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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2013
: PRESENT :
THE HON’BLE MR. D.H.WAGHELA, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
WRIT PETITION Nos. 16886-87 / 2013 (GM-DRT)
BETWEEN 1. SRI C LAXMAN GOWDA
S/O CHIKKABYRAPPA M.B., AGED BOUT 51 YEARS
2. SRI VASUDEVAGOWDA S/O CHIKKABYRAPPA M.B., AGED BOUT 49 YEARS. BOTH ARE R/AT NO.29, IST MAIN ROAD, S.R.NAGARA, BANGLORE-560 027.
... PETITIONER
( BY SRI S R HEGDE HUDLAMANE, ADVOCATE. ) A N D 1. DEBT RECOVERY APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
4TH FLOOR, BANK CIRCLE OFFICE, NO.55, ETHIRAJ SALAI, CHENNAI-600 008 REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR.
2. DEBT ROCOVERY TRIBUNAL BANGALORE, KIRSHIBHAVANA, HUDSON CIRCLE, BANGALORE-560 001, REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR.
(R-1 & R-2 DELETED VIDE COURT ORDER DATED 21.8.2013)
R
2
3. MANAGER CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA, GANDHINAGARA BRANCH, BANGALORE-560 009.
4. AUTHORIZED OFFICER CENTRAL BANK OF INIDA, BANGALORE REGIONAL OFFICE, NO.20, CRESENT ROAD, BANGALORE-560 001.
5. R S PADMA W/O K.SELVAM, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, R/A NO.499, NEAR VENKATESHWARA TEMPLE, KRISHNAPPA LAYOUT, 8TH BLOCK, KORAMANGALA, BANGALORE-560 095.
... RESPONDENTS
( BY SRI T S VENKATESH, ADVOCATE FOR R-3 & R-4. SRI JOSE SABASTIAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-5. )
WRIT PETITIONS FILED PRAYING TO QUASH IMPUGNED
ORDER PASSED BY R-1 DATED 1.4.2013 MADE IN AIR (SA)
NO. 813/2010 PASSED BY R-1 AT ANNEXURE-G, ILLEGALLY
CONFIRMING THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDER PASSED BY R-2
AT ANNEXURE-D MADE IN S.A. 540/2009 DATED 13.5.2010
BY ISSUE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY ORDER
APPROPRIATE WRIT AND DIRECT R-1 TO ALLOW THE
APPLICATION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE R-2
TRIBUNAL.
THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA, J, MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
3
O R D E R
The order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal at
Chennai (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Appellate Tribunal)
dated 1.4.2013 passed on I.A.No. 1400/2010, which is an
application filed for condonation of delay of 65 days in filing
the appeal, is assailed in these Writ Petitions. By the said
order, the Appellate Tribunal has dismissed the application
for condonation of delay on the premise that Section 18 of
the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI
Act’ for short) does not provide for condonation of delay.
Accordingly, the appeal filed by the petitioners also stands
dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that, the respondent Bank
had issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI
Act against the petitioners. The said action of the Bank
was assailed by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Bangalore, in S.A.No. 540/2009. The appeal was
dismissed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal by order dated
13.5.2010. Being aggrieved by the said order, Writ Petition
4
No. 18947/2010 was filed by the petitioners before this
court. That Writ Petition was also dismissed on the ground
that there was an alternative remedy available by way of a
statutory appeal under the SARFAESI Act. Thereafter, the
petitioners filed AIR (SA) No. 813/2010 under Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act before the Appellate Tribunal at Chennai
along with an application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay in filing
the appeal. The said application has been rejected placing
reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court dated
28.8.2012 in W.P.No. 13456/2012 and connected matters
holding that Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act does not
permit condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Being
aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have preferred
these Writ Appeals.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners
and the learned counsel for the respondent Bank and
perused the material on record.
5
4. While drawing our attention to the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act, learned counsel for the petitioners placed
reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
the case of Smt. Sajida Begum Vs. State Bank of India (Writ
Petition No. 22317/2012 disposed of on 4.9.2012) to
contend that, under the SARFAESI Act, if an appeal is filed
belatedly, the same could be condoned under the
provisions of Limitation Act despite there being no express
provision under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent Bank
placed reliance on two decisions to counter the arguments
of the petitioners’ counsel to contend that, in the absence of
an express provision under Section 18 of the SARFAESI
Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply
and, therefore, delay in preferring the appeal before the
Appellate Tribunal cannot be condoned. He placed
reliance on the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in the case of M/s Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India, reported in AIR 2011
Madhya Pradesh 205, and a decision of the Madras High
6
Court in the case of Dr.Zubida Begum Vs. Indian Bank in
W.P.No.15386/2012 and connected matters, disposed of on
28.8.2012, which has been relied upon by the Appellate
Tribunal.
6. Faced with the contradictory judgments of different
High Courts, we have considered the controversy in the
light of the aforesaid judgments and also the provisions of
the SARFAESI Act as well as the Recovery of Debts due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Debts Recovery Act’ for short) and also
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963.
7. Section 17(1) and Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act
read as follows:
“17. Right to appeal.-
(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved
by any of the measures referred to in sub-
section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured
creditor or his authorised officer under this
Chapter, may make an application along with
such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts
Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the
7
matter within forty-five days from the date on
which such measure had been taken:
Provided that different fees may be
prescribed for making the application by the
borrower and the person other than the
borrower.
Explanation.- For the removal of doubts,
it is hereby declared that the communication of
the reasons to the borrower by the secured
creditor for not having accepted his
representation or objection or the likely action
of the secured creditor at the stage of
communication of reasons to the borrower shall
not entitle the person (including borrower) to
make an application to the Debts Recovery
Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act,
the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as
may be, dispose of the application in
accordance with the provisions of the Recovery
of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the
rules made thereunder.”
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows:
8
“18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.-
(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made
by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section
17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee,
as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal
within thirty days from the date of receipt of the
order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.
Provided that different fees may be
prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower
or by the person other than the borrower.
Provided further that no appeal shall be
entertained unless the borrower has deposited
with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the
amount of debt due from him, as claimed by
the secured creditors or determined by the
Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less :
Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal
may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing,
reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five
per cent of debt referred to in the second
proviso.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act,
the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be,
dispose of the appeal in accordance with the
provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to
9
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51
of 1993) and rules made thereunder.”
Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act read as
follows:
“35. The provisions of this Act to override other
laws.- The provisions of this Act shall have
effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the
time being in force or any instrument having
effect by virtue of any such law.
36. Limitation.- No secured creditor shall be
entitled to take all or any of the measures
under sub-section (4) of section 13, unless his
claim in respect of the financial asset is made
within the period of limitation prescribed under
the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).
37. Application of other laws not barred.-
The provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in
derogation of, the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
1956), the Securities Contracts (Regulation)
Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Securities and
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of
1992), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
10
Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or
any other law for the time being in force.”
8. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act states that, any
person, including a borrower being aggrieved by any of the
measures taken under Section 13 by the secured creditor,
can prefer an appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal
having jurisdiction in the matter, within 45 days from the
date on which such measures had been taken. If a person
is aggrieved by an order passed by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, an appeal is provided under Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act before the Appellate Tribunal.
9. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 states that, any person
aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, under Section 17 may prefer an appeal to an
Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of
receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. The
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 18 deals with the
payment of prescribed fee and also with regard to the
deposit to be made at the time of preferring of the appeal.
Sub-section (2) of Section 18 states that, save as otherwise
11
provided in the Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as
may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the
provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the rules made
thereunder. On a reading of sub-section (2), what emerges
is, if there is any express provision made under the
SARFAESI Act, the same would be applicable. If there is
no express provision on any aspect of the matter, then, the
Appellate Tribunal could dispose of the appeal having
regard to the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act and the
rules made thereunder. In other words, reliance placed on
the Debts Recovery Act and its rules would be insofar as it
can be applicable to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act
and are not inconsistent with the latter Act. Therefore, on
a reading of sub-section (2) of Section 18, it becomes clear
that, while dealing with an appeal filed under the
SARFAESI Act, the Appellate Tribunal has to keep in mind
the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act and the rules
made thereunder.
12
10. Section 35 states that the provisions of the Act shall
have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent
contained in any other law for the time being in force or
any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.
The said section gives an overriding effect to SARFAESI Act
on account of the non-abstante clause. But, Section 36, in
fact, expressly refers to the provisions of the Limitation Act
as it states that, no secured creditor is entitled to take all
or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13,
unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made
within the period of limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 37 states that the provisions
of SARFAESI Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be in
addition to, and not in derogation of the Companies Act,
1956, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, the
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 or any other law for the time being in force.
11. As far as the matter in hand is concerned, it has to be
seen as to whether an appeal could be preferred beyond the
13
prescribed period of limitation, which is 30 days, which is
prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 18. It is noticed
that there is no express provision under Section 18 to
condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond the prescribed
period of limitation. But, even in the absence of any
express provision for condonation of delay in SARFAESI
Act, we are of the view that the provisions of the Debts
Recovery Act could be made applicable having regard to
sub-section (2) of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act and there
being no express bar for condonation of delay in filing the
appeal before the appellate Tribunal. On the other hand,
there is an express reference to the applicability of
Limitation Act, 1963 in Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act
and also the applicability of other laws, which would
include even the Limitation Act, 1963, in Section 37 of that
Act. In this context, Sections 20 and 24 of Debts Recovery
Act are relevant and they read as follows:
“20. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.-
(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any
person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed
14
to have been made, by a Tribunal under this
Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate
Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.
(2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal
from an order made by a Tribunal with the
consent of the parties.
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be
filed within a period of forty-five days from the
date on which a copy of the order made, or
deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is
received by him and it shall be in such form
and be accompanied by such fee as may be
prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may
entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said
period of forty five days if it is satisfied that
there was sufficient cause for not filing it,
within that period.
(4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section
(1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the
parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being
heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit,
confirming, modifying or setting aside the order
appealed against.
15
(5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of
every order made by it to the parties to the
appeal and to the concerned Tribunal.
(6) The appeal filed before the Appellate
Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt
with by it as expeditiously as possible and
endeavor shall be made by it to dispose of the
appeal finally within six months from the date
of receipt of the appeal.
21 to 23. xxx xxx xxx
24. Limitation. – The provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far
as may be, apply to an application made to the
Tribunal.”
Section 29 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:
“29. Savings. –
(1) Nothing in this Act, shall affect section
25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(2) Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
section 3 shall apply as if such period were the
period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
16
purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
any special or local law, the provisions
contained in section 5 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far, as and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any law
for the time being in force with respect to
marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall
apply to any suit or other proceeding under any
such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition
of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to
cases arising in the territories to which the
Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may
for the time being extend.”
Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Debts Recovery
Act states that, if a person is aggrieved by an order passed
by a Debts Recovery Tribunal under the provisions of the
Debts Recovery Act, an appeal could be filed before the
Appellate Tribunal within a period of forty five days from
the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to
have been made. The proviso to Sub-section (3) states that
17
if an appeal is filed beyond the period of forty five days, it
can be entertained if the Appellate Tribunal is satisfied that
there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the said
period. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of sub-section (2)
of Section 18 of SARFAESI Act and sub-section (3) of
Section 20 of Debts Recovery Act, it becomes clear that, as
far as the prescription of the period of limitation for filing of
the appeal, sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI
Act would have to be read inasmuch as an express period
of limitation is prescribed i.e., thirty days, for preferring an
appeal. But, the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of
the Debts Recovery Act, which provides for condonation of
delay by the Appellate Tribunal on being satisfied that there
is sufficient cause, would have to be read into Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act having regard to sub-section (2) of
Section 18 of SARFAESI Act.
12. As stated above, the provisions of the Limitation Act
are also applicable to the proceedings before the Appellate
Tribunal in terms of Section 24 of the Debts Recovery Act
which can also be read into SARFAESI Act. Thus, the
18
provisions of the Debts Recovery Act being incorporated
into Section 18 of SARFAESI Act and there being no bar to
condone delay in filing an appeal before the Appellate
Tribunal, the provisions of Limitation Act as are applicable
to an appeal filed before an Appellate Tribunal under Debts
Recovery Act are applicable under SARFAESI Act also. In
Agrawal Trading Corporation Vs. Assistant Collector,
Customs (1972)3 SCC 553, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed that it is a well accepted legislative practice to
incorporate by reference, if the legislature so chooses, the
provisions of some other Act insofar as they are relevant for
the purposes of and in furtherance of the scheme and
objects of that Act. In that view of the matter, we think
that the Appellate Tribunal was not right in dismissing the
application filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of
delay in filing the appeal. The judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court would be squarely applicable, wherein
a similar view has been taken. With respect, we are of the
opinion that the judgments of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court as well as the Madras High Court taking a contrary
19
view would not be applicable particularly having regard to
the analysis of the provisions, which we have made in this
matter.
13. In AIR 2011 MP 205, the Madhya Pradesh High Court
has considered the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the
Debts Recovery Act. While comparing the two provisions,
the court has noticed that sub-section (7) of Section 17 of
SARFAESI Act states that the Tribunal shall, as far as may
be, dispose of the application in accordance with the
provisions of the Debts Recovery Act and the rules made
thereunder. However, it has lost sight of sub-section (2) of
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, which also states that,
save as otherwise provided in the Act, the Appellate
Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in
accordance with the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act,
1993 and the rules made thereunder. Without noticing
sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, the
court has stated that the Legislature has consciously
intended not to confer power of condonation of delay on the
Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.
20
We are of the view that, had the court understood the
import of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI
Act, then, the decision of the court would have been
otherwise.
14. The judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is
adverted to by the Madras High Court in the case of Zubida
Begum Vs. Indian Bank and the Madras High Court is in
agreement with the views expressed by the Division Bench
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Further, the Madras
High Court has referred to sub-section (2) of Section 18 and
has opined as follows:
“40. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 is very
specific that it is only for the purpose of disposal
of the appeals under SARFAESI Act, the
provisions of RDDBFI Act are made applicable.
The question of disposal of the appeal would
arise only after entertaining the appeal. We
have not reached that stage now. We are now
considering the question as to whether a belated
appeal could be entertained by the Appellate
Tribunal. In case there is no power to condone
the delay, there is no question of entertaining
21
the appeal. The question of disposal of the
appeal in accordance with the provisions of the
RDDBFI Act would arise only in case the appeal
is entertained. The fact that the Appellate
Tribunal is obliged to decide the appeal in
accordance with the provisions of the RDDBFI
Act, does not go to show that even for
entertaining the appeal the provisions of
RDDBFI Act are made applicable.”
From the above, what emanates is that the Madras High
Court has opined that an appeal is not entertained until
the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. In other words,
only when the delay is condoned, can an appeal be said to
be entertained is the view of the Madras High Court. If an
appeal is entertained, then it would have to be disposed of
in terms of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 18
which also refers to the provisions of the Debts Recovery
Act. With respect, we are not in agreement with the
aforesaid reasoning. In our view, entertaining of an appeal
would commence from the time the appeal is listed before
the Tribunal for its judicial consideration either on a
preliminary issue or on merits. An appeal would be listed
22
before the Tribunal if the conditions for filing an appeal are
complied with. If the Memorandum of Appeal filed by an
aggrieved person is in order, then, the appeal is listed
before the Tribunal for judicial consideration with or
without interlocutory applications. One of the interlocutory
applications that may be filed along with an appeal is an
application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
Such an application would have to receive a judicial
consideration by the Appellate Tribunal. While considering
such an application, the Appellate Tribunal would, in
substance, be considering as to whether the appeal should
be entertained or not. In other words, if the application for
condonation of delay is dismissed, automatically, the
appeal would also stand dismissed. On the other hand, if
the application for condonation of delay is allowed, the
appeal would then be considered on merits. Therefore,
“entertaining of an appeal” by the Tribunal would mean
when the appeal is listed before the Tribunal along with or
without an interlocutory application such as an application
for condonation of delay i.e., for its judicial consideration.
23
In M/s Lakshminaratan Engineering Works Ltd. Vs.
Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur
(AIR 1968 SC 488), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated
that the word “entertain” means the first occasion at which
the court takes up the matter for consideration. Without
taking note of this aspect, the Madras High Court has held
that sub-section (2) of Section 18 would not be applicable
at the stage of considering an application for condonation
of delay in filing the appeal. The court has thereafter also
held that the Appellate Tribunal is not a court and,
therefore, there cannot be an automatic extension of the
provisions of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section
18 of the Act, as there is no express provision in the
SARFAESI Act indicating the applicability of the provisions
of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the Madras High Court
has also held that the Appellate Tribunal has no power to
condone the delay in preferring a statutory appeal under
Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. We do not also agree
with the aforesaid reasoning.
24
16. In both the aforesaid judgments, sub-section (2) of
Section 18 has not been considered in its proper
perspective. In fact, in sub-section (7) of Section 17 of the
Act also the provisions of the Debts Recovery Act, 1993 and
the rules made thereunder have been made applicable to a
proceeding under Section 17 of the Act before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal.
16. In the case of Smt. Sajida Begum Vs. State Bank of
India, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
has held that there is no express exclusion of the
Limitation Act under the SARFAESI Act and, so far as
Debts Recovery Act is concerned, under which the DRT and
DRAT function and entertain original and appellate
proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, clearly exercise
powers of a civil court under CPC and in addition, the
Limitation Act is expressly made applicable under Section
24 of the DRT Act. Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 29
of the Limitation Act is attracted and thereby, Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the
proceedings under Sections 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act
25
before the DRT as well as DRAT. Thus, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court has held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are applicable under the special law i.e.,
SARFAESI Act. The court has not agreed with the decision
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The court has also
referred to a decision of the Mumbai High Court in the case
of Uco Bank Vs. M/s Kanji Manji Kothari & Co., Mumbai
[2008(4) MHLJ 424 = Laws (Bom) 2008(2) 173], wherein the
Mumbai High Court has held that Section 5 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to an appeal or
application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. To
the same effect is the decision of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in the case of Surinder Mahajan Vs. Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal (C.W.P. No. 22567/2011,
disposed of on 5.4.2013).
17. In the result, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the
impugned order is quashed. The delay in filing the appeal
before the Appellate Tribunal is condoned by consent of the
parties and the appeal is restored on the file of the
26
Appellate Tribunal, to be disposed of in accordance with
law. No costs.
Sd/-
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/- JUDGE
ckc/-