telangana peasants armed struggle

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The Telengana Peasant Armed Struggle, 1946-51Author(s): Mohan RamSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 8, No. 23 (Jun. 9, 1973), pp. 1025-1032Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4362720

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SPECIALARTICLEST h e Telengana P e a s a n t A r m e d

Struggle , 1 9 4 6 - 5 1Mohan Ram

Over 20 years ago, AcharyacVinoba Bhave launched his bhoodan movement at Pochampalli, a villagein Telengana where communists had carried on an armed struiggle for five years around an agrarian pro-gramme. Bhoodan was to be the sarvodaya answverto the comnzunist challenge on the land problem andwas meant to achieve what legislative action was not expected to do.The minuiscuzlareasanztrevolt in Naxalbari (1967) was a reminder that neither the sarvodaygaap-proah nor the legislative process (in wvhichcommunists had begun participating after abandoning thetactic of armned truggle) had solved the agrarian problem in India. There have been many Na.albaris since.The Maoist perspective in the Inidiani on7ninnist movement, which began with the Telenganastruggle, has resulted inl anl extra-spectrum trend wvhichrejects the parliamentary systemnand seeks toachieve the people's democratic revolution throzughpeople's war linked to an agrarian programme. There-emergence of the MaCist trend in the Indian communist movement marks the retlurnof the "Telenganaline". The 25th anniversary of the Telengana armedestruggle last year found the Indian communist move-ment indulging in polemics on the natulre and significance of the struggle. The main controversy was overthe circutmnstancesttending the withdrawal of the struggle in 1951. This article seeks to place the'Telengana line' in perspective with particular reference to its relevance to the split in the Indian commzun-istmovement in 1964 and again in 1968.

THE Telengana peasanitarmed strugglewNs the first independentrend in theIndian communist mnovement.Comimu-nists of the Telugu-speaking tracts ofsouth-central India, noNwAndhra Pra-clesh, organised and led it, often in de-fiance of the central leadership of theCommunist Party of Inidia and of theinternational communiist movement.Until 1953, the Telugu-speakingpeople lived in a contiguous ar-ea, apart of which was in the erstwhileHyderabad state, a multilingual entity,and another in the erstwvhile MadrasPresidency (later Madras state), also amultilinaguialntitv. The Telugu districtsof Madras state wvere conistituted intothe Andhra state in 1953. The Aindlhrastate, together vith the Telengana ne-g(ion (as the Telugu districts of I-Iyderai-bad staite were known) were groupedtogether to create the present AndhraPradesh in 1956, breaking upi) thcI-Hderabad state.

The first comuniiiiiist rotips catme.l-tobeing in Telengana in 1939-40. rhexNvere llegal and functioned through theAnidhra Mahasaliha, a milass organisationto promote the cuiltural and politicalinterests of the Telugu-speaking peopleof the IHyderabadi tate. In 1943, theleadership of the Andhra MIahasalbhapassedl into communist hands. Fromii1944 on, comimunists wvere organisingmilitant struggles against laildlordismand feudal exploitation.'

The Communist Partv of India'szig-zags during the Second World War(the switch from the imperialist Nvar othe people's war slogan in 1942 and theconsequent support to the British w7areffort and the reluctance to support thedlemanid or transfer of power) did notpermit its Hyderabad unit to demandthe end of NizamI's rule, the abolitionof landlordism in the state and the im-plementation of a radical agrarian pro-gramme. A chanigein the CPI's policy,coinicidingwith the post-war upsurge inthe country, enabled the local unit toplan more radical and more militanitstlruggles.In Telengana, the contradiction bet-wveen he mass of the peasants and feud-alism was most advanced in 1945-46.The peasant mlovemenlt wNas initiallNorIganised aroundct simliple demllands aga-iinst eviction and oppressive feutdal ex-tortions but it quickly escalated wheniit miiet w7ith the combined repressioni ofthe lanidlords and the Nizamii's govern-miiental machinery. Peasant resistanceto the attacks of organised hoodlumliis,police and the Nizam's military tookthe form of armed clashes wNich even-ttuallv were to swell into a movementfor the overthrowv of Nizam's ruile.

STRUGGLE AGAINST NIZA-MBy imiid-1946, the miiovemiienithladac(Iqiiredi he characteristics of' a nationalliberation struggle to free the peoplefrom the rule of the Nizam and the

feudal order. In the adjoining Andhraarea (i e, the Telugu districts of MadrasPresidency) the CPI had an efficientorganisation and a wvell-trainedcadrebuit in Telengana it wvas not so xvellestablished and the people of Telenganahad no tradition of political participa-tion. Yet the CPI found itself leading aniarmed struggle in Telengaina that wasto last five years.2The Telengana region had been undera medieval fetudal monarchy while theAndhra area was directly under Britishrule and had the r-yotwari and tenutiresystem. The contradiction bet\veen thepeasants and the landlords had becomevery sharp in Telengana wvhile t badbeen blunted in the Anihra area.Sscondly, the inationalist movementin British India had been lecd by thenational bouirgeoisie, whereas in Te en-g(Yanahe commtunistswere ini eff(ectivecontrol of the smilall nationalist mlove-memit.

Finally, the decision of the Nizanm oreftise accession to India after Inclepen-denice (1947) placed him in clirectcontradiction to the new Indian govern-ment. This factor malde it possible forthe commtinist-le(dmiiovemllentn flIsdera-bad state to take on the char-acterof an-iationial iberation struliggle,w th the-stupport of the n.ationalbotirgeoisie lea-(lerslhipof the, rest of the coontry, iutilInidiain orces marched iilto the state toforce its merger wviththe Indian Uniion.

1025


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June 9, 1913 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYIII 1946, the Hyderabad state unit ofthe CPI began campaigning for an in-terim government in the state as theintermediate step towards breaking utpthe multilingual unit and merger of thevarious linguistic areas comprising itwith the respective linguistic areas

outside. This wvas he genesis of theAndhra communists' slogan of 'Visal-andhra' (an extended Andhra) to unifythe Telugu-speaking people into asingle, unilingual state. In the Andhraregion, the CPI campaigned for ananti-feudal, democratic programme ar-ound the slogan of "People's Rule inVisalandhra" at the 1946 generalelections3 and launched a limitedstruggle in the area to link up with theupsurge in Telengana where the AndhraMahasabha had become a united massorganisationof all the anti-Nizam forces.When the British formally announcedin June 1947 their decision to abdicatepower in the subcontinent, the CPIfound itself confused about the meaningof the transfer of power to take placeon August 15. It settled for a non-classapproachto the Congress leadership thatwas to take power from the British as aresult of a compro.mise.At the inauguralmeeting of the Cominform in Septem-ber, Zhdanov made hig famotis speechcharacterising he world as b)eingdividedinto two hostile camps and calling oncommunists to lead movements tooppose the imperialist plans for expan-sion and aggression.4 TIdian com-munists misread this to mean thatin every non-socialist country thebourgeoisie had gone over to thecamp of Anglo-United States im-perialism and this new alignment offorces had created two camps in irrecon-cilable conflict in everyone of thesecountries. So India's independence wasbranded fake. Indian communists Nventfurther than Zhdanov and embracedthe views of Eduard Kardelj, a Yugoslavparticipant at the Cominform meeting.Kardelj had argued that democratic and

socialist revolutions must "intertwine"and communists must attack not onlythe big bourgeoisie but the bourgeoisieas a whole. Adopting this Titoite line,the CPI concluded that India w-asalready a capitalist country (and not asemi-feudal, semi-capitalistone) and thatthe party should intertwine the tw-ostages of revolution into a single stagethrough an attack on the entire Indiancapitalist class. This was the essence ofthe party's thesis at its second congressin February-March1948. It was a swingfrom right opportunism to left sectaria-nism.5The Andhra commiiunists ad alreadytaken the Telengana peasant movement

to the level of partisan armed struggle."Telengana means communists and com-muinists mean Telengana" thuinderedB T Rana(live, the party'sGeneral Secre-tary-to-he at the second congress w-hichdeposed the reformist P C Joshi. TheTelengana armed struggle was a fewimonths old and it wN-asot until theTelengana delegates had attacked thefailure of the new political thesis torealise the "revolutionarv significance"of the struggle to the "present epochof maturing democratic revolution inIndia" that the new leadership appearedto support the strtuggle seriouslv. Thesecond congress called for similar struig-gles in other parts of the country andfor working class movements in supportof Telengana, all ultimately leading toarmed insurrection. The new albeitfonnally, because it might hasten thewvorkingclass general-strike-cum-armed-insurrection which it had bankedupon in the post-war revolutionarysituation.

ANDHRA THESISIn May 1948, Andhra communistschallenged the second congress thesisand its reliance on the general-strike-cuim-insurrectionweapon. The Andhrathesis said that the Indian revolution,in many respects, differed from theclassical Russian Revolution and that itwas to a great ex-tent similar to the

Chinese Revolution. The perspecthleshould therefore be that of a doggedresistance and prolonged civil war inthe form of an agrarian revolutionculminating in the capture of politicalpower by the democratic front ratherthan a general strike and an armed up-rising. Therefore, where a good pro-portion of the masses were with theparty (in Andhra, Kerala and Bengal)it wvas ime to think in terms of guerillawarfare (the "Chinese way") againstthe military onslaughts of the Nehrugovemnment bent on liquidating theparty. Armed guerilla resistance hadto be developed in several parts of thecouintryand these areas were to be con-verted into liberated areas with theirown armel forces and state apparatus,later, townsvs ere to be liberated bythe armied(lorces from the liberatedareas.

The Andhra thesis also advocated auinited fronit, \vhieh iniclutded he richpeasantry ancd the miiiddle bourgeoisie asthe allies of the proletariat in the peo-ple's demiiocratic rievolution, anidasserted that such a Nvide front ofarmeld struggle could take shape underthe leadership of the party and thatt-he ol)jecti.ve conlditions for realising

these were fast maturing. Only pro-longed armed resistance as in Telen-gana would bring abotut the neededsituation.-Andhra communists had invoked MaoTse-tung's "New Democracy" tojustify their strategy of a two-stagerevolution in India. The new leader-ship of the CPI rejected the Andhratbesis but the significance of this epi-sode has not been adequately realisedin India or outside. The first recorded(debate on the legitimacy of Mao Tse-tung's theories as part of Marxism-Leninism took place between theAndhra communists and the new CPIleadership. The ultra-revolutionaryRanadive, in his polemic against hiscountry-cousins leading the Telenganaarmed struggle, suggestively bracketedMao with Tito and Browder anddenounced him as a charlatan (" ..some of Mao's formulations are suchthat no communist party can acceptthem; they are in contradiction of theworld understanding of the communistparties," he said).7While the CPI's understanding wasbased on a wrong interpretation of theEurope-centred Zhdanov line, theCominform did not seem to have aclear line yet for former colonies likeIndia when Ranadive embarked on hisanti-Mao polemic. The Chinese Re-volution had not been brought to anend. It was not until 1950 that theCominform endorsed the formulationsof Mao's "New Democracy".A Soviet academician, E M Zhukov,advocated a four-class alliance in colo-nies and semi-colonies.8 A little later,Academician V Balabusbevich hailedthe Telengana struggle as the "firstattempt at creating people's democracy"in India and the "harbingerof agrarianrevolution".9 This was vindication ofthe Andhra leadership's "Telenganaline".

SUPPORT FROM CHINASupport to the Andhra leadershipcame also from the Communist Partyof China wvithin weeks of the formalproclamation of the People's Republicof qhina (October 1, 1949). LtuShao-chi declared in Peking in Novem-ber 1949 that "the road of Mao Tse-tuLng" w-as the path for other colonialcounitries an1darmede action was themnain form of struggle Nwheneveran(l wherever possible.10A few days- thereafter, an editorialin the Cominfoirn journal endorsedthe most crucial of formulation of

Litu's declaration:The experience of the victoriousnational liberation struggle of the1026


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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL W;EE?KLY June 9, 1973Chinese people teaches that the work-ing class must unite with all classes,parties antl groups, and organisationiswilling to fight the imperialists andtheir hirelings to form a broadnation-wvidcenited front, headed bythe wvorking lass and its vanguardthe CommunistParty.11But when it came to the form of

struggle, the Cominformii mentionedChina, Vietnaam,Malaya and "othercountries" as exainples of how armedstruggle was becoming the "main formof struiggle"of the inational liberatioiimovement inl many colonies anddependent counmtries. Theni it listedVietnamn, South Korea, Malaya, thcPhilippines, Inldoniesiaanid Burma ascountries engaged in armed struggle,b)ut not India wvhichi vas mentionedmerely as a country with "sham in-dlependlence"."2

With the ComiinforimadebunikilngRanadive, the Andhra leadershipfounid itself heading the party. Rajes-wvaraRao took over as General Secre-tar in May-June 1950. The Telen-gania line of peasant partisall warfaretriumphed inside the CPI, but Mos-cow's intervention was to suppress thistrend later.The new CPI leadership worked outa political line which briefly meant:(1) Rejection of the programmaticunderstanding of the second congress,subsequently elaborated in what wascalled the "Tactical Line" by theleadership;(2) Rejectioni of the thesis of thesingle stage revolution, i e, the inter-twiining of the twvostages of the Indianrevolution into one;(3) Rejection of the idea that theentire bourgeoisie, including the richpeasantry, had become enemies of thepeople's democratic revolution;(4) Upholdiing of the concept of theChinese path for the Indian revolutionwhich meant developing Telengana-type agrariani struggle extensivelywvherever possible.13

The nlew Central Commiiiiittee, oniJunie 1, 1950 highlighted the rolC ofarmne'dtruggle for secturing niationalli)eration aind claiimed that precondi-tionls for starting such struggles werealready there. But this did not meanithat armed struggle could be launchediiniiniediatelyanywhere and under anyconditions. The accent was on armedguerilla xx rfare linked to an agrarianp)rogrammie Nvherever the party'sstrength permitted it. The CentralCommittee pledged to extend theTelengana struggle to other parts ofInidia. It wx-anted o pnit the party?n the rails of armed struggle in thecountryside and rebuild the movement

in the cities aind working class centresonithe l)asis of the new line and tactics.ENTRY OF IND)IAN Ainiy

In the meantime, the entry ofIndian armed forces into Hyderabadand the accession of the state to theIndian Union had created a new situa-tion in the Telengana struggle areas.The Nizam's forces and the privatearmy known as the Razakarshad failedto suppress the armlled truggle. Butafter the surrenider of the Nizam, itwas a miiilitary amiipaignixith 50,000to 60,000 Indiani troops throvn in)against the communists who haddeveloped contiguous liberated zoniescovering 3,000 villages, complete withvillage soviets, people's courts andpeople's militia. A formidable moodernarmy was fighting the ill-equippedsquads. The guerilla squads retreatedto the forests, leaving smiiall groupsbehind to operate in the plainis. Thegovernment tried a strategic hamletsplan similar to the familousBriggs planin Malaya. They destroyed about2,000 tribal hamlets in the forests andherded the people into concenitrationcamps. This wvaspart of the plan toisolate the guerilla s(luads from thetribal people inhabitinig the forests.The guerillas moved to newer forestareas.The correlation of political forces illIlvderabad state chang'ed significantlyWith the accession of the state toIndia. Though the state Congress partyand some other non-communist forceswere not part of all-ini front againstthe Nizam, each lhad fought his auto-cracy and there was sympathby forarmed struggle even fromn the mnassesof the people. But with end of theNizam's rule, this support was thinning.The all-India leadership of the CP'Iwas divided aboout continuing thearmed struggle after the Nizam'saccession to the Indian Union latein 1948. A section of the local partyunit was also for wvithdrawal f thestruggle." In fact, the present dayCPI OwnSup the Telengaina struggleonly upto this poinit anid regards therest of it sectarian anid dogmatic andlittle more than a terror campaign. Itthinks the struggle should have beencalled off when the Nizam's rule end-ed.15But the Visalanclhra communistcommittee as a whole for continu-ing the struggle. The big gains of theTelengana peasantry, especially the onemillion acres of land distributed amongthem, had to l)e d(efendedi and notallowed to be snatched away. Secondly,the national and international situation

was favourable for ariimed partisanstruggle. The Telengana struggle, thecoumnittee thought, was the beginniingof the liberation struggle and it wasdemonstrating that the Indian revolu-tion was more like the Chinese revolu-tion than the Russian revolution. So theTelengana armed struggle continued.16OPPOSITION WITHIN CPI

Opposition to the Andhra leadershipand its new political line came notonly from a group operating from theparty headquarters in Bombay whichincluded S A Danige, Ajoy Chosh anidS V Ghate, who had been releasedfrom prison, but also from the Com-inunist Party of Great Britain. A letterfromi its Political Committee late in1950 traced the CPI crisis to a per-verse understanding of the Comin-forin journal's editorial (January 27,1950). Armed struggle was not ruledout for India but the situation in theCl'I and the country did not holdiminediate prospects for such astruggle. The CPI could utilise allopportunities for legal activities andprepare for general elections (a wholeyear and more awayl). The letter alsocalled for a change in the CPI leader-ship because the Rajeswara Rao leader-ship had not been "democratically"elected (a veiled call for revolt againstthe leadership determined to continuethe Telengana armed struggle). Thesolution to the party crisis lay in "fulland unfettered discussion" (whichmeant armed struggle as a tactic shouldbe abandoned formally). The mostinmportant eferences in the letter wereto the CPI's failure to wvork out apolicy on Korea, where the war wasraging, and on the peace movement.17This amounted to directing the CPI tostep up pressure against Nehru's foreignpolicy.This letter could inot have been sentto the CPI without Moscow's clearance,it Inot a directive fron Moscow. It wasaddressed to the Cenitral Committeeand wvas herefore iiot circulated to thera.nks. But the Party Headquartersfaction made it a point to circulate itthree months after its receipt to exertpressure oni the Rajeswara Rao leader-ship on the eve of the December 1950Central Committee meeting, which re-organised-itself as well as the Polit-bureau to provi(le representation to allthe trends. The iewv leadership decid-ed to seek the Soviet party's help inestablishing political-ideological-organi-sational unity in the party.

According to P' Sundarayya, one ofthe leaders of the Telengana struggle,differences in the CPI related to twoI npy


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June 9, 1973 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYsets of issues. One conicernedthe pro-gramme - the class assessment of thetr-ansferof power in 1947, the exactstage of the Indian revolution and theclass strategy or alliance for it - andanother to tactics the posssiblepath ofthe Indian revolution - Russian orChinese, the nature of the Telenganaarmed struggle, the different phases ofpartisan peasant struggle and the pro-l)lem of equatinig these peasant partisanstruggles with the arme(d struiggle forpolitical power, etc.18Meanwhile the pressure from theBritish party contintued. The directiveswverenow explicit and positive, indicat-ing a clear shift in the Cominform lineand the Soviet foreign policy require-ments. The directives came in theform of answers by R Palme Dutt tofive (luestions on the Indian situation.The peace movement had to be stepp-ed up against Anglo-United Statesimnperialismand for the liberation ofAsia. Nehru's foreign policy, it wasnot a "consistent peace policy" yetand Nehru's opposition to imperialismwas "hesitant and limited", should bereappraised in the light of his attitudeto the Korean war and to China's ad-mission to the United Nations. Peaceand freedom weent together and Indianeeded a "broad democratic fronit"from albove on the basis of a commonaction programminieor peace and in-dependence. Finally, armed strugglewas not the correct path for India forthe present.'9Dutt elaborated this in an interviewvto visiting Indian communists. I-le saidthat as stated in his party's letter tothe CPI, "ultimately the revolution inIndia w'ill and must take the formiiofarmed struggle. It is hardly to bedebated". He had no idea of the exactsituation in Andhra and could not saywhat would be the proper form ofstruggle there. But if the Andhra unithad adopted correct forms of struggleduring the post-second congress period,the party should not have suiffredany disruption there. "But from thereports we possess, this does not seemto be true. NVhenon the., op of it, theso-called experience of Andhra is app-lied mechanically to all over Ifidiawhere the conditions of peasant organi-sation and the strength of the partywere both wveaker han in Andhra, theresult cannot but be disastrous", hesaid. Elaborating the concept of armedstruggle, Dutt was insinuating that theTelengana struggle wvas little mlorethan individual or squad terror. (There-by he was endorsing the factiondemanding its suspension.) Armedstruggle, he said,) was "the higher

form of struggle" anid "mtustbear amass character", as distinct from theterrorismof individuals or small groups.Again, armed struggle was a "higherstate of mass movement, which there-fore becomes the pre-requisite". Dutt'sconcern was with the peace movementbecause the cold war had replacedclass struggle on the Cominform agen-da to suit Soviet foreign policy inter-ests. The peace movement plresentedthe CPI with "one of the most imnpor-tant weapons for building a front ofall sections of Indian people ... If weriecognise that -the building of theNational Democratic Front is the keytask for the national liberation struggle,then it should be obvious that thebroad front that w ll emerge out ofthe peace movemnent miay ay the basisfor the National Front for nationalliberation".2 0

In sum, Dutt's advice aimeid atpersuading the CPI to giv'e up thetactic of armed struggle at least for themoment and to seek the broadestpossible united front for peace, whilethe task of building a national demo-cratic front could wvait.SOVIET INTERVENTIION

The British advice strengthened thefaction opposed to the Telengana arm-ed struggle, but the CPI crisis conti-nued until a top-level delegation clan-destinely visited Moscow early in 1951for consultations with the Soviet partyleadership. The CPI teanmlcomprisedtwo Andhra leaders (C Rajeswara Raoand M Basavapunniah)who were dlirect-ly leading the Telengana stirLggleandtwvo eaders opposed to it (S A Dangeand Ajoy Ghosb). The Soviet partycommission comprised Stalin, MIalenikov,Molotov and Suslov. The main coinclti-sion on the issues concerning thie pro-gramiimewere incorporated in the DraftProgramme published in 1951.2LThe draft said the state that ca.mieillto being with the transfer of powerwvas he samiieold imperialist sLate arndthe Congress government installed withthe consent of imperialism had pledgedto protect the British interests in India.It rejected the second congress uinder-standing that the entire bourgeoisieincluding the rich peasantry wvereout-side the pale of the people's demo-cratic front. It recogniised the possi-bility of winning over- all the Inidianbourgeoisie, barring some individualsand groups of big bourgeoisie: It re-jected the theory of the intertwiningof the twvo stages of revolution.As for tactics, an accompanyingdocument, "Statement of Policy" 2

said "nieither only the Russian pathnor the Chinese path but a path ofLeninism applied to Indiain conditionswas the answer". Partisan warfare ofthe peasantry had to be combined withthe other major wveapon, hat of w,.ork-ing class strikes, the general strike ancduprising in cities led by detachmentsof th'e working class. The statementstressed the leading role of the wvorkingclass inl the worker-peasant alliance.The "Statement of Policy" was thelegal or open version of a larger un-puiblished document prepared by theCPI team to Moscow. It was entitled"Tactical Line".23 Parts of it \vere notincluded in the "Statement of Policy"and the omitted passages dealt withthe elaboration of some of the theore-tical issues and principles which pro-vided the theoretical-ideological basisfor the "Statement of Policy" andinicluded details of the discussions1)etween the CPI team and the Sovietparty commission headed by Stalin.

Neither of the documents referredto armed revolution as part of the im-mediate programme. The "TacticalLine" cautioned the party against"premature uprisings and adventuristactions" and yet thought it wrong tolay down that armed struggle in theform of partisan warfare should beresorted to in every spacific area oi.lywrhen he movemenit n all parts of thecountry rose to the level of anl upris-inig. This was because the uinevenilevels of mass consciousness in a vastcountry like India would not permitpeasant movements of the same temlpoeverywhere. On the contrary situationsdemiiandingarmed partisan warfaremight ar-ise in several areas. For in-stance, when in a big and topographi-cally suitable area the peasant move-menit rose to the level of seizure ofland, the question of effective seizureand clefending the land seized wouldb)ecome a burning one and "partisanw7arfaren such a situation, undertakenon the basis of a genuine mass move-nmentand firm unity... if correctlyconstructed and led, can have a rousingand galvanising effect on the peasantmasses in all areas and raise their ownstruggle, to a higher level".

SVITCH TroPARLIAMENTARISMThe proximity of the general elec-tions seems to have made it expedientfor the new CPI leadership to withholdpublication of the "Tactical Line".Tlhrough the "Statement of Policy" theCPI was tiying to project the image

of a party that had virtually abjuredviolence and was settling for parlia-1 AOa


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ECONONIIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY June 9, 1973mentarism. The leadership feared thatsome of the formulations in the "Tac-tical Line" might prevent the partyregaining its legality in states wvhere thad been bannedl (Travancore-Cochinand Hyderabad). Another reason couldhe that a more explicit reference tothe tactic of combining peasant parti-san warfare with utrban insurrectionmight provide the extremist elementsin the party arguments for opposingthe switch to parliamentarism.The "Draft Programme" and the"Statement of Policy" fornalised Mos-cow's decrees on strategy and tacticsfor India. The "Draft Programme"was published by the Cominformjour-nal immediately after it was releasedin India and the "Statement of Policy"wvithina fortnight of its adoption.Rajeswara Rao had already resignedas General Secretary and Ajoy Ghoshhad replaced him when the CentralCommittee met in May 1951 to hearabout the Moscow discussions. TheMay 1951 Central Committee meetingdecided to call off the Telenganac;truggleand asked its Andhra memn-bers to ascertain from the partisanleaders whether they could hold onuntil the party negotiated with thegovernment on the terms for with-drawal, which included the following:land in possession of the tenants shouldnot be taken away to be handed overto landlords; all warrants against thestruggle leaders should be withdrawn;all prisoners released; and the ban onthe CPI lifted. The resolution madeclear that the Telengana struggle wasnot started and was not being conti-nued to overthrow the Nehru govern-ment, but to end feudal exploitation.It directed the newly-constituted Poli-bureau to review the Telengana prob-lem and adopt all ways and measuresto make the struggle successful.24

Taking advantage of this resolution,the Ravi Narayan Reddy faction inTelengana and the party Headquartersfaction at the all-India level launcheda campaign for withdrawal of thestruggle even before the terms ofwithdrawal could be secured, and toeliminate the fighting cadre from alllevels of leadership. It began claimingthat the Central Committee had al-ready called off the struggle and thatwhat was going on in Telengana wasmere individual or squad terror. Theopen campaign by this faction forcedthe Politbureau to appoint a thre&-member negotiating committee. AjoyGhosh, the newv General Secretary,even threatened to disown the struggleif it was not wvithdrawInmmediately.

Nla(ldukuri Clhandrasekhara Rao, anAndhra leader, retorted that in thatcase the struggle leadership would beforced to disown him and his leader-ship.The struggle leaders were still talk-ing to the partisan leaders in the foresthases when the government told thenegotiating committee that declarationsfavouring wvithdrawal of the strugglewvereof no avail unless the leaders illcharge of the struggle announced itsw7ithdrawal.At the May 1951 Central Committeemceting, the Andhra members agreedthat the struggle could not last longeven as a partial partisan struggle indefence of land and should be with-drawvnafter securing the most favour-able terms. They had supported theCentral Committee resolution in thisspirit. As Sundarayya rightly records,the dissensions that had plagued theparty durinig the last two years caused"irreparable harTnto the Telenganaarmed struggle". There was the viciouspropaganda that the movement inTelengana was nothing but individualterrorism or squad actions and thatthere was no mass participation. TheCentral Committee's resolution washased on the new programme and anew tactical line, but in completecontradiction to it the Politbureauissued a public statement condemningindividual terror and squad actions and

this helped the slander caampaigniagainst the Telengana struggle.25 Also,the releasing to the Press of the partof the Central Commitee resolutionexpressing readiness for a niegotiatedsettlement led the government to be-lieve that the movement was about tocollapse and the party was about tosurrender. This hardened the governi-ment's position.WVITHDRAWntAIOF STRUGGLE

Late in October 1951, A K Gopalan,Onbehalf of the Central Committee andthe Andhra Committee, announced thewvithdrawal f the struggle. Though thegovernment had rebuffed the negotia-tors, the CPI leadership was obligedto "advise the Telengana peasantry andthe fighting partisans to stop all par-tisan actions" and to mobilise theentire people to rout the Congress atthe general elections.26It was tanmesurrender because theparty gave the peasantry no guaranteeabout protecting their hard-won gains.The withdrawal of the struiggle meantsuirrenderof all the guerilla zones anidliberated villages to the Indian army,,and ith it, the other gains. The CPI

\as settlinig foir )arliainciitarisni.The following agreed conclusionswere drawn by the party about Telen-gana at the end of the struggle, ac-cording to Basavapiunniah who wasamong its leaders:(1) It is a crime to characterise thestruggle as individual terrorism orsquad terrorism.(2) It was correct to have continuedthe Telengana armed struggle andguerilla struggle even after the Indiantroops entered Ifyderabad, and to de-fenci land anid other democratic gains,but it was not correct to have had asthe aimii"a people's liberation war forcapturing political power and over-throwing the Central Congress Govern-mnent".

(3) It was wrong to conifuse or char-acterise every struggle of the peasantryor other exploit,\ miasses, wheneverthey are forced to use ;zeapons, andespecially peasant guerilla struggles, asthe final revolutionary struggle or asthe beginning of the final revolutionarystruggle or as an intermediate part ofsuch struggles.

(4) There was the danger of themovement degenerating into terroristicactions by squads and getting isolatedfrom the masses. HIow long the armedpeasant guerilla struggle should becontinued, and when it should bewith(lrawn, dlepended on the ebl andflow of the movement;(5) Stalin and the Soviet partyleadeus had said that it seemed difficultto continue the Telengana strugglefurther, that is, during the first partof 1951 and it was unfortunate thatthe Indian communist movement wasnot in a position to continue it. Butthey had left it entirely to the CPI todecide whether it should be continuiedor withdrawn;

(6) It was not possible to mechani-cally choose between the Chinese pathand the Russian path and it was ne-cessary to learn froimthe experience ofboth.27The struggle wvascalled off late inOctober 1951, but the struggle leaderscould explain what was virtually afait accompli to the partisans in theforests only later. A conference of partyleaders and guerilla fighters of theAmarabadforest region was held in thethird week of November andct approvedthe decision to withdraw the strug,gle.The iinderground(leadership announc-ed a reconstituted commnitteeor Telen-g-anawvith bout 25 membersdrawnfromthe underground cadre as well as thosereleased or still in prison. But GeneralSecretary Ajoy Ghosh, w7ithoutconsul-

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June 9, 1973 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYting the iunidergrouLndeadership, consti-tutedl a1 "Electioni Committee" an(lauthorised it to ftunetionas the (le fletoState Commiiittee. The undergroun0conmllittee asked the cadre to ignorethis body exc.ept for election purposes.While the underground committeecontinued to guide the undergrouundIcadre, the Election Committee got thesupport of the open cadre. However, theundergrouncd cadre worked for thesuccess of the People's Democratic Frontthrough wbhich he illegal partv contes-ted the elections.

LESSON OF 1hE ELECTONSOver 2,000 CPI cadres were still injail when the elections took place.Over 1,000 were underground. ThePeople's Democratic Front could runcandidates in only 42 of the 98 con-

stituencies in Telengana. The extent ofthe CPI victory is underlined by thefact 36 of the 45 candidates runningunder the PDF banner were elected.In addition 10 Socialist candidates thathad the PDF's support also won. TheCongress won 41 seats hbit 25 of thesewere located in Mahbool)nagar andHyderabad districts, where the PDFdid not put up candidates. In the'Red' district of Nalgonda, the PDFmade a clean sweeprof all the 14 seats;in Warangal, another 'Red' district,the PDF won 11 of the 14 seats; inKarimnagar t won 10 of the 15 seats.Thns 35 of the 45 seats the PDF wvonwvere ocated in those three districtswbherethe CPI had condtucted theTelengana armed struggle. Of the 2.5million votes polled, the PDF gotapproximately a third, while the Con-gress, which had contested evervonieofthe seats, could only poll abouit thesame proportion of votes. It was un-mistakable that communist gains inTelengana were most spectacular pre-cisely in those areas where the CPIhad led the peasant partisan warfareor guerilla squad actions, inviting mas-sive police and military repression. Ifthe vote meant anything at all, it wasa vindication of the Andhra communistline of Maoist armed struggle. It wasconvincing refutation of the viciouscampaign that the Telengana armedstruggle was isolated from the massesand was sectarian, anarchist and terro-rist in character.

Even after the elections in January1952, the cadre in Telengana continuedto be divided. Abouit 25 leaders, fromthe fighting areas as well as those inthe open, met in February 1952 fora week to discuss the differences.Ajoy Ghosh, wvhoattended the meeting

stLnI11me(tip the agrecd conclusions anda uiite(l Telengania committee wvasform-ieedo lead the m-ovement.28The government's hunt against theund,ergroundsquiads did not stop evenafter the elections and arrests and pro-secutionis continued. The government'sargument was that arms had nlot beensurrendered and therefore the huntcould niot be relaxed. As the logicalstep to the withdrawal of the struggle,the CP-I decided to surrender arms.The (lutestionhere is: did the 1951locumlents (onl programme and tactics)\varranit he withdrawal of the Telen-gana struggle? The present-day Mao-ist contenition s that they did .:ot andthat the. withdrawal was an act ofl)etrayal by "revisionists" who wantedto take the party into the vortex ofparliamentary politics by entering the1952 general elections.29 In theirview, the Telengana armed strugglecouild have continued as a struggle toprotect the gains of the peasantry,though not as a struggle for statepower.What followed the withdrawal wasthe quiet abandonment of the perspec-tive of armed struggle because theparty settled for peaceful constitution-alism, and eventually opted for peace-ftil transition to socialism.

One of the issues of controversy onthe Telenigana struggle is the Sovietattitude to its withdrawal. RajeswaraIlao, niow General Secretary of theCPI, conitends that the Soviet partyanid Stalin did not support the struggleuntil it was withdrawvn.30 But Sundar-ayya, the CPI(M)'s General Secretary,contenids that the CPSU and Stalinthought that it was unfortunate thatthe struggle could not be defended orcontinued and that, therefore, the timehad come for its withdrawal. It was,however, for the CPI leadershipto decide when exactly and onwhat terms it should be with-drawn and how long it had to be con-tinuled to secure suitable tenns.31Whether the Soviet leadersbip sup-ported the struggle till the end or not,its withdrawal had more than its tacitsupport.

CHINA'S ATrUDEThough the Communist Party ofChina now charges "Indian revisionistsxvith betraying Telengana", it is silenton the Soviet and Cominformroles.An NCNA commentary on August 2.1967 noted that for a long time theIndian communist movement had wit-

nessed an intense struggle betweentwo lines. The revolutionaries had

resolutely urged the seizure of powerthrough armed struggle, that is, thepath of the Chinese people, who weregtuided in their victories by Mao'sThought. "Some revisionist chieftains,howvever, everishly pushed ahead witbthe revisionist parliamentary roadresulting in doing tremendouis harmto the Indian revolution." In 1946-51, base areas of armed strug-gle were establishedl in Telenganawhere landless an(d poor peasantswere aroused to seize land byarmed struggle "and become the bannerof the Indian people's revolutionarystrtuggle of the time". The commen-tary said though the Indian revisionistsdescribed peasant armed struggles asadventurism and individual terrorism,the Telengana struggle grew under theradiance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought.In a party document in September1950 and an open document in 1951,they villified the Chinese people's re-volutionary war led by Chairman Maoand had put fornvard the theory ofIndia's exceptionalism, hystericallypreventing the Indian people fromtaking the road of Chinese revolution.Long after the Telengana "sell out"and after many setbacks the inidianpeasants had realised the "futility ofthe parliamentary path and the needfor armed struggle", it said.It might be well to record here thatthere was even a veiled Chinese sug-gestion in June 1950 that the Telenganaarmed struggle might have been ill-timed. The timing of this suggestion(June 1950) is significant. The Andhraleadership had just taken over fronmB T Ranadive, but the Chinese partyseemed to have some reservations aboutthe Andhra leadership's line of peasantarmed struggle. The suggestion cainein the form of a reply to a reader fronithe editor of the People's Daily, theCPC's chief organ. After referring tocommunist peasant warfare in China,the editor declared that characteristicsof the Chinese revolution "can undercertain historical conditions become thecommon characteristics of all revolu-tionaries of other colonial and semi-colonial countries". He quoted fromLiu Shao-chi's opening address to thePeking World Federation of TradeUnions conference on the desirabilityof armed struggle on the part of "manycolonial and semi-colonial peoples" andfrom the Cominform journal's editorialof January 27. Quoting a statementlby B T Ranadive (when he was theGeneral Secretary of the CPI) fullyendorsing the conclusions of this edito-rial and the lessons of the Chineserevolution as the infallible guide for

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 'WEEKLY June 9, 1973tlle CPI, the editor uniderlinled thelimited applicability of the Chineseexample. It wNs in the liature of awarning to the CPI, against an un-reserved acceptance of the Chineseni)odel.Armed struggle againist imperialistaggression is essential for the libera-tion of many colonies and semi-colonies. But the time and place forconducting this kind of revolutionaryarmed struggle must be decidedaccording to concrete conditions. Itcan by no means be conducted in anycolony or semi-colony at any timewvithoutthe necessary pre-conditionsand preparations.32Tlis, coupled with the absence of anycritical comment on the withdrawal ofthe Telengana armed struggle later,suiggests that the CPC had no objec-tion to the withdrawal. According toSundarayya, at no time between 1951and 1967 did the Chinese say that thewithdrawal was wrong "though theycould have conveyed it on innumerableoccasions when we had the opportunityto meet them personally. Once whenwe said in a mood of self-criticism thatif we had had the correct understand-ing we could have retreated with muchless losses and with greater gains, theytold us not to stress that aspect butto bring forth the revolutionary signifi-cance of the fact that the Nehru gov-ernmcnt could not suppress a peasantpartisan struggle even in a small partof the country."33

GANS Ok' 1HE STRUGGLEIhe more important fact here is thatthe struggIe was withdrawn and notdefeated. It w^as he first armed strug-gle of the Indian communist move-ment over a vide area, resulting in aliberated zone of about 16,000 squaremiles covering 3,000 villages. For 12to 18 months the entire administrationin these areas was in the hands ofvillage peasanit committees. About4,000 party and peasant militants %verekilled and over 10,000 commU.nist

cadres and others were thrown intoprisons or detentioni camps for three tofour years.It Nvasa revolutionary agrarian arm-ed struggle to enid the feudal oider.The village committees in the liberatedzones implemented the agrarian pro-gramme. Though this task could notbe achieved completely, over 3 millionacres of land was redistributed, forcedlabour was abolished, illegal extrac-tions and feudal oppression of varioustypes were ended. Evictions werestopped and a minimum wage ensuredto agricultural labour. The struigglepushed the question of agrarian revolu-tion to the forefront, compelling thie

C:ongress to undertake land iefornis.It. was a struggle for endinig theautocratic rule of the Nizam anid itcontributed to achieving this objective.It was also a struggle for rcorganisingthe states oIn the basis of language an(dit not only resulted in the eventtualforination of a inified Telugu-speakingstate but in the break-up of theIlycderabad state anid the creation ofother linguistic states (Maharashitraanid Karnataka).The Telengana struggle, as Sunidar-ayya says, brought to the fore "aliimostall the questions concerning the stra-tegy and tactics of the Indian people'sdemocratic revolution for correct andscientific answers and realistic solu-tions".34Telengana divided the CPI until thearmed struggle there was called offon the basis of the 1951 documents.But the origins of the 1962-63 Indiancommllunist plit can be traced to thedifference over the Telengana lineduring its last two years. Sundarayyarightly observes that these differencescrystallised into two hostile trends andthose who opposed the struggle areby and large with the present day CPI,while those favouring it went t' theCPI(M). Though the CPI split synichro-nised with the international schism andwas hastened by it, it did not repre-sent a straight Moscow-Peking polarisa-tion. The real ideological split in theIndian communist movement came afterNaxalbari, in 1968.Immediately after the 1952 selectionis,the CPI found itself divided in itsattitude to the Congress party andits government headed by JawaharlalNehru. Should it fight the Congressall out or should it forge a uniitedfrontvith "progressive"sections to fight the"right reaction" which was growinginside the Congress and outside, wasthe issue. A united fronit would re-(quire support to Nehru's foreign anddomestic policies against his criticsboth inside and outside the Congressparty.

Soviet policies of the period hadmiuch to do with the CPI's dilemma.When, in the early 1950s, Nehrushowed an anti-West orientation andsought closer ties, including econiomicaid, with the socialist camp, the SovietUnion supported India as a non-align-ed ally in the peace front. The CPIbacked Nehru's non-alignment policywithout reservation because it servedSoviet foreign policy interests. But theparty remained divided on Nehru'sdomestic policies. Amidst the continu-ing OPI controversy, the Soviet ader-ship began seeing progressive features

not onily in Nehru's foreigi policiCisbut ailso'n his (ldoimesticolcies. Withthis shift in the Soviet attitude, Indialecaime the pivot of Soviet policy forAsia.SEEDS OF THE SPlIT

The C(Pf's 1931 prograiiiiiie ha(laissnllXe(1hat Inidia was a semi-colonialatinddependent country ruled by a bigIbourgedois-landlordl government wvhichWas collaborating with British inmperia-lismi. This forimlulationi now cacmetinder attack froiii a pro-Soviet sectionof the CPI which insisted that Nehruhad abandoned collaborationl withimperialism and had taken to peacefulco-operation anad co-existence with thesocialist caImlp. This group argued thatIindia nieeded a niationalunited front asthe prelude to a government of dermao-cratic unity. Such a policy wvouldre(quirean emergency alliance with theCongress to resist the rightist offensive.This line of thinking vas to bedeveloped later into a slogan for a"national democratic government". InDecember 1955, a few mouths beforethe 20th CPSU congress, the CPIGeneral Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, out-lined a programme for "uniting withand struggling against the Congress"to build a national democratic front.This programme implied not onlypeaceful traiisitioii to socialism (aconcept which wvas to be proclaimedat the 20th congress in February 1956)buit also the conicept of national demo-cracy (proclaimiiedormiiallyhrough theMoscowvStatenielm of 81 commiunistparties in 1960). The CPI had thusaniticipated two of the miost controver-siail formuitilationisbhichwere later tobe coimmended to the initernationialcommiiiunist movemenit b)y the Sovietleadership. The same coonceptsbc-came the miajor issues in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute.The Moscow declaration of 1960(lescribed the national dem.icraticstate as a formiiof transitiojn to socia-lismi, especially in the nion-alignedcountries of the peace zone, in whicbthe national bourgeoisie played anobjectively progressive role and de-served socialist economic and diplo-mnatic upport. The national democraticstate was one that had achievedcomplete economic independence fromimperialism and was ruled by a broadanti-imperialist fronit that included thenational bourgeosie. The working classwas to evolve as its leader only gradu-all. The concept of national demo-cracy was a corollary to the conceptof peaceful transitioni, and India wasonle of the countries of the peace zonewhere peaceful transitionl via the

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June 9, 1973 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYnationial democratic state was possible.The "national deemocracy" con-cept added a new diinensioni to theCPI's conitiniuing truggle for a newprogrammiiieo replace the 1951 docu-inent. As Nehru's domestic policiesshiftedl to the right anid tenision grewon the Sino-Indianiborder, the attitudeto the Indian bourgeoisic continued tobe the central issue in the CPI debatexvhichtook a predictable form: inationaldemiiocracyversus people's democracy.Thle right-wing of the CPI, which hadthe Soviet backing contended that India'sbourgeois democracy could metaior-phose into a national democracy. Itplaced heavy reliance on Soviet aid asthe instrument to secure national demo-cracy. The left wing countered thisby arguinig that the bourgeoisie wvas;compromising with domestic reactionand imperialism. Soviet aid, althoughnecessary, was being used by thebourgeoisie to bargain for more aidfrom the West. Rival programme draftsNvere presented at the CPI's sixthcongress and the split was avertedonly by the intervention of NMikhailSuslov, who headed the high levelCPSU delegation to the CPI congress.Suslov, anxious to preserve CPI unity,mianaged to salvage the rightist lineand to manoeuvre the congress intoshelving the issue of a new CPI pro-gramlmie.The conflict continued behindthe scenies until the GPI split in1964, after which the CPI as well asNwhatater came to be known as theCPI (M) adopted their own pro-gramnmes.

Thuts the factors underlying the1962-63 split date back to the Telen-gana armed struggle and the diff-erences over it.The real significan(ce of Telenganahowveverlies elsewhere: it was thefirst applicatioin of the Maoist revolu-tionary model outside China even be-fIore the Chinese revolution hadtriumphed fully and China had pro-claimed itself a people's iepublic.Over 20 years later, Naxalbaribrought to the fore once again all thetheoretical and ideological questionsconcerning the strategy and tactics ofthe Indian revolution but in a ehangedconitext: the international coinmunistniovenient had split on issues ofideology and Moscow had ceased tobe the sole centre of the internationalcommunist movement.

Notes1 For the mnost comprehensive ac-

count of the Andhra Mahasabha'smovement in Telengana and of thebeginnings of the communist

mnovementin the area, see RaviNarayana Reddy, "Veera Teletngana- Na Atnubhavala' (Telugu),AnidhraPradesh Communist Coun-cil, 1972.2 P Sundarayya, "TeleniganaPeople'sStruggle and Its Lessons", Com-munist Party of India (Marxist)$Calcutta, 1972, pp 7-27. Also, RajB3ahadurGour, et al, "GloriousTelengana Armed Struggle", Com-iiiunist Party of India, New Delhi,1973. "WVhyhe Ultra- 'Left' De-viation?" Communist Party ofInidia (Marxist), Calcutta, 1968.3 P Sundarayya, "VisaalandhraloPl-ajaRajyam",Telugu, Vijayawada,1946, p 6.4 A Zhdanov, "The InternationalSituation", "For A Lasting Peace,For People's Democracy", Bucha-rest, November 10, 1947.5 See Mohan Ram, "Indian Com-munism - Split within a Split",Vikas, New Delhi, 1969, pp 7-21.6 P Sundarayya, "Telengana People'sStruggle and Its Lessons", op cit,p 392-3.7 "Struggle for Peoples Democracyand Socialism - Some Questionsof Strategy and Tactics", Com-munidst,Bombay, June-July 1949.8 E M Zhukov, "Problems of Na-tional and Colonial Struggle",Colonial People's Struggle forLiberation", People's PublishingHouse, Bombay, 1950, pp 1-11.9 V Balabushevich, "The New Stagein the National Liberation of thePeople of India", "Colonial el'ople'sStruggle for Liberation", op cit,pp 32-59.10 For A Lasting Peace, For A Peo-ple's Democracy", December 30,1949.11 "Mighty Advance of the NationalLiberation Movement in the Colo-nial and Dependent Countries","For A Lasting Peace, For People'sDemocracy", January 27, 1950.12 Ibid.13 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 387.14 Ibid, p 392.15 C Rajeswara Rao, "The HistoricTelengana Struggle", CommunistParty of India, New Delhi, 1972,pp 31-33.16 P Sundarayya op cit, p 393-4.17 PHQ Covering Note to the Letterof the Political Committee of theCPGB to the Communist Party ofIndia, December 6, 1950.18 P Sundarayya, p 399.19 "Palme Dutt Answers Questions onIndia," Crossroads, January 19,1951.20 Deveni and Bal Krishna, "TalksWith R Palme Dutt and OtherImpressions Gained Abroad", PHQUnit, Bombay, January 6, 1951.21 This was amended and adoptedby the All-India Party Conferencein October 1951, and later by thethird (Madurai) congress of theparty in 1953. But it was put inabeyance by the fourth (Palghat)congress in 1956 on the ground thatit needed important changes.

22 Statement of Policy of the Com-munist Party of India, Bombay1951.

23 "CommuLinistonspiracy at Miadu-rai", DemiiocraticResearch Seivice,B3omibay, 1954. This is the firstpublishedl version of the secretdocument and the CPI denouncedit is "forgery".But SundarayyahasiioNv vouLched or its authenticity,see P Sundarayya, op cit, pp409-14.24 Text of resolutioni P SwLridarayya,op cit, p 417ff.25 Ibid, p 428.26 "CPI Advises Stoppage of PlartisainAction in Telengana", Crossroads,October 26, 1951.27 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 415-6.28 Ibid, p 432.29 Chandra Pulla Reddy, "VeeraTelengana Viplava Poratam"(Telugu), Janasakthi Publications,Vijawayada, 1968, P 51.30 C Rajeswara Rao, "The IlistroicTelengana Struggle," op cit, p 34.31 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 415-16.Also, M Basavapunniab, "Lessons

of Telengana Struggle - and theRevisionist Betrayal", Peoples De-mocracy, November 5, 1972.32 "An Armed People Opposes ArmedCounter revolution," People'sDaily, June 16, 1950, Pcople'sChina, July 1, 1950.33 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 438.34 Ibid, p 4..35 Mohan Ram, "Maoism in India,"Vikas, New Delhi, 1971, Chapter 1.

Bihar Alloy SteelsBIH-IAR LLOY STEELS, whichl is set-ting up a project in liazaribagh dis-trict of Bihar for the manufacture ofalloy constructional steels, alloy toolsteels and high speed tool steels, ex-pects to commence operationisof theplant before the end of May next. Con-structiorl of various factory buildiiigs isin progress and machinery is expectedto start arriving from July. The direc-tors urged the govermment to declareH-lazaribagh as a 'backward' districton the plea that the employinent pro-blemii s very acute there. If it isdeclared a a 'backward' area, its deve-lopment would be expedited and thepeople would have more employmentopportunities. Meanwlhile, the com-pany's project cost has gone up cwingto virtual devaluation of the rupeetwice vis-a-vis the various Europeancurrencies. Also, increases in importduties on machinery and various otherlevies on steel, etc, imposed in the lasttwo budgets have added to the cost.The directors say that the exchangerates of various foreign currencies arestill in a fluid state and that as soonas the exchange rates are stabilised, therevised project cost Nvouldbe workedout and arraingements made to meetthe shortfall.

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