tepsic - national identity construction and the role of political … · 2013. 9. 7. ·...

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National Identity Construction and the Role of Political Elites:

Protracted Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

GORAN TEPŠIĆ

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences

Summary

In this article author is trying to answer the question whether contemporary conflict in

Bosnia and Herzegovina is of a protracted nature. He argues that conflict did not end

with the Dayton Agreement in 1995, but only its violent phase. During the two past

decades lasting contradictions gained a character of deep-rooted and protracted social

conflict, where basic human (societal) needs of constitutive nations (primarily identity)

are mutually contested. The author arguments his thesis through the analysis of four

identity-based categories in the narratives of Bosnian political elites: state, nation, the

Bosnian war and the Srebrenica genocide.

Key words: basic human needs, social identity, protracted social conflict, political elites,

nation, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian war, Srebrenica genocide

Identity and Conflict

Introduction of structural violence by Johan Galtung (1964; 1971) was a revolutionary point

in the development of peace studies and his academic career, but maybe even more important was

his ‘cultural turn’ and the concept of cultural violence (Galtung, 1990). This conception presupposes

that direct and structural forms of violence have their deeper sources, embedded in culture. All

elements of science, ideology, art, media, and formal education that directly or indirectly legitimize

direct and structural violence, Galtung defines as cultural or symbolic violence (Galtung, 1990).

Very important elements of culture are social identities, which could also have (and they usually do)

a function of conflict and violence legitimization. For proponents of this approach, culture becomes a

frame in which people develop a sense of who they are, what activity they should take, and what are

their social goals. Subsequently, identity becomes the action unit of culture and a problem-solving

tool for coping in particular contexts (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996). For instance, it plays a

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fundamental role in social conflict, delineating ‘us’ from ‘them’ (the Other), mobilizing individuals

and collectives, providing legitimization and validation for individual and group aspirations.

Identities have a major impact on conflicts, but they are also transformed and reconstructed in a

conflict process (Cook-Huffman, 2009).

There are at least five theoretical approaches to the concept of social identity: primordialism,

instrumentalism, constructivism, institutionalism and realism (Varshney, 2007; Formozo, 2009;

Korostelina, 2009). Primordialism is the oldest tradition based on the ontological essentialism and

epistemological positivism. Primordialists insist on shared genes and ancestry, phenotypic proximity,

common language, religion, etc. Instrumentalists perceive identity as a resource of collective

mobilization and political manipulation based on the economic and political interests of elites.

Central idea of constructivists is that our social identities are product of different social actors, agents

and relations. Institutionalists claim that social identity is a consequence of political-institutional

design – proportional or majoritarian polities, federal or unitary governments, national states or state-

nations, etc. And realists use concept of security dilemma to explain logics of social identity

formation and mobilization (Formozo, 2009; Varshney, 2007). The ‘ideal’ definition would probably

be the one that combines positive sides of all, or at least most of the approaches: “Identities are

complex, historically bound, socially constructed, and thus ever moving. They may be transitory in

some cases, and rigid and inflexible in other as they are constituted in specific lived realities, bound

and shared through story, myth, history, and legend” (Cook-Huffman, 2009, p. 19).

Theorists often discern individual or personal identity from collective, communal or social

one. Former they define as individual sense of self, and latter as a consequence of prominent group

membership. This distinction is only analytical, because different identities (family, gender, nation,

religion, etc.) of the same person are empirically inseparable. It would be more correct and accurate

to perceive personal identity as totality comprised of different layers. The most important question

puzzling researchers of identity-conflict relation is how and when different identities or identity

layers become meaningful and salient (Cook-Huffman, 2009).

Identity issues usually do not cause conflicts, however different circumstances, strategies and

interests can shift conflict into ‘identity direction’. If conflicting parties induce the perception of

identity threat, then defensive or preemptive (and preventive) activities, that increase rigidity and

escalation of conflict, are possible. Also, the politics of denial and nonrecognition of a certain

identity can cause the same reactions. Different theorists disagree whether identity based categories

are negotiable or not, but some of the core elements of identity are definitely not, since no one would

voluntarily challenge foundations of its social existence. Identity can also influence conflicts when

one party is imposing ‘negative face’ onto other or endangering its autonomy. “Social

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identities…should be understood neither as sources nor as consequences of conflict, but as form of

consciousness that entirely changes the dynamic and structure of conflict. Once social identity

becomes involved in interest-based or instrumental conflict, it then changes the nature of political or

economic conflict in particular ways, making conflict protracted and deep-rooted” (Korostelina,

2009, p. 101). The most important approaches to this complex multidisciplinary topic are: ‘basic

human needs’, ‘protracted social conflict’ and ‘theories of ethnic conflict’ (Cook-Huffman, 2009).

Basic Human Needs Theory

Following the work of psychologist Abraham Maslow (1943; 1954), John Burton, a

prominent critic of the realist school of international relations during the 1970s, developed a concept

of conflict resolution based on the human needs theory. He assumed that human motivations can be

divided into three types: universal, cultural and transitory. Burton defined first category as necessary

preconditions for development of the human kind (needs), second as culturally specific attributes

(values), and third as motivations of transitory nature (interests).

“Human needs theory argues…that there are certain ontological and genetic needs that will

be pursued, and that socialization processes, if not compatible with such human needs, far from

socializing, will lead to frustrations, and to disturbed and anti-social personal and group behaviors.

Individuals cannot be socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other need goals and,

therefore, must react against social environments that do this” (Burton, 1990, p. 33). Besides the

biological or genetic needs for food or shelter, there are socially ontological, basic human needs for

identity, recognition, security and development. Frustration and denial of these needs leads to

intractable or deep-rooted conflicts.

Burton’s colleague and associate, Edward Azar is another representative of this approach. His

concept of protracted social conflict, similar to Burton’s intractable conflict, is dominantly based on

the basic needs argumentation. His classification includes security, distinctive identity, social

recognition of identity, and effective participation in the social processes dealing with security,

identity and development issues (Azar, 1985).

Johan Galtung (2004), built his transcend and transform method on this concept as well. His

main idea is to start conflict transformation (both/and approach) with determining conflicting parties’

legitimate goals, and main criteria for that should be basic human needs, i.e. survival, well-being,

freedom and identity.

A few decades after the pioneering works of Burton and Azar, identity need became a central

theorizing point and, in some respects, incorporated other needs as its aspects (Rubenstein, 2001).

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Nevertheless, this evolution did not weaken basic human needs theory. On the contrary, it enhanced

its applicability (new ‘ethnic’ conflicts and intractability of the old ones, ‘clash of civilizations’,

immigration issues, etc.).

Human needs theorists further argue that, when human needs become an issue in conflict,

traditional resolution techniques are often ineffective. Interest-based negotiation and mediation

focused on interests and distribution of resources turns out to be insufficient and even

counterproductive. Mistreatment or neglect of basic human needs can lead to increased polarization

and dehumanization, and deepening of the conflict (Azar, 1985; Burton, 1990; Cook-Huffman,

2009).

Protracted Social Conflict

Based on his research and monitoring of conflictive events for over a decade, Azar came up

with a type of seemingly irresolvable conflict, termed ‘protracted social conflict’. These conflicts are

of a prolonged nature, characterized by multi-ethnic and communal cleavages and disintegrations,

economic and technological underdevelopment, social injustice, economic disparities, and non-

integrated social and political systems. Real causes of protracted conflicts are deep-rooted, and even

those involved in this type of conflict sometimes have difficulties comprehending them. Basically, a

denial of those essentials required for development of all the people and their communities, i.e. basic

human needs (or societal needs), is causing the conflict. “Protracted social conflicts universally are

situations which arise out of attempts to combat conditions of perceived victimization stemming

from: 1. a denial of separate identity of parties involved in the political process; 2. an absence of

security of culture and valued relationships; and 3. an absence of effective political participation

through which victimization can be remedied” (Azar, 1985, p. 61). Another, very important Azar’s

notion is that self image and ‘image of self by others’ are the vital elements of identity, and therefore

they could be strong incentives for action and conflicts. Any solution not including transformation of

these root features is only temporary, and could lead to new conflict eruptions (Azar, 1985; 1990).

As another critic of state-centric ‘realist school’, Azar suggested four clusters of variables

that influence conflict longevity and violence intensity. First, he proposed that the focus for

understanding conflict dynamics should be on communal content, and identity group (religious,

ethnic, cultural, etc.) as a unit of analysis. Azar’s second variable is inter-communal dynamics,

particularly activities concentrated on the denial of human needs. His third variable is governance

and state’s role and their capacity to satisfy citizens’ societal needs. In most of the protracted conflict

cases, dominant groups (mis)use their governing positions to fulfill self-interests at the expense of

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other groups. Their elite often use tactics and strategies of exclusive identities followed by the

process of counter-identification of afflicted groups. This deforms political system and weakens its

legitimacy and capacity for basic needs fulfillment (weak, vulnerable or failed state). The fourth

variable is international linkage, or the relations of economic dependency and political-military

linkages that constitute regional and global networks of clientage and cross-border interests.

Further on, he added three more variables or determinants of social conflict: communal

action, state actions and conflict dynamics. The first one involves formation and mobilization of

identity groups, such as the emergence and character of leadership, selection of political goals,

tactics and strategies, etc. State actions include an array of different policies, ranging from political

accommodation to the domination, coercive repression and subjugation. Conflict dynamics are the

various ‘built-in mechanisms of conflict’ like polarization, dehumanization, attribution error, security

dilemma, ideational formulation of the enemy, and others (Azar, 1985; 1990; Cook-Huffman, 2009;

Ramsbotham, et al., 2011).

Finishing his research in 1985, Azar indentified more than sixty cases of protracted social

conflicts in the world. Examples he mentioned are Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia,

Cyprus, Iran, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Most of these conflicts, if not all, are still untransformed and

unresolved.

Theories of Ethnic Conflict

Very important addition to theorizing identity and conflict are the theories of ethnic conflict.

The strong point of these theories is its study of the relationship between social context and

mobilization of identity categories. However, some of the core concepts of this approach, such as

ethnic group, ethnic conflict and ethnic violence, are questioned and problematized. Its critics shifted

academic attention to broader categories of social or communal identity and its content (Cook-

Huffman, 2009).

Michael Benton argues that it is more proper to describe ‘ethnic conflicts’ as “political

conflicts with an identifiable ethnic dimension”, and Bruce Gilley adds that this concept

homogenizes rather different social and political phenomena (Guelke, 2010, p. 2). But the most

influential and quite radical critique comes from the constructivist theoretical stances. Rogers

Brubaker (2002) challenges the treatment of social groups (ethnic, national, racial, etc.) as

“substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed”, or main protagonists of social

conflict and units of social analysis. He calls this fallacy of intellectual reification – groupism.

Brubaker further argues that ethnic conflicts (suggests ethnicized or ethnically framed conflict as

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better terms) shouldn’t be understood as conflicts between the ethnic groups, but among

organizations, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs representing or claiming to represent ethnic groups. Their

goal is to socially reify those groups, to summon them and mobilize (Brubaker, 2002).

Ethnicity or ethnic groups should be conceptualized in processual, relational and dynamic

terms. Not as substantial groups, but practical categories, cognitive schemas, discursive frames or

political projects. “It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization and nationalization as political,

social, cultural and psychological processes. And it means taking as basic analytical category not the

‘group’ as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable (Brubaker, 2002,

pp. 167-168).” Degree of groupness depends on particular categories, such as myths, collective

memories and narratives, and sociopolitical settings, like institutionalization, entrenchment in

administrative routines, etc. These categories are proposed, articulated and propagated ‘from above’,

and appropriated and internalized ‘from below’. Their function is to rationalize social world of

individuals, determine their expectations about category members and direct their attitudes toward

non-members (often through stereotypes and prejudices), sharing the sense of groupness (group

potential). Groupness is usually a cause or precondition of conflict, but it can also be its

consequence. Conflicts are often accompanied by “social struggles to label, interpret and explain it”

(Brubaker, 2002, p. 147). These ‘metaconflicts’ are integral and consequential part of every ‘regular’

conflict. Coding and framing of conflictual and violent past can become quite important factors of

identity construction and groupness enhancement (Brubaker, 2002; Guelke, 2010; Varshney, 2007;

Brubaker and Laitin, 1998; Anastasiou, 2009).

The main protagonists of these grouping processes and activities are various kinds of

organizations: governments, ministries, agencies, political parties, churches, non-governmental

organizations, media organizations, armed units, paramilitary organizations, terrorist group, and

others. Using ethnic categories, they structure perception and interpretation in everyday interaction

through official classifications and organizational routines. They use identity categories “to allocate

rights, regulate actions, distribute benefits and burdens, construct category-specific institutions,

identify particular persons as bearers of categorical attributes, ‘cultivate’ populations or, at the

extreme, ‘eradicate’ unwanted ‘elements’” (Brubaker, 2002, p. 184).

Bosnian conflicts and ‘metaconflicts’

The Bosnian civil war, as a part of the wars of the Yugoslav succession, officially started on

6 April 1992 (although incidents began a few months earlier), and it was a crucial battlefield and a

key conflict for understanding of the whole process of dissolution. After the declarations of

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independence and armed interventions in Slovenia and Croatia, Parliament of Bosnia and

Herzegovina approved the Memorandum of Sovereignty (15 October 1991) despite the opposition of

Serbian members and legal disposition that all crucial decisions must be approved by the

representatives of all three constituent nations. Reaction of the Serbian representatives, voted at the

first multiparty elections in BiH (November 1990), was a formation of the Assembly of the Serb

People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a highest representative and legislative body of the Serbian

population. This Assembly held a plebiscite among the Bosnian Serbs to remain a part of

Yugoslavia, and proclaimed the Republic of Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later to

become Republika Srpska) on 9 January 1992, declaring it a part of Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. On the other side, Bosnian government and parliament, led by Muslim1 and Croatian

politicians, held a referendum for independence (64% turnout, 99% voted for), from 29 February to 1

March, and declared sovereignty of BiH three days later. The referendum was boycotted by the

Serbs, which led to further polarization and the beginning of war (Bougarel, 2004; Kasapović, 2005;

Halpern and Kajdikel, 2002; Bougarel, et al., 2007; Bose, 2007).

Three and a half years later, after four rejected peace plans (Carrington-Cutileiro’s, Vance-

Owen’s, Owen-Stoltenberg’s and Contact Group plan) and over one hundred thousand casualties

(approximately 65% of them were Muslims/Bosniaks, 25% were Serbs, and 8% were Croats), the

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. the Dayton Agreement)

was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. Agreement constituted new Bosnia and Herzegovina

(BiH) as a special-type consociational state and asymmetrical federation made up of two entities, the

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). New institutional

design inherited some elements of Bosnian constitutional and political tradition based on a long

history of regulating religious and ethnic divisions, namely communitarianism, collective rights,

ethno-political proportionality and parity and ‘national key quotas’, but also territorialized and

politically institutionalized those divisions. Primarily, that was the consequence of ethnic cleansing

during the war, which was one of the main goals of national political and military elites. That turned

Bosnia from ethnically mixed unified territory to homogenous three areas with a few enclaves

(Kasapović, 2005; Bougarel, 2004).

Brubaker is only partially right when he points out that Yugoslav wars have more to do with

“thuggery, warlordship, opportunistic looting and black market profiteering than with ethnicity”

(Brubaker, 2002, p. 176), since the identity need had a significant role in these conflicts. Concept of

1 Muslims became a constituent nationality of Yugoslavia in 1971. A new ethnonym – ‘Bosniaks’ was officially adopted by the Council of the Bosniak Intellectuals Congress in 1993. Alija Izetbegović, as a supporter of pan-‐Islamism and other Islamist ideas, originally confronted this proposal (Varshney, 2007; Bougarel, 2004).

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Yugoslavia (from 1918) was primarily an answer to the Serbian national question. For the Croats,

Slovenes and other nations, Yugoslavia was predominantly a step toward national independence and

statehood, and a relatively favorable environment for nation-building.2 At 1992, when major

European countries and the USA started recognizing independence of Yugoslav republics, answer to

the Serbian question was ‘erased’. Consequently, the war was an instrument of ‘writing’ new

answers which included ethnic homogenization and cleansing (Ringmar, 1996).

In case of Bosnia, Serbian elites’ answer was remaining a part of Yugoslavia, or BiH as union

of the national states, Muslim/Bosniak answer was independent, unitary, and Bosniak dominated

BiH, and for Croats, the answer was a secession to Croatia, or as the second (and accepted) best

option, independent federal BiH in confederation with Croatia.3 Therefore, the Dayton Agreement

was some kind of compromise of interests which facilitated peaceful relations in Bosnia, and as

Mirjana Kasapović argues, it is not itself the main cause of the political system ineffectiveness and

inefficiency. Although the ‘Dayton Bosnia’ is excessively complex and weak state, central source of

its disorganization is the lack of a minimal consensus of all three nations’ elites on the state and

political system, and its necessity and desirability (Kasapović, 2005).

It is more than obvious that Bosnian political elites are in conflict over some of the crucial

political principles, and being part of ethnopolitical system they are incorporating their perceptions

and following narratives into identities of nations they are representing or claim to represent.

Furthermore, they are intentionally presenting these quarrels as conflicts between nations, in order to

preserve their positions, satisfy their interests, delegitimize political rivals and gain broader support

at the elections. These ethnic entrepreneurs (re)construct identities making them mutually exclusive,

threatening and potentially very destructive.

Ethnicization and national identity construction is a constant trait of post-Dayton Bosnia

politics, but the groupness raising culminated during the 2012, when the Parliament of BiH adopted

the Law on Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 2013,

when the census is going to take a place. This is going to be the first population census in BiH after

22 years (since 1991), and, what is more important, it will clearly show demographic consequences

of the war and outcomes of elites’ nation construction. “When they answered the questions of

ethnicity, at the census in March 1991, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not even imagine

how that statistical data would manage their lives in the next twenty years” (Pisker, 2012). Similar to

the 1991 census, this is also an event of the utmost political importance. 2 During the period of Yugoslavia, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims articulated and developed their nationalities. 3 The Washington Agreement, signed between the leaders of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in March 1994, included the article about BiH-‐Croatia confederation, which was never implemented.

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Following Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict and Brubaker’s critiques, I will analyze

political elites’ identity related narratives, using certain categories of identification (or groupness)

and inter-communal dynamics as units of analysis. Subject of the analysis, precisely, will be four

identity categories: the state, the nation, the (Bosnian) war, and the genocide (in the BiH), in the

‘census period’. I found these categories as the key points of political dispute between elites in BiH,

especially between Bosniaks and Serbs. Croats, as the smallest constituent nation and without

autonomous entity and government, are somehow marginalized in this conflict (except the state

issue) and they will be mostly omitted from this analysis.

The State

Members of the Bosniak political elite, politicians, NGO activists, intellectuals and religious

community representatives, generally agree that the independent and sovereign Bosnian state was

their primary goal, both in war and peace; and that they were not satisfied with the Dayton

Agreement from the very beginning. Right after signing it, Alija Izetbegović, 'father of the nation'

said: “This is not a just peace, but it is more just than the continuation of war. In such a situation as it

is, and the world like this, better peace could not be achieved” (Radio Sarajevo, 21 November 2012).

The main reasons of their dissatisfaction were ‘division’ of Bosnia and ‘legalization’ of Republika

Srpska. They especially criticized RS because of its ‘genocidal nature’: “This 'republic' in question,

was created by Karadžić on a genocidal basis“ (Anadolu Agency, 8 August 2012);4 discrimination of

the non-Serbs: “Bosniak nation has survived genocide and the imposition of the Dayton Constitution,

which includes elements of apartheid and discrimination” (B92, 4 September 2012); 5 or because of

the occupation of the ‘Bosniak land’: “…the territory of RS is just an occupied zone of BiH”

(Oslobođenje, 16 July 2013).6 Some of them would like to see its end, like Sejfudin Tokić:7

“Republika Srpska should disappear due to discrimination of the non-Serbs…”; or Sefer Haliović:8

“…RS is an Orthodox Christian entity, which has Orthodoxy in its own roots. Therefore, RS is

economically, politically, military, and especially morally unsustainable and we all hope that one day

we will see its end” (B92, 14 April 2013).

4 Late A. Izetbegović, being the most influental Bosniak politician is often quoted in the media. 5 Mustafa Cerić, former leader of the Islamic Community in BiH and a President of the Bosniak World Congress. 6 Emir Suljagić, leader of the Bosniak NGO coalition '1st March' (the date of the 1991 referendum for independence). 7 President of the Bosniak Movement and a coordinator of the coalition ‘It is important to be a Bosniak’ 8 A war general and commanding officer of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and President of a minor political party, Bosnian Patriotic Party.

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Bosniak politicians often like to stress that struggle for their vision of Bosnia is not over: “We

have entered a third decade of the struggle for the survival of integral BiH, for its development, and

well-being of our people. This battle, armed and political, has been led by the same kind of people.

They defend freedom, unity, and, above all, the dignity of our people. And that struggle is not over

yet” (Nezavisne, 16 June 2013);9 and if someone tries to secede, they will confront him: “Splitting

the country definitely leads to war” (Glas Srpske, 17 August 2013).10 S. Halilović, even declared that

it is more likely that Sandžak (Muslim/Bosniak dominated part of Serbia) would become a part of

BiH, than RS a part of Serbia and added: “if Dodik and [the Serbian President] Nikolić continue with

this [pro-independent] rhetoric, let them know that they have declared war on Bosnia and let them

know they will lose that war” (Radio Sarajevo, 2 May 2013).

On the other side, Serbian elites are to some extent satisfied with the Dayton Bosnia,11 but

they advocate its further decentralization (a union of three independent states) or, preferably,

independence of the RS. There was a multitude of statements that challenged the statehood of BiH

and invoked its ending. Most of them came from the President of RS, Milorad Dodik. He stated that

BiH is not in the Serbian interest: “Serbs have never truly accepted Bosnia. BiH, after the breakup of

Yugoslavia, ceased to be a political and historical interest of the Serbian people. Bosnia has not

experienced the fate of the former Yugoslavia because there was a strong ‘international factor’ and

its wish to preserve it…” (B92, 8 January 2013); and that BiH is nothing but a great cost: “You can

now be hypocrites and say, as some foreigners do, that Bosnia has a chance. I think that…BiH stands

no chance and that we are all at a dramatic loss, and that BiH costs us a lot” (Radio Sarajevo, 20 July

2012). He also expressed his feelings toward BiH in one of the interviews: “I do not like BiH. […] I

live in Republika Srpska. […] And BiH does not cause me any other feeling than disgust” (Večernji,

17 September 2012); and on a various occasions called it a monster, rotten, virtual and a devil-state:

“This is a devil-state; there is no democracy, there is nothing” (Avaz, 26 May 2013).

In the same time Serbian politicians use every opportunity to stress the statness of Republika

Srpska, and readiness to hold the referendum as soon as the conditions allow them to. “Serbs, as a

nation, have two states, Serbia and Republika Srpska. RS has all the criteria of state, government,

9 Bakir Izetbegović, son of A. Izetbegović, member of the Presidency of BiH and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). 10 Željko Komšić, member of the Presidency of BiH and former member of the pro-‐Bosnian/pro-‐Bosniak Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP). Now leading the Democratic Front (DF). 11 Petar Kunić, President of a minor ruling party in RS (Democratic People’s Alliance): “BiH can only exist on the Dayton principles. Dayton Agreement is a guarantee of its survival and any Constitution interference could radicalize and destabilize political situation in the country”. (B92, 4 September 2012)

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territory, and people” (Oslobođenje, 15 May 2013). “We have not, even for a moment, forgotten our

referendum and it will always be an option, be sure in that” (Avaz, 8 November 2012).12

During the welcome party for Momčilo Krajišnik (one of the founders of RS convicted by the

ICTY for war crimes), Mladen Bosić, leader of the opposition in RS,13 stated that nothing can shake

the RS, neither the storms (name of the Croatian military operation against Serbs in 1995 was the

Storm), nor the NATO bombing, and that RS will surely meet its final goal (Radio Sarajevo, 30

August 2013). In his welcoming speech, Krajišnik addressed the audience in Pale (the war capital of

RS) with the following words: “You do not know what a country this is. Keep it, defend it. There is

no better in the world” (Radio Sarajevo, 30 August 2013).14

The Nation

Bosniak elites depict their nationality dually. There is a majority that perceives and constructs

nation as a fusion of the Islamic religious tradition, specific Bosniak history and Bosnian language,

and a minority that represents the idea of Bosnian nation consisted of all three religions and

ethnicities.15

First option is primarily recognized by their parole ‘Bosniak-Islam-Bosnian’. “There is only

one correct answer. Nationality – Bosniak, religion – Islam, and the language - Bosnian. These are

the only three proper, valid and authoritative answers in the terms of constitutional categories”

(Oslobođenje, 16 January 2013).16 This option is quite antagonistic toward the ‘Bosnian nationality’

and sees it as a fraud and a great threat: “Offering us Bosnian and Muslim nationalities, they are

trying to reduce us to a certain measure, which would crush our majority in Bosnia, and with it, the 12 M. Dodik. 13 President of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), founded by Radovan Karadžić. 14 Croatian elites, although supporting both sides, are closer to the Serbian positions on the issues of the state. They feel minorized in the FBiH and their key goal is a creation of the Croatian entity. Dragan Čović, President of the Croatian Democratic Community of BiH (HDZ BiH), told that territorial autonomy would be a rational solution for the Croats and a precondition for the normal functioning of BiH. In addition, he argued that “what we have now absolutely does not offer any possibility but to perceive Federation of BiH as an entity of the Bosniak nation” (Nezavisne, 26 September 2012). One year later, he proposed concrete reforms: “To the suggestion to reduce the number of cantons, we answered with a proposal to abolish the Federation. That would solve a lot of problems” (BH-‐index, 26 August 2013). M. Dodik generally supports Croatian proposals: “If a three-‐ethnic territorial structure does not prevail as a realistic solution, the agony will remain until one day we all come to conclusion that BiH no longer exists” (Hrvatska Riječ, 23 November 2012); and another evidence of their alliance is Čović’s presence at the RS National Day celebration, which he commented with the following words : “I am here at the invitation of my friend, President of RS Milorad Dodik, to be a part of this celebration” (Hrvatska riječ, 12 January 2013). 15 Damir Hadžić (Social Democratic Party of BiH), Minister of Transport and Communication of BiH and a coordinator of the 2013 census, explained his national affiliation with the following words: “…it is not a secret that I will declare myself at the next census…as a Bosnian. I am convinced that I share this primary identity with the hundreds of thousands of Bosnian citizens …” (Radio Sarajevo, 6 February 2013). 16 Mustafa Spahić, professor, imam, close associate of A. Izetbegović, and a communist dissident.

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whole BiH” (Anadolu Agency, 30 November 2012).17 As Mustafa Cerić once said, there is no

Bosnia without Bosniaks, and no Bosniaks without Bosnia (Anadolu Agency, 29 December 2012).

How do they perceive the Other is perhaps best illustrated by the B. Izetbegović's description of Emir

Kusturica (an Orthodox Serb of a Muslim Bosnian descent): “…the great director and even greater

traitor” (Glas Srpske, 16 August 2013).

Serbian identity in Bosnia is constructed on the premises of particularity of RS, integration

with Serbia (not territorial, but cultural and national) and negation of ‘Bosnia’. During the

commemoration in Donja Gradina (part of the Jasenovac concentration camp in the WWII), Dodik

declared that “we do not want to lose our identity, grieves and sufferings, and we do not want to lose

Srpska” (B92, 12 May 2013). He also expressed his unconditional devotion to Serbia: “We (RS) are

ready to do anything for Serbia… […] Serbia is our love, we dream of a strong and respected Serbia.

We live for that day” (Radio Sarajevo, 10 August 2012); and emphasized the unity of RS and Serbia:

“We are not going to NATO without Serbia, because then there would be a border on the Drina”

(Oslobođenje, 24 September 2012). Furthermore, Dodik often underlines that he is primarily a Serb,

and certainly not a Bosnian, not even as regional affiliation (B92, 13 May 2013).

It is clear that Bosniaks are not the Serbian primary Other, but Bosnia as a concept: “I do not

consider Bosniaks bad people, I have a problem with their politics of domination…and

marginalization, that want to introduce Turkey as a dominant political actor in the country, which

would determine measures and conditions of our development” (B92, 15 October 2012). “When they

bring Bosniaks to the streets of Sarajevo trying naively to transform us into citizens, instead of

members of our nation, we have to be careful and even more united” (Oslobođenje, 28 June 2013).18

Problem of the language is a good example of that. In his debate with reisu-l-ulema Kavazović,

Dodik stated: “…I would like to remind him that there is no Bosnian language, as he likes to mislead

the public. […] Bosniaks have the right to their own language, but it cannot be called Bosnian, but

Bosniak. The name of the language reflects the name of the nation” (Radio Sarajevo, 9 August

2013).

The War

The war and the genocide are maybe the most important categories of the identity conflict

between Bosniaks and Serbs. Their interpretations and narratives of these events are almost

completely opposed. 17 Husein Kavazović, current leader of the Islamic Community of BiH. 18 M. Dodik.

13

For Bosniak elites, war was a “heroic phase when we built our army, first time after 500

years” (Radio Sarajevo, 2 September 2013);19 a glorious resistance against the Serbian aggression:

“Bosniaks confronted the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina and thwarted the plans of the

Greater Serbia…” (Oslobođenje, 8 September 2012);20 and time when the chivalry of Bosniak nation

was forged: “Here in Sarajevo, there in Bihać, Mostar and on all the other bastions of our country,

the chivalry of our nation was forged. …white tombstones are exclamations of our memory to that

chivalry. The best of our sons have defended this country” (Oslobođenje, 9 August 2013).21 Unlike

Serbs, Bosniaks did not do anything wrong: “When going to negotiations to the European countries I

do not have to bow my head down, because we did not kill women, children and old people. We did

not attack anyone’s sanctuaries. However, our enemies did all that, and right before the eyes of the

entire West” (Anadolu Agency, 19 October 2012).22

On the other side, the Assembly of RS adopted an official position about the nature of war in

Bosnia in the Declaration on the causes, character and consequences of the tragic armed conflict in

BiH (1992-1995). Some of the main points are: “…in evaluating events of the previous war, there is

a lack of objective, balanced and unbiased approach on all sides in BiH and abroad, especially when

it comes to violations of the International Humanitarian Law, and the attitudes toward the causes,

character and consequences of the war. Negative qualifications of particular events have been the

basis of many forms of the Serbian nation satanization. […] …’the tragic conflict’ in BiH, based on

the scientific, expert and historical criteria and standards, had a character of the civil war, with a high

degree of the international factor involvement. […] …verdicts imposed by the International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not contribute to the reconciliation and truth about

the wars in the region. The National Assembly emphasizes that ICTY…cannot impose collective

sentences on nations, organizations or governments” (Bigportal, 19 June 2013).23

Maybe the best example of contradicting narratives is a perception of the NATO intervention

in BiH. Commenting that intervention, former prime minister and member of the Presidency of BiH,

Haris Silajdžić, said that he really enjoyed it and that Serbs deserve it. One of the Alija Izetbegović’s

associates, Mufid Memija, added: “There was a great relief and excitement. …the people of BiH

experienced NATO intervention as an act of justice. By the standards of contemporary political

19 Bakir Izetbegović. 20 Sulejman Tihić, President of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), founded by A. Izetbegović and а former member of the Presidency of BiH. 21 Husein Kavazović. 22 Alija Izetbegović. 23 Sulejman Tihić rejected the Declaration as a falsification of history: “The Declaration is groundless, discriminatory and falsifies the history of BiH from 1992 to 1995” (Radio Sarajevo, 2 July 2013).

14

culture, we cannot let the bad guys be victorious in the end, they must be punished” (Oslobođenje, 30

August 2013).

Then again, Serbian elites have a completely different opinion: “Of course we have a

problem with NATO, because NATO bombed the Serbs and Republika Srpska, dropping depleted

uranium here, which directly led to the increase of diseases, cancer and leukemia… We have the

exact data about that. We were an experimental area for NATO. NATO has chosen one side…in the

Bosnian war” (Avaz, 26 May 2013). Also, they are convinced that Muslims/Bosniaks wanted the war

and intentionally caused it: “Therefore, Alija Izetbegović is to blame for war. All of them, signed the

Cutileiro plan in 1992, but Izetbegović, returning to Sarajevo, rejected the agreement. A month later,

the war raged all over the country. […] Izetbegovic’s idea was to make BiH a unitary country, based

on the principle - one man one vote, which would mean a Bosniak dominated unitary state, and that

could not pass, nor it can” (B92, 9 April 2013).24

The Genocide

The genocide in Srebrenica was confirmed in a few verdicts of ICTY and the International

Court of Justice, and as a legal matter it is not a subject of this article. Nevertheless, its political

implications articulated through the political narratives are very important part of this prolonged

conflict. As in other cases of genocide, there is one side trying to deny it and other side trying to

make a ‘political capital’ out of it.

Building their image of the ‘only victim’, Bosniak elite is trying to equalize Srebrenica

genocide with the Holocaust: “Innocent and helpless victims were faced with the cold and merciless

hatred of criminals akin to those in the Nazi camps of Hitler’s Germany” (VOA news, 11 July

2013);25 to present it as a global symbol of evil: “Srebrenica became a synonym, not only of the

three-year conflict brutalities in the former Yugoslavia, but also a symbol of evil and injustice for the

whole humanity“ (Anadolu Agency, 2 August 2013);26 and to use it to delegitimize RS: “It is

morally unsound and politically dysfunctional that a place like Sreberenica belongs to those

responsible for the genocide. It would be the same if a museum in the former concentration camp

Auschwitz is ran by the Nazis...” (Radio Sarajevo, 29 May 2012). They often interpret it as

culmination of a century-long genocide against Bosniaks: “Over the last hundred years, from the

Balkan Wars onwards, we had hundreds of Srebrenicas. Hundreds of pits in BiH where our 24 M. Dodik. 25 Bakir Izetbegović. 26 Member of the Presidency of BiH, Zlatko Lagumdžija (President of the Social Democratic Party of BiH), and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, in their joint article in The Washington Post.

15

grandfathers, brothers, mothers, sisters, and innocent people were being killed, raped and tortured”

(Anadolu Agency, 11 July 2012);27 which is still going on: “Being Bosniak in the ‘eyes’ of Ministry

of Interior Affairs and Government of the RS seems the same as having an infectious disease”

(Oslobođenje, 4 June 2013).28 To sum up, Bosniaks perceive themselves as the “European

Palestinians” (Anadolu Agency, 17 August 2012).29

Although M. Dodik was one of the very few RS politicians that publicly recognized genocide

in Srebrenica, he changed his opinion stating that the Srebrenica genocide was politically imposed:

“I claim here that the genocide was not committed! There was no genocide! There was a plan by a

certain foreigners and Bosniak politicians to impose the guilt and responsibility upon us, for

something we did not do” (Oslobođenje, 24 September 2012). Besides denying it, he also stresses

that Serbs were actually the real victims, in the WWII: “[Bosniaks] are committing self-genocide by

constantly claiming that they are the victims. RS and Serbian people did not commit genocide in the

past, but they were the victims of genocide in Jasenovac and other places, that predecessors of

Mustafa Cerić strongly supported” (Radio Sarajevo, 2 June 2012); and again in the last war: “The

census will clearly demonstrate a schism in the Bosniak nation, because some will declare

themselves Bosniak and other Bosnian or Muslim. It will also show that there are no Serbs in

Sarajevo and that some kind of genocide happened there, since it does not involve only killing, but

also systematic displacement of population” (Radio Sarajevo, 15 July 2013).

Conclusion

Bosniak political elites never really come to terms with the Dayton solution, arguing it

legalizes Serbian aggression and genocide. Although, there are some proponents of single Bosnian

(or Bosniak) nation made of members of all three religions, Bosniak elite dominantly perceives

members of Bosniak nation as those who are religiously Muslim (alternatively atheistic) and speak

Bosnian language (not Croatian or Serbian). Former concept of the nation is completely anti-

systemic, disputed from both Croatian and Serbian elites, whereas letter concept is completely

exclusive, and, in combination with genocide and aggression narratives, inevitably determines Serbs

(and potentially Croats) as the other and potential enemies.

Serbian political elites envisage Bosnia as a union of three sovereign national entities. They

claim that Republika Srpska gained its independence and subjectivity in 1992 and that Dayton 27 Mustafa Cerić. 28 Emir Suljagić. 29 Emir Zlatar, General Secretary of the Council of the Bosniak Intellectuals Congress.

16

Agreement only verified it, so it cannot be abolished by the Agreement revision. Current political

system is the maximum of centralism they can accept, and they represent themselves as the guardians

of the Constitution. Republika Srpska is the cornerstone of their national identity construction, which

excludes anything designated as Bosnian (not Bosnian Serbs, but Serbs). Therefore the Other for

them is more Bosnia as a concept (Bosnian state, language, and potential nation), than the

neighboring nations.30

This Bosnian ‘quarrel’ meets most of the Azar’s conditions for protracted social conflict:

perceived victimization and attempts to combat it (Bosniaks as the victims of Serbian aggression and

genocide), denials of identity (negation of ‘Bosnia’ or RS), imposition of the ‘negative face’

(‘genocidal RS’), counter-identification (Serbs as non-Bosnians), absence of remedy mechanisms for

victimization, state incapable of satisfying societal needs (BiH and both entities), misuse of the

governing position (every party in the Bosnian government is following their national interests),

polarization (pro-Bosnian is in the same time anti-RS, and vice versa), dehumanization (Serbs as

Nazis, Bosnia as a monster and devil-state), security dilemma (potential secession),

institutionalization of collective memories and narratives, etc. This does not necessarily mean that

conflict will turn back to its violent phase, but it has a lot of preconditions for that. Cultural and

structural violence dominate its social and political context.

Bosnia will probably stay deeply divided society and a failed state as long as there is an

interest of international community (EU and NATO) for that. When those interests cease to exist, it

will most likely fell apart or become a confederation of three sovereign states, and that is the main

precondition for the transformation of this conflict to begin. The first scenario would probably lead

to violence.

30 Croatian political elites lead dual politics. On one side, they supported Bosnian independence and creation of Bosniak-‐Croatian entity, but on the other side they fought Bosniaks in the war and later confronted their politics of domination in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As they even held referendum in 2000 and, based on its results, proclaimed Croatian self-‐rule – the third entity, which was declared illegal by the High Representative, they are much closer to the Serbian vision of three entities. Their identity struggle is mainly directed toward Bosniaks as the Other, since they fear their supremacy. Beside the national ones, international political elites also have a significant role, since they are present in the Bosnian domestic politics, primarily through the Office of the High Representative. Their political engineering (the Bonn Powers) and promotion of ‘civil society and liberalism’ proven to be very conflict stimulating (Kasapović, 2005).

17

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