DEDICATION

TO

CHINWEOKE, CHIDUM, OBIAJULU, OBIANUJU, IFEANYI,

IKECHUKWU, NONSO, MUNACHIMSO and KAMSIYOCHUKWU.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A book like this depends greatly on the research materials available

and I am particularly grateful to the World Bank Research Library of

the University of Port Harcourt and the Uniport Graduate School

Library, where I spent many pleasant days wandering through its

incomparable collections.

I highly appreciate my dear wife, Chinweoke, for her indulgences,

sleepless nights and sacrifices, just to see me through. She tolerates

my shortcomings basically because I have chosen against so much

odds to lock myself indoors and write…one could not have asked for

a better family.

While accepting blames for all defects and omissions as may,

possibly, be contained on this text, I most warmly acknowledge the

following persons: Dr. Mrs O.P Anwuluorah, Mr. C.C Chukwujekwu,

Mr. Ifeanyi Ojukwu, Barr. Fab Onyisi, Rev. Fr. Ejike, Mr. P.K.C.

Onyejekwe, Mr. Greg Ezenne, Mr. Ajie Obiozor, Mr. C.M Nwose and

Mr. Uche Ekwonu.

Most especially, I am grateful to Law Egbomuche-Okeke esq, who

constantly encouraged me to write. My thanks go to all renowned

scholars, whose works assisted me in this publication. To those who

gave me the necessary support and inspiration to write this book, I

say thank you. To Prof. Kimse Okoko, Dr. Omenihu Nworgu, Dr.

Henry Alapiki and Dr. P.G. Odondiri whose works and articles, ignited

the academic spark in me, I am not ungrateful.

Finally, I acknowledge my parents for equipping me with the

instruments which kept me at this level, and most of all, to the glory of

Almighty God who maketh all things possible.

Ogbaji, Udochukwu A.O

February, 2009.

PREFACE

Nigeria's political tranquility has been disturbed and destroyed.

Before a decade now, Nigeria has not seen stable governance

groomed within peace; a sustained peaceful environment needed to

root political vision and the building of democracy. The Niger Delta

Region, which long epitomized a peaceful country in the sub-region is

today one of the few ethnic regions where peaceful settlement than

armoury exchanges characterizes the focus of the true leaders of this

country.

A look into the history of the Niger Delta region, together tied a vision

to happily throw out the cloak of colonialism, have not been spared of

the particles-bond of true federalism. Rather, they are countries,

which over the years have struggled woefully to put our nationalism to

the test of global ridiculing.The Bello's, Azikiwe’s, Awolowo's and

Boro's were themselves heroes in their own rights. However, such

individuals again stand to be blamed may be for their failure to

adhere and build sustainable nationalism among their citizens but

rather manipulated the system to sustain their presidencies.

Considering that such leaders have had strong experiences of

democracy should have set the path for the bright future of this

country. What they failed to do (giving that time may not have

favoured some) left the indelible struggle of some of these states.

The nightmare, name-calling and the monster in oil-producing states,

to the good, have not appeared as religious or ethnic implied

struggles. The only exception but not deeply highlighted is that of the

political scene of the region– the Muslims in the north and the

Christians in the South. What has bedeviled and created a platform of

power struggle and not democratic development is ‘personal’ and

sometimes mundane and myopic aspirations of few whose sole

desire is to become president or get access to huge sums of money

in the short time. With little money in hand, such unpatriotic power

hungry individuals gather few hungry citizens, seek foreign

assistance and commence their assault on democracy and peace but

not state. The noisy and monotonous rhyme of the dire bullets shows

no respire for the wailing of mothers and children, mercy on the sick

and the elderly. They become victims of greedy ambitions of ignorant

brats.

Nigeria appears to have been spared at least, from this kind of power

hungry souls over a period of time. After some period of military drills,

Nigerians are gradually building but fast, the fringes of what should

be good and sustainable democracy in the country. Since 1999, when

the country was ushered into democratic governance, Nigeria has

had the chance to change presidents through the ballot for the first

time. This is no mean achievement considering the fact that this has

never happened in the history of the country. Secondly, such a

wonderful period of democratic learning is taking place and

surrounded by neighbours in the West African Sub-region whose

countries are experiencing political struggles and turmoil and a

possible spill over. As witnessed in some other parts of Africa, cross

boarder fighting have the tendency to spill over neighbouring

countries. Thirdly, this democratic feat will certainly become a lesson

for countries nearby to reassess their noble books of peace and seek

the path of dialogue using Nigeria as a measure of capability.

In making the exemplary efforts in seating democracy in Nigeria,

evidences of minor circumstances; views, different ideological

leanings, political language, perceptions, etc are germinating. By

democracy, certain ingredients which should have been cooked so

well to dress the path of Nigeria's effort are simply becoming the very

iota of differences delivered in explosive thoughts, unearthing the

atmosphere which is in them the hovering threats to the peace in

Nigeria.

These threats, which may be perceived as minor or insignificant in

proportion in causing an abrupt cessation to democratic efforts, need

a second thought. For scientific prove an atom is required even if

small, to set forward compound.

Political tension characterized the debate of issues rather than

‘peaceful dialogue’ among the most competitive political parties gives

the impression that things are discussed on affiliations and not

credibility. In the party bloc, PDP and minority parties do not seem to

click together. Differences in views pertained to programs are

discerned from extreme ends. The despairing arguments are positive

and encouragement from PDP members and media coordinators

while the other parties frown’s deeply about the kind of analysis and

abuses inherent in PDP.

However, the growing level of poverty in this country is another great

threat to democracy. One may not be expected to go voting in

hunger. Neither shall we appreciate the fact that Nigerians will go

toiling all day only to get what is scarcely enough to feed oneself and

not the small size families in the country today. Poverty heightens

frustration and supplants disappointment, hatred and annoyance in

the minds of people who hope to see change. It drives children from

school into indulging in criminal activities, developing wickedness and

child’s interests in possessing armoury (among boys) to perpetuate

criminal activities and terrorize communities. Poverty pushes young

females into the hands social decay and childbearing. Poverty

develops the test of disapproving democratic governance and rather

approving military junta as saviour of the plights of the suffering

masses. Poverty blinds achievements and gains of some sort and

builds intuitive anger for community desperadoes willing to die in

creating chaos. Such people see no hope in life. Not until government

draws up an inclusive (emphasis on self-help/assisted and

economically viable income generating projects) plan for

development efforts on democracy make no meaning to hungry and

angry souls.

At the threshold of such an enviable and peaceful democratic

dispensation, we all owe much credit to ourselves for the effort made.

It does not matter which party is in power and what achievement they

made. What matters is Nigeria’s democracy. On the other hand, we

stand tall to embrace the blame of our failure to move forward and not

for one party or government. Nigerians have gone through

tumultuous moments of governance. Yet again, we have the chance

to build democracy and set the path the future knowing and proving

that in whatever state Nigerians are, we can demonstrate what

Azikiwe said, “…the Blackman is capable of managing his own

affairs.’ To do this, we need to see ourselves as Nigerians and not by

tribes. We need to put Nigeria first but hold firmly to our cultural

identities.

We should share and strife to make our democracy work. At the

moment, we are only building the fences today; and to think that

democracy has taken root is just talk. Even in advanced countries

where they boast of democracy, they learn each day. Meaning that,

democracy is a living process, a cyclical adventure for the good of

nationhood. We cannot afford to let such little threats hovering around

us, be what Shakespeare describes in his book ‘Macbeth’, to be the

serpent under the innocent flowers.

This text in all dealt extensively on the origin of Nigerian Politics from

Independence to present, Issues in Nigerian Democratic Process,

Political Parties and Pressure Group Influences and their

contributions to Nigeria Democratic Process, Political Finance in

Nigeria, Public Opinion, Ethnicity in Nigerian Politics, and the

Concept of National Question and Resource Control in Nigeria. It will

of course serve as a valuable reading guide to students of Political

Parties and Pressure Groups in Nigeria and all other Nigerians

interested in Nigerian Government and Politics.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICS: DEFINITIONS AND MEANING

It should be noted that politics derives from the Greek word “polis” which

means city-state. To the Greeks, the polis was the most meaningful

community above the family level. The Great philosopher, Aristotle, began

his famous work, Politics, with the observation that “man is by nature a

political animal”. By this, he means that the essence of social existence is

politics and that two or more men interacting with one another are

invariably involved in a political relationship. Aristotle also means that very

few people prefer an isolated life to one that includes social

companionship. Men are engaged in politics as they try to define their

positions in society, as they struggle for scarce resources and as they try to

convince others to accept their point of view. Aristotle then concluded that

the only way to maximise one’s individual capabilities and to attain the

highest form of social life was through political interaction with others in an

institutionalised setting, a setting designed to resolve social conflicts and to

set collective goals-the state.

What therefore is politics? A search through the political science literature

confounds the student with numerous definitions, starting that politics is the

process of making and execution of governmental decisions or policies; the

authoritative allocation of values; or who gets what, when and how; the

quest for power, order and justice; the art of influencing, manipulating and

controlling others; a process of resolution of conflicts in society and a

struggle among actors pursuing conflicting desires on public issues. Karl

Deutsch argues that any community larger than the family contains an

element of politics. While some writers are in support of a clear definition of

politics, others are opposed to it, claiming that the growth of the discipline

would be restricted if the scope were prematurely delineated.

Scattschneider is one of those who strongly support a clear definition of

politics. He reasons that:

“There is something strange about the feeling

of scholars that a definition is not necessary.

Inevitably, there is a lack of focus in the discipline

because it is difficult to see things that are undefined.

People who cannot define the object of their studies

do not know what they are looking for, and if they do

not know what they are looking for, how can they tell

when they have found it?”

To Abraham Kaplan, Easton, and Lasswell, politics is the authoritative

allocation of values as influence by the shaping, distribution and exercise of

power. Wesby (1970) says that:…..where there is politics, it is said, there is

controversy, where there are issues there is politics. Where no controversy

exists, where no issues are being debated, politics does not exist. It should

be noted that politics is not only about controversies and the mere

discussion of issues. Politics is more positive and concrete than this.

However, when politics is seen as a process, it becomes easier to

appreciate its importance since it is through such process that values;

material or symbolic, are aggregated, allocated and ultimately acquired.

Everyone, or every group therefore, strives to maximise the acquisition of

these values which as has been pointed out, are relatively fewer in

comparison with a great many competitors. What this triggers off is

competition in which every competitor attempts to exert as much power as

he possibly can muster.

It is in this regard that the definition of politics as “struggle for power”,

Morgenthau (1985), seems to have some meaning, but this seeming

relevance and meaning should not be stretched too far. This caution

appears necessary at this point, in the light of a more broad definition of

politics. This conceptualizes politics not only in terms of the distribution of

existing values but also brings into focus the whole issue of planning and

creation of values in accordance with the desires of the decision makers.

For Laski (1961), “politics concerns itself with the life of men in relation to

organized state,” while Sidwick (1929) sees politics as……concerning

primarily with the constructing on the basis of certain psychological

premises the system of relations which ought to be established among the

persons governing and between them and the governed, in a society

composed of civilised men.

The highest point of the above definition is the relationship between the

government and the governed. Politics as already mentioned is a process

which has it, varied activities reflected in negotiation, arguments,

discussions, application of force, persuasion, by which means an issue is

agitated or settled. What is quite clear in this explanation is the fact that

politics is not basically conflicts all the time, there is consensus, leading to,

resolution. The political system may become heated with demands for the

allocation of certain values, or stressed by reason of non-performance by

the system, tending in some serious cases towards system breakdown and

legitimacy crisis. However, if some of the major demands, concerns or

areas of conflicts are attended to, the danger of regime collapse, can be

averted. This would not go to mean that all demands are to be totally met,

only those that the system can accommodate at a particular time and in

relation to other competing demands, will be processed and thus,

authoritatively allocated. It is in this respect that politics is accepted as “the

art of the possible”.

The problematic of politics since ancient time has been its meaning. The

question, what is politics?, has continued to be a recurring decimal in

political enquiry and analysis. There exist no text any where, that has single

handedly supplied the answer to the question. Every such text has been a

contribution to the clearer and proper understanding of politics. The present

attempt here falls short of providing this one capsule answer to a notty

question as the one we are grappling with presently. Instead of defining

one word, “politics” one has to contend with the definition of such words as

“authoritative”, “allocation”, “values”, and “society”.

According to E, Nwabuzor and M. Mueller: politics consists of all social

intersections and dispositions which are directly/indirectly aimed at or

actually succeed in obtaining binding decisions about who have desired

resources (or who do not), and when and how these are obtained, in any

enduring social system. The authors further contend that politics is involved

whenever there is struggle over the distribution of scarce resources by

decision makers in any social group. The social group may be a family, a

club, public corporation, an army or the State apparatus of any given

country. The definition by Nwabuzor and Mueller is largely a synthesis of

those by Dahl, Easton and Lasswell. There is an acknowledgement of the

fact that those things which the citizens of a country value are scarce

relative to demand for them. Therefore, in order to guard against anarchy

and perpetual deprivation of the powerless by the powerful, there must be a

way of authoritatively allocating the values for the entire society. This

implies that at any given point in time, some citizens may be indulged while

others are deprived. But the decisions must be regarded as binding by both

categories of citizens whose fortunes may be reversed in subsequent

allocations.

The authoritative allocation of values presupposes the fact that politics is

characterized by conflict. Hence politics takes place whenevr conflict exists

about goals and the method of achieving them. The process of solving

conflicts at home, in school or at a national level is a political process. This

forms the basis of our discussions in subsequent chapters. I took time to

analyse the concept of politics so that a student of political parties and

pressure group in Nigeria will understand the background of politics before

knowing what political parties and pressure groups are. This, I believe will

make for a proper understanding of both concepts as the title of this book

states.

Appadorai asserts that when a body of people is clearly organised as a unit

for purposes of government, it is said to be politically organised and may be

called a body politic or State. Therefore, politics is viewed as “the science

concerned with the State and of the conditions essential to its existence

and development”. In the words of Janet, it is “that part of social science

which treats the foundations of the State and the principles of government”.

It is worth mentioning that politics is the making of decisions by public

means in contrast to the making of personal decisions privately by

individuals. There are also some definitions which identifies politics with

government, that is, the activities that take place around the legally based

institutions of a society which makes legally binding decisions. Politics is

also taken by some as a synonym for “legal government”. The problems

posed by these definitions are that much as we have to know the precise

meaning of government, “legal government” is tautological or superfluous

because it is legality that defines a government.

However, scholars like Marx Weber and Nnoli have contrary view.

According to them, social interaction is political to the extent that it occurs

within the framework of the state. Weber (1947) for example defines politics

in terms of all those human activities that are directed towards, and indeed

reflect in the process of acquiring, using and maintaining governmental

power. From this perspective, politics represents the sum totality of all

these activities that are directed towards determining public policies and

the means of implementing such policies. Similarly, Nnoli (1986) defines

politics as “all those activities which are directly or indirectly associated with

the seizure of state power, the consolidation of state power, and the use of

state power”. It goes to say that both Nnoli and Weber pitched their

definitions on the macro level. Politics makes sense only when it is

examined within the context of the state and the sum total of all those

activities which revolve around the acquisition, consolidation and

manipulation of the state apparatuses.

Furthermore, the definition that equates politics with government is

unrealistically restrictive. It does not take cognisance of binding decisions

that are tatken in societies where formal governmental institutions do exist.

There is also a definition which identifies politics with “power”, “authority”,

or “conflict”. This definition posits that there is politics in conflict situations

or where power relationships are in existence. This lends credence to the

earlier assertion that the process of solving conflicts is a political process. It

is in the same vein that Max Weber, the German sociologist, defines

politics as “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of

power, either among States or among groups within a State”.

One of the criticisms often levelled against the definition that equates

politics with power is that it is overly broad because power is exercised in

different groups, institutions or organizations. However, our interest is in

political power which has to be distinguished from other forms of power.

Finally, it is pertinent to stress that the different definitions examined here

are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are mutually reinforcing. But one

cannot but espouse Easton’s definition which equates politics with the

authoritative allocation of values for the society. Its utility transcends socio-

cultural boundaries.

The Greek concept of politics more accurately refers to a process by which

men debate matters concerning the ‘polis’ that is, the political community,

and take actions in an attempt to realize the public interest or the common

good. Thus, politics is seen as a controversy, a process of resolution of

conflict through discussion, bergaining and compromise.

The most important factor leading to the development of knowledge in any

field of study is agreement among its members about the content of that

field. In other words, the scholars in the field must agree on a fairly clear-

out definition of what they are studying. But, as noted by the English

historian, Morse Stephens, after teaching in the United States for two years

reported that “he had not been able to find anyone who can tell him

precisely what political science was.

While there has been a wide range of definitions, most of them can be

classified as being one of two types- the Classicists/Institutionalists identify

politics with government, “legal government” or the “state”, while others, the

behaviouralists, revolve around the notion of “power” “authority”, and or

“conflict”. Alfred de Grazia says that “politics” or the political includes the

events that happen around the decision-making centres of government.

Charles Hyman claims that legal government is the subject matter of

politics.

William Bluhm, a political scientist explains: “Reduced to its universal

elements, then, politics is a social process characterised by activity

involving rivalry and cooperation in the exercise of power and culminating

in the making of decisions for a group. The appeal of the definition flows

out of its apparent flexibility or wide scope. Politics is found wherever power

relationships or conflict situations exists, which means that the political

scientist can legitimately study the politics of a labour union or corporation,

religious organisations, as well as what goes on in the legislature or

administrative agency. The emphasis of this kind of definition is a type of

activity or behaviour rather than a particular kind of institution. There is a

practical difference between a definitionbased on government, and one

based on politics.

However, this goes to say that the Eastonian definition of politics as the

“authoritative allocation of values for a society”, is considered useful by

political scientists. It emphasizes political activity rather than institution. The

authoritative allocation of values, is, Easton argues, the kind of activity we

should be interested in. The first assumption is that in every society, values

are desired, that is, people have different interest or objectives, and these

must be allocated; or distributed by someone or something.

In a sense, this is a power and conflict situation. Every society has different

political systems allocating values authoritatively. Easton posits: “a policy is

authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are

affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it”. In other words, it

is considered binding. To most scholars, therefore, the behaviouralist

approach to the definition is more comprehensive. Politics is considered as

the activities and process that take place in the political realm.

Most contemporary political scientists question the usefulness of any

attempt to define politics on the grounds that there is no final solution to a

problem of definition, as reflected in many existing definition of politics. On

this issue, a known political scientist, Frank Goodnow, wrote that: “Such an

attempt to define politics is not only dangerous but even if successfully

made, it is not in my opinion sufficiently fruitful of practical results to justify

the expenditure of thought and time necessary to secure the desired end”.

While there is no best definition of politics, most political scientists agree

that politics has something to do with power, influence and authority, which

are the central organising concepts of the study of politics.

WHY DO WE STUDY POLITICS?

At this point, it is very clear that politics, whether we refer to it as a dirty

game or a clean one, an evil act or a good one or even if we see it as a

necessity is an act we cannot avoid. It is all around us! Infact, our protests

could suggest a political form or behaviour that makes us participants in

politics. Instead of running away from it, one should study to properly grasp

the subject of politics and analyse the options the system presents him

with. No meaningful choice can emanate from total ignorance of other

alternatives. It therefore requires interest and proper knowledge of

available alternatives and their relative degree and or ability to satisfy the

needs for which values are required to be authoritatively allocated. The

following reasons make the study of politics necessary:

(i) The study of politics helps an individual irrespective of his place in

the society to be able to make the best possible choices among

several attractive alternatives.

(ii) It affords an individual also to come to better grips of politics and

several political issues of the day, and so may not be easily tricked

into doing what he would ordinarily not have done. It helps to

satisfy ones curiousity.

(iii) A proper knowledge and understanding of politics encourages the

cultivation of a critical mind which is necessary in dealing with the

many complexities of politics.

(iv) Since we cannot run away from politics, it becomes necessary, if

not imperative, to devote time to study and analyse it. This will

make one make sense out of the world around him.

REFERENCES

Alan .C. Isaak (1975): Scope and Methods of Political Science,

(revised edition) Illinois: Dorsey Press, p.13

Alapiki, Henry (2000): Politics and Governance in Nigeria, corporate

impressions, Owerri.

Alapiki, Henry (ed): The Nigerian Political Process, Emhai Publishers,

P.H. (2001)

Appadorai. A (1975): The Substance of Politics, Ibadan: Oxford

University Press. Deutsch Karl: Politics and Government, 2nd edition.

New Jersey: Houghton Miffein Company, Boston. (1975)

Nnoli, Okwudiba (1986): Introduction to Politics, Lagos: Longman

Publishers.

Nwabuzor, E and Mueller, M (1985): An Introduction to Political

Science for African Students, London: Macmillan publishers.

Nwaorgu, O.C (2002): Dimensions of Political Analysis, Springfield

Publishers.

Weber Max (1947): The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation,

translated by A.M Henderson and Calcott Parsons. Glencoe, Ill, Free

Press.

CHAPTER TWO

NIGERIAN POLITICS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Formation of political associations in Nigeria has been almost as old

as Nigeria. Those who have come together to form such associations

since the political entity called Nigeria came into being, do so for

various reasons.

As a people, we have never lacked names for political parties that

have emerged from associations. The Nigerian political landscape

is therefore cluttered with the tombs of many a political party in the

past.

To a keen observer of political intrigue and practice in Nigeria, it is not

a difficult conclusion that politicians generally form political parties for

the dominant purpose of contesting and winning elections rather than

as vehicles for coordinating development efforts on the basis of some

deep political and economic conviction-ideology.

The Nigerian news media is quick to celebrate every emerging

political gathering of old and "experienced" politicians with all manner

of superlatives, without a clinical analysis as to whether such

gatherings have a foundation for altruistic endurance. Such a

foundation is necessary because a selfish and hateful motivation for

any human cause is hardly a strong foundation to build upon for the

general good.

THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ASSOCIATIONS.

The origins of political parties are closely associated with the

development of the modern state and representative democracy in

Western Europe and the United States. Parties evolved through the

struggle of contending groups to grasp control of the apparatus of

government. This struggle for power generally took place within

legislatures. Formed initially to advise monarchs, by the 17th and

18th centuries many legislative bodies had begun to claim

independent power bases and privileges of their own. An early model

of the modern party system developed in Britain in the 18th century,

shaped around the efforts of the Whig and Tory parties to control

government jobs and political influence. A party system also

developed in the United States in the decade following ratification of

the Constitution of the United States in 1788, putting members of the

Federalist Party against members of the Democratic-Republican

Party.

In both Britain and the United States, competition between political

parties undermined traditional conceptions of politics rooted in

classical and Christian notions of virtue and public service. According

to this tradition, political leaders should act according to a model of

virtue that involved placing the common good above the interests of a

fraction of the society. Leaders acting to benefit only themselves or a

narrow portion of the society were considered corrupt. However, party

competition required public figures to act upon a contrary set of

assumptions: (1) that politics “naturally” involves conflict and division,

and (2) that its true goals are to secure the economic interests and

political influence of groups divided along lines of class, ethnicity,

race, and religion. From the vantage point of the 20th century, some

political scientists have concluded that party competition, far from

corrupting a society, measurably strengthens and integrates it by

providing a way to include and represent different groups and

interests.

During the 19th century, the broad extension of voting rights to adult

male citizens throughout Europe and the United States required

legislators to appeal to a much larger segment of national

populations. Political parties grew dramatically in size and began to

take the form of independent, popularly based organizations, no

longer serving merely the interests of a narrow elite. During the late

19th and early 20th centuries, arguably the period when political

parties in the United States reached the height of their influence,

party organizations played an important role in the lives of millions of

Americans. Political party “machines” organized new communities out

of the vast waves of immigrants settling in America's largest cities.

These political machines offered urban Americans an array of

services, ranging from housing, food, and jobs to legal assistance

and language instruction. In return, they asked for votes. They also

expected loyalty from their victorious candidates, who were to remain

ever mindful of the party organization's role in delivering the votes.

However, let us go down memory lane and chronicle political

formations and coalitions in Nigeria. Nigeria has had so many political

associations and parties since becoming a nation that one would

naturally lose count. Some have died no sooner than they sprouted

up.

Before political independence in 1960, real political parties existed,

namely the Northern People's Congress (NPC)-North-dominated; the

Action Group (AG)-South-West-dominated; National Convention of

Nigerian Citizens -as it came to be called after 1960-(NCNC)-South-

East-dominated. Why do we see them as "real" political parties? It

was clear what each stood for and where clear differences existed

between them beyond mere ethnic preponderance.

The NPC, for instance was very conservative and not so inclined

towards a hurried exit of the British colonial masters. The AG was

more socialist in view with Marxist doctrinal beliefs that the state

should be paternalistic. The NCNC could be referred to as liberal,

with a moderate stance on issues, and may be this accounted for its

significant following in the South-West. Maybe strong fiscal

federalism with strong regions after independence strengthened the

political parties as each strove to produce results in the regions of

dominance. The regions had responsibilities like Health and

Education, leaving the center to take care of Finance, International

Relations, Customs, Immigration, and national security.

Although the NPC, NCNC, and AG could be referred to as strong

political parties with strong and discernible political beliefs in their

time, not long after political independence in 1960, splinter groups

started emerging within the ranks, not so much because of significant

ideological differences as clashes in personal ambitions of political

gladiators. So, in the South-West, the clash between Awolowo and

Akintola resulted in the formation of the United People's Party (UPP),

later re-named the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). In

the North, the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) emerged

from the NPC.

Before the first legislative elections since political independence,

which took place in December 1964, two grand alliances were formed

between the now five political parties, namely, the Nigerian National

Alliance (NNA) consisting of the NPC and the NNDP; and the United

Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) consisting of the NCNC, AG, and

NEPU. The UPGA, which lost to the NNA.

After the military interregnums of 1966-1979 and 1984-1999 true

fiscal federalism became crippled, giving rise to the deformed copy

we have today. The political parties that have emerged (and died)

between 1979 and now have not stood up to the standard of true

political parties.

True political parties, like an individual person, must have a

recognizable personality and character (ideology). Looking at the

mushroom of political parties-so-called-we have in Nigeria today,

there should be no cause for celebration of another in the offing,

especially when the players are re-cycles from the existing parties

whose only reason for attempting to form new parties is to regain the

power and influence they have lost where they are coming from.

The time has come for Nigerian elite to refuse to be deceived by

political prostitution which is rampant among our politicians, who go

into politics only for themselves and by themselves. Political parties

should be seen as vehicles for national development where

disciplined commitment to good governance is an addiction for the

national good.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Political parties are organized groups of individuals seeking to seize

power of government in order to enjoy the benefits to be derived from

such control. They are also a regular and permanent organization of

a certain number of people concerned with either conquering power

or keeping it. They could be seen as any group, however loosely

organized seeking to elect governmental office holder under a given

label.

Political Parties could also be seen as organizations that mobilize

voters on behalf of a common set of interests, concerns, and goals. In

many nations, parties play a crucial role in the democratic process.

They formulate political and policy agendas, select candidates,

conduct election campaigns, and monitor the work of their elected

representatives. Political parties link citizens and the government,

providing a means by which people can have a voice in their

government.

CHARACTERISTIC OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The most important characteristics of political party are as

follows;

a. Membership: Any political party must have members. This

means they must have people that supports their ideologies

and party programmes in other words, they are referred to as

political party members.

b. Leadership: There must be leaders of that party. These

leaders see to the organization and administration of the party.

c. Goals and Objectives: Any party must have goals, aims and

objectives for its formation.

d. Ideology: There is need for a party to have its ideology. Any

party without philosophy or ideology is otherwise not a political

party.

e. Resources: There is need for funds, talents, electoral spread

and charismatic candidates. These will make the party to stand

firmly.

f. Constitution: There is need for a party to have its fundamental

laws guiding it. This will make the party to have a guiding

principle.

g. Manifesto: There must be programme of activities for the

people. This gives the people an idea of what the party have in

mind in promoting both the socio-political and economic affairs

of the people.

TYPES OF POLITICAL PARTIES

There are various classifications of political parties but it is

difficult to classify party systems according to one single criteria. The

most useful factors to take into account are:

i. The number of parties

ii. The relative strength of the parties

iii. The ideological differences between the parties

iv. The structure of the parties

Using all these criteria with varying degrees of emphasis, we could

arrive at the following classification.

a. Elite/Cadre party: This is a type of political party where the

membership is restricted to a particular group of people. It is not

thrown open to every interested person. For one to become a

member of the party, one must satisfy certain special

requirements or conditions. For instance, one must be

academically or economically notable. This means that, the

person must be very wealthy, highly educated or highly

influential in the society. The belief is that if one posses these

qualities, members will attract a lot of vote for the party during

election. Elite or cadre parties are less interested in the number

of members it has, but they are more interested in the quality of

their members. Their belief is that, a man with high repute,

integrity, influence and wealth attracts many votes than low

integrity, illiterate and poor people.

b. Mass Party: This type of party has open membership to any

person that wants to become a member. They do not have any

special qualification or condition necessary for ones

membership. They are less interested in the quality of their

members but on the quantity. They always look at winning as

many supporters as they could. Their belief is that if all their

members vote for them during election, they are surely going to

be the overall winner in that election.

c. Direct Party: A direct political party is that party where

members fill and sign membership forms themselves, pay their

monthly dues and attend meetings regularly. In this type of

political party, people are allowed to register as member of the

party as individuals. They do not need to go through any union

or any other group or body. In the 2nd Republic 1979 – 1983, the

parties then were all best classified as direct political parties.

d. Indirect Party: A political party is indirect when membership is

through union, groups or component bodies. Parties may also

be made up of trade unions, groups or organizations. The

labour party in Britain, the socialist party in Soviet Union and

the Catholic Party in France are all examples of indirect political

parties.

e. Ideological or Missionary Party: This type of party has a very

strong ideology to pursue and defend. They are not much

interested in the quality of their members but their aim is to

make sure that the few who accepts to become their member

can keep to their party ideology. They sack any member who

does not keep their party ideology. The Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (CPSU) is a good example of the ideological

party.

f. Non Ideological or Broker Party: They do not have a strong

ideology to pursue or defend in that they are very much

interested in the quantity of their members. They are ready to

change their ideology if they feel that such will win more

membership for them. All the political parties since Nigerian

independence could best be described as Non-ideological or

Broker parties.

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties mediate the relationship between citizens and their

government. In democracies with competitive party systems, political

parties pressure governments to respond to the needs and interests

of broad segments of the population. In more authoritarian

governments, parties offer a structure for directing and conditioning

the behavior of individual citizens.

Most political parties espouse democratic principles and

commitments. In practice, however, a combination of factors has

placed limits on parties as instruments of democratic participation. In

the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, most parties took their

message to the people through the work of committed activists. The

introduction of new communications technologies has since reduced

the incentive of parties to mobilize and actively engage its members.

Even during the so-called “golden age” of political parties, from the

middle of the 19th century until the outbreak of World War I in 1914,

most effective parties developed a rigid bureaucratic structure that

increasingly hampered participation of ordinary party supporters.

Power instead flowed to elites at the top of the party hierarchy.

Political parties employ different strategies for recruiting supporters.

“Externally mobilized” parties develop around leaders who lack power

within an existing government. These leaders compensate by

mobilizing and organizing a popular base of support from among

disaffected groups in society. External mobilization has typically

provided the origins of social-democratic, Socialist, Communist, and

Fascist parties in Europe.

“Internally mobilized” parties, by contrast, usually represent a

defensive strategy of counter-mobilization on the part of influential

government insiders. This strategy also involves efforts to recruit a

broad base of party members and supporters. Internally mobilized

parties seek to neutralize the organizational efforts of another party or

to gain that party's cooperation in the pursuit of goals, such as wars,

that require a broad foundation of support and sacrifice. Conservative

parties and Liberal parties in Europe have more often used a strategy

of counter-mobilization. In the late 1930s, the Democratic Party

sponsored social reform to fend off challenges from the Socialist,

Communist, and Progressive parties, and from populist leaders such

as Father Charles Coughlin, Francis Townsend, and Louisiana

Senator Huey Long.

However, modern political parties cannot survive without

organization, although at the earlier development of parties, it started

without organization. All over the world, the structure of each political

party, no matter whether it is direct or mixed derive from certain

elements which give it coherence. All parties are structured on basic

definite components. It is these components that give the party its

character. The basic components are:

a. The Caucus

b. The Branch

c. The Cell

d. The Militia

THE CAUCUS

This is an informal group in a party. They wield influence and

manipulate the happenings in the political party. In Nigeria, for

instance, there are some groups of people in a party that dictates

what happens in that party. Most times, they hold meetings after the

general meeting of all members and dictate or decide what policies or

principle to be adopted. These groups of people are best referred to

as “The Caucus members”.

However, the major characteristic of Caucus is its limited nature. It is

made up of small number and seeks no expansion. They do not really

admit members because they are a close group. One does not go

into it simply because he or she desire to do so. Membership is

achieved only by a kind of a tacit co-option or by formal nomination.

Their activities are at the peak during elections. They are responsible

for selecting or nominating candidates in times of election. The

caucus could also be regarded as an influence group or machine

group of a party.

However, we have the “Caucus of notables” and the “Caucus of

Experts”. The caucus of notables includes the people with influence

and influence features. Only very rich and influential people fall under

this category. They are the king makers, otherwise known as “the

political godfathers”. They make the leaders and kings but they do not

want to be one. The caucus of experts, on the other and wields or

manipulate power on the basis of their intelligence or talents. Most

times, they are good in speech or they are powerful strategist or

planners. The technocrats and intellectuals fall under this group.

THE BRANCH

One major difference between the Branch and the Caucus is that the

branch is open while the caucus is not open. On the other hand, while

the caucus is not easily identifiable, the branch is easily identifiable

and called by names. The branch is also numerous while the caucus

is small. The branch is commonly found among the socialist parties

especially those whose membership is based on labour unions. They

see to the daily execution of the local activities of the party though

they are semi-autonomous unit of the party and they function within a

geographical unit.

THE CELL

According to Maurice Duverger, “Branches” were a socialist

invention, while “cells” are a communist invention. Both were

inventions of the Russians Communist Party and their adoption was

imposed on all communist party by the third international congress

after their resolution of 1924. In comparison, the cell is much smaller

group than either the branch or the caucus.

Unlike the Branch, the Cell has no geographical definition in terms of

membership. It is mostly a phenomenon of the work place i.e.

occupational organization. It is common in the Russia Communist

Party and has been difficult to reproduce cell in any other party

except in the communist party.

The cell offers political education to the members of a party and

discusses the party’s activities from the secretariat or the directives

from the party. If one is not a member of the party or cell, one cannot

understand their discussions. You need to belong to their party in

other to understand them clearly. The cell is historically an

organization that featured during the early part of the Russian

revolution when the Tsarist Regime made it impossible for any

revolutionary activities to be carried out. The party heads used the

“CELL” to communicate to the people who are members about what

is happening in the country by then.

However, the “cell” is also used by the modern government in Russia

to spy against non-communist countries or to inform the government

in power about some secrets. This is the reason why the cell is made

up of very small number of people. If not, Secrets will not be well

protected.

THE MILITIA

The militia is peculiar to the fascist party of Italy and Spain. The

militia is a kind of private army used to coerce people into party

membership. They are also used in making people work towards a

given political action. The militia men are ranked like normal army

and they have similar terms with the army too.

Militia is peculiar to an economy that is generally depressed, like an

economy with the problem of inflations, unemployment and high

political instability. They wear uniforms and organize match-pasts.

They are always ready and trained to fight like the soldiers whenever

they are been commanded to do so by their leader.

POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS

Party system defines the formation, organization and structure of

political parties. It also defines the number of political parties that

operate in a political system. A political party system consists of all

the parties in a particular nation and the laws and customs that

govern their behavior. There are three types of party systems:

a. One party or Single party system

b. Two party system or West minister model

c. Multi-party system.

ONE PARTY SYSTEM

A one-party or single party system of government is a type of party

system in which only one party is legally recognized and permitted to

control the affairs of the state; and in which all efforts to form rival or

opposition party is considered as an act of treason. It could also be

defined as any political system where you have either one party or

unquestionable predominance of one party, in which all rival parties

are officially regarded as treason, and where the party is the only

legal one. In summary, one-party or single party system allows the

existence of one party within a given state.

A single-party system is also one in which one party nominates all

candidates for office. Thus there is no competition for elected offices.

The only choices left to voters are (1) to decide whether or not to vote

and (2) to vote “yes” or “no” for the designated candidate. Single-

party systems have characterized Communist Party governments and

other authoritarian regimes. They have become much less common

since Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) between 1989 and 1991. Surviving

Communist states, most notably China (Red China), North Korea,

The Fascist One-Party System of Spain, Portugal and Cuba, do

continue to enforce the rule of a single party. International financial

pressure has also reduced the number of single-party systems in

developing nations. Funding agencies such as the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development (also known as the World Bank)

often insist upon a competitive party system as a precondition for

granting loans or aid to these countries. Defenders of single-party

systems point out that they provide a way for nations to mobilize and

direct the talents and energies of every citizen toward a unified

mission or purpose. This advantage appeals to leaders of some

nations that possess limited human and material resources.

Moreover, single-party systems limit the political freedoms and

choices of citizens.

However, other countries that practice one party system includes

Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah Regime), Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi Arabia,

Algeria, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Guinea.

ADVANTAGES OF ONE PARTY SYSTEM

a. A one-party system allows for strong leadership either in one

person (as the Convention people’s party of Ghana headed

by Nkrumah) or a collectivity of leaders.

b. One-party system has a strong ideology and doctrine to

pursue. Just like what Stallin, a Russian Communist said to

his followers: “Every Political party represents a class. In

nations where several classes exist, several political parties

must also exist; but in soviet Russia only the working class

exists, and so only one party – the communist party – is

needed to represent it. Any other party could only oppose

the interests and welfare of the proletariat, and that of

course, would be counter-revolution and treason”.

c. One-party System Seems to be called a programme party

because it does things according to a predetermined

programme or course of action, and tries to pursue the

programme to a conclusive reality.

d. One party system represents the dominant segment of the

society and as such gives the majority of the people the

power of governmental control and leadership. For instance,

in Ghana, when the National Liberation Movement, as a

party rose in opposition to Dr, Nkrumah and his Convention

People’s Party, as the dominant party, in 1956, The National

Liberation Movement won only 27 Seats out of 104 seats.

This shows that one party system usually represents the

majority of the people in a given state.

e. One party system gives no room for disunity. It is integrative

and eschews tribalism.

f. It provides the necessary platform for political socialization

for the masses and a forum for political apprenticeship for

would-be leaders

g. The single party system is in line with African system of

government while the multiparty is alien, divisive and

sectional.

h. It gives room for stability of government, in that is makes the

society to be unique; whereas the two-party system makes

the society to be divided.

DISADVANTAGES OF ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

a. One party system leads to the silence or the persecution of

the opposition. It becomes practically impossible for any

minority group to voice out their views for fear of being

persecuted.

b. It eventually degenerates into regimentation and

dictatorship. The government does what the leaders of the

party wants it to do.

c. It makes the political power to reside with one leader or a

group of leaders for long because the system does not allow

the emergence of alternative leader.

d. The government of one party system is most times

irresponsible and does not render proper and transparent

accountability of their stewardship to the people.

e. Legitimacy and sovereignty do not reside with the people.

TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

To Austin Ranney, a Two-party system is one in which only two

parties regularly win substantial portion of the votes and public

offices, and in which the majority parties to some degree alternate in

having majority of both”. From the above, we can understand that at

every election, in a two-party system, one party can have a

substantial lead over the other party by having more candidates

elected than the other.

The two party system does not imply that there are no other political

parties existing within the country; there may be other minor parties

which do nominate candidates and contest elections, but rarely, if

ever, win more than a tiny fraction of the votes or elected any

candidates.

In a two-party system, control of government power shifts between

two dominant parties. Two-party systems most frequently develop

when electoral victory requires only a simple plurality vote, that is, the

winner gets the most votes, but not necessarily a majority of votes. In

such a system, it makes sense for smaller parties to combine into

larger ones or to drop out altogether. Parliamentary governments in

which the legislators are elected by plurality voting to represent

distinct districts may develop party systems in which only two parties

hold significant numbers of seats, as in Great Britain, Newzealand,

United States, Australia and Canada. Advocates of two-party systems

believe they limit the dangers of excessive fragmentation and

government stalemate. However, in the United States, which

separates the powers and functions of government between

executive, legislative, and judicial branches, it is possible for one

party to control the legislature and the other to control the executive

branch. This frequently has led to political gridlock between the

Republican Party and the Democratic Party. Opponents of the two-

party system also believe that in time the two parties increasingly

tend to resemble each other and leave too many points of view out of

the political process. These factors may alienate voters and lead to

low turnout in elections.

However, in two party system, the party that forms the government is

that party that wins the largest number of seats of the legislature,

while the other party forms the opposition. In Britain, the two major

political parties are the conservative and the labour parties. Although

there is the existence of the liberal party as the third political party.

The liberal party represents a minor political party because it has

never won or become one of the two dominant political parties in the

parliamentary elections in Britain.

ADVANTAGES OF TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

1. The system makes for an efficient means for political education

since the electorate have the choice of alternative programme.

2. It is a system which fixes responsibility of government on a

continuing and recognizable group.

3. The system makes it certain that a particular party win the

majority in every elected body either singly or by coalition; and

therefore it increases the chances of stability and coherence in

government.

4. The two-party system tends to be more democratic because the

majority of the people is not only given the chance to project

their ideology but is has equally given the minority party the

chance to show its interests and express its news without fear

of molestation. There is room for the expression of views both

the majority and the minority parties.

5. The fear that people, through the election, can remove the

power of government from one party and place it in another

makes the ruling party to be more conscious of its

responsibilities to the people.

6. The two party system readily opens the minds of the people to

public affairs and makes them conscious and interested in their

public administration.

DISADVANTAGES OF TWO PARTY SYSTEM

1. The system tends to divide the society into two factions, one

faction being the opposer of the other faction and thereby

tending towards disunity.

2. It may degenerate into multiparty system whereby three or

several parties regularly share substantial portions of the

seats; and in which a single party rarely, if ever, wins a

majority of seats. (The Nigeria Federal Election of 1959

which led to the formation of a coalition government by three

parties due to the fact that a party was not able to command

the majority of seats is an example).

3. It sometimes degenerates into the imprisonment and killing

of members of rival parties. The western Regions election of

Nigeria in 1965 is a case in point; whereby the election

became a rivalry between the N.N.D.P and the A.G and

many innocent citizens were either killed or burnt alive as a

result.

4. It is more expensive to practice than a one party system.

5. The system slows down the rate of nation development.

MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

A multi-party system can be defined as one in which three or several

parties regularly share. Substantial portions of the votes and public

offices, and in which a single party rarely, if ever, wins a majority of

either. The multi-party system is otherwise referred to as “group-

system”.

Multipartism is a characteristic of the democratic nations of Western

Europe and Scandinavia, Italy, France, Nigeria, Germany and India.

In each of these nations or states at least three and usually as many

as five or six parties regularly win a majority of the legislative seats to

be called ‘majority’ parties. Rarely does a single party win a majority

of the legislative seats to be called “majority’ parties. Rarely does a

single party win a majority of the legislative seats and so the nation’s

cabinet and ministers are composed of coalitions of several parties

rather than the representatives of any single party.

Multi-party systems are the most common type of party system.

Parliamentary governments based on proportional representation

often develop multi-party systems. In this type of electoral

arrangement, the number of legislative seats held by any party

depends on the proportion of votes they received in the most recent

election. When no party gains a majority of the legislative seats in a

parliamentary multi-party system, several parties may join forces to

form a coalition government. Advocates of multi-party systems point

out that they permit more points of view to be represented in

government and often provide stable, enduring systems of

government, as in most of contemporary Western Europe (where

every system, including Great Britain, has at least three and usually

five or six significant parties). Critics note, however, that multi-party

systems have sometimes contributed to fragmentation and political

instability, as in the Weimar Republic in Germany (1919-1933), the

Fourth Republic in France (1946-1958), and Italy after World War II.

In Nigeria, for example, as from 1954 to 1966 there were three

dominant political parties: The NCNC, the N.P.C., and the A.G and

some minor parties such as the N.E.P.U, the U.N.D.P and the

U.M.B.C. In 1959 federal election to the House of Representatives

the three dominant parties as well as the N.E.P.U, as a minority Party

presented candidates for the election to the House. The House of

Representatives consisted of 312 members then. In the election the

N.P.C won 142 seats: The NCNC, 89 seats: and the A.G, 73 seats

and the N.E.P.U won 8 seats. Three of the four parties that won seats

in the election united to form a coalition government; the N.P.C., the

N.C.N.C and the N.E.P.U while the A.G became the opposition party

in the parliament. Thus, the three parties have 239 seats making

them have majority seats in the House of Representatives to form the

government; while the A.G remained as the opposition party.

The above analysis shows that Nigeria has been operating a multi-

party system of government since her independence; and that in a

multi-party system of government, there may be more than three

major parties aiming at winning the elections; but the parties, after the

election, will ally with one another to allow the government to be

formed.

ADVANTAGES OF MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

a. Multipartism permits more shades of opinion to be

represented in the legislature.

b. Unlike the two-party system, a multi-party system reflects

more accurately the way in which the popular mind is

actually divided.

c. The greatest advantage is that a multi-party system fragment

the country into smaller parties that no party is strong

enough to form the government unless by coalition.

d. When there are many political parties, there is likely to be

less of uncritical sentiment of loyalty to party, and less will be

the desire to regard all questions habitually and

systematically form a party point of view. People will allow

reason to guide their thinking and decisions rather than

being allowed to be carried away by party ideology as is the

case in a two-party system.

e. Multi-party system gives legitimacy and sovereignty to the

people.

f. Multi-party system creates room for responsible government.

g. Multipartism promotes democracy.

h. Multipartism makes for an effective operation of the rule of

law and separation of powers.

DISADVANTAGES OF MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

a. A multi-party system leads to instability of government

because not only does the frequent re-alignment of political

parties make the government unstable but it renders the

government weak as it is composed of parties of different

ideologies.

b. The Executive arm of government, the cabinet, is always

very weak. It is usually composed of members drawn from

many political parties and having different ideologies to

pursue. Infact it becomes practically impossible for

members of the cabinet to make quick decisions on

governmental policy, as members will like the policy of the

government to be positive to their party beliefs and thinking.

c. In a multi-party system, it becomes practically impossible for

the government to make long-term policy and planning.

Long-term planning of policy can be successfully attempted

only by a government which is certain of a reasonably long

period in office; and such certainty, if any, can be provided

for only under a two-party or dual party system.

d. The multi-party system does not only weakens the

executive, but gives a disproportionate power to self-

seeking minorities as the ministerial portfolios have to be

shared among the parties that form the coalition in

accordance with an acceptable formula to all the component

parties.

e. Finally, Multi-party system tends to turn important branches

of the legislation into class, bribery and corruption and thus

lowers the tone of the public life.

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Though most pronounced in the United States, the decline of

traditional parties is an international phenomenon. Some analysts

believe political parties will one day cease to exist, and that the

function of democratic linkage between citizen and state will then

be performed by polls, by interactive television, and by other

media. Others argue, however, that none of these institutions

offers citizens the public arena in which reasoned debate can lead

to collective action on behalf of an organized membership.

Collective action, they suggest, is the only effective recourse of the

less privileged members of a society. A nation without multiple

strong, competitive political parties will inevitably be a nation in

which power rests in the hands of a narrow elite. Still other

analysts simply note that the first act of a new nation, or a nation

newly liberated from authoritarian control, is to create political

parties. These analysts believe that human political communities

have not outgrown their need for political parties.

REFERENCES

Microsoft ® Encarta ® 2009. © 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation.

Nwankwo, B.C (1992): Authority in Government. Almond Publishers.

Makurdi-Nigeria.

Ogbaji, U.A.O (2008): Principles, Practice and Techniques of Public

Administration. Petrosini Publishers, Lagos-Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA

THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NNDP)

With the establishment of a Legislative Council under the Clifford

Constitution of 1922, a new political party came into being. It arose

from an earlier political association known as the ILU (Town)

Committee. This new political party soon became the most

powerful political association of the period. It was called the

Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP); inaugurated on 24

June, 1923.

STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE NNDP

The first president of the party was Egerton-Shyngle, Gambian by

birth and a prominent barrister in Lagos. The party relied heavily on

the highly organized market women. The moving spirit or leader of

the party, from its inception until 1946, was Herbert Macaulay. T.H.

Jackson was the first honorary secretary.

Even though it was called the Nigerian National Democratic Party,

the party was in all respects a Lagos affair. It had no branches

outside Lagos and its membership was predominantly Yoruba.

One of the reasons for limiting its activities to Lagos was the fact

that except in Calabar, elections to the Legislative Council were

held only in Lagos. Secondly, politics was not as highly developed

in other parts of the country as in Lagos. Other prominent members

were J.C. Zizer (first solicitor of the party) and Dr. C.C. Adeniyi-

Jones.

OB J ECTIVES AND SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR NNDP

The objectives of the NNDP were divided into two: those relating to

Lagos and those relating to Nigeria.

1. The Lagos-related objectives were:

(i) The nomination and election of the Lagos member for the

Legislative Council.

(ii) The achievement of municipal status and complete local

self-government for Lagos.

2. The objectives of nation-wide scope were:

(i) The establishment of branches of the party in all areas of

Nigeria.

(ii) The development of higher education and the introduction of

compulsory education throughout Nigeria.

(iii) Economic development of the natural resources of Nigeria

(iv) Free and fair trade in Nigeria and equal treatment of the

native traders and producers in Nigeria.

(v) The Africanisation of the civil service.

(vi) The recognition of the National Congress of British West

Africa and the pledge to work hand-in-hand with that body in

support of its entire programme.

The financing of the party came essentially from contributions by

Lagos market women and Eshugbayi, the Eleko of Lagos.

ELECTORAL PERFORMAN C E OF THE NNDP

The NNDP won the three seats in the Legislative Council in 1923,

and 1928 and 1933. It also won the three-yearly elections to the

Lagos Town Council in 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932 and 1935.NNDP

achieved only part of its objective for Lagos, and very little was

achieved of its objectives or aims for Nigeria. It was, however, the

first and best organized political party in British West Africa from 1923

to 1933.

THE NIGERIA YOUTH MOVEMENT (NYM )

In 1934, the students and graduates of kings College, Lagos, formed

the Lagos Youth Movement, to make known their feelings about the

government’s educational policy. Their major quarrel was with the

type of training provided by the Yaba Higher College, which they felt

was below the standard expected from an institution which at that

time was the highest in Nigeria. They also demanded that

scholarships be given to deserving Nigerian students to study in the

United Kingdom. They were interested in the appointment of Africans

to higher posts in the civil service and oppose to the discrimination

against Africans. In 1936, the Movement changed its name to the

Nigerian Youth Movement.

STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE NYM

Within a short time after the NYM was organized, branches were

formed in several parts of Nigeria, including Ibadan, Abeokuta and

several other cities and towns, mainly in southern Nigeria. There

were branches of the organization in some towns in the Northern

Region, such as Kano and Kaduna, but their membership was made

up of people mostly from the south. Lagos was the centre of major

activities and the headquarters of the movement.

Among the foundation members were Dr. J.C. Vaughan, H.O.Davies,

Ernest Ikoli and Samuel Akinsanya. Other leaders of the party were

Dr. Kofo Abayomi, Dr. Akinola Maja, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Mobolaji

Bank-Anthony, S.L Akintola, Jubril Martins, Obafemi Awolowo, S.O.

Sonibare, Duro Emmanuel and J.A. Tuyo. The average age of the

movement leaders in 1938 was 40. According to H.C. Davies in 1935,

the membership was over 20,000 in about forty branches, including

Enugu, Jos, Sapele, Ondo, Ijebu-Ode, Port Harcourt and so on.

OBJECTIVES OF THE NYM

1. The unification of tribes of Nigeria through the encouragement of

better understanding and cooperation.

2. The elevation of public opinion to a higher moral and intellectual

level

3. Complete autonomy within the British Empire and complete

independence in the local management of Nigeria affairs.

4. Compulsory and free mass education

5. Voting right for all adult citizens

6. Separation of the judiciary from the executive

7. Opposition to discrimination in the salary of those who work

especially in the civil service where Africans were paid less than

Europeans with the same qualification.

ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND ASSESSMENT OF AIMS AND

OBJECTIVES OF NYM

In 1938, the NYM won the election to the Lagos Town Council and all

the three elective seats in the Legislative Council. It thereby displaced

Herbert Macaulay’s NNDP as the most important political party in

Lagos.

Although it fought hard to achieve its aims and objectives,

government did not cooperate with the organization. Through its

newspaper, the Daily Service, the NYM tried to educate the public on

many political issues. Many of the political leaders who ‘fought’ for

Nigeria until independence was won in 1960 were members of this

organization in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROONS

(NCNC)

In 1941, the resident or boarding students of King’s College, Lagos,

were asked to vacate their dormitories for soldiers and move to what

they considered inferior lodgings in town. They petitioned

government, but their petition was rejected. This led to a strike in

which 75 of the senior members of the school were expelled and 8 of

them conscripted or forced into military service. In June 1944, the

Nigerian Union of Students (NUS) called a ‘mass meeting’ at the

Glover Memorial Hall, Boadstreet, Lagos, to consider among other

things, the immediate formation of a representative national

committee.

Herbert Macaulay presided at this meeting and was elected president

of the patriotic association called the National Council of Nigeria

which the meeting decided to form. Nnamdi Azikiwe was elected

General Secretary. The NNDP of Macaulay joined the National

Council. By January, 1945, there were no less than 87 member

unions of the National Council, including three from the Cameroon.

The inclusion of the Cameroon led to change of the name of the

organization to National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons.

Membership was through existing organizations and not on an

individual basis.

STRUCTURE OF THE NCNC

In 1951, the NCNC adopted individual membership. Despite this in

many areas, particularly in some areas in the Western Region and

the Midwest, the party’s position was based on its alliance with other

local parties, such as Adelabu’s Mabolaje Grand Alliance and the Otu

Edo in Benin-City.

By 1959, Azikiwe claimed that the party had 142 branches in the

Eastern Region, thirty-seven in the North, one in Lagos and 126 in

the West. Each region had divisional or zonal headquarters, as well

as a regional working committee. The national headquarters was

situated in Lagos. The NCNC was not known for effective

organization, either at the national headquarters, the regional or zonal

divisional offices, or indeed the local offices. Its membership did not

include persons who could b e regarded as professional party

organizers.

LEADERSHIP, MEMBERSHIP AND SUPPORT OF THE NCNC

The first leader of the party was Herbert Macaulay, from whom

Nnamdi Azikiwe took over after the former’s death in 1948. Dr.

Michael Okpara took over from Azikiwe when the latter became

Governor-General in 1962. Other prominent members of the party

were Odeleye Fadahunsi, Alfred Nwapa, Eni Njoku, Okoi Arikpo,

Adegoke Adelabu, Dennis Osadebay, Festus Okotie-Eboh and

Adeniran Ogunsanya.

The strongest backing for the party came from the Eastern Region,

both in terms of membership and support at various elections

between 1951 and 1965. After the Eastern Region came the Mid-

West Region and then the Western Region. The support of the party

in the Northern Region was through its alliance with the Northern

Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), led by Aminu Kano.

SOURCE OF FINANCE FOR THE NCNC

Apart from overdraft from the African Continental Bank, the party

relied upon membership subscriptions, affiliation fees and dues, sale

of party constitution booklet and other item, levies on the salaries of

members of parliament and board members, as well as donations,

etc. as its sources of revenue.

SUCCESSES AND FAILURE OF THE NCNC

It was the NCNC that first introduced modern representative local

government system into Nigeria. During the leadership and

premiership of Michael Okpara, the party introduced even

development throughout the Eastern Region, especially into areas

now known as Abia, Enugu, Imo and Anambra states. The first

regional university-the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, was established

in the Eastern Region when Nnamdi Azikiwe was premier of the

region and leader of the party.

Proper organization was a problem for the party. Except in the

Eastern Region, not much was achieved in terms of co-ordinated

organization, even at the Federal or national level. As the oldest of

the three major political parties, it failed in its attempts to establish a

national outlook. With age, the party gradually withdrew into the

Eastern Region.

THE ACTION GROUP (AG)

The Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a cultural organization which brought the

Yoruba elite together, had been in existence for about two years

when the basic outlines of the MacPherson Constitution were drawn

up. Obafemi Awolowo was the General Secretary of the organization.

He was also the secretary of the organization’s committee on

constitutional reform. In March, 1950, he called a meeting of the

Yoruba elite at his residence in Ibadan. Only seven people, beside

himself, attended the meeting. These were Abiodun Akerele, S.O

Sonibare, Ade Akinsanya, J.Ola Adigun, Olatunji Dosumu and S.T.

Oredein. It was not until after the nineth private meeting of the group,

in March 1951, that the Action Group felt strong enough to announce

its existence. At its first public meeting, held at Owo in April, 1951,

Obafemi Awolowo was elected President and Bode Thomas General-

Secretary.

STRUCTURE OF THE ACTION GROUP

From the very beginning, membership was on an individual basis.

Any Nigerian, or any person resident in Nigeria and not less than

sixteen years old, could join. The lowest branch was at the local

government electoral ward level in each region. Next was the

divisional conference, which was made up of one or more local

government units. At the regional level were the regional

parliamentary council and the regional executive committee. The

regional parliamentary council was made up of the chairmen and

representatives of divisional conferences. At the federal level were

the federal executive council and the federal congress, which met

annually. There were federal officers, as well as regional and local

government offices of the party.

LEADERSHIP, MEMBERSHIP AND SUPPORT OF THE AG

The founder and leader of the party was Chief Obafemi Awolowo. He

was, in all respects, the “moving spirit” of the party. Other very

prominent members of the party were Bode Thomas, who was the

first general secretary and later deputy leader of the party; Samuel

Ladoke Akintola, Arthur Prest, Athomy Enahoro, Dauda Adegbenro,

Samuel Ikoku and many more. Ladoke Akintola succeeded Bode

Thomas (after the latter’s death) as deputy leader of the party and

later took over from Obafemi Awolowo as leader of the party and

premier of the Western Region.

At its inception the Action Group announced itself as a Western

Regional political organization. Even though it tried hard to be more

national, it remained essentially as it started-a Yoruba-dominated and

supported organization. Its influence outside the Yoruba area was

through alliances with smaller political parties, such as Joseph

Tarka’s United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), Josiah Olawoyin’s

Ilorin Talaka Parapo, and the Bornu Youth Movement (BYM), whose

interest it catered for.

SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR THE AG

There were five main source of finance. These were enrolment fees

and monthly subscriptions sale of flags, almanacs, handkerchiefs and

party publications, levies on the salaries of legislators and board

members, donations, as well as overdrafts and loans from the

National Bank of Nigeria Limited.

IDEOLOGY AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AG

The motto of the party was ‘Life More Abundant.’ Until about 1961,

the party, like most others in the country, was a party led and

financed by successful lawyers and businessmen. Although the

interests of the common man were of concern to the party, the

interest of the business men were also fully championed. From 1961,

however, the party attempted to give greater emphasis to the

interests of the common man than to those of the big businessmen.

This was one of the causes of the crisis in the party from 1962- 66.

It was the Action Group that first introduced free primary education in

Nigeria in 1955. It also introduced free health services for children

under eighteen years. The party was at the helm when the Western

Region was granted self government in 1957. It was reputed to be the

best organized, best financed and most efficiently run political party in

Nigeria between 1951 and 1962.

THE NORTHERN PEOPLES CONGRESS (NPC)

Like the Action Group, the NPC originated from a cultural

organization. The cultural organization from which the NPC rose was

called the Jamiyyar Jama’ar Arewa-Meaning the Northern Nigerian

Congress. This cultural association was started by R.A. B. Dikko, first

medical officer of Northern origin and D.A. Rafih in 1948. When the

cultural association became a political party in 1951, all civil servants,

including Dr. Dikko, were advised to resign their membership, Alhaji

Sanda, a Lagos merchant, was made Acting President of the new

political party. The motto of the party was ‘One North One People,

irrespective of religion, rank or tribe.

STRUCTURE OF THE NORTHERN PEOPLES CONGRESS

The party was open only to ‘people of Northern Nigerian descent.’

Outside of the Northern region, the party existed only in the Sabo

area, where most dwellers of Northern Nigerian descent lived. There

was no organizational structure in the real sense of the term. The

constitution of the party provided only a rough guide to its structure.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) was the policy-making

organ of the party until 1957, when it was replaced by the Central

Working Committee (CWC). Members of the federal legislature were

virtually excluded from the governing organ of the party, which was

dominated by members in the northern legislature. The NEC or CWC

met only occasionally. It met once between 1959 and 1965)

LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT OF THE NPC

Sir, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who became the leader

of the party in 1952 and Premier of the Northern Region in 1954, was

the chief decision-maker of the party until his death in January, 1966.

Nothing could be carried out in the name of the party particularly in

Northern Nigeria, of which the Sardauna did not approve. He

however consulted with a chosen few, such as Alhaji Tafawa Balewa,

the first and only Prime Minister of Nigeria, Muhammadu Ribadu, Isa

Kaita, Aliyu Makaman Bida, Kashim Ibrahim, Alhaji Usman Nagogo,

the Emir of Katsina and Alhaji Abubakar Bello, the Sultan of Sokoto.

This group constituted the top leadership of the party. The party’s

ideology was based on its motto ‘One North, One People’.

As its motto indicated, the party’s support came entirely from the

North and was over-whelming throughout the party’s existence. The

party did not try to seek support in other parts of the country.

SOURCE OF FINANCE FOR THE NPC

The NPC was secretive about its sources of finance. It would appear,

however, that some of the sources were dues from regional, federal

and board members, donations, as well as proceeds from the sale of

publications, lectures and social events.

ACIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF THE NPC

The party led the people of Northern Nigeria into active and sustained

collaboration with their Southern Nigerian compatriots for the

achievement of independence for Nigeria. It was conscious of the

need for a gradual introduction of modern systems of government into

Northern Nigeria.

The party was, in a way, rather narrow in the scope of its objectives.

Even when the opportunity was available, it refused to change its

name to the Nigerian Peoples Congress. Much more could have

been achieved for the common people of the party had the leadership

been more open-minded and appreciative of the need for change.

The party was slow in introducing mass formal education when the

other major political parties were doing so in other parts of the

country.

THE NEPU, UMBCM, NNDP, NDC, AND UNIP

Each of the three big political parties discussed so far dominated one

of the three regions of Nigeria. In each region, smaller parties existed

and were encouraged, and sometimes financed, by the bigger ones

from outside the state. These smaller parties were essentially political

parties formed by people in the minority areas of each region. Both

the NEPU and UMBC were prominent smaller parties in the Northern

Region. The NEPU was led by Mallam Aminu Kano and was

supported mainly by the poor people from what is now Kano State.

The UMBC was started and led by Joseph Tarka among the Tiv of

Benue-Plateau States. Other smaller parties in the Region were the

Bornu Youth Movement (BYM), which had its support among the

Kanuris and the Ilorin Talaka Parapo (ITP) led by Josiah Olawoyin,

with support from the Yoruba speaking people in Ilorin and Kabba

provinces.

In Eastern Region were the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the

Cameroon (DPNC), which was mainly a breakaway faction of the

NCNC, led by Kingsley Mbadiwe, and the United National

Independent Party (UNIP), which came into existence as a result of

the expulsion of some ministers and other legislators in the 1952-53

crisis in the NCNC. The party fought for a separate Calabar-Ogoja-

River State.

In western Region were the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) led by

Deppa Biriye and Melford Okilo. The NDC came into existence during

the 1964 Federal elections with the single purpose of creating a

Rivers State, and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP),

led by Ladoke Akintola. The (NNDP). The NNDP was a coalition of

Akintola’s breakaway group from the Action Group and Remi Fani-

Kayode’s breakaway group from the NCNC. Others were the Mid-

West Front and Adunni Oluwale’s Liberal Party.

ALLIANCES WITH THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

The Action Group was the champion of minority parties outside its

own region of influence. In the Northern Region, the UMBC, BYM and

ITP remained allied with the Action Group virtually throughout their

existence. The NEPU, on the other hand, remained in alliance with

the NCNC. In the Earthen Region, the UNIP was in alliance with the

Action Group. In the Western Region, the NDC and the NNDP,

particularly during the 1964 federal elections, allied with the NPC to

form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). This alliance competed

with the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) which was made

up of NCNC, Action Group, and the Northern Progressive Front (NPF

comprising the NEPU and UMBC).

PERFORMANCE OF THE NEPU, UMBC, AND NNDP AT FEDERAL

ELECTION, 1959 AND 1964

The NEPU and UMBC performed well in their areas of influence

during the two elections. In Zaria, Katsina and Kano provinces, the

NEPU performed very well against the NPC. In the Tiv area, the

UMBC was able to hold most of the seats allocated, during the two

elections.

In the Western Region, the NNDP formed the western Regional

Government from 1963-66. The election of 1965 in the region was

one of the worst elections ever conducted in Nigeria. Although the

party retained power in the region, the election was neither fair nor

free.

All the other small political parties did not perform well at the two

elections which they contested. Whatever limited electoral success

they scored had little effect on the major party which supported them.

REFERENCES

Lecture Handbook of Dr. Henry Alapiki on “Political Parties and

Pressure Groups in Nigeria” for Year three students of Political and

Administrative Studies Students of the University of Portharcourt.

1999.

Lecture Notebook of Dr. P.G.O Odondiri on “The Nigeria Constitution”

for Year Two students of Political and Administrative Studies

Students of the University of Portharcourt. 1998.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NIGERIAN SECOND REPUBLIC

The Second Republic was the republican government of Nigeria

between 1979 and 1983 governed by the second republican

constitution.

THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1979)

Following the assassination of Nigerian military Head of State,

General Murtala Mohammed in 1976, his successor General

Olusegun Obasanjo initiated the transition process to terminate

military rule in 1979. A new constitution was drafted, which saw the

Westminster system of government (previously used in the First

Republic) jettisoned for an American Presidential system. The 1979

constitution mandated that political parties and cabinet positions

reflect the "federal character" of the nation — Political parties were

required to be registered in at least two-thirds of the states, and each

state was required to produce at least one cabinet member.

The widely monitored 1979 election saw the election of Alhaji Shehu

Shagari on the NPN platform. On October 1, 1979, Shehu Shagari

was sworn in as the first President and Commander-in-Chief of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC POLITICAL PARTIES

Greater Nigerian People's Party (GNPP)

National Party of Nigeria (NPN)

Nigeria Advance Party (NAP)

Nigerian People's Party (NPP)

People's Redemption Party (PRP)

Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)

THE SECOND REPUBLIC: AN OVERVIEW.

In the program of transition to the Second Republic, the military

leaders' primary concern was to prevent the recurrence of the

mistakes of the First Republic. They believed that if the structures

and processes of government and politics that had proved

inappropriate in the First Republic could be changed, a stable and

effective civilian government would emerge. The transition was

therefore designed to address those fundamental issues, which were

historically divisive, and to establish new political institutions,

processes, and orientations. Except for the census, which remained

problematic, most issues that threatened the stability and survival of

the federation were addressed. The revenue allocation process was

altered based on the recommendation of a technical committee,

despite the politicians' rejection of its recommendation. Local

governments were also streamlined and made more powerful by the

1976 reforms.

The second aspect of the transition involved the making of a new

constitution and appropriate institutions. A Constitution Drafting

Committee (CDC) was appointed in 1975 under the chairmanship of

a leading lawyer, Rotimi Williams, and, in 1977, a Constituent

Assembly (CA) composed of both elected and appointed officials

examined and ratified the draft constitution. After final ratification by

the SMC, the Constitution was promulgated in 1979. Political Parties

were formed, and new corrective national bodies, such as the Code

of Conduct Bureau, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, and

Public Complaints Commission, were established. The most far-

reaching changes of the transition were made in the area of

institutionalizing a new constitutional and political system.

At the inauguration of the CDC, Murtala Muhammad outlined the

objectives of transition as the continuation of a federal system of

government with constitutional law guaranteeing fundamental human

rights, maximum participation, and orderly succession to political

power. To avoid the pitfalls of the First Republic, the new constitution

was designed to eliminate political competition based on a system of

winner-takes-all, broaden consensus politics to a national base,

eliminate over-centralization of power, and ensure free and fair

elections. The SMC suggested that these objectives could be met by

recognition of national rather than sectional parties, controls on the

proliferation of parties and on the creation of more states, and an

executive presidential system similar to that in the United States. In

addition, the federal character of the country was to be reflected in

the cabinet; an independent judiciary was to be established as well as

corrective institutions.

The draft constitution incorporated these elements. When the CA met

to ratify the constitution, a few issues were highly volatile. The most

notable was the matter of sharia law, which Muslims argued should

be given appellate jurisdiction at the federal level. Most Christian

members of the assembly vehemently opposed this. Only the

intervention of the head of state resolved the situation. Although the

sharia clause was deleted from the constitution, the cleavage

between Christian and Muslim groups persisted. Other controversial

issues included the creation of more states, the determination of an

age limit for participation in politics (intended to eliminate most

discredited politicians who had actively participated in politics in the

First Republic), and the scope of the executive president's powers.

After the CA completed its work, the SMC added a few amendments,

including use of Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba as additional official

languages in the National Assembly and applying the federal-

character principle to the composition of the armed forces' officer

corps.

By Decree No. 25 of 1978, the 1979 constitution was enacted. The

constitution differed from that of the First Republic in 1963 in that it

introduced a United States-type presidential system in place of the

parliamentary system. Previously, the executive branch of

government derived its powers from the legislature. Under the 1979

constitution, the president and vice president, as well as state

governors and their deputies, were elected in separate elections. The

elections had the federation and the state, respectively, as

constituencies. Furthermore, while the Senate was largely a

ceremonial body in the First Republic, the new constitution gave the

Senate and House of Representatives coequal powers.

There were other provisions in the 1979 constitution that aimed at

eliminating past loopholes. The first was the federal- character

principle, which sought to prevent the domination of power by one or

a few states, ethnic groups, or sections at the federal center, and by

one or more groups in the states and local government areas. The

principle required that the composition of the cabinet, boards, and

other executive bodies, as well as appointments to top government

positions, should reflect the federal character or diversity of the

country at the particular level of government. This principle also

applied to the composition of the armed forces. The principle was

extended to the distribution of national resources, such as the siting

of schools and industries.

The question of party politics became a constitutional matter. In view

of the need for a limited number of national political parties, the

constitution specified certain criteria that parties had to meet in order

to be registered: the name, emblem, or motto of the party could not

contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the party the image

of a sectional party; membership in the party should be open to all

Nigerians irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation; the party

headquarters must be in the federal capital; and the executive

committee of the party should reflect the federal character of the

country. The task of registering political parties and conducting

elections was given to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO).

The necessity for national parties resulted from the conviction that the

disunity of the First Republic was engendered by the regional parties

then operating. When the ban placed on political activities in 1966

was lifted in September 1978, at least fifty-three political associations

were formed. Seventeen of them applied for registration, but only five

were registered: the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian

People's Party (NPP), the United Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great

Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), and the People's Redemption Party

(PRP). In 1981 a sixth party, the Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), was

registered.

Contrary to the expectations of the drafters of the constitution and the

military rulers, most of these parties resembled the ethno-regional

ones of the pre-1966 period although, legally, parties were required to

transcend ethno-regional bases. The only exceptions were the NAP,

which proclaimed itself a "new breed" party, and the NPN, which

despite its regional antecedents, was probably the only national party

in Nigeria. The UPN was a resurrection of the AG with its Yoruba

core; the NPP was a rejuvenation of the NCNC with its Igbo core and

strands of middle-belt support; the PRP recalled Kano's NEPU; and

the GNPP, which appeared initially to be a new minority’s formation,

had its strength within the Kanuri section of the north. Apart from the

PRP, which flickered as a radical party, and the populist NAP, the

other parties appeared to be parties of the wealthy class or those who

aspired to join it, for whom politics was a means of enriching

themselves and consolidating their material base. Given this

character of the registered parties, it can be argued that the

perceived need to balance the power groups in the country rather

than the constitutional requirements decided which parties were

registered.

In the 1979 presidential election, NPN candidate Shehu Shagari was

declared the winner, even though many people thought he did not

meet the full requirements. He obtained a simple majority of the total

votes cast in the federation but failed to get 25 percent of the total

votes cast in thirteen states of the federation. The latter was the

generally accepted interpretation of the constitutional requirement

that the winner of the presidential election should obtain 25 percent of

the total votes cast in two-thirds of the nineteen states of the

federation. Shagari obtained 25 percent of the votes in twelve states

but got only 19 percent in the thirteenth state. When FEDECO

declared Shagari the winner "in the absence of any legal explanation

or guidance in the electoral decree," Awolowo, the presidential

candidate and leader of the UPN, led other defeated candidates and

their parties to challenge the declaration in the electoral tribunal and

later in the Supreme Court. But the challenge was to no avail. The

controversy led to strong anti-NPN, anti-Shagari sentiments in

several states controlled by the other parties. Once the NPN

succeeded in consolidating power at the center, the attraction it held

was strong enough to tear the other parties asunder. Consequently,

the history of the Second Republic is replete with interparty and

intraparty schisms and federal-state conflicts.

At the domestic level, the NPN-controlled federal government

embarked on politically expedient but uneconomic projects, such as

establishing a federal university in every state, commissioning iron

and steel plants that remain unfinished in 1990, and indiscriminately

awarding contracts to build the new Federal Capital at Abuja. To

finance these projects, the government relied heavily on foreign loans

and aid. While the external debt of the country increased, the lot of

the common citizen worsened. The global economic recession in the

early 1980s and the collapse of crude oil prices in the world market

accelerated the economic decline of the Second Republic. By the

time Shagari decided to initiate IMF-inspired austerity measures

under the Economic Stabilization Act (1982), the problems of the

economy required more drastic measures. This act, however,

provided the blueprint for the austerity measures subsequently

introduced by Buhari and by Babangida.

The demise of the Second Republic was accelerated by the tension

generated by the 1983 general elections, which were similar to those

of 1964-65. As in the earlier elections, two major political camps were

involved in the contest: the NPN and the Progressive Parties Alliance,

comprising the UPN, the NPP, and factions of the PRP and the

GNPP. The NPN won landslide victories even in states considered

traditional strongholds of the other parties. In several places, violence

erupted, and every election was contested in court. A number of the

electoral verdicts were rescinded in view of evidence that results

were falsified. Under these circumstances the military intervened in

December 1983.

THE NATIONAL PARTY OF NIGERIA (NPN)

The NPN as a political party first came into being when sir Abubakar,

the Sultan of Sokoto celebrated his fortieth anniversary as dignitaries

assembled in Sokoto. The most important of these were former

members of the NPC. The meeting of the constituent Assembly on

the 1979 constitution gave the early members of the NPN an

opportunity not only to meet together more regularly, but also to invite

southern political leaders to join them in what was initially called the

National Movement. The National Movement was a grouping of

states, rather than individual. This was to ensure that what emerged

as the NPN was made up of people from all the 19 states.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NPN

There were four levels of organization level; one was made up of the

town, clan, district and ward. The local government area was

classified under level two. The third level was the state, while the

national level constituted the fourth level. Each of these levels had a

secretariat. The national convention was the supreme authority of the

party. Its meetings were held once in a year, but a special convention

could be held at any time, at the request of the national executive

committee, or two-thirds of all the state executive committees. Apart

from the national executive committee, which was a very large group,

there was also a national working committee, which was responsible

for the day-to-day administration of the party. This body was made up

of the national chairman, the president and vice-president of the

country (following the success of the party at the 1979 federal

elections), two Deputy National Chairmen, nineteen National Vice-

Chairmen, the National Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the National

Treasurer, the National Legal Adviser, the Leader in the Senate and

the House of Representatives and three other persons elected by the

National Executive Committee.

LEADERSHIP AND FOLLOWERSHIPS OF THE NPN

Although the major offices of the party were shared according to the

four-zones to which the country was divided, (i.e. northern, western,

eastern, and minorities), the leadership of the party rested with the

northern group. The most critical positions-the presidency or

presidential candidacy and the national secretary-were held by the

northern group of states. Other important positions in the party-the

national chairman (western group of states) vice Presidential

candidate (eastern group of states) presidency of the Senate

(Minorities) – were meant to show the national character of the party.

During the 1979 elections, the minority states (Bendel, Benue, Cross

River, Plateau and Rivers) gave the NPN 56.99 percent of the total

votes cast during the presidential election. In the ten northern states,

however, the party had only 32.84 percent of the total votes cast. The

party won the presidency and seven governorship posts in 1979. In

1983, it was declared winner of the presidency and twelve

governorship positions, as well as a majority in the National

Assembly.

SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR THE NPN

The major sources of funding the party were: donations,allocation

from FEDECO, membership subscriptions, sale of party constitution

booklet and other items.

PARTY’S MANIFESTO AND ACHIEVEMENTS

The NPN was identified with two slogans and images. The slogan of

‘One Nigeria’ linked with the raised single fore-finger and the slogan

of ‘Green Revolution’. The main emphasis of the party was on food

and agriculture, housing, rural development, education, health,

defence and foreign policy.

Unfortunately, although the party was in control of the federal

government and seven of the nineteen states for four years, not much

could be said to have been achieved. A lot of money voted for

agriculture and housing, the two most important promises of the

party, was not spent to develop these areas of national need. The

NPN is generally adjudged as having been a total failure.

THE UNITY PARTY OF NIGERIA (UPN)

The UPN was the Action Group with a new name. Between 1966 and

1978 when party political activities were not allowed in Nigeria, the

major leaders of the banned Action Group in Western Nigeria

continued to meet under the umbrella of the committee of friends.

This made it possible and easy, as from 21 September, 1978, when

the ban on party politics was lifted, for this group to be transformed

into a political party, the UPN. The provision of the constitution on

party formation compelled the group to look for supporters and

members in other states in Nigeria. When the first convention, of the

party started on 2 September, 1978, three delegates represented

each of the 449 federal constituencies in the country.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UPN

The party had the following organs:

1. The national congress, which met once a year at such place

and time as prescribed by the national president

2. The national executive committee, which met as often and in

such places as prescribed by the national president, who also

presided over such meetings

3. State conferences held in each of the 19 states, at least once

every year, at such place and time as prescribed by the

Chairman of the state conference-who was the state Governor

or governorship candidate of the party.

4. State executive council

5. State constituency meeting and

6. Local or ward meeting

The UPN, unlike all other political parties of significance, gave its

national president unusual powers which made him the most

important man in the party.

UPN LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT

As with the Action Group of the first republic, Chief Obafemi Awolowo

was the leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria in every respect. He was

the base upon which the party was built and the pivot around which it

revolved. Due to the requirements of the constitution and the fact that

a presidential candidate had no hope of success without support from

at least two-thirds of the nineteen states of the country, important

party positions were distributed to members outside the Yoruba

States. Clement Gomwalk from Plateau State was the National

Secretary, while the National Treasurer was Chia Surma from Benue

State. The Vice-Presidential candidate of the party in 1978 was from

Anambra State and in 1983 from Bauchi State.

Although support for the party was restricted to the Yoruba-speaking

states, it was not because the party did not try to penetrate other

states in the country. However, all attempts, including, for instance,

the choice of a presidential running-mate from Bauchi in 1983, proved

unsuccessful. The party in 1979 won 29.18 percent of the total votes

in the presidential election. The strongest support came from the

Yoruba States where the party won all the Legislative Seats in the

State assemblies in Ogun and Lagos States, 65 of the 66 in Ondo

State and 117 of the 126 seats in Oyo State. The party won the

governorship race in 1979 in these four States, as well as Bendel.

SOURCE OF FINANCE FOR THE UPN

Like the NPN, the sources of financing the party were:donations,

allocation from the Federal Electoral Commission, membership

subscription, sale of party constitution booklets and other items. The

most important were donations and contribution from the Federal

Electoral Commission.

UPN MANIFESTO AND ACHIEVEMENT

The party had four cardinal principles which were:

1. Immediate free education at all levels

2. Integrated rural development

3. Free medical care

4. Full employment of all labour.

The party hoped to re-organise and modernize the economy, with

priority attention given to agriculture, industry, commerce,

transportation, telecommunication, postal services, electricity and

water.

The failure of the party to win the presidency was handicap in the

achievement of its objectives. In the states in which the party was in

control however, not much could be said to have been achieved. The

possible exception was Lagos State, where the governor, Chief

Lateef Jakande, is often acknowledged as having contributed, whilst

in office, towards improving the quality of life of the people of the

State.

THE NIGERIA PEOPLE’S PARTY (NPP)

The NPP was a product of the merger of three distinct political

associations which came into being between late 1977 and early

1978. These were club 19 (originally club 14), The progressive front

of the Eastern States and Lagos and the National Council of

Understanding and Solidarity (NCUS). The men who led club 19 from

Benue and Plateau States were Solomon Lar, Paul Unongo and Paul

Belabo, Ayuba Kadzi and Mvenda Jibo. The Eastern progressives

were led by Nnanna Ukaegbu, Basil Okafor, Matthew Mbu, Christian

Onoh, and Obi Wali. Adeniran Ogunsanya led the Lagos

Progressives.

In October 1978, club 19, the Progressives of Lagos and the Eastern

States and Waziri Ibrahim’s National Council of Understanding and

Solidarity agreed to come together as one political party. At the

National Convention of the party in Lagos on 18 November 1978, the

party split into two over whether or not the presidential candidate of

the party should also be its chairman. As a result, two political parties

emerged. One of these, the NPP, was later led by Dr. Nnamdi

Azikiwe and the other, the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), by

Waziri Ibrahim.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NPP

There were four levels of organization at the national level:

1. The National Convention, which met once a year was the supreme

organ and authority of the party.

2. The National Executive Committee (NEC), which was composed of

the national officers of the party, past national chairmen and all state

chairman as well as men holding important positions in the legislative

houses at the federal level. It met at least once in four months. It was

responsible for organizing and conducting the National Convention.

3. The national working committee, which served as a committee of

the NEC. It was made up of national officers mainly. It met more

frequent to perform many of the functions of the NEC.

4. The national parliamentary council, which was a Senate and

House of Representatives caucus, responsible for co-ordinating the

activities of the party’s members in the National Assembly.

5. At the State and Local government levels were:

i. The state convention,

ii. The state executive committee,

iii. The state working committee

iv. The state parliamentary council

v. The state consultative committee,

vi. The senatorial zonal meeting,

vii. The local government area general meeting

viii. The local government area executive committee

ix The state constituencies consultative meeting,

x The clan/ward/town/district general meeting and

xi The clan/ward/town/district executive committee.

NPP LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT

As we saw above, the party was led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. Other

leaders included Chief Adeniran Ogunsanya, R.B. Okafor, Obi Wali,

Jim Nwobodo, Sam Mbakwe, Solomon Lar, Paul Unongo and Alex

Fom.

At the 1979 elections, the party won three of the nineteen state

governorship elections. These were in Anambra, Imo, and Plateau

States. The strongest support for the party came from Imo and

Anambra States. Here, the party dominated in all the five elections. It

won all the senatorial seats in both States, and an overwhelming

number of seats in the House of Representatives and the State

Assemblies. The party had little followership in the Yoruba-speaking

States of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Ondo. The same was true in the

Northern States, except Plateau and Benue. Internal rift, as well as

other factors, reduces the party’s support in the Igbo-speaking States

in 1983.

SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR NPP

The sources of finance were: party registration and membership fees,

levies, subscriptions of members and branches, donations, proceeds

from entertainments, sale of badges, books and pamphlets, flags and

other items, allocation from the Federal Electoral Commission

(FEDECO).

THE NPP MANIFESTO AND ACHIEVEMENT

The party hoped to promote and sustain national unity, defend

Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and equal opportunity for

all, as well as protect the fundamental human rights, freedom and

opportunity for all persons. To this end, it emphasized the need to

reorder national economic priorities, transform the rural area,

modernize agricultural production, expand and improve public

utilities, provides free education in accordance with the provision of

the constitution, i.e. when feasible, and evolved a defence policy that

would make Nigeria a strong nation.

From all available evidence, especially from revelations at the military

tribunals set up in 1984 and 1985, the Nigerian People’s Party

achieved very little in terms of its objectives. Much financial resources

available to the party in the state it controlled were misused.

THE GREAT NIGERIA PEOPLE’S PARTY (GNPP)

As we saw above, the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP) came

into being as a result of the crisis in the Nigeria People’s Party (NPP)

in November, 1978.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GNPP

The party at the national level had the following organs:

1. The Congress

2. The Convention

3. The Executive Committee

4. The working committee and the strategic committee.

Of all these, only the congress was not supplicated at the state level

where, in place of the convention there was a conference.

At the local level were:

1. The general meeting

2. The executive committee and

3. The working committee

At the ward or district levels were:

1. The general meeting and

2. The executive committee.

The National Congress was the supreme authority of the party. It was

charged with the power of laying down the broad principles and

guidelines on which the party was run. It also had authority to raise

funds for the support of the party, to elect officers of the party and to

receive, debate and examine reports from the national executive

committee. Membership of the National Congress included all

national and state officers, all party members of the National

Assembly, all party members who were State Governors, or Federal

Ministers, their Deputies, as well as representatives of State and local

party organs. The congress met at least once in two years.

Membership of the National Executive Committee included all

national officers of party, all Federal Ministers, all Governors

belonging to the party, and leaders of the party at the National

Assembly. Like all Executive Committees, the NEC carried out the

decisions and directives of the party congress and convention.

Among its other functions were the formulation of broad party

proposals to congress for deliberation and approval. It met at least

twice in a year.

Acting as a committee of the NEC was the national working

committee, which also meet at least twice a year and was composed

of the national party officers. These were the Executive President,

five Deputy Presidents, nineteen Vice Presidents (who were

chairmen of state branches) a National Secretary, two Deputy

National Secretaries, four Assistant National Secretaries, a National

Financial Secretary, four Deputy National Financial Secretaries, a

National Treasurer, four Deputy National Treasurers, six Legal

Advisers, a National Publicity Secretary, two National Auditors and a

National Public Relations Secretary. The national working committee

was charged with the responsibility of carrying out the directives of

the NEC when it was not in session. One other body was charged

with acting on behalf of the NEC. This was the National Strategic

Committee which had a different composition but was, like the NEC

and other national organs of the party, presided over by the Executive

President.

GNPP LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT

The GNPP was formed, financed and led by Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. He

was the party’s Executive President and Presidential candidate at

both the 1979 and 1983 elections. Other leaders of the party were

Mohammed Goni and Abubukar Barde, who were the Governors of

Borno and Gongola States respectively. Before 1983, however, both

had problems with the party and decided to join other political parties.

Goni joined the UPN and Barde the NPP, each of them becoming the

Governorship candidate in his State for the 1983 elections.

At the 1979 elections the party performed fairly well. Even though it

won only 10.01 percent of the total votes cast at the Presidential

election, the party’s support was not concentrated in Borno and

Gongola. It was supported by at least fifteen percent of the electorate

in Bauchi, Borno, Cross River, Gongola, Niger and Sokoto States.

The party won one seat to the House of Representatives in Bauchi,

four seats to the Senate and twenty-two to the House of

Representatives in Borno, two seats to the Senate and four to House

of Representatives in Cross River State, one seat to the House of

Representative in Kaduna, one in Kwara and six in Sokoto. In

Gongola State, the party won two seats to the Senate and eight to the

House of Representatives. The GNPP also controlled the House of

Assembly in Borno State.

By 1983, due to various crises in the party, much of its 1979 support

had withered away. Consequently it performed poorly at the general

elections that year, winning neither Governorship nor House of

Representatives seat and only one Senate seat from Kwara State.

SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR GNPP

As with the other political parties, the sources of financing the GNPP

were levies, membership subscriptions, donations and Federal

Government allocation through the Federal Electoral Commission

(FEDECO).

THE GNPP MANIFESTO AND ACHIEVEMENT

Among the objectives of the GNPP were the promotion and

sustenance of the Unity of Nigeria, the integration and equality of the

people of Nigeria, without regard to ethnic affiliation, religion or sex

and the just and the equitable distribution of the fruits of economic

development among all states and citizens of Nigeria. The campaigns

of the party, both for the 1979 and 1983 elections, were based on the

slogan ‘Politics without Bitterness’. It promised a dynamic foreign

policy and better living standard for all Nigerians.

It was not possible for the party to carry out its objectives or fulfil its

promises, because it lost the presidential election. However, even in

the States in which the party won, the condition of Nigerians was

none the better for it. Education virtually came to a halt, medical

services were very poor and many workers who were still employed

were not sure of their pay at the end of each month.

THE PEOPLE’S REDEMPTION PARTY (PRP)

With the formation of the National Movement, which eventually

became the NPN, a group of racial socialists emerged in the Northern

States strongly opposed to the conservative National Movement. This

group included public servants like Abubakar Rimi and Balaraba

Musa as well as University Lecturers, such as A.D. Yahaya, Bala

Usman and Lekan Balogun at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

The group lacked a recognizable national leadership. When Aminu

Kano quarrelled with the National Movement he was warmly

welcomed as the leader of the People’s Redemption Party. Samuel

Ikoku, who came with him from the National Movement became the

National Secretary of the party.

ORGANISATONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRP

The party had several organs. The National Directorate was

composed of national officers, chairmen of state directorates, the

party parliamentary leader in each State Assembly, the Senate and

House of Representatives selected to represent each State in the

Federation, among which there had to be female members. Other

organs of the party were the national working committee, which was

made up of the national officers and met frequently to exercise the

powers of the National Directorate; state directorates, which reach

local branch of the party was represented by two delegates. Local

branches, which had their own directorates and chapters based on

wards, towns, villages, hamlets and clans. Each registered branch

elected its local officers annually.

After Malam Aminu Kano left the NPN, he took over the national

leadership of the PRP. At each State level, particularly in Kano,

Kaduna and to a lesser degree Bauchi, the governorship candidates

of the party provided leadership. In Kano and Kaduna, Alhaji

Abubakar Rimi and Alhaji Barabe Musa, who were governors of the

two States respectively, led the party, even when it was in crisis.

Other leaders of the party included Samuel Ikoku who, before his

return to the NPN in 1982, was the National Secretary of the party.

Alhaji Bakin Zuwo, was a Senator from 1979-1983 and the Governor

of Kano State after the 1983 elections, and Michael Imoudu, who was

the deputy National President of the party at its inception and later

the leader of the faction named after him during the crisis. Other

leaders of the party included Alhaji A.M. Rimi who took over the

governorship of Kaduna State when Balarabe Musa was removed,

A.Y. Eke, chairman of the Bendel State directorate of the party, and

Lekan Balogun from Oyo state. Alhaji Hassan Yusuf, who was the

party’s Governorship candidate for Borno State became the

presidential candidate after the death of Malam Aminu Kano.

At the 1979 elections, the party won two Senate seats in Kaduna and

the five seats allocated to Kano State. In all, the party was supported

by only 7.26 percent of the electorate at this senatorial election.

There was a slight improvement in the support given to the party

during the election to the House of Representatives. About 10.91

percent of the total electorate voted for the party, giving the party

forty-nine seats in the 449- seat assembly. Although the party won

the governorship election in Kaduna State, it was able to capture only

sixteen seats in the State assembly out of the ninety-nine seats

available. At the presidential election, the party retained its electoral

support of 10.28 percent, beating the GNPP to the fourth place.

As with the GNPP, the party’s internal crisis during the 1983

elections, coupled with the death of Aminu Kano, weakened the

support of the party during those elections. The PRP won only the

Kano governorship election and, even so, with a considerably

reduced majority of just five Senate seats and forty-one seats in the

House of Representatives.

SOURCE OF FINANCE FOR THE PRP

Financially, the PRP was the weakest of the political parties. There

were very few in the party who could be said to be wealthy and willing

to donate huge sums of money to the party. However, like the other

political parties, it depended on membership fees, levies, donations

and Federal Government Allocation through the Federal Electoral

Commission (FEDECO).

THE PRP MANIFESTO AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Unlike the other political parties, the PRP distinguished between its

programme and its manifesto. It viewed manifestos as statements of

practical solutions to national, political, social, economic and

diplomatic problems. Programmes, to the party, meant objectives,

hopes or what it called ‘keys to a radical transformation of society’.

The party was of the view that it is necessary to bring about a radical,

comprehensive social transformation of Nigeria in order to bring

about full national liberation, national cohesion and true democracy

which would lead to the formation of a people’s democratic state

under which the people would create an independent, balanced and

self-sustained national economy, regain their self respect and re-

assert their cultural identity. The party, through its own organization,

hoped to achieved collective leadership, centralized direction and

discipline.

It felt that Nigeria needed to eliminate foreign domination of her

economy, reduce inequalities in the distribution of wealth, maintain

guaranteed income levels for every citizen, de-colonize Nigerian

mentality and develop a political ideology based on African social

values.

The PRP manifesto was the most radical of all the party manifestoes.

However, the party had very little chance of implementing its plans.

The opportunities in Kano and, to a less extent, in Kaduna, where it

was voted into power, were effectively utilized. For four years, despite

the leadership crisis which erupted soon after the 1979 elections in

the party and the opposition of the emirs, Abubakar Rimi’s

government tried hard to bring about a new society in Kano.

Education received great attention and support. While the concept of

leadership based solely on traditional heritage and privileges was

seriously challenged. New opportunities were opened up for the

under-privileged. In Kaduna State, the state legislature controlled by

the NPN undercut, in every possible way, the various attempts of

Balarabe Musa’s Government to transform the State socially and

politically. During his short time in office, however, he abolished the

payment of poll tax, cattle-tax and income rates’ for poorly paid

workers. Land was made available to the poor who tilled it and made

a reasonable living from its yields.

THE NIGERIA ADVANCE PARTY (NAP)

The Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) was one of the nineteen political

association that applied for registration as political parties in 1978,

when the Federal Electoral Commission, under Chief Michael Ani,

invited applications. The party was not given official recognition

because it was said to have failed the tests applied by the electoral

commission. However, the party was given official recognition on 25

May, 1982, by the new commission under Justice Victor Ovie-

Whiskey. The NAP thus qualified to be one of the six political parties

that contested the 1983 elections. It was founded by Tunji

Braithwaite, a lawyer from Lagos, who called the party a

‘Revolutionary Vanguard Party of the Peasants, Youths, Intelligentsia

and the masses of the country.’ The party had as its watch ward

‘Change, Radical Change’. In other words, the Nigerian Advance

Party was of the view that revolution was the only solution to Nigeria’s

problems. The leader of the party was the youngest among the

leaders of all the political parties recognized in 1982.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAP

Like all the other parties earlier discussed, the NAP had its National

and State Executive Committees. The highest body was the congress

of the party which, because of the newness of the party, could not

meet frequently. It was this national congress which, at its meeting on

20 December, 1982; nominated Tunji Braithwaite as the presidential

candidate of the party. Membership of the congress was made up of

delegates from the State braches of the party.

The National Executive Committee included all national officers of the

party and the State chairman of the party. When the congress was

not in session, the national executive committee carried out the

decision and directives of the congress. It was this body that

formulated the broad policy positions of the party. Below the State

level were Local branches of the party at the Local Government level.

The structure of NAP had not matured before the military returned to

power in December, 1983. In other words, the NAP had a legal

existence of about one year only.

NAP LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT

Apart from Tunji Braithwaite, who was the presidential candidate of

the party and his running mate, Alhaji Usman Girei from Gongola

State, other leaders of the party were Emeka Onyemelukwe,

(Anambra), Malam Uba Mohammed (Bauchi), Joseph Udi (Bendel),

Emmanuel Ugba (Benue) Arabi Bello (Borno), Eddie Utik (Cross

River), Chahari Elkanah (Gongola), Mannaseh Nwosu (Imo), Ubala

Tijani (Kano). Musa Salami (Kwara), Bola Ayandele (Lagos), Dapo

Ilori (Ogun), Dare Omoboye (Ondo), Oladele Ojo (Oyo), Reuben

Kutok (Plateau),Joseph Sodinenye (Rivers). These men were the

governorship candidates for the party in 1983.

Even though it would appear that the party was widely represented all

over the country, since it contested sixteen out of a possible nineteen

governorship seats, it actually enjoyed little national support going by

the number of votes cast for it.

THE NAP’S SOURCES OF REVENUE

Membership fees, levies, donations and Federal Government

allocations were the official sources of revenue for the party. The

NAP was, financially, one of the weakest political parties in 1983. It

would appear that most of its revenue came from the leadership of

the party, and in particular from Tunji Braithwaite himself, as its

presidential candidate and founder.

OBJECTIVES OF THE NAP

The main objectives of NAP were stated as sign-posts to change.

These, it believed, would enable Nigeria to become a highly

advanced, industrial, agrarian nation. The signposts were:

1. No more NEPA (ie National Electric Power Authority) but YES,

that is, Universal Electrification System.

2. Socialism is freedom from exploitation, freedom from

harassment.

3. There must be free-flow of water for every Nigerian

4. Revolution in agriculture will lead to surplus food, surplus

money from food export and industrialization.

5. Pupils and students will be regarded as workers and so will be

given monthly allowance from the time they are in secondary

school until they complete university education.

6. Mosquitoes and rats must be eradicated

7. Modern roads, residential sidewalk and compulsory

accommodation will be provided for all workers and the

peasants

8. All Nigerians will have a health insurance policy for a small free.

As already stated, the major objective of NAP was to change the

Nigerian society, by revolution, so as to introduce a new way of life

for all.

NAP’S ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND ACHIEVEMENT

The party did not win any electoral seat in any legislative house in

the nineteen states of the federation. It also did not win any seat in

the National Assembly. As a matter of fact, a very large number of

its candidates lost their deposits at the elections for which they

were candidates.Tunji Braithwaite, the presidential candidate of

the party and his running mate Usman Girei, had the least number

of votes at the presidential election of 1983.

The NAP was, in its own way, able to get young, radical men and

women across the country to take part in the election, not only by

voting but also by running for office. Many of its candidates, either

for governorship legislative positions, were formerly members of

other political parties who joined the NAP mainly in order to

become electoral candidates.

REFERENCES

Lecture Handbook of Dr. Henry Alapiki on “Political Parties and

Pressure Groups in Nigeria” for Year three students of Political and

Administrative Studies Students of the University of Portharcourt.

1999.

Lecture Notebook of Dr. P.G.O Odondiri on “The Nigeria Constitution”

for Year Two students of Political and Administrative Studies

Students of the University of Portharcourt. 1998.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION (NRC)

AND THE SOC IA L DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP)

Military government headed by General Ibrahim Babangida came

to power in 1985. By 1986, the government set up a transition

programme which was the agenda of the process of handing

power over to civilian politicians by 1989. The government set up

two political parties namely, the National Republican Convention

(NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Prior to the setting

up of the above two parties, the government had asked Nigerians

to form political parties. Of the thirteen associations that applied for

registration, none was approved by the government. Consequently

upon the disqualification of the association, the government set up

the NRC and SDP.

In setting up the two political parties, the government argued that

the aim was to provide a ‘grassroots’ basis for the emergence of

political parties that would serve as organs of socio-economic

mobilization, and which would establish a platform for new

leadership and give equal rights and opportunities to all Nigerians

to participate in the political process.

The government also argued that in setting up the parties, they

were guided by past events in the country which made money so

important in the participation in politics, and subsequently

engendered violence due to intra-party conflicts and alliances.

STRUCTURE OF THE NRC AND SDP

Membership of the two parties is open to every citizen of Nigeria

irrespective of the person’s religion, ethnic group, place of birth,

sex, social or economic status. The person must not be below the

age of 18 years and can only belong to one party at a time.

Application for membership is made on an individual basis. It is

also mandatory that a person wishing to be a member of either

party must be registered as a member of the party of his choice at

the ward in which he or she resides. The organization of the

parties which are of four levels are as follows;

1. The ward

2. Local government area

3. The state; and

4. The national level.

The constitutions of the parties also provided for a functioning party

secretariat at the above levels of the party organization. In addition,

the organisational structures of the parties are as;

1. The ward executive committee

2. The ward congress

3. The local government area executive committee

4. The local government area congress

5. The state executive be committee

6. The state congress

7. The national executive committee

8. The national convention

PARTY LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT OF NRC AND SDP

Because the two parties were established by government there were

no people who could be regarded as founding fathers or as leaders

and founders of the parties. Thus, at their first national convention in

July 1990 the parties elected the following as their principal officers;

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE NRC

Chairman Tom Ikimi

Deputy Chairman S.O. Lawani

National secretary Usman Alhaji

Publicity secretary Doyin Okupe

Treasurer Chris Adighije

Financial secretary Abubakar Buba

Legal Adviser Rafiu Ariso

Auditor Aliyu Yelwa

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE SDP

Chairman Baba Gana Kingigbe

Vice Chairman Augustine Ademola Babalola

National Secretary Ebene Osieke

Publicity Secretary David Lornen

Treasurer Hammani Bazza

Financial Secretary Frank Kokori One

Legal Adviser Ogana Lukpata

Auditor Sambo Mohammed Koko

As at the middle of 1991, the support enjoyed by the parties could

only be measured by their performance at the first nationwide local

government elections held on 8 December, 1990, when candidates

stood for elections for the offices of local government chairmanships

and councillorships. At the local government election, the NRC won

206 seats while the SDP won 232 of the chairmanship in country. In

the councillorship election the NRC had 2,558 candidates elected as

councillors while SDP had 2,934 candidates elected as councillors.

Going by the December 1990 local government elections, it appears

that the two parties enjoyed relatively equal support nationwide.

SOURCE OF REVENUE FOR NRC AND SDP

It will be noted that the two parties were established by the

government, consequently, their major source of finance was

government subvention; although the constitutions of the parties

mandated each party member to pay the prescribed annual

membership fee as may be levied by the party.

Again, the decree that set up the parties made provision for

contributions by party sympathizers. Although contributions are

acceptable, no individual nor organizations must donate or contribute

more than N100, 000 in a given year to a party, or N50,000 to a party

candidate.

MANIFESTOES OF THE NRC AND SDP

The manifesto of the NRC is rooted in the free enterprise economy in

which individuals will be allowed to participate by owning businesses

of their choice and on any scale. Thus the party hopes to build for the

country a system of political economy created substantially on

individual initiative, open choices and a free, competitive market.

On the other hand, the manifesto of the SDP states that a

government of the SDP will strive to build a self-reliant economy that

will develop on the strength of the nation’s resources and by the effort

of the people. The party plans to pursue this objective by making the

state play a leading role in the economy in order to achieve a self-

reliant and just society. It also plans to bridge the gaps between the

rich and the poor through an equitable income distribution policy and

by providing full and gainful employment for all citizens.

THE 1998-1999 DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN NIGERIA

General Abudulsami Abubakar planned the transition, which brought

into power the civilian regime. The Abubakar political transition

programme (June 1998 - May 1999) is the shortest in Nigeria’s

political history, lasting barely one year. In order to understand and

explain the present situation, there is need to reflect on the past. It is

on this premise that this section will x-ray the democratisation

programme of the Abubakar Military regime and set in context the

nature of the civilian regime that was established through the

transition process, the Fourth Republic.

However, the 1998-1999 transition programme was against the

background of two successive military authored political transition

programmes, which were dubious to start and ended up in fiasco.

The first was the lengthy political transition programme of the

Babangida regime (1985-1993) and the second by the Abacha

regime (1995-1998). The Abacha transition programme, like the

Babangida episode, was a political fraud designed to entrench

General Abacha in power and was inconclusive due to his death in

June 1998. The demise of General Sanni Abacha, on June 8, 1998,

ushered in the regime of General Abubakar Abdulsalam. Thus, he

became Nigeria’s Head of state, the second day after Abacha’s

death, in circumstances still shrewd in secrecy. Immediately on

assumption of the reins of power, Abdulsalam began a new

democratization course for the country.

On assumption of office, General Abdulsalam Abubakar set a new

agenda for the political and economic rejuvenation of the country. His

first focus was how to launch the country back into the comity of

nations. This he found necessary due to the fact that his

predecessor’s audacious rule had won some sanctions for Nigeria

from the international community. Also, due to the sanctions imposed

on Nigeria because of human rights violations and protracted military

rule, the economy of the country was seriously affected. Therefore,

General Abubakar’s administration was faced with the task of

rebuilding the economy. This he did by travelling to western nations

to solicit support for his regime and the economy.

The greatest and most important task for the regime was how to

return the country to civil rule after several futile attempts by his

predecessors. In doing this, General Abubakar embarked on

reconciliation and consultations with different people and groups in

the country. He admitted the failure of past attempts at

democratisation in the country. In his national broadcast of Monday

July 20, 1998, he said: While recrimination and buck-passing would

be unhealthy, we must admit that mistakes have been made,

particularly as our most recent attempt at democratisation was

marred by manoeuvring and manipulations of structures and actions.

At the end, we have only succeeded in creating a defective

foundation on which a solid democratic structure can neither be

constructed nor sustained. This is an overwhelming verdict from our

consultations (Guardian, July 21, 1998:15).

In the light of this, he dissolved the five political parties registered by

the Abacha regime and their assets were taken over by

administrators appointed by the government. Similarly, all previous

elections conducted under these parties were cancelled, for lack of

credibility. Immediately, senior civil servants were posted to take

charge of local government councils, for the management of their

affairs. In a bid to convince the world that the country has finally

turned to the path of democracy, Abubakar pledged not to interfere

with party formation.

Consequently, Abacha’s electoral commission, the National Electoral

Commission (NECON), was dissolved and a new electoral body was

established. This he called the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC), which was headed by Justice Ephraim Akpata, a

retired Supreme Court judge. This body was charged with the

responsibility of registering political parties, registration of voters and

the conduct of elections.

Furthermore, in an attempt to march towards a genuine and fully-

fledged democratic civilian rule, many transition implementation

agencies established by the Abacha regime were dissolved. These

include the Transition Implementation Committee (TIC), National

Reconciliation Committee (NARECOM) and Power Devolution

Committee (PDC). The decrees establishing those agencies were

also repealed. With all these reformations, political activities resumed

in all parts of the country. The electoral commission opened the

floodgate for party registration, with some specific guidelines. Thus,

about fifty political associations emerged within a month. However,

only thirty of them collected registration forms from INEC

headquarters and, by the end of the close of submission of

registration forms, only twenty-four of these associations had

returned their forms. Out of these twenty-four associations, only nine

of them met the conditions for registration of political parties, in

accordance with INEC guidelines. Consequently, nine political

associations were registered provisionally as political parties. These

include the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Peoples Party (APP),

Democratic Alliance Movement (DAM), Peoples Democratic Party

(PDP), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), United Democratic Party

(UDP), the United Peoples Party (UPP) and the Movement for

Democracy and Justice (MDJ). On December 5, 1998, the election

for local government councils was held. This election was used as a

yardstick for the final registration of political parties. The electoral

guidelines stated, among other things, that any party that would

eventually be registered must score at least a minimum of five

percent of the total number of votes in at least 24 states. Fulfilling this

and other conditions, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), All Peoples

Party (APP) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) were granted full

and final registration by the Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC) as the three parties that qualified to participate in

the remaining elections of the transition programme.

The result of the chairmanship and councillorship elections into the

local government councils showed the AD having 100 chairman and

1,071 councilors, APP, 459 chairmen and 4,650 councilors while MDJ

got three chairpersons and 61 councilors. NSM and PRP won two

chairmanship seats each, with 8 and 21 councillorship seats

respectively. The UPP won one chairmanship and 26 councillorship

seats, while DAM and UDP won no chairmanship seat but managed

to get 4 and 26 councillorship seats, respectively. (Tribune,

December 15, 1998:2).

This result shows that the Peoples Democratic Party won the majority

of the chairmanship and councillorship seats and also has a wider

geographical spread than the remaining parties. This result also

shows that the All Peoples Party (APP) came second with votes

drawn from the north. The Alliance for Democracy (AD) came third

with the concentration of their support from the south-western part of

the country.

On January 9, 1999, Governorship and Houses of Assembly

elections were held nationwide. The results were not all that different

from the pattern the local government elections took. The Peoples

Democratic Party (PDP) maintained its lead by winning twenty-one

Governorship seats, the All Peoples Party (APP), won nine

Governorship seats and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) maintained

its domination of the south-western states by winning in six south-

western states. Elections into the state Houses of Assembly also

showed the same pattern of victory by the political parties. That

election was followed by the National Assembly election, which was

held on February 20, 1999. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)

also maintained its lead, by winning sixty-nine Senatorial seats and

majority seats in the House of Representatives election; it was

followed by the All Peoples Party (APP), which won twenty-one

Senatorial seats and had a considerable number of seats in the

House of Representatives. The Alliance for Democracy (AD)

maintained its third position by winning nineteen Senatorial seats and

the least number of seats in the House of Representatives. The major

upset of that election was the AD victory of two Senatorial and two

House of Representatives seats in Enugu State, which was one of

the strong bases of the Peoples Democratic Party in the Eastern part

of the country.

Due to the dominance of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in all

previous elections, the scene was set for an easy win for any

presidential candidate presented by that party. As the February 27,

1999 presidential election drew nearer, the AD and APP fashioned

out an alliance to checkmate the unchallenged popularity of PDP. On

realising that General Olusegun Obasanjo (Rtd), was selected as the

presidential flag bearer of PDP, in the party’s presidential primaries

held in Jos, Plateau State, the AD and APP sealed their alliance talk.

Chief Olu Falae of the Alliance for Democracy was therefore chosen

as the joint presidential candidate of both the All Peoples Party (APP)

and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). The most interesting thing here

was that both presidential candidates were from the south-western

states of Ogun and Ondo, respectively. This was the first time in the

political history of the country when the presidential candidates came

from a particular zone of the country. This development may not be

unconnected with the fact that Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the acclaimed

winner of the June 12, 1993, presidential election (who eventually

died in detention, after the annulment of that election) was from that

zone. This gesture was ostensibly used to appease the Yoruba of the

south-western part of the country.

THE NIGERIAN THIRD AND FOURTH REPUBLIC

THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The march toward civilian rule in Nigeria moved to the crucial stage in

the last days of February 1999, with the presidential election. On

February 27, 1999, the presidential election was held. There was low

voter turnout in most parts of the country. The day after the election,

international observers or, more precisely, members of the

International Election Monitoring Group (IEMG), invited by the

government to allay fears of bias or “hidden agendas” in the

elections, in unison estimated voter turnout at about 20%. However,

the actual election results put the turnout at between 30% and 40%.

There was a widespread disparity between the number of voters

observed at the polling stations and the final results that were

reported from several states. Mr. Jimmy Carter, former President of

the United States of America, who was head of the Carter Centre,

one of the Election Monitoring Groups, subscribed to this view. Other

election monitoring groups, such as the National Democratic Institute

for International affairs, the Commonwealth Observer Group, the

European Union and the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a

coalition of Nigerian human rights and civil liberty groups, shared

Carter’s view on the irregularities during the election. Most of them,

however, said that they did not think the irregularities were massive

enough to question the result. This was partly informed by their

findings that both the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All

Peoples Party (APP) were involved in box stuffing and inflation of

election results, the commonest of the irregularities (Conscience

International, May 1999:19).

This notwithstanding, the result of the presidential election confirmed

the trend that emerged since the inception of elections in Abubakar’s

transition programme. The PDP maintained its lead in most states

and zones of the Federation. The hopes raised by the AD/APP

alliance proved misplaced, as the alliance lost many states to the

rampaging PDP. This, however, was attributed to the handling of the

alliance and the exit of many of the APP presidential aspirants from

the party on the eve of the election. In all, the PDP candidate,

General Obasanjo, won 18,738,15 votes representing 62.78% of the

votes, against the 11,110,287 votes representing 37.22% won by

Chief Olu Falae of the AD/APP presidential alliance.

The analysis of this result shows that PDP won in five of the nation’s

six geopolitical zones, conceding only the south-west to the rival

APP/AD alliance. This is a confirmation of the Yoruba’s grudge

against General Obasanjo. In his base he did not win a simple

majority in any of the six states, not even in his native Ogun State.

Worse still, he won the mandatory one-quarter of the votes only in

two of the states: Ogun and Ekiti States. The result was not surprising

because in all the six elections previously held in the transition

programme, Obasanjo’s PDP had consistently lost by wide margins

to the AD in that zone.

Using some irregularities observed by the international observers as

a basis, Chief Olu Falae rejected the outcome of the election, which

he eventually challenged at the law court. But, after some legal tussle

and pleadings from different quarters, the presidential election results

were upheld and on May 29, 1999, General Olusegun Obasanjo

(Rtd), who was a military head of state from 1979 to 1983, was sworn

in as the new President of Nigeria, amidst fanfare, by General

Abdulsalam Abubakar, in a manner akin to what General Obasanjo

did to Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. Also, the State Governors were

sworn in on the same day, in their respective states throughout the

federation. The National Assembly was also inaugurated some days

later.

It is noteworthy that Abubakar’s transition programme is seen by

many onlookers as a transfer of power from the military in uniform to

a military in mufti. Obasanjo, as a person was a military president

from 1976-1979. It is never a misnomer to say that his military

antecedents will seriously affect his leadership style. This reason

accounts for why the man got serious opposition from certain

quarters. People saw Obasanjo as an old wine in a new bottle. Also,

the three political parties that participated in the elections were

parties that were hurriedly put together in an effort to ease out the

military. All the three political parties lack an ideology and are made

up of strange bed fellows. This situation signals serious problems for

these parties and the nascent civilian experiment. Indeed, these

parties have been riddled with conflicts, crises, and serious divisions.

It can be said there are no parties in Nigeria presently, in the proper

sense of party functioning.

POLICY CONCERNS

There are three key areas in which there should be policy concern in

relation to the democratisation exercise. The first has to do with the

electoral body (INEC). How can Nigerians truly select an objective,

representative and public-inspired INEC? At present, it is said that

many members of INEC are card-carrying members of some political

party, which shows outright partisanship. Second is the issue of party

registration. The limit placed on the number of political associations to

be registered greatly limits the ability of people to freely express

themselves through party formation. The role of INEC should be

restricted to party identification rather than registration. Third is the

issue of inter-governmental relations. The Nigerian constitution is

unclear, inconsistent and even contradictory in many respects and

this has created loopholes for either the executive or the legislative

branches to manipulate, creating problems for the other party. There

is the vexing issue of corruption that has now rocked the National

Assembly. The institutional safeguard for corruption control, outside

of the framework of the enacted Anti-corruption Act, is quite weak.

There is, for instance, no protection for those who expose corruption.

Fourth, is the issue of oversight function that the National Assembly

should play. Here, there is need for a well-articulated policy

framework that will address the role of the Assembly in that regard.

The Executive sees it as contravening the principle of separation of

powers. This should not be the attitude.

Tied to that, there should be civil society initiative to monitor and

ensure accountability in public delivery capability. This will make civil

society and politicians alike to be vigilant and alive to their respective

responsibilities. Finally, there is need for a planned programme of

reform, re-orientation and revitalization for the military (Jega,

2001:14).

FOURTH REPUBLIC.

We have fifty (50) political parties today, but only twenty-two (22)

were registered in the list of Independent National Electoral

Commission (INEC) for the April 14 and 21, 2007general election that

held in all the 36 states of Nigeria with the office of the President, and

the National Assembly. Below are the political parties.

1. Action Congress (AC)

2. Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACN)

3. African Democratic Congress (ADC)

4. Alliance for Democracy (AD)

5. All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)

6. All People’s Party (APP)

7. All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA)

8. Democratic Alternative (DA)

9. National Democratic Party (NDP)

10. New Democratic (ND)

11. People’s Democratic Party (PDP)

12. People’s Redemption Party (PRP)

13. People’s Salvation Party (PSP)

14. United Nigeria People’s Party (UNPP)

15. Fresh Democratic Party (FDP)

16. Communist Party of Nigeria (CPN)

17. Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA)

18. People Progressive Party (PPP)

19. Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN)

20. National Conscience Party (NCP)

21. Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM)

22. African Renaissance Party (ARP).

THE STATES AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Abia State PPA

Adamawa State PDP

Akwa-Ibom State PDP

Anambra State APGA

Bauchi State ANPP

Bayelsa State PDP

Benue State PDP

Borno State ANPP

Cross-River State PDP

Delta State PDP

Ebonyi State PDP

Edo State PDP

Ekiti State PDP

Enugu State PDP

Gombe State PDP

Imo State PPA

Jigawa State PDP

Kaduna State PDP

Kano State ANPP

Katsina State PDP

Kebbi State PDP

Kogi State PDP

Kwara State PDP

Lagos State AC

Nassarawa State PDP

Niger State PDP

Ogun State PDP

Ondo State PDP

Osun State PDP

Oyo State PDP

Plateau State PDP

Rivers State PDP

Sokoto State PDP

Taraba State PDP

Yobe State ANPP

Zamfara State ANPP

FCT PDP

Note: The above is based on the 14 and 21 April 2007 general

election.

PDP 27 states

ANPP 5 states

PPA 2 states

APGA 1 state

AC 1 state.

THE ACTION CONGRESS (AC)

This is a classical liberal Nigerian political party formed via the

merger of the Alliance for Democracy, the Justice Party, the Advance

Congress of Democrats, and several other minor political parties in

September 2006.

The party was formed in 2006 in order to form a larger political

opposition to the federally-dominant centrist People's Democratic

Party and the Northern-based All Nigeria Peoples Party. On May 12,

2006, the provisional officers of the party (most of whom carried their

seats from the Alliance for Democracy) were replaced at the Kaduna

convention by ballot; Bisi Akande succeeded Hassan M. Zurmi as

National Chairman, and Bashir Dalhatu replaced Bumi

Omoseyindemi as National Secretary.

However, the party ran Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who defected

from the People's Democratic Party, as its presidential candidate in

the 2007 presidential election. Abubakar was disqualified from the

election by the Independent National Electoral Commission, but the

disqualification was later overturned by the Supreme Court.

Currently, the party's most prominent elected official is governor

Babatunde Fashola of Lagos State.

The party was torn apart by in-house fighting that led prominent party

Chieftain and Lagos State Gubernatorial Candidate, Femi Pedro, to

decamp to the Nigeria Labour Party. Pedro cited gross manipulation

within the party structure favouring Tinubu's candidates in South-

Western Nigeria as his reason for dumping the newly-formed Party.

Additionally, there have been rumours of cracks in the Party's initial

alliance with the prominent national opposition party, the All Nigeria

Peoples Party.

In the 21 April 2007 Nigerian National Assembly election, the party

won 32 out of 360 seats in the House of Representatives and 6 out of

109 seats in the Senate.

Following the victory of PDP candidate Umaru Yar'Adua in the 2007

presidential election, the AC has been pursuing a legal challenge to

the results. On July 6, 2007, the party announced its rejection of an

offer to join Yar'Adua's government (an offer that was accepted by

the ANPP and the Progressive Peoples Alliance), with a spokesman

saying that "there is no compelling moral, legal or political reason for

us to join a government that we have told the whole world stole its

mandate" and that participating in the government would mean

"partaking in stolen goods".

However, on August 7, 2007, the National Secretary, Bashir Dalhatu,

resigned (along with two other officials) over the refusal of the Action

Congress to take up Yar'adua's offer. He was replaced by the current

Secretary, Usman Bugaje.

THE ADVANCED CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS(ACD)

The Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD) was an opposition

political party in Nigeria, created and first registered in March 2006. In

September 2006, in merged into the newly (2005) formed Action

Congress. The ACD was primarily composed of former People's

Democratic Party members, and was one of a series of anti-Obasanjo

coalitions, beginning with the Movement for the Defence of

Democracy in 2005, and followed by the AC in 2006/2007. It

maintained a small independent organization after the 2007 elections,

while its leaders have merged into the AC.

The party was formed by opponents of a proposed constitutional

amendment that would allow incumbent President Olusegun

Obasanjo to seek a third term in office, and had its base of support in

the south west of Nigeria.

The then Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, a northerner who opposed a

third term for Obasanjo, was believed to back the new party from its

inception.

The ACD was largely made up of disgruntled PDP members who felt

they had lost power and patronage to the President's supporters.

Attempts by the President's supporters to amend the constitutional

two term limit, allowing President Obasanjo to continue in office for a

further four years, led to a rupture of the underlying tension within the

party.

Three of the founders of the ACD, Alhaji Lawal Kaita, Alhaji Bashir

Dalhatu and Audu Ogbeh, are former PDP politicians, and have

complained of harassment and detention by the government since

the ACD's founding. In March, ACD chair Alhaji Lawal Kaita, the

former PDP governor of Kaduna state was detained shortly after a

party rally was shut down by police in Dutse, Jigawa State.

The Vice President, who had previously shown no interest in running

for president, was in 2006 the main focus of these former PDP

politicians. He was widely expected to be a future Presidential

candidate of the ACD.

In September 2006, the ACD led the creation of a coalition with the

Alliance for Democracy, the Justice Party, and several other minor

political parties, and forming the Action Congress. Atiku Abubakar

was its presidential candidate in the 2007 General Election.

THE ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (AD)

This was a progressive opposition political party in Nigeria. It was

formed on September 9th 1998. At the 2003 legislative elections, 12

April 2003, the party won 8.8 % of the popular vote and 34 out of 360

seats in the Nigerian House of Representatives and six out of 109

seats in the Nigerian Senate. In September 2006 it merged with other

opposition parties to form the Action Congress party. The chairman

was Cief Mojisoluwa Akinfewa while the secretary was Dominique

Manzo Abubakar.

THE ALL NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY (ANPP)

This is a conservative political party in Nigeria. The chairman of

ANPP is Hon. Rtd Chief Edwin Ume-Ezeoke while Nya .E. Asuquo is

the Secretary. At the last legislative elections (21 April 2007), the

party won 27.0% of the popular vote and 92 out of 360 seats in the

House of Representatives and 27 out of 109 seats in the Senate. Its

candidate in the presidential elections of 19 April 2003, former military

ruler Muhammadu Buhari, won 32.2% of the vote. Buhari was again

the ANPP candidate in the 2007 presidential election, taking second

place and about 18% of the vote according to official results.

The ANPP is the household party in the extreme north of Nigeria,

primarily due to its mass appeal. It is the strongest opposition party,

controlling seven of the nation's thirty-six states. The party's biggest

achievement in the 2003 election was its gubernatorial victory in

Kano State where it defeated the ruling People's Democratic Party to

take control of one of the country's most populous state.

In the 21 April 2007 Nigerian National Assembly election, the party

won 62 out of 360 seats in the House of Representatives and 16 out

of 109 seats in the Senate.

Following the 2007 election, the ANPP challenged the victory of

Umaru Yar'Adua and his People's Democratic Party, although it was

announced on June 27, 2007, following talks, that the ANPP had

agreed to join Yar'Adua's government. There was reportedly

disagreement within the ANPP about the talks. Buhari subsequently

denounced the idea in a BBC interview and suggested that the

decision was only made by part of the party, alleging that they were

"just looking for jobs for themselves".

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

The ANPP is a right-wing conservative party with mass appeal. The

party draws its strength from the predominantly radical region of

Northern Nigeria, and strives to maintain the status quo of radical

politics in the Nigerian polity.

EARLIER INCARNATION

There was a party of the same name during the Second Republic,

which was banned following the Military Coup of 1984 led by General

Buhari.

The current party is a party with the same name but with little or no

resemblance or affinity or affiliation to the original ANPP and was

created in the National Election of 1999.

THE ALL PEOPLE'S PARTY (APP)

This was a former Nigerian political party. It was formed in late 1998

during a transition from military to civilian rule by a coalition of

associations that received considerable support under the regime of

Sani Abacha.

Most of the party's support came from the middle belt region and

parts of the north.

Following gubernatorial elections in January 1999, the People's

Democratic Party (PDP) emerged as the dominant political party. As

a result, the APP and another party - the Alliance for Democracy

(AD), formed a coalition to contest the upcoming presidential election.

Olu Falae of the AD was chosen as the coalition's presidential

candidate, while Umaru Shinkafi of the APP was chosen as his

running mate.

In the 20 February 1999 legislative elections, the APP won 20 out of

109 Senate seats and 68 out of 360 seats in the House of

Representatives. The presidential election, held on 29 February

1999, was won by PDP candidate Olusegun Obasanjo. He received

62.78% of the vote compared to 37.22% for the Falae/Shinkafi ticket.

Thereafter, the APP suffered a factional split and contested the next

round of elections in 2003 as the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP).

THE ALL PROGRESSIVES GRAND ALLIANCE (APGA)

The All Progressives Grand Alliance is a political party in Nigeria

with Chief Victor Umeh as the Chairman and Dr. Sani Shinkafi as the

secretary. At the last legislative elections, 12 April 2003, the party

won 1.4 % of popular votes and 2 of 360 seats in the House of

Representatives of Nigeria and no seats in the Senate. Its candidate

at the presidential elections of 19 April 2003, Chukwuemeka

Odumegwu Ojukwu won 3.3 % of the vote. Mr. Peter Obi was the

gubernatorial candidate of Anambra State who contested with Dr.

Chris Ngige of AC. With the problem of god-fatherism and political

problems in the State, after declaring Ngige as the winner, Obi went

to court and later was sworn in as the governor of the State.

THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE (DA)

This is a Nigerian opposition political party. On June 3 and 4, 1994,

about 200 Nigerians critical of the military politicians and

collaborators met in Benin City to examine the political impasse and

decide on a political plan for the country and the peoples. The

conference concluded with the adoption of the Constitution and

Manifesto, The Liberation Charter to inaugurate the Democratic

Alternative (DA). The organization thereby emerged as a political

party at the time Sani Abacha was implementing a policy that made it

illegal for Nigerians to associate in political parties. The participants in

the conference defied the dictatorship and launched what has

become the oldest existing political party in Nigeria.

A National Executive Council with Alao Aka-Bashorun and Chima

Ubani as President and Secretary-General, respectively, were

elected to run the affairs of the party. As demanded by the political

situation, the activities of the party from its inception until the demise

of direct military dictatorship in the country were focussed on building

the party at the national, state and local government levels; engaging

in anti-dictatorship protest activities either alone or in association with

other anti-dictatorship organisations to enforce the end of anti-

democratic and military rule in Nigeria; and operating political

education programmes for workers and the peasants in towns,

villages and cities across the country.

The party school, Nigerian Peoples’ Institute for Democracy (NIPID)

was established in 2003 to carry out formal programmes of political

education among members and in the general population. The

military dictatorship collapsed to constitutional rule on May 29, 1999.

The party was denied free participation in the elections of 1999, but

continued with its educational programmes, territorial expansion and

popular activities against the right wing parties.

At its Convention in Ilorin on January 11, 2003, the party decided to

show its programme to the peoples of Nigeria by participating in the

2003 elections following legal victory along with other parties that led

to the formal registration of the DA. By fielding candidates at the

presidential, some governorship and legislative elections, the party

was successful in showcasing its Manifesto and programme in

government to the Nigerian people.

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY(NDP).

This is a progressive political party in Nigeria which was founded on

23 July 2001. At the last legislative elections, 12 April 2003, the party

won 1.9 % of popular votes and 1 out of 360 seats in the House of

Representatives and no seats in the Senate.

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)

The People's Democratic Party led then by Prince Vincent

Ogbulafor is a centrist political party in Nigeria. It won the Presidential

elections of 1999, 2003, and 2007, and is the dominant party in the

Fourth Republic.

In the legislative election held on 12 April 2003, the party won 54.5%

of the popular vote and 223 out of 360 seats in the House of

Representatives, and 76 out of 109 seats in the Senate. Its candidate

in the presidential election of 19 April 2003, Olusegun Obasanjo, was

re-elected with 61.9% of the vote.

In December 2006 Umaru Yar'Adua was chosen as the presidential

candidate of the ruling PDP for the April 2007 general election,

receiving 3,024 votes from party delegates; his closest rival, Rochas

Okorocha, received only 372 votes. Yar'Adua was eventually

declared the winner of the 2007 general elections, held on April 21,

and was sworn in on May 29, 2007, amid widespread allegations of

electoral fraud. In the Nigerian National Assembly election, the party

won 260 out of 360 seats in the House of Representatives and 85 out

of 109 seats in the Senate.

At the PDP's 2008 National Convention, it chose Prince Vincent

Ogbulafor as its National Chairman on March 8, 2008. Ogbulafor,

who was the PDP's National Secretary from 2001 to 2005, was the

party's consensus choice for the position of National Chairman,

selected as an alternative to the rival leading candidates Sam Egwu

(who was backed by Obasanjo) and Anyim Pius Anyim. All 26 other

candidates, including Egwu and Anyim, withdrew in favor of

Ogbulafor. Meanwhile, Alhaji Abubakar Kawu Baraje was elected as

National Secretary.

HISTORY

PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

PRESIDENT VICE-PRESIDENT

ELECTION OUTCOME

OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

ATIKU ABUBAKAR

1999 WON

OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

ATIKU ABUBAKAR

2003 WON

UMARU MUSA YAR’ADUA

GOODLUCK JONATHAN

2007 WON

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

The party has a neoliberal stance in its economic policies and

maintains a conservative stance on certain social issues, such as

same sex relations.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

The PDP favors free-market policies which support economic

liberalism, and limited government regulation. In 2003, President

Olusegun Obasanjo and Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala

embarked on a radical economic reform program, which reduced

government spending through conservative fiscal policies, and saw

the deregulation and privatization of numerous industries in Nigerian

services sector — notably the Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL)

industry.

The PDP strives to maintain the status quo on oil revenue

distribution. Though the PDP government setup the Niger Delta

Development Commission (NDDC) to address the needs of the oil-

producing Niger Delta states, it has rebuffed repeated efforts to revert

back to the 50% to 50% federal-to-state government revenue

allocation agreement established in 1966 during the First Republic.[5]

SOCIAL ISSUES

The PDP is against same sex relations, and favors social

conservatism on moral and religious grounds. In 2007, the PDP-

dominated National Assembly sponsored a bill to outlaw homosexual

relations, making it punishable by law for up to five years in prison.

On the other hand, the PDP adopts a more leftist stance towards

poverty and welfare. In 2005, President Obasanjo launched Nigeria's

first National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to ensure that every

Nigerian has access to basic health care services.

The party is a moderate advocate of state-autonomy and religious

freedom for the Nigerian provinces. In the year 2000 the introduction

of Islamic law in some states in Northern Nigeria triggered sectarian

violence in Kaduna and Abia states. The PDP-led federal government

refused to bow to pressure from the southern, predominantly

Christian states to repeal the law, and instead opted for a

compromise where Islamic law would only apply to Muslims.

THE PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION PARTY(PRP)

This was a political party in Nigeria. Often considered the Second

Republic incarnation of the Northern Elements Progressive Union, the

party was created by the late Mallam Aminu Kano. The PRP was

highly regarded as a progressive left of center political party. Some

well known members of the party included Governors Abubakar Rimi,

Balarabe Musa, Dr. Edward Ikem Okeke, and Chinua Achebe — who

served briefly as Deputy National President in the early 1980s.

The original party was banned following the Military Coup of 1984 led

by General Buhari.

A new party with the same name but with little or no resemblance or

affinity or affiliation to the original PRP was created in the National

Election of 1999. In the legislative elections, April 12, 2003, the party

won 0.8 % of popular votes and 1 out of 360 seats in the House of

Representatives of Nigeria and no seats in the Senate.

THE UNITED NIGERIA PEOPLE'S PARTY (UNPP)

This is a political party in Nigeria. At the 12 April 2003 legislative

elections the party won 2.8 % of popular votes, 2 out of 360 seats in

the House of Representatives of Nigeria, and no seats in the Senate.

THE FRESH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (FDP)

This is a liberal political party in Nigeria. FRESH is an acronym,

Faith, Responsibility, Equality, Security and Hope. The founder and

presidential aspirant (2007) is Reverend Chris Okotie. The party

believes in the unity and diversity of the Nigerian nation; the sanctity

and collective will of the Nigerian people; the right of the Nigerian to

good, accountable and compassionate leadership; and that

federalism is the most effective form of co-existence in Nigeria.

A recent 50-page voters' guide, Who Deserves Your Vote has been

criticised as being a medium to campaign for Okotie because it

supports "a God fearing man of God as the true president that will

take Nigeria to its next level". The author, Afo O Temienor, has stated

that he has no personal relationship with Okotie, disputing claims that

he is silently campaigning for him, "I am not campaigning for any

single individual via my book, I am only trying to sharpen the

discernment of the average voter to vote wisely. That does not mean

I don't have a candidate of choice which dramatically turns out to be

reverend Chris Okotie. In fact I intend to work with FRESH Party

because I believe in his vision, but once again I didn't write my book

because of him". The guide, being published in February 2007, has

been predicted to become the most controversial book ever written in

Nigeria.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF NIGERIA (CPN)

This was a communist party in Nigeria. It was founded in November

1960 in Kano, largely by cadres of the Nigerian Youth Congress.

Initially the party drew political inspiration from the Communist Party

of Great Britain. However, the constitution adopted by the party was

based on the 1945 constitution of the Communist Party of China.

However, the party remained relatively isolated from international

relations, not having close links with neither the Communist Party of

the Soviet Union nor the Chinese party. When the Socialist Workers

and Farmers Party of Nigeria was formed in 1963, the CPN

denounced it as "the latest effort in a long series of opportunist and

egoistic acts which have contributed much towards disrupting the

Socialist movement in Nigeria."

CPN was banned by the Decree 34 of the regime of General Johnson

Aguiyi-Ironsi in 1966.

THE PROGRESSIVE PEOPLES ALLIANCE (PPA)

The Progressive Peoples Alliance is a political party in Nigeria.

Notable members of the party include Orji Uzor Kalu.

The party won gubernatorial elections in 2003 and 2007 in Abia

State. The party also won the governorship election in 2007 in Imo

State. The Governor of Abia State is Chief Theodore Ahamefula Orji

while the Governor of Imo State is Chief Ikedi Okakim.

In the 21 April 2007 Nigerian National Assembly election, the party

won 3 out of 360 seats in the House of Representatives and 1 out of

109 seats in the Senate.

Following the April 2007 presidential election, the PPA agreed to join

the government of president Umaru Yar'Adua.

OFFICERS OF THE PARTY

National Chairman-Chief Clement Ebri, National Secretary-Chief

Sam Nkire, National Treasurer-Chief Emeka Duro, National Financial

Secretary-Mustapha Habib, and the National Legal Adviser-Alh.

Lamido Abubakar.

REPRESENTATION

The party won some seats at the National Assembly in the 2007

Elections. In the Senate, Senator Uche Chukeumerije representing

Abia North Senatorial Zone is the only Senator from the party.

In the House of Representatives, the Party has three members and

these are Hon. Nnanna Uzor Kalu,a two time member and he

represents Aba North/South Federal Constituency. He is the Abia

Caucus leader at the House of Representatives.He is presently the

House Chairman,Sub Committee on Anti-Corruption.(Independent

Corrupt Practices and other Related matters Commission,ICPC).

The other two members are first term members and they are

Hon.Emeka Stanley(Ukwa East/West) and Hon.Stanley Ohajiruka a

former Speaker of Abia State House of Assembly and he represents

Umuahia North/South/Ikwuano Federal Constituency.

Equally, following the Election Tribunal Ruling as regards to the

Ohafia/Arochukwu Federal Constituency and Isiukwuato/Umunneochi

Federal Constituency, PPA may get additional two seats at the House

of Representatives.

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST MOVEMENT (DSM)

The Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM) is the Nigerian section of

the Committee for a Workers' International (CWI). It publishes a bi-

monthly newspaper, Socialist Democracy.

FOUNDATION

The section was first founded in 1986 at a conference of labour and

student socialist activists, although due to the military dictatorship at

the time, the DSM as an open organisation was only launched in July

1998. Prior to this the section was identified mainly by the name of its

newspaper, Labour Militant (1987-1994) and Militant (1994-1998).

STRUCTURE

The basic unit of DSM is the local branch. The highest policy making

body is the National Congress which meets annually. The next in

rank is a National Committee comprising representatives of branches

and which meets at least three times a year. A National Executive

Committee, elected by the National Congress, directs the day-to-day

work of the organisation.

CAMPAIGNS

During the first 13 years of the section's existence they were heavily

involved in fighting against the dictatorship in Nigeria at that time.

Since then they have continued to fight for full democratic rights, but

also for the rights of workers. This campaigning has led to the arrest

several times of leading DSM activists. More recently, the DSM

played a leading role in the general strike of June 2007 against high

fuel prices.

NCP, ELECTIONS AND A MASS WORKING PEOPLE'S PARTY

Although currently part of the National Conscience Party (NCP), the

DSM has argued since the 1980s for the formation of a Mass

Working People's Party. They argue that such a party should be

wholly opposed to neo-liberalism and privatisation. The DSM

participated in the briefly lived Nigerian Labour Party in 1989, and

participated in the founding by Gani Fawemhinmi of the National

Conscience Party in 1994. In the 2003 elections, the DSM stood as

candidates for the NCP and achieved some of the party's highest

votes. However, in 2007 DSM members democratically elected at a

State wide NCP conference were bureaucratically replaced as NCP

candidates in Lagos State by the current NCP leadership, leading

local NCP members withdrew their candidates from the elections.

Since then, Lagos State NCP has quit the National Conscience Party

and set up the Campaign for the Formation of a Genuine Mass

Working Peoples' Party.

INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION

The Democratic Socialist Movement is affiliated to the Committee for

a Workers' International, and is the second largest of its forty

members.

PUBLICATIONS

As well as regularly producing a paper, the DSM has produced

several pamphlets.

Nigeria's Crisis: Time For System Change (2004)

Nigeria: Civil rule in danger (August 2002)

A Season of Struggles (September 2000)

Legacy of Leon Trotsky (2000)

Nigeria's Crisis: Breaking The Vicious Circle (1996)

The Abacha Junta (1995)

Programme and Perspectives for the Nigerian Revolution (1987)

REFERENCES

Ashafa, A.M. "Multi-Party Democracy and National Stability: The

Dynamics of Inter-Party Relations in Nigeria’s 4th Republic." Paper

presented at the Conference on Democracy and Democratization in

Nigeria, 1999-2001, organized by CRD&T, BUK, Kano, May 28-30,

2001.

Conscience International, April/May 1999.

Jega, A.M. "The Impact of Military Rule on Governance and its

Implications in Nigeria." Paper presented at the Conference on

Democracy and Democratization in Nigeria, 1999-2001, organized by

CDR&T, BUK, Kano, May 28-30, 2001.

Nigeria Tribune, December 15, 1998.

Ola Awoniyi: ‘Nigeria sets date for election’, Mail & Guardian. 29

August 2006.

‘Nigeria Senate Blocks for 3rd Presidential Term’, Washington Post.

16 May 2006.

‘Nigeria Party picks its Candidate’, BBC News 17 December 2006.

‘The Candidates to be Nigeria’s Leader’, BBC News. 22 December

2006.

Daily Sun. Obasanjo’s undoing was that he played God – Lai Muhammed, AC publicity secretary: June 15, 2007.

Daily Sun. I don’t relate to Obasanjo at all. I don’t even want to see him. He has destroyed the PDP we formed and is mismanaging the country – Rimi: August 21, 2006.

Daily Sun, Action Congress: A tale of parallel secretariats: October 14, 2006.

ACD Party Website

"Nigerian VP 'able to stand in poll'", Al Jazeera, April 16, 2007.

Tom Ashby, "Nigerian opposition agrees to join government", Reuters (IOL), June 27, 2007.

"Nigeria opposition move condemned", BBC News, June 28, 2007.

ANPP USA (cached site from archive.org)

CIA Factbook - Nigeria

Ferreira, Dr Abayomi (2006). Savagery in Politics: The Hindrance to National Development: Faulty Political Practice as the Primary Cause of Failed Economic Development in Nigeria, Author house.

Debo Abdulai, "PDP Convention: Intrigues, horse-trading as Ogbulafor emerges chairman", Nigerian Tribune, March 9, 2008.

"Nigeria: As Ogbulafor Emerges PDP Chairman Obasanjo Loses Grip", Daily Trust, Abuja (allAfrica.com), March 9, 2008.

http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article_4146.shtml

http//news.bbc.co/1/hi/world/Africa/6183845.stm

CHAPTER SEVEN

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTION MAKING IN NIGERIA

Constitutional development in Nigeria could be said to have started

with nationalist agitation. The first constitution in Nigeria was that

made in 1914. The changes which the 1914 constitution was

expected to usher in were denied by the British Government. Instead,

the British pursued a vigorous policy of divide and rule. The North

was ruled by proclamation while the South was ruled by a colonial

constitution. Sklar (1963:18) noted that, "for a period of twenty two

years after amalgamation, the Northern and Southern provinces were

linked tenuously in law and through the person of the Governor; their

destructive political identities were preserved by the maintenance of

separate administrative establishment.

However, Okibe H. B. (2000:86) observed that most of the colonial

constitutional reforms de-emphasized the essence of corporate

existence of Nigerians as that would cripple their mission of economic

exploitation of the people. Between 1914-1946, the philosophy of

British colonial government was based on protecting its interest

economically while Nigeria bled to death. Nigeria participation was

only nominal. The constitutional conference at Ibadan in 1947

provided the British a better opportunity to vitiate the destiny of the

country. It was at this time that the cracks in the political class

manifested more vividly with the political leaders disagreeing sharply

on what form of constitution suited the country. The conference

produced about four minority reports submitted by Mbonu Ojike, Eyo

Ita and the Action Group.

The colonial constitutions were imposed on Nigerians by the British in

the sense that they were neither allowed to determine the nature of

the documents nor did they participate in the process of bringing

them into being. In this category fell the Lugard Constitution of 1914

the 1922 Clifford Constitution and the Richards Constitution of 1946.

The electoral principle introduced in 1922 was dubious since it

presented greater obstacles in qualification and universal adult

suffrage. Of the three seats allotted to Lagos only one was won by a

pure Nigerian. The other two were secured by nationals of Gambia

and Sierra Leone resident in Nigeria and who satisfied the one-

hundred-pound annual income qualification. The seat allotted to

Calabar was won by Ata Amonu, Ghanaian. The 1946 constitution

was promulgated without consultations. It introduced regionalism and

in the process gave official seal to separatist tendencies.

The problem of the 1951 Constitution, according to Aguda (1985:304)

was not primarily with whether there should be a sort of federal union

but with how many units should comprise the federal union that was

agreed and what amount of power should devolve on the units to be

created. However, Aguda (1985:411) dismisses the 1951 constitution

as being basically unitary with extensive authority of the central

government and its powers of control over the regions. For these

reasons, the 1957 constitution could not function well in a big country

like Nigeria with diverse communities of different cultural

backgrounds and more so in a setting of inter-religious friction, as

there were burning desires for regional autonomy with each of the

regions being dominated by an over-bearing ethnic group and

political party.

The point one is making is that all the constitutions so far used in

Nigeria have been one imposition or the other including the

independence constitution. When the military struck in 1966, the

constitution was suspended and party politics was put in chains. The

1979, 1995 and 1999 federal constitutions were all imposed by the

military on Nigeria. Everybody knows that the military is incapable of

formulating a people-oriented constitution basically because of its

praetorian nature. It is therefore not surprising that all these

constitutions have been very subjective in one form or the other.

What the military has always done is to create the impression that

Nigerians are involved in the formulation of their constitution and this

explains why each of these constitutions has always started with a

nebulous statement, "We the people of Nigeria…" Of all the militarily-

imposed constitutions, the worst remains the 1999 constitution. The

1999 constitution was fashioned simply for perpetuation of Abacha in

office. It is a Hitlerite constitution meant to foist and maintain

despotism in Nigeria and animalize the Nigerian people. It never

originated from the people and was never intended for any form of

amendment.

Curiously, all these constitutions were made in the absence of any

organised party system. Therefore, as democratic institutions

concerned with interest–aggregation and articulation, no political

party in Nigeria has ever partaken in the process of constitution

making. Because of the historicity in terms of constitutional evolution,

these constitutions have tended to generate more friction in the

system than it envisaged to solve. Such critical matters as self

determination, principles of derivation and revenue-sharing formula

have continued to cause tensions in the land ostensibly because the

real stake-holders in the Nigerian enterprise have been denied the

opportunity of making inputs in the constitution that is supposed to

guide them.

Anyone looking at the nation of Nigeria from outside its geographical

shores will agree that by size and political importance, Nigeria is

indeed the giant of Africa. Since many decades, Nigeria has carried

itself and its foreign policies to project the image of a “big brother” for

the rest of the continent. Agreeably, Nigeria is huge enough and

powerful enough to continue to protect its image; however, the

continent needs not a “big brother”, but a role model, both economic

and political role model. So far, the political role modeling is present;

Nigeria currently has the largest political party (People’s Democratic

Party- PDP) and approves the existence of a truly multi-party system

in the whole Africa. The economic role modeling is also highly

present, what with so many billions of dollars Nigeria makes on crude

oil and its petroleum products revenue daily, the trillion of Naira banks

and financial institutions declared as profits, the constant

development in the Agro-allied, the small scale industries and many

other highly productive sectors of the Nigerian economy. The

activities in the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market indicate that,

indeed, Nigeria is currently a good economic example for the rest of

the continent even South Africa. But there is a huge need to sustain

such example. There is need for sustained growth in both the political

and economy not just viewed from the present but also in a far future.

This sustenance will not depend on someone’s wishful thinking or

expectations (which dies with him when he leaves), but it should

depend largely on a structural ideological orientation, which suggests

and commits the country to consistent policy directions, which

invariably will be the yardstick of measuring long-term achievements

or development of that country aside from using GDP. Ideology is a

distinctive thinking of a critical class of people, who deliberate and

conceive answers to social, economic and political directions a nation

or group should pursue in order to be prosperous.

THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL SCENE AND POLITICS OF

RESISTANCE

Politics is about power and influence. It is a struggle of contending

ideological viewpoints on the allocation and distribution of resources.

It determines who gets what, when and how. Resistance to politics is

constructed in response to the distributive mechanism adopted by the

governing political party in the polity. The disadvantaged groups feel

oppressed and/or marginalized. Thus, resistance to oppression

manifests itself in any of the following categories: class, ethnic, race,

regional, religious, or gender. Elements in these categories argue for

systemic changes that will eliminate the causes of their oppression.

They demand for equity and fairness. On the other hand, resistance

to change is championed by elements of the ruling class, which

includes representatives of the military-industrial complex, and some

academics who provide intellectual leadership that sustains military

and civilian oppression in politics. Resistance to change is a major

obstacle to social progress. This sub-section will focus primarily on

the impact of class, ethnicity, region, religion, the military and

intellectuals in government.

As a fundamental dynamic of social progress, change is a constant

phenomenon which must be embraced and nurtured as a political

imperative. When protagonists of resistance to oppression

and resistance to change fail to engage in a meaningful dialogue,

their conversation could easily degenerate from a dialogue of the

deaf to a dialogue of the deaf and blind, which invariably leads to a

systemic breakdown. Thus, it is the responsibility of the proponents

of resistance to change to engage their opposing parties in a

transparent and constructive dialogue leading to a peaceful resolution

of their conflicts.

Oppression is a reality of a political struggle. Its continued

manifestations compel a people to revel in their historical past as they

compare the way they were with the present. This historical

retrospection influences their politics. For them, History becomes an

intoxicant for social and political activism, perhaps in the same way

that Karl Marx referred to religion as the opium of the masses.

Depending on where we stand on the spectrum of oppression,

History can provoke us to adopt positions inimical to peaceful

resolutions of conflicts. The vigour of ethnicism or nationalism in

Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta is explainable in History. The

conflict of interests is perceived as a challenge to the legitimacy of

ethnic or nationalistic claims to power and authority. Representatives

of the given categories of the countervailing interests employ different

survival tools to advance their course. Depending on our particular

attachment to any of these categories, we recognize the losers as

heros. For example, while the regime regulators and their agents

gloat over the assassination of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his associates,

their life and death are celebrated by their people and admirers

worldwide. The defeated celebrate their heroes, sometimes with

greater passion and intensity than the victors celebrate theirs.

The international system is replete with cases of oppression. No

country is immuned from this affliction. There are groups within each

country that experience different forms of oppression: class, ethnic,

racial, religious, or gender. While these phenomena have led to grave

consequences for several countries, others have "succeeded" in

managing the conflicts within more democratic settings. If the

dissolution of Czechoslovakia was peaceful and democratic, that of

Yugoslavia is an ongoing exercise of discord, war and destruction.

Though Rwanda still "survives" as a country, the bilateral killings of

the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups have left irreparable scars in the

consciousness of the country that question the rationale of Rwanda's

survival. The failure of politics is also witnessed in Liberia and Sierra

Leone where ethnic conflicts have caused severe damages to the

respective polities. Even in a mono-ethnic state like Northern Ireland,

religious conflict continues to tear that country apart.

The situation in the Americas is rather complex. The indigenous

populations have either been extinct or reduced to nothingness by

agents of European colonialism. These settler regimes that have

acquired global legitimacy as sovereign states have perfected the act

of oppression that systematically eliminated the indigenous

populations from access to political and economic activities.

Resistance is expressed differently across countries of the Americas.

The progression from violence to managed coexistence is predicated

on the correlation of forces in the respective polities. The United

States exemplifies this progression. In early 2001, the Mexican state

was compelled to lend partial recognition to the rise of the Zapatistas

in Mexico in order to construct a basis for rapprochement with that

country's indigenous populations that have been oppressed for over

500 years. Named in memory of Emiliano Zapata, the great Mexican

indigene who led the struggle against Mexican dictatorship, the

Zapatista National Liberation Army (ZNLA) has emerged as a symbol

of the struggle against oppression. The Zapatistas' demand of tierra y

libertad - land and freedom - is fundamental to the position of the

proponents of resistance to oppression in all societies. It calls for a

change of the status quo which has failed to engineer any viable

policy of national reconstruction and reconciliation.

How do we situate Nigeria in all these? Like Mexico, Nigeria is a

colonial creation. But unlike Mexico, Nigeria is not governed by

colonial settlers, rather it is governed by indigenous populations of

disparate lands that the British "amalgamated" into one country in

1914. Since 1914, these disparate peoples now known as Nigerians

have not been able to establish an agreeable framework on the type

of country they want. This failure has led to a series of crises,

including the civil war of 1967-70, as well as the current turmoil in the

country. It must be stressed that the 30 years of military dictatorship,

out of the 49 years of independence since October 1, 1960, has

distorted the values of politics and the landscape of the country's

institutions.

While it is true that the military has facilitated the exponential growth

of this phenomenon, it is equally true that many civilians, especially

some academics have provided the intellectual justifications for the

various military and civilian regimes to destroy the fabric of Nigerian

political development. I recall an article by Obaro Ikime in which he

depicted the deplorable situation of some Nigerian academics in

government, who have permitted themselves to be kicked around like

a football. This was in the fourth year of Ibrahim Babangida's military

dictatorship. In that article, we saw two categories of Nigerian

academics: the cooperative and uncooperative. As a rule, the

uncooperative intellectuals are never invited to advise Nigerian

governments (military or civilian). But when they are invited, they are

always prepared to stand by their cherished principles. They readily

resign rather than compromise their principles. Eme Awa exemplifies

this breed of Nigerian intellectuals. On the other hand, the

cooperative Nigerian intellectuals, driven by greed and power, are

always ready to prostitute themselves to the regime regulators. They

are the ones that readily abandon their lectures and classrooms and

become frequent visitors to Aso Rock, in quests of political

appointments as advisors and speech writers to the leading

governments. They justify their role in government as an avenue to

convert military (and civilian) dictators to democracy. The dictators,

on the other hand, perceive such academics as mere tools to

legitimize their dictatorial rule. Notwithstanding the series of

oppressive measures of the dictatorship, these academics, as

emissaries of the regime, continue to propagate the dictators as

humane, democratic, peace-loving and visionary leaders. They enjoy

their intellectual leadership power behind the throne of military and

civilian dictatorship. This breed of Nigerian intellectuals poses greater

dangers to Nigeria and Nigerians than military and civilian dictatorial

regimes.

ON POLITICS

The contest for political power in Nigeria is driven by the contrasting

imperatives of ethnicity and regionalism, which, by implications, is

devoid of any sustaining unifying theme or ideology. Corruption and

political opportunism have emerged as the critical elements of

Nigerian political behavior. The history of Nigerian politics is replete

with individuals who have consistently violated the peoples' trust and

have lost any credibility in the system. But because of the poverty of

thought and the abysmal level of political consciousness of the

population, Nigerians have hailed these individuals as folk heroes.

Musicians have composed songs praising these individuals. While

they are criticized for betraying the people, Nigerians do not hesitate

to elect them to represent their collective interests. Thus, in spite of

their credibility gaps, Nigerians have bequeathed their thinking

faculties to these individuals and give them a blank cheque to

continue abusing their trust. Politics has acquired a bad name in

Nigeria. Given the recent political history of the country, Nigerians

have come to equate a politician with a highway robber. This breed of

politicians dominates contemporary Nigerian society.

None of the current political parties in Nigeria can be said to

represent the interests of Nigerians. The process of party formation is

monopolized by the wealthy few who control access to power. The

interests of the working class and the poor are excluded by

implications. Even the middle class in Nigeria has been rendered

obsolete and moribund. This dislocation of the middle class and the

growing impoverishment of the vast majority of Nigerians have

intensified the exploitative grip on power by the wealthy

few. Even in the areas of articulating capitalist ideological policies, the

ruling parties have demonstrated gross ineptitude. The primary focus

of Nigerian political leaders has been the promoting of their

respective ethnic interests. The emphasis is not on developing

economic infrastructures that will benefit the entire country, but rather

it is on which ethnic group will produce the next president. Defined in

this context, therefore, the construct of political alliance and alignment

in Nigeria is driven by inter-ethnic coalition, and not by any reasoned

ideological framework that cuts across ethnic divide. As a rule, when

people of diverse ethnic groups establish their respective political

parties, the motivation has been on how to embezzle public funds

and further the underdevelopment of the country. Addressing his

party's - the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) - 3rd National

Convention in Abuja on March 31, 2001, President Olusegun

Obasanjo seemed to lament the lack of an ideology in the PDP.

According to him, the PDP is "no more than a dynamic amalgam of

interest groups." He continued:

And what has held us together, if anything at all, is that our party is in

power and there is a strong expectation of patronage, our party lacks

cohesion. Itemizing the properties of a political party as

"cohesiveness, organization propelled by strict discipline, ideology-

based human ideas and solidarity and socially motivated unity of

purpose," he asked his PDP members: "Can we in all honesty say

that we are such a party?”.

The "dynamic amalgam of interest groups" that Obasanjo referred to

is the group of Nigerians whose main raison d'être in politics has

been to "make money" and deplete the national treasury in the

process. Not much thought has been devoted to nation building. This

phenomenon is not restricted to the PDP; it forms the basis of the

other political parties - All Peoples Party (APP), and the Alliance for

Democracy (AD). The fact that some prominent leaders and

members of these parties, including their former presidential

aspirants in the 1999 elections decamped and joined the PDP can

only be explained by their desire to belong to the "party in power,"

because "there is a strong expectation of patronage" to be gained in

the PDP. It is doubtful if such leaders play any significant role in

advancing the democratic agenda in Nigerian politics.

Deprived of a national party to articulate their interests, the working

class, the poor and Nigeria's middle class find solace in their

respective unions, for example, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC),

the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Colleges of

Education Academic Staff Union (COEASU) etc. It is only within

these unions that serious socio-economic and political questions of

relevance to the country are discussed. They also articulate the

frustrations of the oppressed nationalities, especially in the Niger

Delta, who experience the brutality of exploitation by domestic and

foreign capital. For these peoples, particularly in the Niger Delta, the

current Nigerian state is a prison of nationalities.

Niger Delta is representative of the exploitative nature of domestic

and foreign capital in Nigeria. Over the years, Nigerians, irrespective

of their ethnicity, have aligned with foreign capital (MNCs) to exploit

the natural resources of the Niger Delta with complete disregard to

the development of the region. The ecosystem of the region has been

ruined. Thousands of families have lost their agricultural lands and

fisheries, as a result of the environmental degradation of the region

by oil (domestic and foreign) companies. None of the political parties,

including the federal government has developed any concrete

policies on how to deal with the degradation in the region. The unions

and NGOs, especially the Environmental Action Rights (EAR) and the

Civil Liberties Organization of Nigeria (CLON) have remained the

main voice of the oppressed and deprived peoples of Nigeria. Those

politicians that have spoken in support of the oppressed and deprived

peoples of Nigeria have done so, not as representatives of their

respective political parties, but as representatives of their

constituencies. The absence of a well articulated national

development plan in any of the parties has increased the polarity

between the proponents of the resistance to oppression and those of

the resistance to change.

Access to power is the chief cause of social strife in any society.

Those in power determine the distribution of resources and who gets

what, when and how. Driven by the desire to preserve the status quo,

those in power have neglected their responsibility to create a

conducive environment for the articulation of contending policies that

would benefit the entire country. However, a reluctance to accept

change may lead to a breakdown of the polity. With respect to

Nigeria, the challenge to the status quo has been argued primarily in

ethnic, state and religious terms. A brief discussion of these will help

to situate the status of the current crisis in Nigeria.

ETHNICITY

From time immemorial, ethnic identity has defined the scope of

political intercourse in pluralistic societies. Nigeria exemplifies such a

society. In each of these societies, including Nigeria, a critical

element of the conflict is the treatment of minority groups by the

majority groups. Thus, the majority-minority relationship lends itself

as one of the conceptual frameworks for analyzing the problems of

plural societies, including Nigeria. The others are ideology, religious

affiliation, etc. Each level of analysis addresses specific problems of

the relationship.

Ideologically, as argued by Marxists, the ruling class determines the

form and content of the means of production as well as the

distribution and consumption of national wealth. Marxists argue that it

is the ruling class that controls state power. In Nigeria, however, the

debate over this phenomenon has regrettably acquired an ethnic

flavour because of the concentration of state power in the hands of a

specific group, the Hausa-Fulani. Territorial disputes, access to

power and wealth, to employment and education, and to social

services and resource control are some of the causes of ethnic

conflicts in Nigeria. In the absence of a national, ideologically oriented

party representing concrete class interests of Nigerians across the

ethnic divide, ethnic based political movements have filled the void to

challenge the present distribution of power and wealth, demanding a

restructuring of the political system in such a way that will grant them

equitable access to these properties. For example, Afenifere and the

Odua Peoples' Congress represent the Yoruba ethnic group, while

the Igbos are represented by Ohanaze Ndigbo, and the Union of

Niger Delta speaks for the South-South. An Arewa Consultative

Forum has been established to defend the core interests of the

Hausa-Fulani who feel threatened by these challenges to their power.

On both sides of the Niger and the Benue, competing ethnic political

movements and military units have been established to advance the

courses of their respective ethnic groups. This development poses

serious potential dangers to the Nigerian state, if the causes of ethnic

conflicts are not meaningfully resolved.

Over the past twenty years a series of violent inter-ethnic clashes has

caused severe damages to the polity. Witness the Ezon-Itsekiri-

Urhobo schism in Delta State, the Ezon- Yoruba confrontation in

Lagos, the Igbo-Hausa clash in Aba, the Hausa- Yoruba conflict in

Lagos and Sagamu, and the Hausa-Igbo crisis in parts of the North.

All these incidents resulted in the death of scores of Nigerians. Buried

in this push-and-pull is the perennial problem of minority ethnic rights

in the polity. The increasing failure of Nigerian political leaders to

construct a viable and sustainable strategy for national integration

and equitable distribution of national wealth has significantly

facilitated the rise of ethnic (and religious) conflicts in the polity.

Arguing from opposing ideological perspectives, both Liberal and

Marxist theories predicted the withering away of ethnicity as a political

force in the polity. For the Liberals, the imperatives of modernization

with its emphasis on individual success and economic activity will

compel the formation of inter-ethnic national associations that will

render ethnicity obsolete. On the other hand, Marxists referred to

ethnicity as a false consciousness of the masses and a stratagem of

the bourgeois ruling class to subjugate the working class. However,

historical experiences over the past two centuries have contradicted

both assumptions. Across the globe, ethnic conflicts have remained

as, arguably the most potent destabilizing factor in respective multi-

ethnic polities, including Nigeria. Over 90% of states in the

international political system are multi-ethnic, with two or more ethnic

groups. Competing ethnic nationalisms challenge the sovereignty of

states in Asia, Africa, the Americas, Middle East and Europe. Thus, it

is vital for Nigerian political leaders to respond to the dynamics of

ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. It is not enough to condemn ethnocentrism

in Nigerian politics, they must take appropriate measures to address

its causes.

With an estimated population of 123,337,822, Nigeria is composed of

more than 250 ethnic groups. In any polity with such diverse ethnic

affiliations, it is perhaps inescapable that inter ethnic conflicts will play

a vital role in the country's politics. Each ethnic group regards itself as

a distinct nationality with defined customs and territories. The

contending desires to assert this distinctiveness collides with the

federal government's strategy to create a Nigerian. It is perhaps futile

and counterproductive to attempt to create a Nigerian and destroy

his or her historical being in the process. That historical being is the

source of the individual contemporary Nigerian traceable to his or her

ethno-regional base. Thus, he or she is first and foremost a Bini, an

Efik, an Esan, an Ezon, a Hausa, an Ibibio, an Igbo, an Itsekiri, a

Nupe, a Tiv, an Urhobo or a Yoruba, etc. This fact must be

recognized and accepted as the only viable base upon which

contemporary Nigerians are molded.

It compels Nigerians to also recognize and respect their diversities

just as much as they emphasize and celebrate their shared

historical similarities. Thus, they cannot celebrate Nigerian multi-

culturalism on the debris of their respective historical being.

Every ethnic group in Nigeria is marginalized, deprived and

oppressed. Irrespective of the fact that the North has produced most

of the leaders (civilian and military) and has controlled the apparatus

of state power in Nigeria since 1960, the average Fulani,Hausa,

Kanuri, or Nupe is not materially better than the average Efik, Ezon,

Itsekiri, or Yoruba of the South. Thus, all Nigerian ethnic groups have

been victimized by a coalition of North-South political leaders who

have neglected the basic needs of the Nigerian populace. Who

speaks for these victimized Nigerian ethnic groups? While it is true

that the federal government has failed in this regard, it must be

stressed that the various state governments have also failed to

respond to the basic needs of their respective constituencies. The

same politicians who facilitate deficient governance are also

engineering the populace to blame the other level of government for

their ineptitude and gross mismanagement of the economy.

STATE

The crisis of inter-ethnic relations, made possible by the collapse of

good governance, informs the deteriorating state of Federal-State

relations in Nigeria. As citizens of a federation, it is expected that

Nigerians will pay allegiance to their respective States, for without the

federating States there will not be a Federal Republic of Nigeria. The

inability of a federal government to equitably relate to the interests of

the federating units gives rise to centrifugal forces that could

destabilize the federal polity. Thus, the levels of citizenship - State

and Federal - become entangled in perpetual conflicts as the federal

government and the federating units fail to agree on vital issues of

interests to the later. Under this scenario, citizens' loyalty gravitates

toward their respective States and the legitimacy of the Federal

government becomes questionable. The current crises in Nigeria are

explicable in these terms. A number of States has challenged the

constitutional base of Nigeria's federal structure. While the country is

supposedly a federation, the 1999 Constitution is fundamentally a

unitary document. It makes the federal government highly centralized,

a phenomenon which is injurious to the federal polity as it establishes

a quasi federal or unitary system.

Given the above, any protestation by a State is perceived as an

"ethnic" position against the federal government and the coalition of

interests protecting the status quo. This is so because of the ethnic

composition of the states. For example, when Ondo State adopts a

constitutional position opposed to that of Sokoto State, it is

immediately construed as “Yoruba versus Fulani," thus lending ethnic

colourations to a genuine concern on constitutional renewal. This

strong linkage of contending ethnic and state interests tends to

obfuscate the imperative of a national consensus on the constitution,

for example. Thus, every legitimate constitutional question has ethnic

ramifications.

Several states have demanded a constitutional conference where the

issues of federal-state jurisdictions will be resolved, taking into

consideration the exclusive jurisdictional powers of the states over,

for example, state police, state/local government elections, natural

resources, education, culture, local government, etc.

The Niger Delta has emerged as the epicenter of the agitation for

constitutional renewal. The demand for resource control by states of

the Niger Delta, and the unwillingness of the federal government to

address it, has led to violence and wanton destruction in the region.

The federal government and the northern states seemed unwilling to

endorse any idea to construct a genuine federal system that would

recognize the independence of the federating units. President

Obasanjo responded to the legitimate demands of the Niger Delta in

November 1999 by sending Nigerian military to invade and destroy

the town of Odi in Bayelsa State. Energized by the symbolism of Odi,

governments of the 17 states of southern Nigeria have repeatedly

called for a federal restructuring of the polity. While ethnic

organizations of the southern states endorse this position, those

representing the core political interests of the north are opposed.

RELIGION

Competing religious values further complicate the conduct of politics

in a multi ethnic polity. While Islam predominates in the northern

states, Christianity predominates in the south. While the majority of

the ethnic groups in the south are Christians, the greater population

of the North is Muslim. These demographics underline the north-

south polarization of Nigeria along ethnic and religious boundaries.

The clash of religious values is a potent force of de-stabilization of

any polity. Given the history of Islam, its conquest of parts of Africa

and the militancy of its conversion strategies, it is highly unlikely that

it can co-exist peacefully with any other religion under the bowel of

the same State. Unlike Christianity, Islam has a political manifesto

which makes it difficult for most Muslims to accept the governance of

"non believers." This contempt for "non believers" is evident in the

Muslim stratagem to islamize Nigeria from the Sahara to the Atlantic.

According to Muhammed Adamu, the Hausa-Fulani, meaning the

Muslims, have the "tacit approval of God to rule Nigeria." The series

of religious conflicts in multi ethnic states of Africa, Asia and the

Middle East lends credence to this viewpoint.

It is within the above parameters that the perennial religious conflicts

in Nigeria should be approached. The recent introduction of sharia in

several northern states is regarded by Christians as a Muslim

scheme to force Islamic legal system on non Muslim Nigerians. The

controversy over this issue has led to inter-religious clashes in

northern Nigeria. Even though sharia contravenes the 1999

Constitution, its introduction may facilitate the stage for asymmetrical

federalism in Nigeria. Viewed from this perspective, therefore, sharia

is a valuable jurisdictional precedence for the proponents of

constitutional renewal in Nigeria. Based on this, other States in the

federation may be able to appropriate certain powers of the

Constitution as falling under their respective exclusive jurisdictions,

including state police, state/local government elections, natural

resources, state police, local government, etc.

CAN WE MOVE FORWARD?

There are three dimensions to this question: ethnic, religion, and

state. Should the contending parties reach a rapprochement on the

architectural design of a renewed federal polity, they will be

responding to the ethnic and state dimensions of the current crises. A

reconstruction of the architecture will recognize the independence of

the federating units as a solid base on which Nigeria could be built.

The religious dimension will be difficult to resolve, for the reasons we

discussed above. Let us briefly consider the contending views on the

question of renewed federalism.

Those arguing for a re-construction of Nigerian federalism base their

arguments on the premise that the current federal constitution is

faulty. For instance, the constitution grants the federal government

exclusive powers on almost every vital aspect of jurisdictions. The

federal government controls the only police service in the country. It

determines the creation of local government councils. It has exclusive

jurisdiction over natural resources (oil, gas, mining, etc.) Natural

resources companies have to register with the federal government to

whom they pay royalties. None of the states has its own constitution

or flag. These are some of the anomalies which the proponents for

constitutional renewal are proposing should be addressed, in line with

the best practices of federalism in the world. They demand the

convocation of a National Constitutional Conference, where

delegates from the federating states will decide on how much power

they each want to concede to the federal government. At such a

conference, the independence of the federating states will be

recognized. Thus, States that wish to concede their jurisdictions over

police and natural resources to the federal government will be free to

do so at the conference, while those that do not wish to concede

these powers would be free to exercise their jurisdictions in those

areas. This asymmetrical federal structure will be following the

precedence of sharia. Under asymmetrical federalism, the polity will

be energized by competitive federalism, a phenomenon which will

enhance productivity and sustain the federating states.

The counter argument is anchored on two premises. First, the

exponents reject the convocation of any national conference to

discuss changes to the constitution. They argue that the apostles of

change should follow the established procedures for amending the

constitution. They challenge their counterparts to refer their demands

to the National Assembly, as is required by the constitution. Second,

they contend that the natural resources in Nigeria belong to the

federal government, irrespective of the location of those natural

resources. It is obvious which premise is primary in the

considerations of those opposed to a constitutional renewal. While

the first premise seems rationale on constitutional grounds, the

second premise has pre-determined the outcome of the debate.

The primacy of the second premise in the calculations of the

opposition to constitutional changes would seem to suggest a

continuation of the crises. But it is in the overall interest of Nigeria

that the crises are resolved, in such a way that will reflect the

essence of federalism as evident in leading federal systems. A

resolution of the crises will enhance inter-state cooperation as well as

foster inter-ethnic harmony. It will strengthen Nigeria's voice in the

international political system, especially in intra African politics.

If, on the other hand, the crises are protracted, we could be

witnessing the gradual withering away of Nigeria. Even if Nigerian

political leaders succeed in crafting a compromise, it is highly unlikely

that there will be a decline in inter-religious conflicts. Continued

Muslim-Christian confrontation could lead to catastrophic results for

Nigeria. At any rate, it is difficult to see how Nigerians could resolve

the constitutional crisis and the religious conflict at the same time.

Both the 1960 Constitution and the 1963 Republican Constitution

adhered to the concept of true federalism. Both constitutions

recognized the independence of the constituent units and

their exclusive jurisdictions over natural resources. The 1969

Petroleum Act promulgated by the military regime of General Yakubu

Gowon that transferred this jurisdiction to the national government,

was perceived as an emergency measure to aid the government in its

conduct of the civil war against the secessionist Biafran regime of Lt.

Col Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. This emergency measure eventually

acquired a permanent status as successive military administrations

used it as a precedence to justify the national government's exclusive

jurisdiction over natural resources. General Olusegun Obasanjo's

military regime of 1976-1979 promulgated its 1978 Land Use Decree

as a follow-up to Gowon's 1969 Petroleum Act. These military

injunctions were subsequently injected into the 1979 Constitution by

General Obasanjo and into the current 1999 Constitution by the

previous military regime that handed over power to the civilian

administration of President Obasanjo on May 29, 1999.

The real issue at stake in Nigeria is rather a simple one: Is Nigeria a

federal state or not? While there is a universal consensus among

Nigerians that the country is a federal polity, it is however disturbing

that Nigerian political leaders seem to prefer monolithic political

structures as a vehicle to govern a federal political system. This gross

incongruity, a caricature of Sovietism, exposes a major conceptual

flaw in the articulation of federalism in Nigeria. If Nigerians want a

federal system, it is essential that they disengage from such a

debilitating monolithic construct.

Thus, the fundamental challenge facing Nigerian political leaders is

how to disengage from the fabric of militaristic federalism that defines

the current constitution of the country. Decades of military

dictatorship have distorted the concept of federalism. But it is doubtful

if military dictatorship should be held solely responsible for the current

political crises in Nigeria, or the arrant drive for power by some of its

constituent units that constructed the current constitution as a

stratagem to maintain their grip on power. The status quo is not a

viable option. To deny the federating units their independence is to

invite them to reconsider their membership in the Federal Republic of

Nigeria. The coalition of forces that are opposed to a restoration of

true federalism will only facilitate the dismemberment of the country.

When this will occur, cannot be determined. Should this occur, the

core interests which the exponents of resistance to change intend to

protect, with regards to the control of oil and gas resources in the

Niger Delta, and access to the sea, will be lost. Since the centre of

this resistance to change is located in the northern parts of

contemporary Nigeria, the post-Nigeria politics of these exponents

will be compelled to severe their ties to those resources.

REFERENCES

David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan

Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,

Stanford, CA., 1999. For other perspectives, see Hans Binnendijk,

ed., Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World,

Washington, D.C., 1999; and W. W. Cornelius, P. L. Martin, and J. F.

Holifield, eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective,

Stanford, CA., 1994.

Gordon Smith & Moisés Naím, ALTERED STATES: Globalization,

Sovereignty, and Governance, Ottawa, Canada, 2000. For a debate

on the pros and cons of globalization, see Thomas L. Friedman and

Ramonet Ignacio, "Dueling Globalization," Foreign Policy, Fall 1999,

pp. 110-127.

Maude Barlow, "Globalization and the Dismantling of Canadian

Democracy, Values and Society," The People-Centered Development

Forum, Number 17, March 10, 1996, Ottawa, Canada.

James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier,

Cambridge, 1997.

Obaro Ikime, "Football of the Year," The Guardian, Lagos, August 13,

1989, p.7

Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu, and S. Egite Oyovbaire, Transition to

Democracy in Nigeria, 1985-1993, Ibadan, 1993.

 The Guardian, Lagos, April 1, 2001.

Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in

Nigeria, Ibadan, 1973.

Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, 1978; Donald

Rothschild, ed., State and Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas,

Boulder, CO., 1983; and Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in

Conflict, Berkeley, CA., 1985.

"Federal Government of Nigeria's Policies and the Niger Delta's

Problems,"

http://www.waado.org/Environment/FedGovt_NigerDelta/

FedGovt_NigerDeltaPage.html

"Nigeria: Hausa-Fulani Must Always Rule: Rotational Presidency is

Bullshit," Sunday Concord, Lagos, April 13, 1997.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PRESSURE GROUPS

Pressure groups are collections of individuals who hold a similar set

of values and beliefs based on ethnicity, religion, political philosophy,

or a common goal. Based on these beliefs, they take action to

promote change and further their goals. They could also be seen as

an organized group that tries to influence the government to adopt

certain policies or measures. One can still describe them as an

organized group that does not put up candidates for election, but

seeks to influence government policy or legislation. They can also be

described as ‘interest groups’, ‘lobby groups’ or ‘protest groups’.

Some people avoid using the term ‘pressure group’ as it can

inadvertently be interpreted as meaning the groups that use actual

pressure to achieve their aims, which does not necessarily happen. In

Britain, the number of political parties is very small, whereas the

number of pressure groups runs into thousands; as the membership

of political parties has fallen, that of pressure groups has increased.

The term pressure group is a very wide definition that does not clearly

distinguish between the groups that fall under the term. For example,

a pressure group can be a huge organisation like the CBI

(Confederation of British Industry), which represents 150,000

businesses, and it can also be a single-issue locally based

organisation like CLARA (Central Area Leamington Resident’s

Association), which represents less than 300 households

campaigning to preserve and improve the town of Leamington Spa.

The definition also does not distinguish between the more extreme

pressure groups such as the Animal Liberation Front, whose

campaigns include the illegal activities such as planting bombs, and

the pressure groups such as the Institute for Public Policy Research

(IPPR), which has links to the Labour government and regular contact

with cabinet ministers.

The aim of all pressure groups is to influence the people who actually

have the power to make decisions. Pressure groups do not look for

the power of political office for themselves, but do seek to influence

the decisions made by those who do hold this political power. Often

pressure groups find themselves competing with rival pressure

groups with the aim of gaining an advantage over them, but

sometimes groups work together to achieve a common aim.

Pressure groups provide a means of popular participation in national

politics between elections. They are sometimes able to gather

sufficient support to force government to amend or even scrap

legislation. For example, in March 1998 around 300,000 people went

to London to protest about the Labour government’s rural policies -

the ‘Countryside March’ - the government reacted by announcing

plans for a Ministry of Rural Affairs and by publishing a white paper

investigating all aspects of rural life. 

Pressure groups also provide a means of participation in local politics

between elections. For example, in 1994 the A452 Coordination

Group campaigned to block plans by Warwickshire County Council to

make the A452 a dual carriageway. After the group’s intense

lobbying, the council dropped the plans. Pressure groups also act as

a sense of specialist knowledge, and often have access to

information that is highly valued by decision makers. For example,

MENCAP and MIND – groups campaigning on behalf of people with

mental disabilities – are often invited to give government briefings. In

return, these groups have an input into the making of decisions, and

they can also receive financial contributions direct from the

government.

Pressure groups can use a variety of different methods to influence

law. Firstly, it can merely inform legislators of its member’s

preferences. Second it may well give money or time to help with an

election campaign. Third, its members may threaten, as a group, to

vote as a bloc. By doing this they promise to help a cooperative

legislator, and threaten to harm a non-cooperative legislator. Fourth,

a pressure group may speed up legislation by writing bills and helping

legislators make progressive agreements. Finally, a pressure group

may attempt to influence members of the executive, who have some

law making input and who can partly decide the strength and

effectiveness of law enforcement.

Pressure groups often represent viewpoints of people who are

dissatisfied with the current conditions in society, and they often

represent alternative viewpoints that are not well represented in the

mainstream population. By forming a pressure group, people seek to

express their shared beliefs and values and influence change within

communities and sociopolitical structures, such as governments and

corporations. Some pressure groups, such as the tobacco-control

movement, have been successful at influencing change across a

number of sociopolitical structures.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES AND

PRESSURE GROUPS.

Pressure groups are different from political parties. Political parties

seek to create change by being elected to public office, while

pressure groups attempt to influence political parties. Pressure

groups may be better able to focus on specialized issues, whereas

political parties tend to address a wide range of issues.

Pressure groups are widely recognized as an important part of the

democratic process. Some groups offer opportunities and a political

voice to people who would traditionally be thought of as

disadvantaged or marginalized from the mainstream population. In

this way, pressure groups strengthen the democratic process by

giving a voice to a variety of people. Pressure groups also offer

alternatives to the political process by providing opportunities for

expressing opinions and a desire for change.

While pressure groups are acknowledged as potentially beneficial to

a democratic society, problems can arise when the democratic

process becomes dominated by a few specific groups. In this

situation, the voice of a small group of people with a particular

interest can become overly influential and negatively affect the rights

of other individuals. In the democratic process, there is a need for

compromise in order to reach consensus regarding the common

good. If pressure groups remain rigid and refuse to compromise on

specific issues, they can potentially monopolize the democratic

process by focusing public debate on a few specific issues.

Pressure groups may adopt a variety of strategies to achieve their

goals, including lobbying elected officials, media advocacy, and direct

political action (e.g., organized protests). Clearly, some pressure

groups exert more influence than others. The degree to which such

groups are able to achieve their goals may depend on their ability to

be recognized as legitimate by the population, media, and by those in

power. For example, civil rights groups, trade unions, and

professional associations are more widely recognized and accepted

than a newly formed, single-issue pressure group.

Significant gains in public health have been achieved because of

efforts by pressure groups, including important changes and

advances in public health issues such as tobacco control,

occupational health and safety, air pollution, and HIV/AIDS.

As pointed out earlier, political parties are also targets for pressure

groups. However, because influencing public policy rather than

electing a certain candidate is the aim of an interest group, most

groups avoid heavy involvement with one party and generally remain

at least formally nonpartisan. Some large pressure groups make a

considerable effort to mold public opinion by means of mailing

campaigns, advertising, and use of the communications media. On

the other hand, there are other groups, especially the more powerful

organizations representing narrow interests, which prefer to have

their activities and influence go unnoticed by the public at large.

Because any particular pressure group reflects the interests of only a

part of the population, it is argued that such organizations are

contrary to the interests of the general public. However, it is pointed

out that some interest groups supply legislators with much needed

information, while others, such as the labor unions, perform a broad

representative function. The power of an interest group is usually

dependent on the size of its membership, the socioeconomic status

of its members, and its financial resources. There are a great many

categories of interest groups, including economic, patriotic, racial,

women's, occupational, and professional groups.

In Nigeria, we have pressure groups like: The Nigeria Bar

Association, The Nigeria Medical Association, National Association of

Nigerian Students, The Nigeria Union of Teachers, The Nigeria

Labour Congress and a lot them. In Britain, they have: Charter 88 –

campaigning for a written constitution and entrenched Bill of Rights; 

British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection – campaigning to halt the

breeding and use of animals in experiments;  British Roads

Federation – aiming to focus attention for a higher standard of service

from the UK road network;  Earth First – campaigning against the

destruction of the environment;  Liberty – campaigning to defend and

extend human rights and civil liberties;  Unison – trade union for

public sector workers;  National Union of Students (NUS);  National

Union of Teachers (NUT);  National Farmer’s Union (NFU);  British

Medical Association (BMA); Institute for Public Policy Research

(IPPR);  Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

(RSPCA);  National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children

(NSPCC). In America, they have the American Civil Liberation Union,

Conference on American Federation Union, The AARP (formerly the

American Association of Retired Persons), the American Farm

Bureau Federation, the American Legion, the National Association of

Manufacturers, and the National Organization for the Reform of

Marijuana Laws are all examples of well-known American pressure

groups.

TYPES OF PRESSURE GROUPS

There are numerous types of pressure groups of interests in modern

political societies. They are summarized under the following sub-

headings:

(i) CAUSE GROUPS: This group generally champions the

interests and the rights of the under privileged. They are

groups like: American Civil Liberation Union, Oxford

Association for Farming Relief which supplies food stuffs,

clothes and other valuables to the under privileged. In

Nigeria, we have such Cause groups like: Nigerian

Association Against Apartheid, Nigerian Association for

Preservation of Animals, Nigerian Cancer Society etc.

(ii) LABOUR GROUPS: This includes all types of trade unions

like: The Nigeria Labour Congress, The British Trade Union

Congress and Conference on American Federation Union

etc. Labour groups has become in modern industrial age

perhaps one of the most powerful interest groups. This is

because virtually everyone belongs to the union.

(iii) PROFESSIONAL GROUPS: This includes all the members

of a professional body. In Nigerian for instance, we have the

Nigeria Bar Association, Nigeria Medical Association, Nigeria

Union of Teachers, Colleges of Education Academic Staff

Union, and Academic Staff Union of Universities etc.

(iv) ETHNIC/RACIAL GROUPS: In Nigeria for instance, we

have the Oha na Eze Ndi Igbo-an Igbo ethnic pressure

group, the Ibibio Union, the Egbeomo Oduduwa of the

Yoruba Ethnic groups etc. in U.S.A, they have the National

Association for the Advancement of coloured people, the

Urban League etc.

(v) RELIGIOUS/EVANGELICAL GROUPS: This comprises of

the various religious organizations like: the Roman Catholic

Mission, the Church Missionary Society, the Scripture Union,

and the Moslem Association etc.

(vi) BUSINESS GROUPS: In Nigeria, we have the Nigeria

Chamber of Commerce, the Standard Organization of

Nigeria, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria etc.

(vii) AGRICULTURAL GROUPS: The whole association of

farmers all over the globe belongs to this group. In Nigeria,

we have various Farming and Agricultural Co-operative

societies, Farmers clubs etc.

REFERENCES

Abiodun ,A. A. (1997): The Role of Labour in the Political/Democratic

Process in Nigeria. In: Trade Unionism in Nigeria: Challenges for the

21st Century, F. Adewunmi (Ed.), pp. 113-136. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert

Foundation.

Akinyanju, A. (1997): Trade Union and Democratic Struggle. In:

Nigeria, Non-Governmental Organizations and Democracy, T.

Olorode, W. Raji, J. Ogunye & S. Jegede (Eds.), pp. 65-73. Lagos:

Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR).

Banwo, A. (1997): Democracy and Human Rights in Nigeria: An

Overview. In: Nigerian Non-Governmental Organisation and

Democracy, T. Olorode, W. Raji, J. Ogunye & S. Jegede (Eds.), pp.

40-50. Lagos: Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR).

Libby, R. T. (1998): Eco-Wars: Political Campaigns and Social

Movements. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mahood, H. R. (2000): Interest Groups in American National Politics:

An Overview. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Nwankwo, B.C (1992): Authority in Government. Almond Publishers.

Makurdi-Nigeria.

Ogbaji, U.A.O (2008): Principles, Practice and Techniques of Public

Administration. Petrosini Publishers, Lagos-Nigeria.

CHAPTER NINE

PRESSURE GROUPS AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN NIGERIA.

In Chapter Eight, we defined Pressure Groups, its relationship and

differences with Political Parties, and the various types of Pressure

Groups. This Chapter examines the contributions made by Pressure

Groups to the democratic process in Nigeria. The Chapter attempts a

conceptualization of Pressure Groups and Democracy. It also

examines the relevance of Pressure Groups generally, as well as

their attitude to and participation in the democratic process in

particular. The specific contributions of these groups to the

democratic process as well as obstacles to their effectiveness are

discussed.

The term pressure group is used interchangeably with such terms as

interest groups or organized interests. Henry Ehrman (1972:468-488)

defines pressure groups as voluntary associations of individuals who

band together for the defence of a particular interest. Interest in this

sense is a conscious desire to have a public policy or the

authoritative allocation of values, and to move in a particular, general

or specific direction.

The term pressure group is however loosely used here to include

trade or industrial unions, professional associations and any other

associations whose focus extends beyond the realization of the

parochial interests of their members. Barber (1975:198-199)

categorized pressure groups generally into two, namely defensive

pressure groups and promotional pressure groups. While defensive

pressure groups are basically concerned with the protection of their

members’ interests and have a defined membership, promotional

pressure groups are concerned with promoting some general public

interest as opposed to their own self-interest. Trade or industrial

unions, professional associations and human rights associations

therefore fall into the category of promotional pressure groups,

otherwise referred to here as functional pressure groups.

According to John and Erna Perry (1976:584-585), interest groups or

pressure groups are many and varied. Some are formally organized,

others are not. However, the more formally organized tend to be the

more durable whereas those informally organized usually dissolve

after the crisis that originated them is resolved. The longevity or

durability or these groups, their consistency as well as their high

sense of commitment to the realization of set goals all contribute to

making them functional.

Functional pressure groups can therefore be defined as those

pressure or interest groups whose activities are not limited or

restricted to the promotion and protection of parochial interests but

who are vocal and determined in pursuing policies and goals that

have relevance to citizens in their own society. Viewed within the

context of political participation, such groups often criticize unpopular

or unfavourable government policies, organized conferences,

seminars, rallies, and even demonstrations or protest marches to

express their displeasure and, in some cases, to suggest alternatives

to programmes or policies which they consider unfavourable.

Functional groups work towards sensitizing and mobilizing the

populace against unpopular acts of government. In this respect,

mention could be made of such groups as the Nigerian Bar

Association (NBA), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Nigerian

Labour Congress (NLC), human rights organisations such as the

Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), as well as pro-

democracy groups such as the Campaign for Democracy (CD),

Academic Staff Union of Universities, (ASUU), National Association

of Nigerian Students, and the Press.

Democracy as a concept has been defined in various ways and given

various interpretations. The generalized or loose nature of the

concept would account for this. However, according to Adeyinka

Banwo (1997:40-50), the basic features of democracy which serve as

a consensus among the contending perspectives on what democratic

system ought to entail or manifest include the right to elections, a

representative form of governance and freedom of choice, respect for

the rule of law and equality before the law, accountability, the

guarantee of the rights of individuals, an independent judiciary, as

well as a decentralization or delegation of power and authority

between all tiers of government.

Obviously, functional pressure groups have contributed to the

democratic process in Nigeria just as some may have contributed to

the problem of democratization in Nigeria, either overtly or covertly. In

the view of Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992:23), pressure groups are

to a very large extent necessary and healthy for a thriving democratic

culture to evolve. Obasanjo and Mabogunje are, however, also of the

opinion that such groups must not be seen to be operating under the

influence of foreign bodies. Moreover, the leadership under which

these groups operate some of the time, the prevailing situation in the

country, the organizational structure of these groups as well as the

general mood of the society determine, to a very large extent, the

effectiveness of these groups and profoundly influence their

contributions to the democratic process.

RELEVANCE OF PRESSURE GROUPS.

Pressure groups are undoubtedly relevant in terms of the functions

which they perform. These functions, according to Henry Ehrman

(1972:488-490), include managing the flow of influence between

government and the governed by participating in the political

competition of a given system. Through this process, a government is

able to ascertain reactions to its policies. Even so, pressure groups

do not seek responsibility for the direct management of government,

but reflect the concerns of the society in which they operate. They

sometimes destroy an existing consensus as well as prepare for a

new one. Their part in providing a balance between stability and

change within a governmental system remains important. Pressure

groups not only articulate the demands of their potential or actual

membership, they also serve as outlets for the social energies of their

members. Furthermore, through concrete and continuous group

campaigns, the socialization of the citizen by pressure groups often

proves more effective and lasting. In some cases, they supplement

the functions of political parties while they also seek to meet

conflicting claims and provoke favourable government decisions

(Ehrman 1972:490).

The techniques frequently commonly employed by pressure groups

to achieve their aims include campaigns, demonstrations or marches,

and strikes. Specifically in Nigeria, pressure groups like the Nigerian

Labour Congress (NLC), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), as well

as National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), have made

themselves relevant not only in terms of what they have been able to

achieve for their members but also for the larger society. The NLC,

for instance, successfully negotiated a new minimum wage with the

Shagari administration in 1981 after an effective general strike.

Similarly NMA has consistently been in the forefront of negotiating an

exclusive and improved salary package for its members. In the same

vein, the opposition to the implementation of Structural Adjustment

Programme, spearheaded by NANS in 1989 led to the introduction of

SAP relief packages for Nigerians, particularly the working class.

However, political developments in the country in the 1980s and

early 1990s have not only toughened some pressure groups but have

also resulted in the emergence and growth of new ones. This

development has led to the increased involvement of more assertive

pressure groups in efforts to attain and sustain a stable democratic

order in the country.

ATTITUDES TO AND PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

The attitude of pressure groups to the democratic process and their

participation in it depend to a large extent on developments over a

particular period and the resultant conditions. Even before the

attainment of political independence, organized labour has had cause

to participate in partisan politics, particularly with its affiliation with the

National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC) in 1944. The

outcome of this affiliation was the success of the general strike of

1945. A similar situation came about in 1964 when workers not only

demended improved wages but also made a number of political

demands. The climax of this development was the formation of the

Nigerian Labour Party by Michael Imodu and Eskor in 1964. Even

though the party did not have much following, owing to the regional

nature of political parties formed during the period, it nonetheless

participated in the controversial elections of 1964(Olujoku 1997: 337-

350). Despite the decision of the Nigeria Labour Congress that its

leaders should be non-partisan in the emerging political process in

1979, individual members and officers who were interested in politics

were allowed to participate freely in the political process, even though

they did not receive overt corporate backing from the congress. The

decision to be non-partisan must have arisen out of the need to

protect the new-found freedom of the congress, particularly in the

face of the towering military presence in the Obasanjo administration.

Consequently, many labour leaders contested and won election to

various offices under the auspices of different political parties. This

development notwithstanding, moves were made to pursue anti-

labour policies and to introduce anti-labour legislation, though without

any success.

As a result of the failure to get the Nigerian Labour Party registered in

1989, the NLC was involved in an unprincipled and incoherent

affiliation and romance with the Social Democratic Party. This

affiliation, which probably arose from a desire to realize the selfish

ambition of Pascal Bafyau, the one-time President of the NLC and

several labour leaders, did not benefit organized labour in any way

and even contributed to a reversal of the political gains made by

organized labour in the recent past. In contrast, however, articulate

and determined labour leaders like Frank Ovie Kokori and Milton

Dabibi emerged during this period, not only to restore credibility to

trade unions but also to prove that “the economic power of labour

could be used as a bargaining weapon in the political arena”.

(Olukoju 1997:348) Specifically, Kokori and Dabibi strongly believe

that the NUPENG was able to use the strike option to pressure the

military to reverse its unjust annulment of the presidential election of

June 12, 1993. Generally speaking, therefore, organized labour,

whether in the form of the unions or as individuals within the unions,

has a tendency to participate in the democratic process by contesting

elections, supporting candidates for election or identifying with a party

or parties with a similar ideology and orientation (Olukoju 1997:337-

350).

The genesis of explicit human rights activities can be traced to 1987,

when the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) was formed. From 1987

onwards, a staggering number of human rights organisations had

been formed as Non-Governmental Organizations. These included

the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), formed in

1989, the Constitutional Right Project (CRP), the Universal Defenders

of Democracy (UDD), the National Association of Democratic

Lawyers (NADL), and the Human Right Africa, all formed after the

abortive coup d’etat of April 1990. Traditionally, these human rights

organisations have been mainly involved in the campaign to protect

human rights, highlighting the incidence of human rights abuses, and

seeking redress or restitution for victims of such abuses, mainly

through the due process of law. However the manipulation of the

democratic process led to a radical transformation of these HROs

and the manifestation of a greater interest in political matters per se.

The climax of this development was the emergence in November

1991 of the Campaign for Democracy as an umbrella organization for

all HROs and pro-democracy groups. The CD sought to pursue

strictly political questions left unattended to by most of its constituent

member-groups and other democratic agencies. Its struggle centred

around two main issues, namely: (1) increasing pressure on the

Babangida junta to keep to its hand-over date of January 2, 1993,

which was eventually shifted to August 27, 1993; (2) the campaign to

convene a Sovereign National Conference, SNO, where the national

question could be discussed and the foundations of a new Nigeria

laid. Beyond these issues, the CD was the mobilizing force in the

protest against the annulment of the June 12 election results. The

political commitment of the CD was further clarified by its declaration

that: although it is not a political platform the CD has a political

interest that rests on the restoration of democracy and the

transformation of Nigerian society, hence the CD shall set up a

political commission to draw up a minimum politico-economic

programme (Mimiko 1995:155).

The major preoccupation of the Academic Staff Union of Universities,

ASUU, has been with pressurizing the government into ensuring the

adequate funding of research and accommodation for students, the

maintenance or safeguarding of university autonomy, and

improvement in salaries. The ASUU has nevertheless had cause to

become involved in covert political activities. The progressive nature

of the ASUU has probably accounted for this. The glorious era of the

ASUU was witnessed during the tenure of Dr. Attahiru Jega, and later

that of Dr. Asisi Asobie. It could be inferred that the strike action

embarked on by the ASUU between May and November 1993, even

though it was primarily due to the unwillingness of the government to

honour its 1992 agreement with the union, smacked of political

involvement on the part of the ASUU. This was clearly manifested in

the demand made by the union for the revalidation of the annulled

elections of June 12, 1993 by the Babangida regime (Akinyanju

1997:65-73). In the same vein, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA)

and the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) had actively associated

themselves with the maintenance of democratic principles in Nigeria.

The NBA has not only consistently advocated the independence of

the judiciary but has also advocated respect for the rule of law and

equality before the law, all of which constitute the bedrock of

democracy. The growing radical inclination of the NBA particularly

under Alao Aka-Bashorun and Mrs. Priscilla Kuye eventually made

the Bar Association a target of attack on the part of the adventurous

military regime of Ibrahim Babangida. The outcome was the

comatose state of the NBA from 1992 to 1995. (Mimiko 1995:150-

166).

Under the auspices of the National Union of Nigerian Students

(NUNS) and later the National Association of Nigerian Students

(NANS), Nigerian students have not only displayed a positive attitude

to the democratic struggle but have been fully involved in it since the

1960s. The repudiation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact of 1962

owed a lot to the struggle waged by students. The philosophical basis

of the students’ democratic struggle is contained in the Charter of

Demands of the National Association of Nigerian Students, which

focuses on the revolutionary perspective that democracy is not

possible unless the exploiter class is overthrown. The body has also

constantly kicked against the violation of the constitutional rights of

the people while advocating the restoration of popular democracy

(Idika 1997:77-86).

Moreover, the emergence of a radical, progressive and activist press

has undoubtedly given further impetus to the democratic process in

the country. Mention could be made of such newspapers and

magazines as The News, Tempo and Tell. Their biting criticisms of

the inherent contradictions in the Babangida transition programme

eventually led to their proscription, seizure and even the arrest and

detention of the journalists involved at various points in time. Their

strong desire to give a fillip to the democratic process led to the

emergence of what has been described as “guerilla journalism”

(Mimiko 1995:150-166).

CONTRIBUTIONS OF FUNCTIONAL PRESSURE GROUPS TO

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

There is no doubt that, in one form or another, progressive groups

have contributed to the democratic process in Nigeria, just as a few of

them have also constituted an obstacle in the path of the democratic

process. The dismal performance of organized labour between 1984

and 1988 notwithstanding, the unions still succeeded in recording

some achievements. For instance, the Chiroma-led NLC identified

with the Nigerian students in their struggle for a better educational

environment. More importantly, the trade unions participated

effectively in the political debate of 1986. In the same vein, Abiodun

A. A. has observed with reference to organized labour that:

Its articulated position for a political arrangement of “socialist

organization” that could bring Nigeria to the path of social progress

remained the hallmark of the trade union movement’s involvement

with other constituencies of democratic struggles… (Abiodun

1997:115).

However, the poor leadership provided by Pascal Bafyau from 1988

to 1993, in sharp contrast to the exemplary leadership of Hassan

Sunmonu, weakened the organized labour. In consequence,

organized labour could not mobilize Nigerians against the glaring

injustices of the period, as a social movement would have done. The

Campaign for Democracy (CD) eventually filled this gap.

Human rights organizations have undoubtedly contributed

meaningfully to the maintenance of democratic zeal in the country.

Apart from organizing conferences, seminars, symposia and lectures

on the maintenance of democracy in the country with a view to

sensitizing and mobilizing Nigerians, in extreme and serious cases it

has also challenged government attempts to abort democracy or stifle

the democratic process. This they have done by organizing mass

protests and civil disobedience campaigns. For instance, between

July 5 and 7 1993 the CD commenced direct political action by calling

for mass protests against the annulment of the presidential election of

June 12 1993. The violent manner in which the protests were put

down led to a change of tactics with the adoption of a campaign of

civil disobedience. Sola Iji (1997:74-88) has rightly observed that the

pro-democracy agitation anchored by the CD and other human rights

organizations contributed in part to the unceremonious exit of

General Ibrahim Babangida from power in August 1993. Mobilization

is thus a potential tool for the achievement of desired objectives by

the human rights organizations.

For its part, the National Association of Nigerian Students has at

different times exercised their constitutionally granted freedom of

expression by mobilising in 1986 against a 25 kobo increase in the

price of petroleum. Similarly, in 1989 the student body was at the

forefront of a popular uprising against the dehumanizing effect of the

Structural Adjustment Programme pursued by the Babangida regime

(Idika 1997:79-88). The SAP relief packages that came afterward

were visible evidence of the success of the protests.

Even in the second republic which lasted from 1979 to 1983 the

undemocratic actions and political intolerance of the political actors of

the period did not go unchallenged. A good example of such

undemocratic acts was the illegal deportation of an opposition leader,

Alhaji Shugaba Abdulrahaman Darman, in 1980. Adeyinka Banwo

(1997:44) has posited that Opposition to these undemocratic

practices was spear-headed by the students, members of the

intelligentsia and workers through their main bodies like the NANS,

ASUU and the NLC in a new-found alliance. This was complemented

by support from progressive politicians, lawyers, journalists and other

professionals.

Other functional professional groups like the NMA and NBA have

consistently commented on national issues with a view to influencing

the direction of policy. The NBA, for instance, has constantly criticized

the inclusion of ouster clauses in decrees which have effectively

thrown out judgments made by courts, thus constituting a breach of

the rule of law. In addition, the setting-up of tribunals to try cases that

could be tried by normal courts has also been criticized by the NBA.

OBSTACLES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESSURE GROUPS

IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

The functional pressure groups faced a number of problems as a

result of their belief in democratic ideals and their active pursuit. One

of such obstacles was the interference of the government in the

affairs of these groups. This has contributed to a marked weakening

of the groups. In addition, the perceived meddlesomeness in the

groups’ activities has created specific problems for the different

groups themselves. For instance, it has led to the emergence of

Pascal Bafyau, a military apologist, as the leader of the NLC. It has

also resulted in the inability of the NBA to constitute its central

leadership between 1992 and 1995, while the NMA was almost

polarized into groups or camps on various occasions. Furthermore, at

one point in the history of NANS two national presidents with different

executive committee members co-existed. Consequently, it has been

difficult for most of the groups to focus wholly on the pursuit of

democratic principles, bogged down as they were in internal

problems.

In some extreme cases, the government has wielded a big stick by

outright proscription of some of these groups, the purpose being to

keep them out of circulation for as long as possible so that they would

not pose any threat to the undemocratic government. Part of the

effectiveness of this policy was achieved by the NLC, ASUU and

NANS being proscribed separately at different times.

Similarly, unfavourable legislation was imposed on these groups to

incapacitate them and in the process render them useless or at best

ineffective. Such unfavourable legislation includes the National

Economic Emergency Power Decree 22 of 1985, the Trade Union

(Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 17 of 1986, Decree 12 and 16 of

1986, and Decree 47 of 1987. In the course of this process the ASUU

became disaffiliated from the NLC (through the provision of Decree

17 of 1986) as a result of what the government considered the

“radical influence” of the NLC.

Moreover, unwarranted arrests and detentions of members of these

groups, often without trial, was a common development. Many

examples abound of human rights, labour and pro-democracy

activists who were detained without trial, including Olisa Agbakoba,

Baba Omojola, Gani Fawehinmi and Femi Falana. In the same vein,

progressive news media have had their premises sealed up several

times, while printed copies of their papers and magazine have been

confiscated on the slightest excuse. Moreover, many journalists have

arrested and detained without just cause. For instance, on May 5

1991 the Editor-in-Chief of the now defunct Newbreed Magazine,

Chief Chris Okolie, was detained, apparently because of criticism of

the Babangida administration. Similarly, in 1993 alone, several copies

of Tell magazine were confiscated on at separate occasions and the

editor went underground in order to escape arrest (CHDR Annual

Reports 1991-1993).

CONCLUSION

Functional pressure groups have contributed immensely and are still

contributing to the promotion and protection of democratic ideals in

the country. However, for the groups to be more effective in the

democratic process there is a need for them to have a wider influence

so that their impact will be felt nation-wide. As presently constituted,

these groups are restricted to the south-western part of the country.

The expansion of their base would provide them with a more broad

based and national outlook. Moreover, it is very difficult to define the

sources of funding of some of these groups. There is therefore a

need for them to disclose their sources in order to clear up all doubts.

Furthermore, these groups should not simply criticize the government

for the sake of criticism alone, with a view largely to drawing attention

to themselves and thus attracting popularity; rather, they should be

principled and constructive in their criticism. There is also a need for

pressure groups to be more democratic in their operation as well as

in the running of their organizations.

Finally, these groups should consider moving beyond the status of

facilitators to actual participants in the democratic process in order to

be more relevant. In doing so, however, they must be prepared to

pursue political activities and the attendant developments with the

courage and vigour with which they pursue pressure group activities,

without hiding anything from the people.

REFERENCES

Annual Reports on the Human Rights Situation in Nigeria, Lagos

CDHR. Committee for the Defence of Human Rights. 1992.

Annual Reports on the Human Rights Situation in Nigeria, Lagos

CDHR. Committee for the Defence of Rights. 1993.

Annual Reports on the Human Rights Situation in Nigeria, Lagos

CDHR. Committee for the Defence of Human Rights. June 1996.

Freedom Watch “Why ASUU is on Strike” CDHR. P.3. Committee for

the Defence of Human Rights. 1992.

Victims CDHR Newsletter Volume 3, No.3, Nov. 1992 “NGOS To

Sustain Democracy”, Lagos CDHR P.8.

Trade Unions and the Political Process. In: Trade Unionism in

Nigeria: Challenges for the 21st Century, F. Adewunmi (Ed.), pp.74-

88. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Mimiko, N. O. 1995. From Agitation for Human Rights to the Pursuit

of Power: The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Nigeria’s

Aborted Democratisation Programme, 1986-1993. In: Crises and

Contradictions in Nigeria’s Democratisation Programme 1986-

1993,N. O. Mimiko (Ed.), pp. 150-166. Akure Stebak.

Obasanjo O. & Mabogunje A. (Eds.). (1992): Elements of Democracy.

Abeokuta: ALF Publications.

Olukoju . A. (1997): Organised Labour, Governance and the Electoral

Process: Insights from the American and Nigeria Experiences. In:

Governance and the Electoral Process: Nigeria and the United States

of America, A. Ogunba (Ed.), pp. 337-350. Lagos: American Studies

Association of Nigeria (ASAN).

Perry J. E. (1976): The Social Web: An Introduction to Sociology.

Second Edition. NewYork: Harper & Row Publishers.

Nordic Journal of African Studies. (2002) Pressure Groups and the

Democratic Processing Nigeria (1979-1993) By Adesoji Abimbola of

Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria.

CHAPTER TEN

POLITICAL FINANCE

The term ‘political finance' can be defined as the use of money or the

use of other material resources for political activities. It embodies the

sources or means through which political activities are sponsored in a

given country. The acquisition and disposition of party funds is one of

the least explored and therefore most critically vulnerable areas of

party activity. Lack of information is due in part to lack of legislation

requiring the disclosure of sources and in part to the avoidance or

evasion of appropriate regulations. For example in Nigeria during the

aborted third republic, the then military government took it upon itself

to finance political parties. This led to colossal waste of the nation’s

revenue. Some of the party structures put up by the government such

as the construction of party headquarters in every local government

throughout the country are now standing as monuments all over the

country.

However, the concept of political finance has two broad connotation:

money used for electioneering (campaign funds) and money used for

political party expenses (party funds). [PintoDuschinsky:2001]. It is

believed that in the democracies with free electoral processes, the

principal sources of party funds are business, labour, and agricultural

groups; wealthy individuals and families; statutory government

subsidies; small donations from a large number of party members;

and contributions from candidates. Not only is supporting a political

party system costly, but it also raises a host of ethical and legal

problems. What expenses are legitimate? Should the funds come

from public or private sources? How should they be accounted for? If

politics is indeed struggle for power, will the party with the greatest

financial resources win? If so, what happens to the vital inter-party

competition that is a corner of democracy? Is giving money to a party

the ultimate symbol of political participation by the individual citizen?

Most students of party finance believe that other resources and

circumstances being equal, money alone will not necessarily win

elections. The sky-rocketing costs of electioneering, the increasing

sophistication of the public and the growing tendency towards

government regulation coupled with more stringent penaltie all

conspire to minimize the probabilities of “buying an election”. Moreso,

the dynamics of collecting and spending political money are

undergoing significant changes especially in developed countries like

the U.S.A. and Britain that are affecting public policy.

Nigeria's political history since independence from Britain in 1960 has

been a cycle of authoritarian military regimes with episodic interregna

of civilian governments. Rentier politics in Nigeria has been

characterized over the years by the dominance of 'electoral

machines' controlled by political entrepreneurs comprising largely of

wealthy former military officers and their civilian business cronies.

The major political parties in Nigerian politics today are little more

than grand agglomerations of the respective electoral 'machines' of

the leading political financiers. Most Nigerian politicians are

'sponsored' by local and regional power brokers cum political

entrepreneurs who finance their campaigns for public office. The

'sponsorship' is effectively a business transaction in which the patron

recovers the 'investment' in the form of public works and procurement

contracts, prebendal appointments of cronies to public offices and

other forms of prebendal activity by the 'client, politician on assuming

public office. In some cases where the patron and client failed to

define with sufficient precision, the dimensions of the return on

investment or the client balks at delivering per the agreed terms, the

fall-out has led to mass violence and political destabilization.

During the 1998 transition following the sudden death of General Sani

Abacha in June 1998, ‘political entrepreneurs' comprising ex-military

officers and their civilian business cronies effectively seized control of

the Nigerian political scene. Although retired military officers have

participated in Nigerian politics since the Second Republic in the

1980s, the 15 years of military dictatorship from 1984 -1999 were the

most corrupt and despotic in Nigeria's history. Nigeria under these

generals was routinely described by scholars of African political

economy as a prebendal or patrimonial state. Public office and

government patronage became 'the only game in town'. Retiring

military officers deployed the massive wealth generated from the

proceeds of grand corruption to creating and financing the political

networks that formed the nuclei of several of the political associations

that sought registration as political parties. The 1999 electoral

campaign which brought the current civilian government in Nigeria to

power in May 1999 was largely financed by ex-military political

entrepreneurs as a form of political 'insurance'. Deploying their

massive financial resources, they were able to install ex-military

officers and their civilian business cronies in control of the two largest

political parties and in high federal and state public offices.

Political movements representing the interests of the poor and the

disadvantaged that could have served to moderate the influence of

the dominant political parties have been systematically excluded from

participation in the political arena by a combination of legal

instruments and their relative paucity of resources as compared with

the vast financial resources available to the dominant parties. A net

result is the disempowerment of the generality of the Nigerian people.

The dominance of unrepresentative 'machine' parties alienates the

electorate and prevents the evolution of accountable governance in

Nigeria.

Some of the factors which exacerbate the exclusion of alternative

parties and which reinforce the popular disempowerment include

electoral regulations that impose onerous financial burdens on

political movements seeking to participate in electoral politics and the

absence of an effective system to regulate political finance. These

factors enhance the disproportionate influence of political

entrepreneurs

Nigeria's history of political violence and instability' exacerbated by

political mobilization on ethnic and sectarian lines, has led successive

governments to impose legal guidelines for political party formation,

registration and operation. These guidelines ostensibly seek to avoid

the establishment of parties on sectarian, ethnic or geographical

bases but rather to encourage the creation of cross cutting political

alliances bridging regional, ethnic and sectarian divides. The electoral

guidelines currently in force in Nigeria impose onerous obligations on

citizens wishing to form and register political parties, purportedly in

order to ensure nonsectarian and cross-sectional politics. The 1999

constitution and electoral legislation in force stipulate that only

political parties registered by the Independent National Electoral

Commission [INEC] may present candidates to stand for any elected

office in Nigeria and there are no provisions for independent

candidates. The guidelines require political movements to pay various

large sums of money as registration and sundry administrative fees to

the INEC and submit extensive documentation establishing:-

1. That their membership cuts across the entire country by providing

membership rolls to INEC.

2. That they have and maintain administrative offices in 24 out of

Nigeria's 36 states as well as a national secretariat in Abuja, the

nation's capital.

3. That the national, regional and local party executive bodies are

broadly representative of all interests or sections of the Nigerian

population. These onerous legal and administrative requirements

create major logistical and financial burdens for political movements

seeking registration as political parties in order to participate in

electoral office. The high costs associated with compliance with INEC

guidelines serve to effectively bar the vast majority of Nigerians from

participating in politics. The result is that political parties are formed

and operated mostly by those Nigerians who possesses or can raise

the enormous funds required to comply with INEC strictures. This in

turn leads to the creation of political parties based mostly on alliances

of convenience between wealthy “political entrepreneurs", rather than

political parties based on 'ideological' lines or political platforms.

The cumulative result is that the political playing field in Nigeria is

polluted by the proceeds of corruption that in turn leads to distortions

in Nigeria's democratic development. Parties and candidates finance

their activities and campaigns from funds provided by party bosses

and political entrepreneurs in absolute secrecy. The Nigerian public

has no information as to which entrepreneur has provided funds to

any political party or candidate.

 

REFERENCES

THIS DAY of December 21, 2003.

http://www.boellnigeria.org/documents/political%20Finance%20and

%20Democracy%20in%20Nigeria.pdf

CHAPTER ELEVEN

PUBLIC OPINION

According to V.O Key (1961), “Public Opinion consists of those

opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to

heed”. A political attitude is a relatively general “set” or predisposition,

towards a politically relevant class of objects, events, or behavior. For

instance, Mr. West belief that the Yorubas are greedy or Mr. Don’s

view that they have never been given a chance to rule to show what

they can do. Public Opinion also consists of attitudes, perspectives,

and preferences of a population toward events, circumstances, and

issues of mutual interest. It is characteristically measured by the

sample survey or public opinion poll.

OPINION FORMATION AND MEASUREMENT

Public opinion is shaped both by relatively permanent circumstances

and by temporary influences. Among the former are the ideas that

characterize the popular culture of a given place at a given time. In

the U.S., for example, the youth-oriented culture of the late 20th

century affects the attitudes of many people toward aging and the

elderly. Other fairly permanent circumstances such as race, religion,

geographical location, economic status, and educational level can

strongly influence the opinions of an individual or a particular group

about many subjects. Certain temporary factors also affect the

public's attitudes. Among these are the impact of current events; the

opinions of influential or authoritative persons; the effect of the mass

communications media; and the concerted campaigns of public

relations professionals.

However, public opinions are expressed and measured through the

following means:

i- Writing letters to the representatives, or to the president.

ii- Making publications in newspapers or paid advertisements.

iii- Mass demonstrations or protests.

iv- In extreme cases, members of a group may express their

opinion through civil disobedience.

v- Through opinion polls as may be directed by the government

e.g in a referendum or plebiscite.

HISTORY

The systematic measurement of public attitudes is a 20th-century

development. Although occasionally opinion polls were conducted

before the 1930s, they were generally neither systematic nor

scientific. They dealt with unrepresentative samples or used methods

that made certain people far more likely to be included in the poll than

others. For example, in “straw polls” the only people counted were

those who volunteered to take part.

Public opinion polling improved vastly in the 1930s when business

and educational organizations began to develop methods that

allowed the relatively unbiased selection of respondents and the

systematic gathering of data from a wide cross section of the public.

By present-day standards these polls were crude, but their results

were in some ways useful. Among the pioneers were George H.

Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald M. Crossley.

Two events encouraged polling agencies to further refine their

methods. In 1936 a poll conducted by the Literary Digest incorrectly

determined that the Republican candidate, Alf Landon, would win the

U.S. presidential election. The error arose largely because of biases

that caused wealthy people to be overrepresented in the poll. In the

1948 election, most polls mistakenly predicted a victory for the

Republican candidate, Thomas E. Dewey, over President Harry S.

Truman, again because poor people were underrepresented and also

because the polling agencies missed last-minute changes of attitude

among the voting public. Since 1948 techniques of public opinion

research and polling have improved considerably. Efforts are now

made to select respondents without bias, to improve the quality of

questionnaires, and to train able and reliable interviewers.

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND ITS RELEVANCE

What is Public Opinion Poll? In the simplest sense of the term, a

public opinion poll is any effort to ascertain public opinion on a

question by directly asking some members of the public what they

think and taking the views of this “sample” to represent what the

whole public thinks. Opinion polls are generally accepted as useful

tools by business, political organizations, the mass media, and

government as well as in academic research. Hundreds of public

opinion polling firms operates around the world. Best known in the

U.S. are the organizations, such as the Gallup Poll and Harris Poll,

the findings of which regularly appear in major newspapers.

In business, polls are used to test consumers' preferences and to

discover what it is about a product that gives it appeal. Response to

commercial polls aid in planning marketing and advertising strategies

and in making changes in a product to increase its sales.

In politics, polls are used to obtain information about voters' attitudes

toward issues and candidates, to put forward candidates with winning

potential, and to plan campaigns. Polling organizations have also

been successful in predicting the outcome of elections. In addition, by

polling voters on election day, it is often possible to determine the

probable winner even before the voting booths close.

Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television are heavy users of

public opinion polling information, especially political information that

helps to predict elections or gauge the popularity of government

officials and candidates. The public's attitude toward various social,

economic, and international issues is also considered newsworthy.

Governments use opinion polls to tap public sentiment about issues

of interest. In addition, government agencies use polling methodology

to determine unemployment rates, crime rates, and other social and

economic indicators. It equally guides the government in the

formation of policies. This goes to say that a public opinion freely

expressed can help the government to ascertain the wishes of the

electorate and consequently to formulate policies in accordance with

the expressed wishes and desires of the people.

Public opinion is a means of ensuring some kind of participation of

the electorate in policy formulation by encouraging the public to send

their views on a given issue, and this helps to provide a change

where it is desirable. A government can be compelled to change its

policies in response to public opinion. It also acts as a means of

calling for accountability. When the government respects public

opinion in this sense, the citizens will freely give their loyalty and

support to the government and this ensures stability, economic

growth and development.

Polls have been employed extensively in academic research,

particularly in the social sciences, where they have proven valuable in

studying delinquency, socialization, political attitudes, and economic

behavior. Among the prominent organizations that primarily serve

academic research purposes are the various Research Centres in our

various institutions, the National Research Institutes, Survey

Research Center at the University of Michigan and the National

Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago etc.

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

Public opinion polling involves procedures to draw a representative

sample of the population under study. If, for example, one is studying

the attitudes of all adults in the Nigeria, the survey organization would

seek to draw up a list of the entire adult population of the country and

then select at random a sample to be surveyed. When proper

techniques are used and the sample is large enough—1000 to 1500

people—the results obtained are likely to be very close to the results

one would get if the entire population were surveyed. Thus, if 60

percent of the sample says it approves of the president's policies,

statistical theory shows that if the entire population were surveyed,

the probability is 95 percent that between 58 to 62 percent of the

people would express the same approval as the sample. The criterion

of excellence in a sample is representativeness, not size.

Sampling is vital to the validity of an opinion poll. In practice,

however, sampling can be a complicated procedure involving a great

deal of estimation and guesswork. The population to be surveyed

usually cannot be precisely enumerated. Efforts must be made to

break down the population into sampling units of approximately equal

size. A certain amount of interviewer discretion is necessary, and

complications arise when a proposed respondent is not at home, has

moved, or is unwilling to be interviewed. Often only about two-thirds

of the intended respondents are actually interviewed and give valid

responses. When mail questionnaires are used, problems of non-

response are higher.

Great care must be used when fashioning the questionnaire or

interview schedule, and testing the questions before using them in

the field is always advisable. Ideally, questions should be short, clear,

direct, and easily comprehended. Apart from such an obvious

necessity as trying to avoid bias, many subtle problems arise in

framing a question. A word or phrase, for example, may mean

different things to different people. In making a question simple

enough to be understood by everyone, the issue may be so

oversimplified that it has no meaning to the more sophisticated

respondent. Sometimes the order in which questions are asked can

affect the response. In addition, the tone or wording of the question

may alter the measured response: A study once found that the

percentage of the public in favor of “forbidding” speeches against

democracy was 16 points lower than the percentage in favor of “not

allowing” such speeches.

Other problems can be traced to interviewer effects. Age, sex, class,

or racial differences between the respondent and the interviewer can

sometimes affect the respondent's answer.

Once the opinion data have been gathered, the analyst must seek to

find meaning in the results, keeping in mind the problems of sampling

variability, question-wording biases, and interviewer effects. The

results are tabulated and analyzed using various statistical

techniques to determine patterns. Much successful analysis involves

comparison: comparing subgroups of the population as they react to

the same question; comparing the results of surveys conducted at

different times to discover opinion trends; and comparing the

responses to different questions. Because of comparison-based

analysis, the survey often is divided into small subgroups for

comparison—for instance, educated, politically active women with

educated, politically active men.

LIMITATIONS TO THE EXPRESSION OF PUBLIC OPINION

There are a lot of factors that tend to limit expression of public opinion

in some countries. Some of these factors are summarized as follows:

i- Government intolerance to opposition or criticisms.

ii- When the press does not have freedom, public opinion is

limited.

iii- In a country where the law forbids freedom of speech or

expression, public opinion is therefore limited. For instance,

during the Buhari’s regime in Nigeria(decree two) and in

Uganda, during the regime of Idi Amin.

iv- In military, fascist, socialist, authoritarian and undemocratic

government, public opinion is limited.

v- Illiteracy is one of the limitations to public opinion. In most

third world countries where the rate of illiteracy is high, the

citizens find it difficult to express their views.

CRITICISMS OF THE RESEARCH

Criticisms of public opinion research come from a variety of sources.

Many people simply are not convinced that the opinions of a small

sample of the population are a viable representation of the opinions

of the whole. On this matter, however, the polling agencies can point

to the science of statistics and also to decades of experience from

which it can be shown, for example, that the same question asked on

two different sample surveys at the same time will almost always

generate similar results. Other criticisms deal with sample procedures

that, for reasons of economy or expediency, sometimes use outdated

population data or make compromises with rigorous statistical

requirements.

Even assuming that the basic poll data are valid, analyses of the data

may be casual and superficial. In some cases, the raw data are

simply presented as the public's “opinion” on an issue without deep

and careful analysis to probe nuance and possible bias. The subtle

influence of variations in question wording on the measured response

is often ignored.

In the political area, criticism sometimes focuses on the

appropriateness of opinion polling, rather than on its validity. It is

argued that elected officials may be too willing to act on what a poll

says their constituents think rather than deciding the issues on their

merits. Some experts believe that polls may influence voters to favor

certain political candidates who seem to be enjoying a notable

popularity at the moment. The information that a certain candidate is

far ahead in the polls may discourage people from voting at all or

encourage them to vote for that candidate and thus may affect the

results of the election.

REFERENCES

Key Jr. V.O (1961): Public Opinion and American Democracy. New

York, Alfred A. Knopt.

Lane, R.E and David, O. Sears (1964): Public Opinion, Eaglewood

Cliff, N.J Prentice –Hall Inc.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Democracy and Democratization in Nigeria

Translated into English, the originally Greek word “Democracy”

means “rule of the people”. Democracy is a system which gives

periodic opportunities for the masses to choose their leaders.

Democracy from a layman’s view is government of the people, by the

people and for the people. Another definition of democracy is that it is

a system of government in which the will of the majority of qualified

citizens’ prevails. The selection of political leaders by the people is

the very basis of democratic governance. In most democracies today,

popular political participation is confined to this selection of leaders

on election-day every few years. Elections and democracy are like

two wheels of a cart. If you remove one wheel the vehicle cannot

move forward.

On the other hand, Democratization may be defined as the process

that leads to democracy. This is a complex political, social and also

cultural procedure or development that has taken different shapes in

different parts of the world. The term “democratization” defines a

political process; likewise democracy – once attained – is never

static, but continues to evolve. The evolution of democratic societies

is never a one-way-road.

Democratic rule is inconceivable without elections. A ruler who does

away with elections is rightfully called a dictator. The very essence of

democratic rule lies in the limitation of political power. In democratic

orders, various methods are applied to curb power.

In a democracy, the power of the government is always limited by

time. All democratic constitutions include provisions that limit the

terms of political leaders; in some democratic countries, political

leaders are even explicitly excluded from running for office after a

stated period.

Democracy consists of four basic elements: We can think of

democracy as a system of government with four key elements:

 

1. A political system for choosing and replacing the government

through free and fair elections.

 

2. The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and

civic life.

 

3. Protection of the human rights of all citizens.

 

4. A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to

all citizens. 

Democracy is a means for the people to choose their leaders and to

hold their leaders accountable for their policies and their conduct in

office. The people decide who will represent them in parliament, and

who will head the government at the national and local levels. They

do so by choosing between competing parties in regular, free and fair

elections.

However, in a democracy, the people are sovereign—they are the

highest form of political authority. Power flows from the people to the

leaders of government, who hold power only temporarily. Laws and

policies require majority support in parliament, but the rights of

minorities are protected in various ways. The people are free to

criticize their elected leaders and representatives, and to observe

how they conduct the business of government. Elected

representatives at the national and local levels should listen to the

people and respond to their needs and suggestions.

Elections have to occur at regular intervals, as prescribed by law.

Those in power cannot extend their terms in office without asking for

the consent of the people again in an election. For elections to be

free and fair, they have to be administered by a neutral, fair, and

professional body that treats all political parties and candidates

equally. All parties and candidates must have the right to campaign

freely, to present their proposals to the voters both directly and

through the mass media. Voters must be able to vote in secret, free

of intimidation and violence.

 

Independent observers must be able to observe the voting and the

vote counting to ensure that the process is free of corruption,

intimidation, and fraud. There needs to be some impartial and

independent tribunal to resolve any disputes about the election

results. This is why it takes a lot of time to organize a good,

democratic election. Any country can hold an election, but for an

election to be free and fair requires a lot of organization, preparation,

and training of political parties, electoral officials, and civil society

organizations who monitor the process.

 THE ROLE OF THE CITIZEN IN A DEMOCRACY

 The key role of citizens in a democracy is to participate in public life.

 Citizens have an obligation to become informed about public issues,

to watch carefully how their political leaders and representatives use

their powers, and to express their own opinions and interests.  Voting

in elections is another important civic duty of all citizens. But to vote

wisely, each citizen should listen to the views of the different parties

and candidates, and then make his or her own decision on whom to

support.

 

Participation can also involve campaigning for a political party or

candidate, standing as a candidate for political office, debating public

issues, attending community meetings, petitioning the government,

and even protesting. A vital form of participation comes through

active membership in independent, non-governmental organizations,

what we call “civil society.” These organizations represent a variety

of interests and beliefs: farmers, workers, doctors, teachers, business

owners, religious believers, women, students, human rights activists.

It is important that women participate fully both in politics and in civil

society. This requires efforts by civil society organizations to educate

women about their democratic rights and responsibilities, improve

their political skills, represent their common interests, and involve

them in political life.

 In a democracy, participation in civic groups should be voluntary. No

one should be forced to join an organization against their will. Political

parties are vital organizations in a democracy, and democracy is

stronger when citizens become active members of political parties.

 However, no one should support a political party because he is

pressured or threatened by others. In a democracy, citizens are free

to choose which party to support. Democracy depends on citizen

participation in all these ways. But participation must be peaceful,

respectful of the law, and tolerant of the different views of other

groups and individuals.

 THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS IN A DEMOCRACY

 In a democracy, every citizen has certain basic rights that the state

cannot take away from them. These rights are guaranteed under

international law. You have the right to have your own beliefs, and to

say and write what you think. No one can tell you what you must

think, believe, and say or not say. There is freedom of religion.

Everyone is free to choose their own religion and to worship and

practice their religion as they see fit. Every individual has the right to

enjoy their own culture, along with other members of their group,

even if their group is a minority. There is freedom and pluralism in the

mass media. You can choose between different sources of news and

opinion to read in the newspapers, to hear on the radio, and to watch

on television.

You have the right to associate with other people, and to form and

join organizations of your own choice, including trade unions. You are

free to move about the country, and if you wish, to leave the country.

You have the right to assemble freely, and to protest government

actions. Everyone has an obligation to exercise these rights

peacefully, with respect for the law and for the rights of others.

THE RULE OF LAW

 Democracy is a system of rule by laws, not by individuals. In a

democracy, the rule of law protects the rights of citizens, maintains

order, and limits the power of government. All citizens are equal

under the law. No one may be discriminated against on the basis of

their race, religion, ethnic group, or gender. No one may be arrested,

imprisoned, or exiled arbitrarily. If you are detained, you have the

right to know the charges against you, and to be presumed innocent

until proven guilty according to the law.

Anyone charged with a crime has the right to a fair, speedy, and

public trial by an impartial court.  No one may be taxed or prosecuted

except by a law established in advance. No one is above the law, not

even a king or an elected president. The law is fairly, impartially, and

consistently enforced, by courts that are independent of the other

branches of government. Torture and cruel and inhumane treatment

are absolutely forbidden. The rule of law places limits on the power of

government. No government official may violate these limits.

 

No ruler, minister, or political party can tell a judge how to decide a

case. Office holders cannot use their power to enrich themselves.

Independent courts and commissions punish corruption, no matter

who is guilty.

THE LIMITS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR DEMOCRACY

 If democracy is to work, citizens must not only participate and

exercise their rights. They must also observe certain principles and

rules of democratic conduct. People must respect the law and reject

violence. Nothing ever justifies using violence against your political

opponents, just because you disagree with them. Every citizen must

respect the rights of his or her fellow citizens, and their dignity as

human beings. No one should denounce a political opponent as evil

and illegitimate, just because they have different views. People

should question the decisions of the government, but not reject the

government’s authority.

 Every group has the right to practice its culture and to have some

control over its own affairs, but each group should accept that it is a

part of a democratic state. When you express your opinions, you

should also listen to the views of other people, even people you

disagree with. Everyone has a right to be heard. Don’t be so

convinced of the rightness of your views that you refuse to see any

merit in another position. Consider different interests and points of

view. When you make demands, you should understand that in a

democracy, it is impossible for everyone to achieve everything they

want.

Democracy requires compromise. Groups with different interests and

opinions must be willing to sit down with one another and negotiate.

In a democracy, one group does not always win everything it wants.

Different combinations of groups win on different issues. Over time,

everyone wins something. If one group is always excluded and fails

to be heard, it may turn against democracy in anger and frustration.

Everyone who is willing to participate peacefully and respect the

rights of others should have some say in the way the country is

governed.

THE PILLARS OF DEMOCRACY

Sovereignty of the people.

Government based upon consent of the governed.

Majority rule.

Minority rights.

Guarantee of basic human rights.

Free and fair elections.

Equality before the law.

Due process of law.

Constitutional limits on government.

Social, economic, and political pluralism.

Values of tolerance, pragmatism, cooperation, and

compromise.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AS A CHALLENGE TO

DEMOCRATIC SUSTENANCE IN NIGERIA

Certain pre-conditions that can broadly be classified as economic,

social and political have been regarded as essential for sustaining

democracy. Among these, the political factor in terms of institutional

development may be regarded as vital, for these institutions serve as

viable channels for ventilating people's expectations and their

dissatisfaction through non-violent means. Besides, they also serve

as effective means to establish political accountability. However, more

than the mere presence of the political institutions that help

democratic sustenance, what matters is the fact that they must be

nursed and developed to a level that other narrow, exclusivist ties like

ethnic loyalties become less important. In other words, within the

process of institutional development, there should be a balanced

development of these institutions so that no one particular institution

becomes powerful at the expense of other institutions. The

experience of Nigeria highlights the troubled times the political

parties, judiciary, media and other institutions have gone through as a

consequence of military takeovers during much of the country's

Independence. Faced with eroded institutions, Nigeria could not

unfortunately grapple with the emergent challenges in the social or

economic spheres.

CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC SUSTENANCE IN NIGERIA

The sustenance of democracy requires the existence of certain

conditions, which may be social, economic or political in nature. Of

these, the focus is on the political factors in terms of institutional

development as essential for the continuance of democracy. In the

case of developed countries though the economic and social

conditions helped in the sustenance of democracy but it was primarily

the political institutions, which had evolved over a period of time that

democracy was a success. Seeing its successful operation in the

West, that a number of developing countries that attained liberation in

the mid 20th century opted for it. The primary reason for imitating this

model of government was, first, that it was linked to development and

second, it was regarded as a form where values like freedom; liberty

and equality could be realized. The model was therefore adopted

without taking into consideration the contextual differences. The

result was that in the case of some, where favourable social,

economic or political conditions existed that the experiment was a

success while in the case of others it collapsed. Of the two

experiences, we are to study the issue of failure by taking the classic

example of a country i.e.; Nigeria where democratic experiment has

faced numerous hurdles and in the process has not succeeded in

consolidating itself. But before getting into the case study of Nigeria, it

becomes important to have a conceptual understanding of the term

and also identify factors, the presence of which creates viable

conditions for the continuance of democracy.

FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO EXPLAIN DEMOCRATIZATION.

Some scholars have argued that movement toward democracy

depends on the existence within society of certain preconditions that

may be economic, social or political in nature. There are scholars

who in their approach have regarded economic factors as essential

for democratization. The development paradigm proposed by Daniel

Lerner (1968) and S.M. Lipset (1959 and1960), which connect

democratization to economic growth, and modernization seems to

have been the most influential approach in the field. Their studies

have confirmed the association between stable democracy and

indicators of national wealth, communication, industrialization,

education and urbanization. S.M. Lipset explains this association by a

hypothesis according to which ‘the level of a country’s economic

development independently affects the orientations conducive to

democracy of its citizens.’ (Vanhanen, 1997, p.15). Though he lays

stress on economic development, he nevertheless does not

undermine the significance of political culture, legitimacy and suitable

institutions as conditions of democracy. However, he still regards

economic development as the dominant explanatory factor.

The classic thesis of S.M. Lipset was supported by the

comprehensive statistical analysis of Adam Przeworski. In his

findings, he pointed out that the expected life of democracy increases

with per capita income up to the highest income level of over 6000

dollars and democracies are more likely to persist when they

experience real economic growth (especially rapid growth in excess

of 5% annually). Prezeworski points out that democracy is much

more likely to endure in countries where income inequalities decline

overtime than where it increases (Prezeworski, et al, 2000)

The strong relationship between economic development and

democracy was also supported by Larry Diamond and Garry Marks.

They assert that the level of economic development continues to be

the single most powerful predictor of the likelihood of democracy.

Diamond re-evaluated Lipset’s thesis and tested it by new empirical

evidences and came to the conclusion that "the more well to do the

people of a country, on a average, the more likely they will favour,

achieve and maintain a democratic system for their country"

(Vanhanen, 1997, p.12).

The existence of a direct relationship between democracy and

development was not accepted by the supporters of the dependency

theory like A.G. Frank. He claimed that global capitalism was the

cause of underdevelopment in the Third World countries and implicitly

of the lack of democracy in the Third World. Guillermo O’Donnell

(1973) bureaucratic authorization model challenged the development

theory by claiming that modernization coincided in Latin America with

the emergence of a new type of authoritarian regime. Raymond Gastil

(1985) argues strongly that democratization may depend on the

diffusion of democratic ideas more than on any socio-economic

factors (Vanhanen, 1997, p11). The correlation was weakened

somewhat by the democratization of a number of very poor Third

World countries like Peru and the Philippines and by the rapid

economic growth of a number of authoritarian countries like

Singapore and Thailand. There are also certain states in the Middle

East, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that have

per capita incomes on a par with Europe or North America, but are

not democratic. Moreover many countries that have experienced

democratic revolutions in the past generation, including Spain,

Portugal, Greece, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, all made the

transition from being predominantly agricultural countries at mid

century to being industrialized, urbanized ones at the time of

democratization (Diamond, Chu and Tien, 1997, p.99). It can thereby

be said that by merely focusing on the economic factor, one cannot

understand the democratization process.

The theorists supporting the social factors regard homogeneity

prevailing in society as essential for maintaining stable democracy.

According to Aristotle, "a state aims at being as far as it can be a

society composed of equals and peers"(Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). J.S. Mill

maintained that for democracy to endure there must be some shared

values, a "consensus". The heterogeneity prevailing in terms of

religion or ethnicity were regarded by him as factors that make

regimes less stable (Prezeworski et al, 2000, p.125)

The viewpoint of scholars maintaining a direct link between social

homogeneity and democracy is also not free from criticisms. For

there are societies, which have diversity but are still able to maintain

democracy like in the case of India, where diversity prevails on the

basis of religion, region and language but still democracy has been

able to sustain itself. Therefore one cannot regard diversity as a sole

factor responsible for the collapse of democracy.

Apart from the emphasis on economic and social factors, there are

other theorists who regard the prevalence of political institutions as

essential for sustaining democracy. Increasing scholarly attention has

been paid in recent years to the strength and character of political

institutions as a key factor affecting the viability and stability of

democracy. Scholars like T.R. Gurr (1980) and S. P. Huntington

(1968) have supported this view. The political institutions prevailing in

the society provide viable channels through which people can

express their dissatisfaction mainly through resorting to non-violent

means. The political system is protected from any direct attack by the

political institutions. These institutions therefore serve as shock

absorbers and hence protect the system from crumbling down.

The study maintains that for the success of democracy, the

prevalence of the three factors is essential but nevertheless

considers the existence of strong political institutions as the most

important factor for sustaining democracy. If democracies are to

weather the storms of history and limit the self-aggrandizing impulses

of human actors, then what is needed is strong and well designed

political institutions. However, it may be emphasized that it is not

mere the presence of institutions that lead to stability. What is also

essential is that they must be developed to a level that other ties of

associations become less important as was seen in the West, where

democratization took place after the nation state has been formed.

Secondly, within the process of institutional development, no one

particular institution should become so powerful that it overshadows

the other institutions. In other words, there should be a balanced

development of institutions, with each institution performing the role

specifically assigned to it.

By taking into account the above-mentioned 3 factors, let us now

examine the case of Nigeria.

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE.

The democratic experience of Nigeria can be understood by utilizing

the economic, social and political factors. If we take the economic

factor i.e.; the issue of development, then one finds there were some

phases like during the First Republic, when the nation experienced an

increase in Gross Domestic Product by 5.3%(Oyediran and Asbaji,

1999, p.167) but the benefits of this increase did not percolate down

to the masses and a focus on the masses is very essential mainly

because when we understand development along with economic

connotation, it has a social dimension too. The development should

enable the masses to fulfill their basic needs. So if one views

development by focusing on the social dimension then one finds that

development did not take place in Nigeria. This idea becomes clear if

one focuses on sectors like agriculture, which occupies a very

important position mainly because nearly 70% of the population

depends on this sector for its source of livelihood. Their economic

activities are basically limited to the production of food crops.

To improve their economic conditions, certain steps were undertaken

like the setting up of the marketing boards. But the study of their

operation shows that they underpaid the peasants and sold at high

prices at the world market before passing on the surplus to capital

and other classes that controlled state power. Other measures that

were undertaken were modernizing agriculture to increase

productivity. But it was the rich farmers, which were in a position to go

for modern techniques of production owing to the access they had to

the resources. This helped them increasing their profits, which

contributed to their upward mobility. The small farmers did not

experience similar improvements in their economic position. Another

development that was seen was that land acquired unprecedented

commercial importance, which resulted in the passing of the Land

Use Decree of 1978. This again had a negative impact on the small

farmers for they were deprived of land, which was put in the hands of

wealthy farmer (often absentee) and companies that had wealth and

connection to influence the Land Allocation Committees established

under the decree (Nnoli, 2000, p.566-569).

The condition of the peasantry further worsened with Structural

Adjustment Programme (SAP). The devaluation of the Naira meant

increased hardships for the majority of Nigerian peasantry. Their

earnings had not changed while the prices of the goods and services

they did not produce could not be purchased by them (Egwu,

1998,p.79). The SAP was perceived as an attack on the workers

basic interests and aspirations, relating to wages, health education of

their children and general struggle for survival.

Besides, the agricultural sector, the problem of economic disparities

prevailed even in the industrial sector. Economic differences existed

at two levels, first, between the capitalist class as a whole and the

working class and second, between comprador bourgeoisie and the

Indigenous bourgeoisie.

So, as a result of neo-colonialism it was mainly the comprador

bourgeoisie, which aligned itself with foreign capital that was in a

position to benefit the maximum. The worst effected was the working

class. The devaluation and removal of subsidies resulted in spiraling

inflation and reduced purchasing power of the subordinate classes,

gave wageworkers one of the lowest levels of purchasing power in

Africa (Diamond, Green and Oyediran, 1996, p.556)

Therefore, it can be said that the attainment of liberation did not

provide any solution to the economic problems of the masses. The

economic deprivation in the post liberation period worsened with the

operation of neo-colonialism. This has generated a sense of

discontentment amongst the masses, which has found its outlet not

just in the form of challenges to the political system, which created a

negative condition for democracy but has also played an important

role in giving form to ideas like ethnicity, which has created a sense

of hostility amongst the various groups prevailing in the society.

Besides the economic factors, the social factor can also be utilized to

understand the democratization process in Nigeria. Socially one finds

heterogeneity prevailing for there are more than 250 ethnic groups

that exist in Nigeria. Of these the predominant ones are the Hausa-

Fulani, Ibos and the Yoruba’s. Each one of these predominate a

specific region of the country. The Hausa-Fulani dominates the

northern part, the Ibos dominate the eastern part and the Yorubas

inhabit the Western part. Of these three predominant groups, the

hostility is very sharp between the Hausa-Fulani and the Ibos. The

roots of this hostility can be traced back to the colonial period when

the British pursued the policy of divide and rule. As a result of the

differential policy pursued, it was the southern region owing to its

direct contact with the colonizers that it was able to benefit in arenas

like education and development whereas in these arenas the

northern region owing to its being indirectly ruled lagged behind. Thus

when it came to opportunities, it was the Ibos who fared well. This

was seen even in the post –liberation period. The better capabilities

of the Ibos was not viewed positively by the Hausas and in situations

where the Ibos in spite of their capabilities were deprived of

opportunities, then it generated a feeling of frustration amongst them,

which found its outlet in various forms of conflicts. These conflicts

between the groups, which can be seen from the time of First

Republic, have created instability. It can therefore be said that

diversity prevailing in the nation has made the task of democratic

consolidation a difficult one.

In addition to the economic and social factors, the political factors

also can be utilized to understand the issue of democracy in Nigeria.

Politically the country did not have strong institutions that could

enable the political system to face challenges in a systematic way

without breaking. This can well be seen in the details provided later.

From the above explanation, it can be said that all the three factors –

economic, social and political did create negative condition for

democracy to sustain itself. But the present study without

undermining the role of economic and social factors, nevertheless

gives more importance to the political factors. The main reason for

giving importance to the political factors in terms of political

institutions is primarily because if these institutions were strong then

the challenges posed by the economic and social factors would have

been easily tackled in a systematic way, without leading to the

breakdown of the political system. This is well seen in the case of

countries like India, which in spite of numerous problems like poverty

and social diversity has not collapsed primarily because of the strong

institutions it had in terms of political party, civil service and the

judiciary. Besides the existence of these institutions, there is a

balanced development of these institutions, where each institution

played its respective role without interfering in the working of other

institutions. These things however were not seen in the case of

Nigeria. This can well be understood from the details of some of the

institutions like the political party, armed forces, and the judiciary,

which follows:

POLITICAL PARTY

In a democracy the existence of political party is very essential owing

to the important roles played by them. They are essential instruments

for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating

demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates

for office, organize the electoral competition for power; crafting policy

alternatives, setting the policy making agenda, forming effective

governments and integrating groups and individuals into the

democratic process. To play these roles effectively what is needed is

a strong mass base, which by extending its support helps the party to

legitimize its existence. This is made possible, when the party’s

evolution has taken place in a slow and systematic way and when it

has the presence of leaders. This was what seen in the case of India

where democracy has continued, in spite of numerous ups and

downs. The success of the democratic experiment in India can be

attributed to two main factors. First, the nation had the advantage of a

party, which had a strong mass support. This it was able to build over

a period of time for if one studies the party evolution, then one finds

that it had a long history for it started as a movement in 1885 but with

widening mass support, it was able to take the shape of a party.

Secondly, the nation had leaders like Mahatma Gandhi who played

an important role in bringing together the people belonging to

different religions, regions, languages and walks of life. The national

movement, one can say though led to loss of numerous human and

material resources, it nevertheless helped in building strong political

institutions like the party.

This was not the scenario in Nigeria. For first, it did not have a

national struggle. The national movement that was spearheaded by

the rejuvenated Nigerian Youth Movement was torn apart by mutual

jealousies, suspicions and petty squabbles over party office. The

golden opportunity that was offered during 1938 to 1952 to initiate

and carry out the task of building the nation was just allowed to slip

off. The split in the rank and file of the movement doomed not only

the chances of a unified force against imperialism but also created

ground for the emergence of issues of ethnicity. Secondly, though the

nation had the best-known leaders like Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief

Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello, these leaders failed to provide national

leadership owing to their inability to rise above narrow ties of

ethnicity. Chief Awolowo in his autobiography wrote of Dr. Azikiwe:

"By the end of August 1939 it seemed clear to me that his (Azikiwe)

policy was to corrode the self- respect of the Yoruba people as a

group, to build up the Ibos as a master race…"(Olugemi,

1987,p.254). The national leadership crisis was therefore not solved

with a creation of National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon in 1944,

with an objective of providing a united national front against

imperialism by Azikiwe. Probably because of his explosive nature and

political leadership Dr. Azikiwe alienated most Yoruba middle class

and Hausa-Fulani aristocrats, who resented him because they felt he

threatened their positions and challenged their own aspirations for

leadership. One can therefore say that Nigeria produced "Awoists"

and "Zikists" unlike the leadership in India, which produced Indians.

The result was that when the nation was born, their existed different

regions dominated by ethnic groups following a different a religion of

a particular type. In the absence of unity in diversity, the state was not

a nation but "… a mere geographical expression"(Ekeh, Dele-Cole,

Olusanya, 1989, p.92). The situation was exploited by the political

leaders of various parties in their competition for the limited political

offices and associated. Rather than focusing on issues of national

concern, it was ethnicity/ regionalism that were used by the political

leaders to win elections. This was well seen in 1964 and 1979

elections as we have already discussed in the chapters above.

Thus, in the initial years when democracy needed a suitable

environment, in terms of stability, to consolidate itself, the political

parties, in keeping in mind their selfish interests of obtaining power,

used ethnicity to divide the masses, which generated instability and

thereby eventually contributed to the distortion of the democratic

process.

It was only in later years that military leaders like Babangida, who

tried to reduce the role of ethnicity in politics by evolving two party

systems. To Babangida, the system had the distinct advantage of

simplifying the choices available to the electorate and encouraging

"cohesion in a land of pluralistic interests."(Bello Imam, 1997, p.148).

Intellectuals criticized this attempt as an undemocratic imposition.

Fears also were expressed by a significant cross- section of the

citizenry that two party system even if it prevented ethnic based party

politics of the first Republic, could polarize political cleavages on

regional (North/South) or religious (Muslim/ Christian) bases, which

could be potentially as dangerous if not more dangerous than

polarization along ethnic lines. However, such a development did not

take place. The 1993 elections were considered successful

adjustments ever made to party politics with tremendous potentials

for national integration. The M.K.O.Abiola victory therefore was not a

victory for himself, the Yoruba or the south but a victory for

democracy and national integration and which was possible because

of the two party system which put an end to the possibility of ethnic

groups, particularly the three major ones having their own parties

mobilizing the electorate along ethnic and eventually distorting the

democratic process. With the two-party system, all ethnic interests

were compelled to accommodate themselves in the two political

parties each of which became reasonably representative of all ethnic

groups. The masses could fully express their wishes, voting for the

candidate they considered better of the two rather than for the

candidate of their own ethnic party. But this positive development in

the Nigerian politics was not allowed to make its headway because of

the annulment of the elections. The country therefore did not get a

chance to experiment a new development in the political arena rather

a ground was generated for ethnic tensions. The southerners viewed

it as an intentional action to prevent a southerner to assume power.

The other feature that the party politics exhibited and which effected

the smooth functioning on democracy was the increasing use of

violence. The parties employed violent tactics, which sometimes

involved the physical elimination of opposition candidates. This was

well seen during the 1964 elections when opposition candidates were

harassed, prevented from campaigning and even the filing of

nomination papers was made impossible. These incidents took place

more in the northern and western regions, which were the focus of

competition to control (Osaghae, 1998, p.45).

Apart from using violence, there is also an absence of existence of

free and fair electoral process. This is mainly due to the absence of

an independent and non- partisan electoral body, an independent

judiciary to interpret electoral law, a free press and a well-organized

police to maintain peace and order. During the First Republic, it was

brought out that the members of the Electoral Commission regarded

themselves as representatives of their regions, whose duties were

primarily to defend and protect regional interests (Ekeh, Dele-Cole

and Olasanya, 1989,p.116) The partial nature of the Election

Commission was reflected even during the 1983 elections.

The Babalakin Commission of Inquiry that was set up in August 1985

investigated the activities of the electoral body, the FEDECO, which

handled elections in the Second Republic (1979-83). In the report,

which it submitted on Nov. 14, 1986, it was brought out that FEDECO

and some of its officials had joined with the politicians to subvert the

electoral process. The electoral malpractices seen included

compilation of fictitious names, absence of voters revision exercise,

stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers and falsification of election

results (Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee, 1997,p.128)

The electoral process in Nigeria therefore did not serve as a peaceful

means to bring about change and neither did it offer to the people to

exercise their choices in a free manner. It rather reflected a

Hobbesian state of affairs where each party was in war with the other

party and was ready to employ any means to achieve political power.

Such a state of affairs therefore created obstacles in the smooth

functioning of the democratic process.

In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics, the parties

prevailing in Nigeria reflected another feature, i.e.; they lack strong

ideological commitment. Scholars like Billy Dudley have also

observed the absence of ideological disputes as a prominent feature

of Nigerian politics. According to him – ‘generally, political beliefs are

characterized more by their fluidity than by any consistency with

which they are adhered to and certainly for the political leadership,

political beliefs are more a matter of convenience than one of

commitment.’(Ekeh, Dele-Cole, Olusanya, 1989, p.166) Martin Dent

emphasized this same observation, when he said, ‘The Nigerian party

system has usually sought for an ideological orientation but has so far

failed to achieve it’ (Ibid, p.166). This was well seen during the

Babangida era, there existed two parties, as discussed earlier –

National Republican Convention (NRC), which was "little to the right",

and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was "little to the left".

The former emphasized market economy and corporate capitalism

and the latter emphasized a mixed economy and social welfarism.

But a study of their manifestos showed that essentially both were

capitalist parties and committed to the continuous of economic reform

programme of Structural Adjustment Programme (Momoh and

Adejumobi, 1999.p.135).

Instead of ideology, it was observed that they revolved around

individuals. It is because of this moving from one party to another,

which is essentially done to be closer to the goal of achieving power,

is a common phenomenon in Nigerian politics. This development

therefore reflects not only the fragile nature of country’s politics but

also the selfish attitude of the leaders. They view the entry into

politics as an easy way to enrich themselves rather than providing

solutions to the socio-economic problems of the masses. The masses

therefore with the passage of time, loose their faith in their political

leaders and look forward for any means that would enable them to

put an end to their deteriorating state of affairs.

Therefore it can be said that political parties by sidelining the national

interest and the interest of the people have not served as true

representative of people. They therefore have swayed the masses

away from them and have created obstacles in their legitimization

process. This has generated numerous challenges before the political

system, which ultimately has led to the collapse of the democratic

process and has facilitated the entry of repressive institutions like the

military into the political sphere of the country.

ARMED FORCES

The understanding of Nigerian politics is incomplete without a focus

on the armed forces. This is mainly because of the 49 years of

country’s independence; the nation has been under military rule for

29 years. Their entry into the political affairs was made possible by

the operation of certain factors the most important being that of the

inability of the political leaders to live up to the expectation of the

masses. The people had great hopes that the leaders will help them

to resolve numerous problems experienced by them. But such a thing

did not happen; the leaders on the other hand utilized their power to

perpetuate their own selfish interests. Not only this they even pursued

policies that sidelined the national interest. The result of all these

developments was that a sense of frustration emerged amongst the

masses, which found its outlet in various forms of conflicts that

ultimately led to the breakdown of the political system. It is then the

military got an opportunity to intervene in the country’s politics. The

intervention was therefore justified by perpetuating ideas like - "…But

what we do promise every law –abiding citizen is freedom from fear

and all forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and

freedom to live and strive in every field of human endeavour both

nationally and internationally…" "The federal military government will

preserve Nigeria as one strong nation. We shall give firm, honest and

discipline leadership. The federal military government will stamp out

corruption and dishonesty in our public life with ruthless efficiency

and restore integrity and self respect in our public affairs" (Banjo,

1996, p. 3).

Opinions however differ on the role of the military in political and

economic change. The question normally asked is –are the military

midwives to progress or do they simply act to spill the lava of people’s

revolutionary fervour. Scholars like Huntington doubt the ability of the

military to spearhead political and economic progress. According to

him, military is incapable of making real efforts towards building

political institutions, not least because among other considerations,

their skills make them least suitable for such tasks (Caron, Gboyega

and Osaghae, 1992, p. 239). Other scholars like Lieuwen and Bienen

support this viewpoint of Huntington. These scholars agree that

military regime is not capable of fundamental changes. The military’s

ability to bring about political stability and stimulate economic

development is therefore doubted.

The neo-Marxists too perceive the role of the military in the creation

of meaningful, political, economic order as essentially negative, for

the military aligns always with forces of reaction and the middle

classes to defend the status quo and is often used in the conspiracy

to abort efforts at engineering real change in their countries. (Caron,

Gboyega and Osaghae, p.240)

However, some scholars while studying the role of military in the

context of Nigeria have come up with different conclusions. Akin

Iwayemi credits the military with rapid economic growth the country

witnessed since 1970(Caron, Gboyega and Osaghae, p. 240-41)

If one studies the role of military in the context of Nigeria, then one

finds that some of the military leaders did pursue some positive

policies. The Ironsi government in search of national cohesion

banned over 80 political associations and parties and dissolved the

Federal Structure replacing it with a unitary structure through the

Unification Decree 34. The government therefore made its effort to

save the country from drifting away into destruction.

The Gowon military government did release political prisoners,

abrogated the Unification Decree thereby returning Nigeria to a

Federal set up, created 12 states in May27, 1967 thereby gave

recognition and sense of belonging to the minority groups, pursued

national unity like National Youth Service Corps established in 1973

and the establishment of Unity Schools in states. A good deal of

infrastructure Nigeria has today were planned or executed under the

Gowon government. Indigenization Decree 1972 gave Nigeria and

Nigerian greater participation in selected business, while the import

substitution strategy boosted industrial development especially in the

arenas of automobile assembly plant, machine tool factories and food

processing factories.

But if one studies the overall role of the military, then one finds that it

too was not different from the elected regimes. Their policies did not

cater to the socio- economic needs of the masses. Some of the

policies like the SAP, acted as catalyst in worsening the economic

conditions of the weaker section like the peasants and the workers.

The problem of corruption which the military promised to wipe out, not

only continued to persist but rose to unprecedented heights. Their

operation created a negative environment for return of democracy for

while in power they put curbs on institutions like the political parties.

To the military leaders, good politics is essentially non-party politics.

Keeping this idea in mind, number of military leaders like Gowon

during their period of rule, banned their operation. Restrictions were

also imposed on the independent functioning of the mass media as

was seen during the Buhari regime. Under Decree4 of 1984, two

Guardian journalists were jailed and the newspaper fined 50,000

Naira. The officials of the State Security Service killed Editor in Chief

of Newswatch Magazine. The circulation of Newswatch was

prohibited for six months in Nigeria. In the subsequent four years,

Nigeria witnessed the closure of more newspaper houses than in all

of the years put together since independence (Diamond, Green and

Oyediran, 1996, p. 398-399). They established their authority even on

the judiciary and therefore effected its independent functioning.

These repressive measures were accompanied with a promise to

bring back democracy. Like General Ironsi promised to effect certain

constitutional changes after which he would consult the Nigerian

people and ‘with the consensus of various representatives of public

opinion’ he would re-establish a system of democracy for the country.

The military leaders that succeeded Ironsi also gave similar

assurances to the people of the interimness of military rule and

therefore of hopes for a return to democratic politics. But these

promises essentially were false for they were merely given to gain

time to strengthen their own positions.

We can therefore say that role of the armed forces in Nigeria is not

just limited to defence and security of the country but over a period of

time it has widened its sphere of action by interfering in the political

sphere. Once after resuming the political role it has intentionally

operated in a way that has destroyed the independent functioning of

representative institutions. By doing so it has not only assumed an

important position but has created hurdles in the process of

democratic return.

JUDICIARY

In a democracy, judiciary has to play an important role for it is not just

the custodian of people’s fundamental rights, guardian of the

constitution but also helps in maintaining a balance between the

various wings of the government. These functions can well be

performed if the judiciary is independent and free of any control.

However, such was not the position of judiciary in the Nigerian

context. The independent functioning was curbed under the military

regime. The overthrow of the Second Republic on 31st December

1983 brought about the suspension of various provisions of the 1979

Constitution. The passing of decrees limited the authority of the

courts to interpret the law and adjudicate disputes (as reflected in

Section 5 of Decree1). It declared: “No question as to the validity of

this or any other Decree or Edict shall be entailed by any court of law

in Nigeria."(Diamond, Greene and Oyediran, 1996, p.393). To further

affirm the supremacy and unquestionable status of military decrees in

Nigeria, the government promulgated the Federal Military

Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree 13 of

1984, which provided:

"No civil proceedings shall be or be instituted in any court or on

account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported

to be done under or pursuant to any Decree or Edict, and if any such

proceedings are instituted before, or after the commencement of this

decree, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and made void

(Diamond, Greene and Oyediran, 1996, p.393)

The above provisions effectively ousted the competence and

jurisdiction of the courts from enquiring into the validity of decrees

made by the military government. These provisions are found in all

decrees affecting human rights made by the military since 1984. A

further provision that features in all military decrees affecting human

rights is the suspension of fundamental rights.

In violation of the cardinal principle of the rule of law, the power of the

military to make laws was expanded to include the promulgation of

retroactive decrees Thus Decree1, the State Security Decree 2, the

recovery of Public Property Decree 3 and the Banking Decree6,

which were all promulgated in the first quarter of 1984, were made

retroactive to commence on 31 December.

The Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offence) Decree 20,

promulgated in July 1984, turned out to be the most draconian and

unjust piece in Nigeria’s legal history. It provided the death penalty for

a wide range of offences including arson, tampering with oil pipelines

or electric and telephone cables, importing or exporting mineral oil or

ore etc.

The military also annihilated the principles and practices of due

process recognized by the nation’s legal and judicial systems. First,

Decree 1 of 1984 suspended the provisions in Section 32(3)-7of the

1979 Constitution of Nigeria entitling an accused person to remain

silent on arrest until he consults his lawyer to be informed in writing

within 24 hours of the reason for his arrest, to be charged to court

within reasonable time and to be compensated for unlawful arrest.

Second, military tribunals were set up to co-exist with the ordinary

civil courts in the administration of criminal justice. The first of such

tribunals was the Recovery of Public Property Tribunal set up under

Decree 3 of 1984"to ascertain whether any public officer has been

engaged in corrupt practices or has corruptly enriched himself or any

other person or has by virtue of abuse of his office contributed to the

economic adversity of Nigeria. "The Public Officers (Protection

Against False Accusation) Tribunal was set up under Decree 4 of

1984 "to try persons who publish in any form whether written or

otherwise, any message, rumour, report or statement which is false in

any material particular or which brings or is calculated to bring the

federal military government or the government of a state or a public

officer to ridicule or disrepute"(Diamond Greene and Oyediran,

1996,p.395)

The military also set up the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal and the

Robbery and Firearms Tribunal to try persons accused of various

other criminal offences including drug trafficking and armed robbery.

The decrees setting up the tribunals forbid judicial appeal against

their decisions. Appeals could be made only to a special appeal

tribunal, whose decisions were subject to confirmation by the ruling

Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC).

A look at the tribunals set up the military since 1984 reveals that the

tribunals cannot either legally or in practice be considered

independent or impartial. For most of their duration, the tribunals had

military personnel in their membership. Most of the military officers

lacked knowledge of legal issues and proper orientation towards the

administration of justice. The military officers saw their mission on the

tribunal as enforcement of the decrees promulgated by their

colleagues in the AFRC and times saw the conviction of an accused

person as a victory for the military government.

Thus, the Guardian editorialized on 20 July 1991 that "the continued

existence of the special tribunal, demilitarized or not, represents the

perpetuation of the parallel judicial system which impedes confidence

in the regular courts. It is ultimately detrimental to our hope for an

improved and uniformed system of laws"(Diamond, Green and

Oyediran, 1996, p.397)

The deteriorating position of the judiciary can be explained by the

amendments that were brought out in the appointment of judges. The

AFRC was virtually vested with powers to appoint judges to the State

and Federal Courts. According to the Decree 1 of 1984, the Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria was appointed by the AFRC

entirely on its own discretion, while justices of the Supreme Court

were appointed at the of the AFRC, but acting on the advice of the

Court of Appeal sitting jointly. The President and Justices of the Court

of Appeal, the Chief Judge and Judge of the Federal and State High

Courts were appointed by the AFRC acting on the advice of the

Advisory Judicial Committee. In essence, the nation’s judicial officers

were appointed at the pleasure of the military government. While

making appointment, the military, the military government appointed

into judicial offices only those who were unlikely to engage in undue

radical decisions.

It can therefore be concluded that judiciary in Nigeria, is a weak

institution for neither did it safeguard people’s fundamental rights nor

it has succeeded in maintaining a balance between the various

organs of the government. In fact, it has succumbed to the increasing

pressures of the military and in the process lost its autonomy.

Therefore it can be said that the democratic process in Nigeria has to

face challenges from the socio-economic and political arena but it is

mainly due to the existence of weak political institutions that the

sustenance is been made a difficult task. The weakness of the

institutions can be attributed to the certain features that they exhibit

which thereby has hampered the development of institutions to a

level, where they cannot manage social or economic crisis smoothly

without breaking down. Even in situations where the political

institutions responded by initiating some measures, such measures

were undertaken to promote not the general interests of the masses

but only for a section of the society. The large section was therefore

alienated and did not share the benefits of such positive measures;

the result was that a sense of disillusionment emerged, which found

its reflection in various kinds of political conflicts that brought down

the democratic process. Another political reason that can be utilized

to understand the failure of democracy is that in Nigeria there has not

taken place a balanced development of the institutions. Some

institutions which do not reflect people’s aspirations and which are

repressive in nature like the army, is so overdeveloped, a ‘leviathan

monarch’ that it has effected the proper functioning of the

representative institutions. Thus the institutions like the judiciary have

not been able to deliver the best owing to its subordination to the

army. Thus, if the political institutions were strong and developed in a

balanced way, they could have succeeded in meeting any crisis

emerging from the social or economic sphere but in the absence of

such a situation democracy in Nigeria has not been able to

consolidate itself. In its 49 years of independence, it has had

democracy for 20 years. The memory of the past should not however

lead to a state of despair. The country has tremendous potential both

human and material for building a state on solid foundation. The

reshaping of the country’s future needs some efforts and some of

these include:

First, there is a need to solve the leadership crisis, without which the

country’s future is bleak. The idea that virtually anyone without any

form of adequate training and exposure can become a head of state

in Nigeria must be seriously called to question. To survive and

progress, the most competent individuals in the country, irrespective

of ethnic or religious inclination need to be selected, to lead the

country. Scholars like Diamond, Linz and Lipset have also pointed out

the significance of leadership. According to them "even structures

and institutions, especially political ones, are shaped by the actions

and options of political leaders. The more constraining and

unfavourable the structural circumstances, the more skilful,

innovative, courageous, and democratic committed political

leadership must be for democracy to survive." They further argued,

"even when the obstacles are formidable, democratic breakdowns

are not inevitable but are accelerated by poor leadership and bad

choice."(Bello-Imam, 1997, p.140)

Second, political democracy can be strengthened if its important

counterpart that it is economic democracy accompanies it. The

political system needs to undertake steps that would provide solution

to economic problems like that of poverty with which a large section

of the society is struggling. Since this struggle against poverty is a

multi- faceted and long term one, what is needed is evidence of a

concerted effort to wage this struggle as the highest priority project.

This step would also help in bringing under control other problems

like that of ethnicity for ethnicity is essentially a reflection of feeling of

economic deprivation.

Third, the linkage between the political parties and ethnicity or religion

is not to the best interests of the Nigerian people. This is an arena

where de-linking is necessary and appropriate. This can be made

possible if people have political education. The people should

understand their rights, responsibilities and the role of the state. They

should be educated to demand accountability on the part of those

elected office. They should be in a position to recall those who have

failed to deliver. A proper understanding of the various political issues

will therefore prevent them from being used as pawns by the leaders

in name of ethnicity.

Fourth, the way the parties are constituted and legitimized has

bearing on both the scope and content of democracy in the country

as well as on the capacity of government to be responsible and

accountable to the electorates. The parties need to be internally

democratic and should be interested in deepening the content of

democracy in the country.

Fifth, the survival of democracy is dependent to a large extent

depend on the ability of the electoral body to conduct free and fair

elections through a transparent process. For this to take place what is

needed is the existence of an electoral body which is independent in

its functioning.

Sixth, the judiciary is another organ of democratization. It can play an

important role in promoting good governance. It should therefore be

an independent institution.

Seventh, there is a need for accountability and transparency in

governance. This will help fighting the problem of corruption for apart

from destroying the moral fabric of the society; it also leads to the

drain of national resources, which are needed for development.

Finally, the role of the army should be limited to the defence and

security of the nation. It should not look for opportunities to jump into

politics as it has done in the past years for this development leads to

the curbing of people’s freedom and also leads to the destruction of

the institutions which can democratize the nation.

REFERENCES

Adamolekun, Ladipo (1985): The Fall of the Second Republic,

Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan.

Ake, Claude (1996): Democracy and Development in Africa,

Spectrum Books Limited, Abuja.

Harris R" Nigeria: Crises and Compromises," African Report, March

1965.

Huntington, S.P (1968) : Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale

University Press, New Haven.

Ibrahim, J., (eds) (1997): Expanding Democratic Space in Nigeria,

CODESRIA, National Studies Series, Oxford.

Inamete, U. B.: "Federalism in Nigeria: The Crucial Dynamics", The

Round Table, Vol.318, 1991.

Jegede Segun, Ale Ayodele and Akinsola Eni, (eds): State

Reconstruction in West Africa, Committee for the Defence of Human

Rights, Lagos.

Sarabjit Kaur: Institutional Development as a Challenge to

Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria. Lecturer, University Institute of

Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh. An article delivered at

the Centre for Democracy and Development, Lagos as a Visiting

Scholar under the South-South Exchange Programme in 2002.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ETHNICITY IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

The vilification of ethnicity as the scapegoat of all vices associated

with the Nigerian body polity has made the subject a dominant theme

in the study of Nigerian political economy. No work is deemed

‘scholarly’ that does not consider the salience or irrelevance of

ethnicity in its analysis and conclusions. Thus, analysts interested in

such diverse issues as nationalism, decolonisation, national

integration, political parties, military intervention, corruption, economic

development, structural adjustment, democratisation and violent

conflict have all considered the ‘ethnicity’ variable. This was the case

even in the 1960s and 1970s when the major intellectual traditions

felt ethnicity was of secondary importance as an explanatory variable;

at best an epiphenomenon and at worst a mask for class privilege

(Sklar 1967).

The result of such interest in ethnicity, which is proportional to the

high level of ‘ethnic consciousness’ in the Nigerian society (Lewis et

al 2002), is a legion of literature on ethnicity, making a critique a

Herculean task.

As Jinadu (1994: 166) rightly puts it, ‘the study of ethnic relations in

Nigeria has passed through a number of phases reflecting changes in

the country’s political status as well as changes in fashions and

trends in the social science research agenda’. This introductory

section is followed by conceptual clarifications and a critical analysis

of the different explanations scholars have advanced for

understanding the phenomenon of ethnicity in Nigeria. Following this,

the themes that have dominated the study of ethnicity in Nigeria are

examined, outlining some of the neglected issues.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Ethnicity may be defined as “the employment or mobilization of ethnic

identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition,

conflict or co-operation” (Osaghae 1995:11). This definition is

preferred because it identifies two issues that are central to

discussions on ethnicity. The first is that ethnicity is neither natural

nor accidental, but is the product of a conscious effort by social

actors. The second is that ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive

or competitive relations but also in the contexts of cooperation. A

corollary to the second point is that ethnic conflict manifests itself in

various forms, including voting, community service and violence.

Thus, it need not always have negative consequences. Ethnicity also

encompasses the behaviour of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are

groups with ascribed membership, usually but not always based on

claims or myths of common history, ancestry, language, race,

religion, culture and territory. While all these variables need not be

present before a group is so defined, the important thing is that the

term ethnicity is consistently used in this chapter for what some

analysts have called tribalism or communalism. Such a group is

classified or categorised as having a common identity that

distinguishes it from others. It is this classification by powerful

agencies such as the state, religious institutions and the intelligentsia

such as local ethnic historians that objectifies the ethnic group, often

setting in motion processes of self-identification or affirmation and

recognition by others. Thus, ethnicity is not so much a matter of

‘shared traits or cultural commonalities’, but the result of the interplay

between external categorization and self-identification (Brubaker,

Loveman and Stamatov 2004:31-32).

Most analysts agree on the basic constitutive elements of ethnic

groups but disagree on how and why they were formed, why ethnicity

occurs, why it occasionally results in violent conflicts and what should

be done to prevent its perverse manifestations. Depending on what

answers they provide to these elementary questions, analysts have

been divided into several schools of thought. While earlier

commentary classified the approaches as primordialism and

constructivism, this chapter is attracted to the recent schema used

by Varshney (2002), which distinguishes four schools: essentialism,

instrumentalism, constructivism and institutionalism. This is because

it enables us to identify different tendencies that have been lumped

under constructivism. Briefly, essentialism restates the thesis of

primordialism (that ethnic identities are static and given) by noting

that ethnic identities date back to the distant past and are rooted in

cultural differences among kinship-based groups.

Instrumentalism posits that ambitious classes manipulate dormant

ethnic identities to pursue their interests, thereby politicising ethnicity

and ethnicising the polity. Constructivists interrogate the origins of

ethnic groups, tracing identity ‘construction’ or ‘invention’ to the

activities of colonial authorities, missionaries and emergent

nationalists and emphasizing the historicity and fluidity of ethnic

identities. Institutionalists emphasize the critical role of political

institutions and pragmatic policies in the framing of ethnic relations.

As Ake (2000) and Mustapha (2000) have correctly argued these

distinctions have been overemphasized as use of one does not

necessarily preclude the other. Most scholars combine more than one

perspective in their analyses. Essentialism, the earliest of the four

approaches, arose from cultural cartographies and greatly influenced

modernization theorists whose positions became the points of

departure of the other three approaches. The following sub-title

examines the interplay between the ethnicity literature and theories

from other disciplines.

MODERNIZATION THEORY AND ETHNICITY

Modernization theory assumed that conflicts in developing societies

were borne out of the fact that the peoples who constituted these

societies originated from varied cultures that engaged themselves in

bloody duels before the advent of the ‘civilisers’. Embedded in

essentialist or primordial explanations is the assumption of

irrationality in ethnicity. W. Arthur Lewis’ (Cited in Sklar 1967:1- 2)

prognosis of the problems of independent states of West Africa

succinctly states this position: “Most of them include people who differ

from each other in language or tribe or religion or race; some of these

groups live side by side in a long tradition of mutual hostility,

restrained only in the past by an imperial power. French writers use

the word ‘cleavage’ to describe a situation where people are mutually

antipathetic, not because they disagree on matters of principle, like

liberals and socialists, or because they have different interests like

capitalists and workers, but simply because they are historic

enemies. Cleavage cannot be overcome merely by argument and

economic concessions, as in the traditional British manner, because it

is not based on disputes about principles or interests. Hence it is the

most difficult problem of all”.

Such characterization, which was based on the earlier work of

several of the colonial anthropologists, was credited for inspiring early

policies of ethnic and race relations in several African societies such

as Nigeria. These include the promotion of separate settlement

schemes for ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in emergent urban communities;

indirect rule; and, regionalisation aimed at ensuring that there was a

minimum social distance between the groups. While modernization

theory was based on the premises of essentialism, modernization

theorists were not convinced that separate development was the best

solution to the problem of ethnicity. Rather it advanced charismatic

national leadership, national parties, national youth movements,

national political institutions, western education, advances in

communication and transportation, and urbanization - indeed

modernization - as catalysts for integration.

The expectation of integration derived from antecedents of the

‘American melting pot’ as well as the apotheosis of nationalism in

Western Europe. However, this ‘prophecy’ turned out to be false.

Ethnicity rather than receding into the darker pages of history

repositioned itself. It moved from the backseat it had occupied to take

up the driver’s seat. Analysts were quick to point to the persistence of

ethnicity despite decades of unrestrained modernization in all

spheres. In a major critique of modernization theory, Robert Melson

and Howard Wolpe (1971:3) asserted that, “inter-group conflict is

seldom a product of simple cultural diversity and, in the Nigerian

case, there is little that is ‘traditional’ about the contemporary pattern

of political divisions. On the contrary, Nigeria’s political crisis is

traceable directly to the widening of social horizons and to the

process of modernization at work within the national boundaries”.

James Coleman (1971) shows how the desire of the Igbo speaking

people for education was seen as threatening the status quo, where

the Yoruba speaking people, who had earlier contacts with western

civilization, dominated the colonial service. He also highlights how the

rising profile of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (an Igbo) in the nationalist

movement aroused rivalry among the Yoruba elite, leading to the

formation of alternative political platforms. Thus, both education and

charismatic leadership, which modernization theory expected to

reduce or eliminate ethnicity, exacerbated it. Abner Cohen’s (1971)

research focussed on the commercial enterprises of migrant Hausa

communities in Ibadan, a Yoruba town, showing how ethnic identity

developed as the migrants devised measures to take control of the

cattle and kola nut markets. The study demonstrates that migrant

communities often developed political institutions and systems

distinct from cultural practices dominant in their places of

provenance. Their relations with their ‘host’ communities were at

different points cooperative, competitive and conflictive. The Yoruba

started to mobilize against the Hausa traders not because they were

Hausa, but because they had dominated the market and were

regarded as exploitative merchants. Hausa migrants often felt their

interests were not only distinct from their kinsmen at ‘home’, but

sometimes threatened by them. Thus, they were ready to enter into

alliances they deemed necessary for their survival. Their forms of

organization were meant to checkmate not just competitors from

other ethnic groups but those from their own groups. Hence, when

some Hausa traders decided to create another market and attendant

political organizations outside sabo, it was the Hausa traders at sabo

that protested and fought against the idea, not the Yoruba. John

Paden (1971) examined Igbo migrants in Kano and concluded that it

was not differences in values but similarity of values that resulted in

the competition over scarce resources, in order to actualise such

social values which pitched the Igbo against their Hausa-Fulani hosts.

Wolpe’s (1971) study of politics in Port Harcourt arrived at a similar

conclusion. Other articles in the volume highlighted how the military

and educational institutions, which were expected to foster

integration, became sites of - and catalysts for - ethnic competition. In

contrast, ethnic unions, which were deemed reflections of primordial

loyalties embarked on community development initiatives and also

played useful roles in political mobilization by political parties. Thus,

Smock (1971), and Magid (1971) who studied ethnic unions among

the Igbo and Idoma respectively, support Coleman’s (1958) position

that ethnicity, symbolised by the presence of ethnic unions, was not

opposed to nationalism. Nationalists used ethnic unions to penetrate

the rural areas and mobilise the people, which was to the chagrin of

the colonialists who preferred to confine nationalist activities to the

urban elites. Furthermore, Richard Sklar’s (1971) contribution, using

material from Western Nigeria, outlined ‘the contributions of tribalism

to nationalism’ by distinguishing ‘pan-tribalism (which) is a vigorous

offspring of modern urbanization and distinctive expression of ethnic

group activity for the most politically conscious members of a new

and rising class’ from ‘communal partisanship that is endemic to rural

areas and old towns where traditional values are paramount and the

socially cohesive ties of traditional authority are binding upon the

people’ (Sklar 1971:263-264).

Clearly, the Melson and Wolpe volume has helped clarify the

phenomenon of ethnicity. However, the criticism of modernization

theory is sometimes taken too far as to suggest that modernization

inherently generates conflict. Such a conclusion is unfounded as it

suggests that modernization leads to conflict everywhere. There is

no empirical support for such position in Nigeria where most cities

have not witnessed violent ethnic conflicts. Still, this absence of

violent conflicts in several Nigerian cities has not attracted serious

attention given the orthodox presupposition that ethnic diversity

begets violent conflicts. As Horowitz (1998) observes if this were the

case, the most modernised nations not the least modernized, would

be the sites of intense ethnic conflicts. Studies that link modernization

to ethnic conflicts need to underscore the specific contexts within

which advances in modernization can contribute to the breakdown of

harmonious ethnic relations. There is also a need to problematise the

stage at which modernization would most likely generate conflict, by

disaggregating aspects of modernization that tend to generate

conflicts. Other issues that should be considered are demographic

factors such as size of ethnic groups and patterns of migration, as

well as the nature of socio-economic specialization, cooperation and

competition among ethnic groups.

ETHNICITY, MILITARY INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR

Publications on the civil war have also contributed to the study of

ethnicity in Nigeria either by privileging the ethnic factor or assigning

it a marginal role in the hostilities. Melson and Wolpe’s position that

modernization promoted uneven development in different spheres

among the different ethnic groups, and that the initiatives adopted by

disadvantaged groups to bridge such disparities culminated in

conflicts, is shared by several studies (Nafziger 1983). These and

other studies, however, go beyond inter-ethnic competition to identify

the role of class and international capital in precipitating the crisis.

The bourgeois class bungled the First Republic because it did not

play by the rules of the game (Dudley 1973) and manipulated ethnic

sentiments in its competition for wealth and power (Diamond 1988,

Post and Vickers 1973).

This is similar to Lonsdale’s (1994) formulation of moral ethnicity and

political tribalism in Kenya. Increasingly, following the First Republic

and the end of the civil war scholars began to adopt an

instrumentalist view of ethnicity arguing that ethnicity was a weapon

adopted and perfected by regionally based elites in their struggle to

acquire state power and the wealth it guarantees. Ordinary Nigerians

had nothing against each other. It was the elites that mobilised them

against one another. The case of Bornu where the political and

traditional elite spoke out against hostilities towards the Ibo, and

therefore prevented anti-Ibo sentiments spreading to the Bornu area,

is often cited as signifying the agency of the elite.

STATE, CLASS AND ETHNICITY

Okwudiba Nnoli’s Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (1978) represents the first

comprehensive effort to investigate ethnicity in Nigeria. Unlike

previous critics of modernization who identified social change as the

cause of ethnicity, Nnoli, inspired by the Marxian class perspective of

the dependency movement, asserts that ethnicity developed from

colonialism. The provenance of ethnicity according to Nnoli was the

colonial urban setting where: ‘The exploited Africans soon

experienced the colonizers’ racial prejudice and discrimination in the

fields of jobs, remunerations, housing, sports, and even churches and

burial grounds. Having been uprooted from the pre-colonial setting

which had valid meaning for him, in which history had effectively and

organically related him to his local environment and culture had

produced salutary patterns of interactions with others, the African

migrant found the door to the coloniser’s glorified world securely

barred to him. The resultant anomie and alienation affected his socio-

economic and political activities. Even in interactions with his fellow

Africans, he experienced tension, anxiety, and insecurity. Disoriented,

subjugated and humiliated by the colonizer he directed his aggressive

impulses against other colonised ‘natives’ with whom he competed on

the basis of equality.

Ethnic group membership was useful for this competition’ (Nnoli

1978:22). The exploitative tendency of the coloniser and the scarcity

of socio-economic and political opportunities in the colonial period

generated intense elite competition. Nnoli argues that the colonial

administration deliberately promoted ethnicity through policies of

indirect rule, categorization of Africans by ‘tribe’, and promotion of

separate settlements between natives and settlers of urban centres.

The outcomes of the divide and rule oriented policies that led to the

rise, spread and consolidation of ethnicity include: socio-economic

competition, regional inequalities, lack of economic unity, rivalry in

provision of amenities, low class consciousness, intemperate

utterances and factional politics, among others. Although, Nnoli

acknowledges that some pre-colonial differences were relevant in

inter-ethnic competition, he states that cultural diversity was a myth

because the colonised had been uprooted from the pre-colonial

setting. By emphasizing the colonial experience, Nnoli draws

attention to role of the socio-economic system in the politicization of

ethnicity.

Ultimately therefore, he argues dependent capitalism pursued by

colonial and post-colonial Nigeria, which promoted and exacerbated

inequalities and placed emphasis on distribution instead of

production, is the cause of ethnicity. It goes without saying according

to Nnoli, that all projects such as the creation of the states within the

Nigerian Federation administered by the bourgeois elites, will fail.

Only a socialist revolution that rescues the country from dependent

capitalism will promote the type of development that does not

encourage ethnicity.

Nnoli’s seminal study is illuminating in several respects. It identifies

the materialist underpinnings of ethnicity. It shows that inter-ethnic

contact does not necessarily provoke violent conflicts especially

where there is socio-economic division of labour and exchange.

Worthy of mention also is its inter-disciplinary perspective, which

derives from Nnoli’s political economy approach, enabling him to

combine evidence from historical, anthropological, psycho-

sociological, economic and political studies to buttress his arguments

on the origins, crystallization and persistence of ethnicity.

However, there is the tendency to exonerate the subordinate classes

in privileging the role of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois classes

leading to what Hodgkin (cited in Jinadu 2004:7) aptly called the

‘clever elite/dumb mass thesis’. Moreover, history contests the view

that ethnicity is a logical consequence of dependent capitalist

development. Several dependent capitalist countries have avoided

violent ethnic conflicts. Obviously, this position was influenced by the

attraction of the dependency movement in social science faculties

across Africa in the 1970s. It is instructive that Nnoli (1995) has

changed his views and later propounded the argument that

democracy and the substantial withdrawal of state from economic

activities would help to check ethnicity. Finally, while it is true that

colonialism was crucial, the approach can be questioned for

underestimating pre-colonial antecedents. The assertion that

migrants were uprooted from the pre-colonial setting presupposes an

end of history, a clean break between the two epochs. There is no

doubt however, that the transition was marked by both continuity and

change. This is implicit in Peter Ekeh’s (1972, 1975) theory of two

publics, which he has applied to explain citizenship, ethnicity and

corruption in Africa.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ETHNICITY

Ekeh (1972, 1975) posits that one of the fundamental consequences

of colonialism was the creation of two publics, which contested for the

loyalty of Africans. These are: (1) the primordial public which is made

up of ethnic unions, community associations and other primordial

groups, established in the colonial period to meet the welfare needs

that were denied by the colonial state; and (2) the civic public whose

genealogy begins with the colonial state apparatus and encompasses

the symbols and institutions of the post-colonial state. While the

primordial public enjoyed the affection of the people who always

thought of what they could do for it without asking for anything in

return, the civic public is inundated by avaricious citizens with a

notion of citizenship that begins and ends at the realm of rights. It is

Ekeh’s argument that ethnicity has flourished because the Nigerian

elite who inherited the colonial state have conceptualised

development as transferring resources from the civic public to the

primordial public. The civic public is thus a contested terrain where

representatives of the primordial public struggle for their share of the

national cake. In this struggle, politics is amoral and the end justifies

the means. The state is so treated because it is seen as alien,

exploitative and oppressive. Ekeh cites as evidence of the dichotomy

between the two publics, the Ekeh’s thesis is similar to the views of

French writers like Balandier and Bayart who argue that ethnicity is a

form of resistance to colonial fact that the same bourgeois elements

that evaded taxes and pilfered public funds contributed generously to

community projects and, when called upon, exhibited the highest

level of probity in management of community finance. An example of

this is found in the popular Igbo lexicon where the public service is

referred to as olu oyibo (white man’s job) and is different from olu

obodo (community service).

Despite the light which Ekeh’s theory sheds, especially on the

centrality of the struggle for access to and control of the state, some

of its assumptions remain suspect. It is still an instrumentalist

explanation that privileges the role of the elite; it wrongly assumes

that the motivation for corruption emanates from the desire to serve

the primordial public; and it overlooks the possibility of overlap

between the two publics given its fixation with the tradition-modernity

dichotomy popularised by functionalist theory (See, Osaghae 2003,

Joseph 1987). Moreover, Ekeh’s theory overemphasizes the ‘love’ for

the primordial public. Yet, studies on ethnic and hometown

associations show clearly that payment of dues by members has

remained a problem. Some communities were engulfed in violent

conflicts on account of embezzlement of community funds indicating

that corruption is not restricted to the civic public (Ahanotu 1982).

The major problem with these pioneering studies on ethnicity is that

they are state-centred, elite based and proceed on the assumption

that the history of the Nigerian peoples started with the arrival of the

British. The preoccupation with the nation-building project, which is

assumed to have began at the onset of colonization and is

conceptualised as the transfer of loyalties of cultural units to the

nation-state, has stymied any consideration of the “the possibilities

and constraints offered by the actual historical dynamics of the sub-

nation groups and formations” in pre-colonial Nigeria (Mustapha

1999:27). Indeed, Obaro Ikime (1985) has drawn attention to various

forms of inter-ethnic relations that prevailed in the pre-colonial period

but have since been supplanted by the colonialists and the post-

colonial political elite. Mustapha (1989, 1999) suggests that one

possible approach to the national question is to take a cue from pre-

colonial state formations which did not promote the indigene-settler

distinction in identity formation, but granted full citizenship rights to

non-natives that had settled and become important actors in their

political economy. Pre-colonial histories and cultural differences also

matter because they sometimes provide a useful background for

understanding current conflicts, such as the Zango-Kataf and Ife-

Modakeke conflicts, amongst others (Mustapha 2000, Albert 1999,

Ekeh 1996). The localization of some of these violent conflicts in rural

areas where “a particular ethnic group invokes historical and

ancestral claims to the land area which is the subject of conflict, with

the aim of restoring ownership” suggest the emergence of rural

ethnicity which was neglected in earlier studies on ethnicity (Egwu

1998:55). In addition, recent studies have shifted focus from the so-

called major ethnic groups which exclusively preoccupied studies in

the period between 1950 and the mid-1970s to minority ethnic

groups. While minority politics from the late colonial period to the

onset of the civil war were subordinated to the conflicts of the major

ethnic groups, the state creation exercises that started in 1967

reconfigured the terrain for contestation.

The term was coined to capture the new fortunes of ethnic groups

who were hitherto regarded as minorities under the three-region

structure but became dominant in the newly created states even

though they are still regarded as minorities in the politics of the

federation. They include Edo, Ijaw, Tiv and Ibibio. Minority minorities

on the other hand are those groups that remained minorities in the

new states such as Idoma, Itsekiri, etc. Accused of oppressing the

‘minority minorities’ with occasional outbreaks of hostilities,

vindicating the position of the Willinks Commission that states

creation was not the solution to the minority problem. The problem is,

however, compounded by the fact that major ethnic groups also

acquired more states in successive state creation exercises. These

groups continue to dominate the federation which witnessed greater

fiscal centralization since the advent of the military in 1966. This

provoked dissent from ethnic minorities in the oil producing Niger

Delta region who bemoan the continuous reduction of the share of

revenue based on the derivation principle since the discovery of oil

(Naanen 1995, Mustapha 2000).

The Niger Delta thus became a site of conflicts manifested in various

forms, ranging from conflicts between communities and the state to

conflicts among communities and oil companies, and conflicts

between communities (Ojo 2002). While some have argued that

these are environmental conflicts others have implicated the

discrepancy between state and community understanding of security

as contributing factors. According to Ibeanu (2000), who assimilates

both views, conflicts in the Niger Delta arise from the fact that while

the state defines security as the condition where transnational

corporations have unrestricted access to the oil rigs in order to

explore and exploit oil, community conceptions of security focus on

guarantee of livelihoods. The efforts of both parties to each enforce

their own security result in violent conflicts. Furthermore, it has been

suggested that some of the communal conflicts in the region are

proxy wars engineered and executed by state agents to divide and

rule the people of the area (Ake 1996). While these explanations may

hold in some cases, it is still risky to generalise. It has become

evident to some scholars that while there is a national template for

conflict, each conflict scenario has its own peculiarities and deserves

to be studied in its own context. This realization has resulted in

several studies that target specific conflicts in order to offer deeper

insights into their origins and transformations (Otite and Albert 1999,

IPCR 2003).

One effort in this direction which focussed on the restive Niger Delta

arrived at the interesting conclusion that: ‘In virtually all the conflicts,

the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who mobilize ethnic grievances in

pursuit of their material interest has been decisive. Politicians,

businessmen and youth leaders have been implicated in virtually all

the conflicts. And usually the aim has been to mobilize ethnic

grievances to achieve personal in individual objects, which are

oftentimes even subversive of collective communal interests’

(Isumonah and Gaskia 2001:74).

However, beyond the refrain of ‘low’ and ‘false’ class consciousness

that attends instrumentalist theories, one is left to wonder how few

‘greedy’ characters are able to instigate and sustain conflicts that are

against the common interest unless a concerted effort is made to

understand the genuine ‘grievances’ of the apparently voiceless

majority. We need to understand what specific political processes

endear ethnic leaders to their followers. Explanations of ethnicity

would be richer if they combined the historical and structural

approaches. As Mustapha (2000:105-106) has aptly argued there has

recently been a tendency for western scholars to focus on the

historical aspects in a bid to deconstruct the notion of primordial

ethnic groups without relating such historical analysis to current

manifestations of the problem which has been the preoccupation of

scholars in Africa. The tendency for social constructionists to describe

the agency of the colonial state, Christian missionaries, and fledging

African elite in the construction of ethnic identities (as Law (1996) has

reiterated for Yoruba identity) would be tantamount to a fairy tale if it

is not related to contemporary developments. Conversely, studies

that focus on what has been described as the rise of sub-ethnicities

since the onset of economic crises without relating it to the social

history of pan-ethnic identities will end up with a short story that lacks

depth. To this end, it is necessary that academic research on

ethnicity in Nigeria, as elsewhere, take a closer look than ever, at

local histories authored by ‘amateur’ historians to understand the

social basis of ethnic identity formation and mobilization (Harneit-

Sievers 2002).

DOMINANT THEMES IN THE STUDY OF ETHNICITY

Apart from the abovementioned theoretical explorations, several

themes have attracted the attention of scholars interested in ethnicity.

These themes are: ethnic unions and ethno-political associations;

economic crisis, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) and ethnicity;

management of ethnicity; and ethnicity and democratization.

ETHNIC UNIONS AND ETHNO-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

Earlier insights on the phenomenon of ethnicity emerged from the

study of the formation and roles of ethnic unions and homeland

development associations (Coleman 1958, Sklar 1963, Smock 1972,

Nnoli 1978, Ahanotu 1982). These studies trace the origins of the

unions to migrants who conglomerated in the colonial urban

environment that was unfamiliar, unfriendly and insecure. Their roles

in the mobilization of resources order to award scholarship to

promising youths, provide credit to businessmen, and to embark on

amenities provisioning of the homeland have been highlighted. It has

also been shown that although they emerged as a result of lack of

interest of the colonial state in community development, they became

more popular in the 1950s when some regional governments began

to provide counterpart funding for such development. Their

politicization and involvement in ethnic politicking have also received

scholarly attention. But scholars began to shift attention from the

unions after the new military banned them for their alleged

involvement in partisan politics during the First Republic. There was

renewed interest in these bodies in the wake of the economic crises

of the 1980s, which saw the resurgence of civil society perspectives,

as it became apparent that some of these groups had filled the

vacuum created by the retreating state (Albert 1993, Osaghae 1994,

1995). One of the interesting revelations of these studies is that

ethnic unions did not vanish entirely after the ban. They merely

transformed their identities through changes in name, and concerned

themselves with immediate communal issues. While pan-ethnic

unions vanished, homeland associations continued to flourish. Pan-

ethnic unions only became useful in the Diaspora where homeland

associations could hardly be effective as a result of their insignificant

membership. It was such dormant unions that were revitalised in the

context of the ethno-religious conflicts from the mid 1980s.

The impetus for this resurgence was the desperation of military

administrators to impose peace by seeking representatives of

different ethnic groups in their domains. One consequence of this

legitimization or state recognition was the traditionalization of the

bodies as their leadership appropriated traditional chieftaincy titles

and symbols. This development has generated intra-group conflicts,

as chieftaincy tussles have emerged in the Diaspora that hitherto

crippled development in the homelands. The export of tradition to the

areas of settlement has also generated inter-group tensions, as the

‘sons of the soil’ fear this might be a prelude to making claims to their

land. Recent attempts have also been made to analyse the rise of

ethno-political associations within the framework of civil society

against the predatory rule of an ethno-military class (Joseph 1999,

Mustapha 2000, Akinyele 2001, Ikelegbe 2001). These studies need

to be enriched by examining the possibilities of historical affinities

between present and past groups, analysing their structures and

modes of resource mobilization, and the extent to which they

represent those they claim to represent as well as their constraints.

ECONOMIC CRISES, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND

ETHNICITY

There is an underlying assumption in studies of ethnicity that ethnic

identities and conflicts flourish in the milieu of economic crisis and

poverty (Nnoli 1978, 1995). The common feature of such argument is

the centrality of the state and the agency of conspiratorial bourgeois

elements. This is evident in Jega (2000:25): ‘Under conditions of

economic crisis, and subsequently structural adjustment, there has

been a swift decline in the ability of the state to provide for the basic

socio-economic needs of the people. Similarly, there has been

increased exclusion of a segment of the elite and the bourgeoisie in

the distribution of the spoils of office, and an acute marginalization of

the majority of the population from the benefits of development

projects and social provisioning…And as the state …disengages from

critical, basic social provisioning, only the constituencies and clients

of those who control state power actually continue to have access to

the state resources through patronage. Thus, under these conditions,

groups have tended to rely on identity-based politics to struggle for

access to the state and the resources that it controls, in order to

protest exclusion and oppression, as well as to demand basic rights

and socio-economic provisioning.’ Apart from showing a coincidence

between the onset of economic crisis and resurgence of conflicts,

analysts have provided empirical evidence for different dimensions of

the crisis. Egwu (1998) has shown how the ‘agrarian crisis’ has

relocated conflicts to rural Nigeria. Osaghae (1995) argues that

structural adjustment has heightened mobilization of ethnic identity

with evidence from the privatization programme and the Ogoni crisis.

However, most analysts are also in agreement that although, ethnic

mobilization has been instrumental to the development of social

capital, its net impact on development has been largely negative

(Egwu 1993, Nnoli 1995). Despite the great insights these studies

offer in understanding contemporary ethnic conflicts, they have

tended to generalise excessively. The attempt to link ethnicity to

economic crisis and SAP needs to be framed in such a way that it

explains why conflicts have arisen in some areas and are absent

elsewhere even though there has been uniform implementation of the

programme across the country. This would entail highlighting the

important intervening variables such as ethnic inequality. Osaghae

(1995:21) has rightly suggested that, “It is the perception of inequality

held by actors rather than actual inequality that leads to action. In

some cases, inequalities are exaggerated to justify action or mobilize

group solidarity…It is not so much deprivation or disadvantage that

engenders ethnic action, it is rather the prospects of advancement

from them”.

Still despite the centrality of horizontal inequality to the understanding

of ethnic relations (Stewart 2002), studies on ethnicity in Nigeria have

merely glossed over it assuming it is evident for all to see. Few

studies that have touched on inequalities have highlighted

educational, economic and political inequalities at the federal level

(Mustapha 1987, 2004, Ekeh and Osaghae eds. 1989, Osemwota

1994). However, although inequalities at the federal level have

shaped the national template of inter-ethnic animosity, most of the

conflicts have arisen out of perceptions of inequalities at the local and

state levels. Even in the anti-Igbo riots in Northern Nigeria in 1966-67,

which degenerated into a national conflict, it was significant that

members of the Igbo ethnic group held prominent positions in both

the public and private sectors of Northern Nigeria, and were ipso

facto implicated in inequalities at the region and local levels in

northern Nigeria.

MANAGING ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND CONFLICTS

Years before the attainment of independence, Nigeria’s constitutional

development experiences were concerned with the principal goal of

managing ethnicity, which had shown clear signs of subverting the

nation-building project. Federalism, the creation of regions and states

and local governments, the shift from parliamentarism to

presidentialism, the institutionalization of quota systems, the

prohibition of ethnic political parties, consociational politicking, and

the adoption of the federal character principle are some of the

approaches that Nigeria has taken to manage ethnic diversity. These

mechanisms have enjoyed the intellectual backing of institutionalists

who posit that there is a connection between ethnic conflict or peace

and the nature of political institutions (Young 1976, Horowitz 1985).

Several works on ethnicity in Nigeria have been committed to

examining the impact of these approaches to the management of

ethnicity (eg. Ekeh and Osaghae ed. 1989, Adamolekun ed. 1991,

Ekekwe 1986 Horowitz 1985, Mustapha 1986, Nnoli 1995, Osaghae

1998, Suberu 2001).

The verdict of such scholars who have examined the issues from

different theoretical standpoints is that while these initiatives have

solved some old problems they have generated many unintended

consequences that have exacerbated ethnicity. What is more, they

have been destabilizing for the Nigerian state system. As Suberu has

noted with respect to revenue allocation and states creation: ‘The

establishment of nine separate commissions on revenue allocation

since 1946 has led to neither the development of an acceptable or

stable sharing formula nor the elaboration of an appropriate

framework of values and rules within which a formula can be devised

and incrementally adjusted to cope with changing circumstances’

(2001:11) ‘Given the sheer multiplicity and fluidity of the territorial and

cultural cleavages that can be used to justify the demands for new

states and the federal resources they bring with them, there is no

certainty that the states-creation process will ever be concluded in

Nigeria’ (2001:15) Analysts have attributed the limitations of the

ethnic management policies to improper implementation, distortion of

visions and lack of political will. Some however doubt the possibility of

a state that generates fissiparous tendencies (Ibrahim 2000) and a

predatory class that is endlessly looking for formulas to divide the

Nigerian peoples (Mustapha 1985) implementing policies that

promote ethnic peace and harmony.

ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRATISATION

Those who profess their love for democracy have always been afraid

of plurality. This is one of reasons why the ancient Greek ‘inventors’

of democracy excluded the ‘weaker’ sex and the ‘barbarian’ race from

political participation. This antipathy for plurality was carried over into

the ‘age of liberty’ as evidenced by the belated extension of suffrage

in liberal democracies. J. S. Mills voiced this concern when he argued

that democracy would not survive in a plural society (See, Horowitz

1985). These fears trailed most of the plural African countries at the

eve of independence as some countries adopted one-party systems

in order to preserve democracy and build the nation. Nigeria is one of

the few African countries that retained a multi-party structure even

though de facto one party rule persisted in the regions and states. In

the wake of ‘the resurgence of democracy’ from the mid-1980s,

several analysts warned that democratization would ignite ethnic

conflicts. This warning came at a period when scholars and renascent

civil society were advertising democracy as a liberator from

dictatorship and violent conflict (Nnoli 1995, Osaghae 1995, Olukoshi

and Laasko eds. 1998).

Some analysts referred specifically to the fact that liberal democracy,

which privileged individual rights and disregarded group rights was

not suitable for the African context where group rights are

emphasized (Ake 2000, Jinadu 2004). Thus, some efforts were made

to assuage the fears of impeding doom. Ake (2000:114) was one of

the boldest optimists: ‘Far from being prone to generating ethnic

conflict, democratization is actually an antidote to those things, which

promote ethnic identity and what passes for ethnic conflicts in Africa.

What are these causes? The most important is the character of the

post-colonial state in Africa…its power over economy and society is

enormous, arbitrary and it is largely privatised. For all but a few of its

citizens, it is alien and remote, uncaring and oppressive…many of

them have turned away from the state and given their loyalty to sub-

national formations’. As Ake argued most of the conflicts that erupted

in post-military period in Nigeria have been linked to the state in one

form or the other (Mustapha 2002, Ukiwo 2003).

ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW

Despite being home to somewhere between 250 and 400 ethnic

groups, Nigeria is primarily made up of three main ethnic groups –

Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba -- that comprise about 60 percent of

the population. A fifth group, the Ijaw, has been growing in population

and influence and currently makes up another 10 percent.

THE HAUSA-FULANI

Muslim Hausa-Fulani are the predominant ethnic groups in Nigeria's

northern region. Though the groups originated in different parts of

West Africa, religion, intermarriage and adoption of the Hausa

language by the Fulani have unified the groups over time. In

contemporary Nigerian society, they are often referred to collectively

as Hausa-Fulani.

The largest of the major ethnic groups, Hausa and Fulani have been

politically dominant since Nigeria's independence from Britain in

1960. Islam is a key component of their ethnic identity and continues

to inform their role in modern Nigerian society and politics. Their

culture is deeply patriarchal and patrilineal.

In recent years, Hausa and Fulani were instrumental in adopting and

upholding Sharia, a system of Islamic law, in 11 of the country's

northern states.

THE IGBO

The Igbo, the main ethnic group in southeastern Nigeria, has

represented some of the staunchest opponents of Sharia law. In

many northern Hausa-Fulani-dominated states, minority populations

of Igbo claim to have been unfairly targeted by laws that do not

pertain to their faith.  

Unlike neighboring Hausa and Yoruba cultures, Igbo society was

traditionally decentralized and non-hierarchical. This made its

members easier converts for European missionaries and today most

Igbos are Christian.

Under British colonial rule, many Igbo served in government and

military roles and were later key players in Nigerian independence.

But over the last few decades the group has become less politically

dominant.

Discovery of large oil reserves near Igboland in the early 1960s and

proposed redistricting led many in the group to fear that they would

be cut out of revenues from the country's natural resources.

In 1967, an Igbo secessionist movement in Biafra state led to a 30-

month war with the Nigerian government, in which hundreds of

thousands of Igbo starved to death.

After the war, Igbo were reintegrated into Nigerian society, but in a

more marginalized role. Despite lingering ethnic tension, they now

play an important part in southeastern Nigeria's oil trade. In recent

elections, however, they have struggled to coalesce around a single

candidate for the presidency.

THE YORUBA

The Yoruba are one of Nigeria's most urban ethnic groups.

Historically, their culture centered on densely populated city-states

each controlled by an oba, or king. Yoruba now form the majority in

Lagos, the second most populous city in Africa.

In modern day Nigeria, Yoruba speakers do not always identify with

their larger ethnic group, but rather the many smaller Yoruba-

speaking communities.

This pluralism extends to Yoruba views of religion. As Islam and

Christianity spread to Yorubaland over the past few centuries, the

group embraced both faiths alongside its many traditional and animist

beliefs. This blend and acceptance of religion survives in modern

times and has mitigated some religious conflict in places where

Yoruba form the majority.

Like the Igbo, Yoruba held important roles in the British colonial

government, participating significantly in both political and economic

life. Since independence, the group has been overshadowed by the

more numerous and dominant Hausa-Fulani.

However, in 1999 a Christian Yoruba Olusegun Obasanjo became

Nigeria's president and first elected head of state. He was re-elected

for a second term in 2003.

THE IJAWS

In recent years, the Ijaw have agitated for more political franchise in

Nigeria. Although they are the fifth largest ethnic group in the country,

their traditional lands in the Niger River Delta are some of the

country's most oil-rich.

Oil exploration has had devastating consequences on Ijaw territory

and subjected the group to numerous ecological hazards.

Mismanagement of oil revenues has kept much of the wealth from

returning to Ijaw communities.

In January 2006, the Ijaw militia Movement for the Emancipation of

the Niger Delta kidnapped four Royal Dutch Shell employees in the

Niger Delta region, demanding the release of an Ijaw militia leader

who was arrested by Nigerian authorities. His continued detention

has caused members of MEND to swear continued attacks and

disruptions to the oil industry.

Despite these ongoing tensions, 2007 could saw an Ijaw take a major

political office for the first time. Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw, is now

the vice presidential of Nigeria.

ETHNIC TENSIONS

The Nigerian government has worked out tentative power-sharing

arrangements to help ensure that its many ethnic groups have some

say in how the country's natural resource wealth is spent. But major

questions about ethnicity and how to balance the many competing

interests still dog the society.

Cities remain largely segregated along ethno-religious lines, and

confrontation between ethnic groups is common. Often, ethnic

clashes in one part of the country can set off a chain of reprisal riots

and attacks in other parts of the country.

All major ethnic groups have formed militias to protect their own

interests and perpetrate violence on other groups. While illegal, these

vigilante groups continue to act with impunity for lack of stringent law

enforcement.

CONCLUSION

It is argued that changing socio-political realities in Nigeria and the

dominant intellectual traditions of the social sciences have greatly

influenced the study of ethnicity in Nigeria. The quest for imperial

hegemony inspired cartographic demarcation of ethnic boundaries

and anthropological observation of bio-cultural characteristics of

ethnic groups. Ethnic studies also proliferated as efforts have been

made to test the universal validity of the melting pot thesis. The

aficionados of class analysis did their best to confine ethnicity to the

realm of false consciousness. But these competing perspectives,

which have been presented as essentialism (primordial),

instrumentalist, constructivist, and institutionalist are not mutually

exclusive. Scholars have applied them eclectically in explaining the

linkages of such events as military intervention, civil war, economic

crisis and adjustment and democratisation, to ethnicity. These studies

have enriched our understanding of the nature of politics, the state,

resource competition, identity formation and transformation, and

ethnic conflicts in Nigeria.

One false start in ethnic studies which was the assumption that the

ethnic groups were always at each others’ throats for no just cause

tailored studies towards examining instances of ethnic conflicts and

competition to the neglect of numerous instances of harmonious

inter-ethnic cooperation. Related to this is that because ethnicity is

seen as the fault-line, few scholars have been interested in the

incidence of intra-ethnic conflicts which sometimes pose more threats

to human security than inter-ethnic discord (Nnoli 1995, Osaghae

1994). By neglecting intra-ethnic conflicts studies have missed out on

fissures and tensions within groups and limited possibilities of

investigating how ethnic groups come to agree to declare or

acknowledge a common identity and identify a common interest to

pursue. Part of this lack of interest in the study of the internal

dynamics of ethnic mobilization arises from the assumption that

violent ethnic conflicts are instigated by elites to serve their personal

interests. Studies of ethnicity have privileged the agency of the

colonial and post colonial state as well as that of the ethnic elites

while denying popular agency.

This instrumentalist assumption, which pervades the literature, needs

to demonstrate that there is no congruence between the interests of

the ethnic leaders and those of their followers. This would require an

investigation of the nature of horizontal inequalities among ethnic

groups and the response of groups to such inequalities.

REFERENCES

Adamolekun, L. ed. (1991) “Federalism in Nigeria: Toward Federal

Democracy”,: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 21, No. 4

Ahanotu, A. (1982) “The Role of Ethnic Unions in the Development of

Southern Nigeria 1916-1966” in B. I. Obichere ed. Studies in

Southern Nigerian History, London: Frank Cass

Ake, C. (1996) “The political question”, in: O. Oyediran (Ed.)

Governance and Development in Nigeria: Essays in Honour Billy

Dudley, Ibadan: Agbo Areo.

Ake, C. (2000) The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar:

CODESRIA Books.

Akinyele, R.T. (2001) “Ethnic Militancy and National stability in

Nigeria: A Case Study of the Oodua People’s Congress”, African

Affairs, Vol.100: 623-640.

Albert, I. O. (1993) Inter-Ethnic Relations in a Nigerian City: a

Historical Perspective of the Hausa-Igbo Conflicts in Kano 1953-

1991, Ibadan: IFRA

Albert, I.O. (1999) “Ife-Modakeke Crisis” in O. Otite and I. O. Albert

(eds.) Community Conflicts in Nigeria: management, Resolution and

Transformation, Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Anber, P. (1967) “Modernization and Political Disintegration: Nigeria

and the Ibos”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 5 (5): 163-

179.

Brubaker, R., M. Loveman and P. Stamatov (2004) “Ethnicity as

Cognition”, Theory and Society, Vol. 33: 31-64.

Cohen, A. (1971), “Politics of the Kola Nut Trade” in R. Melson & H.

Wolpe (eds) Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism,

East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Coleman, J. (1971) The Ibo and Yoruba strands in Nigerian

nationalism, in R. Melson & H. Wolpe (eds) Nigeria: Modernization

and the Politics of Communalism East Lansing: Michigan State

University Press.

Dent, M. T. (1971) “The military and politics: a study of the relation

between the army and the political process in Nigeria”, in: R. Melson

& H. Wolpe (eds) Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of

Communalism, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

NATIONAL QUESTION AND RESOURCE CONTROL.

The most salient issue among a broad spectrum of the Nigerian

society - the political elite, working class, civil society actors, artisans,

market women, students, lumpen elements and the unemployed - is

the "national question." This "question" is believed to be at the root of

the crisis of the Nigerian state and the problem of peaceful co-

existence in Nigeria. What then is the national question? The

national question as noted elsewhere differs in time and space, and

may be viewed from two angles. The first angle is inter-group

relations, i.e., the tensions and contradictions that arise from inter-

group relations dwelling on the issues of marginalization, domination,

inequality, fairness, and justice among ethnic groups. This may be

real or imagined. The second angle to the national question is the

class dimension, i.e., is the exacerbation of class inequalities and

antagonisms in society between the rich and the poor, the affluent

and the underclass, or to use the Marxist parlance, the bourgeoisie

and the proletariat. The latter sometimes reinforce the former,

increasing ethnic conflicts and antagonism in society (Adejumobi,

2002:156). While both perspectives of the national question are quite

relevant to the Nigerian situation, the former, i.e., the relationship

among ethnic groups, gains currency in the contemporary discourse

of the national question in Nigeria. The main issue of the national

question in Nigeria is how to structure the Nigerian federation in order

to accommodate groups and guarantee access to power and

equitable distribution of resources (Osaghae, 1998: 315). The

background to it is the perceived domination of some ethnic groups

by the others engendered by the structural nature of the Nigerian

federation, the heavy lopsidedness in center-state relations, which

according to Wole Soyinka is highly "unbalanced, exploitative, and

acquisitive" and the growing impoverishment, frustrations and

disillusionment of the people, which is viewed as a direct

consequence of power structure and ruling class politics in Nigeria

(Adejumobi, 2000:126). In the final analysis, as Abubakar Momoh

rightly noted, the national question is fundamentally related to the

question of rights of nations and peoples particularly in the context of

oppression (Momoh, 2002: 2).

The issues involved in the national question revolve around the

following:

What should be the component units and tiers of

government in the Nigerian federation?

How should they be constituted, based on ethnic

contiguity or administrative expediency?

How should political power and administrative

responsibilities be shared among the levels and tiers of

government?

How should the ownership of economic resources be

structured in the Nigerian federation?

What should be the acceptable formulae for sharing

federally collected revenue?

What should be the nature of inter-governmental relations

in Nigeria? (Adejumobi, 2000: 126)

The fears and demands of the ethnic militia groups have basically

revolved around the issues of the national question: marginalization

and domination of one group by another. For instance, the concern of

MASSOB is the marginalization of the East in the power equation in

Nigeria; that of OPC is about "power shift," and restructuring of the

Nigerian federation and the quest for self-determination by groups in

the Niger Delta region is based on the social injustice, neglect and

marginalization that the area suffers in the Nigerian nation. In an

important sense, these ethnic militia groups are offshoots of the

national question in Nigeria.

INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS

Therefore, socialists have to always pose the national question in

both cultural and social dimensions. Take the clamor for the Oodua

Republic as an example. On its own, this is a very legitimate and

democratic objective. But situated within the realm of concrete

historical features of today's Nigeria, it becomes obvious that only

with a democratic socialist agenda can ensure that such a republic

brings meaningful changes to the well-being and political rights of the

Yoruba masses, as well as safeguarding the rights of non-Yoruba

minorities living within the region. The same condition is applicable to

agitation for Biafra in the South East and demands for autonomy or

separation in South-South and other geo-political zones in Nigeria.

In the past six years at, least Lagos has been the centre of OPC's

agitations and activities. Although historically a predominantly Yoruba

city, Lagos is easily the most cosmopolitan of Nigerian cities. Any

nationalist trend or agitation that fails to take this factor into

consideration is therefore doomed to create more problems for the

working masses of even the Yoruba extraction than the envisaged

benefits of separation.

The OPC rallying call is that all Yoruba sons and daughters should

come back home to establish an Oodua Republic. Implicit in this

slogan is a demand that all non-Yoruba origin people should go back

to their own "homes". Needless to stress this bourgeois way of posing

the question will always encounter lukewarm if not outright hostilities

of non- Yoruba people of the envisaged Oduduwa Republic. Even

elements of Yoruba extraction who live and work in other parts of

Nigeria and as such have no other practical homes and means of

livelihood cannot be expected to sincerely and enthusiastically

support this kind of political agenda.

As shown by the experience of the past six years, the vast majority of

the Yoruba masses living and working in the envisaged geographical

entity of the Oodua Republic themselves at best have been very

lukewarm to the OPC's campaigns and activities. This, in no small

measure, is largely due to the bourgeois and undemocratic manner

with which the OPC's objectives are being pursued.

Without any attempt at convoking a democratic conference or

organizing referendum of the people of the Yoruba race, different

Yoruba nationalist groups have sprung up, many with intolerable,

anti-democratic constitutions. Instead of an approach which seeks to

systematically mobilize the different strata of the Yoruba working

masses, you have one that places emphasis on supernatural forces.

Myths are spread about ancient "powers" possessed by the Yoruba

race which can make people invulnerable to gun shots and machete

attacks. Like every reductionist bourgeois trend, the OPC and many

other Yoruba nationalist trends present the mass poverty of the

Yoruba masses as something peculiar to the race, and not a

phenomenon prevalent amongst the working masses of the diverse

nationalities that make up Nigeria. The same unscientific approach is

used by MASSOB and many other nationalist groups.

But in their day-to-day existence, the working masses are able to see

that their class enemies cut across tribes, nations and countries. This

is partly the reason behind the huge successes achieved by the two

general strikes called by the NLC in the past years. Therefore, to the

extent that the various nationalist groups fail to emphasize collective

struggles for democracy and social emancipation of the entire and

divergent working class masses of Nigeria, to the same extent are

they denied the crucial support of their respective working masses.

And if it should be stressed, it is this organic weakness that is

responsible for the palpable triumph of government perspective of

suppression of nationalist agitations.

But if the working class movement is defeated, or shows no way out

of the crisis, then the nationalist organizations can win working class

support. This is the danger facing the labor movement. Labor has to

fight this danger by both seriously fighting capitalism and putting

forward demands that meet the national aspirations of the different

nationalities. But for socialists, even if we come to the conclusion that

the time had come for us to call for the break-up of Nigeria, we would

do so on class lines. For example, as the socialists in Britain,

members of the CWI, advocate for a socialist independent Scotland

and a socialist federation of the British Isles. Even if calling for a

break-up, we would still call for common workers' struggles and

explain the internationalist approach essential for the victory of

socialism.

RESOURCE CONTROL

The 1999 constitution has a provision that not less than 13% of

revenues generated from natural resources of any given area must

be paid to the area concerned by the central government. This very

minimal provision has now even been sidetracked by the Obasanjo

capitalist government. This has been done via the artificial

demarcation between revenues generated from onshore and offshore

oil exploration. Regrettably, though not unexpectedly, the Supreme

Court has given a ridiculous judgment to sabotage this modest

constitutional provision. According to this ruling, the oil found within

the territory of a state, including its neighboring shallow water, is

onshore and the respective state is entitled to be paid 13% derivation

revenues, whereas oil sourced from deep water belongs to no states

but Nigeria as a whole.

Hence for the selfish capitalist/nationalist interests of the elites of the

major Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo nationalities that dominate the

economy and polity of Nigeria, logic must be overturned. We are now

being told that if Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta States, etc. do not form part

of the geographical entity called Nigeria, somebody from Sokoto,

Kano, Ibadan, Ilorin, Minna etc can come to the deep sea of the

states bordering on the Atlantic in southern Nigeria to claim

ownership of oil or any other material thing for that matter.

The attitudes of the working masses to the agitation for resource

control differ from one part of the country to the other. The masses in

the non-oil producing states are either apathetic towards it or

opposed to it. To this layer, the whole demand is seen as something

which would reduce the revenue being earned by Nigeria with the

attendant negative effects this is likely to have on their own living

standards. On the other hand, the masses in the oil producing states

support or have sympathy for the agitation for resource control. To

them, this is the only way out of the prevailing endemic mass poverty

in the oil-producing areas.

Socialists supports the democratic aspiration of the masses in the oil-

producing areas to have control over the resources which are being

presently exploited and looted by the multinational corporations and

the Nigerian capitalist elite. However, in its present conception and

articulation, the "resource control" agitation is largely a bourgeois

phenomenon. Under the present arrangement, increase in revenues

to the oil producing states will bring little or no material benefit to the

lives of the masses. Instead, more millionaires will be created from

amongst the friends and families of the capitalist elites in power in the

oil producing areas.

In essence, it is only if the agitation for resource control is posed in

the context of making the working masses to fully and democratically

control the natural resources of nature and the commanding heights

of the economy with a view to satisfy and guarantee the basic needs

of everybody as opposed to the prevailing capitalist system whose

central goal is the generation of profits to a few insatiable capitalist

sharks that it can have a meaningful impact in the lives of the

masses.

But as it is written above, the re-emergence of nationalist agitations

on a greater scale is a very likely development in the coming period.

However, unless these agitations are given working class orientation

and the activities of the nationalist movements are thoroughly

democratized, they will merely serve to deepen the suffering and

agonies of the working masses vis-à-vis their quest for social and

political emancipation.

As socialists, we call for the democratization of all struggles and we

oppose undemocratic organizations. We also advocate the need for

an orientation towards the working class and struggle for socialism by

oppressed nationalities, students, etc. But a vital necessity is

rebuilding a fighting workers movement that can take up these

national issues, but not showing any signs of nationalism. Our

attitude to nationalist organizations depends on whether they are

splitting the workers' movement or representing the first steps of a

new movement. For example, we would oppose an attempt to split

NANS along nationalist lines or the creation of an Oodua Students

Association. But if an OSA did emerge as the major student body in

the south-west then we may be forced to work with it in at least a

united front fashion.

The experience of the past three years has shown that nationalist

groups can be as deadly against the working masses of their own

nationality in the same way they behave towards those from other

nationalities. For instance factional crisis within the OPC alone has

resulted in the premature deaths of hundreds of persons in the past

three years. This sectarian approach has only succeeded in

alienating the mass of the Yoruba working masses from the OPC

phenomenon and this makes them easier targets of physical attack

by the state.

Instead of the agenda which seek to exclusively resolve the economic

and political plights of the working masses of a given nation or

country, socialists must develop one which seeks to combine the

struggle for the cultural and democratic rights of the working masses

of a given nation or country with that of the masses of the other

nationalities and the world working masses as a whole. Only this kind

of approach can successfully defeat the exploitative and oppressive

rule of imperialism and finance capital world-wide.

If this approach is not followed, nationalist agitations will always

succumb to the divide and rule antics of the capitalist state. While it

will always be easier for the capitalist state to out shoot isolated

armed nationalist groups, same cannot be successfully contemplated

against a well-mobilized, democratically-controlled movement of the

working masses, especially one which will not hesitate to use arms to

defend its interest, against the selfish and undemocratic interests of

the capitalist class, whenever such situation arises.

However, unless the working class stamps its outlook and authority

on the polity, more determined nationalist groups will develop or re-

emerge in the not too distant future, whose motto will be violence

unlimited. Similarly, the current retreat on the stoning of Safiyat for

adultery must not be interpreted to mean that Sharia no longer

constitutes a serious obstacle to the building of a virile, pan-Nigeria

working class movement.

As socialists, we have always advocated the complete separation of

the state from religion. We have always advocated against state

religion. We regard religion as a personal question and defend the

rights of believers to carry out their religions. For years DSM has

been demanding immediate stoppage of the practice where

government uses public money to build churches and mosques, and

sends or subsidies pilgrimages to Mecca, Rome or Jerusalem. Our

reasons are based on two broad, related premises. One, religion

generally gives the impression that riches and wretchedness are the

way God, the creator, orders things. However, this scientifically, is a

fallacious theory. The earth and the universe as a whole are endowed

with inexhaustible resources and potentials. As things are today, the

human race has the resources and technical capacity to rid the world

of hunger, homelessness, curable diseases, illiteracy, isolation

(occasioned by restricted transportation and communication

services), national narrowness, etc, which presently constitute the

essence of capitalist civilization. The main reason why this is not the

case and not likely to become the case is that there are out there a

few capitalist elements and corporations who feel that the world

resources must be used not to satisfy the needs of the people of the

world but be left for the capricious and selfish goals of the capitalists.

Socialists must make it abundantly clear that this is not the making of

any God or Creator. We must stress the fact that on the basis of the

existing resources and techniques, our earth can conveniently

support ten times the present population of the world.

Of course, a layer of the masses within and outside the Sharia states

innocently believes that the Islamic penal code is the solution to

crimes and corruption. But Sharia, as it is, is not only a political

adventure; it constitutes a serious breach of the democratic rights of

Muslim and non-Muslim Nigerians. As a rule, whoever pays the piper,

dictates the tune. Thus, Sharia, as it is a government creation, will

only be interpreted on the basis of the fancies of whichever faction or

creed of Islam that is at anytime in control of state power. Under the

Sharia criminal code, two women are required to give evidence to be

equivalent of one given by an adult male Muslim. If a Muslim and a

Christian are jointly accused of committing an offence, an adult, male

Muslim co-accused may be left off the hook and acquitted if he is

prepared to swear his innocence on Koran. Similar option is however

not given to a Christian or somebody who holds a different belief.

Under Sharia someone who steals a cow gets his or her hand

chopped off but members of the capitalist ruling class who steal

millions and billions of naira of public money are never punished

because, according to the present authors of political Sharia, the first

is a crime while the second category represents a breach of trust.

At a stage sooner than anticipated by political Sharia advocates, the

working masses across national, religious and class divides will wake

up and fight these blatant discriminations embodied in the Sharia

criminal code. But unless socialists and the working masses in

general are able to come up with viable political alternative and

platform, which is capable and prepared to mobilise the entire energy

and resources of the masses along the struggle for genuine social

and political emancipation a new, more virulent Sharia movement is

inevitable in Nigeria.

If, as is most likely, the prevailing global capitalist crisis goes deeper

and or its negative effects lasted longer, and if the labor movement is

not able to positively use the generalized, transnational mass poverty,

which this is having on the living standard of the working masses, of

the diverse nations that make up Nigeria, then the emergence of a

more vicious, right-wing political Sharia is an inevitability. That is the

kind of time you would encounter Islamic clerics who are going to

argue that a more ruthless implement action of Sharia criminal code

is the way forward for mankind. However, if it must be stressed, this

will be nothing but the continuation of mass poverty and political

repression for the working masses. As opposed to a religious struggle

which tends to divide the working masses along sectarian lines, what

is needed is a pan-Nigerian internationalist working class movement

whose central objectives will be the struggle to replace the current

man-eats-man, individualist capitalist system with a humane,

democratic socialist ideals where the satisfaction of all the economic

and political needs of every person on earth will be the sole and

primary yardstick of economic management and governance.

SNC or NC

In contrast to this approach, there are those who simply hold the view

that the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) or

National Conference (NC) will automatically straighten out any socio-

political problems faced by the working masses. A truly

democratically elected Sovereign National Conference may address

some of the critical questions ravaging the country today. But if the

country or its new fashion or units remain within the framework of

global capitalist network, it will mean that little or nothing can be

positively done to better the material well-being and democratic rights

of the masses by such an SNC.

Therefore, the SNC must not be about sovereignty where the masses

are only allowed to choose between one set of exploiters and tyrants

or the other. For an SNC to be meaningful to the masses, it must be

capable of raising and taking measures which are capable of

enforcing the democratic, working class control and management of

all resources and technical manpower of the society in the interest of

all as opposed to that of a few as it is under capitalism. This is why all

the various sections of the capitalist ruling class including its Afenifere

AD extraction have not been able to consistently champion the

convocation of an SNC, or an NC. Not even the south-south

bourgeois, who is supposed to be more radical, given the fact that

most revenues come from his area while little development ever

occurs, is prepared to risk his prevailing privileges for an uncertain

and very difficult ideal. Their reasons are not far fetched. Their

present luxury and privileges are reality while the outcome of an SNC

or even NC is a gamble.

For one, they are not prepared to propose to the conference that

privatization must stop and that the commanding heights of the

economy be placed under democratic and public ownership of the

working people where production will be planned for the use of all

and not profits for a few as it is the case under capitalist dispensation.

Yes, each faction of the ruling class is ready to support an SNC/NC if

it is certain that its class interest will eventually be better protected.

The south-south bourgeois for instance will want to have exclusive

control of the oil wealth of the Delta region, to the exclusion of his

counterparts across the country. But if making an immediate move in

this direction will risk provoking a situation where he stands to lose

his personal material wealth, a southern bourgeois or any bourgeois

from other nationalities will rather band together with other fellow,

capitalist partners-in-crime, to sabotage the genuine national and

economic aspirations of the Deltan masses.

For this reason, neither Afenifere nor its south-south bourgeois

counterparts can consistently fight for "true federalism" or "resource

control." This is because to do this will of necessity demand the

involvement of the working masses in the aims and implementation of

such an SNC agendum. But if the truth must be told, this (i.e.

involving the masses in aims and implementation of any crusade by

members of the capitalist class) will be the last, voluntary option that

any bourgeois movement will ever take. Only the working masses

who are the victims of mass poverty and destitution can be

consistently interested in any genuine, democratic agenda which

seeks to truly democratize the economy and politics of society.

This is why labor and youth activists and socialists should canvass for

a truly democratically-elected Sovereign National Conference (SNC).

This type of conference should be dominated by elected

representatives of the working people as its composition should be

according to the numerical strength of the various social groups in the

country. It will among other things, decide on the way forward for the

country and agree on a new constitution. Even then, while such an

SNC may represent a step forward from the present military-imposed

arrangement, the working masses and labor activists need to struggle

for a workers' and poor farmers' government that will implement a

socialist and anti-capitalist program. It is only this type of government

that can guarantee lasting improvements in the political rights and

economic and social conditions of the masses.

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POLITICAL PARTIES

AND

PRESSURE GROUPS

IN NIGERIA.

OGBAJI, UDOCHUKWU A.O