to be protected and agitators intimidated if detachments of troops were not going to be sent from their garrisons whenever disorder was in prospect. But unless the situation in rural areas was judged to be particularly dangerous, it was clearly unwise to disperse the limited numbers of men available on what might be wild goose chases.68

The problem was to ensure that soldiers were available in sufficient numbers at those places where they were likely to be needed. The main concern was thus one of tactical positioning. As the prevailing tactical doctrine stressed, troops needed to be concentrated at those points - larger towns - at which their presence would be most useful, and from which they could easily proceed into the surrounding region if this became necessary.

Movement on foot, or even on horse, along many poor roads, was slow. Improved communications would clearly increase the effectiveness with which a given number of troops could be used. In I847, for example, it was possible to reinforce Agen from Bordeaux by steamer along the River Garonne, and at the beginning of February, sixty men went by steamer from Agen to reinforce Marmande.69 Movement by rail was even more rapid and existing lines were used in I846 and I847 to move troops to areas of disorder, presaging a time in the near future when control over the countryside by the central power would become far more effective.

67 Zaniewicki, 'L'armee francaise', p. 24; GOC i ith DM, 5 Feb. I847 in AHG E5 I56. 68 GOC ist DM, 5 July I847, in AHG E5 I54; OC gendarmerie Finistere, report on Feb. I847

in AN F7 4002. 69 GOC Lot-et-Garonne, i Feb. I847 in AHG E5 i56.




On 24 November i846 the war minister wrote to M. de Loynes, a deputy from the Loiret who had requested reinforcement of the Orleans garrison, to tell him that no city in France had less need of a substantial garrison as it could obtain troops from Paris by rail in four hours, and from Blois in two hours, if necessary. As if to prove the point, but actually in response to disorders at Chateau-la-Valliere (Indre-et-Loire), the general officer commanding the first military division was ordered on the following day to send 400 men of the 73rd infantry from Versailles to Blois. They left Versailles at 9 a.m., taking the left-bank railway as far as Paris and arriving there at i o. I O. The battalion then took the boulevards exte rieures to the Gare d'Orleans and left for Tours at 12. From Tours they marched to Blois, and arrived between 5 and 6 p.m. Again on 16 January I 847 troops followed the same route to Tours and then by forced march went on to Buzancais.70 Similarly, when serious disorders broke out in Mulhouse (Haut Rhin) in June, reinforcements were sent from Strasbourg to the nearest railway station at Guespirlsheim.7' In i846-7, however, most of France was still isolated and accessible only with great difficulty and delay, as only isolated lines of what was to be the first and main railway network had been completed. Rail could be used for troop movements around Paris, and steamers on the major waterways, but normally movements had to be on foot and the problems caused by the limited number of troops available were compounded by the slowness with which they could circulate.

The basic, and constantly reiterated tactical doctrine was that troops should not be disseminated in small groups which in themselves would be too weak and, because of their existence, would reduce the reserves and room for manccuvre of departmental and divisional commanders. But in the case of widespread disorder in particular areas, as around Buzancais in the Indre, commanders had no choice but to deploy large numbers of men with the intention of saturating the zone of disorder. Otherwise there was a risk that disorder would spread, because of the apparent impunity with which protest might be expressed. Widespread disorders due to the problems of subsistence inevitably led to a dispersal of strength, and all senior commanders could effectively do was press for the ending of such extraordinary dispositions as soon as the situation became calmer.72

Troops needed to be dispersed at marketing centres where disorder was feared, particularly where these played important distributive roles. In Indre-et-Loire, as early as November i846 garrisons had been provided for Chinon, Loches, Chateaurenault, Blere, Chateau-la-Valliere and Neuille- Pont-Pierre. Isolated flour mills, especially those with large stores like that at Pont-aux-Moins, near Orleans on the road to Chateauneuf, similarly required protecting. In this case two companies of the 3Ist infantry were sent from

10 Letter to M. de Loynes of 24 Nov. i846 in E5 I54; GOC ist DM, 25 and 26 Nov. i846 in AHG E5 I55 and I53; Lt-Col. L'Heureux, attached to ministry of war, reporting from Tours, i6Jan. i847 in AHG E5 s58. 71 GOC 5th DM, 27 June i847 in AHG E5 x56.

72 See e.g. GOC I3th DM, 28 June i847 in AHG E5 I57.

30-2



878 ROGER PRICE

Orleans in March i847 at a time when considerable concern was being expressed about the maintenance of order in that city itself.73

A special problem, given the limited number of mounted gendarmes and cavalry, was posed by the maintenance of order on the highways. This was clearly essential if farmers and merchants were to supply the markets and the heavy burden fell mainly on the gendarmerie who were required to mount frequent extra patrols along roads radiating out from market towns. In the Mayenne in December I846, io6 N.C.O.s and men were employed on such patrols. In the Sarthe by the end of that month, in an effort to provide extra assurance as agitation increased, landowners intending to transport foodstuffs were invited to notify the gendarmerie beforehand in order that protection could be arranged. In January I847 it was judged to be necessary to provide escorts for carts loaded with flour leaving a large mill at Ebreuil (Allier) which supplied the industrial centres of Montlucon, Commentry and Montmarrault, whilst in Loiret, because of the shortage of mounted men, infantry marched along the convoys of grain and flour.74 This particular problem was solved in Mayenne by stationing infantry in as many places as possible along the roads and in proximity to agglomerations of workers. Anxiety about the quarrymen at St-Berthevin on the Rennes-Laval road, for example, led to the stationing offifty men there.75 In Ardeche halfa company was sent from Privas to St-Agreve to keep the busy road from the river Rhone to Le Puy open. In the same military division another half company was sent from Nimes to Aubenas in case of trouble from workers employed in the large factories there.76 The passage of carts through forested areas, especially where woodcutters and charcoal burners were at work was also often, and with reason, felt to warrant an escort. Thus on 29 April I847 two companies of the fifth light infantry were required to escort a convoy of grain from Chateaubriant (Loire-Inferieure) to Niort because of threats made to carters by forestry workers in the Meilleraye area.77

Shortage of manpower and the multiplicity of minor roads meant in general that only the more important roads could be safeguarded in this way. Other routes were lucky if they saw an occasional patrol. However, special protective measures were enforced by the ministry of war in March I847 for grain transports on roads leading into the Correze, which suffered from a clear deficit in its grain supplies and depended upon the willingness of merchants to enter its isolated markets.78

73 OC gendarmerie Indre-et-Loire on Nov. i846 in AN F7 4028; GOC ist DM, i9 Mar. i847 in AHG E5 I54.

74 OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 3I Dec. i846 in AHG E5 I55; PG Riom, I Feb. i847 in AN BB19 42; GOC Place de Paris to GOC ist DM, 30 Mar. i847 in AHG E5 iri.

"I Minister of interior to minister of war, 3 Feb. i847 in AHG E5 i56; GOC 4th DM, i i Jan. I847 in AHG E5 I55.

76 GOC gth DM, I4 Feb. i847 in AHG E5 I59. 77 GOC I2th DM, 30 Apr. i847 in AHG E5 I57. 78 Prefect Correze to minister of war, I 3 Mar. i847 and minister's reply, I9 Mar. i847 in AHG

E5 I59.




Major urban centres received much of their food supply by waterway, and these required just as much protection as did roads if food supplies were not to be interrupted. Dispositions taken by the minister of war in I817 for the stationing of troops along the Seine appear to have been maintained throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. The Canal d'Orleans, traversing particularly backward and impoverished regions of the Loiret, was another potential danger area which received special attention, again because of its importance for the supply of Paris. In I847 infantry detachments remained along its banks until towards the end of April. The Canal de Briaire, again part of the link between the Loire and the Seine, also required troops if the circulation of grain barges was to continue.79 The waterways of the north-east, supplying the industrial centres there as well as Paris, were another danger area and seem in I847 to have received notably close attention. From March until the end of May, I o? companies of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry were stationed along the rivers and canals between Dunkirk and Lille - some I,500 men.80

Due to the underdevelopment of communications and the slow transmission of information and orders, as well as the slowness of actual troop movements, discretion had to be admitted for subordinate commanders, regardless of formal hierarchy, in cases of emergency or where geographical isolation made sufficiently rapid consultation impossible. Even so, emphasis on proper channels and hierarchy of command, and repeated warnings about the excitability of civilian officials, must have induced a reluctance amongst military officers to take action on their own initiative, and certainly an unwillingness to respond to civilian requests, unless disorder was almost guaranteed.81

Certain situations however made the need for military co-operation self- evident. Anxiety was inevitably aroused by large gatherings at markets where, as the mayor of Montlucon (Allier) observed, 'It was easy to observe on the faces of the country people the disquiet and agitation which the fear of not being able to procure food for their families causes'.82 As they could not be avoided, efforts to control such gatherings seemed essential. The measures taken by the gendarmerie have already been commented on. Wherever possible gendarmes were present at markets, lending support to mayors and town or village police. The first reaction to the threat of disorder was usually to reinforce the gendarmerie at the next market in the hope that this would constitute an adequate preventive measure. It was believed that such measures had considerable success in deterring potential rioters.83 Where it was felt that

79 J. Vidalenc, 'La crise des subsistances de I8I7 dans la Seine Inferieure', Actes du 93e Congres

des sociitis savantes (Paris, I97I), p. 342; GOC ist DM, I4 Apr. I847 in AHG E5 I59; minister

of interior to minister of war, 2 Apr. 1847 in AHG E5 I 59. 80 Ministry of war internal memo, 'Mouvements de troupes ordonn6es par suite de troubles

survenus a cause de la chert6 des grains', in AHG E5 153.

81 See e.g. Mar6chal de Castellane, journal, iII (Paris, I896), 377, entry of I5 Jan. I847. 82 Mayor of Montlucon (Allier) to prefect, 23 Nov. I846 in AHG E5 I59.

83 See e.g. OC gendarmerie Cher, i6Jan. I847 in AHG E5 I59.



88o ROGER PRICE

their presence would be insufficient, gendarmes were reinforced by troops. Thus for the market of 6June i846 at Issoudun (Indre), a place with a tradition of disorder, a squadron of cavalry was sent from Ch'ateauroux.84 Again such measures of intimidation were usually successful.

At Metz in August i846 infantry piquets were stationed at the junctions of all streets leading into the Place St-Louis, in which the grain market was held, in an effort to control crowd movement; and at the little market of Ste-Maurice (Indre-et-Loir) on 27 November, although the crowd was agitated, 27

gendarmes and 25 lancers were able to prevent disorder.85 For the market held on 20 March i847 at Chartres (Eure-et-Loir) the garrison was placed on the alert, and national guard and gendarmerie patrols reinforced with regulars, whilst at the textile centre of Tourcoing (Nord) on 7 May and in Paris itself, following increases in the price of bread in April and May, the presence of the army was requested at the various food markets.86

More often than not, the mere presence of troops was enough to prevent disorder. If not, one important police function in situations in which disorder threatened or had occurred was to arrest potential or actual troublemakers, with the aim both of punishing them and above all of deterring others. By such means more serious trouble might be nipped in the bud. Thus, at the market held in Bethune (Pas-de-Calais) on I4June i847 there was a substantial rise in prices, which greatly annoyed purchasers. A crowd of women began to threaten a merchant, but the immediate arrest of two of their number by the gendarmes on duty prevented the possible development of a serious situation. This policy was summarized in a circular from the procureur-general at Rennes to his subordinates in November I845. They were to proceed with vigour at all times, to make arrests rapidly, but subsequently to keep in prison for trial only the worst offenders.87

If rioting occurred, in spite of preventive measures, or in the absence of the authorities, then action to repress and to deter was deemed to be all the more necessary. At Arques (Pas-de-Calais) in December I 846 the looting of a barge increased anxiety about the security of key waterways and led to determined action with forty arrests; whilst after a serious riot at Lencloltre (Vienne) at the beginning of January i847, during which a crowd of over 2,000 looted grain, and assaulted merchants, gendarmes and national guards, it appeared essential to make a relatively large number of arrests.88 Similarly the appearance

84 OC gendarmerie Indre onJune I 846 in AN F7 4025. On this tradition see R. Price, 'Popular disturbances in the French provinces after the July Revolution of I830', European Studies Review, (I970), p- 336.

85 GOC 3rd DM, 30 Aug. i846 in AHG E5 I54; 7th Legion gendarmerie, 28 Nov. i846 in AHG E5 I57 respectively.

86 OC gendarmerie Eure-et-Loir, 20 Mar. i847 in AHG E5 I54; PR Lille, 7 May i847 in AN BB19 38; GOC Ist DM, 29 Apr., I4 and 30 May in AHG E5 I54.

87 OC gendarmerie Pas-de-Calais, onJune i847 in AN F7 4I i8; PR Rennes circular of 29 Nov. I845 in AN BB18 I436.

88 OC gendarmerie Pas-de-Calais on Dec. i846 in AN F7 41 i8; Brigadier gendarmerie Lencloitre, 5 Jan. I 847 in AHG E5 I 55.




of placards was followed by minute investigations, although these rarely led to arrests, while the existence of bands of beggars led to numerous arrests which were rarely followed by imprisonment; in both cases the object being above all to deter, to create a 'salutary fear', in order to prevent worse disorder.89 In every situation the law was to be upheld, and this must be seen to be the case.

Military protection was not always enough to create the sense of security favourable to trade. In the Angers area, for example, in the late summer of I846 many farmers still refused to go to market, whilst at the markets held at Bourgeuil, Ch'ateaurenault, Amboise, Loches and Azay-le-Rideau in Indre- et-Loire in December I 846 it was observed that, although troops were present, consumers were still able to exert sufficient pressure on sellers to induce them to sell well below the prevailing market price.90 In spite of these shortcomings there seems, however, in the minds of both civil and military authorities, to have been no doubt about the need for and success of these military measures. It was asserted that without action to ensure security on the roads, the supply of foodstuffs to markets would have been greatly reduced, causing further substantial price increases and an intensification of the problem of maintaining public order.9' This was perhaps the most important of the preventive measures taken. Without such measures there might have been many more disorders of the kind which occurred in and around Buzancais.

Events there caused particular problems for those responsible for restoring order. In a geographically isolated area, with only very limited military resources, almost simultaneous disturbances occurred in a large number of communes. The officer commanding the department of Indre had sent thirty dragoons to Levroux on 13 January I847, and a further twenty to Buzancais after reports of agitation at their markets. On L4January at io p.m. a passing traveller informed him that events at Buzancais had taken a more serious turn. He hastened to the prefecture to ask for confirmation, to be told that the prefect had not wanted to pass on the news because he felt that the general did not have sufficient troops both to maintain order at Ch'ateauroux and restore it at Buzancais. An odd example of an underhand attempt by the civil authority to determine the course of military action. The general nevertheless proceeded immediately to Buzancais, accompanied by the prefect and nineteen dragoons. They got as far as Villedieu, where rioters were ringing the alarm bell to call for support from the surrounding countryside. The sight of even this small company of troops was sufficient to persuade the crowd to disperse. Then, receiving news of widespread disturbances and aware of the danger of disorders at the market due to be held at Ch'ateauroux on the following day, the general was forced to agree to return there and await reinforcements.92

It was soon clear that, 'around Buzancais the movement is general, it is a

89 OC gendarmerie Maine-et-Loire on Sept. i846 in AN F7 407I. 90 PG Angers, 26 Aug. i846 in AN BB19 37; GOC 4th DM, 3 Dec. i846 in AHG E5 irr. 91 See e.g. OC I3th Ugion, 2 Feb. i847 in AHG E5 i56. 92 GOC Indre to GOC I5 DM, n.d., in AHG E5 I58.



882 ROGER PRICE

sort of jacquerie', and that substantial numbers of troops would be required. The general commanding the I5th Military Division, although reluctant to disperse his forces, had to admit that it was 'indispensable to occupy ... several points at the same time', in order to prevent the further spread of insurrection and because the small number of cavalry under his command meant that he could not move his men sufficiently rapidly to quell disorder soon after its outbreak. By I9 January I847 there were 400 infantry and ioo cavalry at Buzancais itself. The author of a ministry of war internal review written on 21 May I847 thought this saturation tactic to have been both necessary and successful as a means of restoring order, although even at this late date and after large numbers of arrests might have been expected to have had a salutary effect, it was still deemed to be essential to maintain large numbers of men dispersed throughout the department.93

The mobile column was a means by which a limited number of troops could circulate throughout an area and the worst consequences of dispersal - namely tying men in small groups to particular places - could be avoided. A wide area could be controlled with limited resources. In the Indre in January I847, columns composed of a mixture of cavalry, mounted gendarmes, infantry and, where they were believed to be reliable, national guards, were ordered to appear suddenly in towns, particularly on market days, to create the impression of a strong and active military presence.94

The disorders at Buzan,ais and other places in the Indre were of exceptional gravity and required exceptional measures of repression. In the immediate aftermath of looting and murder at Buzan,ais itself, and whilst the crowds remained excited and encouraged by their first successes, and substantial military forces could not yet be deployed, the authorities had to play a waiting game. Attempts to make arrests would have been resisted by entire communities. The problem subsequently, where almost the whole populations of towns and villages had been involved, was to determine who were the principal leaders and agitators. Local officials seem to have been afraid to name them in some places. The initial response of all those who had been involved was to deny participation. However, as arrest followed arrest, frightened prisoners began to make confessions and to implicate others. Actual violence during popular disorders was normally comparatively limited and typically, after it had occurred and rioters became aware of the judicial repression they faced, the initial solidarity of the crowd disintegrated as individuals sought to protect themselves. At Buzancais people began to come forward and to return the money or objects they had stolen in the hope that by this and by their obvious contrition they might escape the worst rigours of the law. The authorities, however, after an uprising involving a large part of a department, felt that to show any sign of weakness might encourage further disorder.95

9 GOC I5th DM, i6 and 23 Jan. i847; ministry of war memo of 2 I May i847 in AHG E5 I58.

94 GOC Is5th DM, 25 Jan. i847 in AHG E5 I58. 95 PG Bourges, IsJan. i847 in AN BB19 37; OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 22 Jan. i847 in AHG

E5 I 55; GOC I 5th DM, 2 I and 2 7 Jan. I 847 in AHG E5 i 58.




The trial of those involved in the 'Buzancais affair' led to three con- demnations to death for murder. An effort was made to maximize the deterrent effect of these executions. The condemned were publicly executed on 17 April i847 - market-day -by a guillotine set up in front of the town hall at Buzancais in the presence of a large crowd, and guarded by five companies of infantry, with two cannons for further effect. Subsequently the minister of the interior requested his colleague at the ministry ofjustice to ensure that those sentenced to imprisonment were not pardoned, as this would only have reduced the deterrent effect of such salutary punishment.96

Incidents like those in the Indre involved a challenge by particular communities to the whole principle of authority. They revealed the desperation of the poor in backward economic areas, and their willingness to risk subsequent sanctions in order to gain their immediate aims, and also something of the brutal mores and the barely suppressed climate of violence in areas experiencing severe material deprivation. Such areas remained culturally isolated, un-integrated into a national polity, in the more advanced areas of which a growing public distaste for violence in all its forms had for long been evident.

However, rather than a simple propensity for violence, popular protest, on so many occasions, revealed a sense of community, essentially amongst the poor and especially in socially homogeneous communities. This was particularly evident where crowds formed in an attempt to rescue members of the community who had been arrested by the authorites. Such action represented a challenge to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of official action, and of necessity brought a vigorous response. Thus on 14 November i846, at the market of Nerondes (Cher) a miner called Bourgoin threatened a farmer whom he claimed was asking too much for his grain. Subsequently he went from mine to mine calling on other workers to join him at the market due to be held in Nerondes on the 28th, so that they could force a reduction in prices. Bourgoin was apparently a man with some influence in the mining community, so that his actions caused concern and led to his arrest on the 25th and imprisonment at La Guerche. On the 26th, however, a crowd estimated at around I,500 gathered in front of the prison there, demanding his release and threatening to burn down the town. The national guards refused to report for duty and the mayor of La Guerche felt obliged to order Bourgoin's release. The crowd's triumph was short-lived as Bourgoin was subsequently re-arrested by the gendarmerie and no further popular reaction is recorded, in the face of the obvious determination of the authorities to enforce the law. The initial reaction remains, however, a significant indicator of communal solidarity and of hostility towards official action taken in support of a freedom to trade which wasjudged to be iniquitous.97 On 4 September I846, I,OO0-o,200 weavers from

96 Prefect's report quoted byJ. Dautry in preface of J. Valks, Les blouses (Paris, n.d.), p. I39; minister of interior to minister of justice, 3 Aug. I847 in AN BB21 502B.

97 GOC I3th DM, 27 Nov. I846; Lieutenant gendarmerie St-Amand, 2 Dec. I846 in AHG E5 I58; OC gendarmerie Cher on Nov. I846 in AN F7 3959.



884 ROGER PRICE

Cholet (Maine-et-Loire) marched to La Fessonsaille nearby with the intention of freeing eight women arrested for seizing the contents of a cart and selling it at below the market price. Two companies of infantry were required to escort these prisoners to a more secure prison at Beaupreau, and during their march they were accompanied by groups of workers who felled trees into the road in a vain effort to obstruct them.98 On IO January i847 the procureur-du-Roi at Rennes, returning from Ch'ateau-Giron with prisoners and a small escort, was stopped by a crowd vaguely estimated as being composed of hundreds of people, whose attitudes became so threatening that after the legal warnings had been given the escort opened fire, killing one person.99 A particularly serious incident occurred at Bellac (Haute-Vienne) on 30January. On the 28th a crowd of I5200 had gone to the mayor and demanded a reduction in the price of bread. The authorities responded by arresting three presumed ringleaders the following day. In the late evening of the 3oth groups, composed of ten, twenty or thirty people, began to enter the town from the surrounding countryside and at 9 p.m. a column of 600-700 men armed with sticks, pitchforks, axes, etc., was reported to be en route from the village of Darnac. Met by the gendarmerie lieutenant, these demanded the fixing of bread prices, a search of granaries for food stocks and the release of the three prisoners. The mayor of Bellac wanted to agree to the last demand to avoid trouble and clearly failed to lend his support to the gendarmerie, who had little choice but to barricade themselves in their barracks with their prisoners, threatening to shoot anyone who tried to break in, whilst the crowd of about I ,200 people shouted for their release outside. Eventually, as the night wore on, and the determination of the gendarmes not to make concessions became evident to all, the crowd slowly dispersed.100

Such incidents were again to occur in i854-5. At Perigueux (Dordogne) on the morning of I January i854 a riot occurred in the market place and arrests were made. In the evening a considerable crowd formed, many of whose members were armed with sticks, axes and even guns, with the avowed aim of forcing their entry into the prison and releasing the prisoners. Only the deployment of the garrison was sufficient to intimidate this crowd and to persuade it to disperse. In another case, this time at Dreux (Eure-et-Loir) the procureur-imperial was informed at 9.45 p.m. on 7 December I 854 that the whole population of Boullay-Thierry was marching on the town in order to release three prisoners, and in fact a crowd estimated at around 5,ooo men did successfully storm the prison and achieve their objective. The panic amongst the local authorities was so great that they accepted at face value a rumour that these people intended next to march on Chartres, and hurried efforts were

98 PG Angers, 7 Sept. I846 in AHG E5 I57. 99 OC gendarmerie Ille-et-Villaine, report on Jan. I847 in AN F7 4022. 100 Gendarmerie lieutenant Bellac (Haute-Vienne), 3I Jan. I847 in AHG E5 I58. See slightly

different account in A. Corbin, Archaisme et modernite en Limousin au Ige siele (Paris, I 975), pp. 498-9.




made to place that town in a state of defence. Nothing happened and repressive action rapidly followed.10'

In all cases where disorder occurred, whether this was in the market place or elsewhere, repressive action could shortly be expected. Arrests and subsequent trials were possible under a whole panoply of laws dealing with everything from freedom of trade to disturbance of the peace. Although it was generally the policy of the authorities to retain in prison and bring before the courts only the most compromised participants in disorder, the ministry of justice was determined that wherever possible legal action would be used to set an example and to deter potential troublemakers.102 Subsequently the sentencing policy of these courts appears to have varied a great deal, both from case to case and between courts: from the requirement that those convicted of participating in the forced sale of grain at the market held on 24 November i846 at Chateaurenault (Indre-et-Loire) should simply make up the difference between the price they had paid and the prevailing market rate; to sentences of imprisonment for days, weeks and months, plus usually fines and costs which would have represented a heavy burden for poor people. Antoine Gremaud, for example, was sentenced in August I855 to fifteen days imprisonment plus a ioo fr. fine and costs for disturbing the peace at a market held in Arbois. He had complained in a loud voice that, 'the crooks are plotting to starve the people'. Where riots had occurred, those prominent in them could of course expect much more severe treatment. Michel Lucas, a thirty-six-year-old labourer with a wife and a young daughter, received a sentence of a year and a day for his role in a disturbance at Blere in November I 846, notwithstanding the dependence of his family on his earnings, and his previous good reputation.'03

One serious problem faced by the prosecuting attorneys was the frequent sympathy of juries for the miserably poor people with whom they were confronted. Often they shared the basic moral position of the accused, based upon a vague conception of a just price, and also their hostility towards those who trafficked in necessities. From this there followed a reluctance to commit.

Of the extraordinary assizes held in Ille-et-Vilaine from I 5 to 30 March I 847 in order to judge cases involving the pillaging of grain transports, the procureur-general at Rennes reported that juries had failed to comprehend the gravity of the accusations and had 'judged them in a free and easy manner'. At the assizes held in the second quarter of the year in Cotes-du-Nord, when nineteen weavers and agricultural labourers from the bourg of La Motte were

101 Procureur-imp6rial (hereafter PI) Bordeaux, 2 May x854 in AN BB24 448-56; PI Dreux, 8 Dec. I854 and telegraph despatch secretaire-gen6ral of prefecture of Eure-et-Loir to PG Paris, 2 p.m. 8 Dec. x854 in AN BB18 1537.

102 See e.g. circular from prefect Allier to sous-prefets and mayors, x6 Nov. x846 in AN F11 2758; and from PG Rennes to PRs, 29 Nov. x845 in AN BB18 I436, and minister of justice to PG Nancy, 23 June x846 in AN BB18 I444-7.

103 OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 8 Dec. x846 in AHG E5 x55; PG Besancon, x3 Dec. x856 in AN BB24 5oo-6; PG Orleans, 3x Dec. x847 in AN BB24 327-47.



886 ROGER PRICE

tried for causing a market-place disorder, six jurors found for their guilt and six against - in spite of the evidence according to the official report. The reluctant jurors were claimed to be motivated both by sympathy for the accused and by the hostility which, 'with reason', even according to the State prosecutor, existed against accapareurs in times of high prices.104 Yet another problem was the unwillingness of juries to convict those accused under the provisions of article 440 of the penal code dealing with the theft of grain. The penalties laid down by this article were felt to be too severe.105

According to the procureur-general at Caen, success for the prosecution in such cases depended very much on careful preparation and especially the careful selection of jurors. He felt that he owed his success in convicting those involved in disorders at Lisieux in July I847 to the selection of solid pillars of the community for the jury.106

Yet another problem was the frequent unreliability of witnesses. In areas like the Indre, where entire communities had been involved in disorders, potential witnesses were naturally reluctant to incriminate each other. They were frequently unwilling to testify against their neighbours, either from sympathy, or from fear of the consequences. The mayors or gardes-champe'tres, who were usually the only village police, were likely to be similarly inhibited. Investigating magistrates were thus likely to be met with what they took to be a conspiracy of silence.107

One reaction in such cases was to invoke the law of IO vendemiaire year IV which laid the responsibility for the disorders on entire communities. Communes could be judged responsible for any disorders which occurred and liable for damages. The threat alone might persuade local officials and notables who - rather than the impoverished - would have to foot the bill, to be more zealous in their co-operation with magistrates, and at the least would have some deterrent effect for the future. Inability to pay, whether real or feigned, of course reduced the effectiveness of this form of punishment. Communities along the Canal d'Orleans, which were ordered by the courts in I846 to pay substantial damages following the pillage of barges, still had not paid twelve years later.108 Another threat which might be employed was that of billeting troops on the inhabitants of areas in which disorders had occurred. The cost for the commune, and the bother for individual householders, were causes of great anxiety, and might serve as an effective deterrent.109

These then were some of the circumstances in which force in its varying forms might be used by the authorities. The circumstances of time and place,

104 Report on extraordinary assizes of Ille-et-Villaine, x5-30 Mar. x847 in AN BB20 xI4X; report on assizes of C6tes-du-Nord, 2nd trimestre i847, ibid.

105 PG Angers, I I Sept. x846 in AN F11 2758. 106 PG Caen, 9 Dec. x847 in AN BB18 x454 107 OC 7th Legion gendarmerie, 22 Jan. x847 in AHG E5 x55. 108 Ministry of interior confidential circular to prefects of x8Jan. x847, quoted by A. Thuillier,

'La crise', pp. 258-9; see also reports in AN BB24 327-427. 109 See e.g. Prefect Doubs, 3 Nov. x846 in AN BB19 39.




administrative structures and habits, military strength and doctrine, all helped determine its forms, whilst public impressions of the capacity of the authorities to engage in preventive or repressive action were in turn of fundamental importance in determining whether popular discontent would lead to protest, and the precise forms which eventual protest might take.

The problems of policing during a period of subsistence disorders were compounded by poor communications, which reinforced localism and affected both the transmission of information and the movement of police and troops. Already, however, the development of primary education, the reinforcement of bureaucratic and police institutions, and the construction of more effective communications networks were serving to promote forms of socialization which reduced the propensity for violence, reinforced the deterrent effect of administrative action and, by modernizing agricultural market structures, eliminated the subsistence crises which had remained such a potent cause of misery and violence.



techniques of repression: the control of popular protest in mid-nineteenth century france

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