thayer terrorist leadership in southeast asia

8/14/2019 Thayer Terrorist Leadership in Southeast Asia

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LeadershipDynamicsinTerroristOrganizationsinSoutheastAsiaCarlyle A. Thayer*

[Paper to the conference on The Dynamics and Structure of Terrorist Threats in South East Asia,sponsored by The Institute for Defense Analysis in cooperation with the South East Asia RegionalCenter for Counter-Terrorism and the U.S. Pacific Command Joint Interagency CoordinationGroup for Counterterrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 18-20, 2005]

Introduction:MethodologicalProblemsOne key methodological problem associated with the study of terrorist

organizations and their leaders is the lack of an agreed definition of what

constitutesterrorism.1Theinternationalcommunity,firstthroughtheLeagueof

NationsandthenthroughtheUnitedNations(U.N.)hasfailedinitsattemptsto

adopt a convention defining precisely what is meant by terrorism. Other

internationalorganizations

have

fared

no

better.

The

Organization

of

Islamic

Conference (OIC) also hasbeen unable to reach agreement on a definition of

terrorism.AttheOICextraordinarysessionheldinKualaLumpurinApril2002,

Malaysias Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that any deliberate attack on

civilians(includingthosebyPalestiniansuicidebombers)shouldbeclassifiedas

acts of terror.Delegates disagreed. In the finalOICDeclaration on Terrorism

theystatedinteralia:

WerejectanyattempttolinkIslamandMuslimstoterrorismasterrorismhasno

associationwithanyreligion,civilizationornationality;

Weunequivocally

condemn

acts

of

international

terrorism

in

all

its

forms

and

manifestations, including state terrorism, irrespective ofmotives, perpetrators

andvictimsasterrorismposesaseriousthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity

andisagraveviolationofhumanrights;

Wereiterate theprincipledpositionunder international lawand theCharterof

theUnitedNationsofthelegitimacyofresistancetoforeignaggressionandthe

struggleofpeoplesunder colonialoraliendominationand foreignoccupation

for national liberation and selfdetermination. In this context,we underline the

*C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, School of AdvancedInternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, currently on leave as Professor Politics andDirector of the UNSW Defence Studies Forum, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

1See the discussion in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press1998, 13-44.


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urgencyforan internationallyagreeddefinitionof terrorism,whichdifferentiates such

legitimatestrugglesfromactsofterrorism[emphasisadded].2

TheOIC threw thishotpotatoback into the lapof theUnitedNations.This

year, theSecretaryGeneral,KofiAnan,proposed that theU.N. adopt an anti

terrorism

convention

that

would

define

terrorism

as

any

act

that

is

intended

to

causedeathorseriousbodilyharmtociviliansornoncombatantstointimidatea

community,governmentorinternationalorganization. 3

Surprisingly, the United States government, the leader in the globalwar on

terrorism, has not adopted a single comprehensive definition of terrorism.

Terrorism is defined in theU.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 4but the State

Department,5DefenseDepartment 6andFederalBureauofInvestigation7allhave

their own separate definitions. President GeorgeW. Bush added yet another

definitionwhenhe issuedExecutiveOrder 13224 (September 23, 2001) in the

wake of 911.8One scholar has determined that various agencies of theU.S.

Governmentemploynineteenseparatedefinitionsofterrorism.9

UnderthetermsofExecutiveOrder13224,theSecretaryofState,inconsultation

withtheSecretaryoftheTreasuryandtheAttorneyGeneral,hasbeengiventhe

2Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, adopted at the Extraordinary Sessionof the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on Terrorism, April 1-3, 2002. http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_extraordinary/ declaration.htm.

3Colum Lynch, Annan Drafts Changes for U.N., The Washington Post, March 20, 2005, A20.

4US Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as: the unlawful use of force and violenceagainst persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or anysegment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).

5US Department of State defines terrorism as: premeditated, politically motivated violenceperpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usuallyintended to influence an audience.

6US Department of Defense defines terrorism as: The calculated use of violence or the threat ofviolence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in thepursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

7The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses the definition of terrorism contained in the U.S. Code

of Federal Regulations cited in note four above.8According to the Executive Order on Financing Terrorism (September 24, 2001), terrorism (i)involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and (ii)appears to be intended (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence thepolicy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a governmentby mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.

9Nicholas Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of TooMany Grails,Journal of Legislation [Notre Dame School of Law], 30, Spring 2004, 249-274.
http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_http://www.oic-oci.org/english/fm/11_


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authoritytodesignateforeignindividualsorentitiesthatthreatenthesecurity

of theUnitedStatesasForeignTerroristOrganizations (FTO).TheUSAPatriot

Actof2001authorizedtheSecretaryofStatetodesignateterroristorganizations

forimmigrationpurposes.ThisauthorityisknownastheTerroristExclusionList

(TEL).

IntheaftermathofSeptember11th,theU.N.adoptedResolution1267thatmade

provision for theUnitedNationsMonitoringGroup tomaintainaconsolidated

listofentitiesand individuals thatwerepartoforassociatedwith theTaliban

and al Qaeda.10 The United Nations has designated only three terrorist

organizations currently operating in Southeast Asia: al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf

Group(ASG)andJemaahIslamiyah(JI).AllmembersoftheU.N.areobligated

tocomplywith this resolutionbut implementationhasbeen spotty. Indonesia,

for example, has not outlawed JI. In 2004, Indonesias new president, Sisilo

Bambang Yudhoyono, indicated his willingness to submit legislation to

ParliamentbanningJIbutonlyifproofisprovidedthattheorganizationexists.

The U.N. list is not a comprehensive database of terrorists or terrorist

organizationsfoundacrosstheglobe.11

Therearedifferencesbetween theU.N.and theU.S. listspertaining to terrorist

groups active in Southeast Asia. The United States includes al Qaeda, Abu

SayyafGroupandJemaahIslamiyahonitslistofForeignTerroristOrganizations

(December 30, 2004) aswell as theCommunist Party of the Philippines/New

PeoplesArmy.TheU.S.TerroristExclusionList (December30,2004)adds the

AlexBoncayaoBrigade,NewPeoplesArmy,andThePentagonGang.

The scholarly community is equally divided on this question.Onewriter has

identified 109 different definitions used in the academic literature.12 Scholars

specializingonSoutheastAsiahavebeenfreetopickandchoosewhichIslamic

militant groups to include in their analysis.13 In most cases little or no

10The U.N. resolution is binding on all members. The current list contains the names of 272persons associated with al Qaeda and the Taliban. Second Report of the Monitoring Group, pursuantto resolution 1363 (2001) and as extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003) on Sanctions

against al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates and associated entities, 2003.11In 2003, a U.N. monitoring committee found that 108 states failed in their responsibility toreport the names of suspected terrorists to the U.N. Betsy Pisik, 108 Nations Decline to PursueTerrorists, The Washington Times, December 2, 2003.

12Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts,Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005.

1313Defining what constitutes a militant Islamic group is problematic as well. The securityliterature that discusses terrorism and Islam in Southeast Asia employs a number of descriptors


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justification is given for their inclusion of a particular group as a terrorist

organization.ItoftenappearsthatifamilitantIslamicgroupengagesinpolitical

violence and has linkages to alQaeda it isuncritically classified as part of al

Qaedas international network. For purposes of analysis this paper defines a

terrorist organization and its leadership as those individuals and groups that

have been proscribed by the international community through the United

NationsandarecurrentlyactiveinSoutheastAsia.

Two of the three groups proscribed by the U.N. al Qaeda and JI also

constitutecorecomponentsofwhatMarcSageman14hastermedtheglobalSalafi

jihad.15 This term specifically excludes nonMuslim terrorists and Muslim

terroristsinvolvedindomesticinsurgencyandurbanwarfareagainsttheirown

governments. 16AccordingtoSageman:

The global Salafijihad is aworldwide religious revivalistmovementwith the goal of

reestablishingpastMuslimgloryinagreatIslamiststatestretchingfromMoroccotothe

Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries. It preaches salafiyyah the

restorationofauthenticIslam,andadvocatesastrategyofviolentjihad,resulting inan

explosion of terror towipe outwhat it regards as local political heresy. The global

versionof thismovementadvocates thedefeatof theWesternpowers thatprevent the

establishmentofatrueIslamiststate.

AlQaedaisthevanguardofthismovement,whichincludesmanyotherterroristgroups

that collaborate in their operations and share a large supportbase Salafi ideology

determines itsmission, sets itsgoals, and guide its tactics.What sets the globalSalafi

jihad apart from other terrorist campaigns is its violence against foreign nonMuslim

governmentsandtheirpopulationsinfurtheranceofSalafiobjectives.17

Finally,according

to

Sageman,

the

global

Salafi

jihad

is

anew

development

in

thehistoryofterrorismbecauseitcombinesfanaticism(excessiveenthusiasmin

religiousbelief)with terrorism against the far enemy (foreign governments

such as fundamentalist, deviationist, radical, militant, Islamist and extremist. Often these termsare undefined and used interchangeably. Militancy is often equated with terrorism. Quite oftentoo, analysts fail to distinguish between Islamic fundamentalism, extremist religious views andpolitical terrorism. For a discussion see: Carlyle A. Thayer, Radical Islam and Political Terrorismin Southeast Asia, in Derek da Cunha, ed., Globalisation and its Counter Forces, Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, forthcoming 2005.

14Sageman is a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer who served in Islamabad from 1987 to 1989where he worked closely with the Afghan mujahiden. He is also a forensic psychiatrist.

15Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta andBrussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003, 1.

16Sageman excludes the ASG on the grounds that it has lapsed into criminality and has lost thesupport of al Qaeda; Understanding Terror Networks, 64.

17Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 1.


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andtheirpopulations)inpursuitoftheSalafiobjectiveofestablishinganIslamist

state.18SagemansuseofthetermSalafimaybeviewedasanunfortunatecaseof

inappropriate branding. The International Crisis Group, in a report on this

subject, concluded that most Indonesian salafis find the terrorist bombing

activitiesofJIasanathema.Further,salafismasabeliefsystemmaybemoreof

abarriertotheexpansionofjihadistactivitiesthanafacilitator.19Finally,salafi

jihadism represents a radical fringe and is not representative of the Salafi

movementmorebroadly.Accordingtoarecentstudy:

In Indonesia, most strict salafists appear to regard the terrorist movement Jemaah

Islamiyah(JI)withsuspicionandcontempt.Theyobjecttoitsclandestinenatureandits

practiceofmembersswearingoathstotheJIamir.Forpuristsalafists,allegianceshould

onlybegiventotheamirulMuslimeen(amiralMuslimeen),orcommanderofthefaithful

(i.e., leaderof theglobal Islamiccommunity),not to theheadofa smallcovertgroup.

TheyalsorejectJIsinterpretationofjihad,whichsanctionsterroristattacksandtheuseof

martyrsuicidebombers.Mostsalafileadersregardterroristsasmuharibeen(thosewho

causeharm

on

earth)

and

believe

that

the

perpetrators

of

such

acts

should

be

punished

bydeath.They furtherbelieve thatdeathby suicide ina terrorismattack isa sin that

precludesmartyrdom.Finally,salafistgroupscondemnJIsdeterminationtobringdown

theMuslimgovernmentsofIndonesiaandotherSoutheastAsiancountries,believing

thatMuslimsareforbidden torebelagainsttheirrulers,even if theyare tyrannicaland

impious. 20

WhatIsAlQaeda?Ever since the events of 911, international terrorism experts and regional

securityanalystshaveanalyzedtheactivitiesofmilitantIslamicorganizationsin

Southeast

Asia

through

what

might

be

termed

an

al

Qaeda

centric

paradigm.21

TherearethreekeymethodologicalproblemsindiscussingtheroleofalQaeda

18Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 17.

19See: Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Dont Mix, Asia Report No. 83,Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 13, 2004.

20Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia,Lowy Institute Paper 05. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005, 78.

21

For a critical evaluation of three main approaches to the study of terrorism in Southeast Asia international, regional and country studies see: Carlyle A. Thayer, Political Terrorism andMilitant Islam in Southeast Asia, in Mohd. Shafie Apdal and Carlyle A. Thayer, Security, PoliticalTerrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, Trends in Southeast Asia Series 7, Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 11-30; Carlyle A. Thayer, Political Terrorism inSoutheast Asia, Pointer: Quarterly Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, October-December 2003,29(4), 53-62; and Carlyle A. Thayer, Al Qaeda and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia, in PaulSmith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and RegionalStability. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 79-97.


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inSoutheastAsiainthismanner.22ThefirstishowtobestcharacterizealQaeda

asanorganization.Thesecondproblemishowtoaccountforchangeovertime.

The third problem is how to assess the question of agency in al Qaedas

relationshipwithJIandothermilitantIslamicgroupsinSoutheastAsia.

Internationalterrorism

experts

and

regional

security

analysts

differ

in

their

characterization of alQaeda as an organization.ZacharyAbuzawrites that al

Qaeda is composed of a central leadership of around thirty individuals, an

internationalnetworkoftwentyfourconstituentgroups,eightyfrontcompanies

operating in fifty countries, and a membership ofbetween 5,000 and 12,000

organizedintocellsinsixtydifferentcountries.23Finally,AbuzaarguesthatAl

Qaeda was brilliant in its cooptation of other groups, those with a narrow

domesticagenda,andinbringingthemintoAlQaedasstructure.24

JaneCorbin and Peter Bergin,25 argue that alQaedawas run like abusiness

conglomerateor

multinational

corporation

under

the

directorship

of

Osama

bin

Laden. Bergin writes that al Qaeda was an analogue of the Saudi Binladen

Group,thelargeconstructioncompanyfoundedbyOsamabinLadensfather:

[Osama] Bin Laden organized alQaeda in abusinesslikemannerhe formulates the

general policies of alQaeda in consultationwith his shura council. The shuramakes

executive decisions for the group. Subordinate to that council are other committees

responsibleformilitaryaffairsandthebusinessinterestsofthegroup,aswellasafatwa

committee,whichissuesrulingsonIslamiclaw,andamediagroup.26

RohanGunaratnascharacterizationofalQaedasorganizationislesspreciseand

moreequivocal.Ontheonehand,heportraysalQaedainmuchthesameterms

asCorbin

and

Bergin.

He

notes

that

in1998alQaedawasreorganizedintofourdistinctbutinterrelatedentities.Thefirstwas

apyramidalstructuretofacilitatestrategicandtacticaldirection;thesecondwasaglobal

22This section is drawn from Carlyle A. Thayer, New Terrorism in Southeast Asia, in DamienKingsbury, ed., Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, forthcoming2005.

23Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaedas Southeast Asian Network, ContemporarySoutheast Asia, December 2002, 24(3), 429-430. This is repeated in Zachary Abuza, Al-QaedaComes to Southeast Asia, in Paul J. Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia:Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, 40.

24Abuza, Tentacles of Terror, 431; and Abuza, Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia, 40.

25Jane Corbin, The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror, New York: Pocket Books,2002, 33 and Peter Bergin, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, New York:Touchstone Book, 2001, 31. They both rely on the testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese defector.

26Bergin, Holy War, Inc., 31.


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terroristnetwork;thethirdwasabaseforceforguerrillawarfareinsideAfghanistan;and

thefourthwasaloosecoalitionoftransnationalterroristandguerrillagroups.27

The first entity, the hierarchical leadership structure, consisted of an Emir

General, a consultative council (shura majlis), four operational committees

(military,

finance

and

business,

fatwa

and

Islamic

study;

and

media

and

publicity), and dispersed regional nodes. Gunaratna further notes thatbin

Ladendirectedthecoreinnergroupandthattheoperationalcommitteesensured

the smooth daytoday running of the organization. An emir and a deputy

headedeach committee.Themilitary committee, for example,was responsible

for recruiting, training, procuring, transporting and launching terrorist

operations.28AlQaedaalsoranitsowninternalsecurityserviceandanextensive

financialandbusinessempire.29

Ontheotherhand,GunaratnaassertsthatalQaedaisneitherasinglegroupnor

acoalitionofgroups: itcomprisedacorebaseorbases inAfghanistan,satellite

terroristcellsworldwide,aconglomerateofIslamistpoliticalparties,andother

largely independent terroristgroups that itdrawson foroffensiveactionsand

other responsibilities.30 This amorphous portrayal of al Qaeda permits

GunaratnatoincludevirtuallyallIslamicterroristgroupsandmilitantMuslims

intohisdefinitionofwhatconstitutesalQaeda.Thisisthemainmethodological

weaknessofthealQaedacentricparadigm.

Jason Burke presents a powerful critique of the al Qaedacentric paradigm

adopted by Bergin, Colvin, Gunaratna and other international terrorism

experts.31Burkedismisses thenotion thatalQaedawasacoherentand tight

knit organization, with tentacles everywhere, with a defined ideology and

personnel, thathademergedasearlyas the late1980s.32Burkeargues that to

accept such aview is tomisunderstand not only its truenaturebut also the

natureof Islamic radicalism thenandnow.The contingent,dynamicand local

27Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2002, 57.

28Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 58

29Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 60-69.

30Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 54.

31Jason Burke,Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, London: I. B. Tarus, 2003.

32Burke,Al-Qaeda, 12.


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elementsofwhatisabroadandilldefinedmovementrootedinhistoricaltrends

ofgreatcomplexityarelost.33

According toBurke,alQaeda,as it ispopularlyconceived,consistedof three

elements.Thistripartitedivisionisessentialtounderstandingthenatureofboth

theal

Qaeda

phenomenon

and

of

modern

Islamic

militancy.34

The

first

of

these

elements composed the alQaedahardcore,numberingaroundonehundred

activepreeminentmilitants, includingadozenclose longtermassociatesof

OsamabinLaden,manyofwhomhadswornanoathofloyaltytohim.Theinner

corewascomprisedofveteransoftheAfghanwarorveteransoftheconflictsin

BosniaorChechnya.Theyactedas trainers andadministrators inAfghanistan

andonoccasionweresentoverseastorecruit,actasemissariesor,morerarely,to

conductspecific terroristoperations.But,Burkecautions,it isamistake tosee

eventhishardcoreasmonolithicinanyway.35The9/11Reportconcluded:

The

inner

core

of

al

Qaeda

continued

to

be

a

hierarchical

top

down

group

with

defined

positions, tasks,andsalaries.Mostbutnotall in thiscoreswore fealty (orbayat) toBin

Ladin.Otheroperativeswere committed toBinLadenor tohisgoalsandwould take

assignmentsforhim,buttheydidnotswearbayatandmaintained,ortriedtomaintain,

someautonomy.AloosercircleofadherentsmightgivemoneytoalQaedaortrainitits

campsbutremainedessentiallyindependent.36

The second element comprises the scores of other militant Islamic groups

operatingaroundtheworld.But,injectinganothernoteofcaution,Burkeargues

a careful examination of the situation shows that the idea that there is an

international network of active groups answering tobinLaden iswrong.To

labelgroups

included

in

this

second

element

as

al

Qaeda

is

to

denigrate

the

particular local factors that led to theiremergence.37Burke explainswhy this

secondelementshouldnotbeincludedasconstitutingpartofalQaeda:


34Burke,Al-Qaeda, 13. The quotations in this paragraph are taken from pages 13-16.


36The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the UnitedStates, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, 67.

37Burke,Al-Qaeda, 14. In October 2004 Abu Musab Zarqawi pledged his networks allegiance tobin Landen and al Qaeda. U.S. Intelligence analysts who have studied the flow ofcommunications between bin Laden and Zarqawi have concluded both are still independentoperators rather than activists who have fully combined their efforts. See: Walter Pincus,Analysts See Bin Laden, Zarqaqi as Independent Operators, The Washington Post, March 5,2005, p. A15.


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But, though theymay seebin Laden as a heroic figure, symbolic of their collective

struggle, individuals andgroupshave their own leaders and their own agenda, often

onesthataredeeplyparochialandwhichtheywillnotsubordinatetothoseofbinLaden

orhiscloseassociates.UntilveryrecentlymanyweredeeplyantipathetictobinLaden.

AsmanyremainrivalsofbinLadenashavebecomeallies.38

Thecases

of

Indonesias

Laskar

Jihad

and

Free

Aceh

Movement

are

instructive.

Both received and held discussions with al Qaeda representatives and both

rejectedoffersofsupportinordertoretaintheiroperationalautonomy.Yetsome

regionalsecurityanalystsinvariablycharacterizeLaskarJihadasalQaedalinked

if not an alQaedaaffiliate.The FreeAcehMovement isheld suspectbecause

severalofitsmembersreportedlyhavereceivedtrainingatalQaedaaffiliated

camps in the southern Philippines runby theMoro Islamic Liberation Front

(MILF).39

Burkes third elements comprising alQaeda consists of those individualswho

subscribeto

the

idea,

worldview,

ideology

of

al

Qaeda

in

other

words,

the

vast, amorphous movement of modern radical Islam, with its myriad cells,

domesticgroups, groupusculesand splinters40 Burke rejects thealQaeda

centricparadigmthatcharacterizesalQaedaasanorganizationincorporatingall

threeelements into itsorganizational structure. Inhisview, it is thehard core

alonethatcomprisesalQaeda.41AndasReevenotes,formanyyearsalQaeda

waslittlemorethananumbrellaorganizationforvariousbinLadenprojects.42

Thesecondmethodologicalproblem indiscussingalQaedas role inSoutheast

Asiaishowtoaccountforchangeovertime.Internationalandregionalterrorism

expertsadopt

an

approach

that

can

be

characterized

as

back

to

the

future.

In

otherwords,theiranalysisofalQaedasoperationsinSoutheastAsiainthelate

1980s and 1990s begins with the events of September 11, 2001 and works

backwards in an ahistorical manner. Al Qaeda is portrayed as a purposive

organization,endowedwithvirtuallyunlimitedresources,fromtheverystart.It

isasifOsamabinLadensannouncementoftheformationoftheWorldIslamic

FrontdeclaringjihadagainstJewsandCrusaderswhereever theyarefound,

38Burke,Al-Qaeda, 14.39Dana R. Dillon, Southeast Asia and the Brotherhood of Terrorism, Heritage Lectures, No. 860.Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, December 20, 2004, 3-4.

40Burke,Al-Qaeda, 16 and 207.


42Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism, Boston:Northeastern University Press, 1999, 170.


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wasmadein1988not1998.JasonBurkearguesthatalQaedaasanorganization

waslimitedintimeandspace:

Something that canbe labeled alQaedadid existbetween 1996 and 2001. Itwas

composed of a small number of experienced militants who were able to access

resourcesofascaleandwithaneasethatwashithertounknowninIslamicmilitancy,

largelyby

virtue

of

their

position

in

Afghanistan

and

the

sympathy

of

so

many

wealthy,andnotsowealthy,MuslimsacrosstheIslamicworld,thoughparticularly

intheGulf.43

Burkesviewisechoedbythe9/11Commission,whichconcluded:

In now analyzing the terrorist programs carried outbymembers of this network, it

wouldbemisleading to apply the label alQaedaoperations toooften in these early

years [199296]. Yet it would be misleading to ignore the significance of these

connections.Andinthisnetwork,BinLadensagendastoodout.44

Inotherwords,itwasonlyafterbinLadenreturnedtoAfghanistaninMay1996

thatal

Qaeda

emerged

as

an

international

jihadist

terrorist

organization

in

its

ownright.InAugust1996,alQaedashifteditsfocusfromthenearenemyand

defensivejihadtoWarAgainsttheAmericansOccupyingtheLandoftheTwo

HolyPlaces (Expel the Infidels from theArabPeninsula).According toBurke,

onceensconcedinAfghanistan,[t]heyevenhadacountrytheycouldvirtually

call theirown.Therewere thusable tooffereverythingastatecouldoffer toa

militant groupbyway of support.45 In Gunaratnas assessment, Al Qaeda

becamethefirstterroristgrouptocontrolastate.46AlQaedaplayedtheroleof

the stateby projecting its power and influence globallyby using the huge

financial resourcesandhuman capitalavailable. In sum,alQaeda facilitateda

global terrorist network through funding, services and facilities but did not

controlordirectlocalagents.47

It is important to note that militants from Southeast Asia firstjourneyed to

Pakistanin1980oratleasteightyearsbeforealQaedawasfoundedandeighteen


44The Foundation of the New Terrorism, The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the NationalCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 59.


46Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 62.

47Burke suggests that three models characterize al Qaedas organizational structure: a wealthyresearch university, a venture capitalist firm and a publishing house. In each of these three casesindividuals, small companies and free lancers approach the institution to seek support andfacilities for their ideas and proposals. Some are accepted and funded, others are not. Burke,Al-Qaeda, 208-209.


11/25

yearsbeforebinLadenlaunchedhisglobaljihad.Itwasduringthisearlyperiod

that Southeast Asians forged personal links with leading figures in the

mujihaden. One particularly influential figure was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a

Pushtunwarlordandleaderofoneofthefourmajormujihadenfactions.48Itwas

underSayyafspatronagethatkeyfutureleadersoftheASGandJIweretrained

at his camp inAfghanistan. Sayyaf provided training facilities to thebulk of

SoutheastAsiasMuslimmilitantswhilebinLaden,alongwith thebulkofhis

supporters,wasinexileintheSudan(199196).

Duringhis stay in theSudanbinLadenmaintainedguesthousesand training

campsinPakistanandAfghanistan.Thesewerepartofalargernetworkusedby

diverse organizations for recruiting and training fighters. Bin Laden also

attempted to create a base for worldwide business operations and for

preparations forjihad.Alarge and complex setof intertwinedbusiness and

terrorist enterprises emerged. Increasingly, however, bin Laden began to

encounter seriousmoney problems as several of his companies ran out of

funds.BinLadenwasforcedtocutbackhisspendingandtocontrolhisoutlays

more closely. Bin Laden also wore out his welcome with the Sudanese

government,whichcanceledtheregistrationofthemainbusinessenterpriseshe

hadsetupandseizedeverything[he]hadpossessedthere.Accordingtoan

assessmentby the 9/11Commission, Bin Ladenwas in hisweakest position

since his early days in thewar against the Soviet Union.When he left for

AfghanistaninMay1996,heandhisorganizationweresignificantlyweakened,

despite his ambitions and organizational skills.49 The decision to relocate to

Afghanistanresulted

in

the

disengagement

by

many

of

his

supporters

some

of

whomwent off in their own directions. It shouldbe noted thatbin Ladens

decisiontoleavetheSudanforAfghanistanandshifthismainobjectivefromthe

nearenemytothefarenemyprovokedgravedissensionwithintheranksof

hissupporters.AccordingtoMarcSageman,binLadenreturnedtoAfghanistan

withabout150 followersand[m]anypeoplestayedbehindand left thejihad,

which they believed was taking an uncomfortable turn. The return to

Afghanistanwas theoccasion foranother largepurgingofalQaedaof its less

militantelements,whohesitated to takeon theUnitedStates,withwhom they

had

not

quarrel

and

no

legitimate

fatwa.50

48Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan.

49The quotations in this paragraph are taken from: The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 62-65.

50Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 45. The 9/11 Commission Report observed: some alQaeda members viewed Bin Ladens return to Afghanistan as occasion to go off in their own


12/25

WhenbinLadenarrivedinAfghanistanthecountrywasembroiledinacivilwar

astheTalibaninitiateditsdrivetopower.SimonReevenotesthatbinLadenwas

apowerful figure fundingmany Islamicmilitants,buthis levelofdaytoday

control over al Qaeda must be questioned.51 Given the uncertainty of this

period, Southeast Asias militants decided in 1995 to relocate their training

campstothesouthernPhilippines.

The alQaedaSoutheastAsia relationshipmaybe viewed as having passed

through at least three distinct phases following the Afghan war against the

SovietUnion.The firstphase (199196)primarily involved theestablishmentof

networksandprovisionof trainingfacilities inAfghanistanunderAbdulRasul

Sayyaf. During this periodbin Laden was in exile in the Sudan, individual

contacts were initiated between Southeast Asian leaders and personalities

affiliatedwithalQaeda.Equipmentand trainingassistancewasprovided to

theASG,JIandtheMILF.Duringthesecondphase(19962001),theleadersofthe

MILF,ASGandtheJIrelocatedtoSoutheastAsia.Therewasanintensificationof

linksbetweenthemandthealQaedaleadership.Butitshouldbenotedthattwo

key leaders, Abdullah Sungar (the founder of JI) and Abdulrajak Janjalani

(founderoftheASG)bothdiedinthelate1990s.

Theperiodafter2001marksathirdanddistinctivephase.TheU.S.ledattackon

theTaliban regime and alQaeda camps inAfghanistan in the finalquarterof

2001, resulted in the death or capture of key al Qaeda leaders, and greatly

degraded and disrupted al Qaedas international command and control

structures.AlQaedamemberswere forced to seek refuge in remote areas of

eastern Afghanistan and in Pakistans North West Frontier. Other al Qaedamembersdispersedoverseas, includingYemen,Chechnya, Iran52andSoutheast

Asia.Since late2001 the initiative forpolitical terrorism inSoutheastAsiahas

mainlyrestedinthehandsofindigenousorganizationswithsomecollaboration

withalQaedaremnantsleftstrandedintheregion.

Thethirdmethodologicalproblemishowtoassessthequestionofagencyinal

Qaedas relationship Jemaah Islamiyah and other military Muslim groups.53

direction. Some maintained relationships with al Qaeda, but many disengaged entirely, FinalReport of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 65.

51 Reeve, The New Jackals, 192.

52Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, 82(4), 27-40.

53Gunaratnas analysis is one dimensional. JI is uncritically described as an organization that hasbeen penetrated by al Qaeda or as an al Qaeda associate group. Laskar Jundullah and theMILF are listed [a]mong the parties and groups it [al Qaeda] has established, infiltrated, and


13/25

International terrorism experts and regional security analysts are often

ambiguouswhen theyuse the term alQaeda.Whoorwhat represented al

Qaeda in itsdealingswithSoutheastAsianmilitantgroups in these formative

years?What roledid international terrorist freelancersplay?54Andperhaps

mostimportantly,whowere theSoutheastAsian leaderswhojoined theglobal

Salafijihadtobecome terrorists?Andwhatfactorsaccountfor theirdecision to

doso?

LeadershipDynamicsMarc Sageman provides perhaps themost insightful account into leadership

dynamicsamong international terrorists inhis studyof thebiographiesof172

individualsbelonging to theglobalSalafijihad.Sagemanconsiders threemain

explanatoryapproachestothestudyofwhyindividualsjointerroristgroups:(1)

social background, (2) common psychological make up, and (3) particular

situationalfactors

at

the

time

of

recruitment.

Sageman

evaluates

the

strengths

andweaknessesofeachapproach.Hethenconstructsatheoryofsocialnetworks

to explain the dependent variable of why individuals become terrorists.

Sagemans study makes clear that the global jihad movement is historically

unique when compared with other terrorist groups and that JI differs in

significantwaysfromitsterroristcounterpartselsewhereintheworld.

Socialbackground. In termsofgeographicalorigin,of172persons inSagemans

sample, twothirds came from SaudiArabia (N = 31),Egypt (24), France (18),

Algeria(15),Morocco(14)andIndonesia(12).Ifthepatternofinteractionamong

individualterrorists

is

used

to

discriminate

among

the

sample,

four

large

clusters

emerge:

CentralStaff(alQaedaleadership),32members; CoreArabStates(SaudiArabia,Egypt,Yemen,Kuwait),66members;

influenced... The question of agency is overlooked. An authoritative study concluded: LaskarMujahidin refers not to a specific organization but to a coalition of ideologically like-mindedforces that probably included a few JI and DI [Darul Islam], Mujahidin KOMPAK, and some localgroups... See: Rohan Gunaratna, Understanding al-Qaeda and Its Network in Southeast Asia,in Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia, 70 and Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad inCentral Sulawesi, Asia Report No. 74, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 3,2004, 6.

54There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid SheikhMohammed, who though not necessarily formal members of someone elses organization were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to BinLaden, the blind Sheikh, or their associates, The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the NationalCommission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 59.


14/25

MaghrebAfrica(Algeria,MoroccoandTunisiaandwellasmigrantsfromthesecountrieslivinginFrance),53members;and

SoutheastAsia(JImembersfromIndonesiaandMalaysia),21members.IndonesiansformthemajorityofthemembersoftheSoutheastAsiacluster(12of

21);other

members

include:

Malaysia

(3),

Singapore

and

the

Philippines

(2

each),

and Australia and Kuwait (1 each).Most of themembers ofJIwere former

studentsand/orstaffattwoboardingschools,PondokNgrukiinIndonesiaand

PesentrenLuqmanulHakiem inMalaysia, foundedby thegroups leaders.The

SoutheastAsiaclusterisalsothesecondoldest(formedin1993),anddeveloped

inthe1990swhentheleadersofJIwereexiledinMalaysia.JIdidnotembarkon

terrorismuntilafteritsleadersreturnedtoIndonesiain1999.

Sageman included five variables in his analysis of socialbackground factors:

socioeconomicstatus,education,faithasyouth,occupation,andfamilystatus.

Intermsofsocioeconomicstatus,theSoutheastAsiaclustermaybeclassifiedas

solidlymiddle class. TheCentral andCoreArab clusters are similar and are

skewed toward the middle and upper classes; while the Maghreb cluster is

evenlydividedbetweenlowerandmiddleclasses.

The 172 individuals comprising the global Salafijihad leadership came from

relatively welltodo families and were much better educated than the

populationatlargeinthedevelopingworld.Oversixtypercenthadatleastsome

college education. They were a bettereducated group than their parents. A

sizeable proportion had experience living abroad in theMiddle East and the

West.Theywereable tospeakseveral languages.TheCentralStaffclusterwas

the best educated. Eightyeight percent had completed a college or tertiary

educationandtwentypercenthelddoctorates.

The majority of Sagemans sample attended secular schools; only seventeen

percent had Islamic primary and secondary educational backgrounds. It is

significant to note that the Southeast Asia cluster was drawn mainly from

religious studies, while terrorists in the other clusters undertook science,

engineeringorcomputersciencecourses.OfthosewhohadanIslamiceducation,

halfwerefromIndonesia.The Indonesiannetworkstandsoutamong theother

clusters with such a high percentage of its members the product of Islamic

education.

In terms of faith as youth, thirteen of sixteen Central Staff were considered

religious as children. The Southeast Asia cluster exhibited a similarly high

patterndue to theboarding school experienceof itsmembers.TheCoreArab


15/25

cluster also showed early religious commitment.TheMaghreb clusterwas an

exception;itsmemberswerebroughtupinasecularschoolenvironment.

Averyhighproportion(75%)ofterroristleaderscanbeclassifiedasprofessional

(medical doctors, architects, teachers or preachers) or had semiskilled

occupations(police,

military,

mechanics,

civil

service,

small

business,

students).

The remaining onequarter of the samplewas classified as unskilledworkers;

heretheMaghrebArabspredominated.

In terms of family ormarital status, seventythree percent of the samplewas

married.AlloftheCentralStaffandSoutheastAsianleadersweremarried(data

availableon37).Theseindividualswereencouragedbytheirsocialnetworksto

marry theircolleaguessistersanddaughters.These ingroupmarriages forged

closereligiousandpoliticalrelationshipsandthuscontributedtothesecurityof

thegroup.55Thismaritalprofile isunique to theglobalSalafijihad;mostother

terroristswere

unmarried.

Psychological explanations. Sageman considered and rejected a variety of

psychological explanations as factors explaining why individuals became

terrorists.56Hissamplewasrelativelysmall;sufficientinformationwasavailable

ontencasesoutof172.

Circumstancesofjoiningthejihad.Sagemanconsidersfivevariablesaspartofthis

explanatoryapproach:age,placeofrecruitment,faith,employment,andrelative

deprivation.The average agewhen aperson joined thejihad57 tobecome a

terroristwas25.69years.TheSoutheastAsianclusterhadthehighestmeanage

onjoining,

29.35

years,

followed

by

the

Central

Staff

whose

average

on

joining

was27.9years.

Seventypercentof the terrorist leadershipsamplejoined thejihad inacountry

other thanwhere theyhadgrownup.Theywereexpatriatesaway fromhome

and familyworkers,refugees,studentsand fightersagainst theSovietUnion.

The Central Staff members converted to global jihad while in the Sudan.

IndonesianmembersofJIjoinedwhilelivinginMalaysia.Withtheexceptionof

55See the discussion in Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, AsiaReport No. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003, 27-29.

56These factors included: mental illness, terrorist personality, pathological narcissism, paranoiaand authoritarian personality.

57Sageman defines join the jihad as an individuals decision (as part of a group) to gosomewhere for training Afghanistan, the Philippines, Malaysia or Indonesia.


16/25

theSoutheastAsiansandtheSaudis,mostotherterroristleadersjoinedthejihad

intheWestFrance,GermanyortheUnitedKingdom.

Inasignificantfinding,Sagemandiscoveredthattherewasadecidedshiftinthe

degree of devotion to Islam in adulthood (greater than religious devotion as

youths)by

individuals

prior

to

their

becoming

mujahedin.

Ninety

seven

percent

of his terrorist sample adopted Salafi Islambeforejoining thejihad through

exposureatmosqueswherereligiousleadersespousedthediscourseofjihad.

Finally, Sageman considered the variable relative deprivation. Thebiographic

data indicated thatjustbeforejoining thejihad, future terrorists suffered from

social isolation, spiritual emptiness and underemployment (lack of a fulltime

job).Thesebecame a source ofgrievance and frustration. Sageman concluded

that his data supported relative deprivation as a necessarybut not sufficient

explanationofwhytheindividualsinhissampleturnedtoterrorism.

Itis

beyond

the

scope

of

this

paper

to

provide

afull

elaboration

of

Sagemans

theory of social networks as the key variable in explainingwhy individuals

decided tojoin theglobaljihad. Insummary,Sagemanargues thatjoining the

jihadwasathreeprongedprocessofsocialaffiliation(socialbonding)involving

membership in smallworld groups based on friendship, kinship58 and

discipleship. Over time members of these cliques experienced a progressive

intensificationoftheirbeliefsandfaithleadingthemtoembracetheglobalSalafi

jihadideology.Thenextstageinvolvedanencounterbythesmallgroupwitha

link to the jihad. The final stage involved intense training and voluntary

recruitmentusually

marked

by

aformal

ceremony

(swearing

an

oath

of

loyalty).

Sagemans findings reject the arguments that individuals become terrorists

becauseof topdown recruitment andbrainwashing. Inhisview, socialbonds

predatingformalrecruitmentintothejihadarethecrucialelementoftheprocess.

Groupsof friends thatspontaneouslyassemble inmosquesconstitute themain

venueforjoiningthejihad.

JemaahIslamiyahIn termsof socialnetwork theory,a terroristorganizationmaybeviewedasa

network composed of individuals in small groups (relatively isolated nodes)

linkedby hubs (well connected nodes), a very important component of this

network. According to Sageman, a few highly connected hubs dominate the

architectureoftheglobalSalafijihad.ButinthecaseofSoutheastAsiaonehub

58For example, Ali Ghufron, his three younger brothers and the nextdoor neighbor were allinvolved in the 2002 Bali bombings.


17/25

dominatestheclustertheleadershipgrouparoundAbdullahSungkar(untilhis

deathinlate1999)andthenAbuBakarBaasyir.

Sagemansanalysisofthehistoricalformationoffourterroristclustersrepeatedly

highlights how different the Southeast Asia cluster is from the other global

clustersalong

two

dimensions.

First,

the

bonding

of

students

to

their

religious

mentors,AbdullahSungkarandAbuBakarBaasyir, isparticularlynoticeable.

Sageman findings thus underscores the importance of discipleship in JIs

organization. Second, the Southeast Asia cluster is more hierarchical in

leadership structure than the other clusters. JIs founder, Abdullah Sungkar,

intentionallycreatedJIfromabove.

AccordingtotheGeneralGuidelinesfortheJemaahIslamiyahStruggle,JIisledbyan

amir (initially Abdullah Sungkar) who appoints and controls four councils:

governingcouncil,religiouscouncil,fatwacouncil,anddisciplinarycouncil.The

governingcouncil

is

headed

by

acentral

command

that

oversees

the

leaders

of

four territorialdivisions ormantiqis.Themantiqi is subdivided intowakalah,

sariyah, katibah, kirdas, fiah and thoifah. But in practice this structure was

simplifiedtojustthreelevels:wakalah,kirdasandfiah.Thetermmantiqimaybe

literallytranslatedasregion.ButtheInternationalCrisisGrouparguesthatitis

more appropriate to viewJI as a military structure with brigades (mantiqi),

battalions(wakalah),companies(khatibah),platoons(qirdas)andsquads(fiah).59

Initsidealform,JIcomprisedfourmajordivisionsasfollows:

Mantiqi1Singapore,peninsulaMalaysiaandsouthernThailand Mantiqi2Indonesia(exceptSulawesiandKalimantan) Mantiqi3southernPhilippines,Sulawesi,Kalimantan,easternMalaysia

andBrunei

Mantiqi4AustraliaandPapuaWhenJI was first set up it was organized into two mantiqi.Mantiqi 1 had

responsibility forMalaysiaandSingaporeandwasassigned fund raisingas its

majorobjective,whileMantiqi2coveredIndonesiaandwasgiventhepromotion

ofjihadatitsprimemission.Mantiqi3wascreatedin1997duetologisticaland

59Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 11 and Indonesia Backgrounder:Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 2, note 4. For variations see: Republic of Singapore, Ministry of HomeAffairs, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism . January 7, 2003;Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks,140; Abuza, Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia, 44-45; and Rohan Gunaratna, Understanding al-Qaeda and Its Network in Southeast Asia, inSmith, ed., Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia, 70.


18/25

communication problems with existing arrangements. Mantiqi 4 was never

establishedasaproperadministrativeorterritorialunit.TheInternationalCrisis

Group(ICG)assertsamantiqibasedinAustraliawasneveragoingconcern.60

According toSageman,itwasthecentralleadershipthatinitiated,plannedand

executed operations. In this organizational sense, JI was a fairly traditional

organizationincontrasttotherestoftheglobalSalafijihad.

TheICGand itsteamofIndonesiabasedresearchershaveproducedanumber

ofindepthdetailedreportsonJI,itsorigins,itsrelationshiptootherIndonesian

militantMuslimgroupsandJIsregionalconnections. 61Thesereportschallenge

the alQaedacentric paradigm adoptedbymany international and regional

terrorism specialists that homogenizes Southeast Asias very diverse and

complexpoliticallandscape.62

AnISGreportissuedinAugust2003concluded:

60Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia, 2.

61The most important of these reports are: Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, IndonesiaBriefing, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 10, 2001;Al-Qaeda in Southeast

Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia, Indonesia Briefing, Jakarta and Brussels:International Crisis Group, August 8, 2002; Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah IslamiyahTerrorist Network Operates, Asia Report No. 54, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group,December 11, 2002;Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, Asia ReportNo. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 23, 2003; Indonesia Backgrounder:

Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report No. 74, Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group,

February 3, 2004; Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, Asia ReportNo. 80, Singapore and Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 13, 2004; and Recycling Militantsin Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report No. 92, Singapore andBrussels: International Crisis Group, February 22, 2005. See also: Australian Government,Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia. Canberra: National Capital Printing, 2004. For acritique of this report see: Carlyle A. Thayer, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia,Whats Next? [Perth: Future Directions International], October 2004, 12.62Abuza, for example, states categorically that Laskar Mujahideen and Laskar Jundullah areparamilitary arms of JI and the Majelis Muhahideen Indonesia (MMI) is a JI front. LaskarMujahideen is not an organization per se but a term used to describe a collection of militantMuslim groups. It may have had a few JI members (see note 53 above). Laskar Jundullah is thesecurity force of the Committee to Prepare for the Upholding of Islamic Law. Its founder, Agus

Dwikarna, was a member of Wadah Islamiyah who left this group in a dispute over whether ornot to wage jihad in Ambon. The MMI was a broad based political coalition designed to rallysupport for oppressed Muslim communities abroad. Radicals within JI opposed its formation.See: Zachary Abuza, Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia, in Smith, ed., Terrorism and Violence inSoutheast Asia, 45-46; and Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist NetworkOperates, 3-4. For a nuanced discussion of this issue see: Robert W. Hefner, Political Islam inSoutheast Asia: Assessing the Trends, in Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report,Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2003.


19/25

JIhaselements incommonwithalQaeda,particularly itsjihadist ideologyanda long

periodof shared experiences inAfghanistan. Its leaders reverebinLaden and seek to

emulatehim,and theyhavealmostcertainly receiveddirect financial support fromal

Qaeda.

ButJI isnotoperating simplyasanalQaeda subordinate.Virtuallyallof itsdecision

makingand

much

of

its

fund

raising

has

been

conducted

locally

and

its

focus,

for

all

the

claims about itswanting to establishaSouthEastAsian caliphate, continues tobeon

establishinganIslamicstate inIndonesiatheemphasisonjihad inIndonesiaremains

strong.63

Elsewherethesamereportofferedthisassessment:

Despitetheseclearties,JIsrelationshipwithbinLadensorganizationmaybelessoneof

subservience, as is sometimes portrayed, than of mutual advantage and reciprocal

assistance,combinedwiththerespectsuccessfulstudentshavefortheirformerteachers.

OnesourcefamiliarwithJIdescribeditsrelationshiptoalQaedaassimilartothatofan

NGOwithafundingagency.TheNGOexistsasacompletelyindependentorganization,

butsubmits

proposals

to

the

donor

and

gets

agrant

when

the

proposal

is

accepted.

The

donoronlyfundsprojectsthatare in linewith itsownprograms.Inthiscase,alQaeda

mayhelpfundspecificJIprogramsbutitneitherdirectsnorcontrolsit.64

In sum, the ICG reports and assessmentsbyWestern andAsian government

analystsestablishquiteclearly thatJI isastandaloneregionaloperation,with

itsowncamps,recruiting,financingandagendaautonomousfromalQaeda.65

Asecondmajor themedevelopedby theICG is thatseriousfissuresdeveloped

withintheJIleadershipoverdifferencesabouttheorganizationslongtermgoals

and strategy.Broadly speaking, agroup ofJImilitant radicals formed around

AbdullahSungkar.

These

comprised

his

former

students

including

Hambali,

ImamSamudraandAliGhufron.FromthetimeSuhartosNewOrdercollapsed

this group advocated violentjihad.They citedbinLadensfatwas of 1996 and

1998asauthorityforthenecessitytowagejihad inIndonesia inordertocreate

anIslamicstate.

WhenAbdullahSungkar returned to Indonesia in1999hediscovered that the

leaders of Mantiqi 2 had an entirely different agenda. They wanted more

resourcesandtimetobuildupamasssupportbasethroughreligiouseducation

and training. Leaders ofMantiqi 2 argued that therewas no clear enemy in

Indonesiaand

that

it

would

be

amistake

to

expend

limited

resources

on

63Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 1.

64Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, 30.

65Raymond Bonner, Officials Fear New Attacks by Militants in Southeast Asia, The New YorkTimes, November 22, 2003.


20/25

prematurelylaunchingajihad.ThemajorityfactionwithinJIviewedthefatwas

implementationasinappropriateforIndonesiaanddamagingtothelongerterm

strategyofbuildingamassbasethroughreligiousoutreach.66Theyarguedfora

strategy ofbuilding up a core of cadres and set a target date of 2025 for the

establishmentofanIslamicstateinIndonesia.67

SungkarsdisciplesweredissatisfiedwhenAbuBakarBaasyirbecameJIsleader

following Sungkars death in November 1999. According to an ICG report,

[t]heysawBaasyirastooweak,tooaccommodating,andtooeasilyinfluenced

byothers.68In1999,Hambaliissuedinstructionstoactivateoperationalcellsin

Malaysia.Thesecellswereordered tocommenceplanning foraseriesofhigh

profile attacks against selectedwesterndiplomaticmissions inSingapore,U.S.

militarypersonnelintransitonshortleave,U.S.warshipintheStraitofMalacca,

Changi airport and Singaporean defense facilities. JI emissaries went to

AfghanistantopresenttheirterroristprospectivetoalQaeda,butalQaedatook

noaction.HambaliwasalsoinvolvedintheChristmaschurchbombingsinlate

2000(seebelow).HambalisambitiousterroristplanscameforSingaporecameto

anabruptendwhenMalaysianandSingaporeansecurityauthoritiesconducteda

seriesofarrestsofJIsuspectsin2001and2002.

Theantagonismbetweenthemajorityandextremistminorityfurtherintensified

whenBaasyirfoundedtheMajelisMujahidinIndonesia(MMI)inAugust2000.

BaasyirbecamesoinvolvedwithMMIthatheturnedoverdaytodayrunning

ofJI to an assistant (Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan).69 JIs extremist faction

argued that the JI should continue to pursue its aims as an underground

organization. Even more importantly, JIs radicals objected to working withMuslim political parties that advocated Islamic law through elections and

parliament because they viewed this as accommodation with a nonIslamic

(Indonesian) state that would contaminate the faithful and was therefore

forbidden.70

TheeruptionofsectarianviolenceinPosoinCentralSulawesiinlate1998andin

Ambon (Maluku) in1999alsoexposed the fissures thathaddeveloped inJI. It

tooktheJIleadershipafullsixmonthstodecidetosendforcestoMaluku.The

66Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, 1.


68Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Executive Summary.


70Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, 4.


21/25

conflict inAmbon revealeddifferencesbetweenMantiqi2andMantiqi3.Ata

June1999meetingofJIleaders,forexample,theheadofMantiqi2washeavily

criticizedforbeingtooslowandbureaucratic.71BythetimeZulkarnaen,head

ofmilitary operations forJI,was dispatched thereweremany othermilitant

groupsactiveon the scene.72SomemembersofJIevenjoinedoneof the local

militiagroupsbeforeJIhaddecidedonitspolicy.JIsrolewasmainlyconfined

totraining.Therewerealsoleadershipdifferenceswithineachmantiqi.

TheBalibombingsof2002createdadeepriftwithintheJIleadership.Justprior

to thebombings,Baaysiraddressed severalmeetingsofMMIJImembersand

arguedstrenuouslythatbombingsand thearmedstruggleforanIslamicstate

shouldbe put on hold for the timebeingbecause theywould have negative

repercussions for themovement.73 In otherwords,Baasyirs objectionswere

tactical. Baaysirs advice was not accepted by JIs radical extremist faction.

AlthoughtheycontinuedtoshowrespectandacknowledgehimasheadoftheJI,

theradicalsbegansearchingfornewleadersclosertotheirwayofthinking.74

JIs extremistminoritywas responsible for the suicidebombing of theJ.W.

MarriottHotelinJakartainAugust2003.

Thebreakdownofthe2001MalinoAccordandtheeruptionofviolencebetween

Christians andMuslims in Poso inOctober 2003 once again raised the issue

withinJIoverhow,where,andwhen towagejihad.75But,as the ICGscase

study of jihad in Central Sulawesi makes crystal clear, JI is not a unified

monolithic organization. The majority of members were mainly focused of

building up military capacity and creating a mass base through religious

indoctrinationtosupportwhatwouldeffectivelybeanIslamicrevolutioninthecountrywhenthetimeisripe76Theminorityfactionwasdeterminedtoattack

Western targets (thefarenemy)andwere influencedby thefatwas issuedby

binLaden.ThissplitinJIpittedtheleadersofMantiqiIagainstthoseofMantiqi


72Zulkarnen heads JIs Special Operations Force, Laskar Khos, which emerged during the conflictin Poso in 2000. Members of Lasker Khos are drawn from individual cells sometimes foroperations without the knowledge of their direct superiors in the chain of command.






22/25

2.77Theextremistminoritycontinuedtopursuetheirownagendawithasuicide

bombingoutsidetheAustralianEmbassyinJakartain2004.

A thirdmajor theme to emerge from ICG reports on terrorism and political

violenceisthatterrorismanalysisinIndonesiahasfocusedtoomuchonJItothe

exclusionof

smaller

groups

with

local

grievances 78

With

respect

to

the

reemergence of sectarian violence in Poso in 2003, for example, the main

instigatorswere localmembersofamilitiagroup calledMujahidinKOMPAK.

Thismilitiawasspawnedbybut independentofJI.79 Therewerealsomany

otherlocalactorsinvolvedaswell.Thisleadstotheconclusionthatjustaswith

thecaseof thealQaedacentricparadigm, it isalsoamistake toviewpolitical

violence by militant Muslim groups in Indonesia through an exclusively JI

centricframework.

JI turned to political violence in 1999 when itbecame involved in sectarian

conflictin

Poso

(Central

Sulawesi)

and

Ambon

(Maluku)

that

had

already

erupted.Theseactionsmayberegardedasdefensivejihad.JIturnedtoviolent

terrorism in 2000when it attacked the home of the Philippine ambassador in

Jakarta (August) and orchestrated a coordinated campaign involving thirty

church bombings in eleven cities in six different Indonesian provinces

(December).JI crossed over to globaljihad in 2001when it plotted to attack

westernembassiesandmilitarypersonnelinSingapore.WhenthisplotfailedJI

extremists turned tosofter targetsabarandnightclub inBali (2002), theJ.W.

MarriottHotel(2003)andtheAustralianEmbassyinJakarta(2004).

JI:ACurrentAssessmentJIs organizational development, and regional outreach to likemindedmilitant

groupsinSoutheastAsia,hasbeenseverelydisruptedinMalaysiaandSingapore

duetotheactionbysecurityauthoritiesin200102andsubsequently.Earlier,in

July2000,JIsufferedasetbackwhenitpremiertrainingcampinMindanaowas

capturedby theAFP. In Indonesia, eachof the threemajor terroristbombings

(Bali, Marriott and Australian Embassy) has resulted in a round up of key

suspects. Eachwave of arrests has generated actionable intelligence that has

resultedinfurtherarrests.

Thecumulative

impact

of

these

losses

has

impacted

on

all

levels

of

JIs

organization and leadership resulting in a severe dislocation of JIs internal

77Mantiqi 1 was initially led by Hambali . He was replaced by Mukhlas after his capture in 2003.

78Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,1.

79Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,1.


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structure.JIsmidlevelorganizationhasbeenseriouslydegraded.JIhashadto

paredownthetableoforganizationsetoutinitsguidelines.Theregionalshura

reportedly no longer functions and the mantiqi level of organization also

reportedlynolongeroperates.Bymid2003,theJIhadbeensodecimatedbythe

arrestof itsmembers that somewakalahs collapsedentirely.JI in Indonesia is

now divided into fourmain groups:Lamongan,EastJava; Semarang,Central

Java; Banten, West Java and Poso, South Sulawesi.80 The wakalah structure

continuestofunctioninPalu/Poso.

JI has never had a strong financial base. It relied heavily on public donations tosupport its operations in conflict areas such as Maluku and Sulawesi. Thedampening down of sectarian conflict has closed off this avenue for mobilizingdomestic funding. JI was also the beneficiary of external funds, including alQaeda,81 channeled from Pakistan. Al Qaedas demise after 2001, coupled withthe separate arrests of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Hambali, has resulted in

drying up of this source of funds. JIs precarious financial position is nowproving an impediment to its operations. JI, for example, is presently unable tosupport the families of all its arrested members. Some members of JI have hiredout their services to other militant groups. Other JI members have taken torobbery to raise cash. But overall there is little evidence that JI has becomeinvolved into criminal activities (narcotics trade, credit card fraud or peoplesmuggling) in an organized and sustained basis.

InAugust2003,AustralianintelligencenotedaclearsplitbetweensomeJIcells

stronglypushing fora return topoliticalagitationandpropagandaandothers

that advocate nothing less than increased militancy.82 These differences

surfacedagain

in

the

wake

of

the

suicide

bombing

outside

the

Australian

Embassy when militants inside JI criticized the planners for conducting an

operationthatresultedinmostlyIndonesiandeaths.

According to a seniormember ofAustralias counterterrorism effort, JI has

becomeabitfracturedfromwithinwithadisparatecollectionofcellsworking

at cross purposesdue to deep divisions over strategy and no clear leader. In

August2003,forexample,theheadofJIsmilitaryoperationscellinJakartawas

planning tobomb theBankCentralAsiaoffice,unaware thatanother cellwas

planning the suicide bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel. To take another

80But JI cells reportedly remain active in Maluku, East Kalimantan and the Riau islands.

81Al Qaeda funding has been marginal to JIs operations. JI reportedly received $140,000 overthree years. The Bali bombers, for example, had to rob a bank to finance their operation.

82Quoted in Martin Chulov and Patrick Walters, JI deeply divided on use of violence, TheAustralian, August 14, 2003.


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example,althoughJIisabletorecruitnewmembers;someofJIsrecruitmentis

being conducted by individuals who are deeply opposed to Hambali and

targetingofwesterners. In sum,new recruitmentdoesnotnecessarilyproduce

more foot soldiers for the radical extremistswithinJI.JI training activities are

now being conducted on a reduced scale (in Sulawesi and Mindanao); the

standardofthistrainingdoesnotmatchthatwhichwasofferedinAfghanistan

oratCampAbuBakarbeforeitwasoverrun.83

Most recent reports indicate that JIs central command and top leaders are

debatingwhetherornot toreturn tosectarianviolencebyrenewingattackson

Christiancommunities.Elements of JIs extremist faction were reportedly behindthe recent upsurge in attacks in Maluku and Poso in the belief that more violencewould attract more recruits and funding to the global jihadist cause. JI extremistshave advocated extending sectarian violence to Malaysia and Thailand. In this

respect, the speculation that Dr. AzaharibinHussinmayhavebrokenwithJIto

formhis

own

group

may

be

significant. 84

The

Azahari

clique

drew

in

recruits

from outsideJI to execute the southJakartabombing outside the Australian

Embassy.ThesuicidebomberwasamemberofDarulIslam.

In summary, JI has now become badly fractured organization in disarray.

According to formerJI regional leader,NasirAbbas,now in custody, JI is in

ruins now.Anybodywhowas aJImember is no longer claiming tobe aJI

membernow.AzahariandNoordinarethemostdangerous,buteventheydont

say they are part of JI now. There is no management, no administration

anymore.85

Finally,anetassessmentofJIwouldhavetoconcludethatJIhasbeencontained

butnoteliminated.JIhasbeen reconfigured intoa looselydefinednetworkof

independent cells,which initiate their own actions, with intermittent contact

withmembersof the central command.The streamliningofJIsorganizational

structure may have made the organization more difficult to identify and

penetrate.

JIenjoysarangeofcontacts inIndonesiasuchasLaskarJundullah inSulawesi

andMijahidinKOMPAKinJava.JIslinkswiththeMILFandASGhavenotbeen

severed; individualmembers ofJI conductjoint operations with elements of

83After JIs Camp Hudaibiyah, located within the Camp Abu Bakar complex, was overrun, the JIrelocated its training facilities to Camp Jabal Quba in the mountains.

84Shefali Rekhi, Terror in South-east Asia, The Straits Times, October 25, 2004.

85Rekhi, Terror in South-east Asia.


25/25

thesegroups in thePhilippines.AndJI cellshave recentlybeendiscovered in

PakistanandBangladesh.

JIhasbeen able to replace its toplevel leaders fromwithin its own ranks. Its

central command structure is still intact;86 this includes the key technical

specialistsand

bomb

makers.

JIs

infrastructure

remains

in

place87

and

increasinglyJImembersrecruitedandtrainedoutsideAfghanistanareactivein

terroristoperations.

JIsexternalanddomesticoperationalenvironmentshavealteredradicallyover

thelasthalf decade.WhilethePalestineissueisfarfromsettled,forthemoment

television images aredominatedby the peaceprocess and Syrianwithdrawal

fromLebanonnotIsraelimilitaryoperationsandsuicidebombers.Theimagesof

war in Afghanistan have given way to the electoral process and national

reconstruction. Television coverage of Iraq is now dominated by carnage

committedby

terrorists

against

fellow

Muslims.

Domestically,

Indonesia

has

moved from the disintegration of theNewOrder and sectarian violence that

accompanieditsdemise,toacalmerperiodwhereregionalceasefiresareholding

byandlarge.Indonesiahaspeacefullycompletedademocraticelectoralprocess

thatrevealedlittlepopularsupportforMuslimmilitants.Thequickresponseby

theUnitedStates to the tsunami in late 2004has resulted in a rise inpopular

perceptionsfromalowoffifteenpercentattimeoftheAfghanistanwartonearly

fiftypercent today.Nonetheless, thereare traditionalhot spots in Indonesia,

especially where the Darul Islam movement was active or where sectarian

conflict has been particularly rife, that will continue to nurture the social

networksthatprovidearecruitmentbaseforterroristsforalongtimetocome.

86Including Abu Dujanah (secretary), Zulkarnaen, Azahari, Noordin Mohammad Top, and DulMatin.

87Laskar Khos remains a potent threat.

thayer terrorist leadership in southeast asia

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