Teleology and Intentionality:

A Challenge to the Deflationary View

By Benjamin W. Jarvis

A.B. Harvard University, 2002

A. M. Brown University, 2005

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island

May, 2010

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This dissertation by Benjamin W. Jarvis is accepted in its present form by the

Department of Philosophy as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree

in Doctor of Philosophy

Date___________________ Signature__________________________________

Richard Heck, Jr., Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date___________________ Signature__________________________________

Christopher Hill, Reader

Date___________________ Signature__________________________________

Joshua Schechter, Reader

Approved by the Graduate School

Date___________________ Signature_________________________________

Sheila Bonde, Dean of the Graduate School

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CURRICULUM VITAE

for

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Birth Place: Provo, UT Birth Date: April 1, 1978

Education

Brown University (2003-2010) Ph.D. Philosophy, expected 2010. A.M. Philosophy, 2005.

Harvard University (1996-2002 A.B. Philosophy, Magna Cum Laude, 2002.

Positions

Arché Scholar (Fall 2009), Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St. Andrews

Honors and Awards

Brown University: Manning (Dissertation) Fellowship 2007-2008. Summer Fellowship 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. First Year Fellowship 2003-2004

Harvard University: Thomas T. Hoopes Prize, (May) 2002, Awarded for Outstanding Thesis “Transworld Identity’s Counterpart” (advisor James Pryor). John Harvard Scholar 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002.

Publications

“Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction” (with Jonathan Ichikawa) Philosophical Studies, 142.2 (2009).

Presentations

“Experiences as Mere Enablers,” Arché Philosophical Methodology Conference (University of St. Andrews),

April 25-27, 2009. “The Instrumental Value of Truth and the Utility of Belief-Desire Psychology,” Southwest Graduate Conference (Arizona State University), March 21, 2009. “Representation and Function,” Arché (University of St. Andrews), March 19, 2008. “Assertion and Knowledge upon Knowledge,” Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Philosophy Conference, March 8-9, 2008.

Teaching Experience

Instructor of Record, Brown University: Philosophy 11, The Nature of Fiction, Fall 2008.

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Philosophy 4, Reason and Religion, Fall 2006. Philosophy 903, Skepticism, Summer 2006, 2007, and 2008.

Teaching Assistant, Brown University: Philosophy 3, Knowledge and Skepticism, Felicia Nimue Ackerman, Fall 2004. Philosophy 36, Early Modern Philosophy, Justin Broackes, Spring 2005.

Grader, Brown University: Philosophy 164, The Nature of Morality, James Dreier, Spring 2007.

Professional Experience

Editorial Assistant (under Pauline Jacobson), Linguistics and Philosophy, 2006-2007.

Editorial Assistant (under Ernest Sosa), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Spring 2006.

Research Assistant to Felicia Nimue Ackerman, Fall 2005.

Research Assistant to Justin Broackes, Spring 2009. Conference Organizer (with Eoin Ryan), Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, October 14-15, 2005

Coordinator, Philosophy Graduate Forum, Brown University, 2006-2007.

Committee Member, Philosophy Graduate Forum, Brown University, 2004-2007.

Participant, Informal Aesthetics Discussion Group, Brown University, Spring 2009.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

Of all my intellectual debts, my greatest is to Richard Heck, who shepherded me not only as a

graduate student at Brown, but also as an undergraduate at Harvard. I am very grateful for

Richard’s thoughtful criticism and advice these last ten years. I hope to continue to benefit from

them for many years to come.

I am also grateful to the other members of my committee, Chris Hill and Josh Schechter.

The course Chris taught on concepts has turned out to be the most influential course I took as a

graduate student. I regret not having taken more of his courses. I greatly appreciate Chris for

his sharp criticisms (which I have learned to take as a sign of concern and respect) as well as his

passion for the subject. I likewise appreciate Josh both for his profound insights as well as his

nimble critiques. In addition to being a good mentor, Josh has become a good friend.

I have benefited from a great number of past and present members of the Brown

faculty, but there are a few others that stand out: Jaegwon Kim, Ernie Sosa, Jamie Dreier, Doug

Kutach, James van Cleve, and Polly Jacobson. I would like to thank my undergraduate advisor,

Jim Pryor, not only for stewarding my intellectual development during that period, but also for

teaching me how to write a philosophy paper.

I would be remiss if I failed to mention the graduate students I have met at Brown, who

have greatly contributed to my social life as well as my education. Of the graduate students I

met while I was at Brown, Jonathan Ichikawa has been most influential on my development as a

philosopher. I have greatly valued his friendship and collaboration.

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Of course, no graduate student at Brown has been more important to me than my wife,

Katherine. I will always be grateful to Brown University (and to philosophy) for bringing us

together. I am most grateful for her love and her support of my academic endeavors.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Introduction, p. 1

Chapter One, p. 3

Chapter Two, p. 59

Chapter Three, p. 88

Chapter Four, p. 118

Concluding Thoughts, p. 158

References, p. 160

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INTRODUCTION:

This work is an extended argument for a particular theory of intentionality—what I call the

“teleological theory of intentional representation” (TTIR). According to TTIR, beliefs and desires

are cognitive states with representational jobs, where having representational jobs of the

requisite sort involves being subject to particular representational norms. TTIR contrasts with

non-teleological theories of intentionality—including deflationary theories of content—

according to which intentional properties (having a particular attitude and content) are merely a

matter of having the right collection of dispositional properties (which generally are not

constitutive of teleological properties).

This monograph is composed of four chapters. I spend most of the first two chapters

differentiating TTIR from its competitors. For instance, one of the distinguishing features of TTIR

is the prominent role it gives to truth and satisfaction conditions in the theory of intentionality.

Of course, no sensible theorist would deny that beliefs (and their immediate kin) have truth

conditions while desires (and their immediate kin) have satisfaction conditions. This admission,

however, falls well short of assuring truth and satisfaction conditions any prominent role in the

theory of intentional states. Truth and satisfaction conditions are too easy to come by with the

addition of a deflationary theory of truth; moreover, a deflationary theory of truth does not put

any constraint on the theory of intentional states. According to TTIR, truth and satisfaction

conditions must correspond to genuinely normative correctness conditions. This thesis

substantially constrains the supervenience relations between intentional properties (of attitude

2

and content) and underlying dispositional properties. In Chapter Two, I argue that TTIR

motivates rejecting a deflationary theory of truth.

In Chapter One, I not only explain in great detail what the teleological theory of

intentional representation is, I contrast it with its clearest competitor: deflationary theories of

content. In so doing, I show what is at issue between these two types of theories of

intentionality, and at the end of the chapter, I suggest how what’s at issue might be settled. I

spend the rest of the dissertation arguing on behalf of TTIR.

The case in favor of TTIR is conclusive for two reasons. First, as I point out at the end of

Chapter One, a commitment to TTIR is effectively a commitment to the idea that belief-desire

psychology advantages a subject by producing cognitive states with representational jobs. In

other words, an advocate of TTIR ought to be able to argue that beliefs and desires only succeed

in reliably getting a subject around the world by acting as states with representational jobs

ought to. Thus, if TTIR is true, it should be the case that reliably producing and retaining beliefs

that are true and thereby reliably satisfying desires is essential to the utility of belief-desire

psychology. In Chapter Three, I argue that this is so—a belief-desire psychology is useful only to

the extent that it is producing and retaining true beliefs so as to regularly satisfy desires that are

closely aligned to the subject’s antecedent interests. Second, as I also suggest at the end of

Chapter One, deflationary theories of content must be accompanied by an adequate theory of

attitudes. In Chapter Four, I show that any adequate theory of attitudes vindicates TTIR.

Part of making the case in favor of TTIR involves indicating how the teleological aspect

of TTIR might turn out to be naturalism friendly. In Chapters Three and Four, I also show that

once we can understand how creatures come to have interests, it is fairly straightforward to see

how the cognitive architecture of creatures can have the telos of producing and retaining

representations.

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CHAPTER ONE:

Deflationary Theories of Content and the Teleological Theory

of Intentional Representation

§1: Introduction

This chapter is a work in philosophical taxonomy. In particular, it is a taxonomy of philosophical

theories of the intentional.

For my purposes, a mental state is intentional only if it is an attitude with a content.

(Beliefs and desires are paradigm intentional states. Perceptual states do not count as

intentional even if they have content.) Consequently, a philosophical theory of the intentional

has two different components, a theory of attitudes and a theory of content. A theory of

attitudes is a theory that, among other things, explains what makes some particular intentional

state a belief, say, rather than, say, a desire. A theory of content is a theory that, among other

things, explains what makes some particular intentional state, one of Winston Churchill's beliefs,

for example, have the content that it does, e.g. that the Iron Curtain had descended, rather than

some other content, e.g. that the Berlin Wall would fall.

Without question, there are major disagreements among theories of content (and

consequently among theories of attitude). The primary purpose of this chapter is to make some

of those disagreements plain.

2

This chapter follows up on Hartry Field's “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.”1

In that paper, Field attempts to make a distinction between two views on content. According to

one, “inflationist,” view, “truth conditions play an extremely central role in semantics and the

theory of mind.”2 On the other, “deflationist,” view truth conditions are not so central. Far

more central to the theory of content is various aspects of a sentence's “use.”

Unfortunately, what it is for truth conditions rather than “use” to play the “central” role

in the theory of content (and vice-versa) is far from clear. For my part, I am not satisfied that

Field has made this difference adequately perspicuous. I believe the crucial distinction here is

one between those theories of content that adopt what I call the teleological theory of

intentional representation (TTIR) and those do not. Throughout §2, I will attempt to clarify this

distinction. In §3, I will show that deflationists are committed to reject TTIR.

While I think that the TTIR distinction is the (relevantly) crucial distinction between

those theories that do and do not take truth conditions as central, I am not at all convinced that

it is the distinction between inflationary (or “inflationist”) and deflationary (or “deflationist”)

theories of content (DTCs). DTCs have other distinguishing features in addition to rejecting TTIR.

I will attempt to explain DTCs in §4.

§2: The Teleological Theory of Intentional Representation

§2.1: Principal Theses of TTIR

The teleological theory of intentional representation (TTIR) is easy enough to state:

(TTIR) Principal intentional states— most certainly beliefs and desires—are robust mental representations.3

1 Field (1994) reprinted in Field (2001). 2 Ibid, 104. 3 By saying “most certainly beliefs and desires,” I presuppose that belief-desire psychology is core to a theory of intentional states.

3

TTIR is compatible with the thesis that all intentional states are mental representations, but it

allows that some intentional states are not.4 Whatever exceptions there may be, an adherent of

TTIR will likely insist that a subject can only have these intentional states if he is antecedently

capable of having robust mental representations. Henceforth, I will ignore the hedge against

possible exceptions and use “intentional states” to refer only to those of a “principal” sort.

To understand TTIR we must understand what it is for something to be a robust mental

representation. An intentional state is a robust mental representation if and only if the

representational properties of the intentional state play an important role in differentiating its

intentional aspects, i.e. its attitude and content. Thus, TTIR commits us to two supplementary

theses.

The first relates to the content of an intentional state:

(First Supplementary) Something is an intentional state with content that p partly in virtue of representing that p and representing nothing stronger than that p.

According to this first thesis, the content of intentional states is largely (although perhaps not

entirely) a matter of what the intentional state is (representationally) about.

The second relates to the attitude of an intentional state:

(Second Supplementary) An intentional state is of a particular attitude kind, e.g. a belief, desire, etc. at least partly in virtue of the kind of representation it is (as opposed to what it represents).

According to this second thesis, different attitude kinds are closely tied with different ways of

representing.5 So, for instance, to believe is to represent in a maplike way while to desire is to

4 Possible exceptions might be the intentional state of having .7 credence towards the proposition that Churchill was a good painter or that of merely entertaining the proposition that Churchill was a good painter. Thanks to David Christensen for his discussion here. 5 When I say that beliefs represent in a “maplike” way, I don't intend to be entering the debate between potential adherents of TTIR over how mental representations are structured syntactically, i.e. whether

4

represent more as a blueprint does. Thus, as a map about the streets of Chicago reflects the

way that the streets of Chicago are, so, in a way, does a belief about the streets of Chicago.

Likewise, as a blueprint about the streets of Chicago projects a way for the streets of Chicago to

be, so, in a way, does a desire about the streets of Chicago. Moreover, according to this second

thesis, it is at least partly because of these differences in representation that beliefs are beliefs

and desires are desires. For instance, a belief about the streets of Chicago is distinguished from

a desire about the streets of Chicago precisely because latter does not reflect, but rather

projects vis-à-vis the streets of Chicago.

Very likely, representational properties are not brute or primitive properties. In other

words, states and objects likely have representational properties in virtue of having other (more

fundamental) properties. Consequently, TTIR is, very likely, an incomplete theory of

intentionality for it does nothing to explain how it is that people might (or might not) come to

be in states that have the representational properties TTIR says are requisite for intentional

states. Unless he is an eliminativist regarding the intentional (i.e. unless he claims there are no

intentional states), an adherent of TTIR needs to show how psychological states could have the

(more fundamental) properties underlying mental representation. One of the primary

differences between various non-eliminativist theories of intentionality that endorse TTIR is the

way in which the theories attempt to discharge this burden.6

they are structured syntactically like map/pictures/graphs rather than like sentences or vice-versa. See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Chapters 10-11. 6 One might, for example, try to discharge this burden using principally inference, e.g. Block (1986), Peacocke (1992), information, e.g. Fodor (1987), (1990), (1994), (1998), natural selection, e.g. Millikan (1989), or facts about learning, cf. Dretske (1986) (both reprinted in Stich and Warfield (1994)).

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§2.2: The Basics of Representation

To understand better the explanatory burden of TTIR, we must first understand better the

nature of representation. I know of no way to develop an adequate theory of representation

unless it is to consider paradigm cases.

Consider, then, a map of Chicago. The city of Chicago might be organized in many

different ways. Some of the ways are compatible with our map. Other of the ways are

incompatible with the map. A blueprint of Chicago works much the same way. Some of the

ways Chicago might be organized are compatible with a given blueprint of Chicago. Other ways

are not.

Suppose every way compatible with a map/blueprint is one in which Chicago borders a

lake. In this case, our map/blueprint represents that Chicago borders a lake. The converse is

also true. Suppose our map/blueprint represents that Chicago borders a lake. Then, it must be

that a way Chicago might be organized is compatible with our map/blueprint only if it is one in

which Chicago borders a lake.

This example projects. Thus, any representation divides some space of possibilities.

Any representation is such that individual possibilities in this space will be compatible or

incompatible. Moreover, it appears that what makes something a representation is precisely

that it divides some space of possibilities into those that are compatible and those that are

incompatible. If some piece of paper divides ways that Chicago might be organized into sets of

compatible and incompatible, then this piece of paper is a representation of Chicago.

If beliefs and desires are mental representations, then they divvy up possible scenarios

into those that are compatible and those that are incompatible. For a possible scenario to be

compatible with a belief, the belief must be correct when evaluated with respect to that

possible scenario. For a possible scenario to be incompatible with a belief, the belief must be

6

incorrect when evaluated with respect to that possible scenario. For a possible scenario to be

compatible with a desire, the possible scenario must be correct when evaluated with respect to

that desire. (In other words, the scenario must be one in which things have worked out in

accordance with the desire.) For a possible scenario to be incompatible with a desire, the

possible scenario must be incorrect when evaluated with respect to that desire. (In other

words, the scenario must be one in which things have not worked out in accordance with the

desire.) The difference between beliefs and desires on this count corresponds to a difference in

direction of fit. For maplike representations, the representations are supposed to fit the world.

For blueprintlike representations, the world is supposed to come to fit the representations.

According to (First Supplementary), any possible belief or desire with content that p

represents that p and nothing stronger. As we have seen in our map/blueprint of Chicago

example, to represent that p is to divide the space of possibilities in a certain way. Thus,

possible beliefs that p represent that p and nothing stronger if and only if the following criterion

is met:

(Norm of Belief) Beliefs that p are correct relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.

Likewise, desires that p represent that p and nothing stronger if and only if the following

criterion is met:

(Norm of Desire) Any arbitrary scenario is correct relative to desires that p if and only if in that scenario, p.7

7 Although an intuitive understanding of (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) is easy enough, there are reasons to worry that they are not acceptable because the content mentioned/named on the left-hand side of the biconditional is used on the right-hand side. One might think that we could get around this problem by using truth on the right-hand side of the biconditional in its role as a device of generalization. However, on a theory of truth that I am sympathetic to according to which truth is a normative property applying to contents just in case they are correctly believable (or in case the actual world is correct relative to a desire with that content), this revision makes (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) viciously circular.

To assure that (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) have the right substance, either we have to introduce for technical purposes a non-normative, deflationary notion of truth, or we have to use

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TTIR is committed to defending (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire).8 It will likewise be

committed to defending analogous norms for many other intentional states.

To clarify (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire), we would need to understand further

what a (possible) scenario is.9 The adherent of TTIR is not committed to ontological realism

about scenarios, or for that matter, any particular view on modality, so long as one can make

sense of talk of possible scenarios.10 Most pressing for the adherent of TTIR is not the question

of what (if anything) possible scenarios are, but how finely scenarios are individuated. The grain

of scenario individuation, after all, determines the grain of representation.

Beliefs and desires can be about any aspect of the world, where the “world” includes

everything that is. Presumably, then, possible scenarios are individuated at least as fine-grained

as possible states of the world, i.e. the metaphysical possibilities.11 Perhaps, possible scenarios

are individuated more fine-grained still if it is possible to coherently represent the world in ways

substitutional quantification. I see no insuperable obstacle for either approach. For some discussion about problems with the latter, cf. Kaplan (1968). Either approach must contend with the semantic paradoxes, but we must contend with them in any case. See Horwich (1990), 40-2 and Hill (2002), Chapter 6.

At any rate, I will ignore the difficulties that arise in properly formulating (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire). So far as I can see, the fundamental underlying challenges, i.e. the semantic paradoxes, afflict all parties to the debate. Putting forward a proper formulation of (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) is no more difficult than putting forward a proper deflationary theory of truth. 8 I presuppose (again) that an advocate of TTIR is committed to belief-desire psychology is core to a theory of intentional states. 9 It's worth pausing here to acknowledge that I am favoring one important tradition that emphasizes the importance of truth conditions over another. Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1986) are exemplars of the “possible worlds” tradition I am favoring. Davidson (1984) is the father of the other tradition. I favor the former over the latter because of the Foster-Soames problem that plagues the latter view. See Foster (1976) and Soames (1992). Higginbotham (1992) attempts to save the Davidson tradition by claiming the T-theory that is the correct theory of content for a natural language is the one speakers must have knowledge of to be competent. It is not obvious to me how this suggestion can help when we are thinking about the content of intentional states. We cannot suppose that thinkers must antecedently have knowledge (and ipso facto intentional states with content) for them to have intentional states with a given content. Perhaps the Davidsonian program can be salvaged, but I reserve some doubts. Thanks to Richard Heck for his helpful discussion here. 10 See, for instance, Schiffer (2003) for some discussion on this point 11 See Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1986).

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that it (metaphysically) could not be.12 Another of the primary differences between those who

adopt TTIR comes in differences in opinion over how finely the possible scenarios relevant to

mental representation are to be individuated. I will not adjudicate that debate here.

(Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) show that a commitment to robust mental

representation involves a commitment to correctness conditions. The correctness conditions of

a belief are co-extensive with the truth conditions for that belief; perhaps correctness conditions

just are truth conditions. (More on this point shortly.) I would suggest that the important

tradition within philosophy of language/mind that emphasizes the centrality of truth conditions

stems from an underlying commitment (or at least attraction) to TTIR.13

§2.3: Is TTIR cheap?

(Norm of Belief) looks very much like (Truth Conditions):

(Truth Conditions) Beliefs that p are true relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.

What's more, (Truth Conditions) appears platitudinous. Consequently, it appears platitudinous

that beliefs are robust mental representations.

A similar situation arises with desires. One might be inclined to think that (Norm of

Desire) is synonymous with (Satisfaction Conditions):

(Satisfaction Conditions) Desires that p are satisfied relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.

Moreover, (Satisfaction Conditions) appears to be platitudinous as well. Consequently, it

appears platitudinous that desires are robust mental representations. Is any prima facie

plausible theory of intentionality committed to TTIR?

12 See Soames (2005), 331-333. 13 See Field (1994) reprinted in Field (2001), 104-7.

9

No. Consider a deflationary theory of truth-satisfaction. Such a theory will be

committed to (Truth Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions). However, on such a theory, truth

and satisfaction do not have a normative aspect.14 Most deflationary theorists about truth are

fairly clear on that point,15 but it is easy enough to see that many doctrines they typically

embrace lead to that conclusion whether explicitly embraced or not. For instance, deflationary

theorists often say that in ascribing truth to a content/sentence one does little more than using

the content/sentence itself;16 truth is merely a device of generalization.17 However, if to ascribe

truth to a content/sentence was to evaluate a hypothetical belief with that content/the content

of that sentence, it would appear to ascribe truth would not be to do little more than using the

content/sentence itself.

Because on a deflationary theory of truth and satisfaction do not have a normative

aspect, a deflationary theorist of truth/satisfaction will not necessarily be committed to (Norm

of Belief) and (Norm of Desire). If a deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction is true, neither

(Truth Conditions) entails (Norm of Belief), nor (Satisfaction Conditions) entails (Norm of Desire).

Both (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) are genuine norms. (Norm of Belief) entails that a

belief that p is not as it ought to be relative to any scenario that is not a p-scenario. Thus, it

entails one ought have a belief that p only if p. (Norm of Desire) entails that any scenario that is

not a p-scenario is not as it ought to be relative to a desire that p.18 Thus, it entails that things

have not gone well for a desire that p if it is not actually the case that p. On a deflationary

14 I do not count Crispin Wright's minimalist theory of truth as among the deflationary theories of truth. See Wright (1992). 15 See Horwich (1998), 184-95, Horwich (2005), 104-34, Horwich (2006), and Field (2001), 121. 16 Field (2001), 105-6, 151-2. 17 Horwich (1990), 2-3, 31-33. 18 Thus, Boghossian (2005) overlooks the possibility of a norm for desire because he fails to take into account the difference between beliefs and desires in direction of fit.

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theory of truth/satisfaction, (Truth Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) do not entail any

ought statements.

My contention is that representation brings in “oughts.” Shortly, I will defend that

contention. Before I do, however, it's worth noting that under a different non-deflationary

theory of truth/satisfaction whereon truth and satisfaction do have a normative aspect, (Truth

Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) would be sufficient to establish TTIR (at least restricted

to beliefs and desires) because, of course, they would be equivalent to (Norm of Belief) and

(Norm of Desire) respectively. In effect, the success of a non-eliminativist adherent of TTIR

hinges on the availability of a non-deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction.19

§2.4: Representation and Normativity, Part I

In §2.3, I contended that representation has a normative aspect. Challenging my contention,

someone might ask the following question:

• Why is it not enough to qualify as a representation that something divides the space of possibilities in such a way that we can make sense of correspondence between it and the world?

My challenger, no doubt, assumes that there is not (essentially) a normative aspect to dividing

the space of possibilities in such a way that we can make sense of correspondence between it

and the world. For now, I will grant that assumption; I will argue against it in §2.5.

My challenger's question concerns the nature of representation. As I have already said,

I know of no way of addressing such questions about the nature of representation unless it be

considering paradigm cases of representation. Thus, I will turn back to examples.

Suppose that Winston Churchill paints a landscape that unbeknowst to him

“corresponds” in visual likeness exactly (and uniquely) with a valley in southeast China. I

19 See Chapter Two.

11

contend that even if through resemblance Churchill's painting “divides” the space of possibilities

so that perhaps we can make sense of “correspondence” between the painting and the valley in

southeast China, the painting is certainly not a representation of the valley in southeast China.

Representation requires more.

Following Hilary Putnam,20 one might suggest that what's missing here is a causal

explanation of the correspondence relation. This suggestion proves unhelpful. Consider

another example. Various scenes from The Lord of the Rings movies “correspond” quite well

with the landscapes of New Zealand where the movies were filmed (or so I would assume).

These scenes from the movies, however, do not represent the landscapes of New Zealand.21

Despite the caused “correspondence” with landscapes of New Zealand, the scenes from The

Lord of the Rings movies represent the landscape of Middle Earth. Representation is not a

matter of caused “correspondence.”

In fact, as those familiar with the “chain problem” of the so-called “causal theory of

reference” should quickly be able to see, there is at least one principled reason why a causal

theory of representation will fail.22 If there is a relation of “correspondence” between world

state A and world state B facilitated through a causal chain running from A to B, there's very

likely to be a relation of “correspondence” between world state C and world state B, where

world state C is another link of the causal chain that runs from A to B. Thus, “correspondence”

with a causal explanation cannot be sufficient for representation. We can see this principled

20 Putnam (1981), Chapter 1. 21 We might, of course, use scenes from the movies as a representation of the landscapes of New Zealand. Due to our (intentional) use, perhaps they might thereby become representations of New Zealand. Of course, if so, I would argue the same could be said of Churchill's painting in the previous example. Once the “correspondence” relation between the painting and the valley was discovered, there would be nothing stopping us from (intentionally) using the painting (or copies of it) as a representation of the valley (i.e. by showing people what the contours of the valley look like using the depiction in the painting), and through our (intentional) use, I suspect the painting may well become a representation of the valley even when it wasn't one before. 22 For more on the “chain problem” see Prinz (2002), 240. The causal theory of reference traces back to Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972).

12

problem by way of a whimsical example. Suppose that Don Juan, the great seducer, unwittingly

seduces his sister who conceives. By a veritable (albeit nomologically possible) miracle, her child

is a genetic duplicate of Don Juan. (Don Juan) Junior grows up to become the subject of a

famous (realist) portrait due entirely to his natural good looks. The famous (realist) portrait

corresponds exactly not only to Junior, but to Don Juan. Moreover, there is a causal chain

between Don Juan and the portrait, which causally explains the “correspondence.”

Nonetheless, the portrait represents Junior, not Don Juan. (One might complain that the causal

chain running from Don Juan to the portrait isn't sufficiently regular or usual, but it doesn't take

long to see that that feature is merely incidental to this particular example; the chain problem

survives.)

While causal links may, in many paradigm cases, be a necessary condition for

representation, it is only because a creator, designer, or producer must be in causal contact with

something in order to make an object that represents it. What fundamentally matters for

representation in paradigm cases is neither correspondence nor caused correspondence, but

how, given the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the creators, designers, producers, and users,

objects are supposed to match up with the world.

Suppose Warren Buffett commissions a painter to create a (realist rather than surrealist)

portrait of him. We might well suppose that the commissioned portrait turns out not to look

exactly like Warren Buffett. Perhaps the painter became convinced that he would be paid

better if he made the Warren Buffett in the painting slightly better looking than Warren Buffett

actually is. Nonetheless, despite the lack of “correspondence,” there's no problem in supposing

that the portrait represents Warren Buffett as he is rather than representing Warren Buffett if

he were better looking. What matters here is how the portrait is to be evaluated. Realist

portraits representing Warren Buffett as he actually visually appears are supposed to look a

13

certain way (at least qua realist portrait representing Warren Buffett as he actually visually

appears). It is the fact that the portrait ought (qua realist portrait) to look a certain way that

makes it represent Warren Buffett. Assuming the portrait represents Warren Buffett, then it is

not how it ought to be (qua realist portrait) if it depicts a man resembling Warren Buffett, but

slightly better looking than him. Although we might not say that such a favorable depiction

constituted a bad realist portrait, we would certainly say it was not perfectly good or exactly

right. To return to the language of “correctness,” we should say in this case that the portrait was

not correct, at least in the details. We would not generally hesitate in this assessment even if

we acknowledge the painter's overriding reasons, given his financial incentives and an

indifference as to artistic integrity, make it the case that he ought to have painted the portrait

just as he has with all of the inaccuracies.

My contention is that representation comes with “oughts.” The “ought” in play here is

not a moral or pragmatic “ought.” It is an “ought” that arises from having a certain

representational purpose, teleology, or function—the purpose, teleology, or function of

corresponding in a specified way. Representational “oughts” are a sort of teleological or

functional ought. The fact that a realist portrait ought to look a certain way is akin to the fact

that a chair ought not fall apart when sat upon. It is likewise akin to the fact that a goalie ought

to block shots on goal and dancers of the waltz ought not step on each others’ feet. These

normative facts arise because realist portraits, chairs, goalies, and dancers of the waltz are

objects and people with certain functions or purposes.

Generally, things and people come to have certain functions due to the relevant agents’

intentions.23 Thus, in paradigm cases, representational “oughts” come to apply to

representations, such as paintings, in virtue of the artist’s intentions. (We also apply

23 Obviously, they couldn't originally have come to apply to intentional states in this way. Cf. §2.8.

14

representational “oughts” to the states of various human artifacts designed to detect some

property or other. These “oughts” analogously come to apply to the states of these detectors in

virtue of the intentions of the designer or user of the artifact.)24 A painting that is a portrait of

Warren Buffett ought to reflect the physical characteristics of Warren Buffett because the

artist’s intent was that the painting be evaluated according to whether it does. The artist’s

intent can endow his creation with the purpose of “corresponding” to something. This purpose

of “corresponding” gives rise to the “ought” of representation.

§2.5: Representation and Normativity, Part II

In §2.4, I conceded, for the sake of argument, that the normative aspect of representation isn't

essential to dividing the space of possibilities in such a way that we can make sense of

correspondence between it and the world. Here I want to strengthen my argument for the

conclusion that representation has a normative aspect by taking back that concession. If we can

make sense of correspondence, normativity is already in play. Cases in which it appears

otherwise are illusory.

Of course, prominent philosophers have been convinced otherwise. Consider this quote

from Fred Dretske:

...failing (or succeeding) in corresponding to the facts is, as far as I can see, a straightforward factual matter. Nothing normative about it. An arrow (on a sign, say) can point to Chicago or away from Chicago. There is a difference here, yes, but the difference is not normative. Aside from our purposes in putting the sign there or in using the sign as a guide, there is nothing right or wrong, nothing that is supposed-to-be or supposed-not-to-be, about an arrow pointing to Chicago.25

24 Dretske is famous for such examples. See, for instance, Dretske (1986) reprinted in Stich and Warfield (1994), Dretske (1988), and Dretske (2000a), 203-4. 25 Dretske (2000b) in Dretske (2000a), 247.

15

While perhaps prima facie compelling, I believe Dretske's remarks (and others like his) are

misguided. Consider the vectors beginning at the tail of the arrow and passing through the

arrow's head. It is, no doubt, an entirely factual matter whether some such vector (roughly)

ends in Chicago. If this fact settles the matter of whether the arrow “points” to Chicago, then

without question the matter is entirely factual. (Of course, in saying that the arrow “points” to

Chicago, Dretske might have meant that the arrow represents that Chicago is in a certain

direction. However, if so, it is no longer obvious that the arrow's pointing to Chicago is entirely

a factual matter.)26 However, I see no reason to conclude, merely on this basis, that the arrow

corresponds with the facts. Until we know that the arrow was supposed to point to Chicago

(rather than, say, Milwaukee), we can't say whether the arrow corresponds with the facts or

not. Unless the normative facts of representation have been fixed, we can't make sense of

correspondence.

In many cases, we are fooled into thinking we can make sense of correspondence

because we confuse it with resemblance or structural resemblance.27 Winston Churchill's

painting may well resemble the visual likeness of a valley in southeast China taken in from a

certain perspective, but the painting does not correspond to the valley (or at least not in the

relevant sense). Confusion can arise because we often use resemblance as a measure of

correspondence. Nonetheless, the two can evidently come apart. Consider a decent painting

representing the Yangtze River Valley and the negative of a photograph taken of the same

valley. Because the negative of the photograph inverts the color spectrum, the painting may

well better resemble the visual likeness of the Yangtze River Valley from a certain perspective

26 The cogency of Dretske's remarks likely trades on this equivocation on “pointing.” 27 I would be willing to concede that there is a sense of “correspondence” in which it just means resemblance or even structural resemblance. In this latter sense of “correspondence,” we might say that the details of the painting correspond with the features of the valley. Henceforth, I will only use correspondence in the relevant sense, that is, correspondence as it relates to representation.

16

even though the negative of the photograph better corresponds with the visual likeness of the

Yangtze River Valley from that very same perspective. A digital photograph of the Yangtze River

Valley can produce data on a disk that corresponds quite well with the Yangtze River Valley even

though it doesn't resemble a visual likeness of the Yangtze River Valley in the slightest.

Resemblance is incidental to correspondence. Correspondence is a matter of lining up as they

ought to. It can be that they ought to line up so as to resemble, but it need not be.

No doubt there is structural resemblance in many cases of correspondence, but

structural resemblance is easy to come by, and generally not indicative of correspondence.28

Similarity in structure without correspondence is the rule, not the exception. Structural

resemblance only indicates correspondence when it's a structural resemblance that's supposed

to exist.

Against my line of thinking, it is sometimes suggested that we can make sense of beliefs

corresponding to the world merely because beliefs are the sorts of things that can be true or

false where being true/false need not have a normative aspect. Consider the antecedent part of

the Dretske passage quoted above:

Beliefs and judgments must either be true or false, yes, but there is nothing normative about truth and falsity. What makes a judgment false (true) is the fact that it fails (or succeeds) in corresponding to the facts, and failing (or succeeding) in corresponding to the facts is, as far as I can see, a straightforward factual matter.29

Underlying these remarks is the thought that the content of a belief “naturally” divides the

space of possibilities into those possibilities in which the content is true and those in which it is

false. The suggestion is that we need not think this division along the lines of truth conditions

has anything to do with normativity so long as there is “nothing normative about truth and

28 Cf. Lewis (1984). 29 Dretske (2000b) in Dretske (2000a), 242.

17

falsity.” Dretske's thought, I take it, is that this division is enough to make sense of a belief

corresponding to whatever possibility is actual.

Let's say that an intentional state “semantically corresponds” to the world just in case

the content of that state is true.30 In the quoted passage, Dretske suggests, in effect, that

semantic correspondence is, essentially, a type of genuine correspondence. I disagree. Rather,

semantic correspondence is analogous to resemblance; it can come apart from correspondence

even if it often goes along with it. Assume for the moment that TTIR is true. Now consider

someone's disbelief of the urban legends surrounding Area 54, where disbelief is the state of

rejecting something as true. Given TTIR, this disbelief corresponds to world only if it does not

semantically correspond to the world. That's because, given TTIR and a reasonable theory of

disbelief, disbeliefs ought to have contents that are false. If semantic correspondence lines up

with correspondence in the case of belief, it's only because beliefs with true contents are the

correct beliefs. Contents, in and of themselves, do not correspond to the world. “Semantic

correspondence” is something of a misnomer. One has to do something with the content—

something that brings in norms of correctness—before correspondence comes into play.

In any case, unless truth conditions coincide with normatively loaded correctness

conditions, I have my doubts as to how relevantly “natural” a division of the space of

possibilities along the lines of truth conditions is for any given content. We might associate the

content of an intentional state with the set of possible scenarios in which the content is true,

but what's so special about associating that particular set rather than some other? Unless truth

indicates something substantial about the intentional state, e.g. that things have gone well vis-à-

vis that state or the state is correct/incorrect, I see no special reason to associate with the

content the set of possible scenarios in which the content is true rather than some other set.

30 I borrow the term “semantic correspondence” from Hill (2002), 39 who uses it slightly differently.

18

Let truth* conditions be some permutation of truth conditions.31 Why not associate a content

with its truth* conditions?

One might complain that truth* conditions are far more arbitrary than truth conditions

in that when we use contents, we divide the space of possibilities along the lines of truth

conditions rather than truth* conditions. However, this complaint would be misguided. Using

contents divides the space of possibilities along the lines of truth conditions if we, for instance,

assert contents, i.e. present them as true, but not if we assert* contents, i.e. present them as

true*. (We might have need to assert* if we were speaking in code.) When we use contents

assertively*, we divide the space of possibilities along the lines of truth conditions*.

As a matter of fact, we should keep in mind that there may be no reason to associate

sets of possible scenarios with contents at all. Consider Hartry Field's suggestion:

What is mostly relevant to sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is their structural interrelations: the fact that they form a Boolean algebra. Consequently, any other other Boolean algebra that was sufficiently large to make the psychological distinctions we need would do just as well for most psychological purposes; for most purposes at least, there is no need to think of the atomic elements of the algebra as possible worlds; they could be anything at all. For instance, they could just be numbers.32

Field may be wrong in thinking that what is mostly relevant in our theory of content is the

“structural interrelations” between contents. Perhaps it matters in some way that contents are

intimately associated with normatively loaded correctness conditions. (If TTIR is true, it does

matter.) Barring that possibility, however, it is difficult to see why any particular association of

possibilities with a content should be important. If Field is right, i.e. we might do just as well

using numbers, it can't be that any particular division of the relevant space of possible scenarios

is especially “natural.”

31 See Stich (1993), Chapter 5 and Williamson (2007), Chapter 8. 32 Field (1986) reprinted in Field (2001), 89.

19

Genuine correspondence is not the natural by-product of truth on any theory of truth.

Genuine correspondence is what happens when world and representation are correctly aligned.

To set down the conditions for (normatively loaded) correct alignment just is to divide the space

of possibilities in the requisite way for representation, and vice-versa. There's no

representation without normatively loaded correctness conditions because there's no real

requisite division of the space of possibilities without normatively loaded correctness

conditions.

§2.6: First Objection to the Normativity of Correctness

Many philosophers find it difficult to challenge the proposition that beliefs are correct when and

because their contents are true. What they find harder to accept is that the correctness of

beliefs is genuinely normative.

Some argue that the correctness of beliefs does not produce even pro tanto practical

normative reasons. Perhaps the fact that some statement I might make would be incorrect,

doesn't give me even a pro tanto practical normative reason not to make the statement.

Analogously, perhaps the fact that some belief I might have would be incorrect, doesn't given

me even a pro tanto practical normative reason to avoid that belief (whether I can or not). That

my belief would be incorrect only offers a pro tanto practical normative reason not to have the

belief if, in addition, I desire not to have beliefs that are incorrect. On the basis of the

conclusion that correctness does not produce even pro tanto practical normative reasons, some

philosophers infer that the correctness at play is not genuinely normative.33

33 See Papineau (1999) and Hattiangadi (2006).

20

This conclusion would seem to run afoul of much that I have advocated in the last few

subsections. Whether it really runs afoul turns on what it is meant by “genuinely normative.”34

One might think that a “genuine norm” is an applicable binding prescription that one

can't felicitously beg-off and thereby treat as irrelevant to one's course of action, most

especially if one admits that the norm is applicable. We would have trouble understanding

someone making a sincere judgment whose content was “genuinely normative” in this sense if

they do not have any even pro tanto motivation to comply with the judged norm.35

Say that a norm is regulative if and only if it is “genuinely normative” in the sense just

discussed. (Thus, sincerely judging that a regulative norm is true is difficult to reconcile with a

lack of motivation to comply with the norm. Perhaps that combination is even impossible.) If

the would-be incorrectness doesn't offer even a pro tanto practical normative reason not to

have a belief (even when one admits to the would-be incorrectness), then it seems that the

corresponding correctness isn't regulative.

I am not particularly concerned with whether representational correctness is regulative.

In fact, I would be willing to concede that it isn't. When I say that representational correctness

is “genuinely normative,” I mean to contrast “genuine norms” with “conditional pseudo-norms”

and any other pseudo-norms where normative language can be paraphrased away. Here are

some examples of conditional pseudo-norms:

(1) If one’s aim is to harass the neighbors, one ought to play music loudly. (2) If we’re playing according to tournament rules, then we aren’t permitted to end the game in a tie. (3) If one's overriding goal is to win the lottery, then one ought to buy a lottery ticket.

34 I want to acknowledge Jamie Dreier for comments that helped me improve this subsection substantially. (Obviously, he is not responsible for any errors and confusions that remain.) 35 Norms are “genuinely normative” in this sense if they give us “internal” rather than “external” reasons. See Williams (1981) and Korsgaard (1986) republished in Darwall et. al (1997).

21

It's not clear that these examples say anything above and beyond what we might say in purely

descriptive terms. (1*)-(3*) might serve as adequate replacements for the examples above:

(1*) An effective means for harassing the neighbors is playing music loudly. (2*) It's against tournament rules to end the game in a tie. (3*) Buying a lottery ticket is necessary for winning the lottery ticket.

These replacements neither use evidently normative language/concepts nor seem to entail any

other statement that uses evidently normative language/concepts. To the extent that (1*)-(3*)

are adequate paraphrases, we have reason to believe that (1)-(3) are actually descriptive facts

rather than genuine norms.

To judge that a pseudo-norm is true is merely to evaluate something with respect to

some considered standard or end without actually embracing the standard or end. When I

judge that is (1) true, I merely evaluate playing music loudly with respect to the end of harassing

the neighbors; I do not embrace the end of harassing the neighbors. When I judge some

particular fork isn't constituted how a chair ought to be constituted, I am evaluating this fork

with respect to chair standards, but I am not embracing the chair standard for it. Because in

both cases I do not embracing any standard, the “ought” is inessential to the content of these

judgments. I am not making genuinely normative judgments.

In contrast, judgments about representational correctness and, more generally,

teleological/functional “oughts” are genuinely normative. Judging that a teleological/functional

ought statement is true requires embracing the standard or end. When I judge that some

particular piece of furniture ought not fall apart when sat on (because it is a chair), I am

embracing a standard for that piece of furniture in its role of chair. I am not merely evaluating

the item according to the chair standard; I am taking this standard to apply to the item (in a way

22

I did not do with the fork). As a result, the teleological/functional “ought” cannot be

paraphrased away.

Even still, we need not conclude that teleological/functional “oughts” and are

regulative. We can draw a distinction between those genuine norms that are regulative and

those that aren't. To make a genuine normative judgment is to embrace a standard for

something (perhaps even oneself). To make a regulative normative judgment is to embrace a

standard for oneself qua agent.36 One need not do the latter to do the former. Genuine norms

are not necessarily regulative.

Consider winning.37 What distinguishes the conditions for winning from the conditions

for losing is not some descriptive fact about the conditions. The conditions that a participant

wins some game can be the very conditions upon which he would lose were he playing

another—the misère—game. What differentiates winning from losing is the fact that winning is

prescribed and losing is proscribed. Indeed, what settles that I am now playing chess, where

winning is checkmating the opponent and losing is being checkmated, rather than playing

misère chess, where winning is being checkmated and losing is checkmating the opponent, is

the fact that, in some sense, I have committed myself to checkmate my opponent, and thus,

that I am under a genuine norm to do so. Thus, the fact that I am playing chess is genuinely

normative. Whether I am playing chess or misère chess, it is true that it follows from the rules

of chess that I ought now to checkmate my opponent, but only when I am playing chess is it the

case that I am actually under a prescription to do so.

Nonetheless, the fact that I am playing chess so that I have committed myself to

checkmate my opponent, doesn’t obviously give me even a pro tanto practical normative reason

to win independent of any desire I might have. As I see it, to commit oneself to checkmate

36 Cf. Korsgaard (1996), 100-3. 37 I draw on Dummett (1959) reprinted in Dummett (1978) here.

23

one’s opponent merely amounts to one submitting to be evaluated positively just in case one

checkmates the opponent; I can do as much without desiring to checkmate the opponent.

Suppose I want to play chess with my little sister to make her happy because I know it would

make her happy if I let her win at chess. There’s no tension in this desire. I don’t have to think

about having to weigh my reason for making my sister happy against what will be my

commitment to checkmate her if we play chess. (The following is absurd: “I feel so bad! I

wanted to let her win initially, but in playing chess I realized I took on a commitment to win that

outweighed my desire to make her happy. Once we started playing, I was obligated to win;

there was nothing I could do.”) If I have no independent desire to win, and no independent

reason to prevent her from winning (because, for instance, I think letting her win is bad for her),

even the slightest proclivity to let her win is (motivating) reason enough to do so. My

commitment to winning is of no consideration whatsoever—it merely involves my agreeing on

conditions for (overt or tacit) approbation, not an intention to seek that approbation. As I see it,

the genuine norm to checkmate does not create any even pro tanto independently practical

normative reasons for action. So far as I can tell, there’s nothing obviously incoherent about

wholeheartedly throwing a game. The genuinely normative fact that I ought to checkmate my

opponent is “constitutive” of my playing chess, but it is not regulative.

So it (probably) is with representational correctness (and teleological/functional

“oughts” generally). What makes a (realist) portrait of Warren Buffett a representation of his

visual appearance rather than just some picture that looks like him is the commitment the artist

takes on that the painting match up with Warren Buffett’s visual appearance. The painting is

thereby under a genuine norm to match up with Warren Buffett; it is correct in its depiction if it

does, and incorrect to the extent that it doesn’t. To say that the portrait is correct in its

depiction of Warren Buffett cannot just be to say that the painting adheres to the standards of

24

matching up for a painting of Warren Buffett’s visual likeness, for the latter would be also be

true of fifth century Persian painting depicting a man who is, as it turns out, a perfect Warren

Buffett look-a-like, even though that painting is quite obviously not correct in its depiction of

Warren Buffett (because it does not depict Warren Buffett). Ascriptions of what would be

correct are not covertly descriptive, i.e. subject to a descriptive paraphrase, but rather genuinely

normative. Moreover, so far as I can see, an artist may well take on a commitment to assure a

certain resemblance without intending to assure that resemblance merely by agreeing that his

work is to be evaluated positively according to how well resemblance is achieved. (A close

parallel may be helpful here: someone can contract to do something he does not intend to do so

long as he is willing to accept the consequences for failing to live up to the contract.) So far as I

can tell, it makes no difference that these norms do not provide the artist even a pro tanto

practical normative reason to depict Warren Buffett as he actually is. If the artist has no

independent reason to aspire to accuracy and thinks he will be better paid if he paints Warren

Buffett as slightly better looking than he actually is, the artist has no practical normative reason

whatsoever not to depict Warren Buffett as slightly better looking than he actually is.

Nonetheless, qua realist portrait the painting that depicts Warren Buffett as better looking than

he actually is, is not as it ought to be, and it is this very fact that makes it a painting of Warren

Buffett rather than a painting of Warren Buffett slightly-better-looking-than-he-actually-is.

Once we see that the distinction between regulative and non-regulative norms is not

the same as the distinction between genuine norms and pseudo-norms, there's no reason to

conclude that representational correctness isn't genuinely normative even if we concede that

representational correctness (and functional/teleological “oughts” more generally) isn't/(aren't)

regulative.

25

§2.7: Second Objection to the Normativity of Correctness

I have also seen it argued that correctness cannot generally be genuinely normative because

genuine normativity requires capability (“ought” implies “can”) and we cannot always bring

about correct states of affairs.38 This argument is also mistaken, and likewise probably trades on

confusing being “genuinely normative” in the relevant sense with being regulative. Not all

genuine norms require capability.39 When I play chess with Deep Blue, in some sense, I am

under a prescription to checkmate the computer/computer program. That’s because, as already

discussed, to play a game is to take on the prescription to achieve the conditions for winning

that game and the conditions for winning in chess just are that one has checkmated the

opponent. Nonetheless, it’s probably true that I’m not capable of checkmating Deep Blue. (I'm

assuming that if I disable the program/computer, I no longer count as playing Deep Blue.)

Analogously, although I may not be capable of painting Warren Buffett with any accuracy

whatsoever, any (realist) portraiture I paint of him still ought to resemble his actual likeness.

Even if it is the product of my best effort, a portrait of Warren Buffett may still be an incorrect

representation. This is not merely to say that the realist portrait is not up to the standards of

(realist) portraiture for the (realist) portrait is a (realist) portrait in virtue of the fact that the

standards of portraiture actually apply.

§2.8: Explaining Representational Correctness

At this point, it's time to return to the task of understanding the explanatory burden of TTIR

discussed initially at the end of §2.1. We will accomplish this task by considering an analogy

with the moral.

38 See Hattiangadi (2006). 39 For that matter, it's contentious whether all regulative norms require capability.

26

Suppose that I say that John’s actions were wrong. You may felicitously ask me for an

explanation of the wrongness of John’s actions. (“In virtue of what were his actions wrong?”)

To this inquiry, I will cite or at least allude to certain natural properties of his actions. (“They led

to the pain and suffering of his family.”) You expect an answer of this sort to your question. The

natural/descriptive properties of John’s actions should account for their wrongness because the

moral strongly supervenes on the natural/descriptive.40 An action has certain moral properties

because it has certain natural/descriptive properties.

If you are a hedonistic utilitarian, you believe that there is some correct way to

systematize the connection between moral properties, i.e. what one ought to do, and the

supervened upon natural/descriptive properties, i.e. what produces most happiness and the

least pain. Even if you believe that the connection between moral properties and

natural/descriptive properties cannot be systematized so as to give necessary and sufficient

conditions for right and wrong acts—even if you accept some version of “moral particularism” -

you should at least believe that there are complex clusters of natural/descriptive properties that

in various combinations typically fix whether acts are right or wrong.41 Right and wrong acts

often have descriptive properties in common even if there isn’t some one descriptive property

all and only right (or wrong) actions have in common.

40 One of the first to note the supervenience of moral/normative properties on natural/descriptive properties was Hare (1952), 145. For discussion of strong supervenience, see Kim (1984) and Kim (1987) reprinted in Kim (1993). A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and only if for any possible worlds wj and wk and any objects x in wj and y in wk, if x in wj has the same B-properties as y in wk, then x in wj has the same A-properties as y in wk. 41 The view that the connections between moral rightness/wrongness and the strongly supervened upon natural/descriptive properties cannot be systematized is weaker than moral particularism. (Moral particularism implies that view, but not vice-versa.) Rossian generalism is compatible with that view, but incompatible with moral particularism. Moral particularism entails that there are not even systematic connections between pro tanto moral rightness/wrongness and the natural/descriptive. See Hooker (2000) and Crisp (2000) in Hooker and Little (2000) for discussion on this point. See the essays in Hooker and Little (2000) as well as Dancy (1999), Sinnott-Armstrong (1999), and McDowell (1979) reprinted in McDowell (1998) for some discussions related to moral particularism.

27

Why should even a moral particularist believe so? Any plausible moral theory should

allow that sometimes we can reliably distinguish right from wrong acts. However, without some

general connections between the moral and the natural/descriptive—even if these connections

are not strict or systematic –there would be no way to recognize particular actions as right or

wrong.42 Direct perception, for instance, requires causal regularities between the perceived

properties and the perceptual states. If right (or wrong) acts don’t have some

natural/descriptive properties in common that can cause perceptual states of a particular type, I

don’t see how rightness (or wrongness) can be perceived. Of course, moral properties might be

indirectly perceived. We might categorize acts as right or wrong on the basis of what we can

infer from the natural/descriptive properties we do directly perceive. This process of

categorization, however, must rely on noting features that right or wrong acts have in

common.43 Thus, reliable categorization presupposes that there are general connections

between moral properties and the natural/descriptive properties they supervene on as well.

In §2.3-2.7, I argue that representational properties, e.g. the property of representing

that p, apply if and only if functional/teleological norms are in play. These

functional/teleological norms are genuinely normative (like moral properties) even if

(presumably unlike moral properties) these norms are not regulative. We should expect that

functional/teleological normative properties necessary and sufficient for representational

properties strongly supervene on natural/descriptive properties just as moral properties do. So,

suppose that I say that the map of Chicago in my hands is incorrect. You may felicitously ask me

42 Jackson, Pettit, and Smith (2000) in Hooker and Little (2000) cite similar considerations in arguing that moral particularism is untenable. I am not sure about their stronger conclusion. For my purposes, a much weaker conclusion will do. 43 It’s useful here to consider the dominant theories of categorization in the contemporary cognitive science literature, the prototype theory and the exemplar theory. See Murphy (2002), Chapter 2. According to both theories, people rely on the “family resemblance” of objects in the same category to categorize them. (The theories are distinguished by how people rely on “family resemblance.”) If objects share “family resemblance,” however, they must have underlying features in common.

28

for an explanation of the incorrectness of the map (just as you asked me for an explanation of

John’s action). So, you ask me, “In virtue of what is the map incorrect?” As a thorough response

to this inquiry, I could point out that the conventions of map making establish that the

orientation of the lines on the map match the orientation of the streets of Chicago. I answer,

“This paper was manufactured so that the lines would correspond in a certain way to the streets

of Chicago and they clearly don’t.” As with actions and rightness and wrongness, a

representation is correct or incorrect because it has certain natural/descriptive properties.44

Now, there may be a correct way to systematize the connection between normative

properties necessary and sufficient for representation and natural/descriptive. (Perhaps

something comes to represent with a certain content in virtue of somebody using it for the

purpose of representing with that content. If one can give a naturalistic/descriptive

characterization of what it is to use something for the purpose of representing, perhaps there is

a correct way to systematize the connection between norms of representing and the

natural/descriptive.) Nonetheless, even if one can’t give necessary and sufficient

natural/descriptive conditions for norms of representation to apply, one would expect, as with

the moral, that there are complex clusters of natural/descriptive properties that in various

combinations help to fix whether, for instance, a representation is correct or incorrect. As with

moral properties, if there were not such clusters, it would be hard to account for how we are

able to recognize instances of representing this or that. Any plausible account of

representational properties must explain how we sometimes reliably recognize them. (And we

do, just consider maps.) To perceive (either directly or indirectly) representational properties,

these properties must have natural/descriptive features in common. There must be general

44 I'm assuming, of course, that we can understand the intentional states behind the map making in naturalistic, descriptive terms.

29

connections between the realm of representation and the realm of natural/descriptive

properties.

The strong supervenience of norms for representation on the natural/descriptive sheds

light on my suggestion at the end of §2.1 that representational properties require an

“explanation” or, in other words, that the natural/descriptive has to account for them. The

required “explanation” involves pointing to the natural/descriptive properties that the

normative properties of representation strongly supervene on. Effectively, to explain the norms

of representation, one has to show that there are natural/descriptive properties such that it

follows from the correct theory of how normative properties of representation strongly

supervene on the natural/descriptive that the norms of representation apply. As I’ve just

pointed out, the “correct theory” here need not be systematic, but that doesn’t mean one can

cite or allude to just any natural/descriptive properties in order to “explain” some norms of

representation. Any putative “explanation” is subject to challenge on the ground that it

presupposes an incorrect theory of supervenience. Moreover, in giving an “explanation” one

should expect to be able to explain the common ground that these natural/descriptive

properties have with other relevant natural/descriptive properties nontrivially included in the

supervenience base.

This is, of course, analogous to the situation with moral properties. If I explain the

wrongness of John’s action by pointing to the pain and suffering of his family, I presuppose that,

at the very least, pain and suffering of at least certain people is a relevant to the rightness and

wrongness of actions in general. Moreover, even if the relevance of pain and suffering can’t be

strictly systematized, I ought to be able to point to ceteris paribus generalizations as to its

relevance, e.g. if an action causes pain and suffering avoidable at little cost to the agent, it is

wrong ceteris paribus.

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§2.9: Discharging the Explanatory Burden of TTIR

What might the advocate of TTIR point to in order to show that the norms of representation

requisite for robust mental representation are accounted for? First and foremost he might look

at “use” properties.45

One sort of “use” property is conceptual/computational role. Presumably, subjects

come to be in intentional states in virtue of being in internal cognitive states. An internal

cognitive state of a subject has a particular conceptual/computational role in virtue of having

some particular inferential connections with other internal cognitive states of the subject.

Internal cognitive states are inferentially connected when the subject is disposed to move

(ceteris paribus) from one internal cognitive state to another. Perhaps, one can explain the

representational properties of intentional states in part by considering the

conceptual/computational role of those internal cognitive states that correspond to intentional

states.

In addition to or even instead of looking at causal connections between internal states,

an advocate of TTIR might look at another sort of “use” property for the requisite explanation of

robust mental representation; he might look at causal connections between internal cognitive

states and the environment in order to explain the norms of representation he is committed to.

A subject will be disposed to come into particular internal cognitive states given his

environment. In coming to be disposed in this way, internal cognitive states come to indicate

particular properties in the environment. What the internal cognitive states corresponding to

an intentional state indicate may well help account for what the intentional state represents.

45 When it comes to “use” properties, I mean to include any dispositional property that an advocate of conceptual role semantics (broadly construed so as to include informational semantics, see Greenberg and Harman (2006)) might deploy in his theory of content.

31

Similarly, the changes that a subject in particular internal cognitive states is disposed to make

may help account for what corresponding intentional states represent as well.46

Unfortunately, if we restrict “use” properties to only these descriptive properties that

we can understand naturalistically, the prospect of giving the requisite explanation for

vindicating a non-eliminativist TTIR entirely by citing “use” properties appears diminished.

“Use” properties are dispositional properties of internal cognitive states, but whether things are

as they ought to be (representationally) vis-à-vis internal cognitive states and the corresponding

intentional states, may not be merely a matter of how things are disposed to be. So much has

been clear ever since Kripke-Wittgenstein.47 To quote an (in)famous passage on his central

example '68+57= ?':

The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if '+' meant addition, then I will answer '125'. But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by '+', I will answer '125', but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of '+', I should answer '125'. Computational error, finiteness of my capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me not to be disposed to respond as I should, but if so, I have not acted in accordance with my intentions.48

Although Kripke makes the point about meaning of natural language, his point is perhaps even

clearer when we apply it to the content of intentional states where speakers intentions

regarding sincerity and sameness of meaning are irrelevant. Given TTIR, a belief that sixty-eight

plus fifty-seven equals one hundred fifteen is a state that is correct in some arbitrary possible

scenario if and only if in that scenario, sixty-eight plus fifty-seven equals one hundred fifteen.

Nonetheless, a belief that sixty-eight plus fifty-seven equals one hundred fifteen may or may not

46 In my presentation, I have favored a two-factored conceptual role theory, see Block (1986) reprinted in Stich and Warfield (1994), but I do not thereby mean to exclude thinking about “use” properties as long-armed conceptual role properties. See Harman (1987) reprinted in Harman (1999). 47 Kripke (1982). 48 Ibid, 37.

32

be a state that the subject is disposed to come to only if in his scenario, sixty-eight plus fifty-

seven equals one hundred fifteen. There is an open question whether the subject's dispositions

will respect what is correct. In this way, we can see a gap between what a subject is disposed to

do and what he would be correct in doing.

The basic problem is straightforward: doing something regularly doesn't usually make it

correct. In the face of this problem, a non-eliminativist advocate of TTIR with a naturalistic bend

might be tempted to back away from the claim that representation has a normative aspect.

After all, dispositional “use” properties might account for representational properties if

representational properties were also merely dispositional.49

Despite the temptation, moving away from the claim that representation has a

normative aspect is not a good option for anyone serious about understanding beliefs and

desires on the model of representation. Representation that we see in paradigm cases, e.g.

maps and blueprints, does have a normative aspect. Allowing that beliefs and desires might

“represent” in a way so different from paradigm cases of representation undermines the whole

point of trying to think of them as similar to the paradigm cases. Moreover, a theory of

representation according to which beliefs/desires represent merely by having truth/satisfaction

conditions, is a theory of representation on which TTIR puts no significant constraint on the

theory of intentional states at all. Even a theory of the intentional armed solely with a

deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction would vindicate TTIR if all that's required for TTIR is that

beliefs/desires have truth/satisfaction conditions.

49 See also Block (2007), 24. In my opinion, much of the post-Kripkenstein literature on the normativity of truth/meaning arises from the tension between an underlying folk psychological commitment to TTIR and the theoretical difficulties Kripke raises. For exemplars from the literature, see McDowell (1984) reprinted in McDowell (1998), Boghossian (1989), Millikan (1990), Wright (1992), Gibbard (1994), Papineau (1999), Tanney (1999), Lynch (2004), Boghossian (2005), and Wedgwood (2007) among many others.

33

As I pointed out in §2.3, everyone is likely to agree that a state must have

truth/satisfaction conditions in order to be intentional. This agreed upon fact must place a

nontrivial constraint on the theory of the intentional if truth/satisfaction conditions are to play a

central role in that theory. Introducing normatively loaded correctness conditions coinciding

with truth/satisfaction conditions shows why there would be a nontrivial constraint. As we saw

in §2.8, there should be some regularities (even if they are not strict) in the supervenience of

normatively loaded correctness on the natural/descriptive. Because correctness coincides with

truth/satisfaction conditions, natural/descriptive properties must account for truth/satisfaction

in the same way it accounts for correctness. In other words, there should be regularities (even if

they are not strict) in the supervenience of truth/satisfaction on the natural/descriptive. A

theory of the intentional with normatively loaded correctness conditions must respect this

nontrivial constraint involving truth/satisfaction.

Without postulating normatively loaded correctness conditions, it's not at all clear that

truth/satisfaction conditions put any constraint on the theory of the intentional. If we can tell a

story about what it is for a state to be a belief/desire that p, we can always use the (Truth

Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) platitudes to explain how the state comes to have the

truth/satisfaction conditions it does. There has to be more to a theory of truth/satisfaction than

(Truth Conditions)/(Satisfaction Conditions) if truth/satisfaction is going to constrain the way we

tell the story. Without normatively loaded correctness conditions, I suspect we will be

hardpressed to point to some feature of truth/satisfaction that will provide such a constraint,

particularly if I am right in thinking that correspondence (in any useful, robust sense)

presupposes representation with a normative aspect.

34

If advocates of TTIR cannot back away from the claim that representation has a

normative aspect, how should they confront the Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of normativity?50

Three routes are most obvious. First, one can claim pace Kripke-Wittgenstein that in the

relevant cases doing something regularly enough can make it correct.51 Second, one can turn to

the developed literature that addresses the problem by looking at natural selection.52 Third,

pace §2.8, one can deny that representational properties strongly supervene on the

natural/descriptive.53

I am not convinced that these three are the only routes.

The Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of normativity emerges because of an important

difference between paradigm cases of representation on one hand and beliefs and desires on

the other. Typically, norms of correctness come to apply to maps in virtue of the intentional

states, e.g. beliefs, desires, and intentions, of mapmakers and map users. Obviously, norms of

correctness do not come to apply to intentional states in virtue of other intentional states. But,

are we so convinced that norms of correctness always come to apply to maps directly in virtue

of intentional states?

Suppose we constructed an unintelligent machine to clean the streets of Chicago. In

order to facilitate the machine’s work, we insert into the machine a map of the streets of

Chicago, which the machine uses both to find its way around and to assure that all the streets

are clean. For some time, the machine we designed uses the map of the streets of Chicago to

50 The Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of normativity should be separated from the Kripke-Wittgenstein problem of indeterminacy. The normative-descriptive gap is one problem, but even if there weren't a normative-descriptive gap, there would still be the issue of whether, for example, our dispositions settle that '+' means plus in light of our computational capacities and our dispositions to make errors. 51 Unless I misunderstand him, Peacocke (1992), Chapter 5 effectively embraces this view. 52 See, for instance, Millikan (1990) reprinted in Millikan (1993). 53 See Boghossian (1989).

35

efficiently clean the streets. Then, lo and behold, there is a quantum miracle.54 The map we

inserted disappears; our street cleaning machine suddenly becomes considerably less effective.

Fortunately for the denizens of Chicago, another unrelated quantum miracle occurs shortly after

the first. A molecule per molecule duplicate of the map we originally inserted in the machine

appears right where that map disappeared. As a result, our street cleaning machine immediately

becomes effective again. It effectively uses the new molecule for molecule duplicate as a map

of Chicago in fulfilling the purpose we designed it for: cleaning the streets of Chicago.

Is the molecule per molecule duplicate also a map of Chicago? I think it is. Yet, no

person intended for it to be so. This map of the streets of Chicago is a map because some

machine uses it as a map effectively enough to fulfill its pre-existing purpose of cleaning the

streets. The machine does not use the map intentionally. (We are assuming that the machine

does not have intentional states.) Intentional states only come into the story indirectly in giving

the machine the purpose of cleaning the streets.

Humans have needs—to eat, to drink, to avoid pain, in avoid injury, to socialize, to have

sex, to survive, etc. At least some of these needs are not the by-product of cognitive

sophistication. Perhaps, we use some of our internal cognitive states as robust mental

representations effectively enough to help us in fulfilling these antecedent needs. We do not

use our internal cognitive states intentionally in order to help us in fulfilling these needs, but

given the previous example, I do not see that so much is required for these internal cognitive

states to be robust mental representations. So far as I can tell, what is required is that we are,

somewhat effectively, putting them to use for a prior existing purpose, not that we are

intentionally doing so.

54 Cf. Davidson (1987) reprinted in Davidson (2001b) and Dretske (1995), Chapter 5.

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Thinking that representation has a normative aspect does not obviously bankrupt an

advocate of TTIR who seeks a naturalistic theory of the intentional while rejecting eliminativism

about intentional states. There are prospects for paying down the explanatory debt. On the

other hand, rejecting that representation has a normative aspect threatens to trivialize TTIR and

undercut the centrality of truth conditions in a theory of the intentional. Unless robust mental

representation has a normative aspect, TTIR is not a significant constraint on a theory of the

intentional.

§2.10: Inferentialism and TTIR

When it comes to philosophical taxonomy of theories of the intentional, a division is frequently

made between inferentialist or conceptual role theories of content on one hand and

informational and teleological theories of content on the other.55 One might think this division

coincides with a division between theories against TTIR and theories for it, but one would be

mistaken.

A straightforward inferentialist theory of content claims that at least some inferential

connections are essential to contents so that being in a state with a given content requires being

in a corresponding internal cognitive state with certain inferential commitments or dispositions.

(A less straightforward inferentialist theory of content claims that similarity of inferential role is

essential to contents.) On informational and teleological theories of content, no inferential

connections are essential to being in a state with a certain content so long as the corresponding

internal cognitive state is tracking well enough whether the content are true. On informational

theories, having content is a matter of “carrying information” where “carrying information” is

understood (roughly) in terms of nomic covariation.

55 See footnote 8.

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It's not my project in this paper to lay out the differences between these sorts of views,

except to the extent that it helps clarify the theses of TTIR and deflationary theories of content

(DTCs). To that end, I merely point out that inferentialism is not incompatible with TTIR.

Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts defends a quintessential inferentialist theory of

content, but his theory embraces TTIR.56 The views are compatible so long as one accepts a

“determination theory” that allows one to explain correctness conditions in terms of inferential

role.57

It may be possible to hold an informational theory of content that does not accept TTIR

if the relevant notion of “carrying information” does not have a normative aspect.

§3 Dissidents to TTIR

§3.1: Motivation

It can seem crazy to deny TTIR. After all, (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) can seem

platitudinous. Perhaps it even seems obvious that beliefs have (normatively loaded) correctness

conditions that coincide with their truth conditions. Perhaps it seems likewise obvious that

desires are plans with conditions for correct realization that coincide with their satisfaction

conditions.

We have already seem, however, that TTIR does place a significant constraint on the

theory of the intentional. Normatively loaded correctness conditions must be accounted for

through general regularities with the supervened upon natural/descriptive properties. Prima

facie, we can't be sure normatively loaded correctness conditions requisite for beliefs and

desires to exist on TTIR are actually accounted for. If not, what then?

56 See Peacocke (1992). 57 Ibid, 17-20, 133-43.

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Option one: We could become eliminativists with respect to the intentional. If we insist

that beliefs and desires are robust mental representations, and we see that the

natural/descriptive does not account for robust mental representations, then we ought to

conclude there are no beliefs and desires. Option two: We could reject the thesis that beliefs

and desires are robust mental representations. If we are convinced that there are beliefs and

desires, then the fact that robust mental representation is not accounted for will lead us to the

conclusion that beliefs and desires were not what those attracted to TTIR might initially have

thought.

As we shall see in §3.2-3.4, those who accept DTCs are among those who take option

two, rejecting TTIR. They are skeptical about doing the work required to show that beliefs and

desires are robust mental representations, but even so they do not think we need to be

skeptical with regards to the existence of beliefs and desires. In showing that DTCs are generally

committed to rejecting TTIR, I will focus my attention on the two prominent deflationists, Hartry

Field and Paul Horwich.58

For the rest of this paper, it will be helpful, on occasion, to talk in terms of Mentalese, so

that to have an intentional state with content that p is to have an attitude towards a token

sentence of Mentalese with content that p. Thus, for example, to believe that p is to belief-box

a token sentence of Mentalese S with content that p. I will adopt this terminology in part

because both major deflationists do.59

Nonetheless, in using this terminology, I want to minimize any substantive

commitments imported into the discussion. The terminology itself only commits one to thinking

that being in an intentional state involves being in a state that is a particular attitude (belief,

58 Field (2001), Chapters 4-5. Horwich (1998) and Horwich (2005). Perhaps Schiffer (2003) should also count as a DTC. 59 Field (2001), 109. Horwich (2005), 8, 183-5.

39

desire, imagining, etc.) and that has a particular content, but nothing more, so far as I can see.

After all, speaking in terms of Mentalese does not presuppose that there is any way to

individuate sentences-types of Mentalese other than according to the content they express in

different contexts. Moreover, it does not commit one to thinking that sentences of Mentalese

have syntactic constituents, much less, syntactic constituents that have semantic values.60

§3.2: Against Normativity of Truth and Content

To see that DTCs are committed to rejecting TTIR it is sufficient to note their opinion regarding

normativity and content.

Horwich introduces his comments on the normativity of language use in this way:

I shall not be denying that language is pervaded with normativity—with oughts and ought nots. But I think these phenomena can be explained without having to suppose that truth and meaning are intrinsically normative notions. What I shall be arguing, in other words, is that the evident normativity of language can give no reason to reject wholly non-normative accounts of those notions—accounts such as the deflationary theory of truth and the use theory of meaning.61

He goes on to show that we have pragmatic reasons to believe the truth.62 He notes that we

may have moral reasons to tell the truth.63 He accepts that truth might well be valued for its

own sake.64 What he consistently denies is that the normativity at work is wholly inherent to

meaning, content, or truth so that we need to account for it in our theory of what meaning,

content, and truth are.65

60 Cf. Boghossian (1989), 514. Cf. Rescorla (forthcoming). 61 Horwich (1998), 184. 62 See Horwich (1998), 190-1 and (Horwich (2005), 117. 63 Horwich (1998), 186. 64 See Horwich (2006). 65 Horwich (2005), 104-106

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An analogy here can be useful for understanding Horwich's position.66 People have

pragmatic, moral, and perhaps even noninstrumental reasons to abstain from causing pain, but

we need not think that understanding what pain is requires understanding the pragmatic, moral,

or noninstrumental reasons to abstain from causing it. A theory of what pain is might be true

and complete without a discussion of reasons or obligations.

In a similar way, Horwich believes that a theory of meaning, content, or truth can be

complete without a discussion of anything normative. What it is for a psychological state to

have a given content can be explained without invoking normative notions. Thinking as much is

compatible with thinking that many normative facts may arise from considerations about

meaning, content, and truth in the same way that normative facts may arise from

considerations about pain.

Although not quite so explicit on the subject of normativity and content, Field

apparently shares the view that although there are norms related to truth, they are not

particularly central to the theory of truth or the theory of content. Field explicitly says the

following on the subject:

... there is no difficulty in desiring that all one’s beliefs be disquotationally true; and not only can each of us desire such things, there can be a general practice of badgering others into having such desires. Isn’t this enough for there being a ‘norm’ of asserting and believing the truth?67

The subtext of the quoted passage is clear. There may be norms connected to believing the

truth, but these norms are not a central part of the theory of the intentional.

As we have already seen in §2.8-2.9, norms can, without question, get in the way of

understanding intentional states naturalistically if they do play a central role in the theory of the

intentional. Nonetheless, rejecting that norms play a central role in the correct theory of the

66 Cf. Ibid, 109. 67 Field (2001), 121.

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intentional cuts directly against TTIR. On TTIR, what makes a content that very content is partly

a matter of what intentional states with that content represent. On TTIR, contents are

intrinsically representational, and representing is a matter of having normatively loaded

correctness conditions. Consequently, Horwich and Field cannot eschew normativity from the

theory of truth and content without eschewing TTIR altogether.

§3.3: Extreme Content Particularism

A primary feature of Horwich’s view is that content merely (strongly) supervenes on “use”

properties. Thus, although “use” properties constitute having a particular content, the

particular content some internal cognitive state has cannot be “read off” of its “use”

properties.68 According to Horwich, one cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for

some arbitrary content that p. At best, one can only begin to list individually what “use”

properties are required for an internal cognitive state to have this or that content.

The thesis of mere supervenience is not necessarily antithetical to TTIR.69 Consider

David Lewis’s view whereby content is assigned holistically so as to assure a best fit between

“use” and natural properties. Because one has to consider the “use” properties of all internal

cognitive states, and moreover, consult the hierarchy of “naturnalness” in order to assign

content, there’s no chance one will be able to “read off” an internal state's content from its

“use” properties. On Lewis’s view, content merely (strongly) supervenes on “use.”

Nonetheless, there's no insurmountable difficulty in interpreting Lewis’s view as a version of

68 See Horwich (1995) reprinted in Horwich (2004), 67-85 for discussion on “reading off.” See also Horwich (2005), 66-69. The phrase “reading off” comes originally from Kripke (1982), 29. On his commitment to content particularism, see Horwich (1998), 21-7 and Horwich (2005), 32-5, 61-84. 69 Perhaps I should say his sketch of a view as he says very little about what decides when the fit is best. See Lewis (1984).

42

TTIR whereon content is intrinsically representational. On Lewis's view contents are sets of

possible worlds corresponding to truth/correct-believability conditions.70

What is antithetical to TTIR is the thesis that nothing general can be said about the

connection between having a particular content and having certain “use” properties. As a

pointed out in §2.8, although the supervenience connections between representational

properties and “use” need not be systematic or strict, they do need to be somewhat general in

order for the theory of representation to be plausible. Thus, if one accepts that having content

is closely tied to having certain representational properties, there will be a limit to how extreme

one’s particularism regarding the supervenience connections between content and “use”

properties can be.

One often gets the impression, reading Horwich, that his particularism in this regard

breaks that limit; he appears to think that there is absolutely nothing that we can say concerning

the connections between content and “use” other than, of course, that content strongly

supervenes on “use.” In this vein, he says that his theory “does indeed violate the commonly

assumed requirement that there be explanations of the links between given meaning-

constituting properties and given meanings.” He goes on to say that “this requirement is

misconceived; so our violation is not objectionable.”71 However, assuming that contents are

intrinsically representational, the requirement that there be explanations of the links between

given content-constituting properties and given contents is not misconceived, as I pointed out in

§2.8. Inasmuch as he commits himself to the position that the requirement is misconceived,

Horwich commits himself to rejecting TTIR.

70 As another example, it's worth considering Davidson who embraces both a theory of content whereon truth conditions play a pivotal role and anomalous monism. See Davidson (1984), Davidson (1990), and Davidson (1970) reprinted in Davidson (1980). 71 Horwich (2005), 66.

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§3.4: Primacy of Translation

Many philosophers including Hartry Field would agree that proper translation respects content.

If one token sentence (of Mentalese) properly (enough) translates another token sentence, then

the contents of the two sentences are (at least roughly) the same. Moreover, if the contents of

the two sentences are (at least roughly) the same, then the two sentences have (approximately)

the same truth conditions, so that (nearly) any scenario in which one sentence is true, the other

sentence is true as well.

Where Field has disagreed with many philosophers is with regard to the explanation of

the agreed upon fact that proper translation respects content. Many philosophers think that it

is at least partly because one token sentence has the same content as another that the former

properly translates the latter. Moreover, many philosophers will think that one token sentence

has the same content as another at least partly because the two have the same truth conditions.

Thus, that two token sentences have the same truth conditions explains, at least in part, why a

translation is proper.

Field is inclined to think, on the contrary, that it is entirely because one token sentence

properly translates another that the latter has the same content as the former (relative to some

particular interests of translation).72 Field thinks that one token sentence has the same truth

conditions as another (relative to some particular interests of translation) because the two have

the same content (relative to some particular interests of translation).73 Thus, that one

sentence properly translates another (relative to some particular interests of translation)

72 It is an important feature of Field's view that which translations are proper may well depend on the interests of the translator. Field is open to the possibility that there is no absolute relation of having the same content as. I am largely ignoring this feature of the view because I do not think it is a feature of deflationary theories of content considered broadly. I will come back to consider the feature in §4.3. 73 See Field (2001), 147-152, 167-169.

44

explains why the latter has the truth conditions of the former (relative to some particular

interests of translation).

This dispute appears plain enough until we realize that all parties might well agree that

“use” properties of token sentences of Mentalese ultimately underlie proper translation, having

the same content, and having the same truth conditions. Is it so obvious what's at stake?74

Understanding Field's opponent as an advocate of TTIR can help to clarify what's at

stake. Given TTIR, that two token sentences have the same truth conditions implies that the

two have the same conditions for correct belief-boxability. Moreover, two token sentences

have the same representational properties in virtue of having the same conditions for correct

belief-boxability, and given TTIR, two token sentences have the same content partly because

they have the same representational properties. Two token sentences cannot have the same

representational properties in virtue of facts about proper translation (even if both

representational properties and proper translation are at least partly a matter of having a

certain “use” broadly construed) because translation facts (facts about which token sentences

properly translates which) do not settle whether a token sentence has some particular

representational properties. Thus, the advocate of TTIR cannot say that it is entirely because

one token sentence properly translates another that the latter has the same content as the

former. He must say that truth/correctness conditions at least partly explains sameness of

content, which, in turn, at least partly explains proper translation.

In reversing the order of explanation, Field is committed to denying TTIR. This is not to

say that any opponent of Field's primacy of proper translation view is an advocate of TTIR.

There might be other ways to show that content is explanatorily prior to proper translation.

74 Thanks to Josh Schechter for pushing this point.

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Claiming that sameness of truth conditions partly explains sameness of content,

however, requires holding some view central to the nature of truth beyond the (Truth

Conditions) platitude. Unless it involves accepting that there are conditions for correct belief-

boxability coinciding with the truth conditions of token sentences (and hence TTIR), it's hard to

say what this view would be. (Assuming the principal conclusion of §2.5 is correct, a

correspondence theory of truth would involve the introduction of normatively loaded

correctness conditions.)

§3.5: Other Dissidents of TTIR

DTCs are committed to denying TTIR, but does denying TTIR commit one to a DTC?

No. There are other dissidents of TTIR.

We can see as much by considering a straightforward verificationist theory of content

(SfV).75 Motivating the adherent of SfV is the concern that TTIR postulates correctness

conditions for beliefs that far outstrip the functioning of those states.76 The adherent of SfV

finds it compelling that a person shows that he takes his belief to be correct in a situation by

having the belief in that sort of situation. Moreover, he thinks that the only fact available to fix

that a person's belief is correct in a situation is that the person would show in that situation that

he took his belief to be correct. Consequently, he concludes, the only situations that beliefs are

correct relative to are not possible scenarios, i.e. ways the world might be in and of itself, but

rather possible experiences a person might have; the only correctness conditions around

coincide with conditions of verification.

75 See many of the essays of Dummett (1993) for an elaboration of the sort of verificationist view I have in mind. 76 See Dummett (1993), 74-84.

46

In this way, a straightforward verificationism contrasts with a sophisticated

verificationism.77 A sophisticated verificationism might allow that beliefs are correct relative to

possible scenarios, i.e. ways the world might be, but would claim that there are epistemic

constraints on possible scenarios. Thus, ways the world might be cannot outstrip what we could

ultimately discover at the end of rational inquiry. A sophisticated verificationism does not

mandate the rejection of (Norm of Belief), but rather finds a verificationist interpretation of it.

As a result, sophisticated verificationism is really a somewhat unusual variant of TTIR.

SfV calls for the revision of not only (Norm of Belief), but (Truth Conditions). (SfV

appears unacceptable partly because it calls for these revisions.) An adherent of SfV may well

claim that talk of possible scenarios, i.e ways the world might be, does not make any sense

ultimately. SfV rejects TTIR. SfV calls to replace TTIR-style truth conditions with verificationist

truth conditions.

Note, however, that SfV is not a DTC.

Why wouldn't we categorize SfV as a DTC? There seem to be at least two reasons not

to. These two reasons give us some insight into what makes for a DTC:

First, SfV is largely motivated by a commitment to a systematic accounting of content

facts. Identifying content with verification conditions allows one to “read off” the content of a

belief from facts about the situations in which the belief would be formed; given that

identification, one can give necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief to have a given

content in terms of situations in which the belief would be formed. In this sense, identifying

content with verification conditions appears to allow for a systematic accounting of content. It

is for this very reason (perhaps among others) that the SfVer takes verification conditions as

preferable to TTIR truth conditions.

77 For examples of sophisticated verificationism, see Putnam (1981) and Wright (1992).

47

DTCs, on the other hand, embrace an anti-systematic spirit. So much is clear in

Horwich's case from the discussion in §3.3. However, in suggesting that a DTC does not permit

“anything that could plausibly constitute a reduction of truth conditions” to play a central role in

the theory of content, Field effectively embraces this spirit as well.78 As I understand Field's

criterion, any theory where truth conditions can be “read off” “use” properties is not a DTC.

Presumably, that goes for verificationist truth conditions as well.

Second, SfV rejects a deflationary theory of truth.79 He is happy to accept the idea that

truth has a normative aspect along with any concomitant explanatory burdens. However, he

proposes we need to understand truth conditions as verificationist truth conditions rather than

as the advocate of TTIR understands them.

A DTC, on the other hand, proposes that we meet the demands of explaining truth

conditions of intentional states by adopting a deflationary theory of truth.

§4: Deflationary Theories of Content

§4.1: Features of a DTC

At this point, we have uncovered several important features of DTCs:

(Anti-TTIR) DTCs reject the teleological theory of intentional representation. (§3) (Anti-Normativity) No normative notions play a role in a DTC. (§3.2) (Anti-Systematicity) DTCs reject systematic connections between content/truth conditions and supervened upon natural/descriptive properties. (§3.3 and §3.5) (DTT) DTCs meet the demands of explaining the truth/satisfaction conditions of intentional states by adopting a deflationary theory of truth. (§3.5)

78 See Field (2001), 108. 79 See Dummett (1959) reprinted in Dummett (1978).

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A prototypical DTC has these features, and the features are suggestive of why DTCs might be

properly thought of as a stripped-down, deflationary theories of content. However, these

features tell us more about what a DTC isn't, then what it is. In §4.2, I want to sketch a more

elucidating account of DTCs. In §4.2-4.4, I will elaborate further on that sketch. In §4.5-4.7, I

will point out how the account laid out explains the four features listed here.

§4.2: Principal Theses of a DTC

A DTC has two principal theses. The first principal thesis is positive:

(Use) A token sentence of Mentalese, S, has the same content as a token sentence of Mentalese, S* if and only if A*'s use of S* (in some way) serves as proxy for A's use of S (in that same way) where A* and A are (possibly distinct) subjects.80

Two points of clarification are in order:

First: Ways to use a sentence of Mentalese include belief-boxing, desire-boxing,

imagine-boxing, etc. Thus, (Use) says that a sentence S has the same content as a sentence S* if

only if A*'s belief-boxing of S* serves as proxy for A's belief-boxing of S, A*'s desire-boxing of S*

serves as a proxy for A's desire-boxing of S, A*'s imagine-boxing of S* serves as proxy for A's

imagine-boxing of S, etc.

Second: A*'s use of a token sentence of Mentalese, S*, (in some way) “serves as proxy”

for A's use of another token sentence, S, (in that same way) if and only if A*'s using of S* and A's

using of S helps/hinders in getting around in the world in the same way. In other words, serving

proxy is entirely a pragmatic matter. (We will come back to elaborate on this point of

clarification in §4.3.)

The second principal thesis of a DTC is negative:

80 “Serving proxy” is my own term. Cf. §4.3.

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(Minimalism) There is nothing to say about content other than (Use). In particular, no further fact about content explains (Use).

(Minimalism) is the thesis that distinguishes a DTC from any other theory of content.

After all, an advocate of TTIR would (likely) accept that (Use) is true (assuming it's clear

that talk of Mentalese isn't ipso facto smuggling in anything unwanted). What distinguishes an

advocate of TTIR from an advocate of a DTC is that the former would want to give an

explanation of (Use). That's because he would be inclined to say that what matters for the most

part in getting around in the world in the same way is having the same mental representations.

Thus, using one sentence might well serve as proxy for using another when it makes no

difference to the resulting mental representations. But according to TTIR, if two sentences have

the same content, then they do make for the same mental representations. So, more basic facts

about representation and the theory of content help explain why (Use) is true.

In accepting (Minimalism), someone holding a DTC intends to reject the TTIR

explanation of (Use). That explanation depends on saying something else more basic about

content, namely, associating content with representation. On a DTC, any explanation of (Use) is

rejected. (Use) isn't (even partly) to be explained by more basic fundamentals of the theory of

content; rather, (Use) is the basic fundamentals of the theory of content. Having the same

content just is a matter of “serving proxy.”

§4.3: Serving Proxy

This last point brings us back to what “serving proxy” is. As I suggested before, “serving proxy”

is a pragmatic matter; it's a matter of making the same difference in getting around. Obviously,

if S* is identical to S, then using S* rather than S makes no significant difference in getting

around. So a token sentence has the same content as itself. However, anyone peddling a

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theory that says that having-the-same-content relation is the being-identical-to relation

(restricted to sentences of Mentalese) isn't peddling a theory of content so much as a syntactic

theory of mind.81 A DTC better say that using a sentence can serve proxy for using another

distinct sentence.

And it can. When one considers whether a use of S* serves proxy for a use of S, it is

intended that one take into account the (non-normative) “use” properties (broadly construed)

of S* and S. So, for instance, one takes into account the computational/conceptual role of S*

and S. How does computational/conceptual role come into play? Suppose that S* and S are

syntactically distinct, and we are considering whether A's use of S* serves as proxy for A's use of

S. Suppose, though, that S* and S are equivalent with respect to computational/conceptual

role.82 It will make no difference whether A uses S* or A uses S. Thus, S has the same content as

S*.

Of course, computational/conceptual role isn't the only thing that matters. Consider

Winston on Earth and his counterpart Twinston on Twin Earth. S* may have the same exact

computational/conceptual role for Winston as S has for Twinston. Nonetheless, if the stuff in

the environments on Earth and Twin Earth respectively is different in fundamental nature, using

S* won't be helping/hindering Winston in the same way that using S will be helping hindering

Twinston. That's because using S* helps/hinders Winston in dealing with the stuff on Earth

while using S helps/hinders Twinston in dealing with the stuff on Twin Earth. S does not have

the same content as S* because the two differ with respect to their indication relations.83

81 See Stich (1983). 82 For this example, I assume that it is possible for sentences to be syntactically distinct even if they have the same computational/conceptual role. That assumption likely requires importing a substantive language of thought hypothesis. 83 Hence, DTCs can accommodate the “externalist” aspects of content. See Kripke (1972), Putnam (1975), Horwich (1998), Chapter 5, and Field (2001), 117-9.

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One might hold reservations generally about whether, for two distinct subjects A* and

A, it's ever the case that A*'s use of S* helps/hinders in getting around precisely in the same way

as A's use of S. If there are any differences in inferential connections or indication relations,

then how can it be that A*'s use of S* helps/hinders precisely in the same way as A's use of S?

These worries might cause an adherent of a DTC to say that what matters is whether A*'s use of

S* helps/hinders in getting around roughly in the same way as A's use of S. What counts as

roughly getting around in the same way? Perhaps, it depends on what aspects of getting around

are most salient. On certain occasions, some particular inferential connections might matter

more than others. On other occasions, causal relations with the environment might be more

important than computational/conceptual role. Having the same content might be interest-

relative; whether two sentences are correctly judged to have the same content might rest on

the practical interests of the person making the judgment. If having the same content is

interest-relative, maybe it's not ultimately even a symmetric or transitive relation.

Field makes just these (radical) suggestions,84 but adopting these proposals is not

required to hold a DTC. Horwich, for instance, does not adopt them. On his view, we can isolate

the inferential connections and indication relations that are basic and explanatory in the use of

primitive constituents of Mentalese;85 call these isolated “use” properties, the “basic long-

armed conceptual role.” Then, we can say that A*'s use of S* helps/hinders in getting around

precisely in the same way as A's use of S if and only if S* and S are constructed in the same way

from primitive constituents of Mentalese with the same basic long-armed conceptual role.

DTCs have many of the same options for confronting Quinean worries about

interpersonal synonymy that inflationary theories of content do.86 The advocate of a DTC can

84 Field (2001), 169-71. 85 Horwich (1998), 44-6. 86 See Quine (1953), Quine (1960), and Fodor and Lepore (1992).

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propose a way to make some principled analytic/synthetic distinction, isolating those inferential

connections and indication relations that are content constituting, i.e. that matter for

determining whether using a sentence serves proxy for using another, from those that aren't.

(Horwich takes this route.) Alternatively, the advocate of a DTC can rely principally on (non-

normative) informational relations just as Fodor does in order to avoid having to make a

principled analytic/synthetic distinction.87 DTCs need not adopt the radical position Field

suggests. As a result, we should distinguish this radical position from the position of DTCs

considered broadly.

§4.4: Deflationary Propositions

Whether there are, among what other abstract objects there might be, propositions, i.e. reified

contents that sentences with content express, in addition to token sentences with a particular

content, is a matter of great debate even among inflationists.88 Accepting a DTC does nothing to

settle this debate so long as one is willing to be open-minded about what propositions are.89

On a DTC that countenances propositions, propositions are abstractions from token

sentences that serve proxy for one another. Thus, one comes to stand in a relation to

propositions by deploying one of a class of possible token sentences that serve proxy for one

another, i.e. help/hinder in getting around the world in the same way.

Although deflationary propositions essentially have truth/satisfaction conditions,

truth/satisfaction conditions can tell us nothing about the nature of deflationary propositions.

Rather, deflationary propositions tell us about the nature of truth/satisfaction conditions. If

truth/satisfaction conditions told us about the nature of deflationary propositions, then, in

87 Cf. Fodor (1990), Fodor and Lepore (1992), and Fodor (1998). 88 See Davidson (1968) reprinted in Davidson (1984) and Loar (1981), 29-31. 89 See Field (2001), 165-71.

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violation of (Minimalism), we would have to explain coming to stand in a relation to a

proposition, i.e. having a token sentence with a certain content, in terms of coming to have a

token sentence with certain truth/satisfaction conditions. Obviously, then, deflationary

propositions are not intrinsically representational. It would be misleading to use, for instance,

sets of possible worlds to stand for deflationary propositions.

One of the differences between Field and Horwich is that Horwich is clearly comfortable

with countenancing propositions while Field is not. His discomfort with propositions forces Field

to say, perhaps awkwardly, that having a particular content is a matter of properly translating to

a token sentence that I can use to express that content. Field's primacy of translation thesis is

the combination of his discomfort with propositions and his adopting the primary theses of a

DTC. The primacy of translation thesis is, in fact, not essential to DTCs. An adherent of a DTC

(like Horwich), can suggest that a translation is proper because two sentences express the same

proposition. As with Field's other Quinean qualms, it's important to keep his ontological

scruples separate from his commitment to a DTC.

§4.5: Naturalism on the Cheap?

On a DTC, having some particular content is a matter of helping/hindering a person in getting

around when used in a particular way. Thus, sentences of Mentalese have content wholly in

virtue of their dispositional properties. So much should be clear from our discussion of “serving

proxy” in §4.2. “Serving proxy” was explained in terms of non-normative “use” properties.90 As

a result, there should be no difficulty in reconciling a DTC with naturalism so long as there is no

difficulty in understanding what it is to use a sentence of Mentalese, i.e. belief-box it, desire-box

90 This reliance on non-normative properties differentiates DTCs from cousin “use” views such as Brandom (2000). See Horwich (2005), 126-34.

54

it, etc., naturalistically. Someone attracted to a DTC is likely to be so partly in virtue of his

commitment to naturalism.

An adherent of a DTC restricts the “use” properties to dispositional/causal properties

that figure into his account in order to embrace (Anti-Normativity) so that his theory will

obviously unproblematic when conjoined with naturalism. In embracing (Anti-Normativity),

DTCs must also embrace (Anti-TTIR).

§4.6: DTCs and Deflationary Theories of Truth/Satisfaction

An adherent of a DTC will accept that (Truth Conditions) and (Satisfaction Conditions) are

platitudinous. However, he cannot accept that there is a deep explanation for how a token

sentence of Mentalese comes to have the truth/satisfaction conditions that it does. If (Truth

Conditions)/(Satisfaction Conditions) is true, then a use of a token sentence, S, of Mentalese

cannot be a belief/desire that p unless it has the right sort of truth/satisfaction conditions. If a

use of S cannot be a belief/desire that p unless it has the right sort of truth/satisfaction

conditions and there is a deep explanation of how S comes to have the truth/satisfaction

conditions that p, then pace (Minimalism), S does not have the content that p merely in virtue of

the fact that using it helps/hinders in getting around in a particular way. To determine whether

S has the content that p, we would have to consider whether the deep explanation was in place

of S's truth/satisfaction conditions that p in addition to considering the dispositional properties

of S that tell us what sentences serve proxy for it.

Thus, DTCs must claim that truth/satisfaction conditions are transparent, i.e. that there

is no deep explanation of them. Because having correctness conditions would require a deep

explanation, DTCs must reject the thesis that truth/satisfaction conditions have a normative

aspect. Because they are committed to the transparency and non-normativity of

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truth/satisfaction conditions, DTCs must accept (DTT). Deflationary theories of

truth/satisfaction come in two varieties depending on whether propositions or token sentences

are the principal truth/satisfaction bearers. A DTC may accept either a propositional or a

sentential deflationary theory of truth so long as token sentences have truth/satisfaction

conditions that p merely in virtue of having content that p.

It is partly because he accepts a deflationary theory of truth/satisfaction, that we can

understand an adherent of a DTC claim to put “use” rather than truth/satisfaction conditions in

the central role of the theory of content. On a deflationary theory of truth, truth is merely a

device for using contents—truth/satisfaction conditions tells us nothing about them.

§4.7: Against Systematicity

Systematic connections between content and “use” properties or truth conditions and “use”

properties runs afoul of (Minimalism). The existence of significant regularities in the way

content or truth conditions supervene on “use” properties implies that there is more to say

about content than just (Use). More importantly, it suggests (although does not imply) that

(Use) has some explanation. It could easily be the case that the “use” properties that fix

whether a sentence has such-and-such content also help explain why somebody using a

sentence with such-and-such content will get around the world in such-and-such a way.

(Minimalism) explains why (Anti-Systematicity) is a feature of DTCs.

Prima facie, we can imagine borderline cases where it is unclear whether connections

between content/truth conditions and supervened upon “use” properties are systematic

enough to cause problems for (Minimalism). These borderline cases show that the distinction

between inflationary and deflationary theories of content is not sharp.91

91 Field (2001), 107.

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§5: Conclusion

In this paper, I have primarily been concerned with making the distinction between TTIR

and DTCs rather than how to address the dispute between the two positions. In concluding, I

turn now briefly towards the question of how to address that dispute (partly because I think

tackling that question can further clarify the distinction between the two positions).

To begin with, there is a question about which theory (if any) we should adopt as the

default. Field proposes that we accept “methodological deflationism,” i.e. that we take on a

DTC as a working hypothesis only giving it up if we see that it cannot do the explanatory work

required from an acceptable theory of content.92 This proposal contrasts with the investigations

of a large number of theorists who take TTIR as their starting point. Going forward, should we

privilege one view over the other?

I don't see that either view is the “neutral” position. Both TTIR and DTCs carry serious

theoretical commitments. To embrace TTIR is to take on a certain explanatory burden that can

only be satisfied if there are systematic connections between content properties and

supervened upon “use” properties. To endorse a DTC is to disavow that there are such

systematic connections. Prior to investigation, I see no reason to have any particular view about

whether there are significant regularities in the way content supervenes on “use.”

Consequently, I see no reason to adopt any particular theory as the default view.

Nonetheless, Field may be right in suggesting that we look first at what explanatory

work is required of a theory of content in order to settle the issue. The dispute between TTIR

and DTCs would be settled if the advocate of TTIR could show that (Use) has an explanation. If

we could say, generally, why believing, desiring, etc. that p gets a person around in the world in

a certain way, we would have more to say about content than just (Use). Moreover, if we could

92 Field (2001), 119.

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show that what fixes that believing, desiring, etc. that p gets a person around in the world in a

certain way also fixes that these states are robust mental representations, we would be able to

show that TTIR is true. Going forward, it would be helpful if the advocate of TTIR could point to

reasons for thinking that facts about content should explain (Use). Moreover, it would be

helpful to understand what robustly representing (or properties concomitant with robustly

representing) does for subjects in getting them around. Showing that having robust

representations (directly or indirectly) serves a practical purpose for subjects may well be key to

showing how it is that subjects come to have robust representations. (Consider our discussion

from §2.8.) In other words, it may be that the most efficient way to settle the explanatory

burden of TTIR is to answer Field's challenge by pointing to the pragmatic upshot of robustly

representing.

That said, there is another route to challenging DTCs. DTCs largely focus on the theory

of content, but, in order to be successful, DTCs must have an accompanying theory of attitudes.

The theory of content and the theory of attitudes are essentially interconnected. Ultimately,

attitude and content must be defined together; it is central to the theory of content that

contents are the sorts of things attitudes are had towards just as it is central to the theory of

attitudes that attitudes are the sorts of things had towards contents. Notice that (Norm of

Belief) and (Norm of Desire) are as important to the theory of attitudes as they are to the theory

of content; thus, rejecting them calls as much for a replacement regarding the theory of

attitudes as it does regarding the theory of content. Moreover, understanding (Use) requires

having an antecedent theory of attitudes. If the inflationist can show that there is no

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replacement deflationary theory of attitudes to be had, then he can show that DTCs are

bankrupt.93

93 I would like to thank Richard Heck, Christopher Hill, Joshua Schechter, Jamie Dreier, Jaegwon Kim, Jonathan Ichikawa, and Michael Lynch for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Part of this chapter was presented at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews in the spring of 2008. I would like to acknowledge members of the audience, particularly Crispin Wright, Jessica Brown, Herman Cappelen, and Martin Smith, for the profitable discussion on that occasion.

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CHAPTER TWO:

Deflationary Theories of Truth and the Teleological Theory of

Intentional Representation

§1: Introduction

In recent years it has become increasingly clear that among the most foundational questions

about the nature of truth is the question of whether truth has much of a nature at all.94

According to deflationary theories of truth, the fundamental facts about truth are exhausted by

whatever is required to have the effect of using a truth bearer by mentioning it. Although

deflationary theories of truth remain controversial, they have gained strong supporters.95

Among the foundational questions in the theory of intentionality is, “To what extent are

intentional states representational?” According to the teleological theory of intentional

representation (TTIR), intentional agents make their way in the world by using states that are

very much like maps and blueprints.96 More precisely, according to TTIR, principal intentional

states, e. g. beliefs and desires, are robust mental representations.97 While not unchallenged,

the teleological theory of representation is compelling.

Taken individually thorough-going deflationism about truth and TTIR can both seem very

plausible. Nonetheless, in this paper, I argue that they are incompatible. An argument of this

sort is significant for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most superficially, it helps us to see that it is

94 I have an odd sense that I might be quoting here even though I don't remember the source. If so, I apologize to the original author. 95 Horwich (1990), Field (1994), Soames (1999), and Hill (2002) just to name a few. 96 Cf. footnote 5. 97 Cf. Chapter One, §2.1.

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not coincidental that thorough-going deflationists about truth like Hartry Field and Paul Horwich

end up endorsing a view of content that rejects the teleological theory of intentional

representation (TTIR).98 More importantly, such an argument illuminates the criticism

frequently made against deflationary theories of truth that such theories are at odds with truth

conditional theories of content. I argued last chapter that truth conditional theories of content

by and large just are theories that adopt TTIR; hence, if deflationary theories of truth are at odds

with TTIR, then they are at odds with truth conditional theories of content. Perhaps even more

importantly, an argument of this sort shows that philosophers who claim that deflationary

theories of truth are “obvious and philosophically innocuous” are mistaken (or, in the event they

are not adopting a thorough-going deflationism, misleading).99

A few words about the structure of this paper: I first cover deflationism about truth (§2)

and deflationary theories of content and their principal competitor, TTIR (§3). In §4, I develop

my principal argument. Explaining the representational aspects of intentional states in

accordance with TTIR requires a substantial theory of correctness or correctness-conditions. I

show that theory can serve as an adequate non-deflationary theory of truth.

In §5-6, I elucidate this argument by laying out the two different ways in which an

advocate of TTIR might go about discharging the explanatory debt of her theory. In so doing, I

show that whatever way the adherent of TTIR goes about discharging this debt, the result is, as

was suggested in §4, inconsistent with a thorough-going deflationism about truth. In §7-8, I

review the major points of the paper and make some concluding remarks.

Since I focus on mental content (as opposed to the content of token sentences of

natural language), I will frame the discussion in terms of Mentalese. I will assume that having an

intentional state with content that p is having an attitude towards a token sentence of

98 See Field (1994), Horwich (1998), Field (2001), and Horwich (2005). Cf. Chapter One. 99 Soames (1999), 251.

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Mentalese.100 (Thus, to believe that p is to belief-box a token sentence of Mentalese S with

content that p.)101

§2: Deflationary Theories of Truth

Roughly, a deflationary theory of truth is one that takes instances of some version of the T-

schema as a complete and a priori theory of truth.102 The effect of taking some version of the T-

schema as a complete and a priori theory of truth is twofold. First, the property of truth is not

fundamentally normative. Second, the property of truth is transparent.103

To claim that truth is not fundamentally normative is to claim that a truth bearer's being

true (platitudinously) entails nothing about what ought or ought not to be done with the truth

bearer. A deflationist about truth can concede—even as a matter of metaphysical necessity—

that one ought (in some sense) to believe only truths. He cannot concede that this norm follows

100 As I suggested in Chapter One, nothing hangs on this assumption. For my argument, it would make no difference whether there were any way to individuate sentences-types of Mentalese other than according to their content. (In particular, I am not committed to what Michael Rescorla calls (in works in progress) “the formal conception of psychological processes” (FCP). FCP claims that “psychological processes are not sensitive to semantic properties of mental representations.”) Nor would it make any difference whether Mentalese sentences had (proper) syntactic constituents with semantic values, or for that matter, whether they had syntactic constituents at all. (It also makes no difference whether Mentalese sentences have “logical” rather than “geometric” structure. See Rescorla (forthcoming).) My argument requires the premise that having an intentional state is being in a state of a particular attitude type (belief, desire, imagining, etc.) that has a particular content, but it requires nothing more, so far as I can see. Cf. Boghossian (1989), 514. 101 I take full advantage of the belief-box metaphor frequently attributed in the literature to Stephen Schiffer. 102 The T-schema is (roughly) taken to be a “complete” theory not in the sense that it implies every fact about truth, but in the sense that it covers all the fundamental facts about truth. I say “roughly” for at least three reasons. First, a deflationist might think that he needed something slightly stronger than the individual instances of the T-schema in order to account for generalizations involving truth. See Soames (1999), 247 and Hill (2002). Second, the T-schema might need to be restricted in order to avoid the semantic paradoxes. See Horwich (1990), 41 and Field (2008). Finally, a deflationist might harbor doubts about a principled a priori/a posteriori distinction, in which case he is likely to think that the epistemological status of the T-schema is similar to that of basic logical truths. For our purposes, we can ignore these complications; we will omit the “roughly.” 103 I adapt the use of the term 'transparent' from Gupta (1993) reprinted in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005), 202.

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(platitudinously) by itself from the theory of truth. Whatever (even metaphysically necessary)

normative consequences truth might have, they do not stem from the nature of truth.

The transparency of truth manifests both metaphysically and conceptually. In the first

place, to claim that truth is transparent is to claim that there is no deep metaphysical

explanation of what makes a truth bearer have the truth-conditions it does. (Compare: There is

a deep metaphysical explanation of what makes some substance water because we can explain

why it is water in terms of the chemical composition of the substance. The more fundamental

facts about chemical composition account for a particular substance's being water.) A deep

metaphysical explanation would be a serious supplement to the T-schema, and therefore is

incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Claiming that truth is transparent also typically

commits one to thinking that truth is not suitable for carrying explanatory weight. Thus, if truth

is transparent, the fact that the proposition that snow is white is true cannot explain anything

more than the fact that snow is white can.

To the extent that truth is transparent, there is no substantial story to tell about how

people come to grasp the truth-conditions of a truth bearer by grasping some significantly more

superficial aspect of truth. Anybody mastering the concept of truth will accept the T-schema,

which gives the truth-conditions for truth bearers.104 Typically, there is a further conceptual

aspect to transparency; the deflationist about truth will typically claim that to say that a truth

bearer is true is to do little more than one would do by using the truth bearer itself. (The “little

more” here is to commit oneself to the existence of a truth bearer.) Thus, in spirit, the property

of truth is redundant. It is not redundant in practice because, for a variety of reasons, one may

104 A deflationist about truth can allow that those with mastery of the concept of truth infer the T-schema by using substitutional quantification or something similar. The T-schema doesn't have to be among the most basic principles someone with a mastery of the concept of truth accepts so long as it follows fairly plainly from these more basic principles. See Hill (2002).

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not always be able to use the truth bearers in question.105 The concept of truth allows us to, as

it were, “indirectly” use the truth bearers in question on these occasions by asserting that these

truth bearers are true. According to deflationists, this feature of the concept of truth exhausts

its utility.

For purposes of clarity, we should distinguish two versions of deflationism.

Propositional deflationists take propositions as the fundamental bearers of truth so that the

theory of truth is exhausted by (PTS):106

(PTS) The proposition that p is true iff p

Sentential deflationists take token sentences107 as the fundamental truth bearers so that the

theory of truth is exhausted by (STS):108

(STS) S is true iff p

where the right-hand side of the biconditional uses the sentence (or an appropriate translation

thereof) named by ‘S’.

105 See Horwich (1990), 31-33. For instance, when I assert that what John says is true, I may not be a position to assert what John says instead because I may not know exactly what John says. Also, when I assert that the instances of the induction schema for Peano arithmetic are true, I cannot assert instead the instances of the induction schema as there are infinitely many of them. (Quine in particular emphasized the usefulness of `true' for making generalizations. See Field (2001), 119-123, for some discussion.) 106 See Horwich (1990) and Hill (2002). 107 For my purposes, a token sentence is a sentence of Mentalese considered in some context. 108 See Field (1994) and Field (2001).

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Some have thought that the difference between these versions is vast in that the

sentential view may force one to adopt a deflationary theory of content, while the propositional

version of deflationism does not.109 I do not think that the difference between these two

versions of deflationism about truth is significant in the end, but in order to avoid confusion, I

will treat them separately.

Over the last twenty years, deflationary theories of truth have become very prominent.

Their rise in popularity is due both to the difficulties of more traditional theories and to the

successes of deflationism's proponents in showing that, even when truth makes an appearance

in the formulation of philosophical problems and theories, it is only for the purpose of using

truth bearers indirectly. For instance, the debate between realists and anti-realists is sometimes

framed as a debate about whether propositions (or sentences) can be true independent of

whether or not they can be verified. However, it is quite plausible that the role of truth in this

debate is merely to allow us to indirectly use a number of propositions (or sentences) at once.

We can frame the debate for any particular proposition (or sentence) without making reference

to truth. For instance, we can ask whether there can be an odd number of stars independent of

whether it could be verified that there is an odd number of stars.110

109 See Heck (2004), 319-320. Heck suggests that although Soames is a deflationist, he is not committed to the Field’s view because although he accepts deflationism about propositional truth, he does not endorse a deflationary construal of content. 110 See Soames (1999), 32-9.

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§3: Theories of Content

In Chapter One, I carefully explained both the teleological theory of intentional representation

(TTIR) and deflationary theories of content (DTCs). I will quickly review my characterization of

these two views here.

According to the TTIR, intentional states are robust mental representations, and thus

the content of such attitudes is differentiated according to their representational properties. On

TTIR, an intentional state has content that p only if it represents that p.111 Acceptance of TTIR is

not unusual. Anyone who accepts that propositions are sets of possible worlds or Russellian

structures of objects and properties is likely to be friendly to the view. Many Fregeans will be

friendly to TTIR as well.

The advocate of a DTC112 denies that intentional states have these robust

representational properties.113 We can understand this contrast by explaining why someone

would make this denial.

TTIR promotes understanding intentional states on the model of maps, blueprints,

pictures, and other paradigm instances of representation. As a result, TTIR incurs an

explanatory debt not easily discharged. Paradigm instances show that representation has a

normative aspect. A painting may match the visual likeness of Warren Buffett more or less well,

but what makes the painting a representation of Warren Buffett is not the degree to which it

matches his likeness, but rather whether the painting is supposed to match his likeness.

111 Furthermore, it has propositional content that p only if, if it represents that q, then the proposition that p entails (at least metaphysically) that q. Note that these are merely necessary conditions. Someone accepting TTIR need not think that propositional content is exhausted by its representational properties. 112 See Field (1994), Horwich (1998), Field (2001), and Horwich (2005). 113 This denial is obviously compatible with the claim that intentional states are representations of a sort, so long as, for example, differences in representation do not necessarily amount to differences in contents.

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Representation presupposes that certain standards of evaluation are in force. X represents Y

because a certain correspondence between X and Y ought to hold.

According to TTIR, beliefs that p represent that p. Given, in addition, that beliefs

represent reflectively (as maps do), TTIR is committed to (Norm of Belief) as a constitutive norm:

(Norm of Belief) Beliefs that p are correct (qua belief) relative to some (arbitrary) scenario iff that scenario is such that p.

Correctness here is genuinely normative because representation is genuinely normative. If a

belief is correct, it is as it ought (qua representation) to be.114 This is not to say that it is

warranted.

According to TTIR, desires that p also represent that p. Given, in addition, that desires

represent projectively (as blueprints do), TTIR is also committed to (Norm of Desire) as a

constitutive norm:

(Norm of Desire) Relative to some (arbitrary) scenario things have gone well regarding desires that p (qua desires) iff in that scenario, p.115

Again, (Norm of Desire) is a genuine norm because representation is genuinely normative.

There is an important upshot to accepting (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire). If

these standards of evaluation must be in force to have intentional states (as on TTIR), and,

114 Of course, it is frequently argued that correctness is not genuinely normative. See Boghossian (1989), Papineau (1999), Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006), Rey (2007), and Glüer and Wikforss (2009). In my “Deflationary Theories of Content and Representation” I argue otherwise. I am not alone in disagreeing. See Dummett (1959) reprinted in Dummett (1978), Wright (1992), Tanney (1999), Wedgwood (2007a), and Wedgwood (2007b). For my purposes, I will assume what I have attempted to establish elsewhere—that correctness is genuinely normative. 115 Thus, pace Boghossian (2005), there are standards of evaluation applicable to desires as well. Perhaps Boghossian overlooks that representations can be like blueprints instead of like maps.

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moreover, intentional states are natural, physical states, there must be an explanation of the

standards of evaluation in terms of the natural, physical states that constitute intentional states.

What sort of explanation is required? A correct application of moral standards of

evaluation requires the existence of metaphysically supporting explanations. Aaron’s turning in

this very paper on Kant is morally wrong because he copied it from the internet. Any action is

morally wrong by virtue of its having certain relevant natural and descriptive properties. Even if

moral properties do not reduce to descriptive properties, moral properties strongly supervene

on and are realized by descriptive properties. Thinking that an action is morally wrong commits

one to the existence of an explanation: one must think that there are some descriptive

properties that account for the moral wrongness of the action. These descriptive properties

must be properties generally relevant to moral wrongness. There may be no strict general

theory—no exceptionless non-massively-disjunctive generalizations—of how the moral

supervenes on the descriptive. Still, at the very least there should be ceteris paribus

generalizations. (Else, how could we recognize when moral properties apply by apprehending

natural, descriptive properties in the supervenience base as we so obviously do?) Natural and

descriptive properties account for moral properties in accordance with these generalizations.

The standards of evaluation constitutive of representational properties should also

strongly supervene on descriptive properties. Thus, thinking that a belief that p is correct

commits one to the existence of an explanation—one must think that there are descriptive

properties that account for the correctness of the belief. The existence of this explanation does

not entail that there is a reduction of representational properties to descriptive properties.

There may be no strict general theory of how the representational supervenes on the

descriptive. However, if there is no strict general theory of how representational properties

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supervene on descriptive properties, there must at least be ceteris paribus generalizations.116

(How could one recognize representational properties by apprehending natural, descriptive

properties in the supervenience base otherwise?) Natural and descriptive properties account

for representational properties in accordance with these generalizations. Advocates of a DTC

forego an explanation of robust representational properties by foregoing robust representation

in their theory of intentionality.

§4: Sketching the Argument

At this point, we're in a position to draw out the tension between TTIR and deflationism about

truth. In this section, I present the argument in sketch.

Before I do, a word about terminology. There will come a point in §6 when it will be

important to make a distinction between whether we're talking about truth and belief as it

applies to propositions on the one hand or to sentences on the other. However, by and large,

what applies in one case will apply in the other. Rather than saying the same thing in both the

propositional and sentential cases, I'll talk in terms of “truth” and “belief” and just leave it

unspecified whether this is propositional or sentential truth, or belief as a relation that applies

to propositions or as a relation that applies to sentences. When I want to restrict the discussion

to the propositional or sentential case, I'll make that explicit. Thus, when I want to talk only

about propositional truth and the believing or the believability of a proposition, I will say so.

Likewise, when I want to talk only about sentential truth and the belief-boxing or belief-

boxability of a sentence, I will also say so.

116 Cf. Chapter One, §2.8.

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With that clarification in mind, let's move to the argument.117 An advocate of TTIR is

committed to (Norm of Belief). Any reasonable theorist about truth is committed to:

(Truth Conditions) Beliefs that p are true relative to some (arbitrary) scenario iff in that scenario, p.

Because instances of (Norm of Belief) and (Truth Conditions) are obviously necessary truths, any

advocate of TTIR is committed to the following equivalence:

(Equivalence) Necessarily, beliefs that p are correct (qua belief) relative to some (arbitrary) scenario iff they are true relative to that scenario.

Given TTIR, truth (relative to a scenario) is obviously necessarily co-extensive with correct

believability (relative to that same scenario). (Remember, this is not a triviality because

correctness is normative.)

As explained last section, an adherent of TTIR owes an account of correct belief. Due to

the supervenience of standards of evaluation on the descriptive, natural, descriptive properties

account for the correctness or incorrectness of individuals’ psychological states. Moreover,

natural, descriptive properties don’t account for representational correctness haphazardly. As

discussed in §3, there are some regularities in the supervenience. Consequently, one might

expect a theory of correctness that explains, in general, what makes individuals’ psychological

states correct or incorrect. For instance, one might think there should be some robust natural,

descriptive property (e. g. correspondence) that accounts for the correctness or incorrectness.

Alternatively, one might expect a theory of correctness-conditions that explains, in general,

what makes individuals’ psychological states have the particular correctness-conditions they do

117 Rattan (2005) argues in a similar spirit that a deflationary theory of truth is only genuinely viable given a deflationary theory of content. I will not try to draw the connections between his argument and mine.

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(e. g. because of conceptual role). (More on the distinction between theories of correctness and

theories of correctness-conditions in §5 and §6.)

Given that truth and correct believability are necessarily co-extensive (relative to any

scenario), nothing prevents the adherent of TTIR from giving the theory of correctness required

by her view as her theory of truth. Why shouldn’t she? Note, though, that a theory of correct

believability does not qualify as a deflationary theory of truth. An adequate theory of correct

believability explains in general the correctness, or correctness-conditions, of individuals’

psychological states in terms of other natural and descriptive properties. Consequently, unlike

deflationary truth, correctness does not appear to be suitably transparent. Moreover,

deflationary truth, unlike correct believability, is not normative.

Of course, the adherent of TTIR might opt to give as her theory of truth, not her account

of correct believability, but a deflationary account. Even if truth and correct believability are

necessarily co-extensive (relative to any scenario), we can still draw a distinction between them.

An advocate of TTIR can say that truth is a transparent property, which we have a grasp on

merely by accepting some form of the T-schema even while maintaining that what makes a

truth bearer correctly believable requires some much deeper explanation.118

So, an adherent of TTIR might distinguish her theory of truth from her theory of correct

believability. She might give separate accounts where she could give one. She might say that we 118 I am working with a thin concept of property where there's a distinct property for every distinct concept. Even if we are generally more concerned about properties in some (metaphysically) thicker sense, whereon properties are not merely differentiated by our theories about them, the important point here is that an advocate of TTIR can differentiate between the theories of correct believability and deflationary truth. This is true even if the fact that each theory is about something necessarily-coextensive with what the other theory is about establishes that, in some thick metaphysical sense, there is only one property. Obviously two different theories can both be about the same thick property without any incompatibility. Furthermore, there’s nothing strange about the thick property of truth being transparent on one mode of presentation, and not transparent when picked out another way, any more than it’s strange that the thick property of being water is obviously the property of being the actual watery stuff on one mode of presentation and not so obviously when it is picked out as stuff composed primarily of H2O.

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have two properties not one. But why? Why not offer just one theory of truth and correctness?

What do we need a deflationary theory of truth for, if our view about content already commits

us to a theory of correct believability? What about our concept of truth requires us to give a

deflationary theory of truth, especially if TTIR is, as some have suggested, the common sense

view?

The case for deflationism about truth is most compelling when there isn’t any

alternative. After all, any viable theory of truth will be committed to the idea that some version

of the T-schema is not only correct, but somehow platitudinous.119 That much is sufficient for a

theory of truth—including a theory of correct believability—to do the work that a deflationary

theory of truth can do. So long as people generally accept the T-schema, they will be able to

ascribe truth to a truth bearer as proxy for asserting it and vice-versa, and thus be able to use

truth to make generalizations, etc.120 The most persuasive argument for deflationism about

truth, then, is that we don't need a thicker concept of truth. However, if TTIR is right, we do

need, in effect, a thicker concept of truth, precisely because, given the nature of intentional

states, we need a substantive theory of correct believability.

A thorough-going deflationist asserts there isn’t an alternative to deflationism about

truth; we don't need—and can't have—anything thicker than a deflationary concept of truth.

According to the thorough-going deflationist, not only is truth transparent and non-normative,

there is nothing necessarily co-extensive with truth (relative to any scenario) that isn’t also just

as transparent and just as non-normative. A thorough-going deflationist, then, cannot accept

TTIR.

119 See Gupta (1993). 120 For a good, detailed discussion of this point, see Heck (2004), 223-228.

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I take this argument to be conclusive. However, there's benefit to be had in examining

the argument more carefully. In the face of this argument, skepticism about the possibility of a

general, substantial theory of truth and correctness might lead one to reject TTIR. This rejection

would be too quick. To understand how there might be room for TTIR, it helps to distinguish

carefully between theories of truth and correctness and theories of truth- and correctness-

conditions. Even if there is no substantial theory of truth and correctness, there might still be a

substantial theory of truth- and correctness-conditions, and the latter can be sufficient for TTIR.

The absence of a general, substantive theory of truth does not pave the way for deflationary

theories of truth; general substantive theories of truth-conditions are also incompatible with

deflationism about truth.121 To understand fully the commitments of deflationism about truth,

it is helpful to understand the two different ways an advocate of TTIR can discharge her

explanatory debt.

§5: Common Property Explanations (CPE)

§5.1: The Basics of CPEs

I have claimed that the advocate of TTIR has an explanatory debt to discharge vis-à-vis correct

belief, and moreover that discharging this debt is inconsistent with thorough-going deflationism

about truth. I also suggested that an adherent of TTIR might discharge her explanatory debt in

two different ways—via a theory of correctness or via a theory of correctness-conditions. In this

subsection, I discuss a theory of correctness before raising some difficulties for it in the next

subsection. In §6, we will consider the distinct possibility of a theory of correctness-conditions.

121 Among deflationists, Field is most aware of this fact. From the onset, he has presented his deflationary views about truth and content as a package. See Field (1994).

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The explanatory debt of TTIR would be discharged if its advocate could show that truth

bearers are correctly believable in virtue of their having some single deeply explanatory not-

massively-disjunctive descriptive (DEND) property, e. g. (if there were such a thing) structural

resemblance between truth bearer and world, and not correctly believable in virtue of their

failing to have that property. Explaining correct believability along these lines is analogous to

explaining the particular moral badness of greedy actions by pointing to some underlying

descriptive property that all and only greedy actions have in common.122 When it comes to the

moral badness of greedy actions, the existence of this sort of explanation is plausible because

greedy actions genuinely have things in common, e. g. a disregard for others' concerns, that

non-greedy actions do not. In other words, it is only because there does seem to be a not-

massively-disjunctive descriptive property underlying greedy actions, that an explanation of

moral badness by this property seems viable. For completely analogous reasons, in order for

there to be an analogous explanation of correct believability, the explaining descriptive property

needs to be not-massively-disjunctive in order to carry the explanatory weight. That a

proposition has the property of either being the proposition that snow is white and such that

snow is white or being the proposition that grass is green and such that grass is green, etc.

presumably cannot explain why that proposition is correctly believable. Having that property

does not constitute having anything genuinely in common, and thus cannot explain why two

propositions are both correctly believed.

Someone attracted to traditional correspondence theories of truth might find

compelling the view that correct believability is explained by some common property; a

122 See Lynch (2004).

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traditional correspondence theorist might argue that the correctness of a belief was to be

explained in virtue of the belief's having some fleshed out property of correspondence.123

As a variation on this position, the adherent of TTIR might believe that truth bearers are

to be divided up into domains, e. g., the domains of moral propositions (or sentences), of

observational propositions (or sentences), etc., according to what the truth bearers are about.

Given a proper division, an adherent of TTIR might believe that, for any particular domain, there

is some single DEND property such that a truth bearer from that domain is correctly believed in

virtue of having that property and not correctly believed in virtue of failing to have that

property. This view might appeal to someone attracted to pluralism about truth.124

If some such approach to explaining correctness is successful, a problem for

deflationism about truth clearly emerges. If one can explain correct believability in terms of, for

instance, robust correspondence, why shouldn’t one offer robust correspondence as a theory of

truth? (This is just a more specific instance of the point I made in §4.)

Of course, no one can force someone committed to a correspondence theory of

correctness to accept a correspondence theory of truth. One might accept a correspondence

theory of correctness and a deflationary theory of truth, but with what motivation?

123 In Chapter One, I argued that correspondence is the by-product of representation. If so, the advocate of TTIR cannot look to correspondence in order to explain representation because representation explains correspondence. 124 Wright (1992) advocates pluralism about truth. Lynch (2009) argues for another version of pluralism about truth, which allows simultaneously that truth is a single, unified functional property.

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§5.2: Challenges to CPEs

Why might this general strategy of explaining correct believability for some (nontrivial) domain

of truth bearers through a common DEND property fail to work?

One of the main motivations behind deflationary theories of truth just is the intuition

that there is no common DEND property that all and only the true truth bearers in any nontrivial

domain, e. g. moral domain, observational domain, etc., have. A Mentalese counterpart of

‘Snow is white’ is true in virtue of snow's being white while a Mentalese counterpart of ‘Grass is

green’ is true in virtue of something entirely different—namely, grass's being green. In some

sense, there can be no one theory of truth; each truth bearer requires a different theory. What

these individual theories have in common is the same form, which the T-schema manifests.

Thus, deflationists about truth are maniacal pluralists. Unless truth bearers are or have the very

same content, they belong to different “domains” requiring different theories of truth.

There is something very plausible about this claim. (I accept it myself.) Of course, if

there is no common DEND property that all and only true truth bearers in any nontrivial domain

have in common, there is no common DEND property that all and only correctly believable truth

bearers in any nontrivial domain have in common either. After all, truth and correct

believability are necessarily co-extensive (relative to any scenario). Consequently, if the

deflationist about truth is right, then we will not be able to explain correct believability in any

nontrivial domain, e. g., the moral domain, observational domain, etc., by pointing to a common

DEND property of all and only correctly believable truth bearers in that domain.

In conversation, I have found that people find maniacal pluralism more plausible in the

case of sentences than in the case of propositions. They are tempted to think that, although

there is no DEND property that all and only true sentences in any nontrivial domain have in

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common, there still might be, for every nontrivial domain of propositions, some DEND property

that all and only true propositions from that domain have in common. One might use these

properties to explain why propositions from various nontrivial domains are correctly

believable.125

However prevalent this temptation, it is very difficult to see how we could coherently be

maniacal pluralists about sentential truth but not about propositional truth. There is, after all, a

tight relationship between sentential and propositional truth. Sentences are true if the

propositions they express are true, and propositions are true if the sentences that express them

are true. If what fundamentally makes particular token sentences true varies according to the

proposition expressed, then it stands to reason that what fundamentally makes particular

propositions true varies according to what proposition it is. Maniacal pluralism about

propositional truth appears intimately tied up with maniacal pluralism about sentential truth.

(The converse is also likely to be true for completely analogous reasons.)

§6: Determination Theories

§6.1 Another Option

We have seen that accepting maniacal pluralism about truth requires accepting maniacal

pluralism about correct believability. Thus, accepting maniacal pluralism is incompatible with a

substantial, general theory of correctness.

125 Obviously, these properties must be relational. Whether the proposition that snow is white is true depends on the snow (and thus can’t be intrinsic), while whether the proposition that grass is green is true depends not on the snow, but on the grass (and thus can’t be intrinsic either). Clearly the idea must be that for nontrivial domains, there is some deeply explanatory non-disjunctive descriptive relational property that all true and only true propositions from that domain have in common.

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Accepting maniacal pluralism, however, does not require abandoning TTIR. One can

endorse the position that there are no general explanations of the correct believability of truth

bearers without compromising on the explanation of correct and incorrect believing requisite

for an adequate version of TTIR.

How? Instead of offering a general explanation of what makes for correct believability,

one offers a general explanation of when token sentences of Mentalese have the particular

conditions of correct (or incorrect) belief-boxability that they do. Instead of having a general

theory of correctness, one has a general theory of correctness-conditions.

Following Christopher Peacocke, we might call this general explanation of conditions of

correct belief-boxability a “determination theory” because it shows how natural and descriptive

properties like conceptual role determine certain conditions of correct belief-boxability.126

Subsequently, one explains the correct belief-boxability of particular token sentences of

Mentalese by pointing, first, to the general explanation of how token sentences come to have

particular conditions of correct belief-boxability and, second, to the fulfillment of those

conditions. Thus, the descriptive states of affairs that make sentences correctly belief-boxable

have nothing generally in common, but all sentences are correctly belief-boxable in virtue of

some such state of affairs obtaining.127

To understand this suggestion more thoroughly, consider an analogy to games. Winning

is a normative property. Thus, given the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive,

whether a participant wins must be accounted for with natural and descriptive facts.

126 See Peacocke (1992), 17-21. It’s worth saying that (unlike Peacocke (1992)) I am not assuming that an adequate determination theory shows how conditions of correct belief-boxability are computable from the relevant natural/descriptive properties. It may be enough for adequacy that the determination theory merely points to ceteris paribus regularities in how the relevant natural/descriptive properties account for conditions of correct belief-boxability. 127 See Gupta (2003), 660 where a similar idea is discussed about truth.

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Nevertheless, there is no general explanation of what makes a person or team the winner on

some occasion—what state of affairs accounts for winning varies according to the game the

person or team is participating in. In this respect, an analogous maniacal pluralism with respect

to winning seems very plausible. Nonetheless, we can still account for how particular people

and teams win in natural and descriptive terms. Why? One can offer a general explanation of

how people or teams become participants of some (rather than some other) game, and hence

subject to some (rather than some other) conditions for winning. Pointing to the fulfillment of

those conditions, one can subsequently explain how individuals win.

Maniacal pluralism about correct belief-boxability says that there are no general

regularities as to how correct belief-boxability itself supervenes on descriptive properties. In

light of what I suggested in §3—that there must be regularities about how representational

properties supervene on the descriptive—this might seem problematic for TTIR. Nonetheless,

there’s no problem for TTIR so long as there are regularities as to how the conditions for correct

belief-boxability of token sentences supervene on descriptive properties. Having certain

conditions for correct belief-boxability just amounts to having a certain representational

property. Consequently, if there are regularities as to how conditions of correct belief-boxability

supervene, then there are regularities as to how representational properties supervene as well.

Even if the advocate of TTIR adopts a general theory of correctness conditions for

sentences rather a general theory of correctness, the arguments from §4 still apply. Assume

that there is some general explanation of how token sentences of Mentalese come to have the

conditions of correct belief-boxability that they do. What is the motivation, now, for sentential

deflationism about truth? Why wouldn’t we just lift the general explanation of how token

sentences of Mentalese come to have the particular conditions of correct belief-boxability that

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they do and turn it into a general explanation of how token sentences of Mentalese come to

have the truth-conditions that they do? After all, there’s nothing stopping us giving a

determination theory for sentential truth along the exact same lines as the determination

theory for correct belief-boxability; sentential truth and correct belief-boxability are necessarily

co-extensive (relative to any scenario). Why wouldn’t we, as theorists about sentential truth,

identify sentential truth (relative to a scenario) with correct belief-boxability (relative to that

same scenario)?

Doing so, of course, involves rejecting sentential deflationism about truth. After all, one

will accept that for any sentence, there is a deep explanation of its particular truth-conditions.

Thus, sentential truth isn’t transparent. I won’t insist that there isn’t any motivation for

separating our theories of sentential truth and correct belief-boxability (although I don’t know

what the motivation is supposed to be), but the sentential deflationist about truth who also

endorses TTIR owes us an account of it.

Regardless, one can immediately see why accepting a thorough-going sentential

deflationism about truth commits one to denying TTIR. A thorough-going sentential deflationist

will deny that there is even a viable theory of truth available according to which truth isn’t

transparent. Suppose for argument’s sake that the view that gives the account of correct belief-

boxability conditions as its account of truth-conditions is less well motivated than I think;

nonetheless, that view is a(n) (albeit less well-motivated) alternative account to sentential

deflationism about truth. Why? There is a property, correct belief-boxability that is both

necessarily co-extensive with truth (relative to any scenario) and not transparent.

Consequently, if TTIR is true and, consequently, there is a general account of correct belief-

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boxability conditions (even if there isn’t a general account of correct belief-boxability),

thorough-going sentential deflationism about truth is false.

§6.2: Maniacal Pluralism, Determination Theories, and Propositional Deflationism

Last subsection, we saw how maniacal pluralism and TTIR jointly bear on sentential deflationism

about truth. In this subsection, I will explore how they jointly bear on propositional deflationism

about truth.

According to TTIR, propositions are differentiated at least in part according to their

representational properties.128 Put another way, propositions can be distinguished from each

other partly by their conditions for correct belief. Two propositions are different if one is

correctly believed relative to some scenario while the other is not correctly believed relative to

that same scenario.

In this respect, propositions differ from token sentences of Mentalese. Sentences of

Mentalese are distinguished by their physical characteristics. They have their conditions of

correct belief-boxability only contingently. Propositions, on the other hand, have (or are) their

conditions of correct believability essentially.129 Moreover, anybody who understands exactly

which proposition some proposition is must understand the conditions under which the

proposition is correctly believed. Thus, while it makes sense that there should be a deep

explanation of the conditions of correct belief-boxability for token sentences of Mentalese,

there can be no deep explanation of the conditions of correct believability for propositions.

128 Of course, the advocate of a DTC will disagree; on his theory, propositions are merely that which sentences with certain “use” properties express. 129 Henceforth, I will not be careful about whether propositions merely have or in fact are their conditions of correct believability.

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Of course, that propositions have their conditions of correct believability essentially and

self-evidently does not obviously require us to the conclude that correct believability is a

transparent property of propositions in the way that propositional deflationists about truth

typically claim that truth is transparent. Part of truth’s purported transparency is that one says

little more than that snow is white when one says that the proposition that snow is white is

true. That the proposition that snow is white is correctly believable may well imply that snow is

white and vice-versa, but it is not obvious that one says little more than that snow is white when

one says that the proposition that snow is white is correctly believable, and vice-versa. In

claiming that snow is white, one says something about snow; in claiming that the proposition

that snow is white is correctly believable, one evaluates a hypothetical belief that snow is white.

The property of correct believability does not seem to be redundant even in spirit.

Putting that concern aside, let us grant for a moment that because propositions have

their conditions of correct believability essentially and self-evidently, the advocate of TTIR

should concede that correctly believability is a transparent property. Suppose also that we have

accepted maniacal pluralism about propositional correct believability, so that there is no general

explanation of what makes a proposition correctly believable. Finally, suppose that we offer as

our theory of propositional truth, the following: necessarily, a proposition is true relative to

some scenario if and only if it is correctly believed relative to that scenario. Are we not now led

to a propositional deflationism about truth?

No. On a deflationary theory of truth, truth is not normative. Correct believability,

however, is normative. Consequently, a theory of propositional truth according to which

propositional truth just is correct believability is not a deflationary theory of truth.

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That correct believability is normative is not an inconsequential fact. If propositions are

differentiated according to their conditions of correct believability, token sentences will be

differentiated by their conditions of correct belief-boxability according to the propositions they

express. Otherwise, to belief-box a token sentence expressing a proposition would not

necessarily be to believe that proposition. As we’ve discussed, because correctness supervenes

on descriptive properties, showing that token sentences have certain conditions of correct

belief-boxability requires a determination theory of some generality. One must be able to

explain in general how a token sentence comes to have some (rather than some other)

conditions for correct belief-boxability even if the generalizations aren’t strict. Not everyone

feels so committed to a determination theory of this sort though.130

Thus, there is good reason to think that an account of propositional truth according to

which propositional truth is normative is not a deflationary theory of truth, even if both truth

and correct believability are transparent. Deflationists about truth typically claim that the

nature of truth provides no constraint on a theory of content (or a theory of anything else).

However, because correctness is normative, conditions of correct believability do provide a

constraint on a theory of content by requiring an adequate determination theory. If truth is

exactly like correct believability in this respect, truth-conditions will likewise put a constraint on

the theory of content by requiring an adequate determination theory. Consequently, a theory

of truth according to which truth just is correct believability does not seem to qualify as a

propositional deflationary theory of truth.

Of course, one could accept that there is this normative property of correct believability

that is necessarily co-extensive (relative to any scenario) with truth and yet reject that truth is

130 Paul Horwich, for instance, has explicitly challenged that commitment. See Horwich (1995) reprinted in Horwich (2004). See also Horwich (1998), 65-8 and chapters 3 and 4 of Horwich (2005).

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normative. In this way, one might maintain a propositional deflationism about truth while

accepting both maniacal pluralism and TTIR. However, as I've continued to say, an advocate of

this sort of position owes us an explanation for his creative accounting; he gives two theories,

one of correct believability, the other of truth, where he could give one.

Even if motivation for that view is forthcoming, a thorough-going propositional

deflationism is obviously false as there is a property necessarily co-extensive with propositional

truth (relative to any scenario) that, even if transparent, is also normative.

§7: Review

In §4, I sketched an argument to the conclusion that two independently plausible views,

thorough-going deflationism about truth and TTIR, are inconsistent. Let us review that

argument.

TTIR commits one to the existence of conditions of correct believability. Moreover,

given obvious constraints on the theory of correct believability and the theory of truth, truth

relative to some scenario is necessarily co-extensive with correct believability relative to that

scenario. Barring any forthcoming countervailing consideration, this straightforward

consequence of her theoretical commitments ought to move the adherent of TTIR to conclude

that correct believability and truth (relative to any scenario) are not different properties.

However, there are constraints on the theory of correct believability that stem from the

fact that correctness is normative. Given any plausible theory of the supervenience of the

normative on the natural and descriptive, natural and descriptive properties must account for

correct believability in systematic ways. Of course, if truth just is correct believability, truth

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must be accounted for in systematic ways as well. Consequently, on the supposition that TTIR is

true and truth is identified with correct believability, deflationism about truth—which rejects

that truth must be so accounted for—must be false.

We can see how that this argument goes through by considering the two ways in which

natural and descriptive properties might adequately account for correct believability. In §5, I

discussed one such way. We expect some (complex) natural, descriptive explanatory property

to account for the moral wrongness of greedy actions. We might analogously expect that some

(complex) natural, descriptive explanatory property to account for the correct believability, at

least when truth bearers are restricted to a certain domain. Thus, truth bearers from a certain

domain might be correctly believable in virtue of having this complex natural, descriptive

explanatory property. If so, then, if truth just is correct believability, truth bearers are true in

virtue of having this complex natural, descriptive property. This resulting theory of truth is not

deflationary.

In §6, I discuss the other way natural and descriptive properties might adequately

account for correct believability. We have no reason to think that there is any one natural or

descriptive property (no matter how complex) that accounts for the property of winning.

Participants in different games win under different conditions. Moreover, there is no deep

explanation for why a game has the conditions for winning that it does—not only does a game

have its winning conditions essentially, anyone who understands which game some game is

must know what the conditions for winning are. Nonetheless, we can account for person’s

winning by offering a general explanation for how a person comes to be subject to certain

winning conditions, and then pointing to the fact that in a particular case, those winning

conditions were fulfilled. Analogously, even if there is no deep explanation for why a

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proposition has the conditions of correct believability that it does, we can still offer an account

of a token sentence’s being correctly belief-boxed by offering a determination theory, and then

pointing to the fact that in this particular case, the conditions determined for correct belief-

boxing were fulfilled.

This sort of account of correct belief-boxability conditions satisfies the constraint that

supervenience of the normative on the descriptive be systematic. Moreover, if sentential truth

just is correct belief-boxability, this sort of account of correct-boxability conditions refutes

sentential deflationism, for sentential truth will not be transparent. Of course, even if

propositional truth just is correct believability, we might allow (if we are generous) that

propositional truth counts as transparent. Nonetheless, if propositional truth just is correct

believability, propositional deflationism about truth is false because truth is normative.

As I have pointed out several times, the inconsistency between TTIR and both

propositional and sentential deflationism about truth can be avoided if one is willing to hold

separate theories about necessarily co-extensive properties: correct (propositional) believability

and correct belief-boxability on the one hand, and propositional truth and sentential truth on

the other. Nothing prevents one from steadfastly holding that either propositional or sentential

truth is both robustly transparent and not normative even while holding that there are these

other non-deflationary, but necessarily co-extensive properties, correct (propositional)

believability and correct belief-boxability. Although I wonder at the motivation for this position,

some philosophers appear committed to it.131

131 Scott Soames may be such a person. In Soames (1999), 228-262, he advocates propositional deflationism about truth. Nonetheless, he does not seem adverse to the idea that language/thought may be fraught with “oughts.” See Soames (1999), 29. These “oughts” may well correspond to the standards of evaluation required for TTIR. More importantly, on Soames’s neo-Russellian view of propositions, propositions are naturally understood as representing. See Soames (1987) reprinted in Salmon and

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Of course, the inconsistency between thorough-going deflationism about truth and TTIR

cannot be avoided. The mere existence of a property that is either fundamentally normative or

not transparent and that is also straightforwardly necessarily co-extensive with truth is enough

to refute thorough-going deflationism. As a thorough-going deflationism does entail that TTIR is

false, it is not surprising that deflationists about truth tend to adopt DTCs, TTIR's principal

competitor theories.

§8: Concluding Remarks

The inconsistency between thorough-going deflationism and TTIR is a substantial result. It’s not

uncommon for me to run into philosophers who seem to think that deflationism about truth is

inevitable, i. e., that there are no genuine alternatives to it. If deflationism about truth is

inevitable, though, then something like a DTC probably is as well. (Only if thorough-going

deflationism about truth is correct is deflationism about truth inevitable.) With thorough-going

deflationism about truth, however, one must abandon the notion that the property of being an

intentional state is constitutively representational—and yet many people are of the opinion that

the property of being a intentional state is constitutively representational. So far as I can tell,

TTIR remains a dominant view.

While the inconsistency between thorough-going deflationism and TTIR might initially

incline us to give up latter, I suspect this inclination is at least partly due to the perhaps

somewhat surprising but increasingly apparent plausibility—and even probability—of maniacal

pluralism about truth and our tendency to think that, given maniacal pluralism, only a

Soames (1989). For instance, the proposition consisting of the ordered pair of Scott Soames and the property of being a philosopher is naturally understood as representing that Scott Soames is a philosopher. Thus, his view on propositions fits most naturally with TTIR.

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deflationary theory of truth is possible. Whether or not I am right in suspecting that this

tendency exists, it is definitively mistaken to think that maniacal pluralism entails a deflationary

theory of truth. Although maniacal pluralism makes trouble for a substantive theory of truth, it

does not prove an obstacle to a substantive theory of truth-conditions. Moreover, a substantive

theory of truth-conditions can support TTIR at the expense of thorough-going deflationism

about truth. Consequently, accepting maniacal pluralism about truth does not necessarily put

one on the path to a deflationary theory of truth. Whether or not truth has much of a nature

ultimately depends on the nature of intentional states.132

132 Thanks to Richard Heck, Michael Lynch, Joshua Schechter, Christopher Hill, Jaegwon Kim, and Jamie Dreier for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter.

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CHAPTER THREE:

The Instrumental Value of Truth and the Utility of Belief-

Desire Psychology

§1 Introduction

Philosophers of many different stripes are inclined to take something like

(Norm of Belief*) as common ground:

(Norm of Belief*) Beliefs that p are (in some sense) correct relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p. Moreover, a belief that is correct (or incorrect) relative to the actual scenario is correct (or incorrect) simpliciter.

Even when we understand (Norm of Belief) as a genuine norm effectively prohibiting all and

only beliefs that are not true, (Norm of Belief) remains very plausible. A commitment to (Norm

of Belief) is only a commitment to the idea that avoiding false belief is valuable from an

epistemic perspective. (There may, of course, be other epistemic values in tension with (Norm

of Belief).) But why should we care whether our beliefs have value from an epistemic

perspective? What does it matter if beliefs are correct in this sense? In this chapter, I argue

that whatever intrinsic value epistemic value has, it also has instrumental value.133 Absent

defeaters, respecting (Norm of Belief) facilitates satisfying one's antecedent ends.

133 This is a very common sense view (Cf. Haack (1997)) although it is not without challengers (Cf. Stich (1993)).

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My purpose in defending this position, however, is not merely to vindicate common

sense. In §6, I will argue that the pragmatic utility of belief is tied to pragmatic utility of belief-

desire psychology more generally, and understanding the import of belief-desire psychology for

creatures such as ourselves is obviously of independent interest.

More significantly, I suspect that understanding the pragmatic utility of belief-desire

psychology will turn out to be central to understanding the nature of intentionality. I am

partisan to the view that intentional representation inherently has a normative aspectthat

intentional properties like being a belief, being a desire, having a particular content, etc.

constitutively involve having a genuinely teleological function that are intimately tied to

representational norms. Thus, I'm inclined to think that (Norm of Belief), for instance, does not

merely state a necessary normative fact concerning belief, but rather a norm that is partly

constitutive of being a belief with content that p. This initially plausible but somewhat

controversial view is often opposed precisely because it can be difficult to fathom how these

norms and teleological functions arise.134 I conjecture that any adequate answer to this

question must take advantage of the fact that absent special defeating conditions, intentional

states have pragmatic utility for the subject only if they are acting like representations are

supposed to. In this way, teleological function and representational norms might derive from

pragmatic norms, and understanding the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology might turn

out to be central to understanding the nature of intentionality. I will say a few more things

about this idea at the end of this chapter.

A quick summary of the chapter up until that point: In the next two sections, I will raise

an example to help frame and subsequently clarify the question “Why have true beliefs?”, which

I will be tackling throughout the rest of the paper. In §4, I will explain why I think there ought to

134 Cf. Block (2007), 24.

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be an answer to that question before attempting to give the answer in §5-10. In §5, I will lay out

the general strategy for answering the question, and in §6, I will explain why answering the

question requires thinking about the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology generally. In

§7-10, I will show how the usefulness of belief-desire psychology hinges on beliefs being true

before addressing objections in §11 and summarizing the conclusion in §12.

§2: Why not Tarot?

How might one disrespect (Norm of Belief)? Explicitly disregarding what is true in belief

formation is rather difficult. It requires not believing something when one has come to believe

that it is true. Given the inferential role of true, doing as much with complete generality may

not be altogether possible. We find it difficult to imagine someone who regularly will not bring

himself to believe something that he believes to be true.

This exercise does not show that (Norm of Belief) is trivially respected. There are other

ways to flout (Norm of Belief). More specifically, even if one always believes something when

they believe it to be true (and vice-versa), one can effectively flout (Norm of Belief) by engaging

in belief forming methods that are apparently not reliable, and hence prone to produce beliefs

that, by (Norm of Belief), are incorrect.

We generally think people who flout (Norm of Belief) in this way are at a practical

disadvantage. For purposes of illustration, consider Hector, an inveterate tarot card reader. On

the basis of his readings, Hector makes various predictions. For a period of time, Hector kept

track of the success ratio of these predictions. He now recognizes that, during that period of

time at least, his tarot card readings were not a source of reliable prediction. Nonetheless,

because he is so superstitious, Hector continues use predictions he's made on the basis of the

cards. Indeed, on the basis of a tarot card reading, Hector has formed the belief that the Greedy

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Bank Corporation (XGBC) stock will rise. Today, he is putting much of his life's savings into a

“special” opportunity to buy shares of XGBC.

Hector is not respecting (Norm of Belief). Not only is the mechanism by which he

formed the belief that XGBC will rise is unreliable and thereby prone to produce beliefs that are

not true, Hector is in a position to know as much. By (Norm of Belief), beliefs that are not true

are incorrect and hence to be avoided, at least when it is feasible for a cognizer to do so. Hector

could avoid many beliefs that are not true if only he were to cease deploying his unreliable

method of forming beliefs on the basis of tarot card readings. By using that method of forming

beliefs, he is disrespecting (Norm of Belief).

Suppose that a friend, Dylan, catches Hector in the process of buying up shares of XGBC,

and discovers that Hector is doing it on the basis of his tarot card reading. Dylan is likely to

disapprove of what Hector is doing largely because in following this course of action, Hector is

likely to lose his shirt. Dylan will take it that Hector's propensity to form false beliefs is a

practical disadvantage to him. But can Dylan defend his position? Suppose that, rather than

admitting that he is a compulsive tarot card reader in need of cognitive rehabilitation, Hector

becomes defensive. “What's so important about having true beliefs anyways?” he says. How

should Dylan answer?

§3: Clarifying the Question

Note that the question Dylan ought to answer is not “Why should we care about having true

beliefs?”. That question might be answered by explaining what is valuable about true belief, but

it is not a question of primary import precisely because agents do not generally directly

influence their belief formation by caring in the sense of desiring to form beliefs in some

particular way or other. Belief formation is not routed through the intentional motivational

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system. Although they are sometimes formed by way of deliberation, beliefs are not formed

through a process of instrumental reasoning. (Even though they are mental acts rather than

mental states, the same could be said of judgments.) We intentionally improve our belief

formation in the way that we intentionally grow flowers. Making flowers grow is not something

we can do directly; we can bring it about only by cultivating the flowers, i.e. understanding the

conditions under which they grow and creating just those conditions. Likewise, we can only

improve our belief formation by thinking about ourselves third-personally as a sort of biological

machine that changes and responds to different sorts of conditions, and then creating the

conditions that will elicit the sort of changes and responses we want. These points strongly

suggest that the question we ought to answer regarding how best to form beliefs is most

fundamentally a question about how we as intentional agents might optimally be designed

rather than a question about how we as intentional agents ought to be motivated or even how

we ought to act. This is not to say that the answer to the first question may turn out to have

ramifications for the latter two, but merely to point out what is likely to be the priority between

the questions.

Even if there were no such priority, there are certain advantages to understanding

Hector's question from the standpoint of a cognitive designer rather than the standpoint of an

epistemic agent; we avoid certain difficult questions regarding, for instance, the nature of

epistemic responsibility and blameworthiness and how to reconcile doxastic deliberation with

doxastic involuntarism. For all of these reasons, I will understand Dylan to be tackling the

question from the standpoint of the cognitive designer.

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§4: A Bad Answer

An answer that does not address the instrumental value of true beliefs is not likely to be

particularly satisfactory. It feels unsatisfactory for Dylan to merely insist that (Norm of Belief) is

true or even insist that it is necessarily true. Even supposing Dylan could bully Hector into

accepting that (Norm of Belief) is true, Hector might just become resentful. “What's so great

about being a believer if it implies there are more things that one's supposed to do?” he might

wonder. “Why couldn't I just be a less cognitively sophisticated creature like an amoeba?

Maybe if I do enough drugs, I can become less cognitively sophisticated and get rid of these

dreadful beliefs and the stupid accompanying norms. . . “

Of course, that the dogmatic answer would be unsatisfactory is no clear indication that

it is not appropriate. As with truths outside the normative realm, when it comes to norms there

has to be an end to explanations somewhere even if this end feels unsatisfactory. When it

comes to certain basic moral principles, for instance, it may be a mistake to ask why we ought to

follow them, i.e., to ask for an explanation of their truth, as tempting as it may be to do so.135 It

is plausible that these basic moral principles do not derive their authority from other norms, and

thus, that they have no explanation. Is (Norm of Belief) like that? People may non-

instrumentally value true beliefs, and perhaps they are right to do so. Perhaps true belief is

intrinsically to-be-valued.

Even if it is, Hector's resentful reply to a dogmatic answer shows why the dogmatic

answer must be incomplete. It can make sense to resent our moral obligations when they

become especially onerous, but resenting our obligation to believe truly only rarely makes sense

even when that obligation is difficult to fulfill.136 There are, of course, occasions when pursuing

135 Cf. Pritchard (1912). 136 This is not to say that it might make perfect sense to resent that this obligation is difficult to fulfill.

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truth can get one into trouble, for example, when one is surrounded by intolerant, close-minded

peers, but by and large, trouble comes not from pursuing truth, but failing to do so. Merely

insisting that being a believer comes with an obligation to believe truly fails to point out that

being a believer is independently advantageous precisely because it opens the possibility of true

belief. To give a full and complete answer to Hector, Dylan needs to point out the

(independent) pragmatic utility of being a believer.

§5: Truth as Instrumentally Valuable

More precisely, Dylan must explain how true beliefs are instrumental to satisfying antecedent

ends (at least in the long run and absent defeaters). Antecedent ends are ends that are

conceptually and metaphysically prior to belief-desire psychology, e. g. survival and pain

avoidance; they are our ends, but not due to our status as intentional agents with beliefs and

desires. If Dylan can show him that true beliefs are instrumental so that the cognitive

sophistication of belief-desire psychology advantages a creature, Hector will not only see why he

as a believer should have true beliefs, he will be in a position to rationally embrace being a

believer. Is it the case that true beliefs promote antecedent ends? Of course, true beliefs are

not always pragmatic. Hector's belief that the convenience store will be open when he arrives

may be true, but if there is an armed robbery shortly after he arrives, that belief may not, in the

end, facilitate his survival. After all, had he not had the belief that the convenience store would

be open when he arrived, he may not have gone to the convenience store. Had he had the

belief that the convenience store would not be open when he arrived, he certainly would not

have gone to the convenience store. Obviously, had he not gone to the convenience store, he

would not have been in mortal peril when the armed robbery occurred shortly after he arrived.

In this case, the pragmatic belief, i.e. a belief that serves Hector's antecedent ends, is a false

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belief, not a true one. Of course, Hector would have been served equally as well, pragmatically,

if he had had, in addition to his true belief that the convenience store will be open when he

arrives, the true belief that there will shortly be an armed robbery at that convenience store.

True beliefs won't fail to be pragmatic when they are supported by other relevant beliefs that

are true and relevant desires that are good. The problem is that a person can fail to have the

relevant supporting true beliefs. They can also fail to have relevant supporting desires that are

good. In these sorts of cases, true beliefs are not pragmatic.

In and of itself, however, this result need not worry Dylan. That a pragmatic belief need

not be true does not entail that true beliefs do not facilitate the satisfaction of antecedent ends.

In the same way that certain strategies may facilitate winning a game, e. g. Texas Hold'em, even

when following these strategies are neither sufficient nor strictly required for winning, so having

true beliefs may facilitate satisfying antecedent ends even though true beliefs are neither

sufficient nor strictly required for doing so. Pointing out that pursuing true beliefs is the ideal

strategy (absent defeaters) for pursuing pragmatic beliefs should be enough to defuse Hector

(assuming he responds to Dylan rationally, which may or may not be a safe assumption). The

relevant question, then, is whether pursuing true beliefs (rather than some other alternative)

best promotes a subject's antecedent ends.

§6: Is Instrumental Reasoning the Key?

Let us consider some initial considerations in favor of the true-belief strategy.

Generally, true instrumental beliefs do promote the satisfaction of the desires they are

instrumental to. If bringing it about that p is one of the basic intentional actions a person can

carry out, a person's belief that if p, then q and desire that q can partly (causally) explain a

person's bringing it about that p. (I say partly in the first place because the person might well

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choose to some other means to try to bring q about.) In the event that this belief is true, the

person will have also brought it about that q.137

Nonetheless, in marshalling these considerations for the conclusion that beliefs

promote the antecedent ends of the subject, we come upon one major obstacle. Promoting the

satisfaction of desires may or may not lead to promoting antecedent ends. To use a previous

example, promoting the satisfaction of Hector's desire to pick up some things at the

convenience store will not promote his antecedent ends if the satisfaction of that desire puts

him in the middle of an armed robbery. The satisfaction of explicitly suicidal desires may

likewise not promote antecedent ends. It appears, then, the question “What strategy of belief

formation would promote the antecedent ends of the subject?” cannot be answered

independent of knowing how closely aligned the motivational system is to the subject's

antecedent ends. If there has to be a joint, coordinated strategy of belief/desire formation in

order to effectively pursue a subject's antecedent ends, isn't possible that truth might not be

what's pragmatic for beliefs when desires are bad?

The take home lesson of this major obstacle is that the utility of beliefs can only be

properly understood through understanding the utility of belief-desire psychology considered as

a whole.138

§7: The Utility of Belief-Desire Psychology

What does the addition of a belief-desire psychology do for a subject? Without question, a

belief-desire psychology can help a subject make advantageous changes to his environment.

However, a belief-desire psychology is not required for a subject to make advantageous changes

137 Cf. Horwich (1998), 190-2 and Horwich (2006). 138 I take it that this point motivates the comment in Harman (1991) that “it is easy to see how [Stich’s] arguments against caring about whether one’s beliefs are true can be converted into an argument against caring that one’s desires come true.”

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to his environment. In fact, under certain circumstances, subjects are better odeploying some

other mechanism to make these changes. When Hector trips, he finds that his hands extend out

from his body to prevent his head from meeting the pavement. This motion is not one that

Hector carries out intentionally. While he does desire (generally) that his head not meet the

pavement, his hands do not extend out from his body on these occasions because of this desire

and the belief (which he has in retrospect if at all) that putting his hands out in that sort of way

would help prevent his head from meeting the pavement. The behavior Hector exhibits is

reflexive, not intentional. Even complex reflexive behavior does not require belief-desire

psychology.

Using reflex mechanisms can be an effective way for a subject to make advantageous

changes in the environment. In many cases, reflex mechanisms are far more effective than

belief-desire psychology would be. The processing required to intentionally put one's hands out

to break one's fall probably takes too much time for belief-desire psychology to be useful.

Reflex behavior has far more pragmatic utility in that sort of circumstance. When a detectable

condition, C, is (1) very commonplace, and the way to deal with C is plain or (2) only somewhat

commonplace, but responding with a particular behavior is paramount, a creature is far better

off if he is built to anticipate facing C with a reflex mechanism that produces the advantageous

behavior in C. Alternatively, if the creature can't be built with the reflex mechanism, he would

be well off to be built such that he develops such reflex mechanisms through conditioning.

Responding to C via a belief-desire psychology is likely to be less efficient when it comes to the

time and energy expended.

Belief-desire psychology is far more useful for subjects in cases where a variety of

conditions they can easily detect do not call for any particular behavior taken individually, but

only taken collectively. These are cases, for example, in which it is useful to synthesize

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information coming from different sources. Moreover, these are cases that are not

commonplace enough to (practically) warrant having a “hardwired” rote behavioral response,

nor, typically, are they common enough to have developed a conditioned behavioral response

to them. Belief-desire psychology is useful in novel cases where differences in present

conditions are significant enough from those faced previously so as to call for new behaviors or

procedures. Whereas reflex mechanisms give you speed in responding to the environment,

belief-desire psychology gives you flexibility in responding to the environment. Reflex

mechanisms are excellent, but only of use in specific common conditions; belief-desire

psychology is fair, but of use in confronting many different conditions. To illustrate the sorts of

situation in which belief-desire psychology is useful, consider the bare details of a charming

anecdote from P. G. Wodehouse:139

Jeeves is in a quandary. His master, Bertie Wooster, is engaged to Honoria Glossop. Unfortunately, marrying Honoria Glossop furthers neither the interests of Bertie, nor Jeeves. Evidently, Bertie is afraid of confrontation and cannot manage breaking the engagement of his own accord. Sir Roderick Glossop, a psychiatrist and Honoria's father, is coming over to Bertie's for lunch. Before he arrives, Bertie's cousins stop with a friend to ask whether they might find assistance in stowing several stolen items, including cats, a fish, and Sir Roderick Glossop's hat. Jeeves invites Bertie's cousins and their friend to leave these items at Bertie's flat without telling Bertie anything about it. When Sir Roderick discovers these stolen items, he eventually comes to believe that Bertie is not right in the head and, consequently, Bertie's engagement to Honoria Glossop is broken.

It was not by luck that Jeeves facilitated the break-up of Bertie's engagement. Furthermore,

while a reflex mechanism that had Jeeves bring the cats, fish, and Sir Roderick Glossop's hat into

Bertie's at in precisely the conditions he did would have successfully facilitated the break-up of

Bertie's engagement, having a reflex mechanism of that sort is not practical given how unlikely it

is for those very conditions to arise. It is not practical to have built-in reflex mechanisms for

139 Wodehouse (1953).

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every outlandish contingency, and yet it is useful to have means to respond to a wide variety of

outlandish contingencies. A solution to this problem is belief-desire psychology. It was not a

reflex that lead Jeeves to the behavior that ultimately facilitated his and his master's antecedent

ends, but rather his beliefs and desires. Although belief-desire psychology requires heavy duty

cognitive machinery, it can serve well creatures who are likely to confront some of a broad

range of detectable, but complex conditions each of which optimally requires a different

behavioral response.

How can belief-desire psychology help someone like Jeeves? To respond reliably with

adeptness to a plethora of specific situations, Jeeves needs the internal cognitive motivational

states that select specific behaviors to be appropriately tied to his ends considered more

broadly. The way to accomplish the connection is straightforward enough: one just needs a

little instrumental reasoning. Jeeves has core desires to further his principal antecedent ends

generally. Jeeves has instrumental beliefs that tell him how to satisfy those general desires.

These core desires and instrumental beliefs cause new, more specific desires. These new

specific desires combine with further instrumental beliefs to cause even more specific desires.

These newer even more specific desires combine with further instrumental beliefs. . . etc.

Eventually, the specific desires Jeeves forms will be specific enough so as to select for and cause

specific behaviors that Jeeves is capable of exhibiting. Selected behaviors will, ceteris paribus,

further Jeeves antecedent ends so long as 1) his original core desires were closely aligned with

his antecedent ends, and 2) his instrumental beliefs were true. We can see how this process

helped Jeeves specifically in the foregoing example. Jeeves has a core desire to fulfill his basic

needs, e.g. having food, clothes, shelter, etc. If Jeeves has an instrumental belief that being well

employed will facilitate his basic needs, Jeeves will come to have the more specific desire to be

well employed. If Jeeves believes that Bertie's marrying Honoria Glossop will prove an obstacle

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to his being well employed, Jeeves will come to desire that Bertie not marry Honoria Glossop. If

Jeeves believes that Sir Roderick Glossop's thinking poorly of Bertie will most easily prevent

Bertie from marrying Honoria Glossop (without endangering Jeeve's employment), Jeeves will

come to desire that Sir Roderick Glossop think poorly of Bertie. Finally, if Jeeves believes that

stowing stolen items in Bertie's apartment without Bertie's knowledge will facilitate Sir Roderick

Glossop thinking poorly of Bertie, Jeeves will come desire to stow stolen items in Bertie's

apartment without Bertie's knowledge. This last desire is one that, on the occasion of Bertie's

cousins and their friend coming to the door, Jeeves is capable of carrying out—and so he does.

Jeeves's exhibiting that particular behavior for those particular circumstances is no accident; it's

the product of his initial desires and beliefs and the process of instrumental reasoning.

Moreover, it's no accident that Jeeves's behavior is advantageous to the specific

situation he's in. His behavior is guaranteed to further his antecedent ends ceteris paribus so

long as his original core desire is to further those ends and his instrumental beliefs are true.

Furthermore, there's every reason to think that Jeeves can generally have true instrumental

beliefs so long as his belief forming and sustaining faculties reliably produce true beliefs.

Consequently, so long as Jeeves's core desires are closely aligned with his antecedent ends,

there's every reason to think that he will be able to respond reliably to very unusual

circumstances in optimally advantageous ways.

§8: Dual Process Theories and the Emergence of Belief-Desire

Psychology

The distinction I have drawn between reex mechanisms and belief-desire psychology coincides

with—and hence is supported by—a distinction that cognitive scientists have independently

postulated in order to understand empirical results concerning human reasoning. Because the

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cognitive scientists' theory so nicely complements my own proposal, it's worth reviewing it

briefly here.140

According to dual process accounts of reasoning, there are two cognitive systems

involved in human processing, aptly named “System 1” and “System 2”. System 1 is perhaps not

so much a system as a set of autonomous modules; System 1 processing is parallel, fast, and at

least largely subpersonal. The paradigms of System 1 processing are associative reasoning on

the basis of similarity to prototypes or exemplars and the use of heuristics. System 1 is

postulated to explain (among other things) the conjunction fallacy whereby a conjunction is

judged (per impossible) to be less probable than one its conjuncts precisely because the

occurrence of the conjunct is closer to the subject's stereotype of the situation.

System 2 is serial, slow, and more taxing for the subject to deploy. Unlike System 1,

System 2 reasoning proceeds relatively abstractly, and hence, is not closely tied to what is

reasoned about. Hypothetical reasoning and causal modeling are considered paradigmatic

System 2 processes, as is formal rule-based reasoning such as deduction or explicit statistical or

probabilistic inference. System 2 processing is systematic, and hence, sensitive to constraints of

coherence. It is sometimes suggested that System 2 is uniquely human (or at least more fully

developed in humans) while System 1 evolved earlier, and hence is shared with other animals.141

Systems 1 and 2 complement each other roughly in accordance with the division of

labor I set out for reflex mechanisms and belief-desire psychology last section. This is not an

accident, of course. What I have called reflex mechanisms is far more inclusive than System 1; I

140 See, for instance, Sloman (1996), Evans (2003), Stanovich (2004), and Stanovich (2009). 141 The claim that System 2 is uniquely human seems to me unlikely to be true. As I understand it, System 2 processing would include perceptual simulation used to evaluate the prospects of different decisions. For some discussion of perceptual simulation, see Prinz (2002), 150-2. It seems very likely to me that some non-human animals are capable of such simulation, and hence, are capable of some sort of System 2 processing. Thus even if intentionality is closely tied to System 2 processing as I suggest, it nonetheless seems likely to me that some non-human animals have intentional states—at the very least proto-beliefs and proto-desires—even if they do not have concepts and the content of these states is not so finely-individuated so as to be adequately expressed using language.

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would include reflexive response dependent behavior—whether or not it involves cognitive

processing—as among the products of reflex mechanisms. Nonetheless, at least much of

System 1 should also count as reflex mechanisms. System 1 processes information largely by

way of “rules of thumb” rather than deploying some sort of tacit theory of the world. Behavior

that is ultimately governed by heuristic processing of this sort without any sort of systematic

oversight is paradigmatically behavior I would attribute to reflex mechanisms rather than belief-

desire psychology.142

In proposing that the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology comes in its flexibility

in dealing with novel situations, I am effectively suggesting that emergence of belief-desire

psychology—and indeed intentionality—is closely tied to the development of System 2 cognitive

processing. Associative processing (for instance on the basis of subjective similarity) does not,

so far as I can tell, require or entail having mental states that are determinately about anything.

To be sure, System 1 processes and stores information (in Dretske's sense), but processing and

storing information is not the same as processing and storing representations. Mental

representation is more fine-grained than information; it is the product of (at least sometimes)

systematically adhering to strict coherence constraints—i.e., System 2 processing—rather than

merely according with loose (and sometimes contradictory) “rules of thumb”—i.e., System 1

processing.143 Sensitivity to strict coherence constraints is a prerequisite for both tacitly and

explicitly appreciating the nuances of what sort of experiences would be evidence for what

conclusion in light of the possibility of various sorts of evidential defeat. Appreciating these

nuances of evidence allows a subject to deal with situations that are either exceptions to the

ceteris paribus heuristics incorporated into System 1 or not covered by them at all; a belief-

142 Cf. Brandom (2000). 143 For this reason, much of the work on the so-called “disjunction problem” is largely misguided. There’s no particular reason to think that the visual system of a frog snapping at flies is representing anything particularly determinate. Snapping at flies is quite apparently the product of a reflex mechanism.

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desire psychology arises precisely when a subject is able to appreciate the nuances of evidence

in this way.

As I will discuss later on, it is precisely a failure to appreciate the distinction between

System 1 and System 2 processes and moreover, the intimate connection between System 2 and

intentionality, that leads some to reject true belief as instrumentally valuable.

§9: The Reliability of Belief-Desire Psychology

In §7, I argued that the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology comes in allowing subjects

to respond reliably to specific circumstances with advantageous behaviors. Understanding the

pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology now puts us in a position to revisit the issues raised

in §6. Using Jeeves as my example, I have already pointed out that having behavior produced by

good core desires (i.e. desires closely tied to antecedent ends) and true instrumental beliefs is

sufficient for subjects to respond advantageously to specific circumstances. Quite clearly,

though, having behavior produced by good core desires and true instrumental beliefs is not

necessary for subjects to respond advantageously to specific circumstances. Suppose that

Jeeves was not a genius, but a borderline schizophrenic. If Jeeves had had a desire to liberate

frogs from oppression and, furthermore, a belief that stowing stolen items in Bertie's apartment

without Bertie's knowledge facilitated liberating frogs from oppression, he would have acted to

his advantage just as he in fact did. How then does the utility of belief-desire psychology

demand a stategy of pursuing true beliefs and good desires?

The utility of belief-desire psychology comes in allowing subjects to respond reliably to

specific circumstances with advantageous behaviors. Not only is having behavior produced by

good core desires and true instrumental beliefs sufficient to guarantee that it will be tailored so

as to advantageous for specific circumstances, but given that such behavior production is

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sufficient for advantage, we can explain how someone might reliably respond advantageously.

To do so, all we need is an explanation for how a subject can 1) start with a finite number of

core desires and 2) have faculties that can reliably produce true instrumental beliefs. There's

every reason to think such an explanation is forthcoming.

What is not forthcoming is an explanation for how core desires that aren't good and

instrumental beliefs that aren't true might reliably lead to advantageous behavior in a wide

variety of specific circumstances. There are only two sorts of explanations for occasions when

bad core desires or false instrumental beliefs produce advantageous behavior. The first

explanation is that the subject was just plain lucky to have desires and beliefs on that occasion

that led to the advantageous behavior. So, for example, if Jeeves were a lunatic, he might just

happen to have a desire to liberate frogs from oppression and a belief that stowing stolen items

in Bertie's apartment without Bertie's knowledge facilitated liberating frogs from oppression

exactly in the specific circumstances when that belief-desire pair would lead him to doing

something useful. However, if that is the explanation of Jeeves's advantageous response,

there's clearly no reason to think that in general, Jeeves will respond to circumstances

advantageously.

The second explanation is that the subject had the desires and beliefs that he did on

that occasion, not merely because he was lucky, but due to a reflex mechanism. It might be that

being in the kind of condition that Jeeves was in triggered a crazy belief-desire pair that led to

advantageous behavior. In this case, it is no accident that Jeeves behaves advantageously.

However, there's also no reason to think that Jeeves's belief-desire psychology will help him

deal advantageously with a wide variety of specific circumstances with any regularity.

As we saw in the last two sections, that's just not what reflex mechanisms do. Reflex

mechanisms are only tailored to particular conditions.

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What about a third explanation according to which “crazy” belief-desire pairs—that is to

say, belief-desire pairs where the desires are wholly unconnected to the antecedent ends of the

subject and the beliefs wholly unconnected to truth—arise systematically so as to produce

advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances? The only way crazy belief-

desire pairs might arise systematically so as to produce advantageous behavior is if their

emergence depended both on the antecedent ends of the subject, and the information the

subject tracks and stores about his specific circumstances. Effectively, this dependence requires

that the subject with systematically crazy belief-desire pairs have, not just a similar internal

functional organization, but a long-armed nomological functional organization very much like

the long-armed nomological functional organization of a rational person.144 The problem is that

if the subject has a long-armed nomological functional organization very much like the long-

armed nomological functional organization of a rational person, the former's emerging belief-

desire pairs can't possibly be crazy!

We might imagine that a Blockhead-Jeeves who behaves just as Jeeves does without

having beliefs and desires.145 However, Blockhead-Jeeves does not have the same long-armed

nomological functional organization as Jeeves does. (Blockhead Jeeves doesn't engage in

theoretical or instrumental reasoning. Rather than a belief-desire psychology, Blockhead-Jeeves

effectively has a very large number of reflex mechanisms—one for every circumstance Jeeves

might possibly find himself in.)146 We're considering not Blockhead-Jeeves, but Duplicate-

Jeeves. The causal network between Duplicate-Jeeves's (possible) internal cognitive states is

isomorphic to the causal network between Jeeves's (possible) internal (content bearing)

cognitive states; moreover, the causal networks are both hooked up to the environment in the

144 For discussion of long-armed functional role, see Harman (1987). 145 Cf. Block (1981) and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), 114-122. 146 Reflex mechanisms can always replace belief-desire psychology if the circumstances the subject will find himself in can be anticipated. See §11.2.

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same way. It's difficult to understand how, despite this match, the internal cognitive states of

Duplicate-Jeeves could have totally different contents than the corresponding internal cognitive

states of Jeeves. Indeed, even if Duplicate-Jeeves and Jeeves have different cognitive

architectures underlying their respective causal networks, it still couldn't be that while Jeeves is

coming to have a desire that Sir Roderick Glossop think poorly of Bertie and a belief that stowing

stolen items in Bertie's apartment without Bertie's knowledge will facilitate Sir Roderick Glossop

thinking poorly of Bertie, Duplicate-Jeeves would be coming to have a desire and a belief with

the same long-arm causal role as Jeeves's desire and belief, but with entirely different contents

so as to constitute a crazy belief-desire pair. Any plausible theory of content must say that

Duplicate-Jeeves has the same belief-desire pair as Jeeves. To claim otherwise is to deny that

content strongly supervenes on the (long-armed) dispositional properties of the internal

cognitive states of the subject.

The upshot is that crazy belief-desire pairs can't arise systematically so as to produce

advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances.147 And yet, belief-desire

psychology only has any special utility if belief-desire pairs do arise systematically so as to

produce advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances. Consequently,

pragmatic demands on a belief-desire psychology require that belief-desire pairs not be crazy. In

other words, pragmatic demands require that desires be good, i.e. closely aligned with the

antecedent ends of the subject, and that beliefs be true.

In §6, I pointed to the possibility that instrumental reasoning might explain why the

optimal strategy (absent defeaters) for forming pragmatic beliefs is forming true beliefs. Finally,

147 This is compatible with the claim that there might be some way besides having a belief-desire psychology (or being a Blockhead) to systematically produce advantageous behavior in a wide variety of circumstances. That said, I am skeptical as to whether there is in fact some other way. It seems to me that any non-Blockhead cognitive architecture that systematically produced advantageous behavior in a wide variety of specific circumstances would have the functional organization to qualify ipso facto as a belief-desire psychology.

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we're in a position to see why instrumental reasoning does explain as much. A process of

instrumental reasoning is key to explaining the utility of belief-desire psychology because it can

explain how antecedent ends considered generally can be appropriately tied to behaviors

tailored to individual circumstances. In order for this process to be reliably successful, core

desires have to be good and instrumental beliefs have to be true.

It's worth pointing out that, on the explanation given, we avoid the major obstacle I

raised at the end of §6. The fact that true instrumental beliefs don't lead to advantageous

results when someone has some bad core desires at work doesn't show that truth isn't always

the optimal strategy (absent defeaters) for instrumental belief. True instrumental beliefs might

not help someone when they combine with bad core desires, but belief-desire psychology is of

no utility generally when bad core desires are at work. That's not to say that miscellaneous

beliefs might not combine with bad core desires to the subject’s benefit; it's only to say that

there's systematic way for him to benefit from having beliefs when the relevant core desires are

bad. Any reliability he has in doing what's advantageous is achieved via reflex mechanisms; in

theory, these reflex mechanisms do not require belief-desire psychology.

§10: Generalizing to Non-Instrumental Beliefs

There is nothing contingent about the fact that the utility of belief-desire psychology requires

that core desires be good and instrumental beliefs be true (absent defeaters). Necessarily, the

added utility of belief-desire psychology for a subject is that it allows him to reliably respond

advantageously to a diversity of circumstances. Moreover, I used no contingent facts in

concluding that using belief-desire psychology for this pragmatic end requires good core desires

and true instrumental beliefs (absent defeaters). Pragmatic demands on belief-desire

psychology inherently generate an (instrumental) ideal for core desires that they be good and an

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ideal for instrumental beliefs that they be true. Goodness and truth respectively are the means

to a pragmatic ends.

Quite clearly, though, the only reliable way to assure that instrumental beliefs are true is

to assure that beliefs are true generally. Instrumental beliefs are most likely to be true when

they fit into a system of beliefs that is reliably grounded by perceptual faculties, reliably

maintained by memory faculties, and coherent due to reliable theoretical reasoning faculties.

The ideal for instrumental beliefs that they be true thus extends to an ideal that beliefs be true

generally. The truth of confirmation holism implies that any belief might ultimately have an

impact on instrumental reasoning. In theory, any belief might affect an instrumental belief; the

way to assure that this affection is likely to be advantageous is to make sure beliefs are true and

cognitive mechanisms facilitating interaction preserve truth.

§11: Objections

At this point, I have made my case for the conclusion that true belief is instrumentally valuable,

or more specifically that the added pragmatic utility of having beliefs for a creature hinges

crucially on being constructed so as to reliably form beliefs that are true in the absence of

specific reasons for doing otherwise. In making my case, I have not explicitly addressed the

principal concerns raised in the literature for thinking that truth might not be the optimal

strategy (absent defeaters) to advance a creature's antecedent ends.148 I rectify that omission in

this section.

148 The objections considered here are very prominent in Stich (1993).

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§11.1: True Versus True*

Objection: Even if we are assuming that a subject's desires are closely aligned with his

antecedent ends, the fact that true instrumental beliefs promote the satisfaction of desires (that

the beliefs are instrumental to) may not show that these true instrumental beliefs generally

facilitate the most important antecedent ends of the subject. Returning to a previous example,

Hector's true belief that the convenience store will be open when he arrives promotes the

satisfaction of his desire to pick up some things at the convenience store, but by landing him in

the middle of an armed robbery it does not faciliate his survival. So far as facilitating his survival

is concerned, he would be much better off if he were pursuing true* beliefs rather than true

beliefs, where a belief is true* just in case it is the belief that the convenience store will be open

when he arrives and the belief is false or it is any other belief and the belief is true.149 If, as a

believer, Hector were pursuing truth*, he might not have formed the belief that the

convenience store will be open when he arrives, and consequently, he might be in a better

position to survive.

It's worth emphasizing here that rejecting true belief as the optimal pragmatic strategy

does not require that we think that pursuing false beliefs generally best promotes the

antecedent needs and interests of the subject. The question is not whether it would be best for

the subject to pursue false beliefs, but whether it might be best for him to pursue some

particular sort of false beliefs.

Reply: Without question, there will be occasions when core desires are good, instrumental

beliefs are true, and still instrumental reasoning leads to behaviors that turn out not to

promote, all things considered, the subject's antecedent ends. Consider again the case of Hector

at the convenience store. As far as I can see, Hector need not have had any false beliefs to have

149 Cf. Stich (1993), Chapter 5.

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put himself in this bad situation. He need not have falsely believed, for instance, that he would

not find himself in an armed robbery in order to think that it would facilitate his interests to go

to the store; it would have been enough for him to believe truly that trips to the convenience

store are very frequently safe.

Sometimes good core desires and true instrumental beliefs don't keep you out of bad

situations; that's the (sad) fact of the matter. The relevant question is, for instance, whether

good* core desires and true* beliefs do better. They plainly don't. It might be that in his specific

situation, the winds of chance blew, and, as it turns out, pursuing truth* would have served

Hector better. However, truth* doesn't reliably serve subjects better. The winds of chance

might have blown differently after all. It might just as easily have been the case that going to

the convenience store at that particular time prevented him from getting mugged at gunpoint

while going home. In that sort of situation, he is much better off for having pursued truth rather

than truth*.

More importantly, barring anything strange from the winds of chance, Hector will have

been better off for having good core desires and true beliefs. His good desires and true beliefs

generally would have put him in a position to pick up some useful things at the convenience

store. Good* desires and true* beliefs don't do that for him. Consequently, goodness and truth

more reliably produce behavior that works to his advantage than goodness* and truth*. That's

enough to show that the pragmatic strategy (absent defeaters) is not to pursue goodness* and

truth*, but goodness and truth.

§11.2: True Versus True* Revisited

Objection: You haven't really tackled the hard cases. Suppose Hector is constructed such that if

he believed he were as incapable as he actually is, he would become depressed and suicidal.

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Indeed, we might suppose that in general, people would respond poorly were they to assess

their own abilities correctly rather than maintain an inflated view of themselves. (I understand

that this supposition is probably true in fact.) Surely, we don't want to say that the optimal

strategy for facilitating antecedent ends in these cases involves pursuing true beliefs regarding

one's own capabilities. Surely, these cases show that, from a pragmatic perspective, some sort

of truth* is a better target than truth.

Reply: Obviously if Hector has reason to think that he would become depressed and suicidal if

he discovered (or only thought he had discovered) that he was very incapable, he would have a

pragmatic reason to avoid believing that he was very incapable (however he might) even if it

were the truth. Likewise if Hector's designer—say Mother Naturehad reason to think he would

become depressed and suicidal if he discovered (or thought he discovered) that he was very

incapable, she would likewise have a pragmatic reason to design him so as to not pursue the

truth on this point (whatever it might be). (Apparently, Mother Nature may have done just

that.) Neither of these cases is a threat to the position I have defended because I have allowed

for the possibility of defeaters. If, from the cognitive design standpoint, there is some special

reason to think that believing in a way that is not guided by what is true will lead to fortuitous

results, then the believing truths strategy may well be defeated.

What I have intended to argue is that absent any special reason, believing truths in the

optimal strategy (from a cognitive design standpoint). Cases in which there are special reasons

for anyone who might act in the role of the cognitive designer (including the subject himself) are

therefore not counterexamples to my conclusion.

It's worth pointing out that to the extent that someone acting in the role of cognitive

designer can anticipate the very cases that the creature under design will encounter, he will

have special reasons that defeat the true belief strategy. At the limit, where all crucial cases can

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be anticipated, the need for belief-desire psychology in order to facilitate antecedent ends is

completely obviated.

§11.3: The Risks of Reliability

Objection: There are times when the reliability of cognitive faculties vis-à-vis truth can

(apparently) stand in the way of the subject's antecedent ends rather than promote them (even

when the subject's desires are closely aligned with his antecedent ends). Although reliable

faculties might produce a system of beliefs that are largely true, which might, in turn, assure

that the preponderance of a subject's instrumental beliefs are true, and thereby promote the

satisfaction of certain desires, which, might then forward the subject's antecedent ends, under

altogether run-of-the-mill circumstances, the reliability of faculties might, all things considered,

inhibit the promotion of the subject's antecedent ends by failing to produce the relevant true

instrumental belief because it might be false.150 Someone who, when in a dangerous

neighborhood, all too easily forms beliefs that they are in danger may be more likely to form the

belief that they are in danger at the critical time when they are, in fact, in danger. Thus,

pursuing a strategy where a number of false beliefs are formed may actually promote

someone's antecedent ends, e.g. survival.

Reply: Despite apparent examples to the contrary, I see no reason to conclude that the

reliability of cognitive faculties vis-à-vis truth can ever stand in the way of the subject's reliably

promoting his antecedent ends even when the subject's desires are closely aligned with his

antecedent ends. This is the very sort of objection that becomes considerably less pressing once

we remember the division of labor between reflex mechanisms and belief-desire psychology

discussed in §7-8.

150 Cf. Stich (1993), Chapter 3 and Sober (1981).

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Let us return to the example of someone who, when in a dangerous neighborhood, all

too easily forms beliefs that they are in danger may be more likely to form the belief that they

are in danger at the critical time when they are, in fact, in danger. Without question, rather

than having a predilection for false beliefs that he is in danger, this person would do much

better to have a reflex mechanism in place that causes him to respond as if he were in danger

when he detects a strong enough possibility of danger. Beliefs and desires aren't really very

pragmatic at all in this sort of situation. When you detect a reasonable possibility of danger,

don't bother to form any beliefs or run through some process of instrumental reasoning (you

can do that later), just get the hell out of there! (In fact, people may well have just this sort of

mechanism in place. That might well explain why we can feel endangered even when we know

we're perfectly safe.) Training is far more useful in these sorts of cases than having any sort of

beliefs or belief forming mechanisms. Belief-desire psychology is not well suited to these cases.

As a result, my inclination is to think that we shouldn't conclude anything from these cases

about what sort of belief forming strategy furthers pragmatic ends.

That said, I don't see that someone with only true beliefs is at a competitive

disadvantage to a counterpart with a predilection for false beliefs about danger. We might well

expect him to do just as well as his counterpart, a person with a long-standing, well-engrained

true belief that acting as if they are in danger upon merely detecting the strong possibility that

they might be in danger will facilitate their survival and well-being.

§12: Preliminary Conclusion

With these objections met, we're now in a position to conclusively answer Hector on Dylan's

behalf. Why ought Hector pursue cognitive rehabilitation? Hector ought to pursue cognitive

rehabilitation because he's going to end up in the poor house if he goes on making investment

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choices on the basis of tarot card readings! Don't put your money into Greedy Bank Corporation

unless it's on the basis of some reliable indicator that suggests you won't lose your shirt!

Moreover, Hector ought to be grateful for his cognitive sophistication because it allows

him to respond to a diversity of circumstances in advantageous ways. As a believer, he can

evaluate the prospects for investment on a case-by-case basis, keeping his own personal

circumstances and portfolio in mind. This ability puts him in a far better position to succeed

financially than he would be otherwise—but only if he's reliably believing the truth!

§13: Implications for the Teleological Theory of Intentional

Representation

We're also now in a position to return to the issues I raised in the introduction concerning the

nature of intentionality. According to the teleological theory of intentional representation

(TTIR), intentional representation is analogous to artifactual representation, i.e. the sort of

representation exhibited by maps and blueprints.

A map has its representational properties in virtue of having a particular teleological

function. This teleological function is intimately connected to genuine norms of correctness.

Thus, some piece of paper is a map of Eugene, Oregon because it has a particular teleological

function, and hence it is correct only if it corresponds to Eugene, Oregon in some specified way.

The way it has to correspond in order to be correct coincides with the content of the map.

Moreover, it is the fact that the piece of paper is supposed to correspond that fixes that the

piece is a map at all—were it the case that Eugene, Oregon was supposed to correspond to the

piece of paper instead the piece of paper would be not a map, but a city plan of some sort.

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According to TTIR, beliefs have their representational properties in the same way as maps do.

Some cognitive state is a belief because it has a particular teleological function that is intimately

connected to genuine norms of correctness.

Thus, a cognitive state is a belief with content that p at least partly because the state is

correct (in some sense or other) if and only if the actual world is such that p. The content of the

cognitive state is fixed by the conditions under which the fit between state and world is correct.

The attitude of the cognitive state is fixed as a belief at least partly by the fact that the state is

supposed to match the actual world rather than it being the case (for instance) that the actual

world is supposed to come to match the state.

Although TTIR has a great deal of initial plausibility, an immediate objection to TTIR

arises from an obvious disanalogy between artifacts and intentional states. In the case of

artifactual representation, artifacts paradigmatically come to have their teleological functions in

virtue of the intentional states of designers and users of those artifacts. By and large, a map is

supposed to correspond because human intentional agents evaluate it—i.e. take approving or

disapproving attitudes towards it—according to whether it does. The idea that intentional

states have their teleological functions in the same way—in virtue of other intentional states—

would very quickly lead to a nasty vicious regress.

This result would be rather disheartening to the advocate of TTIR if all teleological

functions traced back to intentionality. Fortunately for the advocate of TTIR, there are very

good reasons to reject that view.151 It is far more plausible to allow that there are cases in which

some state or object has a teleological function in part because fulfilling that teleological

function facilitates bringing about some antecedent good.152 Obviously, it will not do to accept

that any object or state that happens to bring about a good thereby has a teleological function;

151 Cf. Bedau (1990). 152 Cf. Bedau (1992).

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a man who walks in front of the assassin's bullet by chance does not have the teleological

function of saving the President even if that is an antecedent good he is bringing about. We

must insist that the dispositional property of a state or object facilitating the antecedent good

be at least partly explained or sustained by the fact that it so facilitates. This sort of non-

accidentality condition rules out cases in which antecedent goods are brought about

accidentally as instances of teleological function. Nonetheless, it allows for instances of

teleological function that are not strictly tied to pre-existing intentional states.

Indeed, this sort of understanding of teleological function opens the door to TTIR in light

of the results of this chapter. For instance, given that being in particular a true belief inherently

facilitates antecedent ends, it is very possible that any possible arbitrary belief that p has the

teleological function of representing that p in a way that is supposed to match the actual world.

To establish this conclusion, we merely need to show how the tendency of beliefs to be true—

i.e., the fact that belief forming mechanisms produce true beliefs not necessarily always, but at

least often enough—is always explained or made true by the very fact that producing true

beliefs facilitates the subject's antecedent ends.

One way to try to accomplish this task is to follow very roughly in the footsteps of the

traditional teleosemanticist; one could attempt to give an explanation of how the replication of

such belief forming mechanisms (through biological reproduction) depends at least somewhat

on whether they facilitated the subject's antecedent ends by producing beliefs that were true.153

This explanation operates at the level of types—particular beliefs derive their teleological

function from the teleological function of the type of biological mechanism that produced them.

Alternatively, one could attempt to fulfill the non-accidentality condition at the level of

tokens, so that Hector's particular beliefs have the teleological function they do because his

153 Cf. Millikan (1984) and (1993).

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token cognitive architecture has a teleological function of producing true beliefs. On this view,

Hector's particular cognitive architecture has the teleological function of producing true beliefs

because the disposition of his very cognitive architecture to produce true beliefs is partly

sustained by that it produces true beliefs. More specifically, by facilitating Hector's antecedent

ends via forming true beliefs, the cognitive architecture underlying his belief-desire psychology

preserves and maintains its own functioning. (The view just sketched is the one I prefer.)

However, the non-accidentality condition for teleological function is met, the advocate

of TTIR must antecedently establish that the pragmatic utility of belief-desire psychology is tied

up with acting in accordance with representational norms. In other words, the advocate of TTIR

needs to be entitled to the very conclusions I have established in this paper in order to move

forward.154

154 I would like to thank Richard Heck and Joshua Schechter for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Part of this chapter was presented to the Brown Philosophy Graduate Forum and the Southwest Graduate Conference at Arizona State University. Several of the participants at those events made very helpful comments, including Randall Rose, Sean Aas, Derek Bowman, and Jeff Watson.

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CHAPTER FOUR:

Attitudes, Representation, and Function

§1: Introduction

§1.1: Theories of Intentional States

A theory of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, has two components: a theory of

attitudes and a theory of content. A theory of attitudes tells us when a state is of a particular

attitude kind, e.g. a belief, a desire, etc. A theory of content tells us when a state of a particular

attitude kind has some particular content. These two theories are, of course, intertwined. They

work together to make perspicacious the functioning of a person's psychology. The content of a

psychological state tells us something about the functioning of a subject, but until we know the

attitude kind of that state, the story is incomplete. We must know the attitude kind of a

psychological state so as to know what a subject is doing with a particular content.

Theories of content receive far more attention in contemporary philosophical literature

than theories of attitude. The commonly deployed “box” metaphor (i.e. to believe that p is to

belief-box a Mentalese sentence with content that p) often obfuscates the need for a

substantial theory of attitudes. However, any theory of content must have a complementary

theory of attitude. We can't make sense of psychological states having particular contents

unless we have something to say about what psychological states with particular contents do. A

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theory of attitudes just is a story about what (non-perceptual) psychological states with

particular contents do.

§1.2: The Teleological Theory of Intentional Representation

One high-level theory of intentional states with both a theory of content and a complementary

theory of attitude is the teleological theory of intentional representation (TTIR). In earlier

chapters, I have laid out TTIR in great detail; to put it succinctly, though, TTIR is the theory that

(principal) intentional states—e.g., beliefs and desires—represent teleologically just as

artifacts—maps and blueprints, for instance—that are representational do. According to TTIR, a

psychological state with content that p represents that p (and nothing stronger). Moreover,

according to TTIR, an intentional state is of the particular attitude kind that it is partly in virtue

of representing in the way that it does, e.g. whether it represents like a map rather than like a

blueprint. TTIR is a high-level theory because representational properties, e.g. representing that

p and representing like a map rather than like a blueprint, are high-level properties, which other

more basic properties, e.g. conceptual role, must account for.

If beliefs are robust mental representations, then instances of (Norm of Belief) will be

not only true, but an important component of the theory of intentionality:

(Norm of Belief) Beliefs that p are correct relative to any arbitrary scenario if and only if in that scenario, p.

Likewise, if desires are robust mental representations, then instances of (Norm of Desire) will be

true:

(Norm of Desire) Any arbitrary scenario is correct relative to desires that p if and only if in that scenario, p.

Parallel norms will apply for any other intentional states that are robust mental representations.

The (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) guarantee that a belief that p and desire that p will

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divide the space of possible scenarios so as to represent that p. However, these norms also tell

us about what sorts of states beliefs and desires are; they tell us about direction of fit. (Norm of

Belief) tells us that when there are discrepancies between a scenario and a belief, it is the belief

that is incorrect relative to the scenario. Thus, beliefs are reflective or maplike representations.

(Norm of Desire) tells us that when there are discrepancies, it is the scenario that's incorrect

relative to the desire. Thus, desires are projective or blueprintlike representations. In this way,

(Norm of Belief), (Norm of Desire), and other parallel norms are as much a constraint on a

theory of attitudes as they are on the theory of content.

(Norm of Belief), (Norm of Desire), and other parallel norms are genuine norms. Thus,

for instance, to say that a belief is incorrect is to say that it is not how it ought to be on some

particular dimension. Likewise, (Desire-Norm) entails that when it comes to a desire that p, any

scenario that is not a p-scenario is not what ought to be the case. To say as much is not, of

course, to say that desiring that p makes it the case that things ought to be such that p tout

court. Perhaps some desires that p are bad because no one's interest is served in scenarios that

aren't p-scenarios. Nonetheless, according to (Norm of Desire), when it comes to desires that p,

things haven't worked out if a not-p-scenario turns out to be the case. (Norm of Desire) entails

that as far as the desire is concerned, this situation is one in which things are supposed to be

otherwise. A scenario is a correct realization of a hypothetical desire if and only if the content of

the desire turns out to be true in that scenario.

(Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) are genuine norms because representation—at

least understood on the paradigm of artifactual representation—has a normative aspect.

Something is a reflective representation only if it ought to reflect some way a world (broadly

considered) is. Likewise, something is a projective representation only if it projects a way the

world ought to match up with. The (genuine) normativity here is teleological. In general,

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representations are states and objects with a purpose; they are states and objects that aspire to

certain ideals. If beliefs and desires are robust representations in accordance with TTIR, they

are no different. According to (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire), beliefs and desires alike

are states that ideally maintain a correspondence with the world. Some ideal inherent to being

a belief demands that beliefs be true. Some ideal inherent to being a desire demands that

desires be satisfied.

§1.3: Deflationary Opponents of TTIR

TTIR is not the only theory of intentional states. According to TTIR, intentional states are

constitutively normative. Thus, to think that some particular cognitive state is a belief or a

desire is to be committed to thinking that certain constitutive norms apply regarding that

cognitive state. Not everyone accepts that beliefs and desires are constitutively normative in

this way.

In particular, deflationary theorists of content don't. They reject that contents are at

least partly characterized by their conditions of correctness. To be sure, they agree that

contents inherently have truth or satisfaction conditions, but they insist these are not

normatively loaded correctness conditions. Rather, these are deflationary truth or satisfaction

conditions. A thorough-going deflationism about truth prescinds from the possibility of TTIR.

Thorough-going deflationists about truth must reject (Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) as

part of the theory of intentionality. Consequently, thorough-going deflationists must reject the

(Norm of Belief) and (Norm of Desire) as even a partial theory of attitudes. Beliefs are not states

that inherently aspire to the ideal of truth. Desires are not states that inherently aspire to the

ideal of satisfaction.

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So what is it for a state to be a belief or desire? Deflationary theorists do not say much

on the matter. They have worked out a stripped down theory of content. On this theory of

content, there is little else to say about content than the platitude that two token sentences of

Mentalese have the same content when “boxing” the sentences makes for getting around the

world in (roughly?) the same way. But what is it to “box” a sentence of Mentalese? What is it

to “belief-box” versus “desire-box”? What is the deflationary theory of attitudes?

§1.4: Conclusion to the Introduction

In this chapter, I will argue that there are significant obstacles to constructing an alternative to

the TTIR theory of attitudes. The most plausible functionalist theory of beliefs and desires will

introduce inherent ideals for beliefs and desires in a way that inherently generates a truth ideal

for beliefs and satisfaction ideal for desires. As functionalism is the most plausible theory of

attitudes, this result strongly suggests that TTIR is true.

The rest of the chapter will proceed as follows: In §2, I will present a challenge to the

most commonly held functionalist theories of attitudes. In §3, I will explain how another sort of

functionalist theory is far more likely to be our common folk theory of attitudes. In §5-6, I

discuss how this other theory supports TTIR before returning to discuss the initial sort of

competitor functionalist theory again in §8. A brief conclusion follows in §9.

§2: Nomological Functionalism

§2.1: A Problem for Nomological Functionalism

The “box” metaphor strongly suggests that prominent deflationary opponents of TTIR intend to

give a functionalist account of attitudes. Explicit remarks confirm this suggestion. Paul Horwich

takes a position on what it is to be a belief when he says “believing a proposition is a matter of

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relying on it in theoretical or practical inference.” 155 Horwich's position is unclear; it is not

obvious how theoretical and practical inferences are to be distinguished from other types of

inference.156 Nonetheless, Horwich's reliance on inference in his sketch of an account for belief

shows that he thinks being a belief has to do with inferential or functional role. Horwich (at

least apparently) commits himself to a functionalist account of belief.

Of course, so much is not surprising. Functionalism about attitudes is the dominant

position in the philosophical literature.157 (Accepting a functionalist account of belief and desire

does not commit one to adopting a (pure) functionalist account of content. One can accept that

being a belief rather than a desire is entirely a matter of the way an internal cognitive state is

used without accepting that differences in an internal cognitive state's conceptual/functional

role correspond to differences in content.)158 It is overwhelmingly plausible that if any theory of

attitudes is correct at all, something like the functionalist theory is.159 Functionalism about

belief and desire is the view that being a belief and being a desire are functional properties.

Functional properties (for my purposes) are theoretically defined properties.160 More precisely,

something comes to have a functional property because it plays or ought to play some particular

role specified in a theory. That our terms ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are defined by way of a theory is

155 Horwich (2005), 119. 156 One might have thought, for instance, that theoretical inferences were distinguished from others because they were inferences involving just beliefs. 157 See, for instance, Loar (1981), Shoemaker (1984), Kim (1996), and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007). Consider also recent accounts of belief: Velleman (2000), Chapter 11, Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Boghossian (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), and Wedgwood (2007a). 158 Cf. Fodor and Lepore (1992), 127. In addition, accepting functionalism about attitudes or content does not require accepting functionalism about the mind generally. 159 I don't mean to rule out instrumentalist/interpretationist accounts, which are very much like functionalism save the existential commitments to a particular functional organization. See Dennett (1981), Davidson (1984), and Williamson (2007), Chapter 8. 160 I am thinking of functional properties more narrowly than one might think of them. One might think of nomological functional properties as macroscopic properties that supervene on underlying causal properties whether they can be defined as part of a finitely expressible theory or not.

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hard to deny; we don’t, after all, directly observe beliefs and desires—at least not in others.

What we observe is behavior, and we use a theory of attitudes to explain that behavior.

If an object or state ought to play some particular role specified in the theory, then the

object or state has a “teleofunctional” property. If an object or state in fact plays some

particular role specified in a theory, then the object or state has what we might call a

“nomological functional” property. (The Lewis-Ramsey method can be used either to define

teleofunctional properties or nomological functional properties. 161 The difference is in whether

the Ramsified theory is a theory of how things are supposed to be or a theory of how they in

fact are.) From what I can tell, most functionalists about attitudes are nomological

functionalists. They claim, for instance, that some state is a belief if and only if it is disposed to

act in a certain way. Despite its popularity, however, nomological functionalism about attitudes

has deep problems.

To see so, consider a simple nomological functionalist account of belief according to

which some state is a belief if and only if it is (causally) regulated so as to be true.162 On this

simple regulative account of belief, being a belief is a matter of being produced and sustained by

cognitive mechanisms that are truth-conducive. As an initial complaint, we might point out that

there may well be other intentional states, e.g. suspecting, that are regulated so as to be true.

Let us put this complaint aside, though, to focus on another problem that points to a serious

issue with nomological functionalist accounts of attitudes generally.

The problem is straightforward: beliefs aren't, in strict generality, even weakly regulated

so as to be true. Many beliefs are produced and sustained by cognitive mechanisms that are

wholly unreliable. What’s more, matters do not seem to improve significantly on this score even

when beliefs are consciously considered in light of the evidence. Without question, there have

161 Lewis (1970). 162 Cf. Velleman (2000), Chapter 11 and Steglich-Petersen (2006).

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been some superstitious individuals who held superstitious beliefs so firmly that they

consciously held onto them even when confronted with serious evidence to the contrary. And

the superstitious are only the beginning of the problem. There are ideologues and delusional

individuals of all varieties to consider.

What's more, well-known studies in cognitive science demonstrate that many of the

cognitive mechanisms regulating belief are not particularly truth-conducive. Consider the well

documented “confirmation bias” whereby people ignore evidence contrary to their already held

views.163 Because of the confirmation bias, people are very likely to retain their beliefs—even

wholly unwarranted beliefs. The confirmation bias is very strong. To quickly review a very

famous experiment: two groups of students were asked for their views on capital

punishment.164 They were then exposed to the same papers on capital punishment and asked

again about their views. Because they had the same evidence presented to them, one might

expect convergence in opinion. In fact, the result was polarization; in general, those who had

been in favor of capital punishment were more in favor of it, and those who had been against it

were more against it.

Convergence is what one might expect if one were assuming that humans were highly

rational. What has become increasingly clear from research, however, is that humans are only

just rational enough. In addition to the confirmation basis, it is also widely known that people

do not reason well on the basis of deduction.165 Cognitive scientists suggest that, in general,

people deploy a quick and dirty method of reasoning that is somewhat unreliable; only when

there is sufficient time and attention do people’s inferences respect deductive validity, and even

163 Wason (1960). 164 Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979). 165 See, for example, Schroyens and Schaeken (2003).

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then, not so well.166 People are also notoriously bad at probabilistic reasoning. There is the

prominent gambler’s fallacy, whereby people ignore the independence of chance events.167

There is also the conjunctive fallacy, whereby people believe that specific events conforming to

a stereotype are more probable than the general events that subsume them.168

In light of the confirmation bias and other human rational failings, it would be

somewhat surprising if every single actual belief were ultimately subject to truth-regulating

cognitive mechanisms. It seems far more likely that there are many actual beliefs—even

deliberately reflected upon beliefs—that are never subject to any genuine check vis-à-vis their

truth.169 (Of course, as we are theorizing about what it is in virtue of which some possible state

is a belief, it matters only that it is possible that there are such beliefs. Pointing out that there

are actually such beliefs is just a useful heuristic.)

Obviously, this is a problem for the simple regulative account of belief under

consideration, but why does it point to a serious issue for nomological functionalist accounts of

attitudes considered generally? The simple regulative account of belief can seem plausible at

least initially because the usual belief is ceteris paribus regulated so as to be true. At its heart,

the problem for this account of belief is that even if the usual belief ceteris paribus acts in a

certain way, there are clear examples of beliefs that ceteris paribus do not act in that way. To

ignore these examples is to turn a blind eye to the possibility and even prevalence of certain

kinds of rational failings.170

This sort of problem recurs for many nomological functionalist accounts of attitudes.

Why? It recurs because what is most central to beliefs—and other intentional states—is their

166 Cf. Evans (2003). 167 Tversky and Kahneman (1971) and (1974). 168 Tversky and Kahneman (1983). 169 Cf. Rey (2007). 170 Cf. Williamson (2007), Chapter 4.

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rational roles, not their causal roles. Most of us can agree that, as a matter of rationality, beliefs

ought to be inferentially connected with other beliefs through theoretical reasoning, ought to

be inferentially connected with desires through means-ends reasoning, and ought to be

inferentially connected in the requisite ways with perceptual states. The difficulty with trying to

characterize beliefs and other intentional states in terms of their causal roles is that, plainly,

causal links need not always line up exactly with these rational links, and that is, of course,

because people can fail to be rational. Even if the usual belief that p ceteris paribus exhibits

some rational role (which, incidentally, may or may not be true depending on the content), it’s

almost certainly the case that there are some outlier possible token beliefs that p that do not

exhibit that rational role even ceteris paribus. A person doesn’t have to function even very

rationally to have beliefs.171 The same could be said for desires or any other intentional state.

Of course, if a creature fails to meet any rational constraints, we may rightly say that

they have no intentional states. However, people can fail to meet local rational constraints, and

in such cases, they may well have beliefs or other intentional states with causal roles that do not

line up with the corresponding rational role. What’s more, they can fail to be rational in ever so

many ways; many local rational failures are possible, so long as the causal roles of most of a

person’s intentional states line up well enough with what it would be rational for them to

infer.172 The result is that there is no obvious way to account for the possible ways the causal

role of belief can deviate from its rational role.

§2.2: A Fix for the Problem?

One way to deal with this problem is to abandon a strictly functionalist theory of attitude and

move to a theory that uses causal roles as paradigms of the attitude kind. For example, even if

171 Again, see Williamson (2007) and Rey (2007). 172 Cf. Williamson (2007).

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beliefs aren't universally regulated so as to be true, typical beliefs are, so we can identify beliefs

as those mental states that are of the same kind as these typical beliefs.

There are at least two reasons to be dissatisfied with this sort of move. First, it's not

certain that even human beliefs ordinarily belong to some underlying natural kind that

distinguishes them from other mental states. It may be that the neural structures that underlie

beliefs might also serve other functions if appropriately arranged to do so. (Just because a

capacitor can be used to store energy doesn't mean that it can't also be used to represent

information.)

Second, identifying beliefs with some underlying natural kind undermines the possibility

that beliefs are multiply realizable. The resulting chauvinism is a heavy cost as we are prima

facie inclined to make judgments about whether a possible subject has intentional states

without consideration for the particular kind of substances that realize those intentional

states.173

§3: The Common Folk Theory

In my view, that the rational (rather than causal) role of a state is most important in fixing

whether it is a belief, desire, etc. strongly suggests that a teleofunctionalism is far better

equipped to serve as an adequate theory of attitudes than a nomological functionalism. At a

minimum, our identification of psychological states by their rational roles shows that the

common tacit folk theory of attitudes whereby we come to grasp what it is to be a belief, desire,

etc. is very likely to be a teleological theory. (A tacit folk theory is a theory that accords with the

recognitional and inferential patterns of the folk. Obviously, in suggesting that the folk have a

173 Cf. Block (2007), Part I.

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tacit theory of psychology, I am not suggesting that people embrace that theory explicitly.)174

Plainly, we have a much better understanding of what beliefs, desires, etc. are supposed to do

than we have of what they, in fact, do. To the extent that being a belief, being a desire, etc. are

properly defined by our common tacit folk theory, the correct theory of attitudes must be a

teleofunctionalism.

Why should our common tacit folk theory address how psychological states are

supposed to act? Wouldn't it be far more useful to have a theory of how psychological states do

act? Surprising as this result might be, I think it likely that a teleofunctionalist theory of

attitudes is far more useful than a nomological functionalist theory of attitudes would be. The

difficulty with nomological functionalist theories of psychology generally is that the functioning

of ordinary people is not particularly systematic. Frequently, people are peculiar; often, we

cannot generalize on the behavior of individuals. A teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes gives

us the best combination of flexibility, predictive power, and ease of use.

To see that teleofunctionalist theories are easier to master and use is fairly

straightforward. Understanding what intentional states are supposed to do generally is far

easier than understanding what they in fact do. A theory of what intentional states do in fact do

has to take into account all sorts of factors that a teleofunctionalist theory of psychology can

ignore.

Teleofunctionalist theories can also give us significant predictive power. Having a

theory about how intentional states are supposed to function does not prevent us from making

useful predictions so long as in a plethora of cases we can assume that intentional states will act

as they are supposed to. I submit that we are entitled generally to make that assumption in the

absence of reasons to think otherwise. Moreover, even when it doesn't do exactly what it is

174 Cf. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Chapter 3.

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supposed to do, knowing what an intentional state is supposed to do (ideally) can give us

significant insight into what it will do, especially as we expand our understanding of the causal

mechanisms underlying rational and irrational behavior. For instance, knowing how beliefs are

supposed to respond to reasons can help me predict how a delusional person's beliefs will

respond to reasons. Thus, a person who does not want to believe his spouse is cheating on him

will respond to the available reasons he has so as to form beliefs that support the belief that his

spouse is not cheating on him.

Finally, teleofunctionalist theories of attitudes are far more flexible than their

nomological functionalist counterparts. A teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes allows us to

categorize even wayward psychological states as beliefs, desires, etc. so long as they fit into a

system of states that functions well enough like an ideally rational system of beliefs, desires, etc.

This categorization allows us to make us to make useful predictions. Often, there are

regularities in the ways these wayward intentional states depart from rational norms. Although

superstitious beliefs do not act as beliefs ought to, nonetheless, they depart from rationality in

regular and predictable ways.

When it comes to functionalist folk theories, teleofunctionalist theories are the rule

rather than the exception. In fact, we might be surprised if our functionalist folk theory of

attitudes were not teleological. Paradigm functionalist properties, e.g. being a mousetrap, being

a carburetor, being a coffee maker, etc., are teleofunctionalist properties.175 Something can be

a mousetrap even if it doesn't, in fact, trap mice. A mousetrap need not be a good mousetrap; it

can be a bad mousetrap. Malfunctioning mousetraps continue to be mousetraps.

Malfunctioning beliefs and desires can continue to be beliefs and desires. Consequently, it

should not be surprising that being a belief and being a desire are teleofunctionalist properties.

175 Cf. Millikan (1993), Chapter 2.

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Does our common tacit folk theory of attitudes properly define what it is to be a belief,

desire, etc.? Even if we ordinarily categorize cognitive states as beliefs, desires, etc. according

to how those states ought to behave, need we think that cognitive states are beliefs, desires,

etc. in virtue of how they ought to behave? Obviously, the common tacit folk theory of

psychology may have some indeterminancies and misconceptions; it may require revisions.

However, these revisions cannot be too extensive, else the result is a theory not of belief and

desire, but of something else entirely.176 For this reason, showing that teleofunctionalism about

attitudes is the folk theory should be prima facie evidence that teleofunctionalism about

attitudes is true.177

§4: The Telos of Belief

§4.1: An Introduction to Telos

A teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes works in favor of TTIR. According to TTIR, any (principal)

intentional state has a telos such that it represents robustly. To evaluate whether TTIR is true,

we need to consider what, on the correct teleofunctionalist account of belief and desire, the

telos of belief and desire might be. In §4-6, I will argue that any plausible teleofunctionalist

account of belief and desire vindicates TTIR.

Before we proceed, it may be helpful to consider more closely what a telos is generally.

The telos of a mousetrap is to catch mice. That's not because all mousetraps catch mice, but

because good or successful mousetraps catch mice when there are mice to be caught. To say

that a mousetrap is a good or successful mousetrap is not, of course, to say that it is good

simpliciter. To say that a mousetrap is a good mousetrap is to say that it is how mousetraps

176 Cf. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), Chapter 5. 177 Eliminativism about attitudes in compatible with the truth of teleofunctionalism about attitudes, so the possibility of the former does not impugn the possibility of the latter.

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ought (teleologically) to be (qua mousetraps). It is not to say, in addition, that having

mousetraps that are as mousetraps (teleologically) ought to be is a good thing. A lover of mice

can agree that something is a good mousetrap while thinking that it is also an evil and horrible

thing. Nuclear weapons may be good qua weapons of mass destruction, but they are not good

tout court. When we say that something is a good or successful F, we are evaluating it as it

stands to some ideal—an ideal whose realization may not be ideal simpliciter. When we know

what it is to be a good or successful F, when we know how F-s ought to be qua F-s, when we

know what the pinnacle of being an F is, that's when we have uncovered the telos of F-ness.

§4.2: Truth as the Telos of Belief

It certainly makes perfectly good sense to ask what a good belief is. Moreover, although good

beliefs may frequently be good tout court, we need not think they are always so to think that

they are good beliefs. We can judge that a belief is a good belief (qua belief) while judging that

the world is a worse place because of that belief. Qua believers, we ought to aspire to good

beliefs, and yet it is a further and even substantive question whether we ought qua moral

agents aspire to good beliefs.

So what is a good belief? No one answer seems absolutely definitive.178 A number of

epistemic and pragmatic properties come to mind. A good belief is true. A good belief is

warranted. A good belief is knowledge. A good belief gets you around the world successfully.

Our tacit folk theory may not be univocal when it comes to what a good belief is. Nonetheless,

these various ideals are interrelated. In arguing for TTIR, it doesn't matter which of these

alternatives is the telos of belief so long as that telos inherently generates an ideal of truth so as

178 I myself feel some attraction (at least sometimes) towards a pluralist stance. There are a number of epistemic ideals for beliefs that are not necessarily in competition with one another. Cf. Sosa (2007), Chapter 4.

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to uphold (Norm of Belief). Obviously, the most straightforward way this might happen is if the

telos of belief was truth, i.e. if a good belief is a true belief.

Why think that the telos of belief is truth? At the very least, it seems very plausible that

we should say a true belief is a successful belief (and a false belief an unsuccessful one).

Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that, in at least some sense, truth is the aim of belief.179

If we understand this truism teleologically so as to say that beliefs are supposed to or

ought qua beliefs be true, then at least one direction of (Norm of Belief) seems to fall out

immediately. If beliefs that p ought to be true, then they are correct relative to an arbitrary

scenario only if in that scenario, p. Moreover, if a good belief is a successful belief and a belief is

a successful belief merely in virtue of being true, then a belief that p is good qua belief relative

to an arbitrary scenario in which p. I take it so much is enough to establish the other direction

of (Norm of Belief): that beliefs that p are correct relative to an arbitrary scenario if in that

scenario, p. It follows that beliefs are robust (mental) representations.

§4.3: Knowledge as the Telos of Belief

Some true beliefs seem faulty qua beliefs. Someone who bets their life savings in a game of

roulette because they firmly believe the ball will land on the number thirty-three is (probably)

foolish (qua doxastic agent) even if, as it turns out, the ball lands on the number thirty-three.

Very plausibly, a good belief is a belief one can act on the basis of. Considerations of these sorts

lead some to think that even if a true belief is ipso facto a successful belief, a true belief isn't

ipso facto a good belief. Perhaps, a better candidate for good belief is knowledge. Knowledge,

after all, does seem to be the pinnacle of belief. A person's belief constitutes knowledge only

when everything has gone as it ideally ought to for a belief: only when the world cooperates

179 Cf. Velleman (2000), Chapter 11, Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Boghossian (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), and Wedgwood (2007).

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with a person's epistemic competency to yield a belief that in virtue of being true is (at least in

some sense) successful.

The view that knowledge is the apotheosis of belief qua belief is consonant with much

of the contemporary literature that emphasizes the importance of knowledge. It does not entail

Timothy Williamson’s thesis that knowledge is a mental state, but it is certainly compatible with

it.180 The view does require thinking of belief and knowledge as intimately connected, and

moreover as theoretically “on a par.” Accepting the view commits one to thinking that we

understand what belief is through understanding what knowledge is and vice-versa, so that our

apprehension of both belief and knowledge comes from apprehending one theory for both.

Those who find Williamson’s view that knowledge is the norm of assertion compelling

should also have some affinity for the view that knowledge is the apotheosis of belief.181 After

all, there is a somewhat appealing way of conceiving of belief as a sort of an inner assertion that

is always sincere; indeed, the language of thought hypothesis takes this conception of belief

very seriously. Alternatively, one can think of assertion as the outwards expression of belief.

Either way the connection between the two views becomes clear. As a good assertion is the

expression of knowledge, so a good belief just is knowledge itself.

Among the requirements for knowledge is factivity.182 Whether a belief meets the

factivity requirement for knowledge is not generally of matter of its etiology. It depends,

generally, on the states of the world outside the believer. We can evaluate whether a

hypothetical belief that p meets the factivity requirement in a possible scenario merely by

considering whether the possible scenario itself is such that p. Thus, assuming a belief is a good

belief if and only if it is knowledge, a belief is a good belief only if it is true. If knowledge is the

180 See Williamson (2000). 181 Ibid, Chapter 11. 182 Shope (2002).

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telos of belief, a belief that has fulfilled its telos is a true belief. Given that knowledge is the

telos of belief, a belief is ipso facto not a good belief if it is not true. That much is enough for

one direction of (Norm of Belief). For a belief to meet its knowledge ideal relative to some

possible scenario, the belief must be true. Hence, for an arbitrary scenario, a belief that p is

correct relative to that scenario only if in that scenario, p.

What about the other direction? If knowledge is, in some sense, the norm of belief,

then beliefs that aren't knowledge are, in some sense, not as they ought to be qua beliefs even

if they are true. So does the other direction of (Norm of Belief) fail?

I think not. Consider a few analogous examples. If the ideal for an Olympic swimmer is

to win a gold medal, and part of winning the gold medal is getting into the pool at a particular

time and place, then not only does the Olympic swimmer act incorrectly if he fails to get into the

pool at that time and place. In fact, he correctly gets into the pool at that time and place even if

he doesn't go onto win the gold medal. If the ideal for cars involves transporting people with

the key to (certain kinds of) places they want to go, and the engine of a car turning over is a part

of accomplishing that task, then not only does a car function incorrectly when the engine does

not turn over, it functions correctly when the engine does turn over, even if the car then goes on

to malfunction in some other way. Likewise, if the ideal of belief is that it be knowledge and

part of what it is to be knowledge is to be true, then not only is a belief incorrect when it fails to

be true, it is correct when it is true even if the belief doesn't additionally constitute knowledge.

It is significant that there is a tight connection between knowledge and truth. A subject

pursues knowledge by pursuing truth; moreover this connection between knowledge and truth

is inherent, not accidental. Because pursuit of knowledge directly involves (and, in fact, just is)

the pursuit of truth, an ideal of knowledge thereby inherently generates an ideal of truth.

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Consequently, the view that the telos of belief is knowledge establishes both directions of

(Norm of Belief), and thereby vindicates TTIR (restricted to belief).

§4.4: Warrant as the Telos of Belief

One might think that, in some sense, success is incidental to the ideal of belief; good beliefs

aren't necessarily successful beliefs. Thus, a good belief is a reasonable belief. The world may

cooperate so as to make a reasonable belief a true belief or knowledge. However, one might

think that even if the world doesn't cooperate so that the belief isn't successful in this regard,

the belief can still be reasonable and ipso facto how a belief (qua belief) ought to be. Thus,

although it would be ideal for beliefs if the world cooperates, whether the world cooperates or

not does not change whether a belief has met its ideal. If this line of thought is somewhat

compelling, perhaps warrant is the principal telos of belief.

Does warrant as the telos of belief undermine (Norm of Belief)? If a belief can be as it

ought to be qua belief without being true, doesn't that show that a belief can, in some sense, be

correct (qua belief) even without being true? Perhaps in some sense. However, that does not

show that there is not some other sense in which any belief that fails to be true is incorrect.

After all, it is very plausible that there is a close tie between warrant and truth.183 Some

argue that, at least for certain sorts of contents, being true is a matter of being warranted at the

end of inquiry.184 Others insist that warrant generally is to be explained, at least partly, as what

is conducive, in some way or other, to truth. No matter which way the order of explanation

flows, however, almost everybody can agree that warranted beliefs are apt to be true, i.e.

warranted beliefs are true in typical or perhaps ideal conditions when the world cooperates.

This connection between warrant and truth is enough to sustain (Norm of Belief).

183 Cf. Conee (1992). 184 Cf. Wright (1992).

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To see why, suppose for a moment that my ideal chess game is not one in which I

necessarily win, but rather one in which I play well. If playing well is my principal goal when I

play chess, then if I am acting rationally, I cannot help but to try to win the games of chess I play.

My goal of playing well at chess compels another goal of winning chess. Why? To have played

well at chess just is to play in a way that would likely result in a win against opponents of up to a

certain skill level. To try to play well on a particular occasion, then, just is to try to win. If it's

not the case that winning a game of chess is, to my mind, a success, then having played well at

chess can't be, to my mind, desirable. In this way, a norm to play well at chess inherently

generates (or perhaps presupposes) a norm to win.

An analogous situation arises with warrant and truth on the very plausible assumption

that to have a warranted belief just is to have a belief that is apt to be true. On that assumption,

beliefs aspiring warrant requires beliefs aspiring to true. What's more, on that assumption, if

truth did not, in some sense, mark a belief's being successful and hence correct, warrant could

not mark, in any sense, a belief's being good. Thus, on that assumption, even if the ideal belief

is merely a warranted belief, the warrant norm will inherently generate (or perhaps presuppose)

a norm of truth.

(Of course, one can reject the assumption that warrant is closely tied to truth. One

might suggest, rather, that warranted beliefs are pragmatic beliefs. It remains to be seen how

TTIR fares on the view that the telos of beliefs is pragmatic. I will discuss that issue in §6.)

§5: The Telos of Desire

Up to this point, we have discussed plausible views on the telos of belief. What about our

teleofunctionalist account of desire? Do we have the same sorts of reasons for adopting a

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teleofunctionalist account of desire as we do for adopting a teleofunctionalist account of belief?

I think so.

When we lose focus and become distracted, we can fail to do what we desired to do and

could have done even though we had no countervailing desire to do otherwise. This sort of

situation represents a failure of practical rationality. When it comes to certain desires, e.g.

desiring to finish a paper, it may be that these rational failures are more common than

successes. Without desiring to do so, a person may lose focus every time he tries to write. This

person may lose focus merely because his desire to write did not provide him with motivational

force enough to overcome his apathy.

The desires (at least, as we talk about them in quotidian life) are not subject to the same

coherence constraints as beliefs; there is nothing wrong with someone who has conflicting

desires. In this respect, desires more closely parallel intuitions than they do beliefs. However,

all things considered desires that ultimately explain our actions do seem to be subject to the

same coherence constraints as beliefs. Someone who intentionally undermines his own efforts

exhibits a sort of practical irrationality. A person torn by competing religious and worldly desires

can exhibit this sort of practical irrationality. His behavior may well demonstrate a pattern in

which he regularly acts intentionally out of worldly desires in a way that undermines the

religious desires regularly behind his intentional action on other occasions, and vice-versa. The

best explanation of this behavior may well be that (at least given the person's beliefs) he has a

total set of desires that are incoherent, and, depending on the occasion, only some of the total

set are occurrent or active. This explanation is entirely analogous to the explanation we might

give of somebody with inconsistent beliefs who, for instance, regularly acts as if she believes in

ghosts on some occasions, but regularly disavows the existence of ghosts on others.

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Desires, like beliefs, have a rational role. Moreover, just as with belief, the rational role

of desire is far more central to it than the causal role. Desires can fail to execute their rational

roles just as beliefs can. The fact that a state does not execute the rational role of a desire (or all

things considered desire) does not imply that the state is not a desire. What apparently matters

for being a desire is whether a state is supposed to execute the rational role of a desire, not

whether it in fact does. Thus, teleofunctionalism seems as appropriate for desire as it does for

belief.

So, what is the telos of desire? It is truistic that the aim of desire is satisfaction. A

satisfied desire is a desire that has been successful, whether by skill or chance. So much may

well be enough to establish that satisfaction is, in fact, the telos of desire. Thus, in any arbitrary

scenario, things are as they ought to be for a hypothetical desire (qua desire) if and only if the

desire has come to be satisfied in that scenario. This would be enough to establish (Norm of

Desire).

The view that satisfaction is the telos of desire parallels the view that truth is the telos

of belief. Thus, as we considered alternatives to the latter view, so we might consider parallel

alternatives to the former. As one might be tempted to think that the pinnacle of belief is when

a combination of epistemic competency and favorable conditions in the world assure truth, so

one might be tempted to think that the pinnacle of desire is when a combination of practical

competency and favorable conditions in the world assure satisfaction. To be tempted by the

latter view is to be tempted by a view for desire analogous to the knowledge-telos view for

belief. As one might be tempted to think that the ideal belief is a belief that is apt to be true

whether or not the world cooperates to make it true, so one might be tempted to think that the

ideal desire is one that is apt to be satisfied whether or not the world cooperates to make it

satisfied. To be tempted by the latter view is to be tempted by a view for desire analogous to

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the warrant-telos view for belief. I won't attempt to thoroughly develop or canvass these

alternatives. For my purposes, it's enough to point out that if the alternatives for belief

vindicate TTIR restricted to belief, these parallel alternatives for desire are likely to vindicate

TTIR restricted to desire for entirely analogous reasons.

Many people would say that a desire is a good desire if its satisfaction promotes some

moral or practical good. We might try to develop this thought into a view on the telos of desire:

desires are good qua desires if and only if their satisfaction promotes the good (tout court).

However, this view would be incomplete without the accompanying view that desires are states

that aim at satisfaction. It's only because desires aim at satisfaction that good desires are ones

whose satisfaction promotes the good (tout court). (If (counterpossibly) desires aimed at

dissatisfaction, then good desires would be ones whose dissatisfaction promoted the good.)

The complete view, then, has to be that desires are good qua desires if and only if when they

are successful they promote the good (tout court), and, furthermore, desires are successful (qua

desires) if and only if they are satisfied. The latter part of this complete view is enough to

establish (Norm of Desire), and hence, vindicate TTIR restricted to desires.

§6: A Pragmatic Teleofunctional Theory of Intentionality?

In §4-5, I discussed several possible views on the telos of belief and desire. For belief, these

views advocated as the telos various epistemic ideals revolving around truth. For desire, these

view advocated as the telos ideals revolving around satisfaction. I have provided reasons for

thinking that all of these views are friendly to TTIR. On all of these views beliefs and desires are

supposed to act like, and hence are, robust representations. Of course, while they are initially

plausible, these views do not exhaust the possibilities. Another plausible alternative is that the

teloi of beliefs and desires are principally pragmatic ideals: something is a belief or desire

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because of the particular pragmatic utility that state is supposed to have for the subject. How

does TTIR fare on this alternative?

It is a dictum of common sense that the basic antecedent ends—surviving, avoiding

pain, having a full belly, engaging in fulfilling sexual activity etc.—are best furthered when

desires that are core to the subject's motivational system are both aligned with these

antecedent ends (rather than being self-destructive for instance) and come to be subsequently

satisfied.185 It is equally sensible to think that the satisfaction of these desires is most likely to

be achieved by having, in particular, true beliefs that interact with core desires via instrumental

reasoning to form instrumental desires that, when satisfied, satisfy the former core desires.

Obviously, there will be occasions when a subject's interests are best served by having false

beliefs (e.g., when someone is offered substantial resources for believing something false);

nonetheless, it seems nearly platitudinous that the optimal belief forming strategy from a

pragmatic standpoint involves forming true beliefs absent circumstances in which the strategy is

explicitly defeated. It is very plausible to think, then, that the particular pragmatic utility of

having a belief-desire psychology comes in satisfying desires by having true beliefs. Last

chapter, I clarified and gave an extensive defense of this thesis. I will take it for granted here.

The upshot of this thesis is a vindication of TTIR even on the alternative view where the

teloi of beliefs and desires are principally pragmatic. Even if something is a belief principally

because of the particular pragmatic utility that state is supposed to have rather than because of

any sort of epistemic aim the state is supposed to fulfill, a derivative norm of truth inherently

arises given the pragmatic utility that beliefs are supposed to have. A similar point might be

made about desire.

185 Cf. Haack (1997).

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§7: The Naturalist Objection

§7.1: An Obstacle for Teleofunctionalism

A principal obstacle for teleofunctionalism about attitudes is how the view comports with

naturalism. If to be a belief is to have a certain telos (and likewise for desire), how could beliefs

and desires come to be at all? More specifically, how can internally cognitive states naturally—

rather than magically or artificially due to the actions of some other rational agent—come to

have the telos of belief or the telos of desire? It runs against our naturalistic scruples that a

state could have the telos of, say, a belief merely as a brute fact. There must be some

explanation of this property in terms of more fundamental properties. Moreover, we ought to

be able to understand these more fundamental properties in naturalistic terms.

There is no reason to think that we would necessarily have a problem explaining

teleofunctional properties generally. Assuming we can give a naturalistic explanation for

intentional states, we offer a naturalistic explanation of how an object comes to have the

teleofunctional property of being a mousetrap by pointing to the intentional states of the

designers and users of the mousetrap. This sort of explanation will not work, however, for

explaining how a state could come to have the teleofunctional property of being a belief, desire,

etc. because this sort of explanation assumes antecendently a naturalistic explanation for

intentional states.

In Chapter One and Three, I have alluded to one possible solution to this problem. If a

creature's parts or states work even approximately in a way that ideally serves (conceptually)

antecendent ends, these parts or states can come to have the telos of working just in that way.

Thus, for instance, if a creature has a heart that (at least typically) pumps blood, and pumping

blood optimally serves a(n) (conceptually) antecedent need the creature has for survival, the

creature's heart can come to have the telos of pumping blood (if the right sort of non-

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accidentality condition is met). Likewise, if humans have internal cognitive states that (at least

typically) act like representations, and acting like a representations optimally serves

(conceptually) antecedent ends that humans in fact have, e.g. survival, socialization, sex, pain-

avoidance, etc., then these internal cognitive states can come to have the telos of representing.

It seems very plausible to me that humans do have antecedent ends, i.e., ends that do not arise

from having cognitively sophisticated states like beliefs and desires. (Thinking otherwise greatly

over-intellectualizes what it is to have ends or interests.) Thus, I see no problem, in principle,

with thinking that being a belief and being a desire are teleofunctional properties. In this

section, I will begin to develop a more complete response of this sort on behalf of TTIR.

§7.2: A Broader Theory of Teleology

Mentalism about teleology is the view that all teleological properties of objects arise from the

intentional states of designers and users of those objects.186 Mentalism is a doctrine that seems

initially very plausible if only because paradigm instances of teloi involving artifacts do seem to

depend on pre-existing intentional states. TTIR, which suggests that intentional representation

is analogous to artifactual representation, can make people very nervous for that reason.

Fortunately for TTIR, mentalism ought to be rejected. Putative counterexamples to

mentalism usually come from biology. For example, in his attack on mentalism, Mark Bedau

suggests that the tendency of fish to school has the telos of avoiding predators.187 People have

come to accept many of these counterexamples as genuine instances of teleology at least partly

because they tend to see natural selection as playing the role of the designer in these cases;

thus, it is thought, these putative counterexamples from biology maintain an appropriate

parallel with paradigm artifactual instances of teleology where the role of the designer is played

186 Cf. Bedau (1990). 187 Ibid.

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by intentional agents.188 In this way, even though mentalism about teleology is rejected, a

prerequisite of design is retained. This putative design prerequisite, however, should likewise

be rejected. Objects need not be designed to have teleological properties. If it is suitably co-

opted, a sturdy stick can come to be a walking stick—it can come to have the teleological

property of helping one keep one's balance—even though the stick was clearly not designed to

do so.189 In the right circumstances, the use of a state or object in a certain way can be

sufficient for its having a particular telos. Design is not a central feature of teleology. The

requirements that people have (pre)supposed to be necessary for teleological properties to

arise are far too stringent to be plausible.

Of course, we don't want to say that something has the telos of being F just because it is

F and its being F achieves some good—and not just because having the telos of being F doesn't

require being F at all. (Remember, a mousetrap doesn't have to be disposed to catch mice even

under ideal circumstances to have the telos to do so.) Even if the rain beneficially causes crops

to grow, clearly it doesn't have the telos to do so. The benefit of the rain's falling is incidental to

its falling—whether the rain falls or not is at all explained by the fact that it would be beneficial

(for us) for it to fall. In this way, the beneficial effects of the rain falling appear to be

“accidental”; this accidentality is sufficient to disqualify the rain's falling as teleological.

Nonetheless, the non-accidentality condition for teleology can be met without pre-

existing intentionality or design. Consider the following case:

On some tropical island there is a tribe of people relatively isolated from modern society. This tribe regularly keeps torches burning throughout their village at night so as to ward off evil spirits. The torches are not causally efficacious at warding off corporeal demons. All of the deaths in the village that have been attributed to demons are actually cases of a fast acting lethal disease. These cases came to look like incidents of violence due to the aggressive nocturnal scavengers that live on the

188 Cf. Kitcher (1993) and Plantinga (1993). 189 Cf. Allen and Bekoff (1995).

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island and immediately descend on the recently deceased tribesmen at night. The lethal disease is more commonly found in local populations of lower primates (where is it slower acting and less lethal), and it is spread by insects that are active only at night. The smoke from the torches keeps away insects that spread the disease, which reinforces the tribe’s practice of keeping torches lit.

Upon understanding the situation, it would be very natural for an anthropologist visiting this

tribe to conclude that while the torches in this community may well have the purpose of

warding off demons when lit, it also has the job of preventing infection from the lethal disease

when lit. Indeed, there is even a temptation to say that this is the real job of the torches

because the practice of keeping the torches burning is causally responsive not to corporeal

demons, but to the presence of the disease. (Obviously, that the torches this particular telos is

not due to the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the tribesmen. The tribesmen completely

misunderstand why the practice serves their good.) In order for the torches to have the job of

preventing infection when lit it’s enough for the torches to serve some (pro tanto) good by

preventing the spread of infection of this disease when lit and for the fact that the torches

persist to be counterfactually dependent on the fact that when lit, they serve this good in this

way. This counterfactual dependence is enough to meet the non-accidentality condition.

Moving to psychology, we find it perfectly natural to ascribe teleological properties

when it is not altogether clear whether intentional states are involved or not. It is natural, for

instance, to think that insecure Amber’s incessant flirting has the job getting her attention. It

may be that insecure Amber subconsciously intends to get attention by flirting, but this

explanation is somewhat speculative. It is far more likely that she engages in unremitting

coquetry because this behavior was reinforced by the way that it made her feel. The fact that

her behavior regularly produces a pro tanto good for her conditions her to continue behaving in

this fashion. No intervening beliefs, desires, and intentions are required in this causal chain,

which is, in and of itself, enough to meet the non-accidentality condition so that Amber’s

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flirtatious behavior has a teleological property. The non-accidentality condition for teleology

can be met when properties of an object or state are causally sensitive to what is good, whether

or not this causal sensitivity is the product of intentional action or anything that closely

resembles design. Although it is systematically maintained, Amber’s behavioral disposition

arose entirely accidentally. The mechanisms of operant conditioning at work provide the fertile

ground necessary for developing and maintaining this behavioral disposition, but providing the

fertile ground hardly constitutes designing.

Abstracting from the particulars of Amber's case, we can say that a dispositional

property to bring some state of affairs about coincides with a teleological property to do so in

cases where developing or maintaining that dispositional property has depended or currently

depends on whether the dispositional property is beneficial. This sufficient condition for

teleology allows for the possibility of teleology without pre-existing intentional states or some

sort of process of design, and therefore makes room for TTIR.

§7.3: Must Biology Subsume Intentional Psychology?

How should the proponent of TTIR and intentional psychology develop his position in light of a

broader theory of teleology? The tendency has been to do so by seizing on the process of

natural selection.190 Thus, humans continue to exhibit the type of cognitive architecture

required for intentional psychology because having this cognitive architecture is more

successful; if the cognitive architecture is more successful precisely because it produced

cognitive states that act often enough act like representations, then TTIR and intentional

psychology are jointly vindicated.

190 Cf. Millikan (1984), (1993), and many of the essays of Ariew, Cummins, and Perlman (2002).

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There are at least a couple of reasons to be displeased with alleged vindications of this

sort (even if they don't ultimately prove to be fatal to the general idea):

First, biological function may not be genuinely teleological. “Success” in biology is

measured by whether there is reproduction, but there's no particularly good reason for thinking

that reproduction is a genuine good for any creature. (Are humans or any other creature

genuinely better off merely for having reproduced?) Biological “success” is perhaps most

plausibly understood as a metaphor; it can be useful to think of biological organisms as engaged

in a game with the end of reproduction even if reproduction is not generally the end of any

particular biological organism. Thus, while maintaining cognitive architecture through

generations is dependent on reproductive success it may not be thereby sensitive to what is

genuinely good, and hence, may fail to be genuinely teleological.191

In fact, biological function (or at least one sort of biological function) may turn out to be

a non-teleological species of etiological function. Roughly speaking, some type of dispositional

property to φ coincides with an etiological function to φ if the current exhibiting of that type of

disposition depends on past exhibitings, i.e. if the current existence of a token of that type

depends on the existence of past tokens.192 There are reasons to think that teleological and

etiological function are not the same. Career setbacks have a tendency to replicate because

they make resumés look worse and they impede the development of career skills. Certainly, we

don't want to say that the telos of career setbacks is to make resumés look worse and impede

the development of career skills.

Obviously, to say that biological function is not generally teleological is not to say that

some instances of biological function may coincide with teleological function, but merely to say

that they need not coincide. (The heart example in the introduction of this section may well be

191 Cf. Bedau (1991). 192 Cf. Wright (1973).

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a case in which biological function and teleological function coincide even if they do not do so

generally.)

Second, the biological function of the cognitive architecture underlying belief-desire

psychology is not conceptually tied up with representation.193 It is conceptually possible (even if

unlikely) that our ancestors successfully reproduced not because their cognitive architecture

produced cognitive states that often enough act like representations, but because their

cognitive architecture made them immune to a particularly fatal disease. Indeed, we can even

imagine that, due to this immunity, our ancestors successfully competed against biological

cousins whose cognitive architecture produced a causal network of cognitive states that far

better approximated a rational network of mental representations than our own causal

networks of cognitive states do. If immunity to some disease was the dominant cause of the

propagation of our cognitive architecture, then the biological function of our cognitive

architecture may have little to do with producing mental representations.

It's hard to believe that the vindication of intentional psychology ultimately rests on

what exactly happened to our ancestors.194 However, accepting TTIR while maintaining a

commitment to explain how teleological properties arose through natural selection would seem

to hold intentional psychology hostage to particulars in the history of evolutionary biology in

just this way.

(This point is, of course, directly related to the questions about Swampman. The

infamous Swampman is an atom for atom duplicate of a normal human being whose comes to

exist by sheer chance.195 There are strong intuitions that Swampman can eventually have beliefs

193 See, for example, Block (2007), 24, and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007), 211-212. 194 Dretske (1995), Chapter 5 and Millikan (1993) give spirited defenses of the idea that history matters to representational content, but, in my view, their defense involves an unacceptable assault on the methodology behind philosophical thought experiments. Cf. Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009). 195 Cf. Davidson (1987).

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and desires even if not immediately after he comes to exist. In effect, these are intuitions that

intentional psychology is autonomous from evolutionary biology, which are obviously in tension

with the evolutionary view on intentionality under consideration.)

It may be that none of these reasons for suspicion are ultimately conclusive reasons to

reject natural selection as jointly vindicating TTIR and intentional psychology, but they are

enough to make one uncomfortable enough to consider alternatives to that joint position.

Does a commitment to TTIR and realism about intentional psychology require a

commitment to a natural selection story? I don't think it does. The actual functioning of any

person's cognitive architecture is clearly causally sensitive to whether the person's antecedent

ends are being met. Obviously, if the person dies (generally not in the interest of the person),

then the cognitive architecture ceases to function as it did. More generally, though, if the

person is hungry, tired, in tremendous pain, emotionally distressed, socially isolated, or sexually

deprived, the functioning is also affected. In fact, the ability of people to form cognitive states

that act like rationally constrained mental representations is generally inhibited when the

person's antecedent ends are not being met; people who are hungry, tired, in tremendous pain,

emotionally distressed, socially isolated, sexually deprived, or dead are not especially good at

being rational. A cognitive architecture that advances the antecedent ends of the subject

maintains its disposition to form cognitive states that act like rationally constrained mental

representations. Assuming that the cognitive architecture does generally facilitate meeting

antecedent ends by forming cognitive states that act like rationally constrained mental

representations, sufficient conditions are met for the cognitive architecture to have the telos of

forming cognitive states that act like rationally constrained mental representations. Moreover,

the formed cognitive states derivatively have the telos of acting like rationally constrained

mental representations. To have that telos is, of course, just to be a rationally constrained

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mental representation. In this way, TTIR and intentional psychology might thereby be jointly

vindicated without any reference to natural selection. The normativity of intentionality can

stem directly from independent sources of value for the subject without drawing on

evolutionary biology.

§7.4: The Problem of Antecedent Ends

There are at least two reasons why the proposal just sketched might offend a philosopher's

sensibilities.

To begin with, one might worry that there are no ends for subjects that are conceptually

and metaphysically antecedent to intentionality; all value is, in some way or other, dependent

on intentionality. Thus, antecedent normativity is not available to ground the teleological

representation of intentional states in the manner I suggested.

In direct opposition to the intuition behind this position, I am inclined to think that the

most basic interests of creatures are much more closely tied to the existence of affective mental

states—pain, pleasure, and primitive emotions—than they are tied to the existence of

intentional states. (This is not to say that facts about a creature's basic well-being are

exhaustively fixed by the sorts of affective mental states it has; it is merely to suggest that

responding to real or imagined scenarios affectively is a prerequisite for having basic interests in

the way the world turns out.) While there are theories of affective states that attempt to

explain their nature in intentional terms, I am inclined to think that these theories have over-

intellectualized affect. The affective states of intentional agents may be content laden—once

introduced, intentionality may infect all sorts of phenomenal states from sensory states to pain

to emotions—but I see no particularly good reason to think that affective states of these sorts

are essentially intentional with fine-grained representational content. (Even if an emotion of

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anger represents some sort of particular offense to an intentional agent, it need not represent

anything determinate to a non-intentional creature.) The intentionality of belief-desire

psychology is relatively cognitively sophisticated, and not a general requirement for cognition.

Associative processing—assimilating objects, scenarios, and events to prototypes or exemplars,

for instance—does not seem to require intentionality; I don't see why having affective states—

that, for instance, trigger fight or flight responses—should require intentionality either. That

some disease has effectively removed the possibility of having higher-level cognitive functioning

required to have beliefs and desires would not convince me that some newborn was not in pain,

and hence, continued to have a stake in how the world was.

Indeed, the idea that natural intentionality (as opposed to artificially designed

intentionality) is ontologically dependent on affect gains some support from examples.

Supposing that the causal connections between various geological states of a planet are

isomorphic to the links of an ideal belief-desire psychology does not generally yield the intuition

that the planet exhibits intentionality.196 Why? I suspect we fail to see any genuinely

teleological relationships between the geological states because the causal connections

between geological states fail to serve any good. If we suppose as part of a children's tale that

the planet has feelings that are served by these causal connections, we are more inclined to see

the causal workings of the planet as manifestations of intelligence.

A second worry related to the first concerns the extent to which the sketched proposal

fails to resolve the naturalistic puzzle we began this section with. Even if you accept that

normative aspect of teleological representation might derive from the way the functioning of

cognitive architecture is maintained precisely by advancing the subject's antecedent ends, still

there is some normativity that has been left unexplained. Where do these antecedent ends

196 Cf. Block (1978).

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come from? Although I have not given a detailed answer to this question, I have given some

indication where to begin—by considering the nature of affective states and their connection to

value. Of course, one can always fret that in making this suggestion I am merely pushing

Brentano's problem onto someone else, but I take the reduction of Brentano's problem to the

problem of understanding affective states and their connection to value naturalistically to

constitute genuine progress. After all, any naturalism that can't accomodate affective states

and their phenomenological character or the basic interests of minded creatures is not very

plausible. If we come to see that naturalism cannot afford this much, we ought to reject

naturalism. We ought to be more confident that we have affective states and interests than we

are about naturalism.

§8: Nomological Functionalism Reconsidered

I have spent the last several sections discussing the various plausible teleofunctionalist accounts

of belief and desire. On all of these accounts, beliefs and desires turn out to be robust

representations in accordance with TTIR. Moreover, last section, I established that in positing

that intentional states like belief and desire have a telos, teleofunctionalist accounts are not

committing any obvious sins against naturalism. The ideals requisite for robust representation

inherently fall out of the usefulness of belief-desire psychology in furthering the (conceptually)

antecedent ends of subjects. Consequently, so long as we can understand naturalistically how

survival, for instance, might antecedently be in the interest of subjects, we can understand how

beliefs and desires could have the purpose of robustly representing.

In light of the difficulties, pointed to in §2 in developing an adequate nomological

functionalist account of attitudes, these results make a strong case for teleofunctionalism.

Likewise, in and of themselves, they work against intentional theories (for example, deflationary

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theories of content) that deny TTIR. My purpose in this section is to strengthen the case against

these intentional theories by more thoroughly evaluating the prospects for a nomological

functionalist theory of attitudes.

After all, one might worry that I dismissed nomological functionalism too quickly on the

basis of concerns raised in §2. Perhaps even a simple revision to the basic regularity account of

belief might suffice to yield a plausible theory of belief. While beliefs that are not causally

regulated so as to be true might be possible, surely it is not possible that a whole system of

beliefs might fail to be regulated so as to be true. Consequently, why could we not offer an

account of belief according to which to be a belief is roughly to be part of a network of states

that are regulated so as to be true? This account of belief may need to deal with the possibility

that other attitudes besides belief might be part of a network so regulated, but assuming that is

a manageable problem, what's wrong with a nomological functionalism of this sort?

Once again the problem is thinking that causal properties can do the work rationality. If

we define what it is to be part of the network of states according to rational links between

states, this account stands a chance. However, if being part of a network of states is supposed

to be a nomological property, I don't see how this account is going to work. All sorts of non-

belief states can be linked causally to belief networks in all sorts of ways. If that were not so,

wishful thinking would not be possible.

Any account of attitudes that does not introduce ideals for being a belief or being a

desire will not do. However, there are ways to introduce ideals where these ideals are not

normative. For instance, the ideals introduced for gases by the ideal gas law are not normative

ideals. Rather, they are merely idealizations. Perhaps, some state is a belief that p because its

causal role similar enough to the causal role of an idealized belief that p. What is an idealized

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belief that p? Presumably, it is a state that acts exactly in accordance with the rational role of a

belief that p. 197

Unless we can make out more precisely what it is for the causal role to be “similar

enough” it will be hard to test the adequacy of this sort of theory. However, there are two

important reasons to prefer teleofunctionalism nonetheless.

First, there is an important difference between non-normative ideals that emerge from

idealizations—such as the ideal gas laws—and the ideals of belief-desire psychology. Non-

normative idealizing involves making simplifying assumptions about the natural phenomenon

under consideration. These simplifying assumptions give us some understanding of the scope of

the idealization. For instance, the idealization that yields the ideal gas laws involves thinking of

gases as point size particles. At high pressures where the volume of the gas particles is no

longer insignificant relative to the occupied space, this simplifying assumption is no longer good.

As a result, we don't expect the ideal gas laws to hold under these conditions.

When it comes to the ideals of belief-desire psychology, there are no simplifying

assumptions that reveal when precisely the ideals apply. (Obviously, the ideals apply when

subjects are rational—but that's just to say that they apply when they apply.) The absence of

simplifying assumptions strongly indicates that what we have here is not a nomological model

precisely because the model by itself gives us no resources to make predications. To be able to

make predictions, we need to know, for example, the conditions under which a belief-desire

psychology would tend to persist. Obviously, persistence occurs when these cognitive states

generally serve the ends of the subject—when they aid in keeping the subject alive and well.

Thus, we ought to expect greater conformity to the ideals of belief-desire psychology in those

cases that are most immediately relevant to keeping subjects alive and well.

197 Cf. Shoemaker 1984, Chapter 12, Horwich (1998), and Horwich (2005).

155

What this exercise shows is that in order to make predictions using the ideals of belief-

desire psychology, we ultimately need to make reference to what belief-desire psychology is

good for. To do that, however, is just to walk down the road to teleofunctionalism. The

teleology of belief-desire psychology just emerges from the fact that it is good for something.

Second, everyone ought to agree that beliefs and other intentional states are subject to

genuine norms of rationality. On a teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes, explaining how these

genuine norms come into play is prior to explaining how it is that an internal cognitive state

could be of a particular attitude kind. On a theory of the sort now under consideration,

explaining how it is that an internal cognitive state could be of a particular attitude kind is prior

to explaining how these genuine norms come into play. So, for instance, on a teleofunctionalist

account of belief, a state is a belief (that p) because it is supposed to be a certain way. On the

sorts of competitor accounts under consideration, a state is supposed to be a certain way

because it is a belief (that p).

To insist that being of a particular attitude kind is explanatorily prior to genuine norms

of rationality is to insist that the theory of rationality is supplemental to and wholly separate

from the theory of intentional states.198 To my mind, the problem with the competitor theories

now under consideration is that, although they insist that the theory of rationality is

supplemental to and wholly separate from the theory of intentional states, they also say that

being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately follow the genuine

norms of the theory of rationality. For my part, I find it difficult to motivate the idea that the

theory of rationality is supplemental to and wholly separate from the theory of intentional

states if, in fact, being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately

follow the genuine norms of the theory of rationality. I would expect there to be an explanation

198 Cf. Horwich (2005).

156

of this obvious connection between the theory of rationality and the theory of intentional

states. If being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately follow the

genuine norms of a theory of rationality, then quite probably, the theory of rationality is

intimately tied up with the theory of intentional states. We ought to look first to see whether a

theory that postulates a tie between the theory of rationality and the theory of intentional

states succeeds.

Of course, we might have to retreat to a theory where the theory of rationality is

supplemental to and wholly separate from the theory of intentional states if we can't find a

viable theory that explains the obvious connection. However, we can find such a theory. A

viable teleofunctionalist theory of attitudes can explain why being of a particular attitude kind

involves being disposed to approximately follow the genuine norms of the theory of rationality.

Being of a particular attitude kind involves being disposed to approximately follow the genuine

norms of the theory of rationality because being of a particular attitude kind involves having the

teleological purpose of following the genuine norms, e.g. truth and satisfaction, of the theory of

rationality. The latter is explanatory because states come to have the teleological purpose of

following the genuine norms of the theory of rationality in virtue of furthering the antecedent

ends of subjects by being disposed to approximately follow the genuine norms of the theory of

rationality. It is by acting like representations, i.e. pursuing the rational aims of truth and

satisfaction, that beliefs and desires further the antecedent ends of subjects.

To my mind, a successful teleofunctionalism about attitudes closes the door on

nomological functionalism.199 As the common folk theory of attitudes (See §3),

199 I am understanding nomological functionalism as the view that the property of being of a certain attitude kind not only strongly supervenes (and is constituted by) underlying causal properties, but also that it is a property that can be theoretically defined in terms of those causal properties. The former weaker view may well turn out to be compatible with teleological functionalism depending on whether

157

teleofunctionalism ought to be the default position. It ought to be revised only if it cannot be

successfully made out.

§9: Conclusion

Functionalism is not the only sort of theory of attitudes one might reasonably have. One might,

for instance, adopt an instrumentalist or interpretationist theory of attitudes according to which

someone has beliefs and desires if and only if in light of a reasonable principle of charity or

humanity, they can be interpreted as having robust mental representations. I will not try to

adjudicate whether that sort of position counts as embracing TTIR, but it seems rather unlikely

that the position will turn out to be friendly to deflationary theories of content. (In addition,

these theories are less palatable because they reject robust realism about intentional states. If

it turned out that deflationary theories of content are committed to these theories, so much the

worse for them.)

In fact, it seems unlikely to me that any theory of attitudes will be friendly to

deflationary theories of content. Although I have not canvassed all the possibilities, showing

that functionalist theories are not likely to be compatible is a very good start.200

being a creature with interests is a property that strongly supervenes on causal properties. Thanks to Joshua Schechter for raising this issue. 200 Special thanks to Richard Heck, Christopher Hill, and Joshua Schechter for their discussion and comments. Part of this chapter was presented at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews in the spring of 2008. I would like to acknowledge members of the audience, particularly Crispin Wright, Jessica Brown, Herman Cappelen, and Martin Smith, for the profitable discussion on that occasion.

158

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:

§1: Continuing to Make the Case for the Teleological Theory of

Intentional Representation

Although Chapters Three and Four make a conclusive case for teleological theory of intentional

representation, Chapter Three in particular might be expanded upon to strengthen the case.

In Chapter Three, I show that belief-desire psychology is useful only to the extent that

the subject reliably forms true beliefs so that instrumental reasoning reliably satisfies good core

desires. The utility of belief-desire psychology thus presupposes that a subject can reliably form

true beliefs. In ongoing work, I argue that reliably forming true beliefs requires that beliefs

function as if they have genuine correctness conditions in accordance with TTIR; in light of

confirmation holism, it is very difficult to understand how subjects could reliably form true

beliefs except via a tacit grasp of what the belief has the job of representing. In this way, the

utility of belief-desire psychology vindicates TTIR twice over. The fact that belief-desire

psychology only has utility to the extent that true beliefs are formed reliably shows that TTIR

must be true. The fact that true beliefs can be formed reliably only if the subject is treating

them like representations further indicates that TTIR must be true.

159

§2: Looking Forward

Two issues raised in Chapter Four deserve further attention. In §7, I show how

teleological properties need not depend on antecedent intentionality. The explanation I gave

there can be used to show how non-intentional rule following is possible. Doing so is a project

for future work.

In §8, I effectively argue that the teleological theory of intentional representation is

superior to alternatives because the former is better able to explain why there ought to be

points of connection between the theory of intentionality and the theory of rationality. Further

substantiating this claim requires showing much more carefully how (teleological) norms of

representation relate to norms of rationality. I hope to tackle that project at some point in the

near future.

160

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