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Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches • Military Option • Economic Sanctions • Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserve

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Page 2: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

“Hardening” Likely Targets

A passive form of deterrence involves hardening likely targets.

Such targets include Political Targets, Economic Targets, Ecological Targets, and Educational Targets.

Page 3: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Political Targets1. The President2. The Vice President3. The First Lady4. Mrs. Vice President5. The President's Family6. The Vice President's Family7. Ex-Presidents8. An Ex-President's Family9. U.S. Embassies10. U.S. Consulates11. Foreign Embassies in U.S.12. Governors of Key States13. The Statue of Liberty14. Political Conventions15. The White House16. The U.S. Congress17. Air Force One18. The Lincoln Memorial19. Camp David20. The Smithsonian Institute21. The Washington Monument

Page 4: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Economic Targets1. Oil Pipelines2. Banks3. Financial Institutions4. Oil Tankers5. Oil Companies6. Auto Manufacturers7. Fort Knox8. The Wheat Belt9. Important Bridges10. New York Harbor11. The Lincoln Tunnel12. The Holland Tunnel13. Postal Services14. Empire State Building15. Wall Street16. NY Stock Exchange17. Electrical Power Grids18. Coal Power Plants19. Nuclear Power Plants20. Chemical Companies21. FED Chairman

Page 5: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Ecological Targets

1. America's Farm Belt (Food Supply)2. National Forests3. U.S. Cattle Herds4. National Parks5. Hoover Dam6. Other Dams

Page 6: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Educational Targets

1. Universities2. Private Schools3. Summer Camps4. School Buses5. Ivy League Schools6. Schools that Politicians attended

Page 7: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Terrorist Targeting Formulas

When selecting a target, terrorists usually seek out the one that is: (a) most high up in vital importance to their enemy; (b) softest in terms of being unprotected; and (c) most significant or symbolic to their cause. 

A series of attacks on the nation's landmarks, for example, would NOT be the typical pattern of a relatively small, emerging terrorist group. 

That kind of totally symbolic strategy would most likely be followed by a terrorist group that has already attacked other targets, and is using the landmarks as a way to "finish up" their work. 

Page 8: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Terrorist Political & Economic Targeting

A group with an ecological target would also be typically one that has already attacked in another way, the purpose here being to demoralize or weaken their enemy, but like groups with an educational target (like an all-white school that rich kids attend), there might be some unusual race-based or nation-based hatred involved. 

Therefore, the main targets are going to be POLITICAL and ECONOMIC, especially as the two of these (and others) might overlap. 

For example, the terrorists can be expected to do their homework, and they will find out which companies, corporations, causes, and schools that the political leaders worked for, are involved in, or attended.  These kind of calculations will ultimately determine targeting.

Page 9: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Targeting Transportation & Tourism

Many homeland security precautions, however, are directed toward hardening what might be called transportation, transit, or tourist targets. 

These are almost always insecure, if not "soft" targets, and usage of them by terrorists may be more a matter of convenience than calculation. 

Their only value is the shock or fear effect produced, but governments must and will go to great lengths to show they are protecting their innocent citizens. 

Page 10: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Tourist Targets1. Museums2. Theme Parks3. Shopping Centers4. Railway Stations5. Subway Stations6. Airports7. Ferries8. Opera Theatres9. Musical Events10. Expensive Restaurants11. Expensive Hotels12. New Years Eve Events13. Cruise Ships14. Ski Resorts15. Golf Resorts16. Casinos17. Athletic Events18. Hollywood Events

Page 11: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Tourism TacticsWith this last group of targets, there is the distinct possibility that a

terrorist attack will not be recognized as an attack when it comes, and by that, is meant that some kind of "silent" WMD might be used, for example, a germ warfare agent or a slow radiological leak of some kind. 

While there is no substitute for the value of news coverage that will be obtained by bombing a tourist target, such "flashy" tactics by the terrorists will make for little difference whether the target is big or small. 

In other words, a small shopping center in the heartland makes for as good a tourist bombing target as a large shopping center in a major city. 

What the major tourist targets need are monitoring devices for a WMD attack, not the usual additional bomb-sniffing patrols.            

Page 12: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Overview of Military and Economic Options

Military and economic counterterrorism is successful largely for symbolic reasons. 

• It makes us feel good to drop bombs on an enemy and to think we are siphoning off their money. 

• This is known as the “catharsis effect” of counterterrorism, and there are some experts who argue that sometimes that is the best policy. 

• The truth, however, is that more innocent people than intended targets usually suffer under these options. 

• Bombs often go awry, causing "collateral damage," and it is well-known that economic sanctions rarely cause the sanctioned regime to suffer -- it is their people who suffer. 

Page 13: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Evaluation of Military and Economic Options

At best, these options produce destabilization in regions where terrorism thrives.

Also, since both military and economic options are so closely tied to foreign policy, we will continue to discuss that, with an overview of national security strategy in the context of international relations.

Page 14: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

BALANCE OF POWER“Balance of Power” theory is the idea of an

interlocking, equilibrium-based system of international order.

Each nation would keep an eye on every other nation, and when one nation showed signs of misconduct (starting a war or expanding its colonies), the other nations would shift their alliances, the weak against the strong, to restore the status quo distribution of power.

It suggests an equilibrium approach to keeping peace. However, it ignores the influence of ideology, values, past grievances, and other psychological factors that would obstruct a shift of alliances.

Nixon’s overtures to China in 1972 is an example: it set up the US as a balancing influence against China and the Soviet Union. The separate branches of the US government is another example.

Page 15: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Can Alliances Shift for Greater Good of Peace?

It had always been the case throughout history that alliances and treaties were formed on the basis that one's ally is who they fear less against the power they fear more (i.e., the law of survival).

But it had never been the case, until the balance of power idea came along, that the enemy of today would become the ally of tomorrow. 

Page 16: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Maintaining the Balance

There still were limited wars among the nations that applied the balance-of-power principle -- to force aggressors afterwards to the bargaining table and/or to restore balance by forcing a retreat. 

State Departments and Foreign Ministries were dedicated to keeping their nations from “rocking the boat.”

It also meant opposing a traditional ally, or supporting a traditional enemy.

Page 17: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

The Military Option is not always necessary to maintain balance

Balance of power could be maintained by redistributing economic wealth, commercial channels, monopolies on technology, or other resources. 

Balance of Power was a generally peaceful system for preventing global domination by any one power.

But it all fell apart with World War I, but then was resurrected after World War II (that version of it is known as detente, with only two superpowers, Russia and the U.S., left to maintain the equilibrium).

However, the US and Russia would form permanent alliances with nations that shared their respective ideology and values. Shifting of support was not based on imbalance, but on ideology and values (and economic advantage).

Page 18: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

The Cold War Version

The Cold War (the rivalry without military aggression) between the US and the USSR led both sides to support dictators and oppressive regimes so long as the dictator opposed the other side.

In other words, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

It meant that sometimes the US would support the “baddies” and oppose the “goodies.”

An example is when the US supported Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the early 1980s against Iran. The latter was the greater threat to the US and Iraq was the only game in town to “check” Iran (without the US doing the invading).

Page 19: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Post WWII (Post 1945)

Moving now to 1945, with the end of World War II and the birth of the United Nations, we see another type of strategy developing - the doctrine of detente or deterrence (and other names) - which was a “game” played by the world's superpowers, (Russia and the U.S.), with the whole world as their playing field.

Page 20: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

The Nuclear Age

1945 was also the birth of the atomic warfare age, and the type of deterrence involved was nuclear deterrence. 

For four years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. enjoyed the privilege of being the world's sole atomic superpower, but that all changed in 1949 when Russia detonated its first atomic bomb in a trial experiment.

Page 21: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The idea that collective world security could be maintained by having a very small number of nations, ideally two, in possession of enough nuclear weapons so that conventional war would become obsolete and the threat of global thermonuclear war would become unthinkable and suicidal.

“Mutual Assured Destruction” was the means of deterrence.

It was meant to deter war, but provided no guidance on how to stop a war if deterrence should fail to prevent the outbreak of war. There were no other theories or policies to deal with that either.

Page 22: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and “Flexible Response”

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was a deterrent philosophy.  It meant that because each side had the ability to wipe each other out, they didn't dare do it. 

The idea of Flexible Response (that augmented MAD) was the notion of using conventional forces first, and then developing and using smaller nuclear warheads (20-megaton city destroyers all the way to devices so small they could be carried by one soldier). 

Page 23: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

An Arms Race Begins

The doctrine of detente or deterrence which took the form of an Arms Race and Cold War between Russia and the U.S. was not managed by the U.N., but that international body quickly became a forum for conflict between the world's two superpowers. 

The U.N. was helpless, and other nations were helpless.  The U.N. could take no action because both Russia and the U.S. exercised veto power whenever it looked like the U.N. needed to step in.

Strangely enough, the Cold War kept the peace pretty well and no nuclear war ever erupted between any nations (or groups). This may be because the US and USSR (and China, France and England) have vetoes on the UN Security Council. It may be because their leaders were rational.

Page 24: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

MODERN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Today, the situation has changed dramatically. Nuclear deterrence is no longer a credible threat.

Nuclear deterrence doctrines no longer preoccupy policymakers. 

Instead, the primary threats facing the United States, its allies and its friends are terrorism, ethnic violence and a few small states that seek to use force to intimidate their neighbors or to enslave their own populations. 

Some strategists have urged a renewal of deterrence as defense policy, but terrorists and their sponsors are quite difficult to deter because they actually seek destruction (the so-called "crazy states" phenomenon), and threatening them with war and destruction in retaliation for some violent act produces no deterrent effect.  It also causes lots of “collateral damage.”

Violence is not a means to an end for many modern terrorists, it is the goal itself.

Page 25: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

How Can the US Respond?

How can the US “retaliate” if a terrorist succeeds in setting off a nuclear bomb in the US?

Do we respond with a nuclear attack on the terror group’s sponsor nations (those that provided money, sanctuary, etc.)?

Can retaliation even be a part of our response policy? If so, how?

Page 26: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Preventive Preemption

The idea that the best defense is a good offense.

Under international law: it is the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or a preemptive war that arises when one side decides there is a very great risk its adversary will attack within days or hours, and that the attack will cripple its ability to defend itself or retaliate.

Page 27: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

How Does Preemption Look Now?

Preventive preemption requires that policymakers assess threats, decide if conflict is inevitable, and then make one of the most difficult and horrific decisions in international relations. 

Policymakers have to make judgments about the level of risk the nation is prepared to accept and decide whether it is better to fight now while the costs are relatively low, or wait and possibly confront a more dangerous adversary later. 

It will (and already has) led to anger toward America by America’s allies and enemies alike.

Page 28: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Preventive Preemption Is Now Official US Policy

Preemptive prevention was announced by President George W. Bush as the official U.S. policy during a speech at West Point on June 1, 2002.

Page 29: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

“Shock and Awe”

It is somewhat similar to a notion of deterrence, however, the correct terminology is “dissuasion”. 

Dissuasion refers to a situation where there is only one superpower in the world, called a hyperpower, and dissuasion suggests that military strikes by this hyperpower will be so technologically and operationally advanced, that potential competitors and enemies will abandon all threats. 

Dissuasion is a hyperpower's way of playing asymmetric warfare, since terrorists do just enough to taunt retaliation with their guerilla hit-and-run tactics, the appropriate response is overwhelming "shock and awe."

Page 30: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Democratic Difficulties in PreemptionThere have been 20 preventive wars launched by great powers

over the last three centuries. 

Pearl Harbor, for example, was a preemptive strike by the Japanese against the U.S. 

Preemptive strikes sometimes backfire.  Democracies tend to avoid them.  Democratic societies are usually restrained by fear of cost and doubts over the serious of a threat warranting preemptive action. 

Politicians also are concerned that voters will toss them out of office if they over-reach. 

Democracies (especially Europe) typically prefer to create an alliance or coalition, relying on strategies of destabilization and containment, or possibly covert operations in hopes of starting a coup.

Page 31: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Preemption is Controversial

However, there is some precedent for preemption.  Military advisors suggested preemption during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Israel definitely used it when they perceived they were under imminent threat of Arab attack in 1967. 

Preemptive wars are rare because of the immense costs at home and internationally, and there are almost always debates about the threat's gravity and immediacy.

Page 32: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

UN CHARTER Provides Basic Right

There is also precedent for preemptive prevention in the U.N. Charter by what is called "anticipatory self-defense." 

The U.N. Charter, Article 51, declares that nothing shall impair the inherent right of a member nation to engage in individual or collective self-defense if attacked.

It should be noted that there are controversies over interpretation of Article 51. 

The interests of justice requires a clear explanation by the attacking nation of the grounds for preemption (need for "regime change"), and there is probably some moral obligation for reconstruction ("nation building") after preemptive action has been taken.

Page 33: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Justification for PreemptionFirst strikes can occasionally be justified

before the moment of imminent attack, if the point of "sufficient threat" has been reached.  This concept has three dimensions:

• [A] A manifest intent to injure by an enemy

• [B] A degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger

• [C] AND a general situation in which waiting greatly magnifies the risk

Page 34: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Preemption Rationale

• Protecting the territory and population of the homeland

• Preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition

• Ensuring freedom of the seas, lines of communication, airways, and space

• Ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources

• Deterring and defeating aggression against allies and friends

Page 35: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES

The military option is what most people think of when they think of counterterrorism.

However, special counterterrorist operations usually are only carried out under special, highly restrictive, circumstances. 

The basic problems are that the military doesn't work well with criminal justice procedures (which are often part of the mix when capture and prosecution, rather than assassination, is the goal). 

Page 36: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Military’s PurposeThe military's purpose is to kill people and blow things up, but

terrorists rarely provide a "target-rich" environment. 

The military is also trained to carry out defensive as well as offensive action, but in many cases (usually involving occupation of a country afterwards), the need for defensive maneuvers interfere with successful completion of tracking down terrorists. 

Offensive action may be necessary to destroy regimes that align themselves with terrorism, and these often have to be U.S.-led efforts, in order to create an incentive for allies to send police forces afterwards. 

Offensive action is synonymous with higher morale at home. [Notice how public support for Iraq war dropped once it turned defensive].

Page 37: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Special Forces are well-suited for Counterterrorism

All branches of the U.S. military contain special operations forces that are well suited for counterterrorist missions. 

It is well known that these special forces are more effective and produce less collateral damage than conventional forces. 

They are also the kinds of forces that commit to the most risk of death. This is the reason why policymakers are reluctant to use them. However, they often suffer fewer casualties than an invasion force. Their use can be provocations.

Page 38: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

America’s “Special Teams”

Some special forces contain police units, but most of them are trained for reconnaissance, surveillance, "surgical" raids, hostage rescue, abductions, and liaisons with allied counterterrorist forces. 

U.S. special operations forces are organized under the U.S. Special Operations Command, and mostly consist of Green Berets organized into units called A Teams.  The traditional purpose of an A Team is getting on the ground and multiplying their operational strength. 

Delta Force is a more secretive group that also operates in small teams. 

When large elite units are needed, America relies upon such units as the Army's 75th (Ranger) Regiment, or the U.S. Marine Corps. 

The U.S. Navy also has special assault units called the Sea Air Land Forces (SEALs). 

Page 39: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

AssassinationsThe most common objective of a special forces unit in

counterterrorism is to punish and destroy the terrorists, and secondly, to destroy their military and paramilitary assets.

There are times, however, when you need to go further, and destroy the terrorist's non-military sources of support. 

This is when covert operations are called for.  They are usually arranged by an agency of the intelligence community, but frequently involve U.S. military forces. 

Some intelligence agencies have their own paramilitary force, however.  There is a long history of covert ops, or "shadow wars," and probably the most controversial aspect of it is assassination.  This is generally reserved for the elimination of key supporters of terrorism.

Page 40: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Evaluating AssassinationsThere is little research on the effectiveness of assassination when

it comes to terrorism, and martyrdom effects are likely.  Needless to say, such missions are secret, and government "deniability" is incorporated into such operations. 

Some history: after the Vietnam war, in 1976, the U.S. officially declared that it would no longer use assassination. It was Executive Order 11905, which also prohibited the US government hiring anyone to commit assassination.

A presidential executive order signed in 1981 (Executive Order 12333) expressly forbids employees of the U.S. from assassinating adversaries.  It reiterates a proscription on US intelligence agencies sponsoring or carrying out an assassination.

In 1995, Clinton signed Executive Order 12947 limiting the US from having dealings with anyone or group engaged in illegal activities. He also expanded the ban on assassinations that specifically outlawed deliberately killing Osama bin Laden, even though the CIA had Osama bin Laden in its sights. 

Page 41: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

US Morality Can Backfire

Prohibitions on assassination kept us from “taking out” people like Osama bin Laden, when he was clearly a threat to the US.

The prohibitions were reconsidered in the wake of terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland during September 11, 2001. 

During the George W. Bush administration this bans against assassination were reinterpreted, and relaxed, for targets who are classified by the United States as connected to terrorism.

Page 42: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Psychological Warfare

Also covert and somewhat secretive in nature is psychological warfare, which involves the creation of mistrust, fear, infighting, and other types of discord in the target society. 

• Typically, this is a destabilization operation, and ranges from dangerous activities like infiltrating a terrorist group or dropping propaganda or disinformation leaflets over the enemy. 

• A number of newer techniques have incorporated principles of cyberwar or information warfare.

Does this qualify as terrorism?

Page 43: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Terrorism Financing

Terrorists use a variety of means for financing. Besides money laundering, they may use drug trafficking, smuggling of bulk cash, trade-based money laundering, charities for fundraising, and informal money remittance systems such as hawala. 

A hawala (also known as hundi) is an informal money transfer system used primarily in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Page 44: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Hawalas

Hawalas originated in South Asia.

In the hawala system, money is transferred via a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. 

The transparency of hawala networks (no records are kept) may very well represent the greatest challenge in fighting terrorism on the economic front.

Page 45: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Hawalas in the US

Within the US alone, there are about 23,000 convenience stores, restaurants, and small shops where the Hawala banking system is practiced.

It is difficult to investigate because record-keeping is not required or controlled and, in contrast to the usual procedure of money laundering, funds used by Hawala to underwrite terror frequently start off "clean" (such as contributions to so-called “charities”) and become "dirty" later.

Amounts are somewhat small, say around $200, adding to the difficulty of tracking them.

Page 46: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Executive Order 13224

Fighting terrorism economically is a priority established by Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001), which expanded U.S. power to target the support structure of terrorist organizations. 

Law enforcement (primarily the U.S. Treasury Department with some of its new offices) now has the ability to freeze assets and to block the financial transactions of terrorists and those that support them. 

It also enables the United States to deny foreign banks access to U.S. markets if they refuse to cooperate with American authorities through identifying and freezing terrorist resources abroad. 

As of early 2003, the United States has succeeded in freezing terrorist assets in over 165 countries. Since September 11, 2001, more than $112 million in terrorist assets has been frozen worldwide in over 500 accounts. More than $34 million of these assets was frozen in the United States, and over $78 million was frozen overseas.

Page 47: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

Besides Treasury Dept. initiatives, the USA PATRIOT ACT also established the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) intelligence unit which is tasked with being the primary U.S. intelligence source for domestic financial information.

It is responsible for maintaining and analyzing Suspicious Action Reports and Currency Transaction Reports filed by financial institutions in accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act. 

It also works with law enforcement, the CIA, and regulatory agencies to assist with intelligence of financial crimes committed within the United States. 

Page 48: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

The EGMONT GROUP

In addition, there is the Egmont Group—an international organization of 69 Financial Intelligence Units formed six years before September 11, 2001 to share intelligence of suspicious financial activities. 

Other multilateral groups, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assist with legal harmonization, which is a term meaning that technical assistance treaties and extradition treaties all have to be modified to support more sophisticated tracking of terrorist financing (while at the same time being sensitive to the different definitions of terrorism and legal systems of foreign countries).

Page 49: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

The Numerically Integrated Profiling System (NIPS)

A Customs supercomputer called the Numerically Integrated Profiling System (NIPS) has improved the Treasury Department’s counterterrorism efforts.

This intelligence software, which was originally designed to track airline passenger information, was modified to track terrorist financing activities. 

NIPS is housed in the Trade Crimes Intelligence Unit within the Intelligence Division at Customs headquarters, and the service spends about $150,000 per year on it, which runs under Windows NT and can search as much as 100G of data nearly instantly.

Page 50: Terrorism & Political Violence “Hard” Policy Approaches Military Option Economic Sanctions Law Enforcement © William Eric Davis - All Rights Reserved

“War on Terror” vs. “Law Enforcement” ApproachThe primary differences between a war on terrorism

versus a war on crime or other social problems:

• Terrorists firmly believe their cause is just (while most criminals admit they are deviant).

• An effective war on terrorism needs military type weapons (police have little need for military weapons and equipment).

• A war on terrorism has (or should have) a clear and identifiable enemy (while social problems are more ambiguous).

• A war on terrorism is political (rather than social, which is “solved” by tinkering with social service delivery systems).

• A terrorist enemy does not enjoy U.S. legal protections (at least they have fewer constitutional protections).