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Ethics 114 (July 2004): 790805 2004 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2004/11404-0004$10.00

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Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion*

Saul Smilansky

Bernard Williams once said that doing moral philosophy could be haz-ardous because there, presumably unlike in other areas of philosophy,

we may run the risk of misleading people on important matters.1 Thisrisk seems to be particularly present when considering the topic of ter-rorism. I would like to discuss what seems to be a most striking feature

of contemporary terrorism, a feature that, as far as I know, has not beennoted. This has implications concerning the way that we should viewterrorism (and counterterrorism) and shows the force of a number ofneglected illusions surrounding the issue of terrorism, as well as its

justification.

I. PRELIMINARIES

First I will quickly go over some definitions and clarify some of myassumptions. There is a broad sense in which terrorism can be under-stood as intentionally targeting noncombatants with lethal or severe

violence for political purposes.2 In ethical terms, this formulation seemsto capture the salient feature of the practice, the intentional targetingof noncombatants (and not in the context of crime or the like). How-

ever, I wish to focus here on terrorism in a narrower sense, as practicedby members of small or weak groups that lack the capacity to field anarmy and engage in warfare. Henceforth when I speak of terrorism Ishall refer to this narrower sense. The distinction between combatantsand noncombatants and its relation to the notion of innocence areproblematic, but to a lesser extent in the context of terrorism than in

* An earlier version of this article was read at the Terrorism and Justice conferenceat Georgia State University, Atlanta, April 2003, and I am grateful to participants for theirhelpful comments. I am also very grateful to Eyal Benvenisti, Michael Gross, Hagar Kahana-Smilansky, Iddo Landau, James Lenman, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Jeff McMahan, DanielStatman, Alex Yakobson, and Noam Zohar, as well as to anonymous referees for Ethics,for their comments on drafts of the article.

1. Bernard Williams, Morality(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 9.

2. C. A. J. Coady, Terrorism, in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker andCharlotte B. Becker, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 1697.


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that of warfare. Terrorism has typically and specifically targeted civilianswithout concern for their innocence; this is a large part of the indis-criminate murderousness and randomness that terrorizes. Similarly, ter-rorists themselves are typically not coerced conscripts or people ignorantof the nature of their commitments, of whom one can wonder whetherthey might not be significantly morally innocent.

Two dominant claims on this issue that will concern us later on are

a) The Principle of Noncombatant Immunity (PNI): it is neverpermissible to aim to kill (or severely harm) noncombatants; PNI forbidsterrorist as well as counter-terrorist activities aimed at killing (or severelyharming) noncombatants.

b) The Antioppression Exception to PNI: PNI is correct in general,

but there are exceptions when weak forces are fighting unjust oppression.In our context, the Antioppression Exception permits terrorist targetingof noncombatants if it is necessary in combating oppressive regimes. Vi-olating PNI in counter-terrorist activity is still, however, forbidden.

Some general remarks about the normative views underlying this article.Some philosophers follow PNI and categorically reject terrorism as such.Coady, for example, writes, I . . . object to the technique of terrorismas immoral wherever and whenever it is used or proposed.3 I do nothold any such unambiguous position. Following in the footsteps of pre-

vious discussions, I think that matters are more complicated and that,as we shall see, the attempt to stick the square absolutist-deontologicalpeg into the shapeless hole of terrorism cannot always be successful.4

At the same time, I recognize the moral force of the deontologicalinsistence on strict noncombatant immunity: according to this positionthe only permitted intentional targets are combatants, broadly under-stood, for it is only they who have in some sense forfeited the universalhuman right of security, by seeking to endanger others.5 In my view

3. C. A. J. Coady, The Morality of Terrorism, Philosophy60 (1985): 58; see also JeffrieG. Murphy, The Killing of the Innocent, Monist 57 (1973): 54748.

4. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978);R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, Violence, Terrorism and Justice, in Violence,Terrorism and Justice, ed. R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), pp. 117; Virginia Held, Terrorism, Rights and Political Goals,in Frey and Morris, eds., pp. 5985. To avoid misunderstanding, the type of deontological

view I refer to is that which poses absolute constraints on intentionally harming noncom-

batants. Thomas Nagel, in his influential War and Massacre, in War and Moral Respon-sibility, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-ton University Press, 1974), calls deontology absolutism, thereby capturing this feature.

5. See, e.g., Murphy, pp. 54748. This is sometimes grounded in the principle of self-defense: see, e.g., Robert K. Fullinwider, War and Innocence, in International Ethics, ed.Charles R. Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 94.


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unless there are overwhelming countervailing reasons, the strict con-straint on the intentional targeting of noncombatants should be fol-lowed. But such reasons may occasionally exist, in extreme situations.6

Moreover, as has been often pointed out, the widespread acqui-escence in the idea of nuclear deterrence makes it difficult to maintainthe absolute deontological adherence to PNI. The relationship betweenjus in bello and jus ad bellum also seems to me to be closer than PNIrequires, so that we would need to pay close attention to jus ad bellum.7

And the distinction between what is philosophically justified and whatit would be pragmatically best to do also makes its presence felt in theissue of terrorism. These and other matters will concern us in detailahead. For now all I wish to do is to note that all these complicationssuggest a multilevel pluralism (of various deontological and nondeon-

tological ethical concerns and of principled versus pragmatic consid-erations) that defies easy codification.

II. TERRORISM AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRACTICE

It seems to me that the relationship between terrorism and moral jus-tification in the world today is striking: the major instances of terrorismare not justified, while in cases where terrorism might be justified, thereis no or relatively little terrorism. In other words, in the world today wehave abundant terrorism without justification and possibly-justified ter-rorism that does not materialize! We shall take up the issue of what thismeans in Section III. Here I shall defend the claim just made. In allthree of our test cases I shall only be able to outline the factors relevant

for our issue, while the wealth of historical detail and complex nuanceslie beyond our scope.The following examples of terrorism are the most prominent ones

of the postSecond World War era: (1) the Irish Republican Army (IRA)struggle against the British and Protestants in Northern Ireland, (2) thePalestinian struggle against Israel, and (3) the Al-Qaida struggle againstthe West in general and others who refuse to recognize the exclusiveauthority of fundamentalist Islam.

A. The IRA

In order to see the hopelessness of the case for IRA terrorism, it isenough to note the following facts:

6. Such a view is sometimes called moderate deontology or threshold deontology,but this seems to me misleading. On the need for conceptual clarity here, see my CanDeontologists Be Moderate? Utilitas15 (2003): 7175.

7. For an extreme view on this, see Jeff McMahan, Innocence, Self-Defense, andKilling in War, Journal of Political Philosophy2 (1994): 193221, and his article, The Ethicsof Killing in War, in this issue.


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a) There is adjoining Northern Ireland an independent, flourishing,and democratic Irish state, namely, the Republic of Ireland. Establishedin 1921, it covers some 85 percent of the island. The Republic fully enablesthe right of the Irish nation to self-determination, to cultural and religiousdevelopment, and to unencumbered formation of identities as Irishmenand Irishwomen. Any Catholic living in Northern Ireland need only movesouth or west the distance of an hours drive, and all of the above rightsand privileges will readily be available to him or her.

b) If choosing to remain in Northern Ireland, any Catholic is acitizen of the United Kingdom, which is similarly a wealthy and dem-ocratic state and an open society. He or she will enjoy full political rightsand religious freedom as a British subject and be represented in theBritish Parliament, as well as in democratic local government within

Northern Ireland.c) Living conditions for most Catholics in Northern Ireland, while

unequal to those of most Protestants, partly due to discrimination, havethroughout the period not been terribly harsh. Discounting certain mea-sures arising from the need to deal with terrorism, there has been little

violence inflicted on the civilian population by the British authoritiesand hardly anything that can be described as tyranny or repression.

d) There is complete freedom of movement and ample possibilityfor cultural interaction with the Republic of Ireland for any Catholicchoosing to remain in Northern Ireland.

Irish Catholics have a strong historical case for resentment against theEnglish. Under contemporary conditions, however, the Catholics of

Northern Ireland are arguably among the few percentiles of the worldspopulation who are the most fortunate, in most respects that matterpolitical, cultural, economic, and religious. The case for armed struggle,let alone for continuous terrorism, is very weak. There is, in terms of

just war theory, no just cause. Unless one implausibly makes almost everygrievance or interest justification for terrorism, the IRAs terrorist cam-paigns have no ethical justification. (Unionist terrorism in NorthernIreland can similarly be shown to be unjustified. Even immediate uni-fication of the whole of Ireland could not justify terrorism by Protestants,for reasons parallel to the above.)

B. The Palestinians

In the case of Palestinian terrorism the major factors that make for the

absence of justification are the clear existence of alternatives to terrorismand the fact that the condition of the Palestinians has largely followedfrom their own choices. Consider the following:

a) Israel was established in 1948 following a decision in 1947 by alarge majority in the United Nations to partition what remained of the


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British mandate over Palestine (the part west of the River Jordan) intotwo independent states, a Jewish State and an Arab State (Resolution181). The Jewish leadership accepted the decision. The official lead-ership of the Palestinian Arabs rejected the very idea of an independentstate for the Jews as well as the compromise partition plan, and thePalestinians began fighting; this included a terrorist campaign, com-bined with the invasion of the military forces of five Arab armies. Hence,already in 1948 the Palestinians could have had an independent statealongside Israel.

b) Between 1948 and 1967 the Palestinians could have called forand attempted to establish an independent Palestinian state in the WestBank and East Jerusalem (captured by Jordan in the 1948 war) and inthe Gaza Strip (captured by Egypt in the 1948 war), both areas intended

to be within the Palestinian-Arab state according to the partition plan.The Palestinians made no such attempt, aiming their political efforts,coupled by continuous terrorist incursions, at Israel. Cross-border ter-rorism was led in the pre-1967 period by the mainstream PalestinianFatah movement, headed (since 1964) by Yasser Arafat, with the avowedintention of provoking a war between Israel and the Arab states.

c) The uncompromising Palestinian denial of Israels right to existcontinued after the Six Day War in 1967, in which Israel captured the

West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, until the late 1980s andthe signing of the Oslo peace accords in 1993. Indiscriminate terrorismaimed at targets such as airplanes, synagogues, schools, and supermar-kets was continuous.

d) It seems that once these territories were in Israeli hands, Israelbecame a classic target for nonviolent resistance, as practiced by Gandhiin India. The fact that Israel is a democracy, the moral traditions andsensibilities of Jews who were continuously persecuted when themselvesnonviolent, and Israels dependence on and support from similarly openand principled societies all could have made such a nonterrorist cam-paign (if aimed at the establishment of a Palestinian state alongsideIsrael and not instead of it) particularly successful.8 But the oppositecourse has been repeatedly taken.

e) In 1978 Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt. In that treatyIsrael recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; one ofthe provisions of that treaty was the establishment of Palestinian fullautonomy in the territories, followed by negotiations toward a per-

manent settlement. That plan could also have led to the establishmentof a Palestinian state. The Palestinians refused to join the talks wheninvited by the Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and rejected that plan.

f) In 1993 Israel, led by Yitzhak Rabin, and the Palestinians, led

8. This was suggested to me by Jeff McMahan.


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by Arafat, signed the Oslo agreement. This arranged for the gradualwithdrawal of Israel from territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,in return for the commitment by the Palestinian authority (which wasstrengthened and well-armed following the agreement) to recognizeIsraels right to exist, cease terrorism, and combat terrorism by otherPalestinian groups that continued to call for its annihilation. This con-ditional land for peace agreement was soon broken: devastating ter-rorist attacks within Israeli cities occurred, often launched from Pales-tinian controlled territory, with the Palestinian Authority doing very littleto stop them. This campaign resulted in the defeat of Rabins successor,the Israeli Labor Premier Shimon Peres, in the 1996 elections, to theLikud candidate Benjamin Netanyahu, who, although continuing to givesome further territory to the Palestinians, did not implement the Oslo

accords in good faith. By then the Palestinians had some control ofaround 40 percent of the territories, including the major Palestinianpopulation centers. The Palestinian state-on-the-way was once again de-railed by Palestinian terrorism.

g) In 1999, a Labor candidate, Ehud Barak, was again elected primeminister. Barak, in the Camp David negotiations (summer 2000) andin the following months at the Egyptian city of Taba (partly even after

violence had begun), made the Palestinians dramatic offers: accountsof the details vary somewhat, but in Camp David the offers includedthe Gaza Strip, 90 percent of the West Bank, and a capital in East

Jerusalem, with most Israeli settlements to be dismantled. The Palesti-nians rejected the offers, made no counteroffer, and resorted to vio-lence. In Taba, the offers included around 97 percent of the West Bank,and Barak offered even to hand over to the Palestinians some pre-1967areas from within Israel itself (making it overall a roughly 100% deal).Palestinian independence and the end to Israeli control seemed im-minent. However, like deja vu all over again, the Palestinians rejectedthese offers as well as Clintons bridging proposals, and they resortedto violence and armed struggle from the beginning, and shortly after-

wardto systematic terrorism and suicide bombings. It is important tonote the central role played in the terrorist campaign by the Palestinianmainstream led by Arafats Fatah movement, and not only by radicalIslamic groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The view that the Pales-tinians only want a state of their own alongside Israel and, if that isgranted, that they would truly recognize Israel and let it be (rather than

use any territory that would be conceded as a springboard for seekingto destroy it) was perceived to have been discredited once again. TheIsraeli public in a political backlash elected Ariel Sharon. He has publiclysupported the idea of a Palestinian state once terrorism ceases, althoughit is not clear what his intentions are.

None of this is to deny that certain Israeli actions have been morally


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unacceptable and that some Palestinian resentment has justification. Nodoubt, as in the case of Northern Ireland, the narrative is more complexand might be interpreted in somewhat different ways at various points.But our question is specific: whether terrorism has been justified. And inthis case as well, the negative conclusion is clear: the Palestinians haverepeatedly had peaceful opportunities for gaining a state of their ownand, tragically, have opted instead for terrorism. For this there is no ethical

justification. In terms of just war theory, the just Palestinian aim of es-tablishing a state of their own alongside Israel did not require terrorism:the necessity condition was not met. Historical circumstances havechanged over the years, but the Palestinians have always seemed to preferthe hopes of annihilating Israel in concert with Arab states, or the romance

of violent struggle, to constructive accommodation. Rather than terrorismbeing required in order to establish a Palestinian state, it is on the contrarythe Palestinians that have repeatedly sabotaged the establishment of anindependent Palestine alongside Israel, both directly, and indirectlythrough the influence of their choices and actions on the Israeli demo-cratic process. (Instances of terrorism by Jews since the establishment ofIsrael also lack any credible moral justification.)

C. Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida seems to have developed after the success of the fight againstthe Soviet occupation of Afghanistan into a network seeking to establishfundamentalist Islamic hegemony, a self-declared Universal Jihad. Al-

Qaida has targeted Western states and westerners in general, Russians,Jews, nonsympathetic Islamic regimes and targets within Muslim coun-tries, and other areas where Muslims may gain power (such as the Phil-ippines). The ideology of this group is radical: it is antidemocratic andtotalitarian, utopian, opposes universal human rights and the emanci-pation of women, anti-Western and anti-Semitic, and in favor of a con-tinuous violent struggle toward the establishment of universal funda-mentalist Muslim rule.

I trust that little needs to be said on why there is nothing here thatcan morally justify the most violent terrorist operations staged by Al-Qaida, which purposefully and typically discount noncombat immunityand moral innocence. Primarily, there is, in terms of just war theory,simply no just cause. There are twenty-two independent countries thatare members in the Arab league and dozens of explicitly Islamic coun-tries (the exact number depends on how those are defined). There isample potential for Islamic self-expression, the development of Muslimculture, and the practice of Islam, the religion of over one billion people.There are many problems within Muslim societies, as well as vast wealth


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derived from oil that could help deal with them, but nothing here canjustify a terror campaign.9

D. Where Might Terrorism Be Justifiable?

We have seen, then, that the most concerted terrorist efforts since theSecond World War, those of the IRA, the Palestinians, and Al-Qaida,seem to lie very low in any plausible scheme of moral justification. Thisevaluation is not dependent on a subtle balancing of considerations butis apparent to any sensible informed analysis.

What about the other side of the equation? Here, since we arethinking hypothetically, it is much harder to judge, and, in any case,one must be very careful when suggesting that terrorist activity thatmight have been justified did not materialize. Making a convincing case

here would also require a very detailed description of the situations.However, I do not think that as philosophers we can hide from ourselvesthat such cases can probably be made.

One situation where terrorism might be justified lies in situationswhere there is clear danger to a groups very existence or the mass ex-termination of noncombatants. There have been a number of almostgenocidal situations in the postWorld War II period we are consideringBiafra, Cambodia, Rwanda, Sudan, and East Timor. It is not clear whetherterrorism would have been effective in stopping the horrors in those cases,

9. It might be thought that by limiting my discussion to postWorld War II events Ihave avoided the pertinent grievances that might justify terrorism. Since I think that theintentional targeting of noncombatants is morally so bad, very strong justification is re-

quired to overcome the constraint against it. It is hard to see why old historical grievanceslying generations away, even if substantial, can justify killing noncombatants in the present.To do so would open the door to virtually unlimited worldwide violence, for historicallynearly every national territorial holding has been acquired unjustly (and imagine, e.g.,any effort to address slavery, colonialism, or the Holocaust through terrorism!). This hasinteresting implications that limit the role of considerations of justice within moral jus-tification, but this matter cannot be pursued here. In any case, I do not see that in ourthree cases the grievances are now morally salient, although a footnote is not the placefor a thorough defense of this claim. The Protestants have been in Northern Ireland forhundreds of years, and one cannot seriously think of current Protestants as invaders orupstarts. Jews have been in what the Romans (seeking to eliminate Jewish national identity)called Palestine for longer, of course, and even before the modern Zionist movement ofthe 1870s had a significant presence there (there was a Jewish majority in Jerusalem, e.g.).The return of Jews to their ancient homeland was a way of reestablishing political andcultural self-determination, as other peoples had,with thehopes forsecurityin a dangerous

world. Zionist immigration was nonviolent and made into a politically undefined place(at the beginning of the process the local Arabs saw themselves as part of the larger Arabentity, and Palestinian national identity itself developed as a response to the Jewish im-migration, which of course does not imply that it is not now morally legitimate or im-portant). I cannot begin to imagine how a serious argument for historical justification ofterrorism is supposed to work with Al-Qaida; judging from the rhetoric perhaps the Cru-saders are the main culprits.


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or that there were not other untried means for doing so, but, if such acase for unique effectiveness could have been made, perhaps in thosecases it might have been, overall, justified.

Another possible area we might examine is that of limited terroristactions aimed at galvanizing public attention to the plight of poor peo-ple in the Third World. With millions in Africa starving, with furthermillions dying because they cannot afford to buy inexpensive and readilyavailable medication, and so on, a consequentialist perspective, at least,certainly justifies great moral outrage. It might be argued that terrorismis unlikely to have a successful coercive effect here. However, if selective,limited, and symbolic, it could certainly raise the issues to the headlines.

Whether there are other as yet untried alternatives, and whether ter-rorism can be a positive influence here overall, are questions that, again,

would require detailed investigation. But for our purposes it sufficesthat we pay attention to the interesting fact that no serious attempts ofthis kindwhether justified or nothave occurred. Terrorism has con-tinuously rocked the world, but such moral and idealistic aims have notbeen its targets.

Third, there is the issue of limited and narrowly focused terrorismaimed at toppling dictatorial regimes and establishing democracy. ManyThird World regimes (or indeed Second World ones, until the fall ofcommunism) are not only undemocratic but also severely oppressive.In many countries there is no likely possibility of improvement unlesspresent rulers are toppled. It could be argued that such regimes wouldnot care about even a great deal of harm inflicted on their civilianpopulation; hence, terrorism would not be effective. However, the re-gimes control over power might weaken, and selective terrorism mightat least be a means of communication, rallying opposition forces insocial orders where other forms of communications are tightly con-trolled. Other means of reform are perhaps not available, while limitedterrorism focused on discrediting the regime or on influencing or harm-ing the often-narrow elite might work. Again, great care must be takenhere, and the possibility of making a proterrorism case should be viewedskeptically. The surprising fact, however, is, once again, how relativelyuncommon terrorism has been in such contexts. The typical targets ofterrorism in the narrow sense have been liberal democratic societies:consider which airlines have been hijacked, for instance. Terrorism hasusually not targeted the worst but rather the best type of regimes in the

world. These are doubtless easier targets, but not morally fitting ones.III. ILLUSIONS

I have argued, in a nutshell, that by and large where there has beenterrorism it has not been justified, and where it perhaps could havebeen justified, it has not occurred. What follows from this?


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A. The Impotence of Justification

One would have thought that there would be some significant positivecorrelation between the practice of terrorism and moral justification.But not only is there no direct positive correlation, the two go in oppositedirections. It might be argued that terrorists and those assisting themcannot be expected to follow intricate discussions of analytic philosophy.But that was not the expectation: there is, after all, political leadership,public discussion, media coverage, academic research, and individualmoral reflection that might have been thought to have some positiveeffect, to help get things right. The continuous nature of terrorism aspracticed in all these cases also precludes the thought that what we havehere are some simple errors of calculation (e.g., the thought that limited

acts of terrorism will ensure quick success) or some spontaneous re-action. Rather, long-term, well-developed, and seemingly self-sufficientbloody cultures of terrorism are involved.

Our result implies that the world is curiously disjointed. Perhapsthere are situations where terrorism has been contemplated but notpursued as a result of good moral reasoning. Still, in a striking way therole of adequate moral reflection is shown in its emptinessboth whenthe efforts at justification ought to yield negative results and when theyought perhaps to yield positive ones. Within the societies and culturesthat have generated terrorism, or support it, moral deliberation on ourtopic has failed to be effective. The thought that terrorism can be ad-equately guided by processes of justification is an illusion.

What, then, is going on? I think that an alternative justificationbypassing explanation of the different situations can be provided, butdoing this in detail is of course beyond our scope. Terrorism exists inour three major examples for historical, sociological, cultural, and psy-chological reasons. It is not by chance that, in all three cases, religionplays a large role. The nationalistic and religious hatred lying behindIRA, Palestinian, and Al-Qaida terrorism goes a long way toward ex-plaining it. It is not so much substantive moral concernswith massivedanger to life, collective self-determination, personal freedom, basiccultural and religious rights, lack of alternatives, or the likethat liebehind these instances of terrorism, but the ghosts of history, the depthsof ill will, and the temptations of power. Fanatical religious and nation-alistic pride and intolerance, the psychological attractions of being avictim rather than assuming responsibility for ones difficulties, anuncritical culture of resentment and envy, romantic idealizations ofstruggle and violence, open hatred of the other for its otherness, irra-tional myths, the self-destructive desire for mastery, and other such be-liefs and passions seem to lie behind contemporary terrorism.


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B. Being Careful

The general project of moral justification makes certain demands: forinstance, that the existence of real needs and just aims be established,that severe violence should be used only as a last resort, that reasonableproportionality be maintained, and that standards of universalizationcan be applied to the would-be justification.

What does the considerable impotence of this project in the presentcontext imply about what we should do? At the very least, it seems tome to suggest that we take great care with this issue. For those deon-tologists who would condemn every instance of terrorism as such, mat-ters are simpler. But even without dismissing the possibility that terror-ism can be justified, we have nevertheless concluded that, in the major

examples of its prevalence, terrorism has been unjustified. This conclu-sion should lead us to be very skeptical about the idea of permittingterrorism. It might be countered that the absence of actualization ofthose examples where terrorism might be justified should lead us, bythe same token, to be more daring in allowing it. But I do not thinkthat matters are symmetrical here. Our conclusion, in brief, is that theconnection between justification and actualization is severed: undersuch conditions, engaging with the issues in the hope of fine tuningthe permission of terrorist activity is far too risky. We should err on theside of not allowing terrorism.

In a still deeper way, we need to confront the fundamental powerof illusory forces. In the past, illusory ideas of superiority and fanatical

hunger for power coupled with fantasies of world mastery, such as thoseof the Nazis, overtook whole nations. The record of modern terrorismshows some of those elemental illusory forces at play and, in any case,exhibits a similar gross blindness to, or disdain of, acceptable standardsof moral justification. There is a grand struggle between moral justifi-cation and the temptations of terrorism, and at least where terrorismhas occurred, so far moral justification has seemed to have but littleeffectiveness. This applies both at the grassroots level and with the re-spective elites. All of this does not mean that we should give up theeffort at clarifying standards of moral justification or give up the idealsof public enlightenment. We should, nevertheless, know where we arerather than fool ourselves.

C. Absolutist PNI as a Positive Illusion

Under such conditions, the Principle of Noncombatant Immunity, orPNI, has a lot to be said for it pragmatically; PNI might be socially usefuleven though philosophically it is unpersuasively strict. Perhaps, in its


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insistence on absolute constraints, in its taboo on intentionally targetingnoncombatants, it is, by and large, a positive illusion.10

A pertinent factor here follows from the general features of combat.Because of its lethal nature, the psychological tendency of situations ofcombat to lead to strong feelings of hatred and revenge seeking, andbecause of the temptations in situations where normal restraints against

violence are left behind, absolute prohibitions are perhaps pragmaticallynecessary in order to achieve actual restraint. While with many mattersethical sensitivity can be problematic, in the case of warfare the dangerstypically lie on the other side.11 Concerning the intentional targetingof noncombatants, and perhaps a number of other temptations ofcombat, it is better that people believe in absolute constraints and notmake exceptions. It is far from obvious, in other words, that the phil-

osophical-ethical complexity should be applied in practice, say, in theminds of soldiers and their commanders. Such a widening gap betweentheory and practice is, however, problematic in itself.12

The absolutist line concerning noncombatant immunity has be-come dominant in Western public debate and in the laws concerningthe conduct of warfare. This has had a large emotional influence, whichgoes much beyond any possible force that a merely conventional un-derstanding of the constraints might elicit. Noncombatant immunity isenshrined in international law and, with the exception of nuclear de-terrence, is widely respected, at least by First World countries. It has acivilizing influence that, other things staying constant, may be extended.

Among the things that may not stay constant is terrorism, particularly

as it receives support from established states and seeks to acquire non-conventional weaponry.

D. The Dangerous Illusion of the Antioppression Exception

The Antioppression Exception to PNI, the modified version of PNI thatallows the targeting of noncombatants by weak groups in the struggleagainst oppression, is a clear casualty of our discussion. All three of ourmajor examples of terrorism are frequently assumed to be permittedby the Antioppression Exception. If there is no justification for terrorismin these cases, then our confidence in following this common lenient

viewpoint should fade.Moreover, if indeed the strict adherence to PNI is pragmatically so

10. On this notion, see Saul Smilansky, Free Will and Illusion(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000), chap. 7. The usefulness of a positive illusion typically depends on its notbeing recognized as such.

11. See Saul Smilansky, The Ethical Dangers of Ethical Sensitivity, Journal of AppliedPhilosophy13 (1996): 1320.

12. See Smilansky, Free Will and Illusion, chap. 11.


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important, we see how dangerous the Antioppression Exception is torespect for PNI. The more antioppression by the weak is tolerated asa justification for terrorism, the more does the one-sided constraint putupon any counter-terrorist transgressions of PNI seem unreasonable,adding pressure toward the abandonment of such counter-terrorist con-straint. Consider the following: Purity of Arms:The IDF servicemen and

women will use their weapons and force only for the purpose of theirmission, only to the necessary extent and will maintain their humanityeven during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and forceto harm human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and willdo all in their power to avoid causing harm to their lives, bodies, dignityand property (my emphasis).13 Such limits follow from relevant partsof international law, which clearly incorporate deontological constraints

upon combat: The civilian population as such, as well as individualcivilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violencethe primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilianpopulation are prohibited.14 Potentially useful ideas such as the fol-lowing are all forbidden by PNI:

a) Threatening to kill noncombatants that terrorists care about inorder to deter the terrorists.

b) Intentionally killing noncombatants as a means to hinder ter-rorist activity.

c) Indifference to noncombatant casualties during counter-terroristactivity.

d) The idea that some terrorists or their leaders are beyond moral

conversational reach, and hence everything may be doneincludingtargeting noncombatantsin order to suppress them.

Now, recall the thoughts of David Hume: And thus justice establishesitself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest,supposd to be common to all, and where every single act is performdin expectation that others are to perform the like. Without such a con-

vention, no one woud ever have dreamd, that there was such a virtueas justice, or have been inducd to conform his actions to it. . . . Tisonly upon the supposition, that others are to imitate my example, that

13. This quotation is from The Spirit of the IDF (the revised ethical code of theIsraeli army; Israeli Defense Force official publication, accepted September2001), available

at the Israeli Defense Forcess official Web site, Doctrine of Ethics, http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?slpen&idp23.14. The quotation is from the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention, Article 13.2.

See Protocols additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating tothe Protection of Victims of Non-international ArmedConflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977,available at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Web site, http://

www.unchr.ch/html/menu3/b/94.htm.


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I can be inducd to embrace that virtue.15

This may well seem tooextreme to many, and I would certainly put independent moral weighton PNI and think that views such as Humes should be resisted. However,

when for terrorists the indiscriminate murder of innocent civilians isthe declared epitome of operational success, the idea that PNI is to bea strict constraint on self-defense from terrorism, with harmful opera-tional repercussions, becomes psychologically problematic, more diffi-cult to maintain in practice, and dubious at least in consequentialistand contractual ways. Even if PNI is maintained, and even if any acci-dental noncombatant enemy casualties are perceived as an operationalfailure by forces combating terrorism, concern for them, at least whenthey occur in the form of collateral damage, would tend to diminish.

And when terrorism becomes overwhelming, more direct reciprocal

approaches that are ready to dismiss PNI in return for effectiveness canbe expected. Moreover, as the experience in Northern Ireland attests,such anti-PNI escalation can itself take the form of terrorism, with bothCatholic and Protestant sides engaging in it. By contrast, a firm insis-tence on PNI can limit divergence from PNI in counter-terrorism andmutual terrorism.

Why can the Antioppression Exception be thought to be attractiveas compared to strict PNI? The reason cannot simply lie with the moral

weight of oppression, for oppression is not the only, nor is it the worse,form of badness that may need to be struggled against. So what linecan the proponents of the Antioppression Exception take, given thatthey want to maintain the permission to transgress PNI as an exceptionavailable only for the weak? Perhaps the most plausible argument, fromfairness or mutuality, might go like this: You defenders of strict PNIare actually defending the strong against the weak, which is not fair.The forces of oppression, of course, wish to limit struggle to armies orcombatants, because that is where they are strong and we, the opponentsof oppression, are weak. Well, we are readygive us an equal share of

your tanks, missiles, and warplanes, and we will fight only combatantsand forgo terrorism. Until you do so, however, the only way we candefend ourselves and combat oppression is by attacking the oppressorsat their weak point, namely, by targeting their noncombatants. Now,one may or may not find this persuasive as a basis for permissible ter-rorism, but, if one does find it persuasive, I do not think that the break

with PNI can be contained. On the contrary, if we leave PNI behind,

there is no reason why counter-terrorist activities oblivious to PNI couldnot be defended. If the terrorists are killing noncombatants, counter-terrorist activities can bring forth similar claims for necessity, because

15. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), p.498.


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they may argue that they are confronted by a mirror image of thelimitations that the terrorists fighting oppression confront. Those fight-ing terrorism can just as well say that they would be happy not to haveto fight terrorism by targeting noncombatants but cannot afford suchluxury because terrorists are elusively blending into their noncombatantenvironment, and only by targeting noncombatants is the justified strug-gle against terrorism possible. They would be quite ready to forgo theunfortunate killing of noncombatants, if the terrorists would only stophiding and come out in the open.

Of course this leaves open the substantive question whether theaim is justified, as well as whether other conditions such as proportion-ality are being met. But this equally can be asked of the proponents ofthe Antioppression Exception in specific cases. The general question is

simply whether the pursuit of just aims may proceed at the expense ofPNI. There is nothing unique in the struggle against oppression byterrorists representing weak groups that can justify the principled break

with PNI through terrorism but can still stop in principle similar jus-tifications for counter-terrorism. Such a gross Asymmetry Claim needsfirm justification, but one cannot imagine what that might be. My claimis not that a breach of PNI can be justified in the very same case bothon the side of terrorism and of counter-terrorism. Rather, it is that if itis just or otherwise morally justified to breach noncombatant immunityon the side of terrorism, it is likely to be sometimes so on the side ofcounter-terrorism. It is an illusion that you can do morally nasty thingsin the name of, say, national liberation, but symmetrical justificationscould not be found for counter-terrorist breaches of PNI. Wherever wedraw the line, it cannot reasonably apply only to one side.

It might be argued that the disappearance of the AntioppressionException could have harmful consequences, emboldening the op-pressors who would know that terrorist resistance would not be thoughtlegitimate. This does not take into account the widespread use thatoppressors currently make of the claim that repression is necessary be-cause of the threat of terrorism, a claim which would also be set back.But, in any case, matters are symmetrical here as well: it might similarlybe argued that ruthless non-PNI counter-terrorism has a useful deterrenteffect against terrorists, who would otherwise be able to count on thefact that, whatever they do, those fighting against them were limited byPNI!

In fact one of the particularly nasty features of terrorism is its par-asitic nature: as in our three test cases, the terrorist infringement ofPNI occurs just because the terrorists know that they can rely on theirenemies not to react in a similar, ruthless manner. Sometimes terrorismaims to provoke reaction, but its perpetrators also know that such re-action is typically constrained by PNI and other limitations. This is one


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of the reasons why contemporary terrorism has typically targeted West-ern democracies, exploiting the principled respect for PNI.

As I have claimed, a number of different illusions (sometimes con-flicting, and held by different groups) seem to be present in the contextof terrorism and justification:

a) The illusion of the efficacy of justification: that processes ofcredible ethical reflection and justification can be relied upon in gen-erating what actually happens.

b) The illusion that the major instances of modern terrorism havea significant justification.

c) The overwhelming spread and force, in our context, of illu-sionsnationalistic, religious, ethnic, and culturalirrational forces

carrying great emotional weight with millions of people and leading toterrorism and the support of terrorism.d) The arguably positive illusory belief, encouraged by the inter-

national laws of warfare, that terrorism is never justified, as embeddedin something such as the absolutist constraints of PNI.

e) The illusion that we might and should permit this line to becrossed, but only in the fight by the weak against oppression (the Anti-oppression Exception).

The widespread impotence of the project of public moral justificationand the prevalence of illusion, in the context of terrorism, merit furthercritical examination. What seems already clear is that these two factorsshould make us, as human beings, considerably more apprehensive, andas intellectuals, more humble.

terrorism justification and illusion

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