Presentation by SRSG Chambas

The Security Situation in the Sahel and Piracy

13th ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Regional Meeting

Freetown – Sierra Leone, 22-24 February 2017

Honorable Ibrahim Bundu, Speaker of Parliament and Leader of the Majority,

Honorable Netty Baldeh, Co-President of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary

Assembly,

Mrs Michelle Rivasi, representing the EU Co-Presidency of the ACP-EU Joint

Parliamentary Assembly,

Honorable Ministers,

Distinguished Members of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,

Distinguished Members of the ECOWAS Parliament,

Members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to thank the authorities of Sierra Leone, and especially the

speaker of Parliament and His honorable colleagues, for their endearing

hospitality. The presence today of ECOWAS members of Parliament,

African Caribbean and Pacific group of states, and European delegates, is

heartwarming. It illustrates the lasting spirit of the Cotonou Agreement. I

have no doubt that our discussions will enable the ACP and European

Parliaments to advance their common understanding of critical issues

affecting the region, including economic integration, natural resources,

migration, peace and security.

Excellences,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Security situation in Sahel is one of the pressing issues mobilizing

attention at the national level, in regional instances, and in larger

international fora. It has featured high on the agenda of the European Union

since the Arab Spring protests in Libya in 2011, and the crisis in Mali, in

2012. [The ACP/EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, as I recall, conducted

early fact finding missions to Mali soon afterwards]. The EU strategy for the

Sahel, adopted in March 2011, signaled a comprehensive approach on

development and security cooperation, which has subsequently been

reinforced by other programmes. The UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel,

for its part, was launched in September 2013. Since then, initiatives have

multiplied to mobilize support for the region, boost resilience and

development, and stem the spread of violent extremism and illicit

trafficking. The situation we are facing today continues to call for a multi-

dimensional response: it involves strengthening the ties between the region

and its partners, and also examining together the measures taken by the

countries themselves, who are on the front line.

As you will recall, 2016 was marked by an overall increase in security

incidents in the Sahel, including terrorist attacks targeting areas previously

spared by such violence – Cote d’Ivoire in particular, as well as Burkina

Faso. Violence has continued unabated in the Northern and Central parts

of Mali. Since its inception in April 2013, the UN Mission in Mali has suffered

over 110 casualties. The most recent terrorist violence has threatened the

Malian peace agreement: the attack on the Gao assembly camp on 18

January led to 77 casualties and over 100 wounded among the armed

groups signatories to the agreement. It remains essential for Mali’s

territorial unity that contentious issues between the Malian parties be

resolved through negotiations and reconciliation. We hope that the current

efforts of the Mediation will allow to reinvigorate consensual solutions.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There are multiple reasons to the insecurity in the Sahel region. Among

legitimate causes for concern, I can mention the continuous flow of

weapons from Libya in particular, but also the risks associated with ISIS

and other armed groups’ combatants operating in Libya or Syria returning

to their countries of origin in West Africa, or join local insurgencies. These

phenomenon have been observed in the Lake Chad Basin area, where the

violence related to Boko Haram activities causes major humanitarian

upheaval. Furthermore, it is established that criminal activities and illicit

trafficking in the region have increased in parallel to the threats posed by

extremist agendas and terrorism. Other types of violence, including

tensions between pastoralist/farming communities are being observed

throughout the Sahel. The price payed by the local population is high, as

the violence takes human lives, disrupts livelihoods and forces

communities to displace. Insecurity compromises their fair chance for

development and economic prosperity. It also undermines the confidence

of the population in central governments, and in the security forces in

charge of protecting them. In view of these intertwined phenomena, efforts

for conflict prevention, as well as local mechanisms to guarantee national

and social cohesion, appear as necessary as the proper military response.

Faced with the threat posed by extremist groups, Governments in the

affected countries have had to mobilize human and financial resources in

ever growing volume. Launching a heavy-handed counter-terrorism

response bears the risks of alienating further the affected communities. As

illustrated during the discussions at recent Summits of ECOWAS and G5,

all countries are confronted with similar constraints. In view of this situation,

coming together to combine expertise and resources has become urgent.

It is in this perspective that, on 24 January, the Heads of State of Mali, Niger

and Burkina Faso met under the « Liptako-Gurma » integrated

development Authority, to adopt a new mechanism for military cooperation

– as you are aware, this triangle area between the three countries, with a

significant population involved in trade and border exchanges, has

encountered increasing challenges to security and development in recent

years. It is foreseen that this “G3” military option would fall under the larger

G5 Sahel project for a regional force formalized at the G5 Heads of States

Summit in Bamako, on 6 February, attended by EU, AU, ECOWAS and

bilateral partners. The United Nations is currently studying options to

support the regional Force, which the G5 countries have described as

essential to supplement the responses already provided under national and

international frameworks. I believe the EU, in particular, has already been

approached for support. Issues related to rules of engagement, force

generation, logistics and sustainability will have to be carefully examined.

As I mentioned earlier, tackling insecurity in the Sahel requires a broad

focus. One of the next presentations, I believe, will focus on migration and

related developments in the region. These issues are also of significant

consequence to the overall stability of the Sahel. It appears very relevant

for both parliamentarian delegations to seize the opportunity of this forum,

and others, and exchange on these phenomenon in order to forge a

common perception and understanding. The situation in Niger, in particular,

and the dependency of communities in the Agadez region upon the

“migration economy”, should be taken into consideration when

implementing measures to regulate population movements.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to conclude with a few words on the UN engagement in the Sahel,

before I move to the topic of Piracy, which is my second presentation.

Since November 2013, the UN, AU, EU, World Bank and others have

established a Ministerial Platform of Coordination for the Sahel. This

platform was designed to discuss peace and security dynamics, as well as

strategic considerations guiding bilateral and multilateral interventions; it

was established with the view that the needs of Sahel countries in terms of

support could be matched with the available offers of assistance. Other

fora, including the forthcoming meeting of the Special Envoys on the Sahel,

to take place in Luxembourg on 14 and 15 March, also serve for

coordination purpose between the partners. Concerning the G5 and its

Secretariat, the UN opened a liaison office in Nouakchott less than a year

ago, which centralizes the support provided by UN entities. We are also

involved in setting up the Center for Threat Analysis and Early Warning

which is attached to the G5 Secretariat, as well as a regional cell for the

prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. This is in accordance

with the vision of the Secretary-General for conflict prevention and

preventive diplomacy, around which my office has designed its

engagement in the region. It is through this lens, also, that we intend to

contribute to national and regional efforts to curb insecurity in the Sahel.

******************

Turning now to Piracy - and Maritime Security - as it is often referred to.

A quick overview of the trends in maritime security, over the past three

years, show a sharp increase of criminal activities in particular in the Gulf

of Guinea – in contrast to the global reduction across international waters.

Kidnapping for ransom, oil bunkering and sabotage have increased in

2016, with most cases reported in Nigerian waters. Incidents showing illicit

trafficking in small arms, weapons, drugs, and persons, as well as piracy,

armed robbery, but also illegal fishing and industrial waste disposal,

continue to be observed in the Gulf of Guinea. In volume, the number of

kidnapping for ransom during 2016 in the Gulf of Guinea surpassed the

total number of local maritime incidents recorded in 2015 by the

International Maritime Bureau1.

Simultaneously, attacks against foreign oil companies, bunkering and oil

pipeline vandalism has had serious economic and security implications for

Nigeria and consequences for countries in the Gulf of Guinea, as most

criminal activities are perpetrated by the groups operating from the Niger

Delta Region. The response and decisions made by the Government in

1 Sources and data based on “Ocean beyond Piracy” reports.

Abuja are therefore key to managing the phenomenon. For example,

decisions to resume the payment of stipends to the members of these

groups early 2016 allowed for a temporary lull in predatory activities in

coastal areas. However, last year was also marked by a level of

sophistication in militant attacks against oil rigs in the Niger Delta region,

including through the use of explosives in strategic locations deep

underwater. The current approach of the Nigerian Government shows the

will to engage in dialogue with the militants, while also addressing issues

related to public investment in the concerned areas and the grievances of

local communities, which are among the root causes of the problem.

Meanwhile, in order to address the threats to security and support the blue

economy, regional organizations and the international community have

multiplied initiatives in recent years. ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of

Guinea Commission (GGC) met in Yaoundé on 25th June 2013 to develop

a comprehensive maritime security strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.

Subsequently, the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety

and Security in the Gulf of Guinea (ICC) was inaugurated in September

2014, to coordinate all activities with regards to the suppression of piracy

and other criminal activities in the Gulf of Guinea.

In 2014 also, the AU adopted its Strategic Plan of Action 2050 which

encourages sub-regional institutions and member states to take concerted

actions to improve maritime sector governance. An extraordinary summit

of the Assembly of African Union (AU) Heads of States and governments

was held in Lomé, Togo, on 15 October 2016. The summit reviewed and

adopted the AU Charter on maritime security, safety and development in

Africa, as recommended by the Executive Council of Ministers. In addition,

the AU Commission was requested to convene the relevant Specialised

Technical Committees (STCs), which were not involved in the elaboration

process of the Charter, to submit their contributions to the Charter in the

form of annexes for consideration in July 2017.

Some key recommendations were made at the summit last October, to

achieve safety, security and economic development for coastal states. This

is also for the benefit of land-locked nations, who rely on the coast for

transportation of goods and services. These recommendations include

international support to the regional maritime security architecture. It also

includes a specific focus on effective information-sharing, spanning from

national to subregional mechanisms. The meeting recommended effective

coordination with the private sector, civil society, coastal communities and

services involved in curbing crimes at sea and the development of the Blue

Economy. The role of national Navies and Coast Guards, the judiciary and

other national institutions involved in maritime activities remains essential.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that solutions to the two security

topics I have discussed today will require a similar engagement for effective

partnering, and regular exchanges to build mutual understanding. The

larger objectives, beyond providing immediate support to address both

phenomenon, should be sustainable economic development and prosperity

for the populations. This remains at the center of the vision for the region

developed by the African, Caribbean and Pacific States, the European

Union, and the United Nations.

I thank you for your attention and look forward to our discussions.*******************