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Telemarketing,Technology,andtheRegulationofPrivateSpeechJustin(Gus)Hurwitz
Abstract
This article considers the viability of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in light of recentSupremeCourtFirstAmendmentprecedent (suchasReedv.TownofGilbert andSorrell v. IMSHealth)and technological & regulatory developments (such as the FCC's ongoing consideration of rules thatwould allowor require prospective callers to implement technologies that obviatemanyof the TCPA'sconcerns). TheTCPA is theprimary lawprohibiting“robocalls”–phonecallsmadeusingautodialersorpre-recordedmessageswithouttheconsentofthecallrecipient. Inrecentyearsrobocallshavebecomeoneoftheprimaryconsumerprotectionissuesfacingregulators–withmorethan2.4billionofthesecallsplacedeachmonth,consumerconcernabout themdominatecomplaints receivedbyboth theFCCandFTC.
TheTCPA includesa strictprivatecauseofactionwith statutorydamages.Thishasgiven rise in recentyearstoanenormousclassaction industrythathasgrownfromjust14suits in2007tonearly5,000 in2016. These suits frequently target firms that attempt to complywith the TCPA in good faith but arecaughtinitsstrictnetthroughinnocent,orevenno,mistake.
BecausetheTCPAregulatesspeech,ithasbeensubjecttorepeatedFirstAmendmentchallengessinceitwasenactedin1991.Thosechallengeshaveconsistentlybeenreviewedsubjecttointermediatescrutiny,underwhichthestatutehasconsistentlysurvived.RecentdevelopmentsinFirstAmendmentprecedent,however,suggestthatsuchchallengeswouldlikelybesubjecttostrictscrutinytoday.Moreover,recenttechnologicalandregulatorydevelopmentssuggestthatthestatuteisnotsufficientlytailoredtosurviveapplicationof intermediatescrutiny, letalone its strictercousin.Given thesharp increase inTCPAsuitsandthis legalevolution,thisarticleprovidesanalysisrelevanttocertainly-forthcomingchallengestotheTCPA’svalidity.
TheTCPAalsoraisesdifficultquestionsbeyondthetraditionalFirstAmendmentanalysis.Forinstance,thegovernmentitselfregulatesmanyaspectsofthearchitectureofthetelephonenetwork.Inthisrole,itisslowedorpreventedtheadoptionoftechnologiesthatcoulddramaticallyreducetheproblemstheTCPAcurtails speech to (ineffectively) address. And the TCPA is largely premised on the government’simportantinterestinprotectingthesanctityofthesanctuaryofthehomeasaplaceinwhichindividualscan be free from intrusions from the outside world. But as mobile telephones increasingly displaceresidentialwirelinetelephones,theTCPA’seffecthasgrownsubsilentiofromprotectingthesanctuaryofthehome toprotecting the sanctuaryof thephone.Bothof these issues– the regulationof speech toaddressproblemsof thegovernment’sownmakingand thesub silentio expansionofprotectionof thehome–arediscussedinthelatterpartsofthisArticle.
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Telemarketing,Technology,andtheRegulationofPrivateSpeechJustin(Gus)Hurwitz
Introduction.................................................................................................................................................3I. TheTCPA’sLegislative,Administrative,andFirstAmendmentHistory..................................................5
TheTCPA’sPurpose.................................................................................................................................6ImplementationandEvolutionoftheTCPA............................................................................................8FirstAmendmentDoctrine......................................................................................................................9TheTCPAandtheFirstAmendment:TheEarlyCases...........................................................................11
II.HowtheTimeshaveChanged...............................................................................................................11Theproblemhaschanged.....................................................................................................................11Thetechnologyhaschanged.................................................................................................................13Thelawhaschanged.............................................................................................................................15
III.RecentFirstAmendmentAnalysesoftheTCPA....................................................................................17IV.ANewFirstAmendmentAnalysisoftheTCPA......................................................................................19
TheTCPAmakescontent-baseddistinctionsthatmaysubjectittostrictscrutiny...............................19ThegovernmenthasnointerestindoingmuchofwhattheTCPAdoes..............................................22
TheTCPAdoesnotmeaningfullyadvanceprivacyinterests..............................................................22TheTCPAinterfereswithcommerce..................................................................................................24
TheTCPAishardlytailoredatall,letalonenarrowly............................................................................25Thereare,andthegovernmentcontrols,lessrestrictivemeansofaddressingrobocalls....................27
V. ConceptualPuzzlesPromptedbytheTCPA’sRegulationofSpeech.....................................................28Thegovernmentcannotregulatespeechtocurtailaproblemofitsowncreation..............................29Thesanctuaryofthehomevs.thesanctuaryofthephone..................................................................31
VI.ABetterApproach.................................................................................................................................33Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................35
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Telemarketing,Technology,andtheRegulationofPrivateSpeechJustin(Gus)Hurwitz1
Introduction
Thelate1980sbroughtanewterrorintotheworld,onethatiswithustothisday:theunsolicitedcommercialphonecall.Increasinglysophisticateddigitaltechnologiesandrapidlyfallingcostsenabledunsavorymarketerstoreachoutandtouchhundreds,thousands,orevenmorepotentialcustomersperhour.Theydidthisthroughacombinationofautomatedtelephonedialers–simplecomputersthatwoulddialphonenumberssequentially2–andpre-recordedorartificialvoicemessages.3
Unfortunatelyforthisnewbreedoftelemarketers,theirbusinesswasproblematicforbothconsumersandthearchitectureofthetelephoneindustry.Thecallsoftencameintheeveningasfamiliesweresittingdowntodinnerorwatchingprime-timetelevision–itwasadifferentera,remember–andseemedagrotesqueinvasionoftheirprivacy.4Becausetheyhadnowaytodifferentiatewantedcallsfromunwantedones–thiswasbeforetheintroductionofCallerID–thesecallsweredeceptive,placingconsumersintheimpossiblepositionofeithermissingcallsfromfriendsandfamilyoransweringcallsfrommarketers.Thesecallswerealsoproblematicduetothetechnicalandeconomicfeaturesofthetelephonenetworkitself:theycouldtieupbusinessandresidentialphonelinesforhoursatatime,fillupansweringmachinetapes,andevenimposeconsequentialcostsoncellphoneorfaxmachineowners.
CongressenactedtheTelephoneConsumerProtectionActof1991(TCPA)inresponsetotheseconcerns.5TheTCPAprovidedgenerallegalprinciplestogoverntheuseofautomatictelephonedialingsystemsandartificialorprerecordedmessages,6anddirectedtheFederalCommunicationsCommission(FCC)tofurtherdeveloptheseprinciplesintorules.7ThelodestoneprincipleoftheTCPAisthat,subjecttocertainexceptions,itisunlawfultouseautomaticdialingsystemsorprerecordedmessagestomakephonecallsexceptwiththepriorexpressconsentofthecalledparty.Inthepast26years,CongressandtheFCChaverevisitedtheTCPAandtherulesmadepursuanttoitnumeroustimes,butbothbodieshaveremainedfaithfultothisprinciple.8
1 AssistantProfessorofLawandCo-Director,Space,Cyber,andTelecomLawProgram,UniversityofNebraska
CollegeofLaw.J.D.,UniversityofChicago,2007;M.A.(economics),GeorgeMasonUniversity,2010;B.A.,St.John’sCollege,2003.ParticipantsattheUNLCollegeofLawFacultyWorkshopandGeorgeMasonUniversityAntoninScaliaSchoolofLawCenterfortheStudyoftheAdministrativeStateResearchRoundtableofferedhelpfulfeedbackonearlierversionsofthisArticle.ThanksinparticulartoKyleLangvardt,EricBerger,EugeneVolokh,andSheldonGilbertforparticularlyfeedback.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Aseverymoderntelephoneownerknows,theTCPAhasnoteliminatedthescourgeofunwantedtelephonecalls.Tothecontrary,todaythereareover2.4billionrobocallsplacedeachmonth,59%ofwhicharemadeusingtechnologiesthatfalsifyormasktheidentityofthecaller.9Whohasnotreceivedacallfrom“RachelfromCardholderServices?”10Butwhilethebasicproblemtodayseemssimilartothatof1991,somuchabouttheecosystemhaschangedthattheunderlyingproblemsarealmostallfundamentallydifferent.Toconsiderjustafewexamples:today,thesecallscomethroughouttheday,mostlytocellphones;CallerIDispervasive;theU.S.Governmenthasdevelopedacomprehensive(ifineffective)Do-Not-Callregime;callersusecomplextrickstomakecalledpartiesthinktheyaretalkingtoahuman;andautomaticdialersarefarsmarter,suchthattheyarefarlesslikelytotieupphonelinesformorethanafewseconds(ifthecallgoesunanswered).
Inaddition,manyoftoday’scallersareengagedincomplexscamsunrelatedtothecallitself.11Themajorityofbad-faithcallers–the“RachelsfromCardholderServices”andthosemakingcallsaspartofscamsunrelatedtothecallsthemselves–usetechnologiestoconceal,andareengaginginscamsthatdonotrequirethemtoreveal,theiridentities.12Thatis,theycannotbesuedbecausetheycannotbefound;theydonotcareabouttheTCPAandmakenoeffortstocomplywithit.ThegovernmentdoeshaveacompellinginterestincurtailingthesecallersbuttheTCPAdoeslittletoaccomplishthisgoal.Legitimatebusinesses,however,areconstrainedbythecontoursofthelawandthemarket.TheyneednotbesubjecttosuchbluntordraconianatoolastheTCPA,andsubjectingtheirspeechtosuchatoolexceedstheboundsofwhatispermissibleundertheFirstAmendment.ThisisafundamentaldifferencebetweenthechallengesthattheTCPAwaswrittentoaddressin1991andthechallengesthatarefacedtoday.ThecontemporaryproblemofunwantedtelephonecallsstemsnotfromthosecallerswhoattempttocomplywiththeTCPAbutfromthosewhoignoreit.
ThisarticletakesafreshlookattheconstitutionalityoftheTCPA.Sinceitwasenacted,theActhassurvivednumerouschallengesbroughtonFirstAmendmentgrounds.CourtshaveconsistentlyfoundthattheActissubjecttoandsurvivesintermediatescrutiny.Butchangesintechnology,themarket,andthelawsuggestthatthisconclusionmaynolongerbesound.RecentSupremeCourtFirstAmendmentprecedentraisesquestionsaboutthegroundsonwhichpriorcourtshaveupheldtheTCPA–leadingsomelowercourtstosubjecttheTCPAtostrictscrutiny.ThisarticlearguesthattheserecentcasesareonlythetipoftheconstitutionalicebergwithwhichtheTCPAisabouttocollide.Inthemodernsetting,thebasicpurposeof(andproblemwith)theActisthatitattemptstocurtailanillegitimateandsubstantiallyharmfulsubsetoftelephonecallsusingtoolsthatsilenceasubstantialvolumeoflegitimatecalls,withlittleeffectonillegitimatespeech.NotonlydoestheActpossiblyfailunderrecentstrictscrutinyprecedent,butitalmostcertainlyfailsundercurrentcircumstancesunderintermediatescrutiny.
ThestartingpointforthisargumentistheSupremeCourt’srecentFirstAmendmentjurisprudence.CourtshavehistoricallyfoundthattheTCPAdoesnotmakecontent-baseddistinctionsandthereforeissubjectonlytointermediatescrutiny.ButrecentcasessuchasReed,Sorrell,suggestthattheTCPAdoes,infact,makecontent-baseddistinctionsand,thereforeissubjecttostrictscrutiny.13ThiscastsserioustheTCPA’sprioraffirmationsintheCircuitCourtsofAppeal.Whenthrownintocrucibleofstrictscrutiny,theTCPAquicklyturnstodross.
9 10 11 12 13
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Evenmorechallenging,changesintelephonetechnologyandthemarketforcallsregulatedbytheTCPAcallintoquestionwhetherthegovernmenthasanyinterestinregulatingthesecallsatall,letaloneacompellingone.TheTCPAandFCC’simplementingrulesarewoefullyunder-andover-inclusive,capturingvastamountsofconstitutionally-protectedspeechwhiledoinglittletoaddressthecontemporaryproblemofunwantedcalls(e.g.,“RachelfromCardholderServices”).Andeveniftheseconcernsweren’tfataltotheTCPA’sconstitutionalstructure,therulesimplementedbytheFCCandauthorizedbytheTCPAarenottheleastrestrictivemeanstoaddresstheproblemonunwantedcommercialcalls.14Theymayhavebeenlessproblematicintheearly1990sduetolimitationsonthestateoftheartintelephonetechnology,butthatisnolongerthecase.TheTCPAwasadoptedevenbeforebasicCallerIDwascommerciallyavailable–andcontemporarytechnologycanempowercallerswithamuchwiderrangeoftoolstomanagebothwantedandunwantedtelephonecalls.
TheFirstAmendmentanalysisoftheTCPAgivesrisetoapairofbroader,moreconceptuallychallengingissues.First,itturnsoutthatinthecontemporarycontextmuchoftheneedfortheTCPAarisesfromthegovernment’sownregulationofthetelecommunicationsindustry.Therearevarioustechnologiesavailable–whichtheFCChashistoricallynotallowedtelecommunicationscarrierstoimplement–thatwouldsubstantiallyincreasethecontrolthatconsumershaveoverthephonecallsthattheyreceive.Thisraisesafoundationalquestionofwhetherthegovernmentcancurtailotherwise-Constitutionally-protectedspeechtoaddressproblemsthatareofthegovernment’sownmaking.Theanswertothatquestionis“clearlynot.”Thequestioninthecontemporarycontextisparticularlyinterestingbecauseitarisesasafunctionoftechnologicalchange:atthetimeoftheTCPA’senactment,itwaslikelyaConstitutionally-permissibleapproachtoaddressingalegitimateproblem,evenundercontemporaryFirstAmendmentstandards;itisonlybecausetechnologyhascontinuedtoadvancewhileregulationscontrollingimplementationofthattechnologyhavenotkeptpacethatthosestandardsareproblematictoday.
ThesecondmoreconceptuallychallengingissueistheunderlyingprivacyvaluesthattheTCPAwasenactedtoprotect–arareinstanceinwhichthegovernmentregulatesspeechbetweenprivateparties.OneoftheTCPA’stwocorejustificationswastopreventintrusionsuponthesanctuaryofthehome–animportantgovernmentinterestpredicateduponathinbutimportantlineofcases.Buttoday,unwantedphonecallsimposeuponindividualsoutsidethesanctuaryofthehome,andarguablyare(orcouldbe,subjecttolessrestrictivegovernmentregulationofthetelephonenetwork)significantlylessintrusiveuponindividualswhileinthesanctuaryofthehome.Technologicalchangehas,therefore,silentlychangedtheunderstandingoftheboundariesofthesanctuaryofthehome–orwhatwemaythinkofasthe“privatesphere.”Ratherthanprotectthesanctuaryofthehome,theTCPAratherprotectsthesanctuaryofthephone.Suchareconceptualizationwarrantsskepticism–ifitstands,itwouldfundamentallyalterthetraditionalAmericanconceptofthedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivatespaces.
ThisarticlebeginsinPartIwithanoverviewoftheTCPA.PartIIthendiscussesthreekeytypesofchangessincetheTCPAwasenactedin1991:changesintheproblem,thetechnologicalsolutions,andthelawitself.PartsIIIandIVanalyzestheTCPAinlightofthesechanges.PartVturnstothebroaderquestionsraisedbythisanalysis:theproprietyofthegovernment’srestrictionofprivatespeechtoaddressproblemscreatedbygovernmentregulationitself,andthequestionsthattheprinciplesofprivacyunderlyingapplicationoftheTCPAinthecontemporarysettingraiseaboutthedistinctionbetweenpublicandprivatespaces.
I. TheTCPA’sLegislative,Administrative,andFirstAmendmentHistory14
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TheTCPA’sPurpose
TheTCPAwasenactedin1991nominallyto“protecttheprivacyinterestsofresidentialtelephonesubscribersbyplacingrestrictionsonunsolicited,automatedtelephonecallstothehomeandtofacilitateinterstatecommercebyrestrictingcertainusesoffacsimile(fax)machinesandautomaticdialers.”15Inadditiontothisexpresslyidentifiedpurpose,thelegislativehistoryhighlights“theuseofautomatedequipmenttoengageintelemarketing”asitsmotivatingconcern,andinitspreambleidentifiesthepurposeofthelegislationasbeing“toprohibitcertainpracticesinvolvingtheuseoftelephoneequipmentforadvertisingandsolicitationpurposes.”16Itwasadoptedinresponsetoparticularconcerns,includingthefollowingexamplesfromtheSenateReport:
• automatedcallsareplacedtolinesreservedforemergencypurposes,suchashospitalsandfireandpolicestations
• theentityplacingtheautomatedcalldoesnotidentifyitself• theautomatedcallsfilltheentiretapeofanansweringmachine,preventingother
callersfromleavingmessages• theautomatedcallswillnotdisconnectthelineforalongtimeafterthecalledparty
hangsupthephone,therebypreventingthecalledpartyfromplacinghisorherowncalls
• automatedcallsdonotrespondtohumanvoicecommandstodisconnectthephone,especiallyintimesofemergency
• someautomaticdialerswilldialnumbersinsequence,therebytyingupallthelinesofabusinessandpreventinganyoutgoingcalls;and
• unsolicitedcallsplacedtofaxmachines,andcellularorpagingtelephonenumbersoftenimposeacostonthecalledparty(faxmessagesrequirethecalledpartytopayforthepaperused,cellularusersmustpayforeachincomingcall,andpagingcustomersmustpaytoreturnthecalltothepersonwhooriginatedthecall).17
Understandingthoseconcernsrequiresrecognizingthetechnologicalsettingasitexistedin1991.ThiswasneartheendoftheeraofMaBell–consumersgenerallycouldonlygettelephoneservicefromasinglelocalexchangecarrier,andtherewaslimited(butgrowing)competitioninthelongdistancemarket.18Residentialcustomersgenerallyhadonetelephoneline(andnumber)perhouse,whichwouldringseveralphonessharedthroughoutthehousewhencalled.19TherewasnocallerID.20Faxmachineswereanimportantandstate-of-the-artmeansofcommunication.21Cellphoneswereonlyjustbeginningtoentertheconsumermarket.22Theentireconsumer-facingsideofthetelephonesystemwasanalog.23ThelastmanualexchangeintheUnitedStates–asystemthatrequiredspeakingtoanoperatorinordertocompleteacallinsteadofjustbeingabletodialaphonenumber–wasnotretireduntilthelate1980s.24SometelephonecustomersintheUnitedStatesreliedon“partyline”service–i.e.aphoneline
15 16 17 18192021222324
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sharedwithseveralotherhouses–wellintothe1990s.25Theunderbellyofthesystemwasalsomuchmoreprimitive:manytelephoneexchangesstillreliedonmechanicalswitches–switchesthatestablishedphonecallsbyestablishingaphysicalelectricalcircuitbetweentelephones–insteadofcomputerizedelectronicswitches.26Theseswitcheswereinmanywaysinferiortotheirmore-modernelectroniccounterparts.Forinstance,theywouldnotendaphonecall,disconnectingthephysicalconnectionbetweeneachend,untilbothpartieshadhunguptheirsideoftheline.27
Everythingwasalsomuchmoreexpensive.Longdistancecallscouldcostdollarsperminuteandevenlocalcallssometimeswerenotfree.28Cellphones–wheretheywereavailable–couldcostdollarsperminuteforallcalls(nottomentionthattheywerethesizeofbriefcasesandtheirbatteriesonlyallowedabout30minutesofconversation).29Faxmachinesprinteddocumentsonexpensiverollsofthermalpaper.30
Atthesametime,thiswasalsoaneraofrapidtechnologicalchange.Telephonenetworkswerequicklytransitioningtodigitalandcomputerizedtechnologies,especiallyinthenetworkcoreandforlong-distanceservice(thatis,foreverythingexceptthelastsegmentofthenetworkthatconnecteddirectlytoconsumers’homes).31Thecostofcallswasfallingprecipitouslyaswell,especiallyintheincreasinglycompetitivelongdistancemarket.32Andwiththegrowthofthecomputerandelectronicsmarkets,thedevicesthatcouldconnecttothenetworkwereincreasinglymoreadvanced.33
ItwastheselatterchangesthatgaverisetotheproblemsthattheTCPAwasmeanttoaddress.AsexplainedintheSenatereport,
Over the past few years, long distance telephone rates have fallen over 40 percent,thereby reducing the costs of engaging in long distance telemarketing. The costs oftelemarketing have fallen even more with the advent of automatic dialer recordedmessageplayers(ADRMPs)orautomaticdialingandannouncingdevices(ADADs).Thesemachines automatically dial a telephone number and deliver to the called party anartificial or prerecorded voice message. Certain data indicate that the machines areusedbymorethan180,000solicitorstocallmorethan7millionAmericanseveryday.
Ontheothersideoftheequation,whilethetechnologyusedbytelemarketersforplacingcallswasrapidlyadvancing,thetechnologyusedbyconsumersreceivingcallswasrelativelystagnant.Indeed,muchresidentialtelephoneserviceprovidedtodayisusingthen-state-of-the-arttechnologythatwasbeingdeployedinthelate1980s.
Importantly,initsinitial1992orderimplementingtheTCPA,theFCCconsideredalternativeapproachestomitigatingtheharmsofunwantedtelephonecalls,includingideassuchascentralizeddo-not-calldatabases,directorymarkingsindicatingtheclassesofcallersfromwhichindividualsconsentedtoreceivecallsfrom,andtechnologicalsolutionsthatcouldbeimplementedbyconsumersorwithinthetelephonenetworktogiveconsumersgreatercontroloverthecallsthattheyreceived.Alloftheseproposalswererejectedaslikelyineffectiveorbecausetheyweretechnologicallyoreconomically
252627282930313233
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infeasibleatthetime.Theseareconclusionsthatmaynolongerhold–inparticular,aswillbeseenbelow,theFCCandtelecommunicationsindustryareactivelydevelopingtechnologiestogiveconsumersmuchgreatercontroloverthetelephonecallsthattheyreceive.
ImplementationandEvolutionoftheTCPA
TheguidingprincipleoftheTCPAisthattelephonecallsmadewithautomatictelephonedialingsystemsorusingprerecordedorartificialmessagescannotbemadewithoutpriorexpressconsent.34Thisgeneralrulerequiringpriorexpressconsentissubjecttoafewstatutoryexceptions,includingthatsuchcallscanbemadeforemergencypurposesandforthepurposesofcollectionofdebtsonbehalfofthegovernment.35Evenmoreimportant,itissubjecttoimplementationandinterpretationbyFCCrulemaking:theTCPAbothdirectstheFCCtomakerulesimplementingtheActandexpresslyallowstheFCCtoexemptcertaincallsfromtheprohibitionoftheAct.36
CallerswhoviolatetheActcanbesubjecttosubstantialcivilandcriminalfines.Moreimportant,itcreatesastrictliabilityprivaterightofactionunderwhichindividualsreceivingcallsinviolationoftheActcanrecoverstatutorydamagesof$500percall.Thishasgivenrisetoacottage–butexpensive–industrybuiltaroundbringingclassactionlawsuitsoverTCPAviolations.37
Importantly,theActdrawsanumberofdistinctions.Forinstance,itaddressesallcallstocellulartelephoneservices,orothertelephoneserviceforwhichthecalledpartyischargedforthecallinsection(b)(1)(A);butitaddressescallstoresidentialtelephonestodeliveramessageasaseparatecategoryofcallsinsection(b)(1)(B).ItalsodirectstheFCCtoconsiderwhetheragivencallincludesunsolicitedadvertisementsinimplementingtheAct,andtherebydistinguishesbetweencallsmademerelytodeliverinformationalmessagesandthosemadeforcommercialpurposes.38
TheFCCfirstimplementeditsTCPArulesinits1992TCPAOrder.39Underthoserules,unsolicitedcommercialcallsgenerallycouldnotbemadetoresidentialtelephonesusingautomaticdialersorprerecordedorartificialvoiceswithoutpriorexpressconsent.40Informationalcallswerenotsubjecttothisrequirement.41Allcallsmadetocellularphones(ifthepartywasbilledforthecall)usingautomaticdialersorprerecordedorartificialvoices,however,requiredpriorexpressconsent.
Intheyearssince,boththeTCPAandtheFCC’srulesimplementingtheTCPAhavebeenmodifiedseveraltimes.42Perhapsthemostimportantdevelopmentcamein2003whenCongress,theFederalTradeCommission(FTC),andtheFCCjointlyimplementedthenationalDo-Not-Callregistry.43InimplementingtheDo-Not-Callregistry,theFTCadoptedastricterunderstandingofpriorexpressconsentthanhadpreviouslygoverned:ifanindividual’sphonenumberwasontheDo-Not-Calllist,telemarketerscouldonlycallitiftheyhadwrittenpriorexpressconsent.44Inlightofthisrequirement,theFCCfollowedsuit,amendingitsrulestoexemptfirmscallingphonenumbersontheDo-Not-CalllistfromliabilityundertheTCPAonlyiftheyhadwrittenpriorexpressconsenttomakesuchcalls.34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
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Congress,theFTC,andtheFCChaveregularlyupdatedthislegalframeworkinresponsetochangingmarketingpractices,judicialopinions,andmarketconditions.45ThemostrecentmajorFCCOrder,the2015OmnibusTCPAOrder,summarizesthecurrentstateoftheFCC’srules:
TheTCPAandtheCommission’simplementingrulesprohibit:(1)makingtelemarketingcalls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to residential telephones without priorexpressconsent;and(2)makinganynon-emergencycallusinganautomatictelephonedialingsystem(“autodialer”)oranartificialorprerecordedvoicetoawirelesstelephonenumber without prior express consent. If the call includes or introduces anadvertisementorconstitutestelemarketing,consentmustbeinwriting.Ifanautodialedorprerecordedcalltoawirelessnumberisnotforsuchpurposes,theconsentmaybeoralorwritten.46
FirstAmendmentDoctrine
TheFirstAmendmentprohibitsCongressfrommakinganylawabridgingthefreedomofspeech.47Thisdoesnot,however,prohibitanylawthatmerelyhastheeffectofabridgingspeech.Tothecontrary,thelawroutinelyabridgesspeech.Thecanonicalexampledemonstratesthepoint:thelawcanprohibit“falselyshoutingfireinatheatre.”48Wehavelawsagainstdefamation,libel,perjury;lawslimitingdisclosureoftradesecretsanddictatingthetermsofwhistleblowing;lawsgoverningtheuseandcopyingofvariousworksofauthorship;lawsgoverningwhatcanandcannotbesaidonbroadcasttelevisionandradio;lawslimitingwhen,where,andhowprotestsandotherformsofpublicspeechoccur;andmanyotherexamples.49
Instead,courtsevaluatethenatureandextentofalaw’seffectonspeechandthenweighthosefactorsagainstthelaw’spurposeandmeansofimplementation.50Themostcommondichotomyinthisframeworkisbetweenlawsthatarecontent-neutralandthosethatarecontent-based.“Content-basedlaws–thosethattargetspeechbasedonitscommunicativecontent–arepresumptivelyunconstitutionalandmaybejustifiedonlyifthegovernmentprovesthattheyarenarrowlytailoredtoservecompellingstateinterests.”51This“narrowlytailoredtoservecompellingstateinterests”standardisknownasstrictscrutiny.52Content-neutrallawsontheotherhand–generally“thosethatarejustifiedwithoutreferencetothecontentoftheregulatedspeech”53–aresubjecttoalessintenseintermediatescrutinyrequiringthattherestrictionsonspeechbenarrowlytailoredtoservesomeimportantorsubstantialgovernmentinterest.54Commercialspeechhashistoricallybeenevaluatedunderathirdanalyticalframework,albeitonethatissimilartotheintermediatescrutinystandard,but–thoughtheCourt’srecentcasescalltheongoingvitalityofthisso-calledcommercialspeechdoctrineintoquestion.55
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Underthetraditionalapproach,courtshavegenerallyevaluatedlawsregulatingcommercialspeechusingthefour-partCentralHudsontest.56Thepremiseofthistest,andtheconstitutionaljustificationforregulatingcommercialspeechingeneral,isthatsuchspeechismorecloselyakintoeconomicactivitythanitistosubstantivespeech.57Thegovernmenthasbroadauthoritytoregulateeconomicactivity,andso–thetheorygoes–ithasgreaterauthorityovercommercialspeechthanoverotherformsofspeech.UndertheCentralHudsontest,courtslooktofourcriteria:1)whetherthespeechismisleadingorrelatedtounlawfulactivity,2)whethertherestrictionservesasubstantialgovernmentinterest,3)whethertherestrictiondirectlyadvancesthatinterest,and4)whethertheregulationismoreextensivethannecessarytoadvancethegovernmentinterest.58Althoughthistestisrelativelyforgivingofgovernmentregulationofspeech,courtsnonethelessregularlyfindthatgovernmentregulationofcommercialspeechviolatestheFirstAmendment.
Content-neutralregulationofnon-commercialspeechisevaluatedunderanintermediatescrutinystandard.59Thisstandard,whichissimilartotheCentralHudsontest,60ismostcommonlyappliedto“time,place,andmanner”restrictionsonspeech.Itrequiresthatsuchrestrictionsare“justifiedwithoutreferencetothecontentoftheregulatedspeech,”thattheyare“narrowlytailoredtoserveasignificantgovernmentalinterest,andthattheyleaveopenamplealternativechannelsforcommunicationoftheinformation.”61ThekeyfactorsunderboththeCentralHudsontestandintermediatescrutinyarewhethertheregulationinquestionservesasignificantgovernmentinterestandwhetheritisnarrowlytailoredtoaccomplishthatgoal.
ThehighestformofFirstAmendmentscrutiny,strictscrutiny,isreservedforcontent-basedregulationofspeech.62Alawthattreatsspeakersdifferentlybaseduponthemessagebeingconveyedwillgenerallytriggerstrictscrutiny.Underthisstandardofreview,alawmustbe“narrowlytailoredtofurtheracompellinggovernmentinterest,”63in“theleastrestrictivemeanstofurtherthearticulatedinterest.”64Thisstandardishardertomeetthanthatofintermediatescrutinyorappliedtocommercialspeech.65Acompellinggovernmentinterestis“aninterestofthehighestorder,”onethatismoresubstantialthanmerelyasignificantinterest.66Becausetheregulatoryrestrictionmustbeimplementedusingtheleastrestrictivemeans,itisnotsufficientmerelytoleaveopenamplealternativechannelsforcommunication:theregulationmustimplementthechannelofcommunicationthatisleastrestrictiveofspeechfromamonganyalternatives.
(TheapplicationofstrictscrutinytolawsthatdifferentiatebaseduponthecontentofmessagesexplainstheimportanceoftheCentralHudsontest:iftheCourtinCentralHudsonhadnotdecidedthatregulationofcommercialspeechismoreakintoeconomicregulationthantospeechregulation,regulationofcommercialspeechwouldnecessarilybecontent-based.Thiswouldbringawiderangeofspeechregulationundertheumbrellaofstrictscrutiny–likelyleadingmuchofittobeinginvalidated.)
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Oneofwaysinwhichwethinkaboutwhetheralawisnarrowlytailoredistoconsiderwhetheritisunder-orover-inclusive.Underinclusiveregulations,thosewhichleave“appreciabledamageto[thegovernment’s]interestunprohibited,”67areparticularlysuspect,because“alawcannotberegardedasprotectinganinterestofthehighestorder,andthusasjustifyingarestrictionupontruthfulspeech,whenitleavesappreciabledamagetothatsupposedlyvitalinterestunprohibited.”68Norcantherestrictionbeoverinclusive,meaningthatitcannot“unnecessarilycircumscribeprotectedexpression.”69AsexplainedbytheSupremeCourt,“Itiswellestablishedthat,asageneralrule,theGovernmentmaynotsuppresslawfulspeechasthemeanstosuppressunlawfulspeech.”70
TheTCPAandtheFirstAmendment:TheEarlyCases
[[[ThissectiondiscussescanonicalpriorFirstAmendmentanalysisoftheTCPA,includingthatofferedinthelegislativehistory,theFCC’s1992TCPAOrder,andbythe8thand9thCircuits(VanBergenv.Minnesota,59F.3d1541(8thCir.1995);MissouriExRel.Nixonv.AmericanBlastFax,Inc.,196F.Supp.2d920(E.D.Mo.2002);Moserv.FCC,46F.3d970(9thCir.1995);Gomezv.Campbell-EwaldCo.,768F.3d871,876(9thCir.2014),aff’donothergrounds,136S.Ct.663,672(2016)).]]]
II. HowtheTimeshaveChanged
TheTCPAwaswrittenintheeraofanalogtechnologyandlandlinetelephones;itwaswrittentoaddressproblemsofphonecallsdisruptingfamilydinnersandfillinguptapesonansweringmachines;itwaswrittentoprovidebasicrulesoftheroadforanewformofcommunicationthatwasprovingproblematic.Notevenalawrevieweditorwoulddemandacitationforthepropositionthatthingshavechangedagreatdealsince1991.AnumberofthesechangesareimportanttoamodernunderstandingoftheconstitutionalityoftheTCPA.
Theproblemhaschanged
AtthetimetheTCPAwasadopted,theFCCreceivedmorethan2,300complaintsabouttelemarketingcallsperyear.71Today,robocallsarethemostcommonsubjectofconsumercomplaintsreceivedbytheFCCortheFTC.Morethan200,000ofthe475,000complaintsthattheFCCreceivedin2016wereaboutrobocalls.72TheFTCmaintainstheDo-Not-Callregistry,soitreceivesalargerportionofcomplaintsaboutrobocalls:morethan5millioncomplaintsin2016.73Thesecomplaintsreflectjustasmallportionoftheproblem,withover2.4billioncallsinviolationoftheTCPAandDo-Not-Callregistryestimatedmadepermonth.
Moreimportantthantheincreaseinvolumeofcalls,thenatureofthecallsthatgeneratethesecomplaintshaschangedsubstantiallyoverthepastdecades.WhentheTCPAwasenacted,itwasinresponsetotheadventofautodialersandpre-recordedmessages.Whenthesetechnologiesappeared,therewerenonormsgoverninghowtheyshouldbeused,nolawstoenforcethosenorms,andindeednorecognitionthattheywerepeculiarlyproblematicforconsumers.Rather,theywereanextensionofpreexistingtelemarketingorinformationalcallingcampaigns:ratherthanpaying100peopletomake1,000callsinanhour,amachinecouldbeusedtomake10,000callsinthesameamountoftime.Itwas67 68 69 70 71 7273
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merelyacheaper,moreefficientwayofreachingpeopleonthephone.Indeed,thiswascentraltothetechnology’seffectiveness:becausepeoplewereunaccustomedtoreceivingmanycallsintheevening,theyroutinelyansweredwhatevercallstheyreceived.Thismadethesecallsbothparticularlyeffectiveandalsoparticularlyproblematic:theyworkedbecausetheycouldtakeadvantageofpeople’strustthatwhenthephonerangtherewassomeoneontheotherendwhotheywantedtotalkto.
Intheyearssince,largelyinresponsetotheTCPAaswellaswiththeadventoftheDo-Not-CallregistryandtechnologieslikeCaller-ID,clearframeworkshavedevelopedtoguidethelegitimateuseofautodialersandpre-recordedmessages.Manyfirms–especiallythoseseekingtodolegitimatebusinesswithwillingcustomers–trytofollowtheseframeworks.Thereareplentyoflegitimateusesforthesetechnologies,suchassendingouttextmessagesremindingpeopleaboutprescriptionsorbillpayments,makingiteasyforindividualstorequestthatinformationorcommercialopportunitiesbesenttothem,orfacilitatingtheuseofefficientdialingtechnologieswhentryingtocontactcustomers.74
Therehavebeenanumberofshockingexamplesofpro-consumersbusinesspracticesthathavebeencaughtinthenetofTCPAliabilityinrecentyears.Onecommonclassofexamplesiscapturedbysuitsagainstsportsvenuesthatallowspectatorstosendatextmessagethatmayappearonthevenue’s“jumbotron.”AnumberofvenueshavefacedsignificantTCPAliabilitybecausetheywouldsendtextsbacktothespectatortoconfirmingreceiptoftheinitialmessage,inviolationoftheTCPA’srequirementthatcommunicationstowirelessphoneshaveexpresspriorwrittenconsent.75Moregenerally,thesendingautomatictextmessagestoconfirmreceiptofamessagehasregularlytriggeredTCPAliability.76
Asanotherexample,pharmacieshavefacedTCPAliabilityforsendingpatientsreminderstorefilltheirprescriptions–remindersthatcanliterallybelife-saving.77AndcooperativecommunitybankshavebeenfoundliableundertheTCPAforcallingtheirmember-customers–asco-ops,suchbanksareeffectivelybeingsuedbythemselvesforattemptingtocallthemselves.
TheTCPAcanforecloseentirecategoriesofpro-consumerbusinesses,mostnotablyanybusinessmodelbuiltaroundcoordinatingservicesviatextmessage.Forinstance,servicesthatmatchconsumerswithhome-servicescontractors(e.g.,lawcare,plumbers,&c),easilyfaceTCPAliability.78Thisisparticularlytroublingfortworeasons.First,suchserviceswouldbeperfectlylegaliftheyusednon-telephonetechnologies–suchase-mail,InstanceMessagingapps,orproprietarysmartphoneapps–tosendtheirmessages.And,second,thistheTCPAdisproportionatelydisadvantagesthosewhoareunfamiliarwith,ordonothaveaccessto,suchtechnologies.Putbluntly,thismakesitharderforthepoorandelderly–whoarelesslikelytohaveaccesstoortobecomfortablewithsuchtechnologies,butwholikelydohaveacellphonewithtext-messagingcapabilities–toavailthemselvesof“sharingeconomy”-styleservices.
Suchexamplesmayseemtrivialtosome,especiallywhencomparedtooverwhelmingdisapprovalofrobocalls.ButmostConstitutionally-protectedspeechismundane–mostspeechisnotthePentagonPapersorunpopularpoliticalspeech.ButthequestionoftheFirstAmendmentisnotwhetherspeechisgoodenoughtowarrantprotection.Quitethecontrary,acorefunctionoftheFirstAmendmentispreciselytokeepthegovernmentoutofdeterminingwhatspeechis“good”–thatis,whatspeechispermissibleormeritsprotection.Rather,theinquiryiswhethercertaintypesofspeecharesoproblematicthattheybearexceptiontothegeneralrulethatallspeechisprotected,nomatterhowtrivialorunmeritoriousitmayseem.
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Ofcoursenoteveryoneusingautodialersisengagedin“good”(or“notbad”)speech.Somebad-faithcallersengageinscams,tryingtotrickunsuspectingindividualsintogivingupsensitivepersonalorfinancialinformation.Othersuseautodialersto“harvest”phonenumbersforindividualswhoarelikelytoanswertheirphones,sothattheycanbecontactedlater(typicallybyascamartist)orhavetheirnumberssold.79Stillotherrecentscamshaveattemptedtotrickthecalledpartyintosayingwordsorphrasesthatcanthenbeusedforidentityorfinancialfraud.80Thesecallsfrequentlyusetechnologiesthatallowthemto“spoof”Caller-ID,tohidetheirillegitimateidentityortomakeitlookliketheyarecomingfromalegitimatephonenumber.81Andmanyofthesecallsaremadeby“leadgeneration”firmsthatplacecallsonbehalfofthirdparties,usingcall-forwardingtoredirectpositiveleadstoaliveoperatoratthecontractingfirm.82
Thesemodernusesofautodialersarefundamentallydifferentfromtheirusebylegitimatebusinesses.Asaninitialmatter,legitimatebusinesseshavereputationalconcernsandwanttomaintainpositiverelationshipswiththeir(prospectiveand,especially,existing)customers.Thosemakingillegitimateusesofautodialersgenerallydonothavetheseconcerns:theyareengagedinscamsorarefacelessmiddlemen.Theyhavenoreputationtolosebecausetheyhavenoidentity:theyusefakephonenumbersthatprovidenoidentifyinginformationintheircalls.Thismakesisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,forindividualsorlawenforcementtotakeactionagainstthesecallers.
Reassignmentoftelephonenumbers,andofwirelessphonenumbersinparticular,isanotherrelativelyrecentbutchallengingproblem.AtthetimeoftheTCPA’senactment,therewereroughly130millionassignedphonenumbersintheUnitedStates,roughly0.5numbersperpersoninthecountry.Todaythereareover460millionnumbersinservice,orabout1.5numbersperpersoninthecountry.Thisincreasehasputadramaticstrainonthesupplyofphonenumbers.Thevastmajorityofthesenewnumbershavebeenassignedtowirelessphones–andtheyarebeingassignedataratefarinexcessofthatatwhichnew(unused)numbersarebeingreleased.83Asaresult,over37millionwirelesstelephonesarereportedtoreceivereassignednumberseveryyear.84
NumberreassignmentisdifficultfortheTCPAbecauseconsenttobecalleddoesnottransferwiththetelephonenumberandcallershavenowayofknowingwhetheragivenphonenumberhasbeenreassigned.Everycallthatacallermakes,therefore,ispotentiallytoanumberthathasbeenreassignedtoanon-consentingparty,andthereforemighttechnicallyviolatetheTCPA.TheFCCaddressedthisissueinits2015TCPAOrderbycreatingasingle-callsafeharbor:ifacallingpartydoesnotreceiveaffirmativeconsentuponmakingacall,itwillnotfaceTCPAliabilityforthecallbutmustassumethatthenumberhasbeenreassignedanddiscontinuecallingitinthefuture.85InadditiontotheFirstAmendmentconsiderationsconsideredbelow,86thisapproachtoreassignednumbersisunderreviewbytheDCCircuitCourtofAppeals,87andunderfurtherconsiderationbytheFCC.88
Thetechnologyhaschanged
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ThereisperhapsnoadverbintheEnglishlanguagetoadequatelycapturehowdramaticallythetechnologyofphonecallshaschangedsince1991.TheFCCrulesallowingtelephonecarrierstoprovideCaller-IDservicestocustomerswerenotadopteduntil1995.OneofthemajorconcernsanimatingtheTCPAwasautodialedphonecallswouldn’trecognizewhenacallwasansweredbyanansweringmachinesowouldfillentireansweringmachinetapes.Itistrivialforautodialerstodaytodeterminewhenahumanisn’tontheotherendofacall;and,ofcourse,theuseofansweringmachinesoraudiocassettestorecordmessageshaslargelybeendisplacedbycentrally-storedvoicemailservices.
Fromtheconsumerperspective,thebiggestchangeis,ofcourse,theriseofthecellphone.In1991cellphoneswereexceptionallyrare–andexpensive.89Typically,consumersconnectedtothetelephonenetworkviaasingletelephonelineconnectedtotheirhouse,whichwouldinturnbeconnectedtoanumberofwiredtelephones.90Thatlinewassharedbetweenthehouse,andanyphonecallwouldcauseeachofthosetelephonestoring.Today,therearemorecellphonesinserviceintheUnitedStatesthantherearecitizens.Phonesareremarkablyinexpensive–iftheyarenotincludedinaserviceplanforfree,basicphonesareavailablefortensofdollars,andtherearefederalsubsidyprogramsavailabletomakesurethatlow-incomeindividualshaveaccesstothem.91Thecostofserviceisalsomuchlower.Intheearly1990s,callscouldcostdollarsperminute;todayeveryserviceplancurrentlyfeaturedinadvertisingbyeachofthemajorwirelesscarriersincludesunlimitedvoiceandtextservice.92Andeventhemostbasicofcellphonestodayismorefeature-richthanthemostadvancedtelephonesin1991,featuringCaller-IDdisplays,programmablering-tones,easyvolumecontrolsandmutecapabilities,andtheabilitytoseamlesslyignoreunwantedcallsorsendthemtovoicemail.
Lessvisibletoconsumersarethemyriadchangestotheunderlyingtelephonenetwork–and,also,thesurprisinglackofchanges.In1991thetelephonenetworkwasstilllargelyanalog,especiallyinthelast-mileconnectionstoindividualtelephones.Eventhepartsofthenetworkthatweredigitalhadlimitedcapabilities.FeatureslikeCaller-ID,call-forwarding,speed-dialing,andotherswerestillrelativelynew.Today,thetelephonenetworkisalmostentirelydigital,andhasfarmoresophisticatedcapabilitiesthanwerepossibleorevenconceivableintheearly1990s.Theseadvances,however,shouldnotbeoverstated:thetelephonesystemiscomplex,theindustryconservative,andthenetworksubjecttohighlyossifiedregulation.Muchoftheunderlyingtechnology–thebasicprotocolsthatcontrolhowtelephoneswitchescommunicateandhowphonecallsarerouted,forinstance–arestillbasedonsystemsdevelopedinthe1980s.93Ontheregulatoryfront,thereisactivediscussionattheFCCtodayoverwhethertelephonecarriersshouldbeallowedtoblockcallsfromcallersthatareknowntobefraudulentlyusingspoofedCaller-IDinformation.
Letthatsinkinforamoment:theFCCcurrentlyprohibitstelephonecompaniesfromblockingcallsthatareclearlyfraudulent–theverycallsthatmakeupmostoftherobocallcomplaintsthattheFCCandFTCreceive.That’sakintotheUSDArequiringsupermarketstosellproducethatisknowntohavelisteriainit,ortheCPSCrequiringstorestocontinuesellingproductswithknowndefects.Ratherthanrequiretelephonecarrierstotakeactionagainsttheseknownharms,theFCChasinsteadclungdearlytoitsvisionoftelephonecarriersascommoncarriers–passiveconduitsthroughwhichphonecallsflowbetweenactivecallparticipants.Ratherthanallow(letalonerequire)thesecarrierstoimplementsolutionsthatcouldaddressthevastmajorityoftherobocallproblem,theFCChasinsteadplaceda
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complexcomplianceburdenoncallingpartiesandthesubstantialburdenofdealingwithnon-complaintcallsonindividuals.
Thelawhaschanged
Thelastsetofchanges,thosetothelaw,aremorerecent.ThebasiccontoursofFirstAmendmentlawdescribedinPartI–commercialspeechandcontent-neutralspeechregulationbeingsubjecttoroughlyidenticalformsofintermediatescrutinyandcontent-basedspeechregulationbeingsubjecttostrictscrutiny–describethefreespeechlawthatmostlawstudentshavelearnedsincetheTCPAwasadopted.ButinrecentyearstheSupremeCourthasredefinedthesecontours,clarifyingitsunderstandingofthedistinctionbetweencontent-basedandcontent-neutralspeechinwaysthatsuggestsboththatmuchspeechregulationthathaspreviouslybeenthoughtofascontent-neutralisactuallycontent-based,andthatregulationofcommercialspeechmayalsobecontent-basedregulationsubjecttostrictscrutiny.
Thepurposeofthediscussionthatfollowsisnottoadvocatefor,ortotrytoadvanceunderstandingof,theserecentcases.Thereisextensivediscussionofthesecases’meaningandhowdoctrineinthisareawillcontinuetoevolve.94Rather,thegoalhereistoapplythesecasesastheyarenaturallyread,andaslowercourtshavebeguntoapplytheminthecontextoftheTCPA.Generally,thesecases(mostnotablyReed)havecalledintoquestionthelowerprotectionaffordedtocommercialspeech.95ButasJusticeKagannotesinherconcurrenceinReed,theCourt’sapproachisconcerninglybroadandthreatenstobringvastswathsofspeechregulationundertheauspicesofstrictscrutiny.96Eveniftheargumentarticulatedbelow,thatpost-ReedtheTCPAneedstobescrutinizedstrictly,fails,thisarticle’sanalysisoftheTCPA’ssubstantiveproblemsremainsvalidunderlessprobingstandardsofreview.
ThemostrecentoftheCourt’sspeechopinions,Reedv.TownofGilbert,hasraisedparticularquestionsthatarerelevantinthecontextoftheTCPA.AsdiscussedinPartIII,inthepastyearsomelowercourtshaveinterpretedReedtosubjecttheTCPAandstate-levelequivalentsoftheTCPAtostrictscrutiny.Others,includingMcCullenv.CoakleyandSorrellv.IMSHealth,reflectongoingdevelopmentoftheCourt’sunderstandingofthedistinctionbetweencontent-neutralandcontent-basedregulation.Thesecasessuggesttwojurisprudentialshifts:first,thatmuchspeechregulationthathaspreviouslybeenthoughtofascontent-neutralisactuallycontent-based;andsecond,thatregulationofcommercialspeechmayalsobecontent-basedregulationsubjecttostrictscrutiny.
InReed,theSupremeCourtinvalidatedGilbert,Arizona’sSignCode–alawenactedtoregulatethesizeandplacementofsigns.Thecentralquestioninthiscasewaswhetherthisstatutewascontent-basedorcontent-neutral.TheCourtheldthatitwascontent-based,andinsodoingitrestatedthedefiningcharacteristicsofcontent-basedregulationinawaythatarguablyredrewthelinebetweencontent-neutralandcontent-basedregulations.Writingforthemajority,JusticeThomasexplains:
Governmentregulationofspeechiscontentbasedifalawappliestoparticularspeechbecause of the topic discussed or the idea ormessage expressed. This commonsensemeaning of the phrase “content based” requires a court to consider whether aregulationof speech “on its face”drawsdistinctionsbasedon themessagea speakerconveys. Some facial distinctions based on amessage are obvious, defining regulatedspeech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated
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speechbyitsfunctionorpurpose.Botharedistinctionsdrawnbasedonthemessageaspeakerconveys,and,therefore,aresubjecttostrictscrutiny.97
ThisframingshiftstheCourt’sfocusbyemphasizingthataregulationisnecessarilycontent-basedifitdrawsdistinctionsbasedonthemessageaspeakerconveys.Previously,somecourtshadfocusedonwhetherthepurposeoreffectoftheregulationwascontent-based,suchthatevenastatutethatmadecontent-baseddistinctionsonitsfacecouldbedeemedcontent-neutralifthosedistinctionswereincidentaltoacontent-neutralpurpose.TheReedcourtexpresslyrejectedthisview.98OtherCourtshadinterpretedpriorcases“assuggestingthatagovernment’spurposeisrelevantevenwhenalawiscontentbasedonitsface.Thatisincorrect.”99Instead,Reedrecasttheinquiryasonecomprisingtwosteps:ifastatuteorregulationisfaciallycontent-based,thatendstheinquiry;ifitisnot,thencourtsinquiremoredeeplyintoitspurposeandeffectstocharacterizewhetheritiscontent-neutralorcontent-based.100
Asdiscussedbelow,ReedhasbeenusedinrecentlitigationchallengingtheTCPAandrelatedstatutes.FollowingReed’sinstructionthatastatutethatonitsfacemakescontent-baseddistinctionsisnecessarilycontent-basedandisthereforesubjecttostrictscrutiny,thesecourtshavebrokenfrompastcasesthathavetreatedtheTCPAascontent-neutral.101
ItisimportanttorecognizethatReedisontheleadingedgeofrecentdevelopmentsinanotoriouslytrickyareaoflaw–itsfullmeaningandtheextenttowhichitbringsspeechwithintheambitofstrictscrutinyandtowhichcommercialspeechremainssubjecttomoreforgivinganalysisarethesubjectofextensiveongoingscholarlydebate.102McCullen,forinstance,alsoarecentcase,remindsusthat“afaciallyneutrallawdoesnotbecomecontentbasesimplybecauseitmaydisproportionatelyaffectspeechoncertaintopics.”103Itisunclearhowtoevaluatesuchastatutewheredisproportionateeffectsareclearonthefaceofthestatute–or,tostatethemattermoreconfoundingly,itisunclearwhat“facial”means.Reed,forinstance,suggeststhatstrictscrutinywillapplyinsuchcasesif“thelegislature’sspeakerpreferencereflectsacontentpreference,”whichsuggeststhatcontentpreferencesmaybefoundbaseduponimpliedCongressionalintent.104Suchinferenceseemsafarcryfromafacialcontentpreference.Ontheotherhand,McCullentempersanalysisintheotherdirection,explainingthat“aregulationthatservespurposesunrelatedtothecontentofexpressionisdeemedneutral,evenifithasanincidentaleffectonsomespeakersormessagesbutnotothers.”105Thissuggeststhatacentralquestionindecidingwhetherastatuteorregulationthathasdisproportionateeffectoncertaintopicsiswhethersucheffectswheretrulyincidentalto,orwereactuallyanobjectof,thelegislativeorregulatorydesign.
QuestionssuchasthisareimportantforevaluatingtheTCPAandthereFCC’simplementingrules.Asdiscussedbelow,106theTCPAdisproportionatelyeffectscertainspeechoncertaintypesofissues.WhetherthisisincidentaltoCongress’sdisapprobationofcallsplacedusingautodialersorprerecordedmessages,orratherdisapprobationofspeechonsuchissuesisthereasonforCongress’sregulationof
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autodialersandprerecordedmessages,isimportanttounderstandingwhethertheTCPAisbestunderstoodascontent-neutralorcontent-based.
III. RecentFirstAmendmentAnalysesoftheTCPA
InrecentyearsFirstAmendmentchallengestotheTCPAhavebeenreinvigorated.ThisisinpartoutofconcernarisingfromthesubstantialincreaseinTCPAclassactionsinrecentyears;itisinpartduetorecentchangesintheCommission’ssubstantiveTCPArulesandthechangedfactualsettingsurroundingtheuseofautomatictelephonedialers;anditisinpartduetochangesinFirstAmendmentcaselaw.Thesecondandthirdfactorsarediscussedbelow.
ThehighestprofilechallengetotheFCC’sTCPArulesisACAInternationalv.FCC.107Thiscase,whichiscurrentlypendingintheDCCircuitCourtofAppeals,challengestheFCC’s2015TCPAOmnibusOrderonawiderangeofgrounds.ThiscaseincludesaFirstAmendmentchallengetotheFCC’sOrder–howeveritisoneofmanyissuesinthecaseandisframedinrelativelynarrowterms.108Thefocusofthischallengeisonthemeaningof“calledparty”inthecontextoftheCommission’srulesrelatingtocallsplacedtoreassignedwirelessnumbers.Asdiscussedbelow,thisargumentisreasonablystrong:ifpetitionersdonotobtaintheirrequestedreliefonothergrounds,theargumentsbelowsuggestthatcourtislikelysidewiththemonthisFirstAmendmentissue.Thereare,however,awiderangeofotherpotentialFirstAmendmentchallengestotheTCPA–bothtotheTCPAasimplementedinFCCrulesandtofaciallytotheTCPAitself.
ThemoresubstantialFirstAmendmentchallenges,however,followfromReed.AsexplainedbytheFourthCircuitinCahalyv.Larosa,acaseconsideringSouthCarolina’sstateequivalentoftheTCPA:
In Reed, the [Supreme] Court explained that "the crucial first step in the content-neutralityanalysis"isto"determin[e]whetherthelawiscontentneutralonitsface."…This formulation conflictswith, and therefore abrogates, our previous descriptions ofcontent neutrality . … Our earlier cases held that, when conducting the content-neutrality inquiry, "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling consideration." ButReedhasmadeclearthat,atthefirststep,thegovernment'sjustificationorpurposeinenactingthelawisirrelevant.
ApplyingReed’sfirststep,wefindthatSouthCarolina'santi-robocallstatuteiscontentbased because it makes content distinctions on its face. Reed instructs that“[g]overnmentregulationofspeechiscontentbasedifalawappliestoparticularspeechbecause of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Here, the anti-robocallstatuteappliestocallswithaconsumerorpoliticalmessagebutdoesnotreachcallsmadeforanyotherpurpose.109
BasedonReed,theFourthCircuitfoundthattheSouthCarolinaTCPA-equivalentstatuteissubjecttostrictscrutiny.Itthenwentontoinvalidatethestatute,findingthat(assumingthegovernmentdoeshaveacompellinginterestinregulatingunsolicitedcallsatall)thestatute’sapproachisnottheleastrestrictivemeansofaccomplishingthegovernment’spurpose,thatthestatuteisover-inclusive(burdeningnon-problematicspeechinadditiontoproblematicspeech)andunder-inclusive(failingtoaddresssubstantialamountsofproblematicspeechwithintheambitofthestatute).
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ItisimportantnottoreadcasessuchasCahalytoobroadly,astheyareaddressingstate-equivalentsoftheTCPA,whichoftenhaveimportantdifferencesfromthefederalTCPA.110Forinstance,Cahalyrelatedtopoliticalmessages,whichbyandlargearenotproblematicunderthefederalTCPA.Moreover,Cahalywasdecidedonarecordinwhichthegovernmentdidnotpresentcontraryargumentstodemonstratethatthestatuteinquestionwas,infact,theleastrestrictivemeanstoaddressingtheinterestatissue.
Post-ReedcaseschallengingthefederalTCPA,are,however,beginning.Forinstance,FacebookhasrecentlyraisedaFirstAmendmentdefensebasedonReedinaseriesofNinthCircuitcases.Inthesecases,FacebookisfacingTCPAviolationsrelatingtotextmessagesitsentoutasbirthdatereminderstoitsusers.Inoneofthesecases,Brickmanv.Facebook,FacebookmovedtodismissthecaseonthegroundsthattheTCPAviolatestheFirstAmendment.111Inamovethatsurprisednearlyeveryone,theDistrictCourtappliedReedandfoundthattheTCPAissubjecttostrictscrutiny,butalsofoundthatthestatutesurvivessuchanalysis.Inhisopinion,theJudgeconsideredthesameargumentsmadeinCahaly–thatthestatutewasnottheleastrestrictivemeanstoaccomplishingitsgoals,andwasbothover-andunder-inclusive–andreachedtheoppositeconclusion.112TheJudge,however,hasrecentlycertifiedFacebook’smotionforinterlocutoryappealonthequestionofwhethertheTCPAsurvivesstrictscrutinytotheNinthCircuit.113
Afinalpost-Reedcasebearsdiscussion:Mejiav.TimeWarnerCable,whichiscurrentlypendingintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.Thisisaclassactionfiledin2015byformerTimeWarnerCablecustomers.ThesecustomersallegethatTimeWarnerCablerepeatedlycalledthemusingautomatictelephonedialersaftertheycancelledtheircableserviceinanattempttogetthemtoresumethatservice.Inlate2016TimeWarnerCablemovedforsummaryjudgementontheproceedings,arguingthatpost-ReedtheTCPAisfaciallyunconstitutional.114TheDepartmentofJusticehassinceenteredthiscaseasanintervenorandbriefingisongoing.115
BetweentheFacebookandTimeWarnerCablelitigation,therearenowtwocurrentlypendingchallengestotheTCPAintwoseparateCircuits.116Bothofthesecasesarebasedonthesamebasicarguments.First,post-ReedtheTCPAissubjecttostrictscrutinybecauseittreatsdifferenttypesofcallsandcallersdifferently.Inbothcases,thisargumentspecificallyhighlightsthemostrecentCongressionalamendmentstotheTCPA,2015changesthatexemptcallsrelatingtothecollectionofgovernment-backeddebtsfromtheTCPA.117ButbothalsocitetotheFCC’sabilitytoexemptadditionalcallsandcallersfromcoverageoftheActasdemonstratingthattheActiscontent-basedunderReed.Inbothcases,thepartiesthenarguethattheTCPAfailsstrictscrutinyonthreegrounds:thatitdoesnotadopttheleastrestrictivemeanstoaccomplishthegoalofprohibitingunwantedcallsandthattheapproachthatitdoestakeisbothover-andunder-inclusive.118Inmakingthesearguments,bothFacebookandTimeWarnerCablebothfocuslargelyonthe2015amendments.Forinstance,botharguethattheprivacyconcernsthatmakeuptheTCPA’scorepurposeareimplicatedjustasmuchbygovernmentdebt-collectioncallsasbyothercalls,suchthatbyexemptingthosecallsthestatuteisnecessarilyunder-
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inclusive.119TheyalsoarguethattherearelessrestrictivemeanstoaccomplishingtheTCPA’spurpose–bothasamatterofhowtheActisstructuredandastotheneedtoexemptsometypesofcallsorcallersfromitsscope–suchthattheactundulyandover-inclusivelyburdensprotectedspeech.120
IV. ANewFirstAmendmentAnalysisoftheTCPA
TherecentcasesdiscussedinPartIIIthatchallengetheTCPAonFirstAmendmentgroundsdemonstratesomeofthecontemporaryFirstAmendmentconcernsabouttheAct.Untilrecently,itwasgenerallyunderstoodthattheTCPAwascontent-neutralregulationofprimarilycommercialspeechandthatitwasapermissiblemeanstotheimportantendofprotectingconsumersfromprivacy-invadingphonecalls.Butaslawandtechnologyhavecontinuedtoevolve,andastheFCChasworkedtoadaptalawwrittentoaddressaproblemdefinedintermsof1980s-eratechnologytothemodernsetting,thisacceptedwisdomisincreasinglysuspect.
RecentcaseslikeFacebookandTimeWarnerCablehavecalledthisconventionalwisdomintoquestionthroughsurprisinglyconventionalmeans.TheplaintiffsinFacebookandTimeWarnerCablesuccessfullyarguedthattheTCPA’sexemptionforcollectorsofgovernment-backeddebtwasacontent-baseddistinction.TheplaintiffsinCahelydidthesamethingusingexemptionsfromstateTCPA-equivalentsforpoliticalcalls.NeitherchallengedtheoverallstructureoftheTCPA,butinbothcasesthecontent-basedexceptionstothatbasicstructurewereenoughtobringstrictscrutinytobear.
ButtheTCPA’sFirstAmendmentinfirmitiesrunmuchdeeperthantheseargumentssuggest.TheActandtheFCC’simplementingrulesarefundamentallystructuredaroundanentireseriesofcontent-baseddistinctions.Moreover,astechnologyhaschanged,theprivacyintereststhatinitiallyjustifiedtheActhaveallbutvanished;today,theAct’sprimarypurposeistodisadvantagedisfavoredspeech.TotheextentthattheActdoescontinuetopromotealegitimategovernmentinterestitdoessopoorly,dramaticallyburdeningdesiredspeechinalaughablyineffectiveattempttoreigninthemodernplightofillegitimaterobocalls.Finally,advancesintelecommunicationstechnologysincetheadoptionoftheTCPAhaveproducednumeroustoolsthatarelessrestrictivemeansofaddressingtheproblemstheTCPAwasmeanttoaddress–thegreatestimpedimenttoadoptionofthesetechnologiesisthegovernmentitself.
TheTCPAmakescontent-baseddistinctionsthatmaysubjectittostrictscrutiny
The9thand8thCircuitsfoundthattheTCPAsurvivedunderCentralHudson’sintermediate-scrutinystyletestinMoser,VanBuren,andMissouriexrelNixon.121ThesearecanonicalamongthecasesatthefoundationofthemodernunderstandingoftheTCPAaspermissibleregulationofcommercialspeech.Infact,neithercircuitevenquestionedthatthiswasthecorrectapproach:theMosercourtacceptedtheDistrictcourt’sdeterminationthatthestatuteshouldbeanalyzedunderCentralHudson,andthepartiesstipulatedtothisapproachinMissouriexrelNixon.122Todayitseemslikelythatthesecasesgotitwrong–thattheTCPA’scontent-baseddistinctionssubjectittostrictscrutiny.123
MorerecentSupremeCourtprecedentsuggeststhattheTCPAandFCCrulesarecontentbased.Arguably,Mosersayssoitself.There,theCircuitCourtreliedontheDistrictCourt’sdeterminationthat
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theTCPAshouldbeevaluatedunderCentralHudson–buttheDistrictCourtreachedthisconclusionfollowinglogicthatisclearlyincorrecttoday.124Specifically,theDistrictCourtstartsby“conclud[ing]thattheTCPAisacontent-basedregulation,andcannotbejustifiedasalegitimatetime,placeormannerrestrictiononprotectedspeech.”UnderReed,thatendsthematter,buttheCourtgoesontoevaluatethegovernment’spurpose,findingthatitdoesn’tintendtoregulatethecontentoftheexpression–onlythemannerinwhichthatcontentisexpressed.ButasReedexplains,theidea“thatagovernment’spurposeisrelevantevenwhenalawiscontentbasedonitsface[]isincorrect.”125
TheTCPAandFCCrulesmakeanumberofdistinctions,manyofwhicharebestcharacterizedascontentbased–somefacially,othersasaresultoftheregulation’sdisproportionateeffect.Theydistinguishbetweencallsthatuseautodialiersorprerecordedmessagesandthosethatuseahumanhandandvoice.Theydistinguishbetweencommercialandnon-commercialcalls.Theydistinguishbetweencallsmadetowirelessandresidentialwirelinetelephones.Theydrawdistinctionsbetweencallsmadewithandwithoutpriorexpressconsent,andbetweendifferentformsofexpressingthatconsent.AndtheFCC’s2015Orderdistinguishesbetweencallsmade(onlytowirelessphones)tonumbersthathavebeenreassignedandthosethathavenot.
DistinctionssuchasthesedemonstratethesoundnessoftherecenttrendofsubjectingtheTCPAtostrictscrutiny.Inpart,theylendfurthersupporttothisconclusionunderReed.Buttheyalsorevealthat,astelephonetechnologyhaschanged–particularlyasthewirelessphonehasascendedtobecomemostindividuals’primarytelephone–theimpactoftheTCPAhasbecomemoresubstantialandlessevenlydistributed(thatis,neutral)atthesametimeastheprivacyconcernsjustifyingtheTCPAhaveincreasinglydiminished.
Forinstance,abanonautodialersasameansofcommunicationdisparatelyaffectscertainkindsofinformationandisthereforeeffectivelycontent-based.Whileautodialersandpre-recordedorartificial-voicemessagescancertainlybeusedinproblematicways,therearesometypesofmessagesthatarebetterconveyedusingthesetechnologiesthanmanually-dialedor(especially)liveoperatorengagement.Informationalandtransactionalcalls,especiallythoserelatingtopersonalfinancialorhealthinformation,maybebettermadeusingartificially-generatedvoices–indeed,suchtechnologiessubstantiallyreducetheprivacyinvasionofhavinganotherpersonreviewinganddiscussingsensitivepersonalinformation.Andthecostofusingthesetechnologiescandramaticallyreducefirms’costsofdoingbusiness–especiallyinthemodernmass-scaleerawhereasinglefirmmaydobusinessacrosstheUnitedStatesorworld–whichcaninturnredoundinpricebenefitsandothersavingstocustomers.Differenttypesofmessagesaresimplybettersuitedtodeliveryusingdifferenttechnologies,dependingupontheircontent.UnderReed,disparateregulatorytreatmentofthesetechnologiesisthereforearguablycontent-basedandsubjecttostrictscrutiny,whetherthegovernmentintendedsuchdisparateresultsornot.
TheclearestdistinctionthattheTCPAandFCCrulesmakeisbetweencommercialandnon-commercialspeech.Thisisaclear,facial,content-baseddistinction.EarlyFirstAmendmentchallengestotheTCPAtreatedthisTCPA’sregulationoftelemarketingasaregulationofcommercialspeechandthereforeappliedCentralHudsonintermediatescrutiny.ButSorrellandReedsuggestthat“commercialspeechisnoexception”totherulethatwhereregulationis“designedtoimposeaspecific,content-basedburdenonprotectedexpression…heightenedjudicialscrutinyiswarranted.”126Indeed,Sorrellinvolvedalawthatrestrictedthedisclosureofprescriptioninformationformarketingpurposes–asituationclosely
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relatedtotheTCPA’sregulationoftelemarketingcalls–andsubjectedthatlawtostrictscrutiny.127ThefactthatthespeechwasofacommercialnaturewasofnoconcerntotheCourtinlightoftheclearcontent-basednatureofthelaw.Tothecontrary,theCourtnotedthat“Aconsumer’sconcernforthefreeflowofcommercialspeechoftenmaybefarkeenerthanhisconcernforurgentpoliticaldialogue.”
Indeed,itisimportanttorecallthattheverypurposeoftheTCPAwas“toprohibitcertainpracticesinvolvingtheuseoftelephoneequipmentforadvertisingandsolicitationpurposes”andthatthestatutewaswritteninresponseto“theuseofautomatedequipmenttoengageintelemarketing.”Althoughthestatutorypurposesoundsinprivacyconcerns,thisisastatuteinwhichthelegislativehistoryexpresslystatesbothaspeakerpreference(disfavoringtelemarketers)andacontentpreference(disfavoringadvertisingandsolicitations).TheTCPA,inotherwords,isnotacaseinwhich“afaciallyneutrallawdoesnotbecomecontentbasedsimplybecauseitmaydisproportionatelyaffectspeechoncertaintopics”128–rather,itisacaseinwhich“thelegislature’sspeakerpreferencereflectsacontentpreference.”129UnderReed’stwo-partanalysis,theTCPAshouldsubjecttostrictscrutinyatbothsteps:onitsfaceitmakescontent-baseddistinctions;andevenwerethisnotthecase,thestatute’slegislativehistoryrevealsaclearpreferencebothforcertaintypesofcontentandforspeakerswhosespeechreflectsacertaintypeofcontent.
This,ofcourse,isanobviousconclusion.Fewwouldobjecttoreceivinganunexpected(andthereforeunconsented-to)callplacedusingeitheranautomaticdialerorprerecordedmessagethatcarriedwithitwelcomeinformation.Welcomeinformationaboutfriendsorfamily(e.g.,notificationsfromanairlinethatafamilymember’sflightisdelayed);informationaboutafinancialwindfall(forinstance,aboutasubstantialawardinaclasssettlement);remindersaboutimportantmedical(e.g.,prescriptionrefills)orcivicinformation(e.g.,aboutvotingdatesofpollinglocations).Rather,itistelemarketingsolicitations–andespeciallyscamsandotherillegitimatecalls–thatarethesubjectofour,andCongress’,ire.130Clothedintheguiseprimarilyofprivacyconcerns–concernsthatwereperhapslegitimategiventhetechnologyatthetime–theTCPAprohibitsallcallsmadeusingcertaintechnologiesinordertocurbacertainclassofcalls.Theconstitutionallyrelevantportionofthelaststatementistheend–“inordertocurbacertainclassofcalls.”Alawthatimposesaruletorestrictonesortofcontentiscontentbased,evenifthatruleisappliedequallytoallspeakers.131Indeed,thefactthatitappliesbroadly,restrictingnotonlydisfavoredspeechbutalsoother,desirable,constitutionally-protectedspeechmerelydemonstratesthattheruleinquestionisoverbroadandnotnarrowlytailored.132
Therearealsosubstantialdemographicdifferencesbetweenwirelessandwirelinetelephonesubscribershipthatfurthersuggestthatdisparateregulationofthetwoshouldbesubjecttostrictscrutiny.Forinstance,wireless-onlytelephonesubscribersaremorelikelytobeyoung,single,lower-income,andrenters.133“Getoutthevote”callstowirelessandwirelinetelephonesubscribersare,therefore,verylikelytoinvolvediscussionofverydifferenttopicsandserveverydifferentfunctions(e.g.,informingpolitically-disengagedindividualsaboutthefactofanelectionandlocationoftheirpollingplacesasopposedremindingpolitically-engagedindividualstovoteinaknownelection).TheTCPAandFCCrulesarealso,therefore,likelytofacilitatetheprovisionofelection-relatedinformationtoknowndemographicsofvoters(e.g.,homeownerswithresidentiallandlines)andtoimposehigher
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burdensofobtainingsuchinformationonotherknowndemographics(e.g.,renters,whoaremorelikelytobewireless-only).134Importantly,thefactthatalawmayhavedisparateeffectsoncertainspeakersormessagesdoesnotmeanthatthatlawisnecessarilycontent-based.135But“[c]haracterizingadistinctionasspeakerbasedisonlythebeginning—nottheend—oftheinquiry.”136Thestatutemaynonethelessbesubjecttostrictscrutinyifthe“speakerpreferencereflectsacontentpreference,”137orthe“inevitableeffectofastatuteonitsface”isunconstitutional.138
TheconsensualrelationshipthatexistsbetweencallingandcalledpartiesinsomecallsregulatedbytheTCPAcreatesafurtherproblemthatdemandstrictscrutiny:wearenolongerregulatinghowthecallingpartyplacescalls,butalsohowthecalledpartycanreceivethosecalls.Thisisparticularlyproblematic,aswillbediscussedbelow,inthecontextoftheFCC’sreassignednumberrule.Thisruleplacesadifficult–arguablyanimpossible–burdenonindividualswhohaveconsentedtoorevenrequestedthattheybecalled.
ThegovernmenthasnointerestindoingmuchofwhattheTCPAdoes
ThepurposeoftheTCPA–thatis,thegovernmentalinterestthatitwasintendedtoserve–wasnominallyto“protecttheprivacyinterestsofresidentialtelephonesubscribersbyplacingrestrictionsonunsolicited,automatedtelephonecallstothehomeandtofacilitateinterstatecommercebyrestrictingcertainusesoffacsimile(fax)machinesandautomaticdialers.”139Asdiscussedabove,thelegislativehistoryalsoexpressesopenanimustowardstelemarketersandthelegislationwasadoptedtoprohibittelephone-basedadvertisementsandsolicitations.140Eventakingtheprivacyandrelatedinterestsatfacevalue,however,thescopeoftheunderlyingharmtoprivacyintereststhattheTCPAwasmeanttoaddresshasdiminishedgreatlysincetheTCPAwasadopted.What’smore,theActhascometostifletheinterstatecommerceitwasintendedtofacilitateandtoregulateactivitythatthegovernmenthasnolegitimateinterestincontrolling.
Unquestionably,thegovernmenthasacompellinginterestinregulatingandtakingactioninresponsetotrulyharmfultelephonecalls–suchasthoseconductedaspartofscams,initiatedunderfalsepretexts,ormadeusingdeceptiveinformationsuchasspoofedCaller-IDinformation.ButtheTCPAdoesnotevenpurporttonarrowlyregulatesuchcalls:itpurportstoregulateallcallsmadeusingautodialersorpre-recordedmessages.
TheTCPAdoesnotmeaningfullyadvanceprivacyinterests
TheTCPAwaswrittenatatimewhenrobocallsimposedsubstantialprivacyandothertangiblecostsonthosereceivingthem,anddidsoinawaythatthosereceivingthemcouldnotavoid.Unsolicitedcallswouldpourineveryevening,disruptinghouseholdsandfamilies,renderingtelephonesunusable(includinginthecaseofemergencies),fillingansweringmachinetapes,andincurringper-minutechargesonwirelessphones.
Noneoftheseissuesringtruetoday.Thenon-privacyissues–whicharenotatthecoreofthegovernment’sassertedinterestsintheTCPA,butnonethelesshaveplayedaprominentroleinits
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defense–arealllargelymoot.Autodialertechnologyhasimproved,suchthatlinesarenolongerblockedforanymeaningfulperiodoftime.Answeringmachinesareincreasinglyathingofthepast.Cellphonesnolongerincurper-minutecharges.AndCaller-ID(whennotinterferedwithbylegitimatelybadcallers),selectivering-tones,easily-controlledphonevolume,andothertechnologieshavedramaticallyreducedtheprivacyimpactofthesecalls.
AdefiningstructuralelementoftheTCPAisitsdisparatetreatmentofcallstowirelessandresidentialwirelinetelephones.Giventhestatutoryemphasisofthisdistinction,itisnecessarytoconsiderwhetheritissupportedbyalegitimategovernmentinterest.Todaythereisnolegitimatereasontotreatwirelessphonesdifferentlythanwirelinephones.TheonlyreasonidentifiedforsuchtreatmentatthetimetheTCPAwasenacted,andtheonlyreasonencodedintheActitself,isthatwirelessusersincurcostswhentheyreceivecallswherewirelineusersdonot.Thisisnolongerthecase:everyserviceplancurrentlyofferedbyeachofthemajorwirelesscarriersincludesunlimitedvoiceandtextservice.Thisisnottosaythatthereisnoreasontobeconcernedabout,andpossiblytoregulate,unsolicitedcallstowirelessphones.ButneithertheTCPAnortheFCCmakeasufficientcasefordisparatetreatmentofwirelessandresidentialwirelinetelephones.
Tothecontrary,todaythereisreasontoimposelighterregulationsonwirelessphonesthanonresidentialwirelinephones.141Telephonecallstoresidentialwirelinetelephonespresentafargreaterprivacyburdenonindividualsthantocallstowirelessphones.First,ataconceptuallevelwirelessphonesarenotusedexclusivelyinthehome.Thisisanimportantdifferencebetweenthemandresidentialwirelinephones.Indeed,thefactthatcourtshavelongrecognizedagovernmentinterestinprotectingthesanctuaryofthehomefromunwantedintrusionisoneofthekeyjustificationsthattheFCCcitesinits2015Orderforitstreatmentofwirelesscalls.142But,asdiscussedinmoredetailinPartV,thisinterestisatleastweakened,ifnotentirelyabrogated,onceanindividualhaslefttheprotectivesanctuaryofthehomeand–phoneinhand–venturedintothepublicworldwheretheymayencounterallformsofideasandexpressions,wantedandunwanted.
Moreover,wirelinephonesdonotenjoymanyoftheprivacy-enhancingbenefitsofwirelessphones.Theyaregenerallysharedbetweenmultiplepeopleinahousehold,andthereareoftenmultiplephonesconnectedtoeachnumber.Thismeansthatitisverydifficultto“silence”awirelinephoneduringtimesthatcallsmaybeunwanted,especiallyascomparedtoawirelessphone(mostofwhichhaveeasytousevolumecontrolsandsilent-modefeatures).Italsomeansthatcallstoresidentialwirelinephonesnecessarilydisruptentirehouseholdswhereastheimpactofcallstowirelessphonesaremorenarrowlycontainedtoindividuals,suchthattheprivacyintrusionofcallstoresidentialwirelinephonesisgreaterthanthatofcallstowirelessphones.AlmostallwirelessphonesincorporatecallerIDfeatures,whereasmanywirelinephonesdonot.Whenacallisreceivedonawirelinephone,theuserneedstoambulateinordertoanswerit,whereaswirelessphonesaregenerallycarriedaroundsoaremoreeasilychecked.Wirelessphonesalsooftenincludeprogrammablefeaturesthatletsubscribersassociatedifferentringtoneswithdifferentcallers,makingitfareasierwithwirelessphonestoknowwhichcallstoanswer(orignore)thanwithwirelinephones–furtherreducingtheprivacyburdenofunwantedcalls.Additionally,wirelessphonessupporttextmessaging,whichunderFCCruleistreatedthesameasawirelessphonecall,andwhichhasminimalprivacyimpact.TheseandotherfeaturesgivewirelessusersfargreaterabilitytocontrolandmitigatetheprivacyconcernsatthecoreoftheTCPAthanwirelinephonesubscribershave.Itisquestionablewhetherthegovernmenthasanyinterestatallinregulatingthem,letaloneacompellingone–and,surely,ifanything,theinterestislessthanwhateverinterestthegovernmentmayhaveinregulatingwirelinephonecalls.141142
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Thecounterargumenttothisconcernisthatunwantedcallstowirelessphonesactuallypresentagreaterprivacyharmthancallstolandlinetelephones.Becauseindividualsoftencarrytheirwirelessphoneswiththemwherevertheygo–wirelessphonesarebyoursidesinourhomes,inourcars,atwork,aswewalkthestreets,eatatrestaurants,andevenonourbedstandswhilewesleep–callstothemhavethepotentialtobesubstantiallymoreintrusivethancallstoresidentialwirelinephones.Ourabilitytocontrolthesecallsonourcellphones,however,issubstantiallygreater.Thisreducestheburdenimposedbythesepotentialintrusionsandshiftspartofthatburdentothecallrecipient.Perhapsmoreimportant,however,isthelongstandingrecognition–recognizedbothbythecourtsand,asnotedabove,theFCCinitsimplementationoftheTCPA–thatanyexpectationofprivacyissubstantiallydiminishedonceweleavethesanctuaryofthehome.143
TheTCPAinterfereswithcommerce
AsecondarypurposeoftheTCPA–onethatisoftenforgotten–istofacilitateinterstatecommercethroughrestrictionsonproblematicusesofautodialersandotherdevices.Asitisappliedtoday,however,theActhasthecontraryeffectofstiflinglegitimatecommerceandlittle-to-noeffectonlimitingillegitimateuseoftechnologiesthatharmcommerce.
Inreality,theTCPAhasgivenrisetoasubstantialindustryofplaintiff’sattorneyswhospecializeinusingtheTCPAtoengageinpredatorylitigation.VeryfrequentlythislitigationtargetsfirmsthatareattemptingtoengageinlegitimatebusinessincompliancewiththeTCPA.ButtheTCPAisastrict-liabilityoffensewithsubstantialstatutorypenalties.ThisputsfirmsattemptingtoengageinTCPA-compliantactivityinaprecarioussituation.144
What’smore,asdiscussedpreviously,theTCPAdoeslittletocurtailtheactivityoffirmsmakingillegitimateuseofautodialersandpre-recordedmessages.Itisthesecalls,andnotthosemakinglegitimateusesofthesetechnologies,thatsubstantiallyharmindividualsreceivingthem.Thisineffectivenessisproblematicinitsownright,andcallsintoquestionwhethertheTCPAisanappropriatemeanstoaddressingtheharmitisintendedtoregulateatall.ButitalsohasthesubsidiaryeffectofunderminingtheTCPA’sstatutorypurposeoffacilitatinginterstatecommerce.AconsequenceoftheTCPAandFCCrules’inabilitytoaddressthesetrulysubstantialcallsisthatindividualshavewidelycometoviewallcallsasillegitimate,unwanted,andharmful.Theshadowofthoseengaginginillegitimatebusinesspracticesloomslargeovertheirgood-faithcounterparts.
TheFCC’s2015OmnibusOrderimposesrulesthatinterferewithinterstatecommerceinanevenmoreproblematicway:inattemptingtoaddresstheproblemofcallsmadetoreassignedtelephonenumbers,theCommissionimposesnearlyimpossibleburdensonindividuals’abilitytointeractwithotherindividualsandfirmsoftheirchoosing.
ReassignmentoftelephonenumberscreatesaproblemundertheTCPA:whenanindividualwithagivenphonenumberhasgivenacallingpartyconsenttocallthatnumber,butthenumberissubsequentlyreassignedtoanewwirelesstelephone,thecallingpartydoesnotnecessarilyknowaboutthatreassignmentandthereforehasnowaytoknowwhetherthesubscribertowhomagivennumberisassignedatagiventimeisinfactthesubscriberwhohasofferedconsent.
Inits2015Order,theCommissionaddressedthisissuebysayingthatconsentfollowsthecalledparty,notthecallednumber.Thismeansthatacallingpartydoesnothaveconsenttocallareassignednumberunlessthepartynewly-assignedtothatnumberhasofferedsuchconsent–acircumstancethat
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willneveroccurexceptintherarestandmostserendipitousofcircumstances.Ineffect,underthe2015Order,callingareassignednumberisalmostnecessarilyaviolationoftheTCPA.Recognizingthatcallingpartiesdonothaveaneffectivewaytodeterminewhetheragivennumberhasbeenreassigned,theFCCadopted(inashowofextremeunderstandingandcompassion)asafe-harbor:callingpartiesarepermittedasinglecalltoareassignednumber–ifthatcalldoesnotresultinanaffirmationofconsent,thecallingpartymustassumethatthenumberhasbeenreassignedandthatconsentforfurthercallsdoesnotexist.
Despitethisrule,callersstillhavenowaytoknowwhetheragivennumberhasbeenreassigned.Theeffectofthisrule,therefore,isthatanytimeacallingpartydoesnotgetthroughtothecalledpartyonagivenphonecall,itmustassumethatthephonenumberhasbeenreassignedevenincaseswhereithasnotbeenreassigned.
Thisruleplacesasubstantialburdenonbothcallingpartiesandthepartiesthathaveconsentedtobeingcalled.Ineffect,partiesthathavegivensuchconsentmustactivelyanswereverycallthattheyreceive,otherwisetheyriskanimputationthattheyhavewithdrawnconsenttoreceivefurthercalls.Thisisanincredibleburden:itisbothimpossibleanddangerous.Nooneiseverinapositiontoanswereverycallthattheyreceive–thatiswhywehaveansweringmachinesandvoicemail.Moreover,callersshouldnotanswereverycallthattheyreceive,giventheoverwhelmingnumberofharmfulandscamrobocallsthatproliferatetoday.
TheFCCrationalizesitsapproachtonumberreassignmentandtheone-callsafeharborasanefforttobalancetheinterestofcallingpartiesandtheprivacyinterestsofpartiesthatdonotwanttobecalled.Butitdoesnotconsiderthemoreimportanttradeoffatissue:therightsofpartieswhodowanttobecalled,andwhohaveprovidedconsenttobecalled,againsttherightsofthesubsetofindividualswhohavereceivedareassignphonenumberonwhichtheyarereceivingunwantedcalls.ThatomissionshouldbefataltotheFCC’sapproach.Itisinherentlyover-inclusive,curtailingthespeechbetweenpartieswhohaveexpresslyconsentedtoreceivingcallsanditiswoefullyunder-inclusive,doingnothingtoaddressthegreaterproblemofillegitimateandscamrobocalls.Whatismore,asdiscussedinPartIV,itisneithernarrowlytailorednortheleastrestrictivemeanstoaddressingconcernscreatedbyreassignednumbers–tothecontrary,theproblemofreassignednumbersisonelargelyundertheFCC’sdirectcontrol,suchthattheCommissionitselfisinabetterpositionbothtomitigateandtorespondtotheunderlyingproblemthanlegitimatecallers.
TheTCPAishardlytailoredatall,letalonenarrowly
Inordertosurviveeitherstrictorintermediatescrutiny,astatutemustbenarrowlytailored.145Atthetimeitwasenacted,theTCPAmayhavemetthatstandard.Todayitishardlytailoredatall,letalonenarrowly.Tothecontrary,ascurrentlyimplementedtheTCPAsimultaneouslysignificantlyfailstostopthecallsthatitintendstocurtailwhilecurtailing(orsanctioning)Constitutionally-protectedspeechthatshouldfalloutsideoftheambitoftheAct.
PerhapsthemostfatalcritiqueoftheTCPAisitsfailuretoaddressinanymeaningfulwaythemodernproblemofillegitimaterobocalls.TheTCPAandFCCrulesimposesubstantialburdensoffirmsandindividualsthatseektobecompliantwiththeTCPAandotherwisetoengageinvaluablespeechactivities,butdolittletoaddressthepervasiveillegitimateconductthatunderliesmodernconcern
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aboutrobocalls.Such“alawcannotberegardedasprotectinganinterestofthehighestorder…whenitleavesappreciabledamagetothatsupposedlyvitalinterestunprohibited.”146
Andontheothersideoftheequation,theTCPAnotonlycurtailsbutplacessignificantliabilityuponthosewhowouldengageinConstitutionally-protectedspeech.Torecountsomeoftheexamplesdiscussedpreviously,theTCPAhasbeenusedagainstsportingvenuesusingtextmessagesforentertainmentpurposes,againstpharmaciescommunicatingimportanthealthcareinformation,andservicesthatmatchconsumerswithcontractors.147Tobenarrowlytailored,astatute“musttargetandeliminatenomorethantheexactsourceofthe‘evil’itseekstoremedy”–“[g]overnmentmaynotregulateexpressioninsuchamannerthatasubstantialportionoftheburdenonspeechdoesnotservetoadvanceitsgoals.”148
TheTCPAisthusproblematically-tailoredcomingandgoing,bothsubstantiallyfailingtopreventtheproblematicspeechitisintendedtocurtailbutcurtailingotherspeechthatthegovernmenthasnointerestinlimiting.
Itisill-tailoredinotherways,aswell.Forinstance,oneoftheTCPAandtheFCCrules’basicdistinctionsisbetweencommercialandnon-commercialspeech.Butbothinformationalandcommercialcallsimposethesameprivacyburdenonthosereceivingthecalls.Therelevantcharacteristicisnotwhetherthecalliscommercial,butwhetheritisdesired.TheTCPA’sandFCC’srulesplacenoconsentburdenoninformationalcallstoresidentiallandlinephonesbutdoplaceconsentburdensonanycallstowirelessphonesandallcommercialcalls.Thisdisparatetreatmentnecessarilyimpliesatleastoneoftwothings:eitherthelackofrestrictionsoninformationalcallstoresidentialwirelinephonesisunder-inclusive,ortheconsentrequirementsforothercallsisover-inclusive.
Therecanbelittledoubtthatitistherestrictionsoncallsforwhichconsenthasbeengiventhatisover-inclusive.ThebasisinCentralHudsonforsubjectingcommercialspeechtoalowerstandardofscrutinythannon-commercialspeechisthatthereisa“distinctionbetweenspeechproposingacommercialtransaction,whichoccursinanareatraditionallysubjecttogovernmentregulation,andothervarietiesofspeech.”149Butwherethecalledpartyhasalreadyconsentedtobeingcalled–asitmusthaveundertheTCPA–wearealreadybeyondthepointof“proposing”acommercialtransaction.Thepartieshavealreadyagreedthatonemaycalltheotherforthepurposesofconductingthattransaction.Thisisnotunsolicitedcommercialspeechbutratherconsensualspeechbetweenadultswhohaveindicatedawillingnessanddesiretoengagewithoneanother.
ThearbitrarinessoftheFCC’sapproachtoconsentundertheTCPAisdemonstratedbythedifferentialconsentrequirementforinformationandcommercialcallstowirelessphones.ThepurposeofthedifferentconsentregimesisnottonarrowlytailortheimplementationoftheTCPAtominimizetheimpactsonspeech.ItistoharmonizetheFCC’sTCPAruleswiththeFTC’stelemarketingrules,whichrequirewrittenconsentpriortoplacingtelemarketingcallstoanynumberontheDo-Not-Calllist.150Therearecertainlyvirtuesinharmonizingregulations,butthosevirtuesdonotrelatebacktoorotherwiseadvancetheprivacyintereststhatunderlietheTCPA.
TheFCC’sreassignednumbersruleissimilarlyarbitrary.Asdescribedabove,thisruleimplicitlypreferencestherightsofthosewhohavebeengivenareassignedtelephonenumberovertherightsofthosewhohaveconsentedtoreceivingcallsontheir(non-reassigned)telephonenumber.IntheOrder146147 148149150
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adoptingthisrule,theCommissiondoesnotsomuchasacknowledgethatitsruleaffectsindividualswhohaveconsentedtoreceivingcalls,letaloneattempttoquantifytherelativeeffectsthisrulehasonthosewhohavebeengivenareassignednumberandreceiveunconsented-tocallsasaresultcomparedtotheeffectsonthosewilllosetheopportunitytoengagewiththosefromwhomtheyhaveconsentedtoreceivecallsbecauseoftheone-callsafeharbor.ThefailuretoevenconsidertheserelativeeffectsshouldbefataltotheFCC’srule.
Thereare,andthegovernmentcontrols,lessrestrictivemeansofaddressingrobocalls
Atthetimeitwasenacted,theTCPAverylikelyaddressedsubstantialgovernmentinterests–indeed,likelyevencompellingones–inanappropriatelynarrowway.ThemostclearlyproblematicdistinctionintheTCPAasinitiallydraftedwasitscarve-outfordifferenttreatmentforwirelessphones.Butgiventhedifferentcost-structureofwirelessserviceeventhatwasverylikelyreasonable.MostoftheproblemswiththeTCPAlaidoutabovearetheresultofeitherchangingtechnologymootingtheconcernsaddressedbyandcreatingnewonesunaddressedbytheTCPAorproblematicimplementationoftheTCPAbytheFCC.
Andtoday,unwantedphonecallscontinuetobeabaneandaplight.Thegovernmentverylikelyhasacompellinginterestreininginavastmajorityofthecallsthatleadtoconsumercomplaints.Manyofthesecallsareundesired;manyresultfromreassignednumbers;manyarescamsandfrauds;manyresultfromunscrupulouslead-generationservices.Thegovernmentshoulddosomethingaboutthesecalls.
Intheearly1990s,therewaslittlethatthegovernmentcoulddo,shortofthebluntinstrumentadoptedintheTCPA.Thisisnolongerthecasetoday.Technologyhasadvancedconsiderably,andmyriadtoolscouldbeimplementedordevelopedtodaythatwoulddramaticallyreducetheburdensofrobocallstoindividualsinwaysfarlessburdensometothosemakinglegitimatecalls.Toitscredit,inthepastyeartheFCChasbegunmakingseriousprogressonthisfront.
OnesimplethingthattheCommissioncando–whichitmercifullyisintheprocessofdoing–istoallowtelecommunicationscompaniestoblockknownscamcalls.151ScamcallsregularlyusespoofedCaller-IDinformation,transmittingafakephonenumberinsteadofthecaller’srealnumber.Telephonecarrierscaneasilyidentifymostofthesefakedphonenumbersandcouldeasilyblockthematthenetworklevel.Thissolutionisfeasibletoday,lackingonlytheFCC’spermission.
Toemphasizethepoint:carrierstodayarenotblockingknownharmfulcallsbecausetheFCCdoesnotallowthemtodoso.Changingthispolicy,andtherebyaddressingasubstantialportionoftherobocallproblem,isfullywithinthegovernment’scontrol.Therecanbenoquestionthatanyrestrictiononspeechthatcouldberenderedunnecessarybythegovernment’sownactionisnottheleastrestrictivemeanstoaddressingaproblem.
Similarly,theproblemofreassignedphonenumbersisfullywithintheFCC’scontrol–indeed,itisaproblemoftheFCC’sownmaking.Telephonecarriersreassignphonenumberswhentheydonothavepreviously-unassignednumberstoassigncustomers.Previously-unassignednumbersaredoledouttocarriersbytheNorthAmericanNumberingPlanAdministration(NANPA),anentityoperatedundercontractfortheFCC.NANPAandtheFCCdeterminewhogetsnewphonenumbersandatwhattime.Theyalsohavetheauthoritytoregulatetheuseofthosenumbers,includingtheirreassignment.Inotherwords,thegovernmentitselfcouldlargelyaddressthereassignednumberproblembyallocatingmorenewnumbersorimposingrulestogovernhownumbersarereassigned.Here,too,theFCCis
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takingpositivesteps,havingrecentlyadoptedaNoticeofInquirysolicitingcommentsonaproposaltoimplementadatabaseofreassignednumbersthatwouldbeupdatedonadailybasis.152
Othertechnologicalsolutionstotherobocallproblemwouldrequiretechnologicalchangestothearchitectureofthetelephonenetwork.OverthepastdecademanyinthetelecommunicationsindustryhavesoughttotransitionthetraditionalPublicSwitchedTelephoneNetwork–whichtodayislargelythesameasitwasatthetimetheTCPAwasadopted–toamodern,IP-based,digitalnetwork.153ThisprocesshasbeendramaticallyslowedbytheFCCitselfandadvocacygroupsseekingtopreservethelegacynetworkforvariousinterests.154
Fortunately,heretootheFCChasrecentlyembracedproposalstomodernizeaspectsofthetelephonenetworkinlightof,andtoaddressconcernsabout,therobocallproblem,havingrecentlyadoptedaNoticeofInquirysolicitingcommentsonnewauthenticationtechnologiesthatwouldmakeitdramaticallymoredifficulttoforgecallerIDinformationandthatwouldgivecalledpartiesmuchmorecontroloverthecallsthattheyreceive.155AmodernizednetworkcouldincorporatemyriadfeaturesthatwouldhelptoaddresstheproblemofrobocallswithouttheneedforbluntregulationsliketheTCPA.Forinstance,itcouldenablestrongauthenticationofcallingpartiessuchasnowunderconsiderationbytheFCC–asuper-Caller-IDofsorts,thatpreventsspoofingbutthatalsoprovidesauthenticatedtext-basedidentificationofacaller.Itcouldenablecodingofcalls,sothatcallerscouldsignalthenatureofthecall(e.g.,friend/family,professional,political,informational,customerservice,commercialoffer,etc.)inawaythatwouldminimizeanyprivacyimpactoncallrecipients.Oritcouldevenincorporatebrieftextdescriptionsofthepurposeofacallintothecallinformationitself,allowingcalledpartiestoknowthepurposeofthecallwithoutneedingtoanswerit.Noneofthesetechnologiesisparticularlysophisticatedorcomplicated–arguablytheFCCshouldhavemandatedtheiradoptionyearsago.Instead,ithassteppedinthewayofthemarket,preventingsuchtechnologiesfrombeingdevelopedanddeployed.
Anyofthesetechnologieswouldpresentlessrestrictivemeanstoaddressingtheproblemofrobocalls,eitherinwholeorinpart.Byandlarge,theonlyreasonthattheyhavenotalreadybeenimplementedisbecausethegovernmentitselfhasnotallowedthemtobe.Needlesstosay,governmentregulationcannotbetheleastrestrictivemeanstoaddressingaproblemthatgovernmentregulationitselfhascausedandthatthegovernmentitselfhastheabilitytodirectlyremedy.ThispointisredoubledbythefactthattheFCCis,infact,actuallyworkingtoimplementmanyofthesetechnologies.
V. ConceptualPuzzlesPromptedbytheTCPA’sRegulationofSpeech
TheTCPAwaswrittenatasimplertimetoaddresssimplerproblemscreatedbyandusingsimplertechnology.Itisunsurprisingthatithasnotagedwell.Astheusesandusersoftechnologyhavechanged,distinctionsthatdidnotseemtoimplicatethecontentofcommunications,orthatweremadetoaddresslegitimatenon-contentinterestsbytechnologicallyappropriatemeans,mustnowbeevaluatedinanewcontextandinlightofcontemporarytechnology.
ThiscontextoftechnologicalchangeraisesquestionsthataremorechallengingthanthoserelatingtotheTCPA’songoingvitalityundertheFirstAmendment–questionthatalsoraisemorefundamentalquestionsaboutregulationintechnologicallydynamicsettings.Thefirstquestionstemsfromthegovernment’sroleinregulatingthedesignandcapabilitiesoftelecommunicationsnetworks:butforgovernmentregulationofhowtelephonenetworksoperate,carrierswouldlikelyhavelong-ago
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implementednetworkfeaturestoresolvemuchoftherobocallproblem.Canthegovernmentimposespeech-restrictiverulestoaddressconductthatwouldbelessproblematicforthegovernment’sownregulation?
AsecondquestionconsiderstheprivacyrationalesupportingadoptionoftheTCPA–indeed,theideathatthegovernmenthasaninterestinprotectingthesanctityofthehomeisboththeprincipallegislativejustificationfortheTCPAaswellasthemostsubstantivedefenseofferedbytheFCCinitsTCPAorders.156Asdiscussedabove,moderntechnologyalreadydoes,anddramaticallyfurthercould,reducetheprivacy-invasiveaspectofunsolicitedtelephonecalls.Perhapsmoreinteresting,thoughframedasprotectingthesanctityofthehome,theTCPAreallyprotectsthesanctityofthephone.Thisrepresentsasilentbutimportantshiftinthescopeofprotection,assuringthatindividualsbefreefromunwantedcontactbythirdpartiesnotmerelywhenathomebutalsowhileoutandaboutinthepublicworldandotherwiseengagedinthebazaarofideas.
Bothoftheseissues–theregulationofspeechtoaddressproblemsofthegovernment’sownmakingandthesubsilentioexpansionofprotectionofthehome–arediscussedbelow.
[NOTE:Thediscussionthatfollowsisstillanearlydraft.Feedbackisverywelcome!]
Thegovernmentcannotregulatespeechtocurtailaproblemofitsowncreation
Asdiscussedabove,oneofthemostimportant,andleastappreciated,aspectsofthecontemporaryproblemofrobocallsistheextenttowhichitisaproblemofthegovernment’sownmaking.157TheFCChaslongregulatedtheoperationofthetelephonenetwork,fromtechnologystandardstointeroperabilityandinterexchangerequirementstonumberassignment.ItisthankstogovernmentregulationthataspectsofthetelephonenetworkrelevanttotheproblemstheTCPAisintendedtoaddressisremarkablysimilartodaytothenetworkinuseatthetimetheTCPAwasdrafted.
TodaytheFCCisconsideringvariouschangesthatwillimprovetheresilienceofthetelephonenetworktopracticessuchasunwantedphonecalls.AuthenticationtechnologieslikeSTIR/SHAKEN,permissiontoblockknown-spoofednumbers,andothertechnologicalimprovementswill,ontheonehand,dramaticallyreducetheabilityofthesecallerstoengageinproblematicpracticesand,ontheotherhand,giveconsumersgreaterinformationaboutandcontroloverthecallsthattheyreceive.
Evenasthetechnologyisunquestionablyimproving,thefactofthegovernment’sroleintheseimprovementsraisesquestionsabouttheproprietyoftheunderlyingTCPA.Itwouldbeverydifficult,forinstance,fortheTCPAtosurvivereviewunderstrictscrutiny:onecannotcolorablysaythataregulationistheleastrestrictivemeanstoachievingagovernmentpurposeifthegovernmentcontrolsalternative,lessrestrictivemeans,toachieveit.158
Themoredifficultcasearisesinthecontextofintermediatescrutiny,underwhichtheregulationneedbenarrowlytailoredbutnotnecessarilytheleastrestrictivemeanstoachievingthegovernment’spurpose.Inthesteadofbeingtheleastrestrictivemeans,intermediatescrutinyrequiresonlythattheregulationleaveopenamblealternativechannelsforcommunication.Butwhileitisconceivableinthegeneralcasethataregulationwherethegovernmentcontrolslessrestrictivealternativestocurtailingtheprohibitedspeechmaysurviveintermediatescrutiny,itseemsunlikelythattheTCPAissucharegulation.Asastartingpoint,therearelikelynoalternativemeansofcommunicationformuchofthespeechprohibitedbytheTCPA.Thiswouldbethecase,forinstance,intheexampleofanysystemthat
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sendsautomatedmessagesinresponsetotextmessage,orforanybusinessorservicebuiltaroundtextmessages.Alternativemeansofcommunicationarealsounlikelysatisfactoryforservicessuchashealth-relatedmessages,whichhaveanelementoftimelinessthatcannotbematchedbymailandthatareoftensenttoindividualswhomaynothaveaccesstoothermeansofcommunication.OnepotentialresponsetothisisthatonecanalwaysavoidliabilityundertheTCPAbyavoidingautomateddialingsystemsandprerecordedmessages.Thismaybethecaseinprinciple–butinpracticethesesystemsareusedpreciselybecausetheyarelower-costandhigh-reliability.Onewouldnot,forinstance,wanttorelyonhumanstocorrectlydialhundredsorthousandsofphonenumbersperdaytocommunicatesensitivehealthinformation.Beyondtheprivacyconcernsthatthismayraise,itcreatesseriousconcernstheinformationcouldbeprovidedtothewrongperson–andthereforenotbedeliveredtoapersonthatneedsit.
Butthereisanevengreaterproblemwiththeapproachthathashistoricallybeeneffectivelymandatedbyregulation:comparedtoalternativesitconflictswiththecoreprivacyrationaleprofferedbyCongresstojustifytheTCPA.Asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow,thecorepurposeandlegaljustificationfortheTCPAisto“protecttheprivacyinterestsofresidentialtelephonesubscribers.”Thispurposeissupportedbylongstandingunderstandings–andmatchingprecedent–thatindividualshavesubstantialinterestsinthesanctuaryoftheirhome.159Thecasessupportingthisidea,however,offeramoreattenuatedunderstandingofthesanctityofthehomethansimplythatitisasanctuaryfromthemarketplaceofideas.Rather,theymorecarefullybalancetheFirstAmendmentrightsofindividualstoengageinspeechagainsttherightsofindividualstobefreefromunwantedspeechinthesanctuaryoftheirhome.Thekeycase–theonecitedbytheFCCinitsordersimplementingtheTCPA–isRowanv.U.S.PostOfficeDepartment,inwhichtheSupremeCourtupheldastatureallowinghomeownerstorequirethattheirnamesberemovedfrommailinglists.
Rowanisfrequentlycitedtodemonstratethesanctityofthehomeagainstunwelcomespeech.Buttheopinionismorecarefulthanthatsimplereadingsuggests.ThestatuteatissueinRowanallowshomeownerstooptoutofunwantedspeech–itisthereforedramaticallydifferentfromtheTCPA,whichrequirescallerstoobtainexpress,sometimeswritten,consentbeforeplacingcertaincalls.ThedifferencebetweenRowan’sopt-outandtheTCPA’sopt-inregimeshasimportantFirstAmendmentimplications:underRowan,theoutsidespeakerhasatleastaninitialopportunitytospeak,butmustrespectthehomeowner’swishforprivacy.TheCourthasnotarticulatedacategoricaldelineationoftheConstitutionalpermissibilityorrequirementsofopt-outvs.opt-inregimes.Subsequentcases,however,continuetoexpressaclearpreferencethatindividualsbeabletomanifestconsideredexpressionsofwhatinformationtheywanttoreceive.
TheFCChasapproachedthetelephonenetworkfromadifferentperspective.Ratherthanthinkingabouthowtodesignthetelephonenetworktogiveindividualsgreaterinformationaboutandcontroloverthecallsthattheyreceive,theCommissionhasthoughtofthenetworkasacommoncarriagesysteminwhichallcallsaretobecarriedonanon-discriminatorybasis.Inotherwords,theFCChasfocusedonthecarriersideoftheindustry,makingsurethattelecomcompaniesreliablycarryallcalls,insteadoftheconsumersideoftheindustry.Ofcourse,thesetwoperspectivesarenotnecessarilyinconflict–theFCCcouldwork(andtodayincreasinglyisworking)toensureboththatcarrierscarryalllegitimatecallsandthattheydeploytechnologiesthatgiveconsumersgreaterinformationaboutandcontroloverthosecalls.
Butthereinliestherub:theTCPAassumesthecarrier-centricmodelinwhichconsumershaveonlyverycoarsecontroloverthecallsthattheyreceive.Approachingthequestionfromeithertheperspectiveof
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narrowtailoringofthatofRowan’spreferenceforindividuals’controloverwhatinformationheorshereceives,theTCPAisundulyburdensome.
Thesanctuaryofthehomevs.thesanctuaryofthephone
Thecorepurposeof,andarguablycorelegaljustificationfor,theTCPAisto“protecttheprivacyinterestsofresidentialtelephonesubscribers.”160Thelegalbasisforthisgoalissituatedintheunderstandingofthesanctityofthehomeassanctuary.TheCourthaslongrecognizedadistinctionbetweenthepublicandprivatespheres.ThelifeoftheAmericanindividualinthepublicsphereischaracterizedbythemarketplaceofideas,amarketplaceinwhichthereisnopartialparticipation.Butonceinthesanctuaryofthehome,thatsameindividualisshieldedfromthedemandsandcuriositiesofthepublic.IntheAmericantraditionthisprotectionrunsmoststronglyagainstintrusionbythegovernmentitself.161Butthatprotectionalsorunagainstunwelcomeintrusionsbyprivateactors.Thus,inRowantheCourtupheldastaterequiringadvertiserstoallowhomeownerstoopt-outofreceivingfurthermailingsfromthem;inMartinv.CityofStrutherstheCourtexpressedthatastatuterequiringsolicitorstoabideby“nosolicitors”isConstitutionallypermissible;inMeesev.KeenetheCourtupheldlabellingrequirementsoncertainpoliticalmailings;andinPacificatheCourtupheldcontentrestrictionsonbroadcasttelevisiononthegroundsthatindividualscouldnototherwisepreventunwantedcontentfromenteringtheirhomes.162Theseandothercasesareallpremisedontheideathatindividualshavearighttobesecurefromunwelcomespeechwithinthesanctuaryofthehome–andthatthegovernmentplaysanimportantfunctioninhelpingtosecurethatright.
Butmoderncommunicationstechnology,includingwirelesstelephonesandtheInternetgenerally,isarguablyerodingtheboundariesofthehome.163Itiseverhardertokeepacleardelineationbetweenwhatisoutsideofandwhatfallswithintheboundariesofthehome.TheInternetisthemodernpublicsquare,164butmostpeopleaccessthatpublicsquareoncomputersormobilephones,fromthecomfortoftheircouch.Andthosesamedevices,especiallycellphones–devicesthatincreasinglydefinemuchofourprivatelives–comewithmanyofuswhereverwego.OneneedonlywatchafewminutesofInternetvideosofpeoplewalkingintoobstaclesorfallingintoholeswhileengrossedintheprivateworldoftheircellphonestounderstandhowcompletelytheexperienceofthesedevicescaninsulateonefromthepublicmarketplaceofideas.165
Othershaveendeavoredtoexplorehowourchangingtechnologicalrealityaltersthelegaldistinctionsdrawnbetweenthepublicandprivatespheres.166Buttechnologyhascontinuedtochange,includinginsometimesdramaticways,sinceeventhemostrecentoftheseeffortshasbeenundertakenandnew,orperhapsongoing,attentionisneeded–attentionbeyondthatwhichcanbefullyofferedhere.167
Thefocushereisnecessarilycabinedtothe“sanctuaryofthehome”justificationfortheTCPA.
Turningfirsttothequestionofthesanctityofthehomequahome,theCourthasneverrecognizedtheboundariesofthehomeasinviolate.Tothecontrary,ithasexpresslystruckdownstatutesthattreatit
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assuch.168ThebalancestruckbytheCourtisrathermorenuanced,capturedbyJusticeBlack:“Freedomtodistributeinformationtoeverycitizenwhereverhedesirestoreceiveitissoclearlyvitaltothepreservationorafreesocietythat…itmustbefullypreserved.”169Thisbalancecarriestwocompetingfactors:theneedtobeabletodistributeinformationtoeverycitizen,andtheabilityofthosecitizenstospecifythetermsonwhichhereceivesit.Thesefactorshaveaninverserelationship.Thelessabilityindividualshavetocontrolhowandwhatinformationtheyreceive,thegreatertheirneedforsanctuaryfromunwantedinformation.Thus,andasdiscussedabove,totheextentthattechnologiesthatofferindividualsgreatercontroloverthetelephonecallstheirreceivedareimplemented–andespeciallytotheextentthatthegovernmenthasinfluenceoverimplementationofsuchtechnologies–thelessjustificationthereisfortheTCPA.
Thesecondquestionisconceptuallymoredifficult:asAmericansincreasinglyturnfromresidentiallandlinetelephonestopersonalwirelesstelephones,thescopeoftheTCPA’sprotectionsarechangedfromthe“sanctuaryofthehome”tothe“sanctuaryofthephone.”Thischanceisfarfrominconsequential:thedefiningcharacteristicofthemobilephoneisthatitisuntetheredfromthehome.ThisexpansioninscopethusexpandstheprotectionaffordedbytheTCPAbeyondthatwhichhaspreviouslybeenconsidered–letalonepermitted–bytheCourt.Makingmattersevenmorecomplicated,whiletheimmediateresponsemaybetoassumethatthisisproblematic(anythingfallingoutsideofthesanctuaryofthehomegenerallybeingseenasfairgameinthepublicsphere),theCourthasofferedsomehintsthattheprotectionaffordedinsidethehomemaynotbeconfinedtothehome’swalls.Forinstance,thecourthasnotedthat“radio[listenedtointhehome]canbeturnedoff,butnotsothebillboard.”AndindiscussingitsholdinginPacifica,theCourtinBolgerexplainedthatmaildeliveredtothehome(asinRowan)is“farlessintrusiveanduncontrollable”thanthebroadcastprogramminginPacifica.Importantly,whilePacificawasexpresslyconcernedwiththereceiptofprogrammingwithinthehome,concernabout“intrusive[ness]anduncontrollab[ility]”applystronglytowirelessphoneswherevertheyarelocated.Justasonemayretreattothesanctuaryofthehometoescapethepublicsphere,onemayalsoretreattothepublicspheretoescapethebanalityofthelivingroomTV–butwiththemobilephone,itmayfollowusnomatterwhichsphereweretransientlyoccupy,sotheintrusionofunwantedcallsisinescapable.Justasthereceiptofmailislessintrusivethanthereceiptofbroadcasttelevision,thereceiptofbroadcasttelevision(whichoneexperiencesonlyintheirhomeandwhilewatchingapowered-ontelevision)islessintrusivethanthereceiptofunwantedtelephonecallsonamobilephone(whichonealmostalwayshasbytheirsideandalmostalwaysispoweredon).
This,ofcourse,isanoverstatement–justliketheradioortelevision,onemayturnofftheirphoneorleaveitathomewhenthegoout.Butthisisahighcosttopay,atleastforsome,toavoidunwantedtelephonecalls.Themodernphone,inparticular,ismorethanatelephone.170Itisaconstantconnectiontothemodernpublicsquare.171Onecouldarguethatthetimehascometoredelineatetheboundariesofanindividual’slife,addinga“connectedsphere”tothepublicandprivatespheres.Justasoneshouldhavesanctuaryintheirhome,oneshouldnotbeforcedtodisconnectfromtheironline,connected-sphere,lifetoavoidtheburdenofintrusiveanduncontrollableinvasions.Alternatively,onecouldtreatthemobilephoneasanextensionofthehome–surelythatishowmanyimplicitlythinkofit.
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Ontheotherhand,oneisexposedtointrusive,uncontrollable,andunwantedinvasionanytimetheyleavethesanctuaryofthehome.Thatisthenatureofthepublicsphere.Itisachaoticbazaarofdistractionandideas.Thefactthatonevectorbywhichthesedistractionsmayvieforone’sattentionistheirmobilephone–adevicethatisreadilyignoredandthatprovidesasleastminimalinformationindicatingthecharacterofagivencall172–seemsinsufficientbasisforreconceptualizingtherelationshipbetweenthepublicandprivatespheres.
VI. ABetterApproach
Noneofthisistosaythatthereisnothingthatthegovernmentcanorshoulddotoaddresstheveryrealproblemofrobocalls.Forinstance,therearecontent-neutralrulesthatcouldbeputinplace;thegovernmentcanregulatespeechthatisnotprotectedbytheFirstAmendment;andtherearenon-speechregulationsthatcouldbeputinplace.Severalsuchapproachesarediscussedbelow.Thepurposeofthisdiscussionisnottobeexhaustiveortoputforwardspecificpolicyproposals.Rather,itismoremodestlytodemonstratethescopeandviabilityofregulationstoaddressthecontemporaryproblemofrobocallsthatcanbeimplementedinwaysthatarenotonerouslyburdensomeofprotectedspeech.
Asastartingpoint,anyregulationshouldbeneutralastobothtechnologyandcontent.TheTCPApresentsastoryofhowtechnologiescandevelopovertimetobemoreorlesssuitablefordifferentuses,suchthatdifferenttechnologiesbecomeassociatedwithdifferenttypesofcontent.Thatis,differentwaysofmakingphonecalls–residentiallandlineversuswirelessvoiceversustextmessage–mayultimatelybecomeakintothesignsregulatedbytheSignCodeatissueinReed.Whereitmaybeappropriatetoregulatespecifictechnologiesindifferentwaystoday,suchdifferentiationshouldbeframedintermsofthespecificfactorsrequiringsuchtreatment,notintermsofspecifictechnologiesthatpossesssuchfactorstoday.Thus,forinstance,theTCPAwouldhavebeenbetterwrittentobemorerestrictiveof“phonecallsorcommunicationsinwhichthecalledpartybearsthecostofthecommunication”insteadofspecificallycallingoutwirelesstelephonecalls.Thereisafarmorecompellingcasetobemadethatthegovernmenthasaninterestinregulatingunsolicitedspeechthatimposesunavoidableanddirectcostsonthepartyreceivingitthanthatithasaninterestinregulatingunsolicitedcallstocellulartelephone.
Theremayalsobeastrongcasetobemadefortheregulationofunsolicitedcallsgenerally,asdiscussedbelow.Suchregulation,however,shouldnotsubjectdifferentcallstodifferenttreatmentbaseduponthecontentofthecall–indeed,followingSorrellandReed,itisquestionablewhethersuchregulationscanevensubjectclearlycommercialspeechtodifferentialtreatment.Thegreatestchallengeforregulationofunsolicitedcallsistherequirement–underanylevelofscrutiny–thattherulesbenarrowlytailoredanduseanappropriatelyrestrictivetechnologicalmeansofregulation.Prescribingsuchrulesinlightofarapidlychangingtechnologicallandscapeisacumbersometask,particularlywherethegovernmentitselfplaysadirectroleinregulatingthedevelopmentandimplementationoftherelevanttechnologies.
Inordertoensurethatgovernmentregulationofunsolicitedcallsisimplementedbyappropriatemeans,anyenforcementactionagainstacallerpremisedonthemannerinwhichtheymadethecallshouldbesubjecttoadefensechallengingtheconstitutionalityofthemannerinwhichtheregulationregulatesspeech.Importantly,thiseffectivelyprecludesprivatecausesofactionthatarepremiseduponthemeansbywhichacallwasmade–anysuitchallengingthemannerofspeechwouldneedtobebroughtbythegovernment(orprovideforgovernmentinvolvementinchallengingthedefense).Totakeone
172
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example,priortotheadventoftheDo-Not-Callregistry,autodialersmayhavebeeninherentlyproblematic;butsubsequenttotheadventoftheDo-Not-Callregistryautodialersthatignoretheregistryareinherentlyproblematic,whereasthosethatdoadheretoitafarlessproblematic.YetnothingabouttheTCPAortheFCC’simplementationofithasincorporatedthisfundamentalchangeinthelandscape–fromtheFCC’sperspectiveallautodialersarethesamenomatterwhetheragivenonemakesuseoftheDo-Not-Callregistry.
Thisdoesnotmeanthattherecanbenoprivatecauseofactionforproblematiccalls.Forinstance,fraudulentordeceptivecallslikelyarenotconstitutionallyprotectedspeech.SuchcallscouldincludecallsusingspoofedCaller-IDinformation,madewithoutconsenttoindividualsontheDo-Not-Callregistry,ormadeunderpretextualcircumstancestofraudulentlyestablishconsent.Themostimportantroleforthegovernmenttoplayinensuringagainstsuchharms,eitherthroughgovernmentorprivateaction,istoensuredevelopmentofbothstructuralandconductremediestoprotectagainstthem.Thismayinclude,forinstance,criminalizingthespoofingofCaller-IDorotherauthenticationinformationexceptwherenecessarytoprotectthecallerfromcertaindelineatedharms.Butitwouldalsoincluderequiringthedevelopmentandimplementationofmorerobustnetwork-levelidentificationandauthenticationmechanisms.
Byandlarge,theclearestroleforthegovernmentinaddressingtheproblemofproblematicphonecallsisusingitsauthoritytoregulatetelecommunicationsservicestoensurethatthoseservicesaredesignedandimplementedinwaysthatgiveindividualsandtelecommunicationscarriersthetoolsneededtoidentifyandrespondtounwantedcalls.Themostbasicandmoststartlingpartoftherobocallproblemisthatthesecallspersistbecausethetelephonenetworkfacilitatesthem.GiventhestateofthetechnologyasitexistedatthetimetheTCPAwasadopted,therewaslittlebetterthatcouldbedone–inits1992TCPAOrder,theCommissionconsideredalternativetechnologicalandregulatoryapproachestomitigatingtheimpactsofrobocallsandcameupempty-handed.Butastechnologyhasadvanceddramaticallyintheyearssince,theFCChascontinuedtothinkaboutrobocallsfromthetechnologicalmindsetasitexistedin1991.Indeed,theFCCitselfhaspreventedthenetworksfromtakingactionagainstcallersthatareknowntobeproblematic–ithasnotbeenuntilthepastyearthattheCommissionhasseriouslyconsideredallowingtelephonecarrierstoimplementtechnologytoblockknownharmfulcallersortoempowercalledpartiestotakegreatercontrolofthetime,place,andmannerinwhichcallingpartiescanintrudeupontheirsolitudebymakingtheirphonesring.
Theflipsideofthisobservationisthatthegovernmentshouldneverprohibitorinterferewithconsensualcalls.Rather,amoreproductive(and,incidentally,constitutional)taskwouldbetofacilitatethedevelopmentofmoresophisticatedfeaturestoallowbothcallingandcalledpartiestoestablish,demonstrate,andrevokeconsent.Again,thesearefeaturesthatarebestimplementedatthenetworklevel,andtheyarethereforewellwithintheFCC’scorecompetenciestoworkwithindustrytodevelopandimplement.173
SuchanapproachrequiresafundamentallydifferentregulatoryphilosophythanhasbeenondisplayintheCommission’spreviousTCPArules.ThisisperhapsbestondisplaywiththeCommission’sapproachinthe2015Ordertoreassignednumbers.Thisproblemis,firstandforemost,theresponsibilityoftheFCCtoaddress.TheFCCoverseestheNorthAmericanNumberingPlan(NANP)andtheNANPAdministration.And,indeed,theproblemofnumberreassignmentinmanywaysresultsfromNANPA’sdecisiontoallocatecarrierssmallerblocksofnewnumbers.YettheCommission’sapproachtotheproblemofindividualsonreassignednumbersreceivingunconsented-tocallswastoburdenthespeechofcallersandtheconsentingintendedrecipientsofthosecalls.Thebetterapproachtotheproblemof
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reassignednumbers–bothpragmaticallyandinviewoftheFirstAmendment–wouldbefortheCommissiontoregulatetheprocessbywhichtelecommunicationscarriersreassignnumbers.Ratherthanputtheburdenofaddressingtheproblemscreatedbynumberreassignmentonthespeechofconsentingparties,theFCCshouldplacetheburdenwhereitactuallybelongs:onthenetworksandnumberreassignmentproceduresthatcreatetheproblem.Forinstance,theNANPAcouldalterhowitallocatesnewnumberstobettertakethevolumeofnumberreassignmentintoaccount.TheFCCcouldimposerulesthat,forinstance,preventnumbersfrombeingreassignedforsomeperiodoftime,inordertofacilitatecallerslearningthatnumbershavebeendisconnectedandscreeningofdisconnectednumbersthatreceiveinordinatenumbersofcalls(and,therefore,shouldnotbereassigned).Finally,theFCCcouldoverseethecreationofareassigned-numbersdatabasethatautodialerscouldconsultinordertolearnaboutnumberreassignmentsanddiscontinuecalls.
Conclusion
UnwantedphonecallsareoneofthemostdetestedcommonoccurrencesinmodernAmericanlife.Withover2.4billionrobocallsplacedmonthly,eachcustomerislikelytoreceiveabout10ofthesecallseverymonth,withsomereceivingfarmore.
Understandably,mostpeoplewantthesecallstostop–andtheTCPAwasputinplacetorealizethatgoal.Unfortunately,theTCPAhasprovenentirelyineffectiveataccomplishingit.Astrongmajorityofthemostproblematiccallsaremadeusingtechnologiesthatmakeenforcementdifficult,hidingtheidentitiesofthecaller.Manyofthesecallsareoutrightscams,wherethecallismerelypretexttoacquiringinformationtobeuseaspartofsomeotherscheme.Atthesametime,legitimatebusinessesthatusetelephonecallsforsociallydesirablepurposesareoftencaughtupintheTCPA’swebofstrictliabilityandstatutorydamages–awebthathisgivenrisetoasubstantialindustryofclassactionattorneysthatoftenpreyoninnocentmistakesofcompaniesthatseektobeTCPAcomplaint.AndtheTCPAsurelykeepsotherproductiveusesofthetelephonefromevermakingitoffofthedrawingboard–allinavainattempttostifleillegitimatecallerswhoarelargelyundeterredbytheTCPA.
TheTCPAisalawthatregulatesspeech.AssuchitissubjecttoFirstAmendmentscrutiny.HistoricallythestatuteandtheFCC’sregulationsimplementingithavesurvivedthisscrutiny.CasesaffirmingtheTCPAhavegenerallydonesounderintermediatescrutiny,findingthatthegovernmenthadinsignificantinterestinitsassertedgoalofprotectingconsumersfromtheprivacyinvasionofunwantedphonecalls,andfindingthestatuteandregulationssufficientlytailoredgiventhetechnologicalandeconomicarchitecturesofthetelephonenetwork.
ThisarticlehasrevisitedtheFirstAmendmentchallengestotheTCPAinlightoflegalandtechnologicalchangesincethelawwasadoptedin1991.RecentSupremeCourtprecedentsuggeststhatthelawisbetterevaluatedunderstrictscrutinythatintermediatescrutiny.Changesintechnologysubstantiallyweakenthegovernment’sassertedprivacyinterests.Thestatutehasproventosubstantiallyabridgesociallyvaluablespeechandhasprovenwhollyineffectiveatcurtailingundesirableandharmfulspeech.And,perhapsmostaudacious,thegovernmentitselfpervasivelyregulatesthetelephonenetwork–assuch,ithastheabilitytoimplementtechnologiesthatbetteraddresstheseproblems.Butratherthanfacilitatingtheirdevelopment,ithashistoricallylimitedwhattelephonecarrierscoulddotocombattheseuniversallydetestedphonecalls.(Fortunately,theFCChasrecentlybegunexploringnewregulationstoreversethistrend.)Regardless,alawthatregulatesspeechtoaddressaproblemthatisitselfbetteraddressabledirectlybythegovernmentisfaciallynotnarrowlytailored.
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Thesimplefactisthatconsumersdon’tdislikethesephonecallsbecauseofthetechnologicalnatureofthecalls.Theydislikethembecausetheybearunwantedmessages.Anautomatically-dialedprerecordedmessageinformingsomeonethattheyhavereceivedafinancialwindfall,orthatafamilymemberhasarrivedattheairport,orthataprescriptionhasbeenfilledmaywillbereceivedwarmly.Acallmadeusingthesametechnologythatispartofascam,oradvertisingunwantedservices,islikelydisfavored.Thisistrueregardlessofwhetherthecallswereconsentedto,expected,orthetechnologybywhichtheyweremade.
BeyondthetraditionalFirstAmendmentproblemstheTCPAfaces,itraisesotherconcerns.ThemodernproblemofunwantedcallsisparticularlyperniciousbecausethetelephonenetworkhasnotbeenpermittedbytheFCCtokeeptechnologicalpacewithothercommunicationstechnologies–andconverselyitcouldbelargelymitigatedthroughtheadoptionofrelativelycommoncontemporarysecuritytechnologies.TheFCC’sroleinregulatingthetelephonenetworkmeansthattheTCPAworksbyrestrictingspeechinordertoremedyaproblemlargelyofthegovernment’sowndesign.Thisisclearlyproblematic.Andastechnologyhaschanged,theconceptionofprivacythatanimatestheTCPA–theideaofthesanctityofthehome–hassilentlytransformedintoaprivacyrightfarbroaderthananythingthathasbeenpreviouslyrecognized.
Ratherthanregulatespeech–tryingtoprohibitcertaintypesofcallersfromtransmittingcertaintypesofunwantedmessages–abetterstatutoryandregulatoryapproachistoencouragethedevelopmentofconsumer-facingtechnologiesthatempowerthemtocontrolwhocancallthemandforwhatpurposes.AtthetimetheTCPAwasadoptedsuchtechnologieswereinfeasible.Todaytheyarenot–indeed,theFCCisactivelyexploringmanyofthem.Theadventandimplementationofthesetechnologieswould–and,hopefully,will–rendertheTCPAanunnecessarystatute.Today,however,thefactremainsthatmanylegitimatebusinessesandindividualsactingingoodfaithandattemptingtobeincompliancewiththeTCPAhavebeencaughtinitswebofliability,andthatfewofthebadactorsintendedtobetargetedbythestatutearedeterredbyit.It’stimewestopsilencingPeterinthisvainattempttoquietPaul.